JPRS ID: 9762 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020001-4
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• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9762 -
.
~1 June 1981
rt Africa Re ort
Near East No h
p _
(FOUO 19/81) -
~
_ F~~$ ~OREIGN BROADCA~T I~IFORMATION SERVICE ~
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- sources are translated; those from English-language sources
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JPRS L/9762
1 June 19 81.
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 19/81)
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Sadat-Qadhdhaf al-Dam Meeting Reported
(Abdel aziz Dahman~; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 22 Apr 81) 1
AFGHANISTAN
Resistance to Russiana Reported Rising
(STERN, 23 Apr 81) 3
ALGERIA
Cultural Berb er Agitation Resurfacea
(MARCHE S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 3 Apr 81) 6
ISRAEL
reace :~:ovement Seeks Rapprochement With PLO
(Mattiyahu Peled; NEW OUTLOOK, Feb/Mar 81) 10
Arab Land Ownership Disputed in Galilee
(Mohammed Watad; NEW OUTLOOK, Feb/Mar 81) 14
LIBYA
A1-Qadhdhafi D iscusses Relations With U.S., USSR
(Qadhdh afi Interview; ASAHI SHIMBUN, 28 Apr 81) 18
SUDAN
Southern Leadership Argues Division of Region
(Jacob Akol; SUDANOW, Apr 81) 20
Joseph Lagu Gives Views on Decentralization
(Joseph Lagu; SUDANOW, Apr 81) 24
Omdurman Unive rsity Factiona Argue Nature of School
_ (Azhari Abdel Rahman; SUDANOW, Apr 81) 28
~
- a- [ I I I - NE & A - 121 FOUO ]
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Three Industries Denationalized
(Alfred Logune Taban; SUDANOW, Apr 81) 32
West.Germany Offers Many Forma of Assiatance
(Nagi Saliem Boulis; SUDANOW, Apr 81) 33
TUNISIA
Basic Agreement Concluded With Peugeot
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 3 Apr 81) 34
Kuwait Loans for Tunisian Projects
. (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 3 Apr 81) 35
Briefs
- Papers Suspended 3~
Shoe Exports 3~
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I
' -
INT~R-ARAB AFFAIRS
SADAT-QADHDHAF AL-DAM MEETING REPORTED -
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Apr 81 p 37 _
[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "A Familq Affair"] ~
. [Text] "President Anwar Sadat met with an ea~issary of Qadhdhaf~ on 12 February in
Paris," read the article in the April issue of the Cairo periodical OCTOBRE by _
Anis Mansour, an eminent journalist and friend of the Egyptian chief of state to
boot. As surprising as it may be, giv~~n the scarcely friendly nature of official
relations between the two countries and their leaders, the information is true.
The Paris meeting at the time of President Sadat's state visit did ta'?ce place and, ~
JEUNE AFRIQUE can state, the mysterious emissary was none other than Ahmed Qa~lhdhaf _
~ al-Dam, Qadhdhafi's cousin and one of his tr.usted aides.
Key
- The meeting took place on 12 February at the Marigny Palace. It was thoroughly
~ planned well before Sadat's arrival in France on the llth. The first day was
- taken up by the usual talks wi th President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and French
~fficials. However, on the fo Ilowing day, there was a strange "gap" of several ~
hours in the Egyptian president's schedule. First he met with representatives
of France's Jewish community, headed by Rene Sirat, the new chief rabbi, and
_ Alain de Rothschild, president of the Representative Council of the Jewish Insti-
tutions of France (CRTF) . Later on in the day, it was the turn of the F~uslim
community, led by Hamza Boubakeur, rector of the Paris Mosque.
It was between these two meetings that Sadat saw Ahmed Qadhdhaf al-Dam for over
two and a half hours. Following the meeting, Qadhdhaf a1~Dam said privately that
he had spoken "the language of frankness" with Sadat, stating that Camp David had -
_ led to an impasse and that Libya could help Egypt return to the "Arab family." -
Sadat replied that "Egypt is not for sale." However, Qadhdhafi announced on
- 28 March in Tobrouk that he was going to withdraw his troops massed along the
- Egyptian border~.
Ahmed Qadhdhaf a1~Dam has become a key person in the policy of Qadhdhafi, who `
often introduces him as his brother. This 38-year-old many distinguished, seduc-
tive and worldly, is gifted with great intelligence. Assigned to the Secret Ser-
vices in 1969, h.e lived in Egypt for several years during the time of Nasser and
became an aicle to Achraf Marouane, son-in-law and confidence man of the leader.
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, Later, in Libya, he became a friend and protector of Carlos, then being sought
, by all Western police. Then, as head of the Secret Services, he was sPnt as a _
discreet emissary on several political missions. As the charge d'affaires for
inter.national rel.ations abroad, he would meet with Western leaders in France,
Germany, Great Britain, and so on. He has often planned other more official
meetings for Qadhdhafi, No 2 Abdesselam Jalloud or Abdesselam Triki, minister of _
foreign affairs. _
On Display -
Ahmed Qadhdhaf al-Dam often goes to Paris, where he is often seen at the -
Plazza Athence where he is higly visible. But he is also at home in the back ~
' of small shops or sitting down with students.
, COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
11,464
cso: 4800/53
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_ AFGHANISTAN
~
RESISTANCE TO RUSSIANS REPORTID RTSING
Har~burg STERN in German 23 Apr 81 pp 242-243 -
_ [Text] In the occupied country in the Hindu Kush, resistance against the Soviet
_ army is unbroken. Hundreds of believers stream out of the great mosque in Kabul
_ after religious services. A young man comes out of the crowd and speaks to me:
"Shuravi? Russian?"--"No, German."--"East or West?" Only after I had said,
"West," did he feel secure enough to whisper. to me: "We are fighting against the
- USSR." -
"I don't see any fighting," I said. He explains to me: "Kabul is quiet, but not
Kandahar, Jalalabad, Kunar, Paktia. We are fighting the Russians in the provinces."
--"Why?"--"Afghanistan is an Islamic country, and the Russians want to make a
socialist one out of it."
I pointed to the mosque: "But your government allows the Moslems freedom of reli-
gion." My anonymous conversation partner got touchy: "The Babrak Karmal govern-
ment is nothing. They are vassals of the USSR. We will destroy them." Then he
disappears as quickly as he appeared.
Such conversations--I am traveling with German and Swiss journalist colleagues--
come unannounced everywhere on our trip through Afghanistan. Sixteen months after
the Soviet intervention, the mottntainous country at the Hindu Kush is still in a
i state of war. To be sure, the hard winter has brought about a reduction in fight-
- ing, and President Karmal has announced confidently that there is "no front anymore,
anywhere in Afgb3nistan, but the "Mo~aheddin" ("freedom fighter") is unbroken in
his Islamic resistance. "Without the 85,000 Red soldiers," a Western diplomat in "
Kabul said, "Karmal wouldn't last a week."
Karmal has used the winter break to work against such impressions. With the foun-
dation of mass organizations on the Soviet model, and with continual indoctrina- -
tion with attestations of loyalty by Islamic priests, tribal leaders, and village
elders, he is putting together a~igsaw puzzle of "broad support for the new phase
of the revolution."
j -
Biit his basic flaw remains: He is the man the Russians brought into the country.
And here Karmal has run up against the clear feeling of a people that has rejected
all foreign ascendancy--the Persians, the British, the Russians. "We are Afghans,"
a textile dealer in the bazaar said proudly to me. "We will never accept foreign
domination."
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- In the night I hear from my window on the third floor of the Kabul HotQl machine ~
gun fire and shots from automatic rifles. The next morning, our attendant
Mohammed offers an explanation: "The soldiers sometimes shoot into the a~r with
glee."
Th~ Soviet helicopters car~nbt be talked away. Roaring, the Mi-Z4 combat machines
rise up from the airport of the capital and fly, aZways in twos, over the city in
the direction of Logar-Tal. Two hours later they return. The rockets on their
side wings have been fired off.
We are presented with a display of captured weapons--as "proof of the imperial-
istic interference in Afghdnistan." The rifles and pistols are a~.olorful ,jumble
of weapons technology from at least 2 centuries: Front loaders and homemade
flintlock pistols, decorated Pashtu hunters' rifles and Lee-Enfield carbines from ,
the times of the British army in India, sten guns and U.S. machine guns from World _
War II, G-3 weapons and Chinese pistols of a recent date, together with simple
plate mines and high-explosive bombs as well as--well sorted out as in a department
store--roo~s of ammunition. A"German rifle," according ta the stamp, from "Suhl/
Thueringen." "Made in Czechoslovakia" is written on one pistol. Omar, our
attendant from the Information Ministry, said: "That was stiamped in in a Pakistani
_ armorer's."
The collection only proves cne thing: The "Mojaheddin" are using everything they '
can get--recently also captured Russian Kalashnikovs. The only thing they do not
have is heavy weapons of the kind that would reach the Mi-24. Perhaps they will
get them when U.S. President Ronald Reagan sends them modern weapons. Reagan's .
announcement is taken by Kabul as confirmation of its conspiracy theory.
"It is good that Reagan is finally admitting it," Vice Prsmier Sultan Ali
Kishtmand, member of the Politbureau of t'he Democratic Peoples' Party (DVPA),
declares. "That is nothing new. But the revolution in Af ghanistan cannot be de-
feated or turned around." A few hours later, his Politbur.eau colleague, Anlhita
Ratebzad, the most influential woman in Afgnanistan, betrays to us what such con-
fidence is based on: "The Soviet Uni~n," she waxes enthusiastic, "is our great ~
friend and helper. With its support we will create a new Afgh:~nistan."
Up to now the government has not dccomplished much to improve the 7i~.r_ng conditions
of the wheat farmers and shepherds, nomads and day workers, who r~~,.1ate this
underdeveloped country. Seventeen million people live here acc ng to rough
estimates (there has never been a census).
Even if no one in Afghanistan is starving and if beggars are sa:~`~m seen, their
poverty is clear to all: 480 marks a year income, life expect ~ 42 years,
illiteracy rate 88 percent, too few do~tors, too few experts, enough roads,
unfavorable balance of trade, and high foreign debt. "Ever~~ is limited,"
Kishtmand admits. "We have no great reserves."
Karmal is making efforts to establish trust so that the builders and mer-
chants will invest again. He is s~eking a rise in buyi r by raising indus- _
trial wages and by making a guar~r~ree nf purGhases in ure.
~
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Just lil:e ev~rywhere else, on the Afghan New Year 1360, the minimum wage was
doi~tiled to 1,440 Af.ghanis in the textile factory Pol-i-Sharki in the outskirts of
Kal>ul. Biit the factory, which is plagued with lack of raw materials, cannot
raise the mone}� for the increased expenditures, in spite of the "surplus fulfill-
metit of ~he planned debt." "The state will pay it," the director explained.
The result of this policy is a growing debt to the USSR, because the Western
countries that give aid have abandoned the country since the Soviet invasion in
December, 1979. KisY~tmand gives the figures: 800 million marks debt in the West,
3 billion in the East--a total increase of 1.2 billion marks since 1978.
In trade, too, dependency on rloscow is oppressive. The Soviets receive 52 percent
of the Afgtian esports, above all al.most the total production of natural gas--at
" a ridiculous price that is "secret" in Kabul.
Soviet advisers sit ir. Kabul in all the ministries. Therefore foreign diplomats
do no~ ~ok upon Foreign Minister Mohammed Dost as the "final resort," but
' Vasili Safronchuk, the third man of the Moscow embassy. And the Ministry of
Tnformation ciistributes brochures such as "The Truth about Afghanistan"--published
by the Novosti Publishing uouse in Moscow. "I am now going to learn Russian,"
a Kabul party functionary told me at a banquet. "It will be needed for a long _
time in Afghanistan." .
So that we will not encounter freedom fighters, we must travel the 150 kilometers
from Kabul to Jalalabad by air. Shortly before landing, our attendant, Mohammed,
becomes strict: "No pictures, otherwise there wlll be trouble." The reason soon
becomes obvious: The Jalaiabad airport is a Soviet army depot. About 90 combat _
helicopters with the rear inscription, "Opasno" ("dangerous") stand here ready for
action. The place is teeming with Red soldiers in tropical uniforms and broad-
brimmed hats. T'he terrain is sealed off by tanks and MG nests.
