JPRS ID: 9763 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9763
1 June 1981 ~
U SSR Re ort
p ,
POIITiCAI AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
CFOUO 16/81)
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JPRS L/9763 -
. _
1 June 1981 ~
- USSR REPORT
- POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 16/81)
CONTENTS ~
INTERNATIONAL
Book Describes Soviet Viewa on Helsinki Accorda
(S. Vladimirav, L. Teplov; RURSOM KHEL'SINKSKIKH
DOGOVORENNOSTEY, 1980) 1
~ NATIONAL
Mirza Ibrahimov Diacusses Role of Soviet Writ~r, CPSU Congress
_ (Mirza T'~rahimov; LITERATURNYY AZERBAYDZHAN, No 2, 1981)... 42
_ a - [III - USSR - 35 FOUO]
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INTERNATIONAL
BOOK DESCRIBES SOVIET VIEWS ON HELSINKI ACCORDS
Moscow KURSOM KHEL'SINKSKIKH DOGOVORENNOSTEY in Ruasian 1980 pp 1, 2, 3-6, 63-112,
217-219, 224
_ [Table of Contents, Iatroduction, the Chapter on "Military Detente: An Urgent Task
of the Present Time" and the Coaclusion from the book by S. Vladimirov and L. Teplov,
edited by V. I. St~-aakov]
[Excerpts] Title Page:
, Titls: KURSOM KHEL'SINKSKIKH DOGOVORENNOSTEY (On the Course of the Helsinki
Accords)
Publisher: Mezhdunarodnyye Otaoeheniya
Place and yeas of publication: Moscows 1980
I Signed to Press Date: 5 August 1980
Number of Copies Published: 10,000
Number of Pages: 224
. Brief Descriptiou:
The book discloses the specif ic coatent of the peace-loving initiatives which have
- been undertaken by the Soviet Union along with the other countries of the socialist
: commonwealth for implementing the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, it unmasks the activities of NATO and the military indus-
- trial complexes of the Western powers, pri~oarily the United States, which are act-
ing against the Selsinki Accords.
The book is designed for specialists in international affairs and readers who are
interested in urgent problems of international life.
Table of Contents
- [Introduction] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Final Act--A Code of Standards for Peaceful Coexistence 7
For Strengthening Peace in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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Military Detente: Aa Urgent Task of the Present Time . . � � � � � � � . � . 63
The Materialization of Detente in the Economic Sphere . . . . . . . . . . . . 11~
Subversive Activities by the Opponents of the Helsinki Accords 160
The Progressive Forces in the Struggle for Security aad Cooperation
in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
APPendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
[Introduction]
L August 1980 marks the Sth anniversary of the signing in the Finnish capital of
Helsinki of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation i.n Europe.
The conf ereace was called upon the initiative of the sc~cialiat countriea. Signed
by the leaders of 33 European atates as well as by the Uaited States and Canada,
- t his docum~nt is of truly historical sigaificance for the fates of the peoples of
Europe and the entire world. In taking a long view of the Final Act, the General
Secretary of the CPSU Ceatral Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, emphasfzed in hia speech at the all-
European conference: The document beiag signed by us is a broad but clear plat-
fcsrm for the actions of states on a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral basis
~
~ or years and poasibly decadea to come.i1
It can be said that literally from the first day of signing the Fiaal Act, the
Soviet Union, together with the fraternal socialist nations, have fought steadily
and consistently for the uaswerving and strict fulf illment of all provisions of
this document, without exception, fully and in all areas--political, ecoaomic and
humanitarian. The USSR has fought to extend polirical deten~e and complement it
with military deten_*.e. Precisely the policy of primarily the socialist countries
can serve and actually does serve as a model of an honeat, conscientious and ~re-
ative approach to carrying out the Helsinlci Accords.
In acting in accord with the 'letter and spirit of the Final Act, the countries of
- the socialist commonwealth in recent years have made a whole series of important
constructive proposals aimed at implea~entiag and developing the provisions contained
in this document. At meetings of the Political Consultative Co~ittee [PCC], at
sessions of the Foreign Ministers ~ommittee of the Warsaw Pact Organization and at
other joint forums and meetings, the socialist countries by concrete deeds and ini-
tiatives convinciagly affirmed and today aff irm the sigaificance which they give to
the questions of strengthening European security and devel~ping cooperation among
states with different social systems in a spirit of the Final Act. This is under-
' standable. For this is the fixed and grincipled policy of the Sovier Union and the
other fraternal socialist countries, the policy of the struggle for peace bequeathed
by V. I. Lenin and reinforced in the decisions of the fraternal party congresses.
Detent~ in Europe is naturally a collective conceru which requires the efforts of
all the involved states. In recognizing that under present-day conditions, when
weapons capable of destroying all living things on our world have been developed
- and stockpiled in enormous quantities and that there is no reasonable alternative
to the policy of detente, the Western countries who showed a feeling of realism in
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the course of the European-~Tide conference, made a corresponding contribution t~
_ the common noble cause, having put their signatures to the Final Act of the Confer-
= ence on Security and Cooperation :n Europe. All of this, of course, has helped to
improve the political climate on the European continent and beyond it.
Howe~ver, at the end of the 1970's and the beginniag of the 1980's, the imperialist
' circles of the West, and prfmarily the United States, have intentionally followed a
policy of exacerbating the situatian in tihe world and uadermiaing a lessening of
international tension; they have begun intensive sniping at the Helsinki Accords.
What is the reason for such a change in Washington's policy? The main thing is that
imperialism and the international reaction do not want ta accept the steady change
in the balance of forces in favor of socialism and peace or the further strengthen-
ing of the worldwide positiona of the socialist coumonwealth. Facts speak f or
themselves: the SO million p~ople of heroic Vietnam have victoriously established
themselves as the reliable and strong outpoat of socialism in Southeast Asia. The
- courageous peoples of Laos and Kampuch~a have set out on the path of building the
foundations of socialism.
The struggle of peoples for national and social liberation has grown wider and is
continuing to develop. Liberation movements havp been victorious in Ethiopia,
Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe and Guinea-Bissau. This has
been a great blow against imperialism. A mass movement is growing in South Africa,
the last bastion of colonialism and racism in the south of Africa. This is the ob-
jective course of history. "The more the opportunities of imperialism are reduced
to rule over other nations and peoples," said L. I. Brezhnev on 22 February 1980 in
the Kremlin, "the more rabidly its most aggresaive and shortsighted representatives
respond to this."2
The situation in the 1970's wao very complex. It was characterized by a deepening
of the general crisis of capitalism. Economic instability, financial disturbances,
a steep inflationary spiral, the growth of unemploymeat, enormous military outlays
and the energy crisis--all of this exacerbated the sociopolitical situation in the
. capir.alist countries.
In this situation, in benefiting from events in Afghanistan, the ruling imperialist
circles in the West, and pri.marily the American Administration, began an off ensive
against detente. "The present U.S. leadership," said L. I. Brezhnev, "is carrying
out a line of subverting detente and exacerbating the international ~ituation. It
is endeauoring to impose its will on the socialist states and other countries."3
However the USSR--and this has been repeatedly stated on the highest level--in the
- tuture will consistently f ollow its peace~loving foreign policy and steadily strug-
gle to fully implement the accords of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe and to check the aggressive f orces and reaction. This course has been de-
fined by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and has a long-range, priacipled natur~.
L~z an interview with the newspaper PRAVDA on 13 3aauary 1980, L. I. Brezhnev, in
describing the prospects of the struggle for European security, emphasized: "In
Europe much can be done that is constructive in favor of peace in the not-distant
future, in particular, in line with the coming meeting in Madrid and the proposal
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of the Warsaw Pact countries to hold a conference on military detente and disarma-
ment. We are decisive supportera of strengtheaing and adding to all that is posi-
tive which has b~een achieved over the years on the European contiinent by the col-
lective efforts of states, large and small. In the future we will carry~ out a
policy of peace and friendship among p,soples. In contrast to the preaent extremist
position of Washington, our policy consists in continuing the talks started in
recent years in many areas for the Furpose of halting the arms race. This, of
course, also touches on the problems of lessenin~ the military confrontation in
Europe.
The unswerving determination of the USSR and the othe~ socialist couatries to fol- =
low this course has gained new vivid expression in the work and the results of the
meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC held on 14-15 May 1980 in the capital of socialist
Poland.
- The meeting whicli was held during the days of the 25th jubilee cFlebration of the
Warsaw Pact put forward major peace initiatives which should, as was pointed out in
the document of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet ~nd the USSR Council of Ministers, provide a new, strong impe-
tus to the process of detente.
"The strength of our party," said L. I. Brezhnev in his speech on 15 May 1980 in
Warsaw, "lies in the fraternal unity of our countries, our parties, our peoples
and in our loyalty to the great ideas a� :~farxism-Leniaism r~nd the principles of
socialist internationali.sm. The strength of our party lies in the fact that it .
meets the vital interests of hundreds of mil5ions of people throughout Che world,
'of everyone who needs peace and not war....
E~OTNOTES
- 1. L. I. Brezhnev, Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Speeches and
Articles, Vol 5, ?loscaw, 1976, p 339.
2, PRAVDA, 23 February 1980.
3. Ibid.
- 4. PRAVDA, 13 January 1980.
5, PRAVDA, 16 May 1980. ~
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Military Detente: An Urgent Task of.the Present Time
Having approved the basic principles which will guide the signatory states in their -
mutual relations, the European-wide conference created a good foundation not only
for developing broader cooperation and mutually advantageous ties. At the same
time a solid basis was put down for extending detente iato the military area. Thus,
a strategic area was pointed out for fur~ther efforta aimed at the final elimina-
tion of the threat of wars in Europe.
Of course, the unswerviag observance of the approved principles of state relation-
, ships by all the canference participants is an iadispensable conditi~n for greater
trust among thesn, and this, in turn, is extremely important for subsequent steps
which involve security interests. But another tbing is alss~ obvious: factors
favorable to the cause o� peace in no way lead a~itomatically to mi].itary detente.
They merely open up real opportunities for the ap~roval of specific measures in
the given a~ea.
There is also another interdependence: each success in the area of military de-
_ tente helps to strengthen political detente, since without implementing the military
detente measures the process of improving political relations between the states
can be impeded. -
~he concept of "military detente" encompasses a number of areas which are largely
interrelated. The basic specif ic components of military detente were c].ear}y formu-
- lated in the Decree of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of "
the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Results of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" of 7 August 1975. Here are ttiese
components: the reduction and then the halting of the arms race, advancement along
a path leading to L.niversal and complete disarmament; the reduction of the military
confrontation on the Furopean continent; the overcoming of the division of Europe
into opposing military blocs. _
` The European-wide conference, as is known, was not s,.acially concerned with the
- specific questions of disarmament and the militaxy s.tua~ion in Europe. But, in _
examining the problems of security and cooperation, ~ne conference paid attention
as well to certain questions which relate to the mi. �ary sphere: the questions of
strengthening stability and trust.
At the conference, and this was stated in the Final ~`^r, lmportant measures were
approved aimed at strengthening trust and stabilit}~: They all help to reduce the
danger of the outbreak of an armed conf lict in Eur.,~, and most importaatly prevent
an incorrect understanding or incorrect asaessmen' ~f military activities by one or
another state. This can occur, in particular, u cc: conditions where the member ~
states lack clear and prompt information on *.'n: ~~.,>f.e of the military activities
of other states.
Here is a striking example tnat it is a q~~a measures wh~.ch are of axception- _
ally great significance. On 9 November =':ae headquarters of the North Amer-
ican Air Defense Command (NORAD) in Colc ~-gs, Colorado, an alert was an-
nounced of an "assumed nuclear attack on States." Fighter interceptors
took to the air upon c~mmand from air h... ~.~gon, Michigan and the Canadian
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Province of British Columbia. The missile bases in the United States were brought
to a state of combat readiness. Only 6 minutes later was it established that the =
alert announcec' by the NOBAD early warning system was erroneous and an order fol-
lowed to countermand it.
The UPI Agency pointed out at that time that if the alert h~d lasted 1 minute longer, _
the warning of a"nuclear attack" on the United 5taties would have reached President
J. Carter who could have givea the order for the take-off of nuclear bombe~s and
- preparatione to launch the intercontinental misailes. _
Among the measures relating to trust and stability, the Final Act provides, in the
first place, preliminary notification of major military exercises. It goes without
saying that such exercises, particul$r1y those conducted aear frontiers, can actual-
- ly cause definite concern in neighboring states an~i this should be eliminated as -
much as possible in the interests of strengthening mutual understanding.l
An accord was reached that "notification will be given of major military exercises
by ground forces with a total number of over 25,000 men conducted independently or _
jointly with any possible air force or navy camponents (in this context the word
'troops' includes amphibious and airborne troopa). In the event of independent
exercises of amphibious or airborne troops or joint exerciaes in which they are in-
volved, the designated troopa will also b~ iacluded in this number."2
, Another aspect of the same measure concerns the zonea where exercises requiring
notification are conducted. It was provided that "notification will be given on
major military exercises which are conducted in Europe on the territory of any sig-
- natory state, as we 11, if applicable, in the adjacent maritime area and airspace. -
In the event that the territory of the sigaatory state extends beyond limit, pre-
liminary notification should be given only for exercises which are conducted within
250 km of its frontier facing any other European signatory state or co~on to it." -
_ This means that the states participating ia the conference--with the exception of
the USSR and Turkey--would notify each other of major military~exercises conducted
on any part of the territory of European states. For the USSR and Turkey, aotifica-
~ tion zones were established withtn the limits of 250 km from their frontiers facing
any other European signatory state or co~on with it.3
As for the time of notification for major military exercises, an accord was reached
- that notification of such military exercises would be sent 21 days or more before
the start or upon the closest opportunity before the date of its start, if the ex- _
ercise is set in a shorte~ time. The notification will contain information about
the nfime, if such is to be assignedi the general purpose of the exercise, the states
involved in it, the type of types and the number of involved troops, the region and
the proposed date for conducting it. The signatory states will also, if possible,
provide the appropriate additional information, in particular, that concerning the
components of the participating forces and the time for using these forces.
The impor_.ance of such an accord on preliminary notif ication of ma,jor military ex-
ercises is amphasized by the fact that never before was such a practice achieved in
international relations. Undoubtedly such a procedure will help to strengthen
mutual trust.
