JPRS ID: 9764 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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, JPRS L/9764 -
1 June 19~1
5ub-Saharan Af rica R~ ort =
p
FOUO No. ~23 _
J
Fgf$ ~OREIGN BROADCAST' INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9764
1 June 1981
_ SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
. FOUO No. 723
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Angola, Congo, Cameroon Becoming Oil Producera,Exporters
(Nicolas Sarkis, Jean ~tebot; AFRIQUE�ASIE, 2 Mar S1) 1
Fuel Consumption of UMOA Nations Evaluated
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 17 Apr 81) 6
~Financing, Projects of OMVS Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 17 Apr 81) 8
Briefs
Senegaleae-Angolan Initiative 17
ECOWAS Meetings 1~
- Joint Niger-Senegal Commiasion 17
ANGOLA
Briefs
Paris-Luanda Flights 18
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Briefs
- IMF Aid 19
FRG Relations 19
Spanish Petroleu~n Exploration Conceasion 19
, ETHIOPIA
Economic Survey Shows Relatively Low Foreign Debt
(Christian Ch$ise; MARCHES TROPICAiJX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
17 Apr 81) 20
Official Reviewa Revolution's Achievements, FuCure Plana
(Legesse Asfaw Interview; BOHEMIA, 20 Mar 81) 27
- - a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]
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y
GHANA
Limann Interviewed on Economy, Party's Ideology -
(Hilla Limann Interview; Mark Webster; 30 -
FIN.4NCIAL TIMES, 13 May 81)
GU:INEA
Figurea Show Country as Largest Beneficiary uf Arab Aid 32 c
(Samir Gharbi; ,IEUNE AF'RIQUE, 13 May 81) -
_ NIGER
~
Briefs 34
' Water Conference
3ENEGAL
Data on ICS Construction, Production, Marketing, Capital
~ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 10 Apr 81) 35 _
- Briefs 38
Diouf Announces Political Reforms 38
Draft Budget 1981-1982 39
ADB Anti-Desertification Financing 39
Fuel Price Increases
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INTER [~FRICAN AF~'AIRS
ANGOL~, CONGO, CAMEROON BECOMING OIL PRODUCERS, EXPORTERS
- Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 2 Mar S1 pp 40-42 -
_ [Article by Nicolas Sarkis and Jean Rebot: "Africa, a New Giant in the Petroleum -
- Market"]
[Text] Nicolas Sarkis, a Lebanese by origin, is a leading inter-
national expert on petroleum questions. An adviser on energy mat-
- ters to the governments of numerous countries in the Thi~d World,
he is currently heading the Arab Center for Petroleum Research, -
which publishes the review LE PETROLE ET LE GAZ ARABES [ARAB OIL
AND GAS].
After sitting in the wings of the world petroleum scene for too long, several Afri-
can countries today are oil producing and exporting states. In addition to the
~ four countries that are already members of OPEC (Nigeria, Libya, Algeria and Gabon),
oil production is also increasingly rapidly in several West African~ countries, par- .
ticularly: Angola, Ivory Coast, Congo, Cameroon and, soon, Ghana and Benin. In
other countries, like Senegal, Guinea and Guinea-Bi.ssau, prospects seem to be en- :
couraging with the intensification of production and the price increases that make
deposits that are relatively costly to develop still commercially exploitable. In
all, oil production in West Africa today reaches 2.7 million barrals a day, of
which nearly 2.2 million comes from Nigeria, and it is estimated that by 1985 it
will exceed 3 million barrels a daq, including 2.3 million from Nigeria. This
rapid expansion in oil prospecting and production in Africa was the result both
of the convulsions that the oil marke~ began to experience in the early 1970's, and
of the determination of the industrialized countries and the oil companies to di-
versify their supply sources, as k~ell as the determination of the African countries
to exploit their own resourcea in a gamble on rapid energy growth. It was made pos-
sible by the considerably hydrocarbon potential hidden below the surface in Africa.
According to the most reliable estimates, "discoverablA" reserves in Africa over the
next 20 years should reach 7 billion tons, or 14 percent of the 50 billion tons
expedted to be found worldwide in the same period.
While making a significant contribution to supplieson the world marke~, the develop-
ment of the oil industry in Africa is also a pricelesr~ opportunity for the Africans
themselves, at a time when their people are faci~g the enormous task of econom3c
and social advancement. Along with the efforts deployed to increase production,
thes~ countries are also anxious to manage prices and taxes to increase the revenue
from each barrel exported, especially as the oil tax laws in certain new producing
countries are much less developed than the exploitation systems in force both in
the OPEC countries and in the North Sea.
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Ten million tons per year in Cameroon by 1985; 20 million in Ango Za, 10 million
in the Congo, not to mention Gabon or Nigeria: it is now official. Something is _
~ happening in the Gulf of Guinea.
The oil experts, the geologista, had long aince noted that the "equatorial group"
- of coastal basins in West Africa showed may signs of hydrocarbon depoei�te. This
was particularly true of the basins of Gabon, the Congo, and Cuanz a. It was to -
- be expected that discoveries would follow in turn, once the oil companies-~with
Elf-Aquitaine, the biggest foreign operator in the region, leading the way--~udged
= it profitable ta invest seriously in this "corner of the world." One sees here a
confirmation of one of the laws of oil economics: discoveries ar e directly propor-
- tional to the investment made in exploration.
Now on balance it seems clear that, in global terms, Africa tends to be neglected
= when it comes to exploration. Thus, out of 62,733 ~ells drilled worldwide in 1979--
exclusive of the Eastern countriea---56,445 were drilled in the United States and _
Canada, compared to 794 on the African continent. The two regions respectively
accaunted for 9C~ percent and 1.25 percent of wells drilled. So much for that.
Africa's proven reserves, however, amount to 8.4 percent of world reserves. But
this figure does not reflect the reality of the oi1 wealth of the continent. It -
is much more revealing of the restrictions which have so far limi zed the exploratory
efforts undertaicen there. The supply situation ~f.. the Western counCries is now
considerably changed, so now things are changing. The climb in oil prices has f irst
of all made a number of known oil depesits, formerly considered not economically _
viable, more attractive. Accidents of history, such as the change of r~gime in
Iran, the political instability in the Middle East--the oil count riea wer.e con- _
siderably upset by the Mecca incident and continue to be worried about the outcome
of the Iraq-Iran war--everything is pushing in the direction of diversification of
supply sources. Particularly significant is the case of the ELF group, w~ich has _
undertaken a program of seismic exploration in Angola; put new f iel.ds into operation
- in Cameroon (Ekoundou Nord, Kombo Nord, ~icoundou Centre); continues a ma~or explora-
tion program in the Congo (the development of Yango and Send~i, new discovPries,
notably at Mengo, the inauguration last April of the Li~COUala fie ld); stabilized
production in Gabon and has prospects of further growth thanks to three discoveries _
(M'Bounba, M'Wengui, and Baudroie); has renewe3 its agreements wi ~h Nigeria in light
of increases in reserves; and gotten a foothold in IViger. The li st, quite obvicusly,
speaks for itself. And all these investments, all this new part icipation, is ~oing
to xranslate in the years ahead into a growth in production levels that will con-
f_irm the status of the Gulf of Guinea as the world's new oil region. If the figures
now floating around ar.e to be believed, production in Gabon, Came roon, the Congo
and Angola--to mention only these prespntly producing countries--should climb from
- 1~.5 million tons (1970 �igurey to more t~-.an 40 million by 1985. Prospects which
will be even further augmented by develo ~nent of production in o ther African countries ~ -
such as Zaire, Ghana, Eenin, the Ivory Coast and, conceivably, Morocco, Chad,
Senegal, Sudan, Niger, Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique and Tanzania, where
exploratory efforts with good chances of success are currently under way.
This tendency to increase production relates to the level of oil company invest-
ment.
Tilus, the P`rench Oil Company, which used to realize a 5.5 percent return on its
investments in Africa (outside the N1~ghreb) in 1977, had increased its profits to -
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12.3 percent by 1979, while the ELF-Aquitaine Group, rahich was devoting 4.8 per- -
cent of irs African investments (again, outside the Maghreb) to "production exploi-
= tation" in ].9779 was investing 19.8 percent for it in 1979. The eize of the sums
, invested ia mathematical groof of a relatively new orientation in the policies of
the Trench oil companies in the Gulf of Guinea.
' T1ie level of pruduction in Gabon, the Con~o, Cameroon for 1979, though it may be
~ anly 19.9 million tons, or close ta 1Q percent of,French c~nsumption, is not negli-
gable even now. But profits cannot help but grow with the increase in production
~ levels and to the extent that oil contracts remain unchanged, that is to say much
more advantageous for the oil companies than those c~f thz OPEC type, widely ~ised now
- around th~ world.
~ As indica*_ed by the chart below, the security of supplies for a country such as
France depends more and more on "the oil-producing Africa" and, given the reserves
policies of Algeria aud Libya particularly, on the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. -
Basic trends emerge from these figures:
RESSOURCES PRGPRES DES SOCIETES FRAN~,AISES A L'ETRANGER (ELF ET C.F.P.) 1
- .~au.rr r('lr~Jusfru� /rnn~asr du prholr rn /979 C'ninn Jrs rhambr.�:: synd~nifvn dr 1'mduetne prfrol;i'rr'1:~.(' ti/ I' ~
~ 1971 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
EUROPE Norvege 40 202 1 238 1 81~ 1 804 2 262 2 263 -
Mer clu fvord 2 Grande-Bretagne 5 32 112 218 255
Espagne 303 313 275 110 61 43
Ital~e 11 271
= Total Europe 40 510 1 583 2 201 2 132 2 589 2 577 ~
MOYEN�ORIENT Irak 19 718 25 795 19 721 12 682 1 1 248 1 1 693 12 840
Abu Dhabi 16 235 16 770 16 680 ~ 5 401 14 069 11 115 10 680
- Iran 12 073 14 978 11 412 11 971 II 907 8 21 1 3 49i
Dubai 1 408 2 980 3 201 4 006 4 008 4 567 3 825 ~
Qatar 2 589 2 148 1 063 2 053 1 400 1 461 1 402
Oman 1525 1241 1613 1485 1249 1120 1486
Arabie saoudite 6 005 5 994 _
Total Moyen-Orient S3 548 63 912 53 690 47 598 40 881 44 172 39 718
AFRIQUE i Algerie 12 475 11 270 11 31y 9 689 10 805 11 768 12 503
Gabon 4 527 8 925 9 735 9 730 9 678 9 126 8 448
Nigeria 857 2 196 1 732 1 795 1 879 1 E25 1 744
Conao 15 1605 1 173 1311 1 153 1435 1592 -
Tunis~e 203 1 525 2 555 2 032 1 327 1 352 1 319
Camerour~ 20 319 807 ~
Libye 338 185 242 225 191 193 179
Total Afrique 1S 415 25 706 26 756 24 782 25 053 26 018 26 652
OCEANIE Indonesie 216 585 1 499 3 788 2 918 2 426 ~
AMERIQUE Canada 1 509 2 020 1 812 1 756 1 781 1 713 1 884 -
= Etats-Unis 35 84 154 319 411 419 38f3
- Colombie 22 ~9 22
Total Amierique 1 544 2 104 1 966 2 097 2 211 2 154 2 286 j
~
TOTAL DES RESSOURCES PROPRES DES SOCIETES A CAPITAUX FRAN AIS A L'ETRANGrR ~ I
~ ~ r�~�~~~~~~ii~~~~. rt c�nntrals6 I 73 547 I 92 448 I 84 580 78 177 I 74 065 I 77 851 I 7:~ 65E:~ ~
Key; l. Real Capital of French Companies Abroad (ELF and French Oil Company) Nor~}~
Sea 3. Middle East 4. Polynesia 5. Total Real Capital of Companies Abroad with
French Backing 6. Shares and contracts
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Decline in resource holdinga in the Mi~dle East region by French overseas companies
(frum 63.4 percent in 1975 they fell to 53.9 percent in 1979); growth of tfiese re- ~
sources in Africa, moving from 31.6 percent to 38.18 percent. This trend should be -
- accentuated in 1980 and 1981, with the losses sustained in Iran and Iraq and the
doubling of Gulf of GuiiYea production in the future. In 1979, nearly 60 percent
of ELF's worldwide production already came from Cameroan, the Congo, and Gabon... _
and this is only the beginning.... This was the conclusion of a long article en-
titled "Oil: Afri~a to the Rescue" in a Fren~h weekly: /"France has many strong
~ po ints that could in the future procure special acceas to Qil and raw materials
~ in central Africa...."/ /"This requires...a policy that allows both parties to
benefit."/ [Slantline3 indicate italics] This is really the heart of the matter:
how to apportion the mutual advantage between young politically independent coun-
- tr ies, searching for paths leading to economic independence, and the big highly
developed capitalist nations, experienced in businesa dealings, endowed with fn-
dustrial and financial groups anxlous for profits and political stability.