While we wait for the vehicles, we start to talk to a few Russians. One was -
recently in Herat and ~escribes the position there with a few gestures, but with-
out a possible misunderstanding: He points to imaginary holes above his chest and
goes "Ratatatat."
A mustached Caucasian who speaks some Germa.n shows me a superficial wound in his
lef.t arm. He got it in a raiding party in which he led Afghan soldiers. His
- Afghans deserted--obviously no exception. According to Wester.n estimates, the -
Afghan army has shrunk f rom 80,000 to 30,U00 men since the beginning of 1980. Now
- the government wants to fill the missing ranks with older men by means of a new
recruiting law.
The Caucasian repores that the Russians only feel secure as long as they can fight
from tanks or helicopters. "Most of them are sick and tired of Afghanistan," he
said. "A year's duty without leave, no bars, no wife--only danger and boredom." -
- He takes a"Camel filter" from me, takes a deep drag and moans sadly, "Home, home,
home."
_ COPYRIGHT: [1981] Gruner & Jahr AG & Co.
91'l4
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ALGERIA
CUI.TURAL BERBER AGITATION RESURFACES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Apr 81 pp 925-926
[Report: "'Cultural Berber' Agitation Resurfaces"]
[Text] The resurfacing of Berber agitation has not come as a total surprise, _
Eor the Algerian authorities had not shunned the discussion. An extensive
national debate on cultural policy had been initiated at the beginning of March,
within the party, trade unions, mass organizations and educational institutions.
The press and the radio had reported the event with remarkable frankness, without -
concealing the differences noted in the exchange o� ideas in Tizi-Ouzou and other
cities, on the subject of Berber culture and its place in Algerian national cul- -
ture. The fact that such debates could heat up l~assions and trigger disturbances
in Kabylian country could not be excluded in advance. '
is it a question, as claimed by the party press, of a"criminal attempt to pro-
mote a split" (EL MOU~JAHID editori,~l, 14 March) conceived for the purpose of -
undermining the entire national structure? Conversely, could everything be re-
duced to anarchic manifestations of the disappointment of a few special interest
centers who had not been given immediate and total satisfaction? Or else, could
one interpret the new Tizi-Ouzou incidents as a symptom of the legitimate exas-
peration of local public opinion dulled by the halfway measures taken by the
~ authorities and losing its patience?
~
Nevertlleless, it is undeniable that, since last spring, the Algerian authorities
had shown their wish to calm down feelings through a number of specific gestures.
Although it was true that a chair of Berber language and civilization, planned
for. Tizi-Ouzou, had not been established, popular Ferber language and literature
could be heard more frequently on the radio and television, and official news
~nentioned the "Berber action" in Algerian history. What was even more important
was tl~at the previously detained active Berber supporters had been released.
The fact that throughout Algeria the FLN members are willing to accept, with -
some caution, Berber cultural existence may be seen, for example, by the speech
delivered by Abdelkrim Abada, secretary of the party's Mouhafadha, in Constan- ~
- tine, on 14 March: "Berber cultural traditions are the patrimony of the entire
Algerian people; we are in favor of the preservation and enhancement of some
of them, for they symbol.ize the history and genious of our people. Nevertheless,
we must point out the danger that imperialism and its agents may manipulate this
problem" (EL MOUDJAHID, 16 March 1981}.
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Vc~ry ~~en Debate But Based on the Party's Interpretation Alone
'I'he d~~bates which were started on 12 March in Tizi-Ouzou seem to have allowed,
initially at least, and on the express recommendation of the wali and the Mouha-
fadha secretary, a real freedom of expression. Both within the party anci in
s~~condrlry schoo].s and the university, a number of young people vi};orously c~~l lucl
for "the preservation of the Be rber language," for Berber culture to be bettcr
served by television and radio, for encouraging rather than retracting specific
local features, and for "talenr_s to be able to express themselves rather than
to be forced to expatriate themselves."
The participants in the debates also emphasized their support of Arabic as the
national language, even though showing a preference for "Algerian" rather than
"classical" Arabic, and condemning "repressive trends" in this area; they also
declared their basic loyalty to Islam. Many of them insisted that they rejected
"any exploitation of Berber awareness for the sake of secret purposes," and that
~ they rejected the need to contemplate in this respect the adoption of precau-
tionary measures or even of restrictions.
The demands of Kabylian youth were not limited to the Berber aspect of the prob-
_ lems. They included the quality of inedia programs which were considered regres-
- sive and insufficiently popular-oriented and, in general, the "cultural vacuum"
felt in the provincial center. The cry from the heart was, "Holidays here are
too long!"
All this was hardly subversive. Therefore, what was the reason for the sudden
excitement on Sunday, 15 March, triggered by a slogan launched by the "university -
community?" Why did Tizi-Ouzou merchants and secondary school students go on
- strike? Why was there a big,demonstr.ation at the university "against repression"
and for "democratic freedoms?" Why did these disturbances rebound at the univer-
- sity in Algiers?
Although it was a procedural question, in this case it was a matter of capital
importance. The debates on culture, sponsored by the FLN, were based on a draft _
issued by one of its commissions, completed as recently as the beginning of Feb--
ruary, marking the beginning of the discussions. However, the Tizi-Ouzou "uni- _
versity community" considered this platform to be too narrow and too hastily _
drawn up. It asked that the conclusions of the study session it has sponsored
in April 1980 in Yakourene be equally submitted to the Assembly.
The authorities refused, citing democratic centralism as a reason: any project
submitted to the people should be formulated by the competent bodies within the
party. Unable, therefore, to present their views in a complete and c.oherent man-
ner, the authors of the Yakourene text tried' to substitute popular demonstrations
to the debate under way. In their view, neither the government nor the party
' sincerely wished a reform, and the only purpose of a discussion based on the
platform drafted by the FLN was to conceal the essence of the problem. _
The quick and profound reverberation which developed in the area as a result ,
of the opposition shown by the "Berber supporters" in Tizi-Ouzou, seems to have
surprised the authorities. Apparently, the Berb er~s cultural problems, to the
great sorrow of those who corisidered them artificial, have hardly changed in a
year and could not be resolved by mere declarations of intentiono
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~(~eneral Effort At Self-Criticism and Rectification
- The new incidents in Kabylia are taking place in the midst of a many-sided cam-
pai~;n oi self-criticism conducted among the Algerian public. 'rhe information
- media are featuring cases of embezzlement, official corruption a.~d severe negli-
gence. Numerous citizens, mostly workers, are reporting cases of waste visible .
to all: most frequently they involve the spoiling of goods apparently neglected
by the state-owned companies to which they were delivered and which shunt~~ them
aside.
The regional affairs sections of the pz~ess and the radio have pointed out numer-
ous occurrences which their commenrators consider t;.pical. ~
In a wilaya not far from Algiers, the cost of installing a water supply _
system had an overrun by a factor of twelve; a communal sanitation project had _
a cost overrun by a factor of six. In both cases no specific studies were made.
The insufficiencies of study offices and the insufficient number nf governmental
technical agents in various administrative centers were emphasized. Such de-
ficiencies in administrative studies have resulted in ths fact that in a distant
governorate, for example, reference prices for ~:.onstruction materials have been
set far below actual costs, worsened by rising transportation costs; several
private entrepreneurs, therefore, deemed it preferable simply to drop construc-
= tion projects, as a result of which the building of housing or of public facili- _
ties would be resumed under difficult circumstar.ces by the state sector.
The housing construction program in such settlement, which was interrupted some
4 years ago, has been partially impie:nented. However, the necessary infrastruc-
tures for the housing projects are virtually non-existent; a part of the implemen-
tation of the program remains doubtful, for slum housing has existed on it for
several decades and there are misgivings on the subject of ousting the popula-
- tion because of lack of alternate housing.
Elsewhere, a setclement lost its water supply when a spring dried out because
of a hastily implemented project in its vicinity. -
A very large industrial project was built in a large village in the eastezn part
~f the country, situated along a major highway, without corresponding engineering
facilities. Para~oxically, this led to a rapid worsening of living conditions. -
The members of the current APC (Communal People's Assembly) blamed their prede-
cessors. The chief of the military sector, who participated in the inspection
of the wali, told th~m that they had been elected precisely in order to provide
better management, and asked them to assume their responsibilities.
1n the "Letters to the Editor" secti.on in the newspapers, the public is express-
ing i ts support of the control exercised by the authorities. Particularly live--
- ly criticism has been voiced at some organs of the health services; in most cases
- the ~ccused officials have tried to justify their actions, sometimes at great
_ leii~th. This represents a sort of "public opinion rostrum." _
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Witi? all this, the state does not consider itself free from takinp action at
the hi.ghest levels. At the end of February the president of the republic inaugu-
rated a"seminar for management cadres," whose proceedings will b~ aime~l at "{~r~~--
~ moting the eEficiency of the production apparatus." Within tlte Lramcwork ul
the "socialist enterprise management," enterprise directors and el.ec~ed represc~n- _
tatives of the workers studied the reasons for the "counter-performance in some
- ec:onomic sectors and the gradual discouragement" of a large number of cadres
ar.d ~oorking people.
In its comment on this undertaking, the edi.torial writer in EL MOUDJAHID unhesi- _
- tatin~ly wrote that "imbalances and ill-advised behavior" cannot be explained
exclusively in terrns of "unsuitable laws or the chronic and dangerous incompe-
tence of hangers-on surrounding some officials" (1 March 1981). This is a formu-
la which, while involving very high offi.cials, nevertheless demands of the tech-
~iicians in charge to acknowledge their responsibilities. A subsequent article
demanded thst "the state assume serious control over economic levers."... The
recovery program formulated at the Fourth FLN Congress "has unfortunately not
been properly taken up by officials in charge of the economy... The recovery
_ wanted. and desired by the political bodies in the country has met with virtually
- no rPSponse among those in charge of implementing it."... (EL MOUDJAHID, '
7 March 1981).
- "In the Euture," Chadli Bendjedid concluded, "we shall no longer tolerate a pro-
duction unit to be a Uurden to the state._" The working people will have to be
' kept informed about the situation of their enterprise and the encountered diffi-
= culties and thus given the possibility to make an effective contribution to the -
common effort. It is also important, he added, for management cadres to join
the FLN. This would strengthen its vanguard nature and influence. The primary
- role of the party, therefore, is being firmly reasserted once again, rumors to
the contrary notwithstanding.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981. -
5I 57
CSO : ~+400/ 1057
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IS RAEL
- PEACE MOVEMENT S~EKS RAPPROCEIEMENT WITH PLO
Tel Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in English Feb/Mar 81 pp 23-26
CArticle by Mattiyahu Peled]
~Text]
The fact that Dr. Sartawi, who has recently No one who is familiar with the Israeli pali-
emaged as oae of the PLO's leading peraonali- tical scene could read without astonishment the
ties, met with m~ny L~raeGs who prondly pra- strange resolution of the Fifteentl~ Post�War
sent thenasdves u Zioniata, is already widdy Congress of the Sociaiist International, held in
known� He met more tl~an once with the editocs Madrid in November 1980, stating that. "the
of "New Outlook," and insisted oa mentioning Isr~eli Labor Alignment, led by Shimon PerPs,
- ihr "New Outlook Group" ameng the peaoe (is) the only viable forcq for peace for and with
forces of Lvad, in an utide he wrote for Mon- israel: ' The political chaptec caf the new plat-
dap Monrraa in Bei%it. He raxived Bruno form of the Labor party, which calls for the
- KKia1cY's p~acaprize u~ 1979 together with "active defence agaic?st the PLO both in the
Arie (Lova) Eliav, Last menth he created a sen� security and ideolopcal�political azena," and
sation by xnding a lette,~ of congratuladona, for the imposition of Israeli sovereignty over
which was rcad pubGdy in a n~eeting hdd oa approximately fifty percent of the West'Bank
the occasion of the fifth a~anivern~ry of the and the Gaza Strip and the whole of the Golan
L9rad Counp1 foR IsraeG-P~lea~tinian. Pqcx, The Heights as a minunal condition for making
oomiauaique of the Frcnch N~wva Servicx from peace with Jordan and Syria, can best be de-
Beinct stated on 13, January that "it is reson- scribed as a program for war and not a contri-
= able to snrmise that A9r. Sartavui has xnt the bution to peace. For in practical terms what the
letta on the directlve of Mr. Arafat 6ia~self." new Labor platform means is simply that peace
' The foilowing artide waa written by General has become~ condidonal'upon the Arab consent
(reserv~e) ~eled af4er the mating of the ICIPP, to the elimination of all national aspirations of
in which he r~ irr. S~rtawi's letter in its ea- the Palestinian people and to the territorial ex-
~h'� pansion beyond the .July 4, 1967 borders of
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[srael. Thia fu exceeds what can be called p~a Now Movement, the New Outlook group
"minor rectifications: ' No one would believe and the Rakah party. By statireg that the .La or _
- that the Socialist delegations assembled in party is the only paace force in lsrael, the So-
- Madrid kn,owingly de~ignated a party announc- cialist International ia saYin6 that a11 the ot}?er
~such a program "a viable peace force," and p~~ forces do not exiat or have nothing to do
the process by which they ~rere persuaded to ~t is dethro.vng those bonafide
take their umazing resolution certainly merits a -~~e groups and replacing them with the Labor
closer examination. Dr. Isam Sartawi, for Party. ~ ~s an act which I believe is beyond _
instance, who attended the Internationai session ~e ma~~date of any intemational body."