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The Soviet Union has unfailingly carried out the accord of the Final Act--like all
its remaining provisions--on preliminary notification of ma~or military exerciaea.
In those instances when mil.itary exercises were conducted in the USSR within the
parameters stipulated by tMe Final Act, preliminary notification of them was given.
For t:he sake of ob~ectivity, it must be said that the other participants of the
European-wide conference more than 50 times have biven notification on military ex-
ercises conducted by them, and such couatries as Hungary, Norway, the FRG, Sweden,
Denmark and a number ~f others have sometimes provided not{.fication on exercises
involving less than 25,000 men, the number provided by the Helsinki Accords.
Another measure of trust and stability state~ in the Final Act is the exchange of
observers at exercises by the armed forces of the signatory states, including those
with different social systema. This is a rather new matter. In the past, in par-
ticular in the 1930's, there were individual instances of reciprocal invitations
by states for observers to attend military maneuvers, but an agreement on a European-
wide scale never existed in this area.
- The inviting of observers to major exercises is a maaifestation of good will by the
_ state conducting the exercise, and for this reason notification of them does not
mean the automatic inviting of observers. Obviously it would be advisable to invite
first observere from neighborin$ countries to ma~or national exercises.
The accord reached on this question states that one or another state in each indi-
vidual instance is to determine whether or not it will send invitations to other
signatory states. In the affirmative case, it will determiae the number of observ-
ers, the procedure and conditions of their participation and provide other informa-
tion which it feels useful. It will also provide the appropriate conditions f or the
invited persons and extend them hospitality.
Thus, the accord on the inviting of observers to military observers--like, inci-
dentally, the other measures of stability and trust--rests on a voluntary basis.
The steps of the USSR, a~ any other sovereign state, on this question have been de-
termined by specific circumstances. Here are the facts.
1976. Invited to the "Kavkaz" [Caucasus] E~cercise conducted from 25 January through
6 February were observers from t~e signatory states located in Southeast Europe:
iiulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia.
In the same year, from 14 through 18 June, the "Sever" [North] Exercises were held.
This time invitations were sent to the couatries located near the region where they
were held, that is, Norway, the GDR, Poland, Finland and Sweden.
1917. Invited to the "Karpaty" [Carpathians] Exercises (11-16 July) were the rep-
resentatives of the FRG, GDR, Austria, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland,
Romania, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
~ 1918. Invited to the "Berezina" Exercises (6-10 February) were the representativcs
of Belgium, the GDR, FRG, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, E~agland, the United
States, France, Czechoslovakia and Switzerland.
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~ Incidentally, in the practice of invitations for foreign obsetWers to military exer-
cises there have been instances when for various reasons one or anot~her aignatory
state refrained from acceptiag the invitation. Thus, Luxembourg did not send an
observer to the "Berezina" Exercises. This, certainly, did not cause any condemna-
tion or criticism from the USSR.
. A third "measure of trust and stability" is the ex.change of military personnel, in-
cluding visits by mil itary delegations. It was assumed that the signatory states,
again acting vol.untarily, could achieve better mutual understanding and this would
aid their common objectives on the questions of strengthening peace.
Within this accord, the contacts of the USSR with other states have noticeably in-
~ creased. Such a conclusion is confirmed by data for the second half af 1979.
I~ July, Odessa was visited by the Ztalian Navy destroyer "Impavodi." At the end
of August of the same year, the Soviet Union was visited by a delegation of French
military pilots from the famous "Normandie--Neman" Air Regiment. Contacts between
Soviet and French aviators have already become a tradition. As was pointed out in
the com~unique, this v isit was carried out "within normal bilateral relations be-
tween the air forces of the two countries."
In September, a detact~ent of ships from the Swedish Navy arrived in Leningrad.
In November, the commander of the Swedish Ground Forces, Lt Gen N. Sk~old, paid an
official visit to the Soviet Union.
During the past, visits were also made by Soviet military delegations to signatory
- countries of the Conf erence on Sec~.3rity and Cooperation in Europe. In SepCember,
Finland was visited by a delegation from the USSR General Staff, and in October
Helsinki was visited by representatives from the Leningrad Higher Naval School imeni
M. V. Frunze.
One should also point out such a form of strengthening trust as the organizing in
September 1979 by the USSR Ministry of Defense of a trip to Kiev for foreign air
force attaches during which they visited the Kiev Higher Air School.
- All of this makes it possible to conclude that the approved measures as a whole have
' been not badly carr ied out and actually contribute to the growth of trust in the
military area. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in deed have
shown that they are faithful to the Helsinki Accords.
In acting in the spirit of the Final Ac t, the Soviet Union has consistently come
f orward with specific initiatives the realization of whiGh would lead r_o progress
on the question of military detente in Europe and throughout the world. These ini-
tiatives were contained in a number of speeches by L. I. Brezhnev and in the docu-
ments of the Soviet govarnment and�the Warsaw Pact. Let us mention the most imp~r-
tant ones.
On 21 October 1977 , L. I. Brezhnev, in his speech in the Kremlin, put forward a
program for military detente. This was a pl~tform of actions which would supple-
ment political detente with military detente. Its basic provisions came down to the
following:
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In the first place, to conclude between the participants of the European-wide con-
f erence a treaty on not beiag the f irst to use nuclear weapons against each other; _
Secondly, to agree at least not to expand the membership of the opposing military-
' political groupings and alliances in Europe;
Thirdly, to consistently carry out such measures envisaged by th~ Helsinki Final
- Act as notification ~f major military exercises, the inviting of observers to cer- _
tain of them and the exchange of military delegations; moreover, to agree not Co
conduct exercises above a certain level, for example, 50,000-60,000 men; _
Fourthly, if the countries in the southern part of the Mediterranean basin desiYed
that the military measures uf trust provided in the Final Act would also extend to
this region ad~acent to Europe, to give consideration to this;
~ Fifthly, to discuss aJ.l these problems thoroughly in the near future, in parallel
_ with continuing the Vienna talks, at speeial consultations ,jointly by all partici- -
pating states in the European-wide confe~-ence.4 '
This platform of actions envisages, as is seen by a comparison of it with the pro-
visions of the Final Act, a significant quantitative and qualitative broadening of
the scope o� already active confidence measures. It was actively supported by the
" Warsaw Pact states. Broad circles of the progressive community in all the countries
participating in the Helsinki conf erence also supported it.
- The Soviet delega tion advanced these proposals for review at the meeting of the rep-
resentatives of the signatory states in B~~lgrad on 4 October 1977--9 March 1978.
- However, the United States and the other NATO countries were unwilling to examine
these truly important, constructive initiatives. ~
Such a position by the NATO countries certainly did not halt the eff~~rts of the
Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to further work out peace initiatives _
aimed at ensuring dete.nte on the European continent.
In f ull accord wit h the requirements of the Final Act, in being guided by a sincere
desire to strengthen European and international security, the Soviet Union, along
with the ather Warsaw Pact countries, in May 1978 put forward a number of important
proposals. The particular feature of them is that they lie as it wer.e on the boun-
_ Qary area of political and military areas of detente. They provide treaty law mea- -
~ sures which, witho ut being disarmament in the direct undeistanding of this word,
create a more favorable basis for practical steps to reduce the military eonfronta-
tion and to lessen the possibility of military clashes between states. -
The Moscow (1978) Declaration approved at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC proposed
the implementing of the f ollowing measures:
1) The concluding of a world treaty on the renunciation of force in international -
- relations, This treaty would envisage an obligation of all states to renounce the
use of Force or the threat of force in all its forms and manif estations, including
a ban on the use of nuclear weapons;
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_ 2) The strict carrying out by all signatory states of the obligation not to employ
force or the threat of force i.n relatiuus with one another;
3) The carrying out of proposals that all signatory states would assume the obliga-
tion not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and ehat the
NATO and Warsaw Yact states would uot broaden the membership of both alliances;
~ 4) Measurzs to strengthen the guarantees for the s~ecurity of nonnuclear states,
including the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against states which do not
possess nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory and equally the re-
nunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states where
they presently do not exist.5
It was perf ectly a~pparent that all these initiatives--naturally, in the event of
their implementation--would help to overcome the dividing ~*f Europe into blocs,
and the preveating of this had been a constant aim for the USSR and the other War-
saw Pact countries for many years.
In May 1979, the Warsaw Pact Foreiga Ministers Co~nittee again proposed that prac-
tical steps be taken the implementation of which would make it possible to rlse to
a new level in strengthening trust between the states, to achieve political detente
and integrate it with military deteate.
As an essential step aimed at achie~ing these objectives, the Warsaw Pact countries
proposed that a treaty be concluded between all the signatory states on not being
the first to employ either nuclear or conventional weapons aga3nst each other.
The concluding of such a treaty would fuadamentally strengthen the political and
_ legal foundation for observing the principle of the renunciation of force or the
threat of f orce in Europe, it would raise its effectiveness and thereby create new
guarantees against the unleashing of military conflicts on the European continent.
At the same time the Warsaw Pact countries stated that they were ready:
1) To agree on preliminary notification of significant troop movements in Europe
and on large-scale air force and naval exercises conducted close to the territorial
- waters of other Helsinki signatories;
2) To agree on the nonextension of military-political groupings in Europe, on ,
limiting the level of military exercises and on extending the confidence measures
to the region of the Mediterranean.
.
Particular attention among the gover~ents and public in the West was focused on the
proposal of the Warsaw Pact countries to convene a conference on the political level
with the participation of all the European states, the United States and Canada for
_ reviewing specific steps for the purposes of lessening the military confrontation
and advancing military detente in Europe.
Seemingly, having in front of them si�,ch an extensive range of proposals by the USSR
- and its Warsaw Pact allies, the West~rn Selainki signatories would act ~s the
Helsinki Accords require and to which their signatures were af f ixed . Certainly no
one could dispute the fact that all the mentioned proposals conf ormed to the spirit
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_ of the Final Act which urged that everything necessary be done to ensure the de-
velopment of European international relations along a path of the consistent
strengthening ~f peacef ul coexistence and the supplementing of political detente
by military detente.
Unfortunately, by the end of 1979, the question of the further developmeat of in-
= ternational relations in Europe had not only not approached itu solution, but, on
the contrary, had taken on particular acuteness. This was due to the plans to pro-
duce and deploy on the territory of a number of the Westera European NATO states
qualitatively new American medium-range nuclear missiles aimed at the USSR and its
allies .
The carrying out of these militaristic plans would substanti~lly alter the strategic
situation in Europe, as this woril.d shatter the equilibrium existing on the continent
between the military f orces of the two social systems, socialist and capitalist.
' Certainly the Warsaw Pact which would never permit NATO military superiority would
- be forced to take measures 3.n response and a new increase in the arms race would
be inevitable.
In order not to permit such a dangerous development of eveats for the cause of
Eurnpean and universal peace, the USSR, together with its Warsaw Pact allies, showed
true political boldness and set an example of good will, having proposed, it can be
_ said, a program for strengthening peace in Europe. This, without exaggeration, his-
toric initiative was contained ia the speech given by L. I. Brezhnev on 6 October
1979, in Berlin during the days of celebrating the 30th anniversary of the GDR.
The contents of the Program for the Strengthening of Peace in Europe encompass all
the basic aspects of military detente. It contains an appeal:
a) To reduce ttie number of nuclear weapons on the European land. An effective way
to this exists, and the Soviet Union has stated its readiness to do its part. More-
over, as a gesture of good will, the Soviet Union expressed a readiness to unilater-
ally reduce, in comparison with the present level, the number of inedium-range nuclear
weapons deployed in the western regions of the USSR, but, of course, only i.n the
event that Western Europe would not deploy additional medium-range nuclear weapons.
Simultaneously the Soviet Union proposed an immediate start to talks on reducing
medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. It was also stip~ulated that the
previously made proposals to pull o~.t of the Mediterranean the Sovist and American
= ships capable of.carrying nuclear weapons would remain in effect and that the USSR
supported the plan proposed by the President of Finlanci U. Kekkonen to turn Northern
Europe into a nuclear-free zone.
b) To renounce--for all states participating in the European conf erence--the use of
both nuclear and noruiuclear weapons against one aaother. In this regard it was
_ clearly stated that the Soviet Union would never begin to employ nuclear weapons
against those states which refused the production or acquisition of such weapons and
did not have them on their territory. The Soviet Union was ready to draw up a cor-
_ responding obligation with any interested state.
c) To reduce the armed forces and weapons in Central Europe, an issue which had
been under discussion in Vienna since 1973. In order to make headway in these talks
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and give them a new impetus, the Soviet Union took the decision--with the agreement
of the GDR leadership and after consultation with the other Warsaw Pact members--
to unilaterally reduce the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe (specif ically
- it was a question of pulling back up to 20,000 Soviet servtcemen, 1,000 tanks ae
well as a definite quantity of other military equipment from GDR territory onto
Soviet territory within a period of 12 months)..
d) To carry out measures aimed at strengthening trust, such as: to provide noti-
fication on ma,~or rroop exercises of ground forces no.t 21 days before, as had been
- agreed upon in flelsinki, but a longer period before, and not on a level of 25,000
men hut rat~er 20,000; not to conduct exercises involving more than 40,000-50,000
- s ervicemen; to provide notif ication on ma~ or air f orce exercises and naval maneuvers
conducted close to the territorial waters of the other si$natory sta~es; to provide
preliminary notification on movements of ground forces aumbering more than 20,000
men in the aone defined in the Helsinki Act.
The Soviet Union considered a European-wide political conference on mili*_ary detente
and disarmament to be the moet appropr iate place fnr discussing the broad range of
measures relating to military detente and hence confideace-building measures.
The carrying out of the program for strengthening peace in Europe as proposed on
6 October 1979 would not provide any unilateral advantages for the USSR or any other
socialist country. All the natioas of the coatinent would gain from its realiza-
tion. The military threat in Europe would be reduced and a lessening~of tension
~ would be deepened and broadened.
The pro~ram for the strengthening of peace in Europe proposed on 6 October 1979 in
Berlin was unanimeusly supported by the fraternal socialist couatries.6 A session
_ of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee held on 5-6 December in the capital
of the GDR noted that the new initiatives coutained in the speech of L. I. Brezhnev
of 6 October 1979 were a major contribution to solving the problems of military
detent e on the European continent.