In other words, they key question could be summarized this waq: will the develop-
_ ment of oil productton effectively help reaolve the problems of hunger, unemploy- -
ment, health and education, or will it continue to be--as in most countries--a
. "p rofit pump" capable, in a short lapse of time, of exhausting the oil reserves
�aithout.for all that solving the burning questions of the people of the Gulf of
Guinea?
Mo st fortunately, those countries today can benefit from the experience of other
oil-produ~ing countries which ha~~e been able to assess the extent to which obtain-
- ing sovereignty over their oil wE:alth enabled them to use the petr~leum income to
advance their economic ~.ndependence; and they also know the fragility of the gains
tr.ey have ~rade .
~ All this experience shows tr~at the "oii weapon," iM order to be able to advance
- noble causes, requires a patient, long-term struggle to c^~stri.ct the power of the -
' foreign companies and a commitment to a process of recover, and national control over -
the oil wealth. -
This initiative--which, at bottom, is nothing but the exe :.Lsa of national sover-
eignty in the field of oil--requires defining and putting ~.~~o icrce a strategy aimed _
at progressively broadening the participation of local kc: ke~-rs tec~?nic.ians and
cadres in the management of the admtnistrative and technc,,gical apparatus in the
f ields of exploration, production, pricing and marketing nil and petroleum products.
- Experience shows jusC as clearly that one cannot effPct , t~'_y protect the future of
the country without coming to a real understanding of ~'i. -esources or defining a _
policy to conserve reserves.
The improvement of the people's living conditions, ~.~:tting up of basic and
processing industries will increasingly lead to ~ ..~'_i- in national energy demand.
- This latter must be the central concern of a ra~ ~ ~:rgy policy.
_ In the same way, it is now established that ; ~eal danger of the producing
countries placiiig excessive reliance nn their ~.~:i t, r:.~~ources to solve develop-
ment problems, to the detriment of the mobil'zdt' ~uma~ resources. There are '
numerous examples of producing coimtries whe~ tiloitation of petroleum re-
sources brought with it a rupture of the ov~ i~. ion of the economy, through a
hypertrophied development of the oil sector .--ar~ ~ n-~ .y;f zalization of the crucial
~
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agricultural sector; or again, another well-known phenomenon, the illusion of a
certain financial freedom--tlie oil revenues punctually "falling like rain"...except
_ when there is a crisis--which encourages getting mired in industrial pro~ects that
- are out of all proportion to the nee~s of the country co,ncerned and are undertaken
without serious preliminary study.
'I'he search for new reserves and conservation of the known reserves, diversified
exploitation of natural rQSOUrces, processing the crude oil, acquiring competence
_ reg~adingthe administrative and productive apparatus, training people, negotiating
contracts that integrate these new requirements, financing development: such are the
ins and o~its of any energy pollcy that considers the "oil weapon" as a lever, by a
nation, to get a handle on solving the great problems of the people sti11 suffering
from underdevelopment. Theee are questions which the growth in oil production ir~
the Gulf of Guinea are bringing more to the foreground than ever before.
No doubt the paths already traveled these last 20 yeaxs by pQOple--both those in
developing countries and those in already developed countries-�-will weigh heavily
in the decisions that are presently being taken in the Gulf of Guinea.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie
9516
CSO: 4400/1093
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- INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
_ FUEL CONSUMPTION OF UMOA NATIONS EVALUATEU -
Paris MARCHES TROPICAi7X ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Agr 81 p 1123
[Text] The Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) recently completed a
- study of the consumption of the grincipal types of hydrocarbons by countries in the
West African Monetary Union (UMOA) from 1975 to 1979.
The successive price increases put into effect by oil-exporting countries over the
past 4 years have had a heavy impact ~on West African nations that do not produce _
oil (the Ivory Coast was not to have significant production until this year).
In the UMOA, the overall consumrtion index (on Che basis of 100 for 1975) was 146
in 1979 compared with 49 in 1965. During this 15-year period, consumption of the
main types of hydrocarbons rose an average of 8.l percent per year. The highest
rate was in 1976 (12.8 percent) and the lowest in 1979 (4.1 percent).
The consumption of the main types of hydrocarbons evolved as follows for the differ-
ent countries over the 15-year period (expressed in 1,000 m3):
_ Benin I. Coast U. Volta Niger Sene al To o Total UMOA
Automobile gasoline
(incl. super.) 1965 24.1 148.9 20.2 15.3 89.6 12.3 310.4 -
1979 55.9 359.6 87 41.8 178.6 87.2 770
Kerosene
1965 11.8 40.3 7.1 4.3 12.4 12.1 94
1979 33.8 63.4 13.2 5.~ 18.9 14.5 147.1
Diesel fuel
1965 22.4 101.5 7.8 14.3 19.2 17.1 182.3
1979 47.5 428 25.1 124.3 141.6 49.8 8i6.3
Fuel oill
~ 1965 1.2 16.6 0.3 (3) 130.3 11.5 159.9
1979 Z 7.3 332.3 14.6 (3) 313.6 42.8 710.6 -
Diesel oil. ' -
1965 (4) 41.1 - 5 31.9 8.2 - -
~ 1979 (4) 99.9 - 23.5 43.9 5.9 - ~
1 In 1,000 m3 except for Upper Volta: in i,000 tons. 2 In 1,000 m3 except for
Upper Volta and Senegal: in 1,000 tons. 3 Included in diesel fuel. 4 Included
in fuel oil.
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The lower growth in 1979 (4.1 percent compared with 11.5 percent during the ~
_ 1975-1978 period) is essentially due to the reduced consumption in the Ivory
Coast of heavy fuel oil for thermal powerplants as a result of the startup at -
the beginning of the year of the Taabo hydroelectric plant. -
The index tab le below sho~s average growth for the 1965-1979 period for each =
country and the weight of each in the U*~iOA index at the beginning and end of the _
period.
Growth 1'965-1979 Structure of Index -
per`year) 1965 1979 -
Benin + 5.8 6.4 4.7
- Ivory Coast + 8.7 48.4 52.5 -
Upper Volta + 9.4 6.0 7.1
~ Niger -1- ].0.8 4.2 6.0
Senegal + 6.1 28.9 23.7
Togo + 8.0 6.1 6.0
Total + 8.1 100.0 100.0
Since 1978, Benin has purchased electric power from Ghana, which has reduced its
demand for oil products. Like~~ise, th.~ Togo El~ctric Company has bought power from
Ghana, reducing the production of therma?-produced electric power, and since 1979, -
the Togolese Mining Company in Benin h;:c not produced its own electricity, buying
from Ghana instead.
d For the Monetary Union as a whole, the structure of consumption changed substan-
tially between 1965 and 1979. Only the share of diesel fuel remained stable:
Growth 1965-1979 Structure of Index
per year) 1965 1979 ~
Automobile gas oline + 12.9 20.2 37.9
Kerosene + 1.3 20.7 805
Diesel fuel + 7.9 28.4 28.2
Fuel oil + 9.8 17.3 22.1
Diesel oil - 13.4 3.3
Total + 8.0 100.0 100.0 `
_ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
11,464 ~
rSO: 4400/112 2 ,
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
FIN~`.~JCING, PROJECTS OF OMVS REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 pp 1097-1099
[Text] Completion of the first portion of the OMV~ [Senegal River Development
_ Organization] program (constructi.on of the Diama and Manantali dams, construction
of the Mahinandi-Manantali road and work on the Mahinandi railroad station)
required $865.7 million in .Tanuary 1981. At the rate of 210 CFA francs to tne
doZlar, this is equi~valent to 181.8 billion CFA francs.
Naturally, it is necessary to reevaluate needs every year and even more frequentl.y `
in order to take inflation into account. This problem was solved at the meeting
- of financial backers that was held in Dakar fi~om 25 to 28 November 1980.
_ It was agreed to use 1980 costs already 12.5 percent higher than in 1979
in applying the following annual rates of inflation for the su,ceeding years:
1981 (10 percent); 1982 (9.5 percent); 1983 (9 percent); 1984 (8.5 percent);
~ 198.5, 8 percent); 198b (8 percent); 1987 (8 percent) and 1988 (8 percent). -
In Tables OMVS-4 and OMVS-5 below, one will find the distribution of fi~ancing .
needs (end of 1980) in U.S. dollars for the ~iama and Manantali dams, The value
- in dollars can be converted into CFA francs on the following basis: U. S. $1 = _
210 CFA francs.
An examination of the f igures contained in these tab les leads to interesting obser-
vations on how work is to be spread out and the cost of each type of operation
within the overall program.
- For Diama, financing needs are as follows: construction of the project and re-
lated facilities: 81.8 percent; electromechanical equipment, 7.4 percent; super-
vision and inspection of work, 6 percent; and miscellaneous, 4.8 percent. �
For Manantali, civil engineering work on the dam itself r~presents 80.5 percent;
equipment, 6.3 percent; supervision and inspection of work, 4.2 percent; work on
the Mahinandi station, 2.8 percent; construction of the access road, 2.3 percent;
and rehousing ~f the people forced to move, 1.8 percent.