as an obserrier on behalf of the PLO, suggests, T'he SI had, of course, an alternative resolu�
in his interview to Monday Morning (December tion it could adopt. The draft proposetl by the
15-21, 1980), that the resolution was adopted SP~ ~yarker's Socialist Party and the Italian
only because Labor's new platform was not ~ialist Party and supported by the delegations
made available to the delegates. He calls it "a of Sweden, Senegal, Venezuela, Austria and _
deliberate decepdon of the Socialist Interna- o~ers, was undoubtedly a more balanced and
tional" which resulted in the adoption of a re- realistic position for the SI to take. ~t insisted
solution not based on the commitment made on the need to base the peace in the Mid31e
by the Labor party before the Israeli public but ~gt "on the security of Israel as well as all the
on some hearsay conveyed by Shimon Peres to a~er States in the region, and on a defiaiitive
some of the leaders of the International. solution to the Palestinian problem, founded on -
the recognition of the Palestinian people's legit�
imate rights:' Stating that "All peace initiatives
The Real Peace G~oup that have attained important results warrant
support"- thus backing President Sadat's peace
The gravity of that re~olution can be fully real- initiative and its consequences - the Spanish-
i~ed when it is remembered that by adopting it I~~ draft went on to declare that "The prob-
- the Congress of the Sociaiist International dealt lem, however, continuxs to be the establishment -
an unnecessary and undeserved insult to genuine of direct and positive relations between the
peace forces in Israel, whose prograrr~s need not ~sraelis and Palestinians, between a State whose
be concealed from anyone in order to be recog- sovereignty and integrity must be respected and
= nized as such. It is significant that of all those ~e PLO, an organizati~n representing the Pales-
present at the Congress it was the PLO observer t~an people and widely recognized as such on
who did not forget the real peace forces in ~~temational level:'
Israel, because for the PLO, the question of ~s draft resolution was vehemendy oppos-
peace ceased to be a theory to be tossed around ed by the Israeli Labor delegation and actively
or an empty phrase meW*si to improve a tarnish- supported by the PI,O observer which, in itself,
ed image, as is probably the cas~ with the Labor ~ould have stopped the SI from declaring the
party of Israel. It is therefore not at all surpris- ~bor Ali~rncnent a peace force, let alone a `
ing that the first protest voiced against the ~able one. As for the PLO it is most distressing
callous disregard revealed in the Congress of the ~~t having given its support to a draft resolu- -
Socialist International of the peace camp of tion calling for the safeguarding of Israel's sov-
Israel was that of the PLO observer, namely Dr, ereignty and integrity it was not even mention-
Sartawi. Referring to the assertion that the ed in the final resolution, and its willingness to
Labor party is the only viable peace force in accept peace on the basis of coexistence and
Israei, he cornmented: "Such an assertion elimi- mutual recognition had gc~ne totally unrecog-
nates with a stroke of the pen all the peace ~yed by the SI Congress.
forces of Israel, including the Sheli party, the
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PLO Naw Considered Respsctable
The unavoidable conclusion fron, this question- doing he is merely following the national con-
able position of the SI must be that it has failed tet~ws it ~lready untrue. The willingness of the
- to assert itself as a viable organization in so far public to put to the test a different policy ta
as the Middle East is concerned. Petty party arard~ th~' P~ile~tinian problem has risen from
conaidecations artainly outweighed any ~ desire ~ome 396 in December 1975, when the ICIPP
- to ~ve up to ttae requirements of t4~e hour. For ~~~d, to close to 50% in more recent
the tune being the EEC initiative, which has yet P�~�
to ~ther momentum, seems to be holding
greater hopes for the peace forces in the Middle ~
East than that of the SI. But on the lev~l of the N~ Political Realines
bilateral relations~between the peace forces and
- the PLO a great deal has been achieved which But in all faimess these developments inside
~ merits closer scrutiny. Israol can hardly be compared to those seen on
Taking as a starting point the Paris talks the Palestinian side. Suffice it to point out, as
which began in June 1976 between the PLO does Dr. Sartawi in his letter to the ICIPP on
and the Israeli Council for Israel�Palestinian ~e~ ~~on of its fifth anniversary, that Chair-
Peace (ICIPP), the progress made since then can Arafac can state now that talks between
- be summarized as follows. On the Israeli side _~e PLO ar?d Sheli haee for their purpose the
there is clearly a greater awareness a:mong the creation of new political facts in the Middle
public of the development that has taken place East and that the world accepts this astonishing
in the political thinking of the PLO, over the declaration. This declaration is significant as
last seven years. Contacts wittt PLO officials is well for the other etements it contains. The
no longer considered a punishabla crime and reference, c,f course, is to the interview Mr.
the number of individuals who seek such con- Arafat gave to A!-Hawadess of 19, December
tacts and obtain them is increasing. No longer- 1980, where he stated that those very talks
does an Israeli who meets a PLO official� have WeCO ~~S conducYed pursuant to the PNC re-
t~ explain his conduct, as did Naftali Feder�at solution of 1977 and that he was bound by that
the time, because of an accidental encounter resolution to maintain those contacts with the
with a PLO official during an international various Israeli political parties mentioned in the
meeting. Meeting PLO officials has become in interview. Furthermore, he stated that "anyone
Israel a respected phenomenon which is still who is prep~red to join these tallcs is weicome
vigorously opposed by political circles who to do so:' No ciearer invitation to other Israeli
maintain that Israel's intecests dictate a denial part{es to join the talks can be offered, consider-
of the Palestinian's legitimate dghts. It would in8 the open nostility toward the PLO by the
be well to ~etnember that the Labor party, Israeli government and of its major opposition,
dubbed by the SI as the only viable peace force the Labor party.
in Israel, is a major champion of the latter posi- As for the new political facts alluded to, Dr.
tion. But neither the Lab~r party nor the Likud Sanawi seems to be in no doubt as to what
government dares hinder free and acknowledged ~ey are: "Sooner than all our combined ene-
contacts between ~~rael and the PLO, mies think, peace shall reign between the Pales-
The signi8cance of this achievement ma~+ ~?d Israeli states and thsir peoptes" he
not be readily appreciated outside Isra~l, but ii states in his letter. All israeli commentators
should not be underestimated. In a situation ~Y ~tegrity admitted in their columns
where an Ieraeli governmecit might have to con- ~at such unequivocal statements nave never
sider a new policy toward the PLO, the public been heard before and cannot be overlooked. It
witl be found ready and willing to support it. still remains to be seen, however, how long it
1fie old argument, so much liked by the hum- ~~a far the "only viable peace force in
drum politician of Israel, that in whataver he is Israel"_ to awaken to the new reality.
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But important and dramatic as these develop- tion of similar aspirations of the Palestinian na-
ments are,.no Israeli would sgnore the profound tional movement. That now, after so many
change that is taking place in the parception of years of strug~le and suffering for which many
Israeli reality by important Palestinia~~ indivi- must be blemed, this hope seems to be realized,
duals. In an extremely important article pub- is a development whose importance transcends
lished both in the daily Falastin al�Thaurra and any political circumstance of the moment. It is
the weekly by that name, Dr. SartaNi has ac~a- perhaps a sign of the rapidly changing attitudes -
lyzed the new political program of the Labor of other parties that the Rakah Arabic paper
party of Israel. In this context he felt it was al-Itihad has reproduced Dr. Sartawi's article in
necessary to distinguish three trends of tii~ught full, allowing thereby thousands of Arabs living
~ inside the Zionist movement of today: the right in Israel to be aware of the great change taking
wing, led by Lakud, which aims. at total annexa- place. among Palestinian leaders outside, regard-
tion of the occupied territories and the eventual ing the nature of Zionism. The flat, two dimen-
expulsion of all its Palestinian inhabitants, in sional perception of Zionism as a homogeneous,
accordance with the well known precept that unified single~colored ideology that bears nc
the Land of Israel belongs to the Jewish people variations, is now replaced by a more penetrat-
and has never belonged to others; the Labor ing perception of that most comple~c and stirring -
school of thought which .?ealizes that the Likud phenomenon of the resurgence of Jewish na-
- goals are unattainable on practical grounds and tional awareness.
therefore is prepared to settle for the annexa- Faced with such far reaching developments .
tion of orrly part of the occupied tenitories :n the Palestinian camp, what is there on the
(practically the whole of the Golan Heights and Israeli side to equal it? The answer need hardly
- 50% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and be spelled out: rigidity of thought, egocentrism
leave the Palestinian population in the non- or even ~autism which precludes any response to
annexed, densely populated, Palestinian areas, surrounding processes, have become the distin-
deprived of any political rights. The third trend, ~~~~ng traits of Israe~i foreign policy.
however, is recQgnized as one which caZls for In 1975, when the first signals of the dyna-
complete withdrawal from all the territories oc- mics of PLO political thinking became notice-
cupied in 196T, includin& Eastem Jerusalem, able in Israel, a number 'of Israeli citizens ap-
and supports the right of the Palestinians to es- pealed to the government to signal back that we
tablish their own state under the leadersi:ip of were eager for further signs of a possible Israeli-
the PLO. ~ Pa,lestinian rapprochement. The appeal went
~ unheeded, so these Israelis decided that the
Growing Awareness to Rapprochement next best thing they could do was form an or-
- ganiaatien of their own which would undertake _
' This was probably the first time that thousands the task of signaling back to thg PLO that some
of Palestinian refugees could read in their own of-us were watching theni with increasir.g hopes
newsp~per an analysis which shows that their for the eventual reconciliation. So the ICiPP
national aspirations can be achieved without ne- came into being in December of that year.
~ cessarily expecting this to be conditioned upon Now, coRfronting a government bent on tena-
eliminating the Zionist entity. For us Zionists. cious hostility to the Palestinians and an oppo- `
in tsrael, who find ourselves recognized in the sition which is bent on disallowing any change
third trend of Sarta,wi's analysis, this signals the in that policy, the ICIPP thought the least they
beginning of a whole new era. &cause it has cQuld do to signal their appreciation of the dra-
always been of the utmost importance for us matic developments in the PLO was tu en-
tttat Zionism, as the embodiment of the his- nounce their adoption of the Palestinian and
torical hope of the Jewish people for a secure Israeli (lags posed side by side, as their formal
sovereign existence in its ancient Iand, should insignia, thus demonstrating their bclicf in the -
be recegnized as compatible with the realiza- vision of the two states living in peace sooner
_ than most people expP~t.