On behalf of their states, the ministers p~rticipating in the session appealed to
the governments of the NATO nations to reexamine the situation which existed in
Europe and not to undertake actions which wouLd complicate the situation on the
continent. At the same time it was stated that the taking of the decision by the
. NATO Council to produce and deploy the new types of American medium-range nuclear
- missiles in Weatern Europe and the acting on such a decision would destroy the basis
- for talks.
The ministers had grounds f or su.ch a statement as the preliminary taking of a deci-
sion f or a"build-up" would mean an attempt by NATO to conduct the talks f rom a
- "poaition of strength." This was fully and frankly admitted by the Co~ander-in-
Chief of the Joint NATO Forces in Europe, Gen B. Rogers, who stated: "In order to
be able to conduct successful talks (with the USSR--Author), we must have strength.
- We can obtain it by a decision to praduce and deploy the new weapons." But the
Western powers knew and had been repeatedly convinced that talks from a"position
of strength" were fundamentally unacceptablef or the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact
states.
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The final document, a communique, from the seasion of the Warsaw Pact foreign min-
isters reaffirmed the peace-lovingness of the socialist states and their desire,
along with all the states which had signed the Final Act in Helsinki, to make
detente a continuous process which was evermore viable and universal in scope and
- to strengthen security and pea~~e in Europe.
= Very significant was the fact that precisely on the opening day of the session,
S December 1979, the first Soviet troap formations numbering 9,500 men along with
their weapons and military equipment began to pull out of GDR territory in full
accord with the announcement made by L. I. Brezhnev on the occasion of the 30th
anniversary of the formation of the GDR. -
The pulling out of Soviet troo.pa was not a manifestation of weakness and not a prop-
- aganda ploy. Any attempts to distort the ob~ectives and esaence of this peace-loving
_ step are doomed to failure. By its actions the Soviet Union opened up the way for -
practical measures to aupplement political detente with military detente. _
The foreign ministers'session felt it necessary to reaffirm a number of important
proposals which had been put f orward in th~ Moscow declaration of the PCC of
23 November 1978, including:
1) The conclwding between all the signatory states of a treaty not to be the first
to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other;
To observe the principle of the renunciation of force or the threat of force
in Europe;
- 3) Not to extend the membership of the North Atlantic bloc and Che Warsaw Pact;
_ 4) To agree to the simultaneous disbanning of the Warsaw Paet and NATO, and as a
f irst step, to eliminating their military organizations, starting with a reciprocal
_ reduction in military activities.
The session of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers also proposed a number of specific
measures in the area of military detente in Europe. Some of them clarified already
icnown proposals by the socialist countries and others were made for the first time.
ti,u~ong the important initiatives which were further developed and made more concrete,
_ at the session a special place was held by the proposal to convene a European-wide
political conference on milxtary detente and disarmament.
The subject of discussion at the conference was clearly defined: this could be both
measures to strengthen trust betweea the states in Europe as well as measures aimed
at reducing the concentration and curtailiag armed forces and weapons on the contin-
ent.
Ttie participants at the session voiced the view that the examination of the corres-
p~~ading questions and the approval of specif ic accords on them should be carried
out stage by stage, beginning with the simpler measures and moving step by step to
the more important and more profound ones. -
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The work of the conference should be orgaaized in euch a manner so ae to form a
auccession from one ~tage to another in achieving progress in the a~c~s of the ~ea-
sures to strengthen confiden,ce, to lessea the military confrontation, to reduce the
concentr~tion and curtail the armed forces and weapone aa well as other disaravament
messiiresa Here the aim was that progress in ona area would create graater oppor-
tunities for achieving success in other areae.
The firat stage of the conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe
should focus work on the confidence-buildiag measures, considering that the confer-
ence would be concerned with real disarm$ment measures in the second stage.
The preparations for the conference, in the opinion of the session participants,
should be carried out in relation to the measurea beiag implemented within the
f ramework of the European-wide process, the most immediate being the forthcoming
Madrid meeting of representatives from the signatary states. They felt that con-
sultations between all the signatorq states should play a substantial role ia
achieving general agreement on the comteaing of the conference and its preparations.
Such consultations conducted on a bilateral basis could then, as experience of pre-
par~ng for~ the European-wide conference has shown, be shif ted to a multilateral
basis. It was the conviction of the session participants that this should be done
as quickly as possible to convene a multilateral preparatory working me~ting in
the f irst half of 1980.
The reco~endations resulting from the preparatory work on the basic questions of
_ organizing the conference, including the agenda of its first stage, could be re-
v iewed at the Madrid Mesting of the signatory states in the aim of approving final
decisi~ns on the convening and procedure for conducting the conf erence.
The states represented at the session urged all the participants of the Helsinki
- Conference to carefully study the above-givpn considerations concerning the ob~ec-
tives, contents and proctdure of work for the conference on European detente and
disarmament in Europe and an its preparations and to respond aff irmatively to them
in order to begin to reach agreement on these questions. In this manner a new real
step was taken to strengthen mutual conf idence, security and peace in Europe.
_ Why is military detente in the center of the European continent today more vitally
- necessary than ever before? This question could be briefly answered as follows:
it is extremely dangerous that Europe continues to be a"powder keg," for the con-
tinent is literally "larded" with the most modern types of weapons.
' Europe is a comparatively smal.l p art of the world. Ia territory it. is almost 3-fold
smaller than Africa and 4-fold smaller than Asia and America. But nowhere else in
the world are there so many nuclear and atomic weapons concentrated as on the Euro-
- pean continent. According to t:he data of the bourgeois press, in Europe there are
over 3 million soldiers of the Western European countries alone comprising 56 army
divisions and more than 150 regiments, over 750 fighting ships and more than 2,500
combat aircraf t. More than 8,000 nuclear warheads and more than 3,000 carriers are
located at American bases and military installations in Western Europe.
The Helsinki Conference aff irmed the importance of solving the problem of reducing
armed f orces and weapons in Europe, stating in the Final Act: "The participatit~g
~
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states recognize the interest of all of them in the efforts aimed at reducing m.ili-
tary confrontation...."~ The aations which aigaed the Final Act expressed their
conviction of the need to take effective mPasures in thia area.
Even in the courae of the preparatory coneultatioas (31 January--28 Juae 1973), the
_ basic principlea were set out for aolvixig the problems of reducing armed forces and
weapons. These were: the non3mpairment of the aecurity of any of the parties,
= reciprocity of reductions and their coverage of both troap personael as well as
weaponry. Then also tlie ob~ective of the talks wae set, namely, to reach an agree-
ment on reducing the conceatration of troops in the cea~er of the continent and _
thereby advance the cause of detente in the military area.
An accord was reached that 11 states would participate in the discussion of the _
_ p roblem. These were: the Soviet Union, Poland, the GDR and Czechoelovaki.a as well
- a s the United States, England, Canada, the FRG, Belgi~, the Netherlanda and Luxem-
bourg. These 11 states which would be tnrmQd the'dirQCt participaats at the talks -
would have the right to participate in taking decisions on the essence of the cut- -
b ack queations. The decisiona would be taken on the baeie of general agreement
(the consensus of 11 states). The other eight nationa which participated in the
p reliminary consultatione were Bulgaria, Sungary, Romaai.a, Greece, Denmark, Italy,
Norway and Turkey. They would receive special status which gave them the right,
- without participating in decisioa taking, to make their contribution to the course
o f the discusaion, in particular to distribute documents on the questions under dis-
cussion.
The Soviet Union and the other socialis t nations were in favor of allowing all the _
~ European states so desiriag to participate in the talks, including neutral states,
as the solution to the question of reducing armed forces should not be the preroga- -
t ive of the esisting military-political alliaaces in Europe. However, siace the
Western natioas were agaiast broadening the range of poss~ble participants in the
t alks, the socialist couatries did not inaist on their propoeal and reserved the
r ight to raise this question subsequeatly.
The talks opened in Vienna in Octoher 1913. On 8 November of the same year, the ~
s ocialist countries aubmitted for discusaion a draft agreement which, in fu~l accord
with the provisions ag~eed upon in the course of the preliminary consultations, en-
v isaged a reduction ia the armies of the USSR, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia
as well as the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, the Netherlanda, Belgitun,
Canada and Luxembourg by 20,000 men ia 1975, by 5 percent in 1976 and by another
1 0 percent in 1977.
Thus, the propoeals of the Warsaw Pact couatries envisaged a reduction in both the
~ oreign and national armed forces and weapone at etrictly agreed-upon datea. The
ground and air forces and thei.r weapona, iacluding auclear weapons, would be sub-
- j ect to reduction. As a whole the reduction wae to be carried out in three stages
_ in order to reduce the armed forces aad weapons ~tn Central Europe by approximate:Ly
17 percent in 1975-1977.
T he counterpropoeals of the Western Powers had a fundamentally different nature. _
The "acheme for trnop reductions" introduced by them on 22 November I973 came down
t o limiting the reduction only to grouad forces, and ia an unequal proportion which _
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was detrimental to the socialist states. The NATO armed forces were to be reduced
almost 3-fold less than the armed foxces of the Warsaw Pact states.
The scheme did not indicate what Western states were to reduce their troops, in
what amount or by what time. The Western scheme disregarded a red~ction in air
forces and nuclear weapons, as if it was not apparent that precisely these forces
represented the greatest threat to the deasely populated regions of Europe. The
reduction involved only the ground forces and was to be carried out ~n two stages.
In the f irst stage, agreements were to be reached on re:~ucing the ground forces of
- only the USSR and the United States stationed ia Central Europe. After the carry-
ing out of this measure, the second phase was to begin where it would be a question
of reducing th~ ground forces of the other participants in the talks.
Thus, the reduction scheme proposed by the Western countries was aimed at obtaining
unilateral advantages and did not conform to the approved ob~ective of the talks
which was a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and weapons. In essence, it en-
visaged a change in the existing balance of forces in Central Europe in favor of the
- Western countries.
In f ull accord with the letter and spirit of the Final Act and in the aim of advanc-
ing the talks and bringing them to practical ends, on 19 February 1976, the USSR and
its Warsaw Pact allies put forward a pr.oposal which took into account a number of
requests of the Western partners. The essence of the new proposals was that in
1976, there should be reductions by an equal percentage in the troops of just the
- USSR and the United States out of the total nianber of the armed forces of the War-
- saw Pact and NATO countries, while the level of the armed fnrces of the other par-
ticipants in the talks would be "frozen" and reduced ia the second etage, ia 1977
= and 1978. These proposals alao geve a apecific number of Soviet and American taaks,
nuclear weapons-carrying aircraft and misaile launchera which would be cut back
aloag with a definite number of nuclear amm~unition for the~e delivery systems.
It was important that the new initiatives bq the socialist countries envisaged a
reduction of both the ground f orcQS aa~:i the air force, including nuclear weapons,
with the understanding that this would include both persoaael, the weapons and the
military equipment. The socialist natioae proceeded froffi the view that propoaals
based on a different approach auch as on a reduction of selective, individual com-
gonents, as the Western powers sought hopiag to obtain unilateral military advan-
tages for themselves, could not comprise a basis foz a mutually acceptable agree-
ment.
As in all the other instances of the advaaciag of initiatives by the socialist
countries at the Vienna talka, theae proposals.conformed fully to the principle of
- nonimpairment of the security of anyone; they emrisaged an equal reduction which
would not le~d to an altering of the balance of forces in the regian of Central
Europe in favor of any of the participants in the talks.
The specific obligationa in the agreement on the first stage of reductions were
made in detail only for the USSR and the United States, while the remaining states
who participated directly in the talka in the first a.tag~ would "freeze" the num-
ber of their armed forces and limit themselves only to obligatious of a general
sort on their reductions in the second stage. Certainly the purpose was a"~reez-
ing" which would in f~ct not allow an increase ia the number of armed forces in the
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states possesaing troops in Central Europe. This muat be emphaeized particuiarly
due to the fact in recent years ther.e have been obvious attempts to increase the
national armed forces and weapons in individual European NATO countries as well as
- shift armed forces and weapons from the United States to Europe.
n In describing these proposals, L. I. Brezhnev stated at the 25th CPSU Congress:
"Our proposals are based on the only realistic foundation fc+r maiataining the
balance of forces which has come into beiag in the center of Europe, in essence,
an equilibrium. Their realization will not harm the security of a single country.
It would be hoped that this would encounter a due response among the Western coun-
tr ies and that it would be possible to finally move from discussions to realistic
measures aimed at reducing armed forces and weapons."8
- Be ing unable to ref ute the objective and ~ust nature of the proposals by the social-
ist countries, Western propaganda begaa to streas that the stumblin~ block in the
ta lks was the refusal of the socialist countries to name the number of troops
stationed in the area of reduction. The socialist countries convincingly showed
t hat it was not a question of figures but rather one of reaching agreement on the
key questions of the cut-back upon which the working out of the agreement primarily -
depended.
N everthele~s, in endeavoring to provide progress at the talks, the socialist states
acco~nodated the Western Nations. On 10 June 1976, numerical data were provided
on the total number of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries in Central
Europe and on the number of ground forces stationed there. The f igures, respec- -
tively, were 987,300 and 805,000 (on 1 April Z976).9 The NATO representatives in
V ienna, in turn, announced that their nations had stationed in Central Europe armed
f orces numbering 981,000, including 791,000 ground forces.l0
_ These figures convincingly conf irm that in Central Europe an approximate equilibrium
_ had developed in the number of personnel from the armed forces of the NATO and War-
saw Pact nations.
However, the NATO countries as before sought unilateral advantages for themselves
t o the detriment of security for the socialist countries. For example, they pro-
p osed that the Soviet Union pull an entire tank army out of the reduction zone. _
In response they promised a selective pull-out of 29,000 servicemen and a certain
quantity of American nuclear weapons deployed in Central Europe.
Seemingly it should be clear to anyone that the approved prin~iple4 of re~iprocity
a nd nonimpairment could not be observed if noncompatible troop elements are reduced, _
- ir one magnitude of reduction, that is, troop formations, is used for some states .
and anuther, Chat is, individual servicemen from different units, is applied for
o thers. In the first instance, when it is a question of the socialist states, ~lie
Wesrern nations propose a true troop reduction. B~ut for themselves they provide
_ a"red~ction procedure" which would fully serve the purposes of reorganizing a;:c?
modernizing the troops. For example, without harming their combat readiness, :.~5e
r~duction could be made from service personnel (barbers, cooks and so fortli). _
~ The proposed reduction in a certain portion of the American nuclear weapons ir.