The operations involv!.ng Diama will be spread out over 6 years (between 1981 and
1986 inclusively, in our table). It is likely that the schedule will be adhered "
to, as will the annual distribution of credits, but because af the delay already -
observable, startup will be postponed from 6 months to a year.
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For Manantali, one must undoubtediy antir_ipate a similar delay. Moreover, it
will be noted that the startup of ope rations on the dam itself (civil engineering) _
will not occur the first year of the program of execution, which is spread out
= over 8 years (1981 through 1988, in our table). The fir.st work planned is that
- on the access road and the Mahinandi stati~n. The volume of work will not reach
its peak until the f ifth year and the termina 1 phase (eighth year) will involve -
onlv .18 percent of all investments p lanned (completion of equippi.ng the facility).
_ Januar}~ 1981: $769 Million
_ On 30 January 1981, the OMVS Directorate of Financial Departments could document
commitment~ amounting to $769 million, distributed as follows (in millions of
Saudi Arabia $150 million
Kuwait $100 million
_ Federal Repub lic of Germany
= 166 million marks plus -
$6.3 million $ 98 million
France $ 70 million
Abu Dhabi $ 70 million
African Development Bank (BAD) and =
African Development Fund (ADF) ~
26.3 million ADF accounting units and =
24 million BAD accounting units $ 63.1 millian
EDF [European Development Fund]
15 + 30 million ECU [European -
currency units] $ 60.4 million
~Iember nations (retrocession out of
Sth EDF quotas)
30 million ECU $ 40.3 million
Iraq $ 40.6 million
Italy
20 billion Italian lira and
$2 million $ 35.5 million
Islamic Bank (BID) $ 20 million `
Canada
20 million Canadian dollars $ 17.2 million ~
- Zran $ 4 million -
Total $769 million
~ L
Talks in February and March with representatives of the OPEC Fund for Internationa].
Dr~velopment, with Qatar, U.S. AID and the U:~1DP [UN Development Program] should make
- it possible to substantially increase the amount of the above commitments before tlie -
meet:ing of financial backers scheduled for rhe f~.rst week in May 1981 in Dakar.
' It should be emphasized that between November 1980 and mid-January 1981, contribu-
tiuns increased by over $98 million, with the countries or organizations modifyi_ng
their participation being the following~(in millions of _
s
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- r~ux ur~r~l~l.Ew u5r. uNLY
Cuuntry or Organization Novemb~r~1980 January 1981
Saudi Arabia 100 150 ~
Federal Republic of Germany 91.7 98
EDF 47 60.4 -
Men;3er nations 60.9 40.3 .
Iraq 0 40.6
- Canada 8.6 17.2 ,
Total 308.2 406.5
It will be noted that the commitments registered b,y 30 January 1981 were half from
Arab nations or the Islamic Bank: _
Saudi Arabia 19.5 percent
- Kuwait 13 percent
Abu Dhabi 9.1 percent
Iraq 5.3 percent
gID 2.6 percent
~Iran .5 percent -
' OMVS-4. Diama Financing Needs (in thousands of dollars, value end of 1980)
Elements 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Total
Spillway, dredging 8,200 17,940 17,115 13,267 7,640 64,162
Lock 4,826 8,814 12,009 7,819 4,503 37,97?
Opening di.ke 2,112 3,860 6,780 5,457 18,209
Access road and final site 4,338 5,805 10,143
Closing dike 314 576 1f010 814 2,714
Related works 600 1,100 1,462 1,791 4,953
Electromechanical 1,681 3,686 3,100 1,814 2,257 848 13,386
- Supervision, inspection
and plans of execution 2,171 2,376 2,210 1,478 1,233 1,391 10,857 -
Training, and so on 371 409 376 248 210 238 1,852
Subtotal 24,613 44,566 34,810 28,086 25,424 8,748 164,247
Physical contingencies 414 4,629 3,795 3,881 3,019 1,310 17,048
Total 25,027 49,195 38,605 29,967 2$t443 10,058 181,295
Prices in thousands of dollars (U.S. $1 = 210 CFA francs), taking into account -
2 percent for work under state supervision. Needs put at $185,174,100 in order to
take future financial eff ect of companies' reserves into account.
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Or1VS-4a. Diama (First Portion) Finaneing Needs Taking Advanr_~s Into Account
(in milliona of CFA francs)
Elemenes 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Total
Spillway and dredging 1,721 3,767 3,594 2,786 1,604 13,474
Lock 1,014 1,851 2,522 1,642 948 7,974
Opening dike 444 811 1,424 1,145 3,824
Access r.oad and final site 911 1,219 2,130
Closing dikes 66 121 212 171 570
Complementary facilities 126 231 307 376 1,040
Electromechanical 353 774 651 381 47~F 178 2,811
Execution plans 456 499 464 310 259 292 2,2gp n
Supervision and inspection 78 86 79 52 44 50 389
~ Subt~tal 5,169 9,359 7,310 5,478 5,339 1,837 34,492
= Physical contingencies 87 972 797 815 634 275 3,580
Totat 5,256 10,331 8,107 6,293 5,973 2,112 38,072 '
OMVS-5. Manantali Financing Needs (in thousands of dollars, value er.d of 1980)
Elements 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Total
Civil engineering 84,600 73,486 109,790 130,148 93,105 56,533 547,662
Equipment 6,100 10,571 7,633 8,243 9,200 1,248 42,995 _
Access road 4,095 9,381 2,372 15,848 -
~ Relocation 471 1,443 2,548 2,752 ~2,9J2 1,981 12,167
Def orestation 1,567 1,700 1,848 1,995 7,110
Supervision, etc. 3,557 5,766 5~067 5,067 5,476 3~848 28,781
Training, etc. 729 1,167 905 1,000 1,095 1,395 6,291
Railroad 5,057 10,610 3,452 19,119
Total 9,152 109,348 95,353 130,581 148,448 112,886 72,957 1,248 679,973 -
OhtVS-Sa. Manantali (First Portion) Financing Needs Taking Advances Into Account
(in millions of CFA francs)
i;leuients 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Total
Civ il engineer-
ing, dam 1~,766 15,432 23,056 27,331 19,552 11,872 115,009
- Equipment 1,281 2,220 1,603 1,731 1,932 262 9,029
_ Access road* 860 1,970 498 3,328
Rehousing 99 303 535 578 624 416 2,555
Def orestation 329 357 388 419 1,493
Supervision, execution -
_ plans, reception,
; ourside experts 747 1,211 1,064 1,064 1,150 808 8,044
~ Training, training
OMVS personnel 153 245 190 210 230 293 1,321
Railroad infra.1,062 2,228 725 4,015 _
Total 1,922 22,963 20,024 27,422 31~174 23,706 15,321 262 142,794
*Price for u~zpaved road.
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.
oM~.. 1 Berrages de Diama et Manant~li
~ Projet de plen d'affectetion et sources de finencement -
!En 1 000 obNus US, sn no~nbr~ /yQpJ
I
~ S 6
, 2 a.e~~ 3 4 a~ e~a-
~budiu Karwn AFA F~~ gAp/FAp AMi-pANi ItNir FEO BIO GeW I~ S~u�ToW aw~tdn mNnMa TDTAI
7 OIAMA
; e fv~au~ur dnppa 20 523 - = 10 000 = - _ _ _ _ _ 70 529 33 639 = B~ 1 B2 ,
Ecm~~ . ~ o ~e3 13 ~15 24188 1 ~ 7A9 37 971 ;
Oipu~ d~ boutlwn - - - 5 4!e 12 743 - - - - - - 18 2~9 1 E 208 ~
` 1 ~ Aout~ d'~edt . . . . . . - - - 1011J - - - - - - - 101 t,7 - - 10143 -
:110iqu~dr f~ntun . . - - - 2)1? - - - - - - - 2711 - - 2714 i
~ 12 OuvnNs eomvNmNnnm . - - - ~ 967 - - - - - - - ~ 963 - - 4 863
` 13 Eq~~�m ~an~k,~p~. . . - - - s eee i 500 - - - - - - ~ a ~te - - i 3 ~ee
' Supcmmn. Kc� . . . . . . . . . 4 2B9 4 2S9 - 2 219 - - - - - - - 10 857 - - 10 A67
~ 14 Famttioa. Kc . . . . . . . . - - - t B62 - - - - - - - 1 162 - - 1 A62
:15 s W,�,~,, u e~ s 16 052 - ~.7 297 20 241 19 ~26 - - - - - 111 S15 47 432 - 1 d~ 247
` 16 aiw, ~,.~w, n nM~d�. t eoo I 948 - E16 2 37~ 1 S76 - 4 000 14 011 7 461 - 21 1a7
;
' T0T0.101AMA . 21312 18 000 - 4~ 901 zs e~ e~ s o00 - - - - z o00 130 83E B~ 81A - t a6114
MAlIAKTAII
} 1 ~ pMr uvil b~rtp~ . e5 ~93 ~7 805 16 95~ 2~ 892 - 47 805 76 500 91 1 b2 20 000 - - 975 s01 172 Oe1 - 547 EOY
18 Eq~i~~ . . . . . - - s 550 - 2S 646 - - - - B E00 - ~Y 99b - - 42 986 1 -
' 19 . - - - - - - - I 5 848 - - - 16 848 - - 16 848 -
20 Aoutld'saN - - - - - - - -
A~p~K - - - 121 E1 - 121 E7 121 E7
2 Z plbi~~t . . . . . - - - - 2 ~7J - - - - - - 2 479 4 E37 - 7110 i
$ Supmiaon. na� . . . . . . . . . . 7 193 1195 1 19E - - 7 ! 96 - - - - - 2B 781 - - 28 781
92A1 - 6281 ~
; 22 Fonnnroe. ~tc - - - - - - - - - - -
~ 2 3 CMmin d~ hr . . . . . . . . . . - - - 1 200 - _ - - - - - 1 200 17 919 - 19119
~ TOTAI MAIIpNTAl1 72 888 Bl 000 91 100 2e 082 ~0 ~4a6 56 U00 75 500 ~7 000 20 000 8 000 - 419 016 200 808 - 978 Y73
i Taid Oiam~ + Ma~at~li I 00 000 100 000 91 700 70 000 E31 Ot 10 s700 ~6 500 47 000 20 000 A 800 4 000 60A 901 2b6 lEA - 8E6 EA7
s 24 ~mkh, int�nAlm ~t ~m~iuau - - - - - - - - - - - - - eo sao eo 900
( TO1Al 6EqEpp1, 100 000 100 000 91 700 70 060 83101 70 000 ~6 600 ~7 090 20 000 A 000 4 000 80Y 901 zse ~ee AO 9D0 9 6B7
~251�I la eadb du mnin du aanwM~at ibk~l aM va o^~
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Key to tnble on previous page;
_ 1. Diama and Manantali Dams, Proposed Sources of Financing and Allocation
(in U.S. $1,000, November 1980)
2~ Saudi Arabia
3. Kuwait
4. Federal Republic of Germany
5. Additional financing
6. Member nations
7. Spillway and dredging
~ 8. Lock
9. Opening dike
10. Access road
11. Closing dike
12. Complementary facilities
13. Flectromechanical equipment
14. Training, etc.
_ 15. Subtotal
_ 16. Physical and financial contingencies
17. Civil engineering, dam
~ 18. Equipment
19. Access road
20. Rehousing
- 21. Deforestation
22. Training, etc.
~ 23. Railroad
24. Intercalated interest and commissions
25. Costs of general consultant's department not taken into account.
The remaining 50 percent was distributed as follows (bilaterally or multilaterally):
Lurope
- EDF (and reconveyances) 13.1 percent
Federal Republic of Germany 12.75 percent
France 9.1 percent
Italy 4.6 percent
A.Erica
BAD/ADF 8.2 percent
America
Canada 2.25 percent
The African Development Bank or its subsidiary, the African Development ~nd, which
wi11 contribute $63.1 mill~on (a little over 13 billion CFA franr_s), would have
wislled to devote a large share of its contribution to the equipping of the Manan-
t11:L electric powerplant. However, this equipment is not included in the .first
phase of operations. Nevertheless, one can consider the following allocations
(in millions of CFA francs): BAD; Diama (1,705), Manantali (5,414); ADF:
_ Diama (2,991), Manantali (2,991). This makes a total of 64.2 percent for Manantali
and 35.8 percent for Diama.