COPYRIGHT: Asa.hi ShimbLn Tokyo Honsha, 1981
C50: 4820 13
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TSRAEL
ARAL3 LAND 0[~1NERSHIP DISPUTED IN GALILEE
Tel Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in Er.glish Feb/Mar 81 pp 32-34, 60
~Article by Mohammed Watad]
~Text]
Recently, scores of Arab villagers in the anter "S~s Lands" -
_ af the country have been- summoned to appear
before the courts for failing to obtain withia six 'I'~~ commonest argtunent used is that "Arabs
months, building permits for premises they had build on the na~ion's Iand:' This statement is
built, or they would have to demoliah the partly untrue from a purely factual ~7ewpoint,
houses themselves. There is, considerable rest- aad generally misleading. Demolition orders
les4ness in these v~7lages, as the proceas of con~ have beea carried out on houses built on lands
~ stnicting these houses hardly take place in which are incontrovertibly privately-owned.
secret: savingi are scraped together, relativw are This was the cuse of the house demalished some _
called upon to help with t3~e work, the l~al en- months ago in �Majd al-Krum in the Gxlilee, one
gineer mak?s the plans, the local building com- of twelve built far from any major road, bother-
mission has been approached for the building ing nobody. Another exampl~ is the house of .
pemuts, and once these are given, work be~ns. the Agbariah brothers in the village of Musmus,
However, the permit issued by the local which was also built on pdvate land, some fifty
planning commission is often insuffiaent, be� meters from the main road, like scons of others
cause only the dishict planning commissions along its length. Not long ago a water main, de-
are authorized to approve the plans. The latter signed to supply water to several communities,
include no Arab represeatatives, and.they work was laid beside this ioad, yet this fact was never
"by the book." Thus the violation begina in the brought up when the issue became public, and
local planning commission, which consists of the planners seemed unperturbed by the fact _
etected local counaelors and public figuras. But that the water main would sure!y impede the
_ the local commission is never prosecuted - the future widening of the road no less than the
- targe!.s are always the householdecs, who~ are building in question. `
charged with building without valid permits.
Usually they are made to pay heavy finea~ and Demolition ordero were also carried out in
sometimes the houses are demolished. The Arab al-Soueid, on the grounds that the build-
demolition orders are rarely carried out, but ingi had been built on State lands. In this dis-
_ whenever it happzns, the event ia given extensive trict, between Deir al�Asad, Karnuel and Sakh-
puh~~c coverage accompanied by hostile propa- nin, and along the Acse-Safed road, there are
- ganda, in which are blended deep-seated pre- landa whosa owncrship is in dispute between
judices and deliberate pnKarications, the Lands Registration Office and the local -
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Arab villages, inctuding Arab al-Soueid. National have solved the housing problem of the Arabs
~ and quasi�national bodies have combined to in- of Haifa. Acre, Jaffa, Lydda, Raanlah and many
crease the Jewish pepulation in the Galilee, dis- other villa~es. But only in very few cases has
playing incredible indifference to the future de- the State allocoted land fpr Arab housing, as for =
velopment of the local Arab villages. This is not instance in the cas~ o~ t~ie Beduin in the Galilee .
unlike the policy concerning the black goats of and now in tha Negev, and in buth cases only
the Arabs, which were declared a menace to the under dnress and when a solution was essential _
very existence of the State and the nation, and for security reaso~s. -
whose extermination was entrusted to the so- Everything is done quite iegally. Conceming
called "green patroi: ' Now it is revealed that this legalify, Shelch Hammad Abu Rebiah, MK,
- rather than endangering the natural vegetation, (who was murdered in ]erusalem in mid-Janu- _
the biack goat helps to promote its growth, and ary. Ed.), said: "[n the past, the weak and de-
- a proposal has been made to encourage Jewish fenseless citizen could find succor in the law.
farmers to breed black goats! Today the law persecu~es us." This statement
- [t is not only disputed land which has been expresses the general feeling of the Arab com-
transferred, in law and in practice, to national munity in Israel. The planning and housing laws -
ownership - private land, too, has suffered the are so devised as to be insupportable by the
same fate, as for example the so-called "area 9;' Arab community, and the repeated admoni-
which belonged to Sakhnin. Once land has been , tions to the Arabs to obey these laws, without
- transferred to State ownership it is immedlately offering any alternatives, c~n only undermine
declared a nati~nal asset, and innumerable "ob� the moral authority of the rule of law in their
servation pasts" are established, in the most eyes. After all, in a democracy, the law is sup-
provocative m~inner, accompanied by the usual posed to serve the citizen, and not the other
rigmarole about Arabs trying to seize national way around.
land, with the financial assistance of "alien
elements" - a sheer fantasy. ~
A Smokucroen
The Genuine Needs Among the arguments brought forward to sup-
~ ~ port the demolition orders is the one that says,
The Arab population in Israel is part of the "One law for Jews and Arabs alike. Houses a~z
State of IsraeL It has grown by more than 300% demolished in Tel Aviv, too!" Now the case o.
since 1948. Aside from the historical fact that a lhe Greiber huuse in Gedera is used to p~ovide
large part of the lands which had been owned an object lesson, yet it is a totally misleading
by Arabs was expropriated by the State, there example. Just as Kfar Harueh and Kibbut:.
is also the essentiai principle that each citizen is Hama'apil are not Tel Aviv, neither is the Arab
entitled to share in whatever d~e State otfers its village of Baq'a al-(iharbiah. The Arab popula- -
citizens. Yet this is not the case in m~eters in- tion in [srael is concentrated in two townships
volving land, construction and housing. Not (Nazareth and Shafamar), ;n five mixed cities
only privately-ownad and ."disputed" lands and in one hundred and thirty seven villages, -
have been transferred to State ownership, b~t as well as Beduin encampments.
public lands in the Arab towns and villages have Most of the architects engaged in piannmg
- also been tranferred, by a variety of legalistic in the Arab sector are insufficiently aware of
and procedural devices, to the Lands Registra- the specific needs of each community. A co-
don Office. The most prominent example in operative farrning community has quite differ- -
this category are the lands owned by the ent necds from those of a kibbut~, and a semi-
Moslem Waqf, i.e., the religious administration agricultural vill~ge has entirely different planning
of the Moslem comrnunity. These alone could problems than a citv suburb. The freQUCni ab-
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sence of a general oudine scheme malcea it Varioua generous souls~ who are themutves~ .
- impas~ible to make use of the aix months's ex- living on State land3, are noa proposing to ex-
tension grin~ed by the courts to obtaiu a per- propriate forty percent of the pdv~tely~owned
mit. Thus the citizen fnds himself guilty of the Isnd "for publlc purposea;' and to re�zone a
additional violation of failing to obey a court portion of the diminithlt~g reserve of agricui-
injunction, and faces the hazard of havin~ his ~ tural la..~ed for housing. Now, agricultural land
house destroyed at dawn. A t~ouse built on pri� which has been thus re-zoned becomes an un- _
vate land is p(aced in the same category as the bearable financial burden on account of the
Greiber house, which was built on State land. ~ high property taxes, and a liability to the own-
Here you have another distortion hidden behind ers who use it aa a home farm. Now that many
the smokescreen of tendentious propaganda. of the basic commodities are no longer subsi-
~ � dized~ the value of th~ home farm has grown
Penalty After Penalty immeasurably, especially in the economy of
large rural families. Even if the district planning
The present situation in the Arab villages is that commission consisted entirely of geniuses, they ~
- there are hundreds of houses, standing and in� . Would still know less than the local inhabitants
habited~ which were built without legal pernnit. about their specific needs. -
It is important to distinguish among these be- The following principles could help to solve
tween (a) }iouses which were built on privately- the problem: - ~
owned land, (b) those which are on State land (1) A general amnesty should be givan to all
(a tiny minority), and (c) those standing on who have built houses on their own land withLR
land which is~in dispute. In the entire "triangle" the housing.zone praposed by the local council.
region in the center of the country there are (2) [n so far as the land in question is State-
leu than a dozen houses in the second and third owned, it should be leased to the householders
categories. Yet the owners of the houses in all under the same terms as those enjoyed by the =
three categories have been heavily 'fined and (Jewish) agricultural communlties.
most havc been threatened with demolition. (3) Where laind ownership ~s disputed, its resa _
_ Not only a~c u~c tmes heavy, but the owners lution should be haatened. Where it is datermin-
are barred from obtaining any kind of mortg,age. ed to be State~owned, it should be leased to its
The housing loans ava7able to (sraeli Arabs are permanent inhabitants.
smaller than those enjoyed by Jews, and their (4) Heusing zones proposed by the local Goun-
terms are much more severe, even in the mixed cils should be confirmed, even before the detail-
cities. such as Acre. Thus the Arxb citizen who ed plans within the zones have bcen worked out.
has been compelled to build his home without (5) The ratio of expropriation sh~uld be re-
a permit is penalized frst by the unequal tertns duced to 2096, aatd devoted chiefly to widening
of the mortgage, secondly by the legal authori- and conatructing roads artd to pesl~ic institu- _
- ties for building without a permit~ and finally tions.
. punishad by domolition. Is there no way out of (6) State land sh~uld be allocated for public
this predicament? purposes and houain~ schemes for young
. _ couples, to ~e built by prlvate initiative or by
contractors.
- To Brak th~ Viciow Circls ('n All privately-o~vned agriculturallots above
one duna~n (a quarter acre), withii? the houaing
A aew apprc~ach to the problem of ~Arab village zomes, should be cecogntzed as home farms, if
planning could easily solve -~he entangiement the ownen so wiah. .
and do away wilh the bitterness and sense of (g) Building commissions di the local councils
discrimination. The arRument that Arabs are not ~hould be authoriud to issue building permits
\ intcrestcd in ~~lanning is withou? fnundatlon. -
- 1G
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- within the proposed housing z~nes.
(9) The size and terms of the housing loans
available to Jewish and Arab citizens should be
equalized uaderthe same c:iteria.
(10) To enable the Arab population to express
its pazticular commur.al culture in the detailed
planning of the o~.aine schemes.
These principles, if applied. would solve a
problem which is bedeviling the country as a
- whole. Some villagers will no doubt prefer to~
grow onions and ~otatces, ratfier than cultivate
rose gardens and lawns on their lands. The end-
less palaver about planning has obscured the
issue, created a genera: pandemonium of mu-
tual recriminations and vicious incitement. Let
us try to distentangle this sorry mess.
COPYRZGHT: Asahi Shimbun Tokyo Honsha, 1981
CSO : 4820
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LIBYA -
AL-QAD1iDHAFI DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH U.S., USSR
Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in English 28 Apr 81 p 7
~Interview with Col Qadhafi, "leader of the revolution" in Libya by Asahi Shimbun
and TV-Asahi before his visit to Moscow~
~Text~ ~Question~ What is the purpose of your visit to the Soviet Union?
~Answer) As friendly nations, we will discuss the world situation which is in
confusion, relations between Libya and the Soviet Union, relations between _
liberation organizations in various places and the Soviet Union, and so forth.
The agenda items will be general, but in the course of conducting discussions,
several separate and specific problems may cora~ to the fore. I wi11 visit the
Soviet Union for the first time in five yea.rs since 1976. During that period, -
the Soviet Union has supported us, who are faced with the challenge of the US,
and friendly relations with the Soviet Union have developed. Measures against
the US, which is strengthening its aggressive nature, will be one agenda item.
We Are Non-Aligned, But Friendly Toward USSR
~Question~ What is your view on the Soviet Union's world strategy?
~Answer~ We are a small power based on neutralism. Therefore, I have no inten-
' tion of comparing the Soviet Union's policies with those of the US. However, the
policy of the iTS shows the trend to establish military bases in other nations'
territory, carry out military intervention, and pose a threat. Also, it supports -
reactionary, feudalistic governments and takes sides with the capitalist, exploit- -
ing system. On the other hand, Soviet military bases cannot be seen in the map of
the world, except for the Warsaw Treaty nations. (In reply to a question asking -
about the situations in Somalia, Ethiopia, and South Yemen). They are not some-
thing Zike US military bases. The Soviet Union does not support reactionary -
_ governments; neither does it take sides with feudalism and exploitation. In
- regard to this point, I can appreciate the Soviet Union.
In s~me respects, the Soviet Union cannot but take actions as a big power, because
it is a big power. Naturally, we are opposed to intervention from any direction. -
- If the Soviet Union becomes an imperialist nation like the US, we wi11 oppose the
So~iet Union just as we oppose the US now. If the Soviet Union demands the con-
struction of military bases in our country, we will probably block it resolutely. -
18
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[Question~ What is your view on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan'? You lean
clearly toward the Soviet Union. Even so, is it possible for you to say that you _
are non-aligned?
~Answer~ We are against intervention by any foreign forces. Concerning Afghanis-
tan, I think that no one but the Afghanistan people can lead Afghanistan success-
fully~ The revolutionary government of Afghanistan has not declared aggression,
so far~ Strictly speaking, we are a 100 percent non-aligned natia~. Besides, we
are not negatively neutral, but we are neutral in a positive way. This, however,
dues not mean that there are no friends among neutral nations.