C entral Europe did not alter the essence of the matter. It was known that, outside
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the scope of the Vienna talks, there was a plan to moderniza the American nuclear
weapons and their deployment system under which a certain number of obsolete types -
of U.S. nuclear weap ons could be withdrawn from the center of the European contin-
ent. And where was the guarantee that such a withdrawal would not be compensated
f or by an increase in the nuclear weapons of the Western European NATO members?
In the opinion of the socialist countries, a reduction in nuclear weapons should
not have the nature of a liraited, single aation, ae the Western cnuntries had in-
aisted. The componeats of the nuclear weapons should be reduced in both stages by
all states possessing these components. A situation could not be permitted whereby
any of the states which possessed, for example, nuclear weapons delivery systems
would maintain their freedom to increase these weapons, while other participants
to the agreement would reduce them.
During the entire per iod of the Vienna talks, the socialist countries repeatedly
and convincingly showed good will and a readinesa to reach agreement. At the be-
ginning of 1975, they had made a propoeal that all the direct participants in the
talks would assume an obligation not to increase the size of their armed forces in
Central Europe during the talks. The importance of such an obligation is hard to
overestima te as it would help to improve the situation in Europe, to strengthen
confidence between the participants in the talks and to create conditions for reach- _
ing accord on troop r eductions. This proposal by the socialist states was on the
agenda of the talks. However, the NATO countries, without accepting it, continued _
from time to time to raise a propaganda campaign over the increase in the Soviet
troops in Central Eur ope. Under this pretext they increased their own armed forces -
- in this region (for example, in 1976 alone, two additional mechanized brigades were
created in the American troops and one division in the FRG troops).
- "In contrast to the NATO countries, for a long time we have not increased our armed -
f orces in Central Eur ope and we do not intend--and I want to emphasize this
strongly--we do not intend to increase them in the future by a single soldier or a
single tank,"11 stated L. I. Brezhnev.
In April 1978, the NATO countries made certain changes in their scheme. For ex-
- ample, they agreed to set dates for the reduction of the troops of the European
nations and Canada in the second stage. However, as a whole their approach re- -
mained unaltered.
In endeavoring to get the talks off dead center, the Soviet Union and the other
socialist states which were direct participants in the Vienna talks (the GDR,
Poland and Czechoslovakia) on 8 June 1978 came forward with new important proposals,
the essence of which came down to the following:
In the first place, as a result of the reductions equal collective levels should be
- established in the sizes of the armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries
in Central Europe wit h 900,000 men in each, includi~g 700,000 in the gxound forces;
- secondly, the reduction in the armed forces personnel should be limited to the -
ground forces, while only an upper limit should be set for the number of personnel
- in the air force, that is, the air force levels would be "frozen";
Thirdly, in the firs t stage, when only the USSR and United States would reduce their
~roops, a selective r eduction and limitation of weapona would be carried out, and
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for those types which were named by the Western aide (the USSR would reduce the
number of tanks and the United States would redu~e a certain numbPr of nuclear am- -
munition and certain tyves of delivery systems);
Fourthly, in the first stage the reduction af Soviet troops would be carried out
with those formations which had been proposed by the 4Jest, that is, by divisions;
Fifthly, the reduction of Soviet and American troops would be carried out propor- ~
tionately to their numbers in Central Europe, as the NATO countries had sought.
A new manifestation of good will by the socialist states was their proposals ~f
30 November 1978 not to increase the siz~ of the armed forces of the participating
states during the Vienna talks. Such an accord would be based on collective (with-
in both military groupings) or individual obligations.
In the aim of bringing the positions of the parties closer together. and facilitat-
ing the reaching of agreement for the West, the socialist countries made yet an-
other step toward the NATO states. On 28 June 1979, the delegations of the GDR,
Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, upon instructions from their governments, made
a proposal.which env isaged that all the direct participants both from the West and
from the East would assume an obligation in the agreement to reduce their ground
forces to equal collective levels of 700,000 each and that each of them would make
a substantial contribution to the achieving of this goal, being approximately pro-
_ portional to the total number of its forces in the region of action of the agreement.
At the same t ime, considering the position of the Western countries, the proposal
pointed out that the individual amounts of the cut-back of troops would be deter-
_ mined by each individual participant to the agreement within the limi.ts of the cor-
responding alliance: in NATO for the Western countries and in the Warsaw Pact for
the socialist ones.12
- In endeavoring to estatalish the necessity of an unbalanced reduction in the armed
forces in Europe in favor of the West, the bourgeois press and the representatives
of the West in the talks continue to emphasize the so-called geographic factor.
They argue thus: if one of the subunits of American troops is pulled back 3,000
- miles, then f or maintaining equilibrium the Soviet Union should pull back six of
the same subunits, as they will be moved back just 500 miles. But if one takes a
more objective and broader look at the "geographic factor," the picture is somewhat
different. -
The Soviet Union, in possessing enormously long ground fron.tiers, is forced to keep
_ the corresponding f orces for their defense not only in the west, but also in the
east and in t he south of the nation. For this reason, if the Soviet Union has to
move its troops to the west, for example, from beyond the Urals or from beyond
Baykal, these distances would be greater than, for example, from New York to London.
As is known, the organizational development of the armed forces in the region of -
' the proposed reduction was carried aut b~ the nations directly participating in _
the Vienna ta lks over the entire postwar period in accord with the interests of
their security. Understandably, the parties took the "geograptiic factor" into ac-
count among many others and this was done long before the start of the talks in -
Vienna. This circumstance wa~ considered in the course of the preparatory consulta-
_ tions which o utlined the region of the reduction and thereby terminated a discussion
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of the question of the "geographic factor." To involve it in the discussion meant
to ar_tempt to distract the participants of the talks from discussing urgent prob-
lems.
A real way out of the blind alley in which the Vienna talks found themselves we~
provided by the new important proposals advanced on 10 Jul.y 1980 by the Soviet
Union and the other socialist countries directly involved in the talks.
The socialist countries, considering the proposals of their Western partners, pro-
posed~a reduction in the numbe~ of Soviet and American troops in thia region dur-
ing the first stage by 20,OQ0 Soviet servicemen and 13,000 American ones. This
proposed reduction did not include the 20,000 Soviet servicemen and 1,000 tanl~s
which had been withdrawn from the GDR unilaterally.
Moreover, the socialist nations proposed a compomise procedure for maintaining the
collecti.ve levels of the number ~f Warsaw Pact and NATO troops in Central Europe
and which should be established as a result o� the two stages of reduction. With
this procedure, on the one hand, consideration was given to the demand of the War-
saw Pact nations that individual nations would not inf initely increase the size of
their troops in the f uture. On the other hand, the desire of the Western partici-
pants in the talks was observed of not imposing individual restraints on the size
of the armies of one or another nation in establishing the same level of armed
forces for both military-politic~al groupings.
The socialist nations stated that in the event of a positive response to their pro-
posals by the NATO nations they were ready to immediately begin to work out the
text of the agreement on the f irst stage.
General :~~cretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, in speaking at the
Helsinki Conference, pointed out: "Precisely the materialization of detente is
the essence of the question.... And here we put the focus on the task of pr13ent-
ing an arms race and achieving real results on the question of disarmament.
The time which has passed since this speech has been full of a constant and pur-
poseful struggle by the Soviet Union to make progress on the question of disarma-
ment. "No nation," L. I. Brezhnev rightly pointed out, "has presented mankind with
such a broad, concrete and realistic program aimed at lessening and then fully
" eliminating the danger of a new war as has the Soviet Union."
The Soviet Union is guided by a carefully elaborated and weighed concept of dis-
armament,which is an extremely complicated and multi-level problem as it involves
the fundamental interests of states, including their national security.
The approach of the USSR to this problem has a comprehensive, all-encompassing
character. Soviet foreign policy, in being realistic, considers that the achieving
of this gcal requires great efforts and time. In working for the most radical
measures, the Soviet Union at the same time seeks opportunities for partial, inter-
mediate measures. Such a realistic approach makes it possible, without overlooking
~he main objective of universal and complete disarmament, of achieving a practical,
piecemeal resolution of this problem.
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In the foreign policy program approved by the 25th CPSU Congress, in representing an
organic continuation and developmenc of the historic Pegce Program, the following
task was clearly formulated: "to achieve a halt in the growing arms race which is
_ dangerous for peace and a transition to ~ ~eduction in the stockpiled weapons and
to disarmament."15
With the ratification of the new USSR Constitution (Basic Law) on 7 October 1977,
the struggle for "achieving universal and full disarmament" was elevated to the rank
of a state law of the USSR.
- In the extensive and diverse problem of disa*~+++AmPnt, the Soviet Union and the other
- Warsaw Pact states consider nuclear disarmament to be the most important and immedi-
ate task, for precisely the nuclear weapons represent the greatest danger for man-
kind. There has certainly been no other area of disarmament in wh{ch the socialist
nations would have put f orward such important and constructive proposals as in the
nuclear area, clearly realizing that there are many difficulties, including objec-
- tive ones, on the path to solving this problem.
Nevertheless the Soviet Union is convinced that nuclear disarmament is not only
possible but also necessary. This can be seen from the experience of the Soviet-
American strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).
- By the time the Final Act was approved, there already existed the 1974 Vladivostok
summit agreement between the USSR and the United States. This opened up an oppor-
tunity for limiting the strategic forces of the two nations both in quantitative and
qualitative terms. In the course of the talks, the Soviet Union consistently and
constructively worked to sign the corresponding documents as rapidly as possible and
in strict accord with the principle of equality and equal security for the parties.
Both parties were agreed that such documents should iaclude a treaty on strategic
arms limitation running up to the year 1985, a 3-year protocol on certain provision-
al measures which was ta be an inseparable part of this treaty as well as a possible
joint declaration on the basic directions for further talks on new measures in the
area of limiting and then reducing strategic weapons.
tn the course of the Soviet-American meetiags in Moscow in March 1977, in Geneva of
- May of the same year, in Washington in September and again in Moscow in April 1978,
the Soviet Union steadily, patiently and in a principled manner worked to conclude
the practical elaboration of the corresponding documents.
However, the process of talks initially was totally blocked and then serious diffi-
culties arose one after another cauaed by the United States. The American side
placed such demands on the USSR which could only be construed as obtaining uni-
lateral advantages for the United States.
The Carter Administration showed indecisiveness and inconsistency. In giving way
- to the pressure of the opponents of detente, and primarily from the military-
industrial complex, it again and again endeavored to alter in its favor what had
already been agreed upon.
In the spring of 1978, in U.S. policy, and this was fully reflected in the SALT
talks, there began to be a tendency to link completely different political problems
and this also did not aid the succeasful development of the talks.
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As for the Soviet side, ae was emphasized by L. I. Brezhnev on 7 April 1978, the
- USSR "is in favor of the most rapid achieving of an agxeement, but only one which
would strictly accord to the principle of equality and equal security and which
wauld truly embody this fundamental principle.... There can be no other solution:'i6
The 5trategic A:ms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2) was signed in June 1979 in Vienna in
the course of the talks between L. I. Brezhnev and the U.S. President J. Carter.
"An event has occurrt~," stated L. I. Brezhnev, "which has long been awaited by
the Soviet and American teoples, by the peoples of other countries, by everyone who
wishes a lasting peace and iscognizes the danger of a further rise in nuclear ar-
senals. In signing this traaty, we help to defend the most sacred right of each
man, the righ~ ta lifp.i17
- The new treaty and the documents accompanying it provide a range of ineasures to re-
strict strategic offensive weapons of the world's two most powerful states both in
quantitative and qualitative terms, and are also a good basis for seeking out solu-
tions to other burning issues in the arms race.
The SALT-2 Treaty undoubtadly is the most all-emcompassing and detailed treaty which
- has ever been signed on arms limitation,and, most importantly, it covers not any
peripheral military systems but rather the weapons complexes which compriae the
basis of the military might of both couatries.
The quantitative reductions provide for the freezing of the number of intercontin-
ental ballistic missile (ICBM} launching units, the launching units for submax'ine-
based ballistic missiles (SBBM), heavy bombers as well as air~to-ground ballistic
missiles (AGBM) on a level of 2,400 units effective the moment the treaty comes into
force, and during 1981 this total ceiling should be lowered to a level of 2,250
- units. The treaty also introduces special quantitative limitations on the strategic
systems equipped with multiple individually-targetable reentry vehicles (not more
than 1,320 units).
The treaty contains around 20 qualitative limitations. These include a limitation
on the pawer of missiles, the poss ibility of their modernization, a ban on the re-
- equipping of light ICBM as heavy ones, a ban on the development of high-speed re-
loading devices f or ICBM launchers and other res uictions.
Of particular significance were the provisions stated in the Joint Soviet-American
communique of 18 June 1979 that a world-wide military conflict is not inevitable and
at present there is no more importanC and immediate task for mankind than the halt-
ing of the arms race and the preventing of war. Here the sides expressed an inten-
- tion to make every effort to achieve this goal.
It is fundamentally important, and this is stated in the joint coi~unique, that each
of the sides is not to endeavor and will not endeavor in the future to achieve mili-
- tary superiority, as this could only lead to a dangerous instability, giving rise to
a higher arms level and not contributing to the security of either side. The carry-
' ing out of this agreement is diff icult to overestimate from the viewpoint of the
prospects of a mutual deterrence of the arms race and the further strengthening of
- confidence and international secur ity. The principle of equality and equal security
stated in the SALT-2 Treaty, comb~r.cd with the mentioned agreement, creates a good
basis for cooperation in the area of disarmament, including nuclear.