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Credits allocated by the EDF are essentiallq for congtruction of the Mahinandi-
Manantali Dam access road.
Funds from the Islamic Development Bank have been temporarily included in the
Civil Engineering column for the Manantali Dam, but could cover other elements~
- Enterprises or Groups of Enterprises Pre-Selected for Completion of the First
Phase of the OMVS Program
_ Civil Engineering
1) Group; Bilfinger and Berger Bau (Federal Republic of Germany)~ Philipp Holz-
- mann (Federal Republic of Germany); International Construction Company (France,
grouping: Dredging and Public Works, Spie Batignolles, Campenon-Bernard Cetra, .
General Public Works Company, Marseille Construction Company); Impresa Astaldi
_ all'Estero (Italy);
2) Group: Impregilo (Italy); Ways und Freitag (Federal Republic of Germany); Fou-
gerolles (France);
3) Group; Hochtief (Federal Republic of Germany) and COGEFAR [expansion unknown]
(Italy);
4) Group: Zublin (Federal Republic of Gei-many); Dyckerhoff und Widmann (Federal _
Republic of Germany); Losinger (Switzerland); SAGECCOM [expansion unknown]
(France) ;
5) Group: Sainrapt et Brice (France); Torno (Italy); Polensky und Zollner
(Federal Republic of Germany); Borie (France); Sabalpina (Switzerland); SATOM
(expansion unknown] (France);
6) Dredging and Construction (Spain);
7) Group: Agroman Empresa Constructora and Entrecanales y Tavora (Spain); and -
8) Dumez-Afrique (Francej
- 8) Dumez-Afrique (France).
Electromechanical Equipment:
1) Neyrpic (France); 2) Voest Alpine (Austria); 3) Energoprojekt (Yugoslavia);
4) Noel (Federal Republic of Germany); 5) MAN [expansion unknown] (Federal Repub- -
lic of Germany); 6) Vevey (Switzerland); and 7) Krupp (Federal Republic of
Germany).
Supervision of work on the Diama Dam was entrusted to the Diama Group, with SOGREAH -
[expansion unknown] as pro~ect foreman.
Supervision of work on the Manantali Dam was entrusted to the Manantali Group, with
Rhein-Rhur as project foreman.
= The Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners engineering consulting firm was chosen as gen- _
eral consultant for the program as a whole.
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_ The allocation of credits granted by Iraq is not yet known to us. -
Probable Allocations of Funds
- In principle, the backers manifest the desir~~ or demand to see their cor.tiYi-
butions allocated for specific operations or we'~1-defined phases or sectors within
the operations.
_ It has not been possible for us to publish a table of final allocations of avai'- -
able credits, but we do give (OMVS-6) a summary of th~ main lines of the likely
- distribution in November 1.980 (that is~ before the last carmnitments mentioned
above).
The loan from Saudi Arabia, acquired in three installments ($33/$100/$150 million)
should normally be assigned to Manantali (73.3 percent) and Diama (26.7 percent).
In 1978 (level: $100 million); the planned distribution was as follows~ Diama
(40 percent); Manantali (30 percent); navigation on the river (30 percent).
Funds from Kuwait go in principle to Manantali (72 percent) and Diama (28 percent).
" The contribution of Abu Dhabi, which has gone from $50 to $70 million in September
- 1980 following the visit of Presiden~ Senghor, could go to Manatali (78.6 percent)
~ and Diama (21.4 percent).
The German loans (very low interest, for 50 years~ 10 years deferment) are exclu-
- sively for Manantali (civil engineering and supervision of work).
In April 1y80, President Giscard d'Estaing raised France's contribution to y70 mil-
lion. It had previously included a FAC [Aid and CooperaCion Fund] grant of -
$19.3 million (80 million French francs) and a loan of $38.5 million (1(0 million
francs) from the Central Fund for Econom3c Cooperation (CCCE) (3.5 percent, 25
years, 8 to 10 years deferment). The French contribution is to go to Diama -
(65 percent) and Manantali (35 percent).
Covering Financing Needs
With $768.5 million in commitments by January 1981, the OMVS had 88.77 percent of
- its financing, which at the time was eatimated to total $865.7 million.
In principle, it was possible to start work. Actually, at the meeting of backers -
in November 1980, most of them reached an agreement according to which they pledged
_ to formally authorize the startup of operations in order to launch work on the -
first phase of the program as soon as financing pZedges reachec~ the required mini-
mum of 80 percent of needs and as soon as f irm assurances were given by members
of the OMVS to cover the remaining 20 percent. _
Nevertheless, the German delegation asked that for the signing of contracts and -
- the startup of workn 85 percent of the financing needs should be covered. The
Federal Republic of Germany also announced to the advisory co~unittee that it was
willing to raise its contribution if other backers made a similar effort. Since
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.
that time, same effort has been made and the movement can only expand at the next
meeting of financial backers planned for Dakar in May. _
The curr.ent rate of participatirn will without a doubt be improved despite the
- effect of inflation, which is fncreaaing costs by same .8 percent menthly. Oc9t -
can reasonably expect that the 95-percent ra+~e of cover will be reached (that is,
- $850 out of the $892 millian th~n needed).
A slightly lower figure would even be a victory and nothing would then oppose the
actual launching of a vast undertaking whose completion has been anticipated for
nearly half a c~ntury and in whose s�~ccess three countrie~ on the banks of the
Senegal River ind all of Africa ha~~e placed immense hopes.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
~ -
~1,464 .
CSO: 4400/112I
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- BRIEFS
SENEGALESE-ANGOLAN INITIATIVE--Senegalese President Abdou Diouf has suggested
to Luanda that this country send an official delegation to discuss the
n~rmalization of relations between the two countries. It is recalled that
President Leopold Senghor had been the only African chief of state who had
refused to recognize the People's Republic of Angola, while providing support
and protection to the two Angolan puppets, Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto,
_ both we11-known CIA agents and collaborators of the racist South Africans.
I, the Senegalese chief of state's initiative an indication of a new
- orientation in Dakar's diplomacy? Luanda would be agreeable to it, evAn though
Angola does not discount the pressure King Hassan II has doubtlessly put on
the Senegalese chief of state to discourage this initiative. [Text] [Parie
AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 13 Apr 81 p 52]
ECOWAS MEETINGS--Directors of studies of the Central Banks of countries belonging
to ECOWAS met in Lome from 26 to 28 March and the committee of governors of the
Central Banks will' meet in Accra on 8 May. A me~ting of transportation experts
was held in Cotonou from 13 to 16 April. Coming statutory m~etings: board of
_ directors of the Fund, 4-5 May in Banjul; transportation, telecommunications,
- energy (energy subcommittee), 6-7 May in Freetown; industry, agriculture and natural
- resources, 8-11 May in Freetown; commerce, customs, imtaigration, monetary questions
and payments, 11-14 May in Freetown; financial experts, Z5-17 May in Freetown;
. meeting of mass media, 18-19 May in Freetowr2.. In addition, the Council of Ministers
will hold two meetings as it does every year, the first in Freetown from 20 to 23
May and the second in Freetown also from 18 to 20 November. The first meeting will
plan the suu~it conference of chiefs of state and heads of gavernment of ECOWAS
countries and will be held on 23-28-29 May in Freetown. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
- TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 p 1123] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
JOINT NIGER-SENEGAL COMMISSION--Senegal and Niger decided to set up a joint
commission for cooperation. An agreement was signed on 5 April by Moustapha
Niasse, foreign minister of Senegal, and by his counterpart, Baouda Diallo, who
- was on an official visit in Senegal. According to th~ two ministers, creating
this cammission makes it legally possible for each country to establish cooperation
according to their "own connectiens." [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 998] [COPYRIGHT: Rene MorEUx et Cie, Paris
1981] 9465
CSO: 4400/1083
_ 17
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, ANGOLA
~
BRIEFS
PARIS-LUANDA FLIGHTS--In spite of many maneuvers, the Angolan Government has
succeeded in establishing that th e second airline connecting Paris to Luanda
will be the Angolan TAAG airline. French authorities had expressed the desire
- ttiat the UTA airline, which flies once a week from Paris to Luanda, should
effect a second weekly flight. In coming weeks, the two weekly flights will
be thos e of the TAAG and the UTA. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French
13 Apr 81 p 52]
- CSO: 4400/1172
\
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EQUATORTAL GUINEA
BRIEFS
IMF AID--The International Monetary Fund has authorized the government of
Equatorial Guinea to buy the equivalent of 4.7 ldllion SDR [Special Drawing
RightsJ or $5.7 million), within the compensatory financing facility of the
Fund, and this is because of the drop in exports recorded for Equatorial Guinea
during the 12 months ending 30 October 1980. This drop was due mainly to a
- decrease by 30 percent in cocoa exporta, that followed a shortage in manpower,
fertilizers, insecticides, in addition to a poor international exchange rate.