New Government of US Is Better
[Question~ What view do you take as to the Reagan Administration of. the US?
~Answer~ It is still too early to form a judgment. However, I think that the new
Reagan Administration will be better than the =ormer Carter Administration. At
least, former President Carter exposed the national rights of the Arab na.tions to
danger by signing the Camp David Agreement.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbun Tokyo Honsha, 1981
CSO: 4820
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, SUDAN
SOUTHERN LEADERSHIP ARGUES D IVISION OF REGION
Khartoum SUDANOW in English Apr 81 pp 16-20
~ [Article by Jacob Akol, southern regional editor]
[Text] Is it the times that have changed, or
merely the tune? Th~ee years ago, vs Pre-
sident of the High Executive Council -
(HEC) of the Southern Regron, JoJeph
Lagu argued forceful/y against the notfon
of administratively dividing the ~Southern
i2egron into discn~te and d~stinct entities. _
Recently, however, he hos re'versed his
opinion �and is now actively propogatin~
this idea. Whatever the, merlts (or lack.
thereojJ of thi~~~jnp~nsa~~`'t ts aie~ that #
_ has provoked b ~to?m ar~b~gst~outhern
- polrticians, rrot tlle, least because . it ,re-
awakens the issue of the ir~.stit~itionalisa-
tion of politrcal powei alor{g cont�ut~l
Knes. In part this is inevitable, ariai in pdrt ~
_ it is contingently tied to one of the pxp� _
posal's justifications': to ~educ'!/ ~ prn-
perly re-adjust the alleged dorrtinance of
_ the Dinka in the higher reaches oj fhe
state m.achinery in the S~~uth.
HE SOUTH; President Nimeiri said people. The President also pointed out
'~in his opening address to the meet� that a division of the South into more
ing of the Central Committee of the SSti regions might be a good way of avoiding
late in February, `has led the Sudan domination of the Southern Region's
successfully on the path to regionalisa� administration by a single ethnic group
tion'. Now that the devolution of powers However, the President stressed that he
has become a reality in the North, which did not intend to let this issue become a
now has five regions, `is it not time,' 8sked source of contention.
the President, `that we consider the pa~d� It would appear that the driving force
bility of devolving administration in the behind the proposal to divide the South -
South itself?' President Nimeid added into three autonomous regions, with
that th~e proposal had some positive borders drawn along the lines of the old
aspects. [t would, for example, bririg ; provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile
- administration nearer to the people and and Equatoria, was General (rtd) Joseph
make government more efficient given Lagu, former leader of the Anya-Nya
the vaatness of the region. This, the Presi- guerrillas during ~he civil war and Presi-
dent said, would be in keeping wlth the dent of the Regional government from
revolution's resolve to hand power to the February 1978 to early 1980. (See inter-
view). I~s argument is esser~tiatlv that the
~ 20
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reasons which dictated that d~e South
~ present a united front no longer e~cist.
~ Tliere is, for example, no fear of religious,
_ ~ cultural or social persecution from the
cv r~~ ~ North. `If the South were divided intu
~ i �C ~ three regions.' he said, `Sunday would
~ ~ ~ ~ still remain the day c.f rest for the
- cp oo ~ ~ ~ Southern Regions. O~rr Southern identity
~ ~ is guatanteed by the constitution, and
~ ~ r, ~ ~ the South would still unite if our
I i ~ t common interests were infringed upon by
I "
I ~ d the North'.
~ ; r Reaction from some Southern members
1- ~ ~~f o W m of the Central Cu:nmittee bordered un
� ~ hostility. They accused General Lagu of
1{ naivete, superficiality and power-seel:ing.
^w~ ~ ~ ~
Dr Justin Yac, Southern Region Minister
_ of Co-operatives, said in the meeting that
any Southemer calling foti ths division uf
the region was simply vying for a pulitic~l
post, and that the President would ne
-"r=-~"~--~~, well-advised to give them posts so that
o they would cease to mdlce such ridicutuus
_ ~ suggestions. General L:igu countered this
_._i oc last accusation by asking why, if he wer~~
_ ~ `power-hungry', as some of his colleagues
' c � ~ h~d suggested, would he have signed the
~ ~ ai t ~ ~ Addis Ababa Agreement without any
i~_ ~ ~ ~ ~o ~ ~ prior guarantee that lie would be given
- a` ~ the top political post in the South, or
J~' E~- some leading position in tlie central
,
" o ~ ? government administratioiii
_ ~ r ~ a As hostility against the proposal
~~t~ Y~j ~ gathered steam. Northern politicians, who
were conspicuously elated by the sugges-
' tion, retired to tlie backgrcund and left
~ the argument to Southerners. A petition,
signed by S9 Southern members of' tl~e
- Central Committee, requested that the
item be removed frorn the agenda and
~ Z�~ t referred to the SSU basic units to weigh
c~o the odds and decide, if they so wislled, to
~ ~ bring the matter up at the national level.
I e ~e_=~ o e o The Central Committee endorsed the
~ ~ 4= � o'~ request of the petition, but matters did
- ( ,w a~~ ac not rest there.
i ~ ~ e~ ~ Followin~ the Central Committee con-
z ~ E o clave, a meeting called by the Southern
~--L_^~ o ~ o Union of Students of the University of
z w Y Khartoum presented General Lagu as tlie
~.t...^~ ~ N M main speaker on the proposed ~iivision uf
the Suuthern Region. General Lag~
reiterated his previous reasons tur the
divisiun of the Suutl~ and dismissecl eco-
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nomic arguments used by his opponents the best guarantee of minimising tribalism
as `myths'. `The colonialists', he said, aimed at minority tribes, because these
'used tl~e same arguments to dominate tribes may bend together to make a
u~hers'. 71ie divisiun of the South into majority that even the biggest ethnic .
regiuns, ne said, would bring leaders from group cannot defeat.'
~ Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal nearer to Southern Region MP William Ajal Deng
tlieir people; he added that such a move reminded the meeting of General Lagu's
was bound to improve development in speech when he, as newly elected
these areas. President of the High Executive Council, _
Angelo Beda, Speaker of the Southern opened the Southem Region's Assembly
Region Assembly, foilowPd General Lagu. in 1978 with the words;. `I wish to
Painfully aware that wliat he was going to call upon ev~ry member of this House, _
say might be used against him by his and every Southerner to maintain re-
opponents in the next election, Beda gional unity. We will not allow tribalism
- said. `I must have ;~iy honest point of to divide us. My election as President of
view recurded in this matter: I do not the High Executive Council proves that -
think for the moment that dividing the xhe South is politically mature and
Suutli into rnure regions is economically nationalistic enough to rise above ethnic
_ feasible, and I do not think that it will and geographical differences when
sulve tribalism in the South. Tlie region; chosing a leader: Deng then asked what
lie said. 'cannot at this stage even collect had happened in only two years to -
�s3 milliun from taxes - and the people chanBe LaBu's mind so dramatically.
are already uvertaxed. The Soutli lacks Ambrose lting, leader of the Southern
manpower: the only surplus manpower in Region SSU Assembly Body, said that it
tl~e reoion is politicians; the only appeal was nonsense for anyone to suppose that _
for this clivision is ro cre~te posts for the Addis Ababa Agreement will remain
puliticians: cliere is a limit to whicli you intact after the division of the South into
can 'tax people 3nd we have already more regions. Having divided the previous
~ reached that limit. To divide the South,' three Provinces into six is not the same
he cuncluded, `would defeat the very con- thing as dividing the South into more
cept of the Addis Ababa Agreement.' regions, nor is it true to say that the crea-
Othwonh Dak, Deputy Speaker of the tion of more Ministers, above and beyond �
Nateonal Assembly, condemned tribalism the number agreed upon in Addis Ababa, -
but refused to accept the idea that divid- is a good preceden~e for calling for the
ing the South into regions would solve division of the South. He asked: `What
the problem. `A handful among the about the sscurity arrangements with tl~e
Dinka have talked of Dinka unity the way North? the currency? - in fact, every-
they talk in Kenya about Kikuyu unity'. thing connected with the agreement?'
The problem, he said, is not the numbers The azgument against the uivision of
but the institutionalisation of tribalism, the Southern Region was basically that it _
which he conde,nned. Moreover he would affect the agreement, throw the
pointed out that Joseph Lagu became the constitution into disrepute and desta-
President of the High Executive Council bilise the country. However, given
over two years ago ?+ecause of Dinka President Nimeiri's address, it is not
baclcing. obvious that Lagu's proposal would either
Peter Gatkuoth, the Southern Region's breach the Agreement or the constitution,
Vice-President and Minister of Fin~nce, Peter Gatkuoth told Sudanow later that _
agrzed thai without Dinka backing Lagu this idea is not new, that Northern poli-
_ would not have succeeded in removing ticians have long c~.lled for the division of
~ Alier in 1978. 'If, he s~id, `we divide the the South into regions. They proposed
South into smaller regions wo will division in 1965 during the Round
condemn smaller tribes in Bahr El Gha.~.al Table Conference. Southern politicians -
and Upper Nile to perpetual domination. olajected to the proposal and it was
Being together,' he pointed out, `may b~ dropped.
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~
in 1970 and 1971 the idea was brought happy. `Because we seem to have een
u a in by Northern politicians as the successful lately in putting a number
P Ba
basis for negotiations with the Southern of things cight with the central govern-
Sudan liberation Movement. Dr Law- ment, these Northern politicians are not
rence Wol Wol, who was Secretary to happy with such progress, and thus the _
SSLM during the peace negotiations call for the division of the South.'
in London anti latec in Addis Ababa, told Bona Malwal, Southern Kegion Minister _
Sudanow that, `we made it a condition of Industry and Mining, sees the call for
that the Northern politicians drop the the division of the region in the same _
- idea of dividing the South into regions, light as Pater Gatkuoth: `It is difficult to
`that this
and it was only because this precondition believe', he tuld Sudanow,
was met that we proceeded to the peace sudden call for the division of the South, _
conference in Addis. We :~ad also called at the time when issues such as the oil
for the division of Northern Sudan into refinery are being discussed, was coinci-
regions, but this was rejected by our dence. There is a point in suspecting that
brothers, and we gave them their way.' the call for the division of the South into
Supporters of Lagu's proposal will of more regions is being used to detract
course tum this argument against Wol from important issues abour which the
Wol, now that Northern Sudan is divided $O~e last six months have seen a number
into regions. of contentious iss~~es arising between the
Many influential Southern politicians _
do not see the call for the division of the Southern Region government and the
Sonth as emanating~frim o effect an effi- Uecember Kafiae Kin~ a~nd Hufrat ~II
by the Southem pe p
cient administration for the good of the Nahas were returned to the Southern
on's administration after they had
region and Sudan as a whole. Tney charge b~ annexed to Darfur by. Abboud's
that the idea is st~l coming from the same
- Northem poGticians who advocated it in regime durin8 the civil war period; the ~
the sixties, and that Southern politicians cAt1tl1Eti1 members of the National
are simply being used in an old game. Assembly, backed by the regional govern- _
- Said Peter Gatkuoth: `leading Northern ment, fought successfully late last year
members of the Central Committee, aSainst attempts by some Northem
particularly members of the political members of the assembly to le~alise a
map which Southerners claimed took
cffice, backed this idea during the con- aWa land from the South and added it to
: ference, and were trying to lobby for ~eyNorth; and these are seen, say
the debate of the proposal by the Central ~u~~ers, by Northern politicians as
- Committee. But the Southern members undue victories, not mghts, for the Sc~utl:.
of the committee had the upper hand in ~ere is cunently ut~rest in Abyei area -
the matter and the proposal was referred where the Dinka community in that dis-
to the 5outhern Region basic urits of tha
SSU. `It is a pity,' he added, `that a man trict of Kordofan is seeking a re-
like Joseph Lagu, whose name is sy- ferendum to decide whether to become
nonymous with the agreement, should part of the South or rema'r~ ~art of the
allow himself to be used in this way.' North. And ]ast but not least, the regional
Gatkuoth's view is that there are some government is flot too happy with the
= diehard Nortrern politicians who centtal It~linistry of Energy's decision to
are not happy to see the South build the refinery in Kosti. �
~ C~PYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981
CSO: 4820
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SUDAN
.JOSEPH LAGU GTVES VIEWS ON DECENTRALIZATION
fihartoum SUDANOW in English Apr 81 pp 16-20
[Interview with Joseph Lagu, former HEC [High Executive Council] president, by
SUDANOfJ: "Changin~ Times?"; date and place not given] -
[ Text ] Nine years after signing the historic
Addis Ababa Accord which 6rought to
an end to 17 tragic ytars of civil war,
three years aJ'ter assuming the Pre- ~
sidency of the HEC of the Southern
Region, and one year after stepping
down from this position, Joseph Lagu
_ has again place~l himself ot the centre of
of an emerging controversy: should the
Southern Regiolt follow the path of the
- North and ~oimally decentralize its
political strustures2 This question, and
many others, avere raised when
Sudanow interviewed th~ former HEC
President.