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Certainly the SALT-2 Treaty would not put an end to the arms race,but it does become
an indisputable brake on it. For this reason the international community with sat-
isfaction took into consideration the common viewpoint voiced by L. I. Brezhnev and
- J. Carter that the signing of the treaty should have a positive effect on talks re-
lating to other questions involved with the restricting of this race. _
An assPssment of the SALT-2 Treaty and ~he other materials related to it was given
~ in the docinnent of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Com~ittee, the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers. "The Vienna meeting~
marks an important step ahead along the path of improving Soviet-American relations
and the entire international-political climate," it points out. "The full reali.za-
tion of the documents signed in Vienna opens up new opportunities to halt the in-
crease in the arsenals of nuclear missiles and to provide their effective quantita-
tive and qualitative limitation. The carrying out of this task would be a new stage
in curtailing the nuclear arms race and would open up the path to a substantial
arms reduction and to the realization of the highest goal of the complete halting
of the production and elimination of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons."18
The USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko at a press conference on 25 June
~ 1979, in taking up the relationship between the SALT-2 and SALT-3 talks, co~ented:
".,.'~he present treaty creates bri~ges to [he next treaty. We are in favor of not
- stopping at the achieved level, we are desirous of moving forward, sparing no effort _
to achieve a further reduction in nuclear missile weapons."19
- The conclusion and realization of the SALT-2 Treaty and its provisions was a
- good incentive for the presently conducted both multilateral and bilateral Soviet-
American talks in the area of arms limitation and disarmament. This applies pri-
marily to the problem of nuclear disarmament. _
The Soviet Union, and it is supported by all the Warsaw Pact members, has advanced
a concrete, realistic and clear plan �or nuclear disarmament. This plan has been
stated in the speeches of L. I. Brezhnev and in other documents of the Soviet govern-
_ ment and joint statements of the Warsaw Pact countries. The essence of this plan
- comes down to the following. -
r1 beginning to a real process of nuclear disarmament should be the halting of nu-
_ clear weapons production, a ban on the arming of the armed forces of states with
them and a stop to the development and creation of new models and types of these
weapons. This simple and at the same time effective measure in fact should put an
_ end to the nuclear arms race and become a dependable basis for subsequent nuclear
t"
disarmament measures.
Directly after the halting of nuclear weapons production there should Lollow mea-
- sures to reduce their stockpiles with the tuxning over of the freed nuclear materi-
als to the peacef ul sectors of the economy.
The ultimate alm of the reduction is th~ complete elimination of all types of nu- ~
clear weapons, strategic and tactical, offensive and defensive. Along with the
- stockpiles of nuclear charges, warheads and bombs, there should be a reduction _
(by disassembly or turning over for use for peaceful purposes) in the delivery sys-
- tems, that is, the missiles, launchers, bombers, submarines and surface vessels.
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To free all mankind from the unforeseen consequences and instability related to a
continuation of the nuclear arms race and from enormous expenditures--this is the
goal of this plan.
In hovember 1977, the year of its 60th anniversary, the Soviet Union made an appeal
to the nuclear states to agree on a simultaneous halr to the production of nuclear
weapons~be they atomic, hudrogen or neutron bombs or shells. Simultaneously the
USSR proposed that the nuclear pawers assume an obligation to begin a gradual re-
duction in the already existing stockpiles, progressing untilthe .r.omplete "100-
percent" elimi.nation of them. This proposal was reflected in one of the resolutions
approved by the 32d UN General Assembly Session.
In advancing such precise and constructive proposals, the Soviet Union was ready
at any time to sit down at Che conf erence table with all the nuc lear powera in or-
der to thoroughly review the entire scope of the problem of nuc lear disarmament and
in co~on to work out concrete paths for its practical solution. The Soviet Union
had no arguments against the nonnuclear states participating as well in such talks,
since all natior_s and all peoples of the world are iaterested in nuclear disarma-
ment .
It goes without saying that nuclear di.sarmament could be carried out only in the
instance that all the s*_ates which possess nuclear weapons would participate in it,
for it would be unjust if only the nuclear powers moved toward eliminating their
nuclear weapons while others stockpiled and improved them.
- In 1977, there was extensive publicity for the plans which had been concealed for a.
- rather long time to produce neutron nuclear weapons in the United States and deploy
them in the Eurapean NATO countries. Neutron weapons are the most monstrous type of
weapons in the entire history of maukind. The adopting of them by states would
strengthen the threat of a torcherous death for millions of people and their deploy-
- ment on the territory of densely populated Western Europe woulci make the unleashing
of a nuclear war more probable. '
The Soviet Union was decisively against the develop~nent of the neutron bomb and
warned that if the bomb was developed in the West, the USSR would not remain a pas-
sive observer and would be confronted with the necessity of making a reply to this
_ challenge for the purposes of ensuring the security of the Soviet people, their
al~ies and friends.
The Soviet state did not limit itself to condemaing the plans to produce the neutron.
~ bomb or issuing warnings over the dangerous plans of the West. The General Secre-
- tary of the CPSU Central Coumittee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
- Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, on 24 December 1977, officially put forward a clear
_ and concrete proposal to agree on the mutual abandoning of neutron weapons produc-
tion.
- On 9 March 1978, the Warsaw Pact states made a new initiative: they submitted for
review to the Disarmament Committee in Geneva a draft convention on banning neutron
weapons. This draft envisaged that the signatories to the convention "would pledge
not to produce, not to stockpile, not to deploy anywhere and not tn employ nuclear
neutron weapons."
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The draft stipulated that control Qver the observance of the conveation should be
carried aut by the signatory states by employing the national technical devices at
their disposal i.n such a manner as to conform to the generally recognized standards
of international law.
Although a discussion of the draft convention in essence had not even co~enced,
- certain representatives in the West, and in particular in the United States, hur-
ried to express a negative aCtitude to the very idea of the proposed convention.
The plans to arm NATO with the neutron bomb evoked indignation throughout the
world. The movement against the neutron bomb assumed unprecedented scope. It in-
cluded tens of millions of people and the most diverse social organizations. The
small NATO countries stated their refusal to deploy neutron weapons on their terri-
tory.
The actions of the world community and the protests in the United States itself led
to a situation where President J. Carter announced on 7 April 1978 his decision to
"defer production" of neutron weapons.
_ Considering the decision of President J. Carter, L. I. Brezhnev stated on ?.,S April
1978 that the Sov iet Union "also would not begin production of neutron weapons, if
the United States did not do this. The future would depend on Washington.i20
- As events were to show, the United States continued to pressure the USSR in the hope
of achieving concessions which would be detrimental to the security of the Soviet
Union and the other fraternal socialist countries. On 25 October 1978, J. Carter
signed a draft law ~n praviding allocations to produce the basic components of the
neutron bomb. Hence the question of the possibility of deploying this barbarian
type of weapon in Western Europe has in no way been removed from the agenda.
The 23d UN General Assembly Session (1978) supp orted the pxoposal of the Soviet
Union and called on all states possessing nuc].ear weapons to begin consultations
on the rapid commencement of talks on halting Che nuclear arms race.
At the beginning of February 1979, the USSR, together with the other socialist
cour.tries, submitted to the Disarmament Committee a document contain~.ag specific
proposals entitled "On Talks to Halt Nuclear Weapons Production in All Forms and
Gradually Reduce Their Stockpiles Until Complete Elimination." The essence of these
proposals came down to the following.
The corresponding talks shoizld be conducted with the participation of all states
possessing nuclear weapons as well as a certaia number of atates which did not
- possess nuclear weapons.
The subject of the talks was to be the halting of nuclear weapons production in all
their forras and a gradual reduction of the weapons stockpiles down to their complet~
elimination. In the various stages of the talks it would be possible to examine,
~or example: the halting of a qualitative improvement in nuclear weapons; a halt
to the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; a gradual rPduc-
tion in t~e existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery systems; the elim-
ination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Here the necessary control meas-
ures should be approved.
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The halt iu production, the reduction and eli~ination of nuclear weapons should be
carried out stage-by-stage on a nutually acceptable and approved basis. The con-
tents of ineasures ia each stage should be a matter of agreement between the partici-
pailts in the talks. The degree of participation in carrying out each stage by Che
ind~.vidual nuclear powers should be determined considering the quan,titative and
qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the states poasessing nuclear
weapons and the other correaponding states. In all the stagea, the existing bal-
ance in the area of nuclear power should be left undisturbed with a gradual reduc-
tion in its level.
- The proposal by the socialist countries evoked great interest. All the member
states of the comnittee participated in the discussion. A special statement by the
- group of nonaligned and neutral sCates expresse3 sattsfaction with the initiative
of the socialist countries. The�nonaligaed states were in favor of agreenent being
reached in the course of th~ 1979 committee session on the "preliminary conditions
- and elements of multilateral talks on nuclear disarmament and the sequeace of ac-
tions was generally outlined for the purpose of obtaining the designated goal."
Extensive approval was given to the principles propoaed by the socialist nations
and on w~ich the talks should be based. These were: nondetrimentalness to the
security~of the parties, the participation of all f ive nuclear powers, the parallel
strengthening of political and internatianal legal guarantees for the security of
states, the continuing of other talks on the problems of nuclear disarmament and
so forth.
The United States and the ~ountries allied with it in essence were against halting
the nuclear arms race under the pretext that talks on this problem at the given
stage were supposedly "premature," although a majority of the committee members were
in favor of continuing and intensifying the exchange of opinions on the given ques-
tion. Due to the resi~taace from the Western states, the committee was unable to
carrv out the required preparatory work and make a beginning to the talks in 1979.
An agreement was reached that an examination of the question of haltiag the nuclear
arms race and nuclear disarmament would be continued at the following committee
session. Support for the commencing of talks on disarmament in the nuclear area in-
volving all the nuclear powers was voiced also by the 34th UN General Assembly Ses-
sion which approved, under a Soviet proposal, a special resolution on this question.
A ban on all nuclear weapons testing has been a long urgent question the solution
to which would largely determine a halt in the arms race. The USSR and the Warsaw
Pact feel that this problem must be solved withaut waiting for the outcome of the
talks on full nuclear disarmament. The reason for this is that a ban on all nuclear
_ weapons testing would put an end to their qualitative improvement and would stop the
appearance of new types of these weapons. After the f irst important step of the
concluding in 1963 of the Moscow TreaCy on Banning Nuclear Weapons Testing in the
Atmosphere, in Space and U.nderwater, the next achievement in this area was the
signing in 1974 of the Treaty on L~mitiag Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing by
the USSR and the United States. The treaty, starting on 31 March 1976, prohibited
any underground expl~~sions of nuclear weapons with a power of over 150 kilotons and
restricted the number of explosions below this level.
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But both the Moscow Treaty on the Banning of Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Atmos-
phere, in Space and Undexwater and che 1974 Treaty_between the USSR and the United
States on restricting underground nuclear weapons testing only partially solved
this problem. Moreover, two out of the five nuclear powers did not sign the Moscow
Treaty and one of them, China, continues even now to carry out test nuclear explo-
- sions in the atmasphere.
After the Helsinki Conference, the Soviet Union became even more active in working
for a full halt on nuclear weapons testing.
At the 30th UN General Assembly Session in 1975, the Soviet delegation, as an im-
portant and timely step, proposed a discussion of the question of concluding a
treaty on the full and universal banning of nuclear weapong testing. A draft of
such a treaty was then submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations and the
General Assembly was in favor of holding specif ic talks with the aim of reaching an
agreement on the full and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing. Due to the
' negative position of certain nuclear powers, however, these talks were not com-
menced. As is known, for a long time the question of halting underground nuelear
tests has been complicated by certain states through the arti~icial exaggeration
of the control question. It was steadily maiatained, in particular, that supposed-
ly without an on-the-spot check it would be impossible to distinguish seismic phe-
nomena of natural origin (earthquakes) from analogous phenomena caused by under-
ground nuclear explosions, and consequently, it would be impossible to monitor the
states' observance of their obligations in bann.ing underground nuclear weapons
tests.
_ A majority of specialists have never agreed with this viewpoint, feeling that na-
tional monitoring equipment is sufficient for controlling the observance of a treaty
- on an underground nuclear weapons test ban in addition to the international ex-
change of seismic data. With the development of equipment for detecting seismic
phenomena, this viewpoint now has virtualZy uaiversal support by all scientists.
= However, at present certain states are in favor of a provision for the possibility
of investigating actual circumetances on the spot, if doubts arise on the observ-
ance of obligations to halt undergroimd nuclear tests.
In showing good will and endeavoring to move things off dead center, the Soviet
Union at the 31st UN General Assembly Session in 1976 stated its agreement to par-
_ ticipate in working out such a compramise basis for an agreement, where voluntary
limits would be observed in taking a decision to investigate the pertinent circum-
stances on the spot and at the same time all the signatories of the treaty would
be certain that the obligations were being carried out.
- The Soviet Union made a great effort to conclude a new Soviet-American treaty on
underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in 1976. The treaty estab-
lished a procedure for conducting these explosions whereby there would be no pos-
sibility of using them f or the purposes of improving nuclear weapAns. This was a
weighty contribution by the USSR to the cause of a complete baa on all nuclear
weapons tests.
In November 1977, the Soviet Union took a new important step in agreeing that in
Farallel with a ban, at a certain time, on all nuclear weapons testiag a moratorium
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was to be declared on nuclear exploeiona for peaceful purposes. The purpoae of
thie proposal wae to facilitate the reaching of agreement on a full and universal
banning of nuclear weapons testing since the Western partners had asserted that
; supposedly it would be difficult to determine the nature of the explosion.
In the aim of achieving agreement on a complete and univarsal ban on nuclear wea-
pons testing, the Soviet Union agreed to the conducting of aa inspection on a vol-
untary basis and that a treaty on the full and universal banning of nuclear weapons
testing would come into force even in the instance that not all five nuclear powers
would initially ~oin it, but only three, the USSR, the United States and Great
Britain. Moreover, the Soviet Union made a gesture to its partnera in proposing
a 3-year period of action for the agreemenC. The Western powers proposed a 5-year
term, and then the United States revised its position and announced that in any
event the agreement should not be in effect for more than 3 years. The duplicity
of the American position could also be felt in the fact that, oa the one hand, it
was aimed at a complete ban on testing, and on the other, envisaged a continuation
of "low-power nuc lear explosive experiments."
- The USSR stead ily continued to work f or a rapid conclusion to the elaboration and
- signing of a treaty on the full and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing.
At the 34th UN General Assembly Session, the USSR delegation voted in favor of a
resolution supporting such a treaty.
The problem of streagthening the conditions for the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons is most directly linked to the question of banning all nuclear weapons
- testing. 5 March 1980 marked the lOth anniversary of the coming into force of the
nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty. The pledge to abandon the proliferation
of nuclear weapons had become a standard of international law.