The IMF quota for Equaturial Guinea is 15 million SDR, of which it had already
taken for other operations the equivalent ar 9.67 million SDR. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 1016] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1981] 9465
- FRG RELATIONS--The 5�ear 1980 saw a definite renewal in political relations between _
the FRG and Equatorial Gutnea. In Bonn, these relations were the main topic
at talks between the president nf Equatorial Guinea during his stay in the FRG _
in November 1980, and the president of the FRG, the minister of Economic Coopera-
tion, and other German high off icials. On 30 September 1980, Mr Julian Escono
_ Abaga Ada Nzogo presented his credentials to Bonn, as ambassador of Equatorial
Guinea in the FRG, with headquarters in Paris. The possibility of future economic
cooperation (technical assistance) between Germany and Equatorial Guinea were also
the subject of various discussions during the visit of Equatorial Guinea~s head
- of state in Germany. Last January, an outline agreement for economic cooperation
and an exchange of r~otes on sending five German economic advisors to Malabo took
place. The above mentioned advisors have since arrived in Malabo. Though trade
- between the FRG and Equatorial Guinea has remained quite slack during 1980, one
can see an ever increasing interast by the German business world and the intentio*~
to establish stronger business ties with Equatorial Guinea. [Text] [Paris
MAftCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 1016] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1981] 9465
SPANISH PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CONCESSION--The government of Equatorial Guinea
granted a concession for petroleum exploration to GEPSA [expansion unknown], a
branch of the Spanish petroleum company Hispanoil. This concession covers an
area of almost 2000 square km and is on the continental plateau, rcorth-east of
Bioko Island. Investments for the next 3 years are expected to amount to $24.5 -
m~,llion, and the first drilling operations will start at the beginning of June.
- jText] jParis MARCHES TftOPICAUX ET MEDTTERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 1016]
jCOPYKZGHT; Rene rloreux et Cie, Par3s 1981] 9465 -
CSO: 4400/1083
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- ETHIOPIA
- ECUNOI~[IC SURVEY SHOIdS RELATIVELY LOW FOREIGN DF,BT
Paris MAiZCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 pp 1109-1112 -
[Article by Christian Chaise: "Socialist Ethiopia Awaits Aid Frbm the West"]
[Excerpts] To say that Ethiopia has come a long way is a nice euphemisn~. Actually,
the empire inherited from the Negus by the military in 1974 came close to breaking
up 3 years later under the staggering blows of the different liberation movements
fighting the central government. The fact is that Ethiopia is not just a mosaic
of peoples, like most other Af rican nations, but a plurinational st~te as well. ~
undermined from the beginning at the end of the last century by the desire for
emancipation of the nations of which it is composed.
More than 3 years after skirting catastrophe, the Dergl seems to h~ave the situation
- well in hand. The settling of accounts within this mysterious organization, a
common occurrence after the military takeover, has ceased and it would appear that
no one is now in a position to contest the preeminence of Lt Col Mengistu Haile -
Mariam.
Another noteworthy improvement in the past 3 years is that the different libera- -
tion movements are on the defensive. Moreover, what could they hope for against _
a large army with superior equipment from Moscaw and the continuing "fraternal" .
aid of f rom 12,000 to 15,000 Cuban barludos?
But more than the improvement in the military situation, it is the evolution in -
the diplomatic area that is the Derg's greatest success. Despite its unequivocal
aFfiliation with the Soviet bloc, Ethiopia has in fact managed to tighten its -
b~;~ds with the Sudan, the main rear base of the Eritrean soldiers, Djibouti and
above all, Kenya.
The goal sought: i.solation of the hereditary Somali enemy, was achiaved beyond
al.l hopes. Held in suspicion by all its neighbors and collapsing under the
_ weight of nearly 2 million refugees who fled Ogaden,2 Somalia now has its hands
tied. Ethiopia is in a position of strength.
And yet, even if the country's territorial integrity and its own power are no .
longer truly threatened, the Derg continues to emphasize the war effort. The
Somali-American agreement signed in Washington in August, authorizing the United -
States to use the port of Berbera l~ss than 200 kilometers fram the Ethiopian
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burcler, has intensified the Ethiopian leaders' feeling that their country is a
besieged citadel. It would therefore be surpri~ing if the portion of overall
spending devoted to military e~penditures were to decrease in the near future.
For the 1979-1980 fiscal year, the defense budget was reportedly 1.1 billion ~
birr4 out of a total of 2,365,000,000, or some 46 percent (percentage similar to
that af the pr~vious year).
Increasing Agricultural Production -
By disorganizing production and diverting the country~s meager reso~xrces from the
productive sectors, the war effort has singularly canplicated the Derg's economic
task, particularly in agrieulture. And yet, agriculture is Che prime concern of
the 30 million Ethiopians. Some regions are actually on the brink of famine. The
- causes? The drought, naturally, but also the inadequacy of the communications _
- system, The de*_erioration in the food situation is reflected in the steady drop
in the daily ration per inhabitant in the past 6 years5: from 426 grams in 1975-
1976 to 321 grams in 1979-1980. The traditional food products (grain and legum-
inous plants) have not followed the growth in population. Ir. the case of grain,
there has even been a decline. It should therefore not be at all surprising that
_ the grain shortage, which was 250,000 tons in 1979, rose to 350,000 tons in 1980. -
In order to provide the people with an adequate diet, the increase in agricultural
- production is the prime slogan of the economic development campaign launched by
the Derg at the end of 1978. Placed under the responsibility of a central planning
counsel, this campaign takes the place ~f a plan covering several years. In addi-
tion to the drought and the war, the major reason for its failure, in the agricul- -
tural area, is the low prices to producers. Under such conditions, the farmers
have no interest in increasing produ.ction or in selling their surpluses to the
government, which has caused the development of shortages and the black market in _
the capital, t~e classic phenomenon of nationalized economies. An inevitable
corollary: In 1979, prices of food products rose some 30 per~.ent in Addis Abaha
even though distribution is almost totally in the hands of ttie state. ~
The creation of supervisory organs, the sending of governm~nt agents to rural
areas to force farmers to be cooperative: Nothing worked and the Derg had to
decide to set up a severe system of rationing based on district committees (the ~
notorious kebeles).
This situation is all the more abnormal because Ethiopia has an arable area of
800,000 square kilometers, but only one-eighth is cultivated. Essentially, they
are little plots of ground without any technical resources, in spite of which
they provide 94 percent of all production. As for the state f arms, set up to
reduce the food shortage, they contribute only 6 percent of a11 production on -
2 percent of the arable land.
In any given year, agriculture nevertheless contributes half of the gross national -
production, absorbing 78 percent of the active population of a country where
90 percent of the people are farmers: ~
1977-1978 1978-1979 1979-1980
GNP (in millions of birr) 4,009.3 4,217.5 4,456.2 ~
Agriculture 1,922 1,968.4 2,062.2 '
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In addition to the increase in the production of grain, the national ec4nomic
- development campaign also emphasizes the promotion of exports, or in other words,
coffee sales.
Coffee is in fact tYie main, not to say the only, source of foreign exchange for
the country. Ir~ 1978, it provided 81.9 percent of all ~xport receipts~ (compared
with 68 percent in 1979). Production can be estimared at 200,000 tons (6 to 7
percent of world production of Arabica), half nf which is consumed locally. What
_ is tragic is that Ethiopia is now the victim of a spectacular drop in world prices,
after taking ac~vantage of the increase in 1976 and 1977 (due to the freeze affect-
ing Brazilian plantat_~ons) . A poun3 of Ethiopian coffee, selling for $1.80 at
the beginning of last year, found no take.rs at ovex $1.15 in February, the mini-
mum price set by the World Coffee Org~nization for the 1981 season. It is such a
low price that the fat-meYs prefer, as usual, to keep their harvest.
Exp~rts therefore amounted to only 47,200 tons for the first 6 months of 1980,
compared with 54,180 tons for the same period last year. Receipts, which reached
the record level of $286 million in 1979, reportedly fell to $245 million in 1980,
a drop that will continue this year.
Adding to this plunge in coffee prices is the collapse of prices for hides and
leathers, the second source of foreign exchange (10.4 percent of all export re-
ceipts in 1978 and 16.8 percent the following year). Between January 1980 and
.Tanuary 1981, these prices were qui~e simply cut in half!
Ethiopia's situation illustrates in a particularly eloquent way the drama of devel-
oping countries without energy resources whose economies depend entirely on the
price of a raw material (agricultural or mineral) that varies erraticall;~.
At the same time, the cost of imports increases alarmingly due to the increase in
the cost of oil and greater grain purchases. In 1979, Ethiopia imported w't?eat
costing 58.7 birr (one-third fram France), or a sum slightly higher than tnat
- paid for all imported food products in 1978.
- For their part, oil purchases stemming from the war effort exceeded 450,OOG tons
in 1980 for crude (compared with 375,000 tons the previous year) and 100,000 tons
for. finished products. Supplied by the USSR by virtue of an agreement signed in
rtarch 1980.6 Ethiopia does enjoy a favorable price ($2 a barrel lower for Arabian
]ight of equivalent quality). And yet, the bill is high: For the period from
~ July .1979 to June 1980, the oil bill ate up half of all receipts from coffee sal.es.
Bztwecn 1978 and 1979, oil imports rose 16 percent, but between the f irst 6 months
ot= 1979 and the f irst half of 1980, the rise was 43.5 percent!
11~lting the Slide
In order to stop this increase in imports, the Derg imposed severe restrictions as
early ,is 1978, banning imports of luxury products,~ for example, or of any product
havinK an equivalent made locally.
~ The effectiveness of these measures remains to be shown because last year, th~
increase in imports was reportedly on the order of 30 percent. Naturally, the
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trade deficit, which had gone down in 1979 (thanks to rising prices for coffee and
hides), began to expand again: _
Ethiopian Foreign Trade (in millions of dollars)
, 1978 1979 1980 (est.)
Fxports 306.2 425.9 400 11%)
Coffee (242.7) (286.3) (245)
Imports 519.9 603.6 790 30%)
- Balance -213.7 -177.7 -390 110%)
If the tren~i toward lower coffee prices continues , 1981 will witness a worsening
of the trade balance, for it is reasonal~le to expect a 20-percent increase in im-
ports,
Inasmuch as the Derg had no w~y of affecting the prices of coffee or hides on the
world market, it decided, in an eff~rt to half the slide, to reduce imports, parti-
cularly in the industrial field (oil imporfis being incompressible) . Industr}~
which is 80 percent nationalized, haa three branches: the processing of raw
materials from agriculture ~sugar, milk, tobacco, meat, but hides and leathers and
textiles as well), the production of building mat erials and some chemical plants. -
It represents some 15 percent o~ gross national production.
Concentrated in the Add~s Ababa reoion and Eritrea, the few industrial units have
slowed down in the past several years, because of the war, naturally, but also -
because of a lack of raw materials and spare parts. Beginning in 1978, the Derg
tried to get them back on their feet, particularly in Eritrea.8 The need to
restore a productive apparatus made inoperable because of a lack of maintenance
~ and operations led to a 50-Fercer.t leap in purchases of equipment between 1978
and 1979, a year when they made up one-sixth of all imports. At the preser,t time,
work to expand 12 plants is utiderway ($113 million in investments) and 8 new units
will be set up between now and 1984, which will require investments totaling -
$260 million. Naturally, a solution to the dramatic problem of the lack of
trained upper-level personnel remains to be found. Out of 70,000 persons working
_ in industry, there are less than 200 high-level t echnicians and skilled workers do
_ not even number 500.