SUDANOW: /n the opening ceremony then have been justified to keep the _
~ of the Southern Region Ass~embly in ~t1'? ~ one - so as to ptovide a
1978, you said ihai ihe Sounc ~ould not balsace with the North.
afford ro be divided. What has pro- I feel the South ahould be administra-
= mpred you ~is rime m ca// for the tively divided inta three on the pattern
division of the Souih into more regions? of the old Southern Provinces of _
JUSEPH LAGU: In my policy state- Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal, and Upper
ment in 1978, I stated that the South it is in line with other
could not afford to be divided and that regions in the North. The advantage
the Southern Sudanese should be which we can derive from this is that
united. In 1978 the North was atill a the cities of the South like Malakal in
bloc somewhat opposed to Southern Upper Nile and Wau in Bahr el Ghazal
regionai au2onomy. Regionalism was will grow up as El Obeid will begin to _
not understood in the northern part of grow up, as El Fasher will begin to grow -
the country, even after several years of up, and the government in the South
self rule in the South. Regionalism has wi11 be decentralised. Further, the
now been understood and hence the Southern elite and the Southem intel-
North divided into five regions. There is 1~~1s, w~o are so few and who all _
thus now no need to keep the South as _ r?~gh~ to Juba, will evenly be dis-
a bloc. It is necessary to improve mat- tributed. Some will pull back to Bahr el
ters on the basis of this change, and the Ghazai., centering in Wau, others will
South should l~arn to cope with the pu11, back to Upper Nile, centering in _
current policies of the courrtry and not ~'1a~a1� Tf?ey w~l be nearer to their
rem~in a bloc. But had the North been people who need them at this time for
divided into only three regions, it yvould the purpose of development. -
2L~ .
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There is no .nore iieed for the South memory that has been fult`dled. We
to group together because it will be mis- agreed at Addis that our interest was to
interpreted and it will continue to ring see that Southerners are represented in
in the ears of the people of the North the armed forces proportionately to the
that the South has some hidden population, and when i visited the dif-
objectives. I want to see the fears of the ferent units of the Sudanese armed ~
North about the South removed and forces I could see by their appearance
~ this is one of the reasons why I called that there is a good proportion of -
for the So+~th to be divided into three. Southern Sudanese in the armed forces.
This is not the same as dividing the And particularly I would draw the _
Southern people. Southerners ~ti~ill attention of my colleagues in the
- remain Southemers. It was not Addis general headquarters to tiie special con-
Ababa which made Southern Sudan; sideration of taking young Southern
Southern Sudan existed before Addis boys from the schools so that they can
Ababa> and Southern Sudan will con- also go in a good proportion, to the _
tinue to exist. Southern Sudan has been military college, so that they can parti- -
the provinces of~ Equatoria, Upper cipate in offficering the Sudanese armed
Nile and Bahr el Ghazal since before the forces with their fellow brothers in the
Turks, and dividing it into administra- North. Md if the same proportion is
tive units will not change it. Sout}iern also maintainted in the officer corps as
Sudan is an ethnic, geographical, and it is in the other ranks one would feel a
cultural entity. It wlll continue to be satisfaction that in the armed forces all
one. And Southern Sudanese will con- is going well.
tinue to group together in the IVational Q; /s tribalism or partisanship a rhreat
_ Assembly here in Khartoum, defending -
their common interests. i~u the stabiliry of Southern Sudan. To
what exteni do they influence poliiical
Q: Looking back over ihe /asr nine years decisional
- of peace in the South: could ihere have A: Tribalism and partisanship is a threat
been a better deal rhat would have safe- to stability and maybe even peace in
_ gciarded ihe speciaJ inreresr of the South Southern Sudan. As I have mentioned in
the Central Committee: today 10 out of
- as well as the general interest of the 20 ~nisters in the Regional Govern-
Sudanl ~ ment, including the President of the
A: I can't see what other better deal ~ Executive Council, come from
could have safeguarded the interest of onehtribe, the Dinka tribe. This is over-
- the South as well as the general interest em hasising tribalism. In all African -
of the Sudan than that of Addis Ababa Ip lcs tribalism is a disease. The Dinka
in 1972. In my assessemnt that was the ma not even be one quarter of the
- best we could do; and it is for the ulation of the South; how can they
Sudanese people to improve upon it beP re resented as half the cabinet?
from time to time, that's why I stated P
in the Central Committee that the Addis They can meet alone and their meeting
Ababa Agreement was not static, that can be valid. You can see what a threat
it was something to open the way for it is to stability and maybe even peace
understanding. It began to restore con- in Southern Sudan; because the others
fidence between Northern Sudanese and are certainly not feeling easy about
Southern Sudanese, confidence which them. -
had been lust over 17 years of the civil About partisanship: yes, there is. I can
war. It was a start for the better and say with authority that since we
upon the Addis Ababa Agreement we returned, political groupings in~ the
South have followed tha pattern of
- can improve our lot in the Sudan. ~uthem party politics prior to the
Southem Suda~ese will feel comfort- ce a eement, that is, the Southern
able in the South; that by it they are ~nt e~o le a inst the SAMJ people.
able to maintain their identity, values P P 8~
and culture within the united Sudan. Each is competing to win ~the favour of ,
authority in Khartaum, trying to show
Q: Has the integrarion of the Ar~ya~Nya that they are the right people. There is
- inio the national army forces worked ~ partisanship in the South and this has
- out ro yoursaiisfac[ion? ~o be, one way or the other, brought
A: Yes. I felt so becaue I remained in to an end. We who had been outside, ~
the armed forces myself so as to partici- voluntarily dissolved ourselves. We
pate in tF.:, ~upervision cf the absorption could have also returned on the basis of
and inte~ation of the Anya-~':,ya into our external organisatious but we didn't
tl~e National forces. To the best of my
~5
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knoH~ much abo~ut political activities people to choose. If they choose tu ~u
- inside. There is a threat to stability and to South then they can bc added tu tl~e
peace in the South because of tribalism South administratively, if they choose
and partisanship and because of the to remain in the Uorth it is up to tl~em.
parties which, aze tearing the South The areas in question are really t~vo:
apar~:. The Southern Front and the one is Abyei and the other is Chally el
SAMJ operate within the SSU and they Feil. Though culturally and ethnically
= tabel anybody else as anti-revolu- part of the Southern complex, we have
tionary and this and that, while they never heard voices from Ciially l:l Feil
themselves are operatulg as parties. The as~ing for a return to the Suuth. Su
Southern Front and S,4NU are the com- my opinion is that so long as they don't
petitors today in the South and this is ask for it, they should be left as they
something that can not be denied. are. We leave the door open su that
~vhen they ask for it, a referendum can
Q: Both your government and that of a~so be held there. The people we know
Abel Alier have so far failed to effe+ct wl~o liave asked to be part of the South
Southern Region administration in a are tlie Dinka N;ok of Abyei. I feel it is
number of areas clearly stated in the in order that they should be given an
agreemeni as part of ihe South. Whai opportunity to exercise their con-
has been ihe diffrculty? stitutional right. Let them be justly con-
A: Well, the areas which are stated in sulted; du they wish to remain part of ~
the agreement as parts of the South. or Kordofan''
as people of the Southern complex. are If they wish to remain part of Kor-
'Kafia Kinji and `Hufrat Nahas' in the ~fofan, w~ in the South shouldn't
Northwest uf Bahr el Ghazal, whi~h quarrel over it because Kordofan is
was administratively part of the Suuth a part of the Sudan and tliey are within
until it was added to the North in lune the Sudan. If, instead, the~i wish to be
1~)b0 through a government gazette added tu the Surith, uur hrothers in
during the military era uf Abboud. That Kordof~i ~~r in the rest ut ~he Sudan
was one part of the South which accord- should also not have har~i ieelings.
ing to the Addis A~eement should liave because tliey ~re not going away. ;liey
aucomatically gone to the Sauth. ~re still witl~in ttie Sudan, oniy prefer-
because the Addis Agreement recogni- ring to be administered from Bahr el
se~i the then standing borders of the l st Ghazal.
January 1956. `Kafia` and `Nahas' were
added to the North after that. It is very Q: Hovr do you view the process of
unfortun3te that such a r;~atter should developmenf in rhe Sourhern Region
have arisen in the national parliament. ( since rhe Addis Al~aba Accord, nine _
felt that it is a matter that we could years ago?
have quietly solved and that this area A: On: vital thing whiel~ I always say, -
would smoothly be transferred back to which I never leave out, is ~liat peace
the South without cau~ing any problem has been achieved, as a result of the
- in the National Assembly. However Addis agreement. It paved the way fur
things happened, and the President of stability, and with stab~ity a lot of
the Republic wisely took steps to form thiags l~ave bten done in the Southern
a committee. The committee made a Region and even in the Sudan as the
suggestion and the President fonvarded whole. In the Southern Region it has
_ it to our National Assembly which been posaible to set up a regional
passed it. anJ I liupe tlte administration govemment ceatred in Juba. With that,
uf 'Hafrat N~has' and 'Katia Kinji will power has ban transferred nearer to
be very smuothly transferred to the the people, and confidencx. has been
S~uth, or to the pruvince concerned, buildingup since that time.
Bahr el Ghazal. In addition our roads, which were des-
In regard to the uther areas mentioned troyed in the 17 years of civil war, have -
~s being nut of the Suuth by culture been imptoved, and more have been
and so forth: it was stated ~learly tl~at constructed. Other development pro-
in such areas where the people are jects like the improvement of Juba air-
culturally and ethnically Sovtliern. ~ re- port, so as to handle heavy planes l~ce
ferendum would be held and it is fur che the Boeing 707 and the 737 have been
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~
legislation for the Sudan?
- implemented. The buildings of the new p; I look at this with fear and suspicion.
parliament and o~ces for the regionai I~ Working to remove any traces of
ministries, is a sign of development. As f~, betwun the South and the North,
- is the bridge over the Nile at Juba and ~t ~ why I am suBSestin8 ~s4
the bridge over the Jur River in Wau, ~uthera Reaon be split into three, so
and so forth. Up to this time a lot of ~ ta t~ove any traces of fear in the =
things have taken place, though more of the northern Sudanese that
could have taken place. I think that the the South st~l maintains this or main-
- nine years of peace in Southern Sudan ~ t~t s~ ~ws cause more
have seen a geat deal of good things fe~ ~ th~ ~uthern Stidanese, and the
happening here az?d there. ~troduction of Sharia laws will make
' Q: What abour the oil discovevies ir. the Southem Sudanese more and more -
eentiu and the controversy concerning suspicious.