The Warsaw Pact countries made a serious contribution to the elaboration of the
designated treaty and are its active participants. They proceed from the view
that the appearance of new nuclear states would lead to an autburst of the arms
race and would cause a corresponding response ia other countries. Under such con-
ditions the question of eliminating nuclear weapons would be greatly complicated.
For this reason it was important to see to it that the nonproliferation treaty
became truly universal.
In recent yenrs, the sphere of action of the nonproliferation treaty has broadened.
In particular, it has been signed by nations which possess a highly developed
atomic industry such as the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Japan.
Presently more than 100 states hav e signed it.
However, up to now a number of s~ates remain outside the treaty, including those
- which could be termed quasinuclear. Among them are South Africa and Israel which
- are conducting an expansionist policy. Undoubtedly, the treaty could have played
an even greater role if it had. been signed by all states possessing an atomic in-
dustry or pl~nning to create it in the near future.
In this regard one cannot help but be alarmed by certain of the international
deals concluded in recent y~ears in the nuclear area. Thus, the FRG has sold nu-
clear equipment =nd techno~logy totaling 10 billion marks to Brazil which has not
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signed the nonproliferation treaty. The United States has proposed the sale of
two nuclear re~ctors by General Electric to the racist regime of South Africa.
Such actions are detrimental to the international community's efforts aimed
at restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The problem is that
in rhe process of operating nuclear power plants, as is known, a f issionable sub-
stance, plutoni~, is f ormed as a side product and is accumulated. This substance
can be used f or creating a nuclear weapon.
Facts show that the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a real oae.
In September 1977, the South African Minister of Finances 0. Horwood stated at a
congress of the ruling National Party that his country "maintains the right to em-
ploy its own nuclear potential f or military purposes."
The Soviet Union in a TASS Announcement of 9 August 1977 condemned the plans f or
the development of nuclear weapons in South Africa and drew the attention of the
world co~unity to the fact that their realizatioa would have the most serious,
far-reaching consequences for international peace and security.
Further events f ully affirmed the validity of the concern and anxiety voiced by the
Soviet Union over the South African nuclear weapons plans. According to announce-
ments of foreign agencies, on 22 September 1979 a low-yield nuclear explosion con-
ducted by racist South Africa was recorded in the South Atlantic. This explosion
caused a stormy response by the dependent African countries and many other states
- of the world.
It is perfectly obvious that for the South Af rican racists, the atomic bomb repre-
sents a means of blacl~ail and intimidation against the iadependent African states
and a means for strengthening the apartheid system at hame. Unfortunately, judg-
ing from everything, South Africa is capable of producing nuclear weapons. Ameri-
can and West German companies havP designed, delivered equipment and built an ex-
perimental nv,clear reactor in Peliadab. A French consortium in 1976 concluded a
contract to build a nuclear pawer plant in the region of Cape Town. South Africa
is cooperating in the nuciear area with lsrael which has hei~~d Pretoriv ~cqaire
technical inf ormation on the production of nuclear weapons in exchaage for South
African uranium.
Other countries are also working to achieve nuclear weapons. Hence a further
strengthening of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has assumed particular
significance. Under the conditions of the exacerbation of the international situ-
ation it is all the more essential to work out new measures to develop interna-
tional cooperation in this area and to create conditions which would provide an
opportunity f or all nations to obtain good from the peaceful use of atomic energy.
Closely tied to the problem of the nonprolif eration of nuclear weapons is the
question of the security of nonnuclear states and the preventing of the deployment
of nuclear weapons on the territory of states where they are not presently found.
In 1978, at the 33d UN General Assembly Session, the USSR propose~ that an inter-
national convention be conc3.uded on strengthening the guarantees for the security
of nonnuclear states and submitted a draf t of such a convention.
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The implementation of this new Soviet i.nitiative would lead to a strengthening of
the security of a predominant ma~ority of states which do not posaess nuclear
capacity. The measure proposed by the USSR is effective~and its significance would
remain until the realization of full nuclear disarmameat. This measure could also
asaiat in strengthening the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons by weakening the
- incentive throughout the world to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
The Soviet proposal caused a broad positive response ia the General Assembly,and
was approved by a predominant ma~ority of the delegations. The Soviet Union, on
its behalf, afiirmed that it would never employ nuclear weapons against those states
which refuse ~o produce and acquire such weapona and did not have the~n on their
territory.
In 1979, in developing this Soviet initiative, a group of socialist states including
the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Polaad and Czechoslovakia, submitted
to the disarmament couimittee, a draft international convention on strengthening the
guarantees for the security of nonnuclear states. The idea of cnncluding a multi-
lateral international agreement on this question was greeted with fervent support
among a broad group of states on the coIDmi.ttee, and primarily t~e nonaligned.
The socialist countries proposed that the guaraatees be given both to nonnuclear
countries which do not participate in military-political alliances as well as to
countries which, although tied by allied obligations to nuclear states, do not pos-
sess and do not produce nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory.
In the course of the discussion, it was poiated out that the formula contained in
the draft of the socialist countries considered the interests of a broad range of
states. In the f irst place, it encompassed the maximum possible number of states
~ which could, considering the real situation in the world, be given a guarantee
against the use of nuclear weapons; secondly, it eacouraged the states to refuse to
possess nuclear weapons, to deplay them on their territory and thereby helped to
narrow the possible sphere of use of nuclear weapons, to s trengthen nonprolifera-
tion and, consequently, reduced the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war.
- For holding specific talks and working out a corresponding international conventian,
the committee set up a special wosk group which was given all the documents and
proposals submitted to the committee. However, the achieving of agreement on this
question was in essence blocked by the delegations of the United States and the
other Western powers who were again~t the coucluding of an international convention
on strengthening guarantees for the security of nonnuclear states. The conmmittee
will continue talks on this question in 1980.
At the 34th UN General Assembly Session in 1979, the Soviet Union and the other
socialist countries proposed that the UN member staCes study the possibility of
= conc lud ing an international agreement on the nondeplopmen t of nuclear weapons on
the territory of states where they do not presently exist.
The USSR has been a decisive supporter of strict guarant ees that international co-
operation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy does not become a chan-
nel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is no t a commerc~al question,
- rather it is a question of policy, a question of international security. At the
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- 31st UN General Assembly Session, the Soviet Union, together with the other Warsaw
Pact members, acted ciecisively in favor of improving the control system for nuclear
units and materials which was being carried out by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). It stated its readiness to cooperate with all interested staCes in
these areas.
The USSR has been a consistent supporter of creating nuclear-free zones in Europe
and other regions of the world. It views their creatton as one of the measures for
stre~igthening the nongroliferation of nuclear weapons,.for reducing the threat of
auclear war and for regional military detente. It is esseatial that such zones be
actually free of nuclear weapons and the correspondiag agreements must not contain
escape clauses for violating the nuclear-free status of the zones.
In accord with its principled line of reducing the threat of nuclear war, on
25 april 1978 the Soviet Union approved a decision in the appropriate form to ad-
here to the international treatq on the baaning of nuclear weapons in Latin America
(the Tlatelolco Treaty). In this maaner, the Soviet Union, like the other powers
which possess nuclear weapons, assumed an obligation not to help the Latin Aaerican
countries acquire nuclear weapons as well as not to employ such weapons against the
_ signatory states. Thus the USSR has helped to strengthen the first and as yet only
nuclear-free zone in the world, a zone encompassing a ma~ority of the Latin Ameri-
can states.
The Warsaw Pact countries, in being decisive supporters of prohibiting the creation
of new types and new systesns of weapons of mass destruction, view this problem as
one of the most acute and immediate problems of world policy. As was stated in the
� Bucharest (1976) Declaration of the PCC, they consider international agreement on
_ this question essential. The rapid development of the scientific and technical
revolution has po~ed a dilemma for mankind: either the scientific discoveries will
serve the good of peoples or they will be put to serving the arms race.
As is known, military equipment in an unprecedentedly short time has traveled a
distance from atomic to thermonuclear weapons, from strategic bombers to ICBM, from
missiles located on the earth's surface to missiles in silos and on submarines,
from single-charge missiles to missiles with multiple atomic warheads.
Since at present there are no.restrictions on the use of science for military pur-
poses, at any time the most unexpected changes of events can occur and their con-
sequences cannot be predicted. It is itnpossible to exclude the appearance of new
types and systems of weapons of mass destruction with unprecedented destructive
power. It is quite realistic to assume that there is the real danger of the de-
velopment in the foreseeable future of we~pons which can be commensurate in terms
of destructive effect with the nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons or even
surpass them.
As has been stated in the Western press, the military-industrial complex of the
United States and the other NATO countries is working on the development of weapoas
that are truly monstrous in their effect. It is technically feasible to create the
so-called gigantoton nuclear bombs with a power of 1,000 and more megatons. One
can imagine the destruction and human losaes caused by such bombs in realizing that
_ the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 50,000 times less powerful.
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The Western press has also announced work on the development of so-called psycho-
tropic weapons by which it is possible to inf luence the human psyche aad stimulate _
- a loss of inemory, a disruption of correct perception and other mental diaturbances
leading to the demoralization of people. Annouacements have also appeared on ray
weapons using ionizing radiation of special devices or radioactive subetances for
acting on the human organism (on the blood and intracellular plasma) for the pur-
pose of both the rapid and gradual exposure of it to radiation sickness. The work
bein~r done in the area of molecular biology is capable of leading to the developmeat
= oQ bacilli which are immune to any modern medicines and vaccines. They also can be
_ used for military purposes.
In speaking on 14 October 1975 at a dinner ia honor of the Presid~nt of France
Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, L. I. Brezhnev pointed out: Ever-greater urgency, we
are convinced, attends the attainment ~f a broad international agreement which
envisages the strict obligation of states not to develop new types of weapons of
mass destruction and new systems of such weapons."21
At the 30th UN General Assembly Session, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. -
Gromyko, on behalf of the Soviet government, made a proposal to include on the -
agenda of the session as urgent and timely the queation of prohibiting the develop-
ment and production of new tyes of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of
such weapons. The essence of the Soviet proposal consisted in haviag all states,
primarily the large states, conclude an agreement based on a pledge not to develop
and not to produce new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, not to
aid and not to encourage any activities aimed at this.
The 30th UN General Assembly Session adopted a resolution "On Banning the Develop-
ment and Production of I1ew Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and ilew Systems of
Such Weapons." Voting in favor of it were 112 nations, that is, a predominant
majority.
In accord with this resolution, in Geneva, in the Disarmameat Co~nittee, talks were
started on the given question. Since ia the course of the talks, a desire was
voiced to concretize the subject of the ban, that is, to def ine the new types and
new systems of weapons of mass desrcruction, the Soviet Union proposed that new
types of weapons of mass destruction include any types of weapons based upon quali-
tatively new principles of action in terms of the method of use or the objects of
destruction or the nature of the effe~t. -
At the 32d UN General Assembly Session, the nations of the socialist commonwealth
again urged the Disarmament CoIDmittee to work out an agreement prohibiting the use
of scientific and technical achievements for creating and producing new types and
systems of weapons of mass destruction. .
The 33d UN General Assembiy Session approved a resolution urging the Disarmament
Committee to actively continue talks for the purpose of working out the tpxt of an
agreement to ban the development of new types and systems of such weapons.
The Soviet proposals on this question have been a subject of bilateral Soviet-
American talks in the Disarmament Committee. The greatest headway has occurred
over one of the new types of weapons, radiological. The Soviet and U.S. delegacions,
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in accord with the agreement reached at the Vienna summit meeting, on 10 July 1979
submitted a~oint prop oeal on the basic elements of a treaty for banning the de-
- velopment, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The draft
treaty on the banning of radiological weapons was a result of 2-year (from May 1977
through July 1979) Soviet-American talks. This document distributed in the cnmmit-
~ tee in parallel by the USSR and U.S. delegations was aimed at preventing the appear-
ance of one of the types of weapons of mass destruction, radiological weapons, which
in the event of their development and use would cause mass human casualties and have
extrP~ely dangerous consequences for mankind.
The Soviet Union views a ban on radiological weapons as a partial solution to the
problem of an all-encompassing ban on new types and systems of weapons of mass de-
struction. The treaty on banning radiological weapons, thus, can become still an-
other important contribution to limiting the arms race and saving mankind from this
danger. In this manner a major step will be taken which will prevent the use of
scientific and technical progress for the purposes of developing new types of wea-
pons of mass destruct ion.
In approving the idea of concluding a treaty on banning radiological weapons, a num-
ber of delegations, in referring to the newaess and complexity of the problem and
- the necPSSity of carefully studying it, were in favor of extending a review of the
submitted Soviet-~%merican proposals and the talks on them to the following session
of the Disarmament Committee. This viewpoint was supported by the other committee
members and the talks will be continued.
In December '.979, upon Soviet initiative, the 34th UN General Assembly Session -
_ adopted a r;olution calling for the conclusion of an all-encompassing agreement on
banning ne=- cypes and systems of weapona of mass destruction. The assembly pointed
to the i~aE::.:tao:ce of preventing a qualitative arms race so that the achievements of
scienti'.:c ar.~., technical progress could be employed only for peaceful purposes.
In the .nion of the Warsaw Pact, the task of completely banning and eliminating a
dangero~.s ~ategory of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, has assumed
particular urgency in the struggle for military deten.te. As is known, the use of
these weapons even dur ing the years of World War I caused heavy suffering and the
mass death of people. Since then military chemical technology has moved far ahead,
and new types of chemical weapoae have been developed capable of causiizg even more
torturous death for people. In December 1979, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign
Aff~irs published a s tatement which, in particular, said: "The entire world knows
tl~at during its aggressive war.against the people~ of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea,
the United '~tates widely used chemical toxins which led to the death and poisoning
oL a large number of peacef ul inhabitants and caused eaormous destruction to the
envir,,~,ent that is still felt. The facts of these barbarian crimes have been re-
peate_j.iy canf irmed by many prominent scientists and public figures from different
nations."
- The socialist countries are waging a consistent struggle to outlaw chemica]. wea-
pons. Even in 1972, the USSR and the o~.her socialist countries of the Warsaw.Pact
submitted to the Disarmament Coffinittee a draft convention on the question of t~e
complete and universal banning of the development, production and stockpiling of
chemical weapons as we ll as the destruction of their stocks. The Warsaw Pact
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members hava done everything in tt:~.eir power to make an international agreement on
banning and deatroying chemical weapons a reality. This is also the purpose of the
Bucharest Declaration (1976) of the PCC which directly states that the Warsaw Pact
members "consider essential an international agreement on the banning and destruc-
tion of chemical weapons." .