- The Derg's emphasis on the relaunching of industry resulted, in 1978-1979, in a
13.1-~ercent growth (7.8 percent in 1979-1980), a rate markedly higher than that _
of agriculture (2.4 and 4.8 percent the following year), but also higher than
that af the overall growth of tra. economy (5.19 p ercent in 1978-1979 and 5.66
percent in 1979-1980).
Actually, there is practically no sector but cons truction that can show better
results (7.7 percent in 1978-1979 and 16.6 percent the following year), after a
4-year recession. The Derg is fully aware that the building sector is a bottleneck -
that checks the completion of most projects. It therefore expects to double its
efforts, particularly in order to increase cement production (a new cementworks -
will be built at Dire-Dawa in Ogaden, with Soviet aid), The authorities' interest
in the construction sector is not without ulterio r motives, however: If expanding
the road system is especially urgent, it is mainly because of military concerns.9 _
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In tlie long run, development of industrial production that would result in fewer
purchases abroad is therefore possible. But in the immediate future, urgent
c~easures appear necessary in order to rehabilitate a delicate financial situation,
_ The year 1979 was marked by a slight improvement in th. .,alance of payments, wir_h
the deficit being reduced from $112.7 to $84.2 million. For 1980, l.nitial esti- _
mates Ghow a deficit of $277 million. Ethiopia therefore runs the risk of seeing
_ a collapse ~f its foreign exchange reserves, which, according to the IMF, went
from $172.2 to $120 million in the space of 10 months, from the beginning of last
year to the end of October. They are reportedly still free f alling because accord-
ing to semi-official information, they dropped to $76 million in the month of Decem-
~ ber, which would explain why the Central Bank suspended the granting of any new
import licenses in January.
Resumption of International Aid
And yet, the situation is far from being desperate because 1980 marked a promising _
resumption of international assistance. This aid was almost totally frozen fol].ow-
ing the nationalization of foreign prflperty decided upon in 1975. Since that time,
Ethiopia has had to be content with a few Italian or Swedish loans and especial.ly
aid f.rom the EDF [European Development Fund]. More than ever, the EEC remains the
coun~ry's main backer. Under Lome t, Ethiopia received $135 million (it has used
only one-ttiird of the package) and it will receive $210 million within the frame-
_ ~�~orl;of Lome II (that is, between now and 1986). Furthermore, Addis Ababa will
- receive STABEX [E:cport Stabilization Fund] aid from the EEC this year to corn-
p~nsante Eor the drop in coffee prices.
Since the Derg agreed to examine protests raised by the 1975 nationalizations, _
the World Bank hailed this gesture of good will and decided to resume aid imme-
dtately. As for the United States, the dispute is still too recent between the
two countries to envisage any resumption of American assistance immediately. Such
a gesture would be welcome, however, because of the extent to which the balance of
payments has deteriorated in recent months. The deficit, only $9.8 million in
1979, reportedly reached $187 million last year and according to some predictions,
might go as high as $380 million in 1981.
- I~:thiopia therefore mainly needs financial aid for its balance of payments in order _
t~ atrenuate the effects of the current circumstances. Such aid is perfectly
~ossibl_e because even though foreign assistance was put on a back burner after
]975, the foreign debt has remained at a reasonable level (naturally, at the pr.ice
- c~F a drop in foreign exchanges assets, which now represent only one or two months
~ of exports). By the end of 1979, it totaled $600 million, with the main creditors
heing the World Bank (49.7 percent), the United States (25 percent) and the Federal
Re~ublic of Germany (8.7 percent). At the end of last year, the deb t did not ex-
ceed $700 million, with the service charge being an estimated $35 million. The
rate of service, on the order of 5 percent, shows that Ethiopia is a relatively -
unencumbered country. ~
Nor are economic arguments alone in pleading for increased financial aid from the -
ulest. There is no dearth of political reasons: By supporting Ethiopia's economic
development, the Westerners could gradually lead the Derg away fram the Soviet -
- bloc. On the other hand, isolating Addis Ababa would certainly have the opposite
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effect. Moreover, there are those within the ruling team who are not always very
content over the heavy presence of the Soviets and their alZies, whose economic aid
- is obviously nat up to the Derg's expectations.
Aid fram the Eastern countries generally takes the form of inedium-t~rm credits
(8 to 10 years) at low interest rates (4 percent) going to the industrial sector.
But the main portion of the Ethiopian debt to these countries is in fact military:
same $2 billion, without it being possible to distinguish between gifts and long-
term loans.
More than ever, it is therefore from the Western countries that Ethiopia expects
the aid it needs. Despite the political vicissitudes of recent years, it primarily
turns to the United States, West Europe and Japan, as shown by the structure of its _
foreign trade:
_ Foreign Trade by Geographical Areas (in millions of birr)
~ Imports Exports '
Total 1,193 876
United States 137.5 255
Japan 124.4 53.6
EEC 399 244
Federal Republic of Germany 118.6 55.3
Italy 117.2 98
Great Britain 77.9 20
France 37.2 29
~EMA 94.5 82.9
USSR 22.9 (1.9%) 59 (6.73%) -
German Democratic Republic 36.7 5
Ethiopia's eighth-ranking supplier in 1976, France has since moved up to sixth
place. with its share of the market being 4.4 percent (compared with 2 percent in
1976). French exports include agricultural and food products (especially wheat _
and milk products), equipment and consumer goods.
But there has been a spectacular increase in French purchases in the past 2 years
(80 percent coffee: 7,829 tons in 1980): 78 million~francs in 1978, 119 million
in 1979, 162 million in 1980. As a result, the balance, in France's favor in
1978 (26 million), has now tipped the other way (6 million in 1979, 67 million in
1980). However, the balance shoul3 be restored this year f ollowing a contract
signed in July by Fives-Cail Babcock and the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation for
~cpansion of the Metahara sugarmill~ Equipment worth 32 million francs will be
delivered within the year. Last year, two other French companies signed contracts: -
Peugeot, for the supplying of vehicles (5 million francs) and the BCEOM [Central =
Study Office for Overseas Equipment], for a rain drainage system in the capital.
This year., the BCEOM hopes to obtain four more contracts, while Fives-Cail Babcock
is interested in the constructioa of a dairy at Assela (10 million) and Nordon
has good hopes of winning an 18-million-franc contract for tt~e supplying of equip- -
_ ?nent for a malt plant. These projects will be matched by COFACE [French Insurance
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Company for Foreign Trade] credits within ceilings set for Ethiopia (80 to 100 mil-
_ lion francs). Whatever the case, Stirn'~s visit last month can only promote a devel--
opment of trade (see MARCHES TROPICAUX, 20 March, p 796). Of all the domains in
which France has promised to take action, the most important one of all is, without
a doubt, that of the Djibouti railroad, which hauls 60 percent of all Ethiopia's
foreign trade. 'For Ethiopians, the rail line is also a lifeline.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
l. The Derg, coordinating committee of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, was set up
in February 1974. Six and one-half years after it came to power, its makeup
is still kept secret and its power is still undivided.
2. See MARCHES TROPICAUX, No 1838, 30 January 1981, p 232.
3. The Ethiopian fiscal year begins on 7 July.
4. $1 = 2.07 birr; 1 birr = approximately 2.45 French francs.
- 5. Supplied by the UNDP [UN Development Progr.am], these figures do not take imp orts
and forei;n food aid into account.
6. Anxious not to depend solely on the Soviet Union, Ethiopia would now seek _
other sources of supplies and has reportedly contacted Saudi Arabia and Kuwa it. -
7. Luxury products include many food products: meat and live animals, milk p ro-
ducts with the exception of powdered milk~ canned fruits, vegetables or meat s.
8. Energy consumption rose 15 percent in this region, after S years of stagnat ion.
9. Since the military takeover, some 6,079 kilometers of roads have been built,
1,209 between June 1979 and June 1980, In 6 years, the road system expande d
_ by nearly 50 percent!
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
1i,464
CS~: 4400/1124 -
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ETHIOPIA
OFFICIAL REVIEWS REVOLUTION'9 ACHIEVEI~NTS, FUTURE PLANS
Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 20 Mar 81 pp 76-77
~Report o� interview with Legesse Asfaw, member of the Permanent Committee of
- the Temporary Military Administrative Committee ~CAMP~, by Pedro Rioseco; date
and place of interview not given~
~Excecpts~ As a member of the CAMP Permanent Committee, Legesse Asfaw is cur-
rently in char e of forming the ~rganizing Committee of the Ethiopian Working
Peoples Party ~COPPTE~, which is now in the process of being created and which
- will be the Marxist-Leninist party in charge of leading the people in the building
of socialism in Ethiopia.
This man of only 31 years of age and of affable personality, who kindly consented
: to grant us an interview for BOHEMIA, is one of the initiators and principal
leaders of the Ethiopian Revolution.
~Question~ Could you tell us something about the agreement between Somalia and
the United States as part of the imperialist strategy in Africa?
~Answer~ The August 1980 agreement between Somalia and the United States, under
which the Somalia's current reactionary regime is committed to sell its ports of
~ Berbera and Kismayou to the United States to be used by the latter as military
bases, is part of imperialism's world strategy and that of the reactionary forces
to subvert the progressive peoples' revolutions an~3 rule the world. The military
bases recently acquired in Somalia by the United States will be added to its
- existing ones in Egypt, Oman, Diego Garcia and other parts of the world. It is
obvious from this that imperialism does not vacillate in taking advantage of any
opportunity that presents itself to subvert the revolutions of the progressive
peoples of Africa and other parts of the world--of Latin America, for example.
This is why the agreement between the Llnited Statas and Somalia is cons~i~dered a
part of the imperialist struggle for the domination of Africa and of the entire
world.
- ~Question~ With regard to President Mengistu Haile Mariam's visit to the Soviet
Union, what have been its most important results?
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~Answer~ Comrade President Mengitsu Haile Mariam's visit to the Soviet Union must
be considered in the light of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that exists
between the Soviet Union and Revolutionary Ethiopia. Seen from this viewpoint, it
is natural for friends to meet, and it is not difficult to imagine the results of
a meeting between fr.iends. In short, Comrade Mengitsu's visit to the Soviet Union
- has helped both part~es to exchange views on bilateral and internationaY issues of
mutual interest and to further strengthen the close ties that already exist bet-
ween the two countries.
~Question~ What are ynur country's primary social, political and economic objec-
tives?
~Answer~ Ours is probably the most backward feudal society history has ever -
known. The opgressive fist of the regime was unquestionably formidable but was
unable to break the indomitable will of our people to free themselves of that
historically antiquated socioeconomic system. The revolutionary fervor that broke
out in the shanties and made its appearance in the factories, together with the
numerous revolts of the farm workers, produced a revolutionary situation that
finally exploded in February 1974. The feudal order and the monarchy were abol-
ished.