So I raally don't see any necessity to
~e place of ~e insta//aiion of ~e r~ ~ of Sharra as the basis of lEgislation
fineryl for tha Stidan, because it wauld mean
q; The oil discovery in Bentiu area is ~ng us Southern Sudanese second
good news for everybody in Sudan. At d~ ~~y~$ in laa,~ without any
least the Sudan, which has suffered ~~ce of aspirln6 for the highest�office
- poverty for so many years, maY ~ in the Democratic Republic of the
the future see prosperity. It is good Sudan. And I have to be very firm here.
news for everybody in Sudan that there people shouldn't even talk about the
are signs of oil here: if it is found in Sh~ ~wg for the Sudan, knowing that
Bentiu, ihen tomorrow it will be found ~e fears ~andr suspi~c~~on ~among
in Kosci, around Torit or even around is causing -
Juba. It is a sign of a good future for the the Southem Sudanese and whoeva
~dan as a whole. There shouldn't be advocate that should relax or forget
any controversy over it. We in Sudu? about it in the interest of unity.
chat we aze about to Q: What is your assess?nen~ of Norrh-
should feel happy ~ .~e p~li- SouU~ rolations over tf?e ~est nine years
be relieved from our poverty.
ticians should keep their noses out of of peaceT Some~e
Vo W~ ~eta
,qr
e -
the site of the refinery. 'I7ieY should heve expressed e ~~e for
leave it to the technicians to dec~de the nrent is me,~elY ~pp 9'
correct place. This is in because if we 5outh gi~~em a~e easanT
to ei~?nk
would really like to say,
politicians put our noses in it then we t/?is way7
- begin to quarrel as to whethet it should A� Well, over the years after signing the
be here or there. We will be wasting agrament confidence has been stead.ily
time and the o~1 will continue to stay restcred between citizens of tt?e
under.ground and none of us benefits Soutturn Region and the North, in
when it rernains underground. We want ~ many fields and in many azeas. We are
it to come to the surface and I would trying to remove this fear, and~{ ethe
- like to put it in my caz My opinion is: my objectives in su88estin8.
let us forget political feelings and leave Southern Region be admirustratively
it to the technicians to decide. divided into three regions, is to remove
- What I could appeal for, in order to these traces of fear and suspicions about
remove the feaz of Southern Sudanese, the South. Southerners now want to re-
is that many young Southern Sudanese :~i~st~vct, to develop their area and !he
should be traiaed in how to handle tYus ~,aire ~on, to participate wi.in the _
- work. No doubt wherever the refinery rest of the Sudan.
will be, Southerners will also aPPear In return also, I would want to see
among the technicians� Young Southern fellow countrymen in the North remove
fellows are to be taken for courses any azeas of of fear and suspicion in the
abroad and so forth, so that any fears miads in Southerners, so that from all
= will he removed. dircctions we look towards buildinB a
Q: What is your attitude ro the Sharia truely united ~dan, wi
aza~ interests
Lawsl Do you see ihe necess~tY vf such of every+ u?dividual sa~eg~
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981
- CSU: 4820
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SUDAN
OMDURMAN UNIVERSITY FACTIONS ARGUE NATURE OF SCHOOL -
Khartoum SUDANOW in English Apr 81 pp 21-22
[Article by Azhari Abdel Rahman: "Unlearnt Lessons"]
[ Text ] The Omdurman /slamic University has -
often been the battleground for warring
factions of students, each with their own
interpretation as to what kind of
university the Omdurman Islamio should
- be; but no?~~, rt seems, rhe battle has been
- carried to the stajf and administration.
_ Reporter Azhari Abdel Rahman examines _
~ the events which led to the latest round
of sit-ins and strikes at the universiry.
- and, perhaps more ominousiy, a reshufjl-
ing of senior administrative
appointments.
~HE C?EFEAT OF the Muslim tha students had patticipated in the
Brothe~s (MBs) by the Forces of action. Even if this seems a little high,
- [slamic Solidarity - a coalition composed there is increasing evidence to show that
of Ansar, Nationai i fninnictc an~i indepen- the MRa are losing their control of the
dent students - in the student union elec� university - they failed :o win a single
tions of last October, has thrown tt,e seat on the executive committee at the -
Omdurman Islamic Unive;sity into regional association elections which were
conflict and brought to the boil some of held just wfter the October poll.
the serious problems which have been The mtn's union sit�in came only two
- simmering under the surface of the uni� weeks after a similar sit-in ~t the Girls' _
versity since 1969. Collego of the university, where the -
On the IOth of last month, the men's Mgg have also lost control of the union.
student union staged a sit-in on the uni� plthough there is, allegedly, no co-
versity premises and began a general ordination between the two bodies, their _
Iecture boycott after months of neg~tia- lists of demands are remarkably similaz:
tions with the university administration dependence on visiting lecturers to be
had `failed to generate any new material,' reduced, staff appointments to be based -
Huasein Khaddam, president of the on academic not political considerations ,
union, told Sudanow. The students aze ~d ~~ediate check on the entry-
complaining about poor educational u~~tions for all students attending
facili�ies on the campus - shortage of ~e university. The Vice Chancellor, Dr
staff and laboratories, an ever-changing Mohamed Ahmed el Haj has been abroad
cuniculum and so on. Although the MBs y~~l months, undergoing medical treat- -
refused to join in the sit-in, Hussein ment, and the chairman of the university -
Khaddam estimated that about 70% of administrative council Dr Awn el Sherif
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who is not popular with the MBs - involvement of both students and staff in _
has had to deal with the negotiations the conflict was a matter of little surprise,
' himself. Two days after the men- since everyone realised the importance of
students began their action, Dr Awn the role of the university in serving Islam,
appointed Dr Hassan el Fateh Gareeballa, but that everyone disagreed on the kind
Dean of the Faculty of Arts and not of servitude the university should show; a
generally considered to be an MB conflict symptomatic of a wider struggle .
sympat}user either, to the post of Deputy dominating the whole Muslim world
Vice Ch:incellor. The Muslim Brothers today, according to the Deputy Vice
have regarded the sit-in as just a tactical Chancellor. -
_ move by the union to win student One student demand, that teaching
support for their policies. One MB staff should be appointed on their
stucient-leader went further and told academic and not political merits, comes
Sudanow that he considered the whole as no surprise. One student told Sudanow
chain of events to be a conspiracy cooked that under the excuse of `Islamicising'
, up against the MBs by the union and the the university, the MBs have been
administration. In support of this theory appointing their staff-members to key
they claim that the Vice Chancellor was positions in the academic structure.
suspended from office last year on Another spoke of how the administration
charges of academic corruption, but was had been observing, with the strict
" ordered to resume his duties as dean by [slamic charter of the university in mind,
~ the chairman of the administrative certain students' political activities with
= council before the fact-finding committee keen interest; over a year ago the adminis-
had submitted its final report. Further, tration banned the Democratic Front - a
they point to the fact that one day after coalition of communists and democrats
Dr Gareeballa's appointmEnt as Deputy - and the Students' Struggle Front - a
Vice Chancellor, the union called off its Ba'athist organisation - condemning
action. them as anti-Islamic. Furthermore, in an
Hussein Khaddam strenuously denied open letter to students issued on
the existence of any co-ordination February 26th, the Students' Deanship -
between union and administration, and administrative body responsible for
denied, also, any ulterior political motive student affairs - warned of retribution _
behind the action. Another student when the two banned fronts expressed
~ source told Suclanow that the MBs have their opinions on recent e~ents in the uni-
had a~ievance a~inst the chairman of versity through~a series of posters.
the university administrative council, Dr Academic reform was the main demand
Awn el Sherif, Chairman of the High from both male and female students.
Council for Religious Affairs and Endow- According to Amal .Warrag, president of _
ments, and through their pamp}ilets have the women's union, in addition to the
accused him of incompetence and called' shortages of staff, libraries and labora-
for his immediate replacement. It would toriss, students were also suffering from
be in order, thus, continued the student, a lack of stability in the curriculum and
for the MBs to be vilifying Dr Awn during a continuous procession of visiting lec-
turers who were staying a maximum of
the present crisis. only a few months. Dr Gareeballa has -
Staff response to the students' sit- since said that a revision of the curri-
in was varied. During the men-students' culum will take place as soon as possible,
actiun, a hand-out from the so-called but, according to some women students,
`non-partisan' lecturers was circulated in do little to help surmount the
- support of the union's demands. The difficulty of learning from a lecturer who
MB controlled Staff Association - to arrives in the middle of a term and who
which all Islamic University staff belong starts teaching. material directly opposite
- was quick to denounce the pamphlet. to what they have been learning for the
Teaching staff at the women's college, on fi~rst half of the term. _
" the other hand, actually declared a strike According to Dr Husham Sultan, head
for three days to punish the girls for of the Department of Religion, the shor-
being, `nothing better than communist tage of teaching staff is now extremely
tools.' According to Dr Gareeballa, the severe, affecting the whole performance
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of the university. In some departments must, by law, be processed through the
there may be only one lecturer; others do Central Admissions office for Higher
not even have departmental heads. Dr Education, the university has established
Gareeballa attributes this to the fact that its own admissions office to deal with the
_ lecturers regularly leave the university for large number of aft3liated students, and. _
- Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states where as a result, the administcation has tended
- greater salazies are available. The annual to neglect the needs of the properly
university budget of �s3 million, qualified higher secondary schoui
contends Dr Gareeballa - six times less graduates. Affiliated students are students
than that of the University of Khartoum w+ho enter the university on a non-regular
- is not enough to alleviate the situation, basis; the university is not obliged to find
The university receives additional support them housing or provide them with
from Saudi Arabia - aid which is not, medical care, but they can attend
controlled by the Higher Education lectures, sit for exams and graduate with
Grants Committee who direct finance to a degree. Another group of students, -
all other higher educational institutes. called `listeners,' who just seem to turn
Saudi univers~ties usually fmance visiting up off the streets and attend lectures in a
lectures, but Sudunow learns that this norma! fashion, have also been seen as a
finance is in darger of being cut off - ' source of instability to the smooth-
certain Saudi universities are reconsider- ~~ng of the university by regulaz
ing their policy of donations in the light students, who are petitioning for their ~
of recent events on campus, which some expulsion. Some regular students allege
interpret as a strengthening of anti- that many affiliated students have been
Islamic elements within the Omdurman admitted without a Secondary Higher
Islamic univecsity. The situation was School Certificate, an allegation which.
hardly improved when a former if true, constitutes a gross infringement uf -
Omdurman Islamic University Vice higher education regulations. Dr Gareeb-
Chancellor, working in Saudi Arabia, on alla denied the existence of an internal
hearing that a female leftist activist was admissions office, but defended the right
going to ~ve a speech on the campus of the university to admit affiliated .
during independence anniversary celebra� students - such as the five taken annually
tions, organised a public rally in Riyadh from religious establishments - on the
calling for Saudi universities to stop their ~ounds that the limited facilities of the
donations. university could not provide an adequate -
education for all the students if they were
The shortage of staff at the university accepted on a fuil�time basis. Dr
cannot solely be accounted for by the Gareeballa explained that the university
usual reasons of better rewards elsewhere, accepts 100 affiliated students annually, -
say many university students. One source evenly distributed between the four
told Sudanow that there has ~own up faculties of the university; and although
over the past few years a tendency not to he denies any charges of admissions irre-
appoint new staff if they happen to be gularities~ orte of his first acts as Deputy -
political rivals of the dominating force in Vice Challcellor was to dismiss the
- the staff and administration. Indeed, it academic secretary responsible for
seems that the complex financial and admissions.
academic problems of runr.ing a univer-
sity have now ceased to be the preroga- Women students have their own parti-
tive of the administration, and loud voices cular problems. Amal Warrag claimed
= among the student body - supported by that w~men students' academic proh~~;ns
some members of staff - have demanded were being heightened by alleg~tions
that a complete check should be made on accusing women of calling for co~duca-
the academic particulars of all students tion within the university. Mixed study
who have entered the university outside has always been seen, by some people at
the regular channel of entry (that is, least, as a possible cure for many of the
graduation from higher secondary school ~ass-roots organisational problems on
with a School Certificate). campus (Current, November), but no-
One lecturer told Sudanow that while one is prepared to take the responsibility
all higher education students in Sudan, for starting off the campaign; co-educa-
tion contravenes the 19?5 iaw of the _
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university. Women also object to the p�omises. ~n p~~~ the name of a heir
name of their college -'The Faculty of seemed ~ ngry
Women; which is typed on their Gradua- co:lege would remain on the graduation
certificates. in response, the administra-
~ tion Certificate, and the demand to have
this changed was one of the mam reasons tion has ordered that the women's college
be closed until July, when students return
- behind their sit-in. The women's union to sit for tinal examinations, previously
is asking for their college to be divided Scheduled t'or the end of March.
into faculties in the same manner as the Most of the problems, as outlined
men's; as envisaged by the 1975 law,
claimed one lecturer, but distorted by the above, date back to 1969, and it seems
academics in charge of the college until that over the years no concerted a~tempt
the women's section of the univetsity had has been made to solve them - with the
become a separate entity. Dr Gareeballa reselt, as one student put it, that `Omdur-
told Sudanow he was prepared to man lslamic has hardly the essential
consider the denaand for facu!ties, but requisites of a university: lecturers,
that co-education was not the policy of reference facilities and students.' The
the university. Furthermore, he said, he university is deeply divided between MBs ,
would encourage separation of the sexes and their supporters on the one hand, and
- within the regional assceiations, whete anti�MBs on the other. Political problems
students form~~rly have had a chance to ~SUes and th'uthas exacerbated a diffi ult
meet together and mix.