Unfortunately, representatives of the NATO countries, without acting in principle
against a ban on chemical weapons, have endeavored to draw the question into a
quagmire of drawn-out and futile discusaions over the technical aspects of the
problem. It is apparent that there are not and cannot be any reasons for a delay
on the question of banning chemical weapons. flere it is merely a question of show-
ing political will and a desire to achieve a reasonable, generally acceptable agree-
ment.
The Soviet Union has set a good example on this question. The Soviet delegation
proposed that the 31st UN General Assembly Session start by discuasing the question
of the ban and elimination of the most dangerous, fatal types of chemical weapons.
- Here a substantial contribution could have been made by rPalizing the Soviet- ,
American agreement on a joiat initiative to conclude a convention on the most dan-
gerous, fatal chemical weapons.
As for control over the observance of the ban on chemical weapons, it should be
based upon national procedures. In this regard there is the positive precedent of
the Convention on Banning Bacteriological Weapons. At the same time, the Soviet
Union expressed a readiness to examine the possibility of using additional contrfll
procedures, and in particular, to discuss a method for monitoring the destruction
of the stocks of chemical weapons which were to be excluded from the arsenals of
the states.
The resolution sponsored by Hangary, the GD&, Polaad, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
- Union and adopted by the 31st UN General Assembly Session drew attention to the
risk related to the further development, production and stockpiling of chemical
weapons under conditions when there was no international agreement which would not
only fully ban but also provide for the destruction of such weapoas. The resolu-
tion pointed out that the achieving of the corresponding agreement would contribute
- to the cause of complete and universal disarmament under effective international
control.
- Upon the proposal of a number of the socialist and other countries, the 32d Session
- urgently called on all states to make an effort to quickly reach agreement on an
effect~~ve ban on the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chem-
ical weapons and their destruction and requested that the Disarmament Committee in
Geneva be first concerned with working out an appropriate agreement considering all
the existing proposals and future initiatives submitted for its review.
- In the course of the Vienna meeting in June 1979 between the Soviet and U.S. lead-
ers, both sides affirmed the importance of an universal, complete and supervisable
ban on chemical weapons and agreed to iacrease their efforts to prepare a coordi-
nat~ed joint proposal for submission to the Disarmament Committee. Soon af ter the
Vienna meeting, the committee was given a Soviet-American statement on the course
of the bilateral talks from which it could be seen that dEfinite, and in a number
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of instances, signtficant progress had been made in the talks. At the same time,
slow progress was being made on certain important poiats.
A majority of the co~mmittee members expressed satisfaction with the bilateral an-
nouncement and participated in the discussion. The line of the more active in-
volvemeat of the co~ittee in the work on the basic proposals of the future conven-
tion was fully and completely supported by the Soviet delegation which recalled
that the Saviet state virtually from the first days of its existence had demanded
a ban on chemical weapons. In particular, it was stated that the Soviet Union fully
share the opinion of the broadest group of states on the urgent need for an imme-
diate ban on chemical weapons as we11 as their concern over the absence of an in-
ternational agreement on this matter.
The Disarmament Committee, proceeding from the view that a baa on chemical weapuns
was one of the most immediate and vitally important problems in the disarma.ment
area, decided to continue talks on this question in 1980 as well.
The USSR was among those UN member states which at the 34th UN General Asse.mbly Ses-
_ sion urged an immediate conclusion to an international conveation on banning nuclear
weapons.
In the opinion of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact members, a limitation
- on the so-called conventional types of weapons could also serve well the cause of
military detente. Their diversity and power and their lethal strength had risen
man lfold in comparison with the period of World War II. As was shown by the example
_ of Vietnam, bombing raids with modern so-called conventional bombs have such conse-
quences that f or measuring their destructive force it would be possible almost to
employ those criteria for assessing the destructive might of nuclear weapons.
In the postwar years all acts of aggression have been carried out exclusively with
the use of conventional weapons. And at present the peoples fighting against col-
onial suppression are the victims of the use of precisely coaventional weapons.
Israeli aggression against the Arab states and peoples was also carried out, aa is
known, using conventional weapons.
"Certainly it is a fact," said A. A. Gromyko, "that 80 percent of the world expendi-
tures on military needs go for conventional arms. How many people i.n the postwar
~ period alone have become victims of the use of weapons which are termed convention-
al but which naw possess--due to the amazing accuracy as well as the complete de-
struction of large areas--the most lethal power!"22
For this reason the task of approving real measures to reduce aviation, artillery,
tanks and other modern types of conventional arms, and likewise the arm~d forces
_ equipped with them, has in no way lost its urgency. The Warsaw Pact members were
proceed ing from this when they pointed out in the Bucharest Declaration (1976) that
they "gave great significance to concluding agreements on reducing armed forces at~d
conventional arms."23 The socialist countries, as is known, have repeatedly made
specific proposals on this question.
The Soviet Union is sincerely ready to conduct talks on reducing armed forces and
armaments. It has repeatedly stated this on various levels. The readiness for
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i
talks on this question was mentioned, in particular, in the memorand~mm of the
Soviet Union on the questions of halting the arms race and disarmament submitted tc
the UN General Assembly in September 1976.24
On 25 April 1978, L. I. Breztlnev came forward with a proposal to give up the en-
larging of armies and increasing the conventional weapons of the states which were
permanent members of the Security Council and the countries linked to them by mili-
tary agreements .
If there were a desire by all states possessing large armed forces to conduct talks
on the conventional types of weapons, then positive results and constructive accords
could be reached.
The Soviet Union, in acting in the spirit of the Final Act, together with its allies
- has worked actively to eliminate a11 foreign military bases on foreign territories
and f or the withdrawal of f oreign troops f rom them. The urgency of this problem has
been emphasized by the fact that by the aut~n of 1979, an eaormous numb~r of such
bases existed throughout the world, including in Western Europe. The U.S. ?resi-
dent J. Carter stated: "We have created t~oo many military bases overseas." Accord-
ing to official data alone, the Pentagon had approximately 2,500 various military
installations located in more than 30 nations of the world, including in nations
which signed the Final Act.25
- In Western Europe the American military bases in 1979 were manned by 340,000 Ameri-
can soldiers and off icers, includiag around 240,000 in the FRG, more than 20,000 in
England, more than 12,000 in Italy, 4,800 in Turkey and 3,700 in Greece. The II.S.
President sta ted that the Pentagon was maintaiaing its troops on the territories of
other countries as well and "some of them are very close to the frontiers of the
Soviet Union."
The Warsaw Pact has acted decidedly to solve this question both on a global scale
and in terms of the individual continents. But there has beea no progress here,
- and this cannot help but cause conc:ern. The Soviet Union, together with the other
Warsaw Pact na tious, is ready to collaborate actively and construc tively in settl-
- ing the given questi on. In November 1976, great attention was given to it again at
a meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC in Bucharest.
_ Two years lat er, in November 1978, the Warsaw Pact nations, in the Moscow Declara-
tion of the PCC, reaffirmed their consistent position in favor of eliminating mili-
tary b ases on foreign territories and puliing f oreign troops out of the territories
of other states, including European ones.
The ensuring of security in the Mediterranean would be a major coatribution to
deepening the process of military detente in Europe~as well as beyond it as this
region encompasses more than 20 nations of Europe, Africa and Asia. The Soviet
Union is a supporter of moving on to canstructive talks and practical steps in a
direction of extend ing mili.tary detente into the Mediterranean.
"We want," said L. I. Brezhnev, "the Mediterranean Sea to become a sea of peace,
go~d neighbors and cooperation.i26 The Soviet Union and the other socialist nations
are ready to increase their cvatribution to the practical embodiment of this noble
task which meets the interests of all the Mediterranean peoples.
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At the Bucharest Session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee in May 1979,
the USSR and the other socialist countries stated th~ir readiness to ~xtend all
measures which would strengthen detente and confidence in Europe as well to the
Mediterranean. The Soviet proposal remained in effect to withdraw from the Medi-
terranean the Soviet and American ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons; thie
had been proposed by L. I. Brezhnev in July 1974.
The vital importance of the preposals of the USSR and its allies vis-a-vis the
Mediterranean is obvious. It has been proposed that new types of nuclear missile
weapons--Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles--be deployed in one of the nations
of this region, Italy. And this in addition to the American forward based weapons
~ahich already exist there! Understandably, such actions could only be detrimenta~ -
to the security of the Mediterranean and to all the nations of Western Europe which
signed the Final Act. To prevent such a development of events is the aim of the
proposals of the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist co~onwealth.
In the opinion of the Soviet Union aad all the Warsaw Pact members, an effective
_ measure in the area of military detente would be a reduction in the military bud-
gets of the states which possess a great military and economic patential. The re-
sources released in this instance could be channeled into the economic and social _
progress of peoples, at raising the economic growth rate, providing employment,
developing new sources of energy, solving the food problem, combating diseases and
building new schools and institutions of higher ~earning.
A reduction of a military budget i.s a most visible indicator of in what direction
one or another nation intends to work on the world scene, that is, toward war or
; toward peace. The share of military expenditures in the budget of the Soviet Union
itself in recent years has systematically declined. In 1976, expenditures were
17.4 billion rubles, or 7.8 percent o~ all the expenditures of the budget, in 1977,
17.2 billion, or 7.2 percent, in 1978, 17.2 billion, or 7 percent, and in 1979, -
17.2 billion rubles were allocated f or these purposes, or 6.8 percent.27 _
The Warsaw Pact countries, starting in 1973, have repeatedly made proposals to re-
= duce military budgets and by their actions have set an example in this regard.
- At the 31st UN General Assembly Session the Soviet Union reaffirmed its proposal
to reduce military budgets and, in endeavo~ing to put this important matter on a ~
practical basis, stated that it was ready to assume a`lexible position on the
issue of the specific f iguze from which the reduction in military budgets should
start. It would be possible zo agree both on a larger figure than 10 percent or on
a smaller one as the first szep. However, it was important to make this question
= more rapidly a matter of business-like talks between the concerned states. At the
Bucharest Conference of the PCC in November 1976, the Warsaw Pact affirmed its sup-
_ ~ort for the idea of reducing the military budgets of states.
~rhe socialist countries are convinced thgt it is possible and nece5sary to rep~a:~.~~ _
the current constant rise in the military expenditures of many states by their ~ys-
tematic reduction. The Soviet Union favors having the nations which possess a
great economic and military potential, including the permanent members of th~~
Security Council, agree on specific amounts for reducing their military budgets
either in a percentage or in absolute terms. It insisted that such a reduction
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~
~
Start in 19'9 and cover a 3-year periocl. Some 10 percent of the funds freed from ~
the reduction could be spent on increasing aid to the developing nations. It is ~
not the fault of the Soviet Union that this vi*_ally important question continues to
remain unsolved. '
A number of useful initiatives i,n the area of disarmament were propcsed by the -
socialist nations which signed the Helsinki Accords in the course of the 34th UN
General Assembly Session, having demonstxated their leading r.ole in the struggle to
halt the arms race. The General Assembly approved the declaration proposec? by the
Czechoslovak delegation on international cooperation for the p:rposes of disarma-
ment. This declaration represents an unique code of standards for conducting dis-
_ arma.ment talks . The GDR played an active role in the draf tiag and adop ting of a
- resolution on increasing efforts aimed at disarntament and checking the arms race. -
FOOTNOTES -
1. See PRAVDA, 2 August 1975.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. See PRAVD.A, 22 O~ctober 1977.
S. See PRAVDA, 24 November 1978,
6. See PRAVDA, 7 October 1979.
7, PRAVDA, 2 August 1975.
~ 8. "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 24.
9. See PRAVDA, 23 July 1976.
- 10. See MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MBZ~UNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 11, 1977, p 113.
- 11. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom," Vol 7, Moscow, 1979, pp 297-298.
12. See PRAVDA, 29 June 1979.
j 13. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 5, pp 337-338.
- 14. Ibid., Vol 6, p 292.
15. "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS," p 38.
16. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit. , Vol 7, p 266.
?.7. "Radi Mira na Zemle: Sovetsko-Amerikanskaya Vstrecha na Vysshem Urovne v Vene,
15-18 Iyunya 1979 Goda. Dokumenty, Rechi, Materialy" [r'or the Sake of Peace
in the World: The Soviet-American Su~it Meeting in Vienna, 15-18 June 1979.
Documents, Speeches, Ma~~rials], Moscow, 1979, p 32.
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18. Ibid., pp 68-69.
- 19. PRAVDA, 26 June 1979.
20. L. I. Brezhupv, op. cit., Vol 7, p 296.
_ 21. Ibid., Vol 5, p 377.
- 22. A. A. Gromyko, "Vo Imya Torzhestva Leninskoy Vneshney Politiki. Izbrannyye
Rechi i Stat'i" [In the Name Af the Triumph of Leninist Foreign Policy.
Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1977, p 540.
23. "Soveshchaniye Politicheskogo Konsul'tativnogo Komiteta Gosudarstv--Uchastaikov
Varshavskogo Dogovora. Bukharest, 25-26 Noyabrya 1976 Goda" [Meeting of the
Warsaw Pact PCC. Bucharest, 25-26 November 1976], p 14. -
24. See PRAVDA, 30 September 1976.
25. See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 September 1979.
- 26. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 7, p 448.
27. See MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZIiIZN' , No 2, 1979, p 102. -
[Conclusion; pp 217-219]
_ In May 1980, international life celebrated a ma~or event, the meeting of the Warsaw
Pact PCC. The conference was a new affirmation of the profound adherence and firm
determination of the fraternal countries to continue the struggle to strengthen
security and to develop cooperation in Europe, for universal peace, liberty and in-
d ependence of peoples, for international deteate, for halting the arms race and for
d isarmament.
The conference unanimously approved documents of enormous political signif icance.
- These were the Declaration and Statement which give a complete program for detente~
and they indicate the ways and means for strengtheaing European and world peace.
The socialist countries reaffirmed their readiaess for a constructive dialogue with
all the interested states. They adv.snced an exceptionally imgortant proposal to -
agree that, beginning at a def inite, approved date, no state or no grouping of
states in Europe would increase the size of their armed forces in the region de-
f ined by the Final Act of the Confereace on Security and Caoperation in Europe.