A national democratic revolutiona~:y program was put into effect, under which the
socioeconomic system was radically restructured. An agrarian reform law was
~ introduced that nationalized lands and distributed them among the farmers. An- _
other equally radical step was the nationalization of the urban properties and
_ extra homes. This is what did away with the detestable and abusive rental system
to which thousands of city inhabitants were being subjected. Rents were reduced,
in some cases by 50 percent, which benefited low-income persons. With generous _
government loans and free terrains, many city inhabitants were now able to build
their own homes in urban areas. The financial institutions, that is, banks, in-
surance companies, etc., were also nationalized and made available to the people.
- ~r~uuction ratios cannot be said to have changed with th~ passing of ~he ownership
of lands from the landholders to the farm workers. The resurgence of capitalism
would of course have been a virtual certainty if the matter had been left to -
- chance. This was the consideration that led the CAMP to foster the creation of
- cooperatives by granting all the necessary facilities in the form of easy credits,
[arming machinery services, fertilizers, etc. To modernize farming and introduce
new technologies, among other things, the government promoted statE-owned gran-
- aries, eliminating private ownerships once and for all. These measures have put _
Ethiopia firmly on the road to socialist growth. The fact that this historical
feat has been achieved without leadership from a political party has earned for
our revolution a unique place in the world revolutionary process of this era.
This has also taken those bourgeois detractors down a peg who were saying that
ours was just another of those rnilitary coups that are unfortunately not infre-
quent nowadays. Under Comrade President Mengistu Haile Mariam's wise and
prominent leadership, the CAMP has taken a number of parallel steps designed
~ as prerequisites to the building of socialism.
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The ttevolutionary National Economic Campaign was launched, having among its objec-
tives the reconstruction of our war-devastated economy, the satisfying of our
people's basic and urgent needs, and the elimination of all the tr.aces of under-
- development inherited from the previous regime. The Campaign has as one of its
objectives the gatherinq of the data needed to bring.forth a 10-year development
plan. We have now achieved encouraging results in all sectors. Unemployment in _
the urban sector has been reduced substantially. Oar relocation, water conserva-
tion and irrigation progLams have brought vast relief to a goodly number of our
people who were victims of natural anc~ man-made disasters. Perhaps the aspect of
- our Campaign that most dr~matically underscores our society's revolutionary trans-
formation is the brilliant success achieved under its literacy program.
The life of a revolution depends entirely on the leadership grovided to it by a
party that is closely linked to the masses. When we formed the COPPTE, ~we thereby
took the first and most decisive step toward the creation of a Party of the Work- -
ing People. The COPPTE, which has as its members all the Ethiopian communists who _
havv distinguished themselves as genuine and unquestionable militants of the
Revolution, has already held its historic first congress. Based on the resolu- -
tions passed by that congress, a massive campaign is now under way throughout the
country to enlarge the COPPTE's social and ideological bas~es. We are confident
the Ethiopian Working Peoples Party will emerge.
~Question~ How do you view the role of Africa, especially that of Ethiopia, in
Nonaligned Movement's struggle against imperialist penetration and for development
and self-determination?
- ~Answer~ All the members of the OAU are also members of the Nonaligned Movement,
and the role they play against penetration by imperialism and for development and
self-determination of peoples is clearly embodied, in spirit and in content, in
the principles of the movement. The continent as a whole plays a significant role
in the struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism. -
- As a member of the family of nations of the OAU, by virtue of its geopolitical
placement, and also because of its having opted for the road to socialistic
growth, Ethiopia plays a particularly significant role in the struggle against
imperialistic penetration. The Ethiopian people are resisting heroically the _
imperialistic penetration of the Horn of Africa.
The recent acquisition by the Uni~ed States of military bases in Somalia and
Revolutionary Ethiopia's diplomatic of�ensive to offset this provide precisely
- another example of Ethiopia's determination to strive agains imperiala.st penetra-
tion. Ethiopia's support of revolutionary movements is firmly based. As regards
development, Ethiopia, in cooperation with the Nonaligned Movement and the Group
of the 77, strives for the establishment of a new economic world order.
COPYRIGFiT: BOHEMIA 1981
9399
CSO: 4410/23 -
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GHANA
LIMANN INTERVIEWED ON ECONOMY, PARTY'S IDEOLOGY
LD131203 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 13 May 81 p 16
[Mark Webster report of FINANCIAL TIMES interview with Ghana's Presi~dent Hilla
_ Limann, near Accra, Ghana; date not given: "The President's View: From Anarchy
to a New Order"]
[Excerpt] The interview began with a general review of the government's first 18
months in power.
[Question] Whaz hope is there of an economic recovery?
[Answer] "Recovery is very relative in economic matters. Given an economic situa-
ti~n of total destruction, it is very diff icult to speak of recovery in facile terms.
You cannot reconstruct roads very quickly even if yau have the means and we don't
have them. Our schools need equipment and some or them need reconstruction. Our
hospitals and clinics lack drugs, everywhere you look you see evidence of neglect
_ and in some cases total destruction. If all these have to be rehabilitated and
we say we are going to rehabilitate them, it needs a lot of money and a lot of time."
[Question] How are negotiations progressing with Il~'?
[AnswerJ "The IMF and the World Bank have come here a number of times and initially
they could understand us and we could understand them. I don't think they still do
fully understand us. They come with ideas and recipes which fit very industrialised
countries and try to advise us to adopt them here, Personally, I have Cold them
~ it is not possible."
[Question] Will you refuse to devalue?
[Ar~swer] "Since 1968 there have been repeated attempts to tinker with the currency
and every time things became worse. If only the IMF could just remember these
things it would have given us less need to talk and explain these things. We can-
_ not forget because we had to live them. We cannot forget in the way they forget.
"If they will only understand what we are saying we will make progress. But on
the whole my attitude is to say that our salvation lies in our own hands. You
don't need IMF's help to start a garden in your backyard. If you get outside help
it should only supplement your own efforts.
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"What will you achieve (if you devalue)? You will achieve nothing. The first
time this was raised I told them that as an economist you devalue to promote ex-
ports, but at the moment we are not producing anything to export so what are we
trying to achieve by devaluing? It would ~ust be an empty gesture which would
cause hardship for everybody with nothing tangible in retu~n."
[Question] Is your party really the descendant of Nkrumah's CPP?
[Answer] Our manifesto picked up quite a lot from the development plans of the
first republic which were drawn up under the late President Nkrumah. But our
problem right now is one of sheer survival, how to live, how to exist. That to
me overrides any question of ideology.
"These people who talk about ideology don't know what they are talking about. Marx
said man must eat, drink and clothe himself before he can think. Our problem is
how to feed people and let them stay alive before they can think.
"Chana is my ideology. Ghana and her economic salvation are my ideology. That
is cur main objective."
- (Qestion] What about moves to remove you as head of the party?
[Answer] "I haven't heard about these moves yet. I think people will never under-
stand our party. Even some people very close to it don't understand certain fea-
tures of the party. Maybe it's like that with all mass parties. Those who in-
trigue most, those who lobby most get nowhere and those who don't come out on top.
It was the case with my own nomination, I never lobbied anybody, I never asked any-
body but I was asked to lead."
[Question] You have been accused of being a lacklustre president?
[Answer] "What creates lustre, money and publicity, unpopular decisions which cap-
ture headlines. We have taken unpopular decisions but they are not the sort which
- capture headlines. If the ship of state is sinking and everyone is running away
from it, what you need at such a time is not declamations and attitudes which give
- you lustre. You need levelheadedness, calmness, open-mindedness, patience and an
understanding of the problems." .
[Question] Is it time to review the AFRC's constitutional amendments?
[AnswerJ "It is something for public debate. We must assess public opinion. These
measure~ were hailed by the general public, even the executions were hailed by the
general public. It is easy to be sentimental now but one had to be there at the
time to know the public reaction."
[Question] How are relations with Britain?
[Answer] Our relations with Britain are very good. I keep telling Britain that
we expect a lot from her because historically she is the mother country and if a
child is in need, it turns to the mother. But we recognise the mother is in dif-
ficulties."
- C50: 4420/1038 31
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GUIN~A
FIGURES SHOW COlTVTRY AS LARGEST B~Nr:FICIARY OF ARAB AID
_ Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 May 81 pp 42-43
[Article by Samir Gharbi: "How To Seduce the Arabs"]
[Excerpts] Never has an African country profited in one single year from the
Arab gold mine like Guinea; $371 million in 1980. This is more than
Senegal (325 million) and more than Mali (260 million) or Cameroon (198 million)
received in 8 years (1973 to 1980).
The record held by Zaire (217 million in 1975) has thus been exceeded. Witli
a cumularive total of $605 million from 1973 to 1980, Guinea now heads the
_ lisC of African countries receivjag Arab aid, ahead of Senegal (599 million),
Zaire (428 million), Kenya (322 million) and Uganda (307 million)....
- Ef f ic iency
But hc~ :;.s it that Sekou Toure's country has suddenly become the cherished
_ child o~ ah~ Gulf states which, thanks to the o31 manna, can lend as much
to ev; ---one at the same time? No religious factor exists, because there are
no mc ,:~oslems in Guinea than in Senegal. Economic potential is equally
not th~ ietermining factor. To be sure, Gu3nea has unexploited riches. But
- Arab lenclers would certainly not look for long-term profits in a far-away
country where, in addition, the economic apparatus must be recreated.
T'o find a motive for Arab largesse, one must in reality acknowledge the
Guinean leader's efficiency. Following 20 years of "voluntary seclusion,"
' he decided, in March 1978, to rediscover the world. A pilgrim's stick in one
hand, a beggar's bowl in the other, he visited the Gulf countries, knocking
on the right doors and e~ibiting simultaneously ~reat sincerity and touching
persuasio~.
Ai~med Sekou Toure has gained the confidence of h3s correligionists in the
political f ield, who appointed him chairman of the Islamic good-will committee
in *he Iran-Iraq issue. One can safely bet that he will, once again, benefit
from this mission, even if it is doomed to failure. Financially, figures
speak for themselves: a simn of $605 million between 1973 and 1978 represents
exactly 10.6 percent of all Arab credits to non-Arab African countries during
the same period ($5.7 billion) .
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Yroj ects
Of course, the greatest part of these amounts is in the form of loanse However,
conditions are more than advantageous: 86 percent in loans granted Guinea
~re reimbursable in 15 or 20 years, with often a grace period of 5 additional
years. The interest rate is low (from 2 to 4 percent), and sometimes non-
_ existent.
These funds are earmarked for the financing of development projects and the
rescue of the balance of payments. Among these pro~ects are the construction
of a cement plant in Conakry ($12.7 million, or 85 percent of the to tal cost),
ttie construction and maintenance of roads ($6 million, or 22.4 percent of the
total cost) and especially the integrated Konkoure and Ayekoye projects viewed
_ as "a first priority," involving the buiZding of two hydroelectric dams in
Souapiti and Amaria and of two plants; one for alumina (capacity: 1.2 million
tons per year) a~nd the other for aluminum (production: 150,000 tons per y ear).