ln the latest development, women stu- ayuanother studentisuggests:SOTurnnthe
dents on the 15th of last month started
a lecture�boycott, claiming that the Omdurman Islamic into a universit:
administration had failed to live up to its aBa~�~
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981
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SUDAN
THREE INDUSTRIES DENATIONALIZED c
Khartoum SUDANOW in English Apr 81 pp 24-25
[Article by Alfred Logune Taban: "Under the Harmner"] -
_ [Text] IN THE LATEST step in denationalisa- tliis allegation: `Tlie busiiless in tl~ese
tion to be taken so far, three government- industries is proFtable, but the profits are
owne~ industries are being put up for sale just being swallowed up by the banks'
following a presidential decree issued last bach interest, at ]4 per cent, on debts _
- month. Prospective buyers, who have accumulated from the early 1~70's. The
paid �s100 for the privilege, are studying future owners wili be clear of tliese bank
the firms' documents prior to the closing debts, because they have been included in
date for bids on April 15th. Un offer will the sale price,' explained Mohamed el
be the Blue Nile Packing Factory, for a Ghagli Suleiman, Director General of the .
minimu?n of �s6,000,000; the Krikab Food Industries Corporation. The _
- Sweet Factory, at a starting price of corporation, which is now left with only
fs3,000,000 and the Rea Sweet Factory, three industries in its care; the Wau
starting at �s2,000,000. The two sweet Canning Factory, the Babanusa Milk
factories were originally Creek-0wned Plant and the Kassala Oil Factory, says it
until their confiscation during the sweep- is not happy to lose. one particular indus-
ing nationalisation measures of 1970, try the packing factory. `Packaging is
when the Blue Nile Packing Factory was applied so extensively these days and is
partly confiscated and part[y r.ationa- such a strategic commodity that it should
lised. The three industries, which are all have ~~emained in government hands,'
in the industrial area of Khartoum North, felt the Director General. Sucla~tu?v
_ were later brought into the Faod understands that the corporation made
Industries Corporation. representations to the Ministry of
One explanation for the sale came from Flnance and National Economy, hut was
a government official in the Ministry of unsuccessful in reversing the decision.
Industry, who said, `The government is The successful new buyers will be con-
getting out of such businesses as sweets, tractually obliged to continue in the same
packing, plastic sacks and so on, and is business, and will have to shoulder all the
concentrating od the big agro-industries industries' current responsibilities, wliich
suc;h as cotton, sugar, textiles, leathes and involve retaining all 650 staff, with the ~
probably edible oil.' ~ possible exclusiun of the general
A petty trader who was less impressed managers, and paying them salaries no -
remarked. `These industries have not less than they receive at present. Further-
turned out to be profitable, so they are more, they will not lack for business com-
being sold. Can anyone in his right petition, there are the Kuwaiti and
mind think of selling a prosperous busi- Salamabi Packing Companies to contend
ness?' with, as well as the p~pular Saad, Sara
The Rovernment has, however, rejected and Sudanese sweet companies. _
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981
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SUllAN
Wl:ST GERMANY OFFERS MANY FORMS OF AS~ISTANCE
Khartoum SUDANOW in English Apr 81 p 25
[Article by Nagi Saliem Boulis]
[Text] SUDAN, WHICH IN the years 1958�78 debts of DM 30 million from individuals'
was the third largest African recipient of commercial transactions were re-
West German aid (being surpassed unly sclieduled for 16 years.'
by Tanzania and Ghana~, will continue to German technical assistance to Su~1an
enjoy priorit~~ in Bonn's development totals about DM 253 million. Tl~is sum
assistance strategy for Africa in 1981 does not include humanitarian aid, cul-
Sudanow has learn? This strategy, out- tural and academic aid, or the costs of
lined in the Pvlicy Paper on German financing the German Volunteer ~rvice.
_ Cuoperatiun witl~ Develuping Cvun~rres Technical aid too is given in the form of
(FRG. July 1980), centres upon the fields grants, covering project costs, experts'
of rural d~velopment, energy, protection salaries, equipment, and the training of
of natural resources, and education. Sudanese personnel.
Aid from the Federal Republic of Agriculture and education/training are �
Germany is of two kinds: financial and the most heavily financed fields, with
- technical. Financial assistance to Sudan, mdre than 50 projects historically tunder] _
wl~ich does not include private sector with German assistance. During recent
German investment nor governmental years the most important projects of
guarantees of credit amounts to about German-Sudanese cooperation have beeri
DM 770 million. Since 1978 such assis- road construction Uetween Nyala and
tance to Sudan has been in the form of Za(ingei and bztween Ed l7ueim an~i
free grants, and following an e~:change of (2abak; a pilot agricultural project in the
letters between Cl~ancellor Helmut Nuba Mountains; and an elementary
Schmi~lt and President Nimeiri all earlier health service in the Southern Region.
of~cial Gern~an loans to Sudan were The Southern Region has been extended
transformed intu grants. `The loans which assistance for several other projects,
were turned intu rran?s amounted tu including a veterinary service and a tree
abuut Dl~i 33S mitlion,' ~ir Bernard plantation project in Yei District. Projects
- [3raun. Press and Cultural Atta~he at the to control the spread of water hyacinths
Hmuassy of the Federal Republic of (which threaten irrigation works) and to
Gennany in Khartoum, told S~ula?tow. `In encourage vocational training have also
addition, an agreement was signed last been funded. ~ ~
month whereby Sudan's outstat?diAg
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981
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TUNISIA
BASIC AGREEMENT CONCLUDED WITH PEUGEOT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS i n French 3 Apr 81 p 936
[Report: "Basic Agreement Concluded With Peugeot"]
[Text] A basic agreement has been initialled between the Peugeot SA French
gtoup and the Tunisian Ministry of National Economy, with a view to strengthening
the ties between Tunisia and Peugeot SA. A cooperation agreement was initialled
by Mokhtar Chniti, president and director general of STIA, Jean-Paul Parayre,
Peugeot board oi directors chairman, and Mo ncef Ben Abdallah, president and
director general of the API for cooperation among the Peugeot Company, the
Turisian Automobile Industry Company (STIA) and the Investment Pronotion Agency
(API), at the Hannibal Palace, on 28 March. The ceremony was attended by -
Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national econ omy, Mansour Moalla, minister of the '
plan and finance, and Pierre Hunt, French ambassador to Tunisia.
_
According to the agreement, the STIA will i ncrease its production of Peugeot
passenger cars and vans. For the past seve ral years the Tunisian company has
been assembling Peugeot 404 cars and vans f o r the Tunisian market (see our spe-
cial issue on "Automobiles Overseas," of 6 March 1981, pp 558 and 584). Current-
ly 7,000 vans or pickup trucks are assemble d annually. Medium-term projections
_ call for reaching at least 10,000 vehicles per year. This is to be accomplished
by gradually raising the industrial use of the vans. The basic agreement stipu-
lates that the participation of Tunisian in dustry in the manufacturing process
musr reach 30 percent, as compared with 10-12 percent today. Furthermore, the
agreement includes a plan for the local manufacturing of automotive parts and
a program of purchases by Peugeot of Tunisian industrial products.' _
In discussing the contract, Lasram stipulated that it was a pilot agreement which
will make it possible to undertake operations at an advanced technological level.
Eie expressed the hope that this agreement, which is an actual association rather
than a contract between Peugeot and STIA, w ill mark the implementation of a new
cooperation formula between the two countries (see MTM 27 February 1981, p 478).
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
5157
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~
TUNISIA
KUWAIT LOANS FOR TUNISIAN PROJECTS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Apr 81 p 935
[Report: "Kuwait Loans for Tourist Projects, Sidi Salem Dam and Turki-Hammamet _
Highway"]
[Text] Cooperation between Tunisia and Kuwait, whose importance we emphasized
on the occasion of the opening of the Tunisian-Kuwaiti Development Bank, in
Tunis, and the appointment of Ali Boukhris as its president (MTM 6 March 1981, ~
- p 608), is giving steady proof of its vitality. _
Thus, in accordance with an agreement initialed by Abdelaziz Lasram, Tunisian
minister of the national economy, and Hamed Douaij, president and director
general of the Kuwaiti Real Estate Investments Consortium, in Tunis, on 27 Febru-
ary, the consortium will invest 50 million dinars (500 million French francs)
in Tunisia during the Sixth Development Plan (1982-1986). According to AFP these
funds will be used to finance several tourist projects in Tunis and its northern
surburb, in Sousse, Mahdia (the coastal area of central Tunisia), and Djerba
Island .
Abdallah A1 Oubeid, the consortium's representative in Tunis, specified that
two projects.have been agreed upon within this framework. The first will be the
construction of a hotel complex next to the Palace of Congresses. It will consist
- of a f our star luxury 600-bed hotel tower similar to the Africa Hotel. The
second will include the development of the Cap-Gammarth tourist area where a
1,300-bed hotel complex will be built. It will consist of "hotel apartments"
and a conventional hotel. The complex will have a commercial center and an
entertainment area.
More recently, in the course of a ceremony held in Kuwait on 28 March, in the _
premises of the Kuwaiti Arab Economic Development Foundation, Abdellatif E1
Hamad, Kuwaiti minister of finance and the plan and foundation president, and
Mohamed Megdiche, Tunisian ambassador to Kuwait, initialled two agreements for
a loan totaling 10.8 Kuwaiti dinars, or about 16 million Tunisian dinars, which
will finance construction of the Sidi Salem Dam and the Turki-Hammamet Highway.
The first loan for the financing of the Sidi Salem Dam will total 7.3 million
Kuwaiti dinars repayable over 25 years, with a grace period of 5 years and carry-
ing a 3 percent interest. -
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'I'he second loan for the fir.ancing of the Turki-Hammamet ~tighway will total 3.5
- Kuwaiti dinars repayable ov~r 20 years, with a 5 year grace pariod, at 4 percent
intcresl.
CUPYRIGH'I': Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
5157
CSO: 4400/1057
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~ TUNISIA
- BRIEFS
~ PAPERS SUSPENGED-~Last week, the newspapers LE PHARE and ERRAI were banned for
a period of 6 mor.ths according to a Tunisian legal source. The ban on LE PHARE,
an independent French-language daily and on ERRAI, an Arab-language legal opposi-
~ tion daily (although close to the authorities) was imposed by the republic's
attorney general for "dissemination of false news which reflect on the dignity
of the president of the republic, and the publication of photographs of a nature
to disturb public order." TUNIS-HEBDO, another newspaper, is reported to have
been banned for 1 year. The Arab-language newspaper EL MUSTAKBAL (socialist demo-
- cratic opposition), which published this information, published a commentary
questioning the sense of such suspensions shortly after the Superior Information
Council had specifically stipulated that "the press was free to present reality."
- ['I'ext] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 3 Apr 81 p 936
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1481.] 5157
_ SFlOE EXPORTS--Currently the Tunisian shoe industry consists of about 50 indus-
- trial and semi-industrial enterprises and many small shops employing some 3,000
people. In 1979 the industry's output reached 10.6 millioi; pairs of shoes and
shoe wear. It will be developed further in the future and produced for export,
which is scheduled to reach four million pairs at tne end of the Sixth Plan
- (1982-1986). The possibility of marketing this suz~plus abroad was discussed
]2 February last at a meeting on Tunisian shoe wear for exports," sponsored
- by the National Leather and Shoe Wear Center and the Expert Promotion Center -
(CEPEX). Specifically, the discussions dealt with the difficulties hindering _
the promotion of this industry which should play a decisive role in Tunisian
exports during the next plan. In turn, the Investment Promotion Agency (API)
pointed out in a recent study that Tunisian shoe manufacturing, which totaled
4.5 million pairs in 1972, should reach 12 million this year. Leather production
rose from 4.8 mill.ion square feet in 1978 to 5.3 million in 1979, or 10 percent. _
[Text] ~Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 3 Apr 81 p 936
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 5157 _
CSO: .4400/105', END
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