The Warsaw Pact members favored careful and intensiee preparations for the Madrid
Meeting set for the end flf 1980 and for canducting it in a constructive and
business-like spirit. The Declaration firmly and clearly stated that the coaclu-
sion of the Madrid Meeting by positive aad concrete results would have a beneficial _
effect on the overall state of the international atmosphere.
- The Warsaw Pact countries favored accelerated preparations for a conference on
military detente and disarmament in Europe and the holding of multilateral
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preliminary consultations by the representatives of the states which would partici-
- pate in the propoaed conference. They were in favor of the Madrid Meeting approv-
ing practical decisions on the tasks of the conference, on the dates, place and
procedure of its holding and oa the agenda for its stage having concentrated the
conference's work on confidence-building measures. As for the place of holdiiig the
conference, the conference participa~nts supported the proposal to convene it !.n the
capital of Poland, Warsaw.
They also pointed to the necessity of increasing eff orts for the purpose of rapidly
achiev ing agreement on various areas of li~iting and halting the arms race.
The immediate tasks in this area, along with ratification of the Soviet-American
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2), were the rapid bringing to a successful
- conclusion of the talks on:
1) Complete and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing;
2) Banning radiological weapons;
3) Banning chemical weapons and destroying their stocks;
4) The nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states who do not have them
on their territory and the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of
states where they do not presently exist.
The reaching of agreement on each of these measures, the Declaration emphasizes,
� wou.ld help to i.mprove the intern~ational situation and the successful conclusion of -
the talks would be a major achievement for the good of mankind.
- The socialist ~ountries proposed an immediate start to business-like talks on the
following urgent measures in the area of halting the arms race and reducing the
threat of war:
1) The concluding of a world treaty on the renunciation of force; _
2) The halting of nuclear weapons production and a gradual reduction in their
stockpiles until their complete elimination; _
3) Banning the development of new types and new sy~tems of weapons of mass destruc-
tion;
4) Reducing military budgets, primarily of the large states;
5) Restricting and reducing the level of military presence and military activities
in the corresponding regions, be it the Atlantic, Indian or Pacific oceans, the
Mediterranean Sea or Persian Gulf.
At the meeting in Warsaw, in addition, a separate Statement was approved. The
higher leadership of the countries represented at the conference proposed that in
the immediate future a summit meeting be held f or the leaders of states from all
regions of the world. Such a meeting could focus attention on the key questions of _
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international life and outline the ways for eliminating centers of international
- tension.
The documents of the Warsaw meeting were peYmeated with a prnfound belief that even
the most confused and complicated problems, global or regional, could be settled
by political means. This applies also to the problems of a Near East settlement and
to the American-Iranian conf lict.
In speaking after the signing of the conference documents, L. I. Brezhnev said:
"In the present complex situation, when millions of people fear for the fate of
d etente aad peace, from Warsaw there rings a clear warning against a policy of
military adventures and feverish arms race; there rings a voice of reason and peace
and an aff irmation of will to cooperate ia solving acute problems of the modern �
world."1
FOOZ'NOTE
1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom," Vol 5, p 339.
C OPYRIGHT: "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1980
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NATIONAL
MIRZA IBRAHIMOV DISCUSSES ROLE OF SOVIET WRITER, CPSU CONGRESS
Baku LITERATURNYY AZERBAYDZHAN in Russian No 2, 81 pp 13-15 -
(Article by Mirza Ibrahimov: "The High Duty of the Wxiter"]
[Text] Throughout the entire history of mankind the artistic word has played an enor-
mous role in the life of society as an integral, organic component of the culture and
spiritual life of peoples.
Literature is a powerful means of exercising a spiritual influence on people and of
developing the human intellect, morality and character; it is a conduit for philo-
sophical ideas and a propagandist for social ideals.
Bourgeois society, on the one hand, strives to make artistic literature an instrument
- for deceiving the popular masses and justifying bourgeois morality and bourgeois social
relations as "just" and "progressive," that is, a mouthpiece for its ideas; on the
other hand it proclaims the theory of "absolute freedom" from ideas, of a supposedly -
- apolitical literature, of art for art's sake. Seventy-six years ago now, V. I. Lenin
in exposing this bourgeois pharisaism foretold the birth of a truly free literature,
_ one permeated, not with careerism and a passion for profits, but rather with the ideas
of socialism and sympathy for working people.
Multinational Soviet literature, brought to life by the Great October, is a literature
devoted to the ideas of Lenin's revolution, one reflecting the thoughts and hopes of
the working masses and serving the welfare, progress and happiness of the peoples. ~Jur
literature sees its sacred duty to lie in service to the building of a new life and a .
free socialist society and in the compilation of an artistic chronicle of this victori-
ous struggle.
In pruclaiming the ideas of the revolution, the heroic struggle of the peoples for the
establishment of socialism and the worldwide struggle far liberation, this literature
marked a new stage in the artistic development of mankind. It brought to light the -
image of a new man in history--the builder of socialism, A man whose credo was to
cleanse the world of the rubbish and f ilth of the old exploitative society and its
parasitic classes. i,moarking on such a grandiose historical mission, the new man
then selflessly devotes himself to the struggle to establish a world of brotherhood
and equality in which free labor triumphs.
It fell to Soviet literature to embody the achievements of this creative man in all
their multicolored variety and for the f irst time to portray his artistic image. It
was for precisely this reason that it has become the standard-bearer and vanguard for
progress:ive artistic thought throughout the world.
1~2
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'1'u purtray the great revolutionary pathos and express the profound universal, humanis-
tic essence of Soviet literature and the grandeur of the ideals it embodies there ap-
peared in world literature a writer of a new type--the Soviet writer. The Soviet
artist sees the mission of the artistic word to lie in the re�lection of historical
truth. That is, the truth serving the interests of the working man, the working peo-
ple, the truth securing his freedom, progress and happiness; in embodying this truth
the Soviet writer serves the cause of the f inal triumph of the ideals of freedom and
f~app:iness throughout the world. As the great Lenin foretold, our literature is a free
~ literature, one truly serving the toiling masses.
_ The literature of not a single bourgeois country of our time can compare with Soviet
literature--in t:ie purity of the moral and ideological qualities it demonstrates, in
the great number of solid, full-blooded human figures it presents capable of serving
as models for millions, in its crystalline esthetic beauty and in the strength of its
f.aith in the mind and conscience of man and his future.
lde Soviet people are fortunate to be witnesses, daily, hourly, to brilliant displays of
the great and abundant spiritual potential of the millions of Soviet people in different
- walks of life; we feel the beating of their hearts and the breathing of their feelings
_ and hopes; we draw inspiration from their accomplishments. This gives wings to our
creative thought; it expands its horizons, stirs and increases our passion to create....
I would like to recount two or three incidents from the lives of people I know, things
passing in the course of personal meetings with them.
On 22 October 1980, at a regular session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I had -
occasion to sit in the illuminated hall of the Great Kremlin Palace beside a noted
- countrywoman, Shamama Gasanova, twice Hero of Socialist Labor and chairman of the
Kolkhoz imeni 1 May. We had known one another for 30 years.
Soon after the end of the war, when work on restoration and construction were only just
getting under way and our technical capabilities were still limited, Shamama was tel-
ling me as wP passed along dusty village side streets filled with her antediluvian
countrywomen about a plan to build an entirely new village. I caught sight of some
kolkhoz women with their pitchers standing in line at a well. Grasping what I was
thinking, Shamama declared that she was dreaming of a pipeline for the village. She
even took me to a nearby hill several kilometers outside the village where there were
some springs. I was delighted to hear of these dreams about water, although they did,
in fact, still seem a little far removed from reality. Who knows when th~y can ever
- be transformed into reality, I thought then. Shamama struck me as a beautiful heroine
living out romantic dreams. -
But what do we see today?
After a look at the village today, those "utopias" now seem quite modest vi5ions.
Shamama-khanum speaks with pride about the new village with its lights, televisions
and stone houses, its straight asphalted streets lined with green trees, the machir~e-
tractur park and the girls who have become equipment operators. At the sight of the~e
women in leading kolkhoz positions, women like Shamama or the women managing indus-
_ trial enterprises, directors, chief engineers and operators, I involuntarily recall
the joyless lot of prerevolutionary Azerbaijani women deprived of rights. But then
I myself think this recollection not altogether appropriate: for considering the rate
and scale of the progress we see today, any comparison at all with a state of aff.airs -
- o~ 60 and more years ago may seem a hopeless anachronism.
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The spiritual and cultural elevation of our people commensurate with our country's
unpre.cedented economic and cultural progress puts the writer onto some fascinating,
interesting ideas. Here now in the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses only a short dis-
tance frum me sits a sharp-eyed, dark-browed, dark-complexioned young woman. That is
Tarlan Musayeva, an equipment operator and team leader. She is listening closely to
the deputies speaking from the platform. I have known her about two years. She rep-
resents the new generation of our young Azerbaijani women. The generation which has
_ taken up the torch from Shamama Gasanova!
This generation characterizes a new stage in our development; we are astonished by its
critical thinking, the breadth of its knowledge and interests and its rejection of any
ideas and customs which have outlived their usefulness! A woman, a young lady an equip-
- ment operator?! Not S0, but even 20 or 30 years ago this would to many have been ab- _
surd and immoral. But in the villages of Azerbaijan there are now hundreds of women
working as equipment operators!
Readers will be aware that it has now been a decade since Azerbai~an entered the front
ranks of all-IInion socialist competition. Gratifying results have been achieved in all
spheres of national economic and social life. Cotton and grape cultivation have been
rai~ed to unprecedented levels in the republic. The republic has been awarded the Red
Challenge Banner 10 years running.... But the picture of all these successes would be
- incomplete if behind them there did not stand real live people and the growth in their
consciousness, their skills and in their level of cultural development. This growth
- has been substantial, it has been magnificent!
Now again my memory takes me back to the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses. A session of
the foreign affairs commission of both chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR con-
vened there at the beginning of iiovember 1980. It met to discuss the Treaty of Friend-
ship and Mutual Assistance concluded between our country and the Syrian Republic. _
The prominent figures of our government, party and society speaking at the session _
pointed to the importance of this treaty for the strengthening of peace, not only in
the Near and Middle East, but throughout the entire world. The session chairman, com-
rade M. A. Suslov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and secretary -
of the CPSU Central Committee, gave the floor to Aliya Takhmasib. If the truth be
known, I was seized by a strange emotion; it is difficult to remain indifferent when
or~e of your countrywomen is speaking. Aliya-khanum words were of substance as well as
interest; the Russian language flowed from her lips cleanly and freely; the faces of _
all her listeners were set aglow; it was a glow of proud satisfaction with our com-
patriot!
The figures of my notable female contemporaries now rush through my mind.
I know many of them, of course, many, both young and white with age, who enjoy no less
of a reputation and who have also honored with awards. But my pen has now been leading ,
me into an area where female fortunes and heroism attract the mosC attention.
They all have one quality in common: they are devoted heart and soul to their work.
This quality brings me to recall the fortunes of one other woman. L. Ya. Sharova, a
resident of the town of Aleksandrov in Permskaya Oblast, wrote me a letter about my
novel, "Sliyaniye vod" [The Waters Combine]. She writes: "I am 25 years old. I have
been working as a cook for eight years now. How much I had squandered, how little I
had accomplished. It seems I was never able to get anything done. I am prepared to
_ ~
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devote my whole life to cooking for my people. When they eat and then leave with
smiles on their faces, the cook is content.... All things considered, I am satisfied
with this work. I just wish everybody loved their work...."
"...thar everybody loved their work!" A beautiful wish. For L. Ya. Sharova to love
_ one's work means to love people, "~y people," as she writes in her letter. My thought
is: what light, what purity in the heart of our Soviet man. And if an ordinary young
Russian woman from the far-away Urals feels the need to share her thoughts about an
Azerbaijani novel and its heroes, if her heart lives on such lofty, compassionate
sentiments and international intcrests, this cannot but inspire!
~
As I write these lines I recall the great programmatic requirements Comrade L. I.
Brezhnev imposed upon Soviet literature at the 25th Congress of our party. Among them
special attention was drawn to the matter of "moral questing" and the role of the em-
bodiment of the highest human spiritual qualities. And then what concern for the human
being permeates Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report at the Oc*..ober plenum of the CPSU Cen-
tral Committee (1980)! It shows a love for th.~ Sovie*_ people.
I have devoted more than a half-century of my life to literature. In addition to prose,
poetic and dramatic works I have also published my literary criticism and journalistic
works. Over a period of many years I have maintained active, creative communication
with comrades involved with our multinational Soviet literature; I have read and I con-
tinue to read, I have followed and I continue to follow the creative work of writers
i knnw personally.
I am not saying all this for my own benefit, but rather in order to illuminate the
sources suppurting my belief in the importance and the force of our artistic word.
Yes, on the basis of concrete personal and creative artistic experience and of the pos-
sibility of making great and powerful artists accessible to the entire world, I have
become convinced that the highest mission and ideological and esthetic value of litera-
ture lies in the people's need for it, in its enrichment of their spiritual world, in
its strengthening of their courage to wage the struggle for truth and justice and in
its development of nobility of character, love and an elevated sense of beauty.
Oc~ly when literature is bound by all its roots to the life and times of the people,
to their life with its struggles and passions, its driving forces, only then will it
Ue able to fulfill this mission fully and successfully. Without this there can be no
~reat art--neither realistic nor romantic.
Feverish creative activity is now under way in all corners of our motherland. The
E~euple in their millions are making their contributions to the material wealth and
spiritual assets of the country. Bright horizons lie ahead.
The basic directions of our country's economic and social development for the period
1981-1985 and ahead to 1990 open up a vast, majestic, brilliant panorama. It all gives
wings to the writer's imagination and spurs him to new creative achievements.
Our whole life, the friendship and bratherhood of our peoples, their inspired and
unified labors, the far-sighted course and radiant ideals of Lenin's party give ever
renewed spiritual energy to Soviet masters of the literay craft.
This imposes upon us the obligation to create a full-blooded artistic image of present-
ciay man, the builder of communism and the fighter for peace throughout the world. In
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carrying out the decisions of the 26th Party Congress, Soviet writers should strive
- in their work for maximum output in order to meet the spiritual needs of the people.
Copyright: "Literaturnyy Azerbaydzhan," 1981
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