- According to certain estimates, the total cost of Guinean economic pro~ects
reportedly amounts to $1 to $1.2 billion. Arab participation (in the form
of loans and investments) reportedly reaches already $400 million (Iraq:
63 percent, Saudi Arabia: 25 percent and Libya: 12 percent).
No Interest
Ai~ to the balance of payments is aimed at financing various imports: in
1979 and 1980, the Islamic Development Bank already granted $21 million for
the purchase of cement, clinker and power generators; oil bills also figured
prominently. In 1980, the IDR provided $20 million far the purchase of refined
products in Libya. From 1976 to 1979, the OPEC Fund loan amounted to
$9 million reimbursable in 15 years...without interest!
As usual, Arab aid is negotiated and granted from government to government.
Countries that are the most generous vis-a-vis Guinea include Saudi Arabia,
- Iraq, Libya and Kuwait. As for multilateral aid, which represents approximately
20 percent of the total, it is notably transacted through the BADEA (Arab Bank
for African Economic Development), the Islamic Bank and the OPEC Fund.
COYYttIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
CSO: 4400/1194
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NIGER
BRIEFS
WATER CONFERENCE--Organized by the WHO and the GTZ [German Office for Technical
Cooperation], the 1981 Niger Water Conference took place in Niamey from
25 to 28 February. It was attended by the Nigerien ministers of Planning and
Hydraulics, and by many backers such as organizations from the United Nations,
regional organizations, and bilateral and multilateral assistance. Discussions . -
were about present needs. In fact, while the country has little over 6,100 ~
~~ater supply sites and the per capita need is estimated at a minimum of 25 liters
per day, 22,000 water supply sites would be needed by 1990. But funds for this
- sector would be difficult to get, and in any case the OFEDES [Off ice of Subsoil
Water] can only dig 250 wells a year. Therefore, it will be necessary to resort -
to sinking wells by private companies, even if these cost ~ore in investment _
and maintenance. Without cocamitting themselves to future assistance, it was thus
_ possible to inform the backers of the problems they w+.ll have to study and, as
is hoped by Nigerien authorities, will help resolve. ~Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Freach 10 Apr 81 p 1006] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
~ et Cie, Paris 1981] 9465
CSO: 4400/1083 -
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~
SENEGAL
DATA ON ICS CONSTRUCTION, PRODUCTION, MARKETING, CAPITAL
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 999
[Article: "Laying the Cornerstone For the Senegalese Chemical Industries"] _
[Excerpts] On 2 April, Senegalese president Abdou Diouf lay the first stone for
the Senegalese Chemical Industries, and according to him this marks a policy for -
industrial revival in Senegal.
At a cabinet meeting on 31 March, the president of the republic pointed out that -
this was the most important industrial project of the Senegalese government since
- Senegal became a sovereign state, and that it had meanL important financing of
about 60 billion CFA francs. -
ICS Plan -
Preliminary studies were positive, and the ICS [Senegalese Chemical Industries]
= then commissioned the Nitrogen and Chemical Products Company to do a series of
_ in-depth studies which confirmed the value of the project an~t. led to the decision
that it be carried out. T'hus, in November 1980, the planning company was changed
into a development company that has a capital of 21.3 billion CFA fr.ancs.
- Production -
The ICS will create 400 jobs and will have annual export sales of ~bout 25 billion
CFA francs. By 1984 the installations are expected to be in seivice. There will
- be three production units.
Two units will be established on the Taiba-Darou Khoudoss site, one will produce
sul.furic acid (with a capacity for 560,000 tons per year), the other will produce _
phosphoric acid (with a capacity of 220,000 tons per year).
- The third unit, set up in Mbao, next to SIES [expansion unknown] will manufacture
fertilizers (45,000 tons a year of superphosphate tribasic TSP and 165,000 tons -
a year of ammonium phosphate DAP).
Finally, installations for storage and handling in the port of Dakar wili insure
delivery of raw materials (sulfur, ammonia), and the shipping of phosphoric
acid (about 200,000 tons a year) and 212,000 tons a year of solid fertilizers.
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'1'he analyses of the "sludge," which were very satisfactory, will be continued
- during the building of the ICS. From the start, workshops will be devised to
use these studies.
- Mar.keting
The marketing of fertilizers (about 212,000 tons per year) can be done, to a great
extent, through the network of the Potash and Nitrogen Sales Company (SCPA),
which will have thP preferential market for ICS products. Moreover, the Indian
partners have ~igned a long-term contract to buy the equivalent of at least
66,000 tons of P205, in the form of phosphoric acid, per year.
Quantitatively, sales prospects are satisfactory, and for certain markets for
which they ar~e targeted the location of the ICS should assure them the ddvantage
of stable prices. In additian, setting up the largest SCPA is a positive element.
Thr.oughout Africa, the consumption of phosphate fertilizers has increased, on an
average, by 8 percent a year between 1165 and 1966, 1977 and 1978. During the
same period, consumption in wesrern and central African countries targeted by the
project increased more rapidly (on the average by +13.5 percent per year),
reaching 46,000 tons of P205 in 1977-1978 (only 5 percent a year of the total
amount in Africa).
Taking into account the agricultural production programs anticipated for these
countries in future years, this market will then absorb most of the production
expected by the ICS in these areas.
_ Capital and Financing
" The ICS Develapment Company is a private limited com~any without rights in
_ Senegal. Its ties with Senegal are through an agreement that guarantees the ICS
a privileged fiscal status, stable prices for use of public goods and facilities
(water, electricity, railroads), and a steady sugply of phosphate.
_ The capital of the ICS Planning Company, first at 100 million CFA rrancs, reached
- 225 milli~n by 18 November I978. The general assembly of 18 November 1580 decided
to change the Planning Company into the ICS nevelopment Company and. to increase
i~s capital to 21.3 billion CFA.
. The capital of the ICS Development Company is distributed as follows:
Capital Distribution of the ICS
Sec�tor Millions CFA Percentages
Senegal 5,673.3 26.6
Ivory Coast 2,300.0 10.8
- Nigeria 2,300.0 10.8
Islamic Development Bank 2,298.0 10.8
Indian Interestsl 4,600.U 21.0
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Potash and Nitrogen Trading Co.,
and S~negalese Fertilizer and
Chemical Products Company2 2,300.0 10.8 _
5enegalese Taiba Phosphates Co. 1,600.0 7.5 _
- Others3 228.7 1.1
Total 21,300.0 -
1.~Indian Farmers Fertilizers Corp., Ma3ras Fertilizers, Southern Petrochemical
Industries Corp., Zuari Agro-Industries, Minerals and Metals Trading Corp, and
~ the Indian government.
2. Subsidiaries of Mineral and Chemical Enterprises (EMC). -
= 3. Senegalese Thies Phosphate Company (27.38 million CFA francs), Industrial `
Fertilizers Co. of Senegal ($2.75 million), BICIS [International Bank of Commerce _
- and Industry of Senegal] (79.2 million), Water and Electricity of West Africa
- (16.87 million), CIECH [expansicn unknown] (Poland) (22.5 million).
- One can see that leading international financial organizations are particip3ting in
- long-term financing. These include: the African Development Bank (ADB), the
Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA), the European Investment
Bank (EIB), the European Development Fund (EDF), the ~~~tral Fund for Economic
" Coop~ration (CCCE), the World Bank, the International Financs Corporation (SFI),
the German Development Corporation (DEG), OYEC Funds, the Iraqi Development Funds.
Finally, we should note that Pierre Babacar Kama is president-general director
of the Senegalese Chemical Industr.ies, while Maurice Boo is its managing -
director.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Parxs 1981
9465
CSO: 4400/1083
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SENEGAL
BRIEFS
DIOUF ANNOUNCES POLITICAL REFQRMS--At a cabinet meeting on 31 March, Presidei~~ _
Abdou Diouf announced a series Qf political and economic measures with a view
towards increasing liberalization by the Senegalese regime and improving condi- _
tions for farmers. In his first message to the country since 1 January, at which _
time he succeeded Leopold Senghor, on 4 April, the 21st anniversary of independence
day, Mr Diouf inentioned the cancellation of the farmers' debt for buying seed
and fertilizers. This measure will cost the government 20 billion CFA francs,
as well as raise the price of agricultural products. President Diouf, who had
promised almost total amnesty, has confirmed that the parliar~ent will. convene in
10 days to approve all political parties, at present limited to fouL. Finally,
the Senegalese head of state declared that after the states general of education,
which met in January, he decided on educational reforn. that will include the
progressive extension of education, liCe:racy for the masses, the use of national
languages, and matching education to jobs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 998] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris
1981 ] 9465
DRAFT BUDGET 1981-1982--An official communique from 2 April indicates that the _
= budget planned for Senegal was set by the government at 212.17 billion CFA francs
for. revenues and at 211.2 billion francs for expenditures, or an increase over
the previous budget of 18.75 billion and 19.5 billion CFA francs respectively.
In general term~, the 1981-1982 budget has the following distribution: an
~ operating budget (125.5 billion CFA francs as opposed to 115.6 billion last year),
a budget for equipment (21.2 billion CFA francs as opposed to 22 billion last
year), and special treasury accounts (65.5 billion CFA francs). According to
_ the communique, the aperating budget takes into account policies for a reduction
in the state's standard of living, now done according to the Senegalese Recovery -
Plan (1980-1985), and the need to account for inflation so rhat the state may
preserve its buying power. The dei.ails of the budgetary plans will be published
_ when it is next examined by the national assembly. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
= Moreux et Cie, Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in rrench -
10 Apr 81 p 998] 9465
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ADB ANTI-DESERTIFIC'ATION FINANCING--It was learned in Dakar that the African
Development Bank (ADB) will finance the projects for anti-desertification in
_ Senegal, where Willy Mung'Omba, president of the ADB, was on an official visit.
The ADB will contribute about 8 million account units (or about 2.4 billion CFA
francs) in projects for fighting brush fires, reforestation, and hydraulics in
eastern Senegal. The total cost of these pro~ects amounts to about 9 million
account units. Moreover, the ADB will finance a part of the Senegalese special
hydraulics program, contributing an as yet undetermined amount. Since their
inception, the ADB and its branch, the African Development Fund, have given
Senegal a total of 14 billion CFA francs in aid. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 1000] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et
_ Cie, Paris 1981] 9465
FU~:L PRICE INCREASES--On 3 April the price of fuel was raised again in Senegal by
a little over 7 percent, less than 3 months after the previous increase on 12
January. According to this new increase, the price of high-octane and regular
gasol:ine will go to 210 and 199 CFA francs respectively, as opposed to the
previuus price of 195 and 185 francs each. Other petroleum products, outside
of fuel-oil, gasoline for pirogues, and gas-oil for fishing to be subsidized by
the government, will also be increased by 7 percent. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 1000] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie, Paris 1981] 9465
CS~: 4400/1083 IND
~
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