JPRS ID: 9761 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400010057-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 57
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9761
29 May 1981
~l1/est~ E u ro e R e o rt
p p
C~Qt10 26/81)
i
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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- NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
- newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
. sources are translated; those from English-language sources
aie transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
- or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the -
last line of a brief, indicate how the original int'ormation was
~ processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parenth e ses were not clear in the
_ original but have been supplied a s appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an =
item originate with the soiirce. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of th e U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWi~1ERSHIP OF
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JPRS L/9 761
_ 29 May 19 81
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 26/81)
CONTENTS
- THEATER FORCES
FRANCE
" New Tactical Air Force ~quipment.Described
(LE MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUE, Apr 81) 1
ITALY
Commentary on Mediterranean Defense
- (Stefano Silveatri; ~UZOPEO, 13 Apr 81) 4
Defense Minister Interviewed on Euromiesilea
(~elio Lagorio Interview; I?, MONDO, 10 Apr 81) 6
Defense Minister Reports to ParliamenC on Arms Sales
(Sandro Acciari; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 15 Apr 81) 11
TERR~RISM
ITALY
~ Role of 'Metropoli' in Terrorism
~ (Marcella Andreoli; EUROPEO, 13 Apr 81) 13
ENEItGY ECONOMICS
ITALY
- Briefa
Reggio Emilia Total Energy 17
-a- [III-WE-150.FOU0]
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ECO~TOMTC
ITALY
- Investment Proposal for Induetrial Modernization
(Alberto Mucci; CORRIERE DELLA ~ERA, 9 Apr 81) 18
SPAIN
= Anti-Carrillo Soviet Involvement in Internal PCE Affaira
(Branko Lazitch; L'EXPRESS, 7 Feb 81) 22
POLITICAL
- FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
- Official Sees Future of EC as European Union
(Niels Hansen; EUROPA-ARCHIV, 10 Mar 81) 24
FRANCE
. rrench Presence in Indian Ocean Examined
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 30 Mar 81)
- This article appears xn JPRS L/9699, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
REPORT, FOUO No 718 of 30 Apr 81, pp 6-10
~
MILITARY
FRANCE
New Overseas Action Pursuit Squadron Activate~
- (LE MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUE, Apr 81) 32
- b -
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THEATER FORCES FRANCE
NEW TACTICAL AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED
Paris LE MONITEUR DE L' AERONAUTIQUE in Fren.ch Apr 81 pp 26-28
- [Text] It was on 20 Februarj~ that RQbert Galley made "r?is first
visit to the armed fo-rces as minister of defense. During this
visit, whose purpose was to assess the new defense programs being
implemented on air bases and the new weapon systems being developed,
the minister was given a stationary presentation of FATAC [Tactical
Air Force] weapons and aircraft.
The Luxeuil Air Base, which was selected for the defense winister's visit, is the home
of a tactical squadron with a nuclear mission, the EC 4[Es~adron de Chasse 4: Fighter
Squadron 4], equipped with Mirage IIIE aircraft, and a strategic bomber squadron
equipped with Mirage IV planes. For this visit, the base and its units were put 4n
red alert, jus t as the~~ would be in time of war. These were the conditions under
which the visi ters were able to evaluate the resources that have been assigned, for
several years now, for the defense of FATAC bases. These resources have actually
been assigned under three main programs concerning the camouflage, toughening and
active protection of tha bases.
- Under the cond itions of a possible conflict in Europe, the invulnerability of the
bases can in f act be provided in three ways: first, by attempting to conceal the
installations in order to make it more difiicult to identify and thus to attack them;
second, by set ting up active defense systema to reduce an attacking enemy's chances
of properly executing his mission; f inally, toughening the install.ations to limit
the damage caused by any successful attack.
The first asp e ct, camouf lage, is the least spectacular, but its importance cannot
be exaggerated, since even when a pilot knows the exact location of his target, he
cannot attack it without recognizing it visually. The FATAC's efforts in this re-
- spect first involved painting the main operational buildings, runways and taxiways
a shade of f la t olive green to make them blend better with their surroundings. Trees
have also been planted to reduce the size of vacant areas, which are easy to spot,
and finally there has been increased use of camouflage nets, which are apparently
_ highly effective when arranged appropriately and not on a taxiway, as was the case
at the time of the defense minister's visit!
With regard to toughening of the bases, we are aware of the finaricial resources that
_ have been allo cated for effective protection of the aircraft and vital operational
1 �
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l.nstallations. The operational centers of certain bases are now underground and
plans have been m~:de to eventually build underground shelters for personnel.
A sizable program for building aircraft shelters was launched several years ago and
about half of the shelters needed--each aircraf t should eventually have its own shel-
ter--have been built at the present time. It is planned that all shelters will be
completed between now and 1985-86 and the finances allocated for this program will
- continue even during the next military long-range appropriations bill. Some shelters
do not yet have armored doors, but plans have been made to eventually equip them
with such doors when a minimal number of open shelters has been completed. To in-
crease the effectiveness of these operations, "merlans" nave also been built near
- the shelters and important operational installations. "Merlans" are 3- to 4-mster-high
walls which force an attacking aircraft to reascend in order to open up its angle of
- fire, thus exposing it to antiaircraft defenses~.
Another effort, which is just as significant from the financial standpoint, has been
made to strengthen active defense resources, specifically antiaircraft weapons. Each
operational base will have to have a battery of Crotale surface-to-air missiles,
whose operation wi11 be supplemented by a larger number of double-barrel 20-mm guns
and heavy 12.7-mm machine guns. As for ground protection, training of defense and
surveillance units has been stepped up and specially trained air commando units now
participate in defending the bases.
'Che ~econd part of Mr Galley's visit concerned the new weapons and equipment which
tlle I'l1TAC will be using. There were new combinations of weapons, in particular Magic
~r-*_u-air missiles mounted on Mirage IIIE aircraft for air defense, as well as
~~atra 530 air-to-air missiles. Beluga grenade dispensers, F3 rocket launchers and
30-6-hi2 launchers for runway bombs [for destroyino airport runways] were also dis- '
played in public for the fisrt time. But the stationary presentation had two main
- ar.~as of interest: electronic warfare equipment and the "exclusivP" mockup of the new
~\~~ri~' [medium-range air-to-surface] missile.
j
- With regard to CME [expansion unknown] equipment, it can be summed up in three different
and complementary types of materiel: the Phimat foil launcher (chaff) for self-defense,
~he IR 531 decoy launcher and the CT-51 container, which actually holds two Calmar
jammers and which gives the carrier aircraft signif icant offensive electronic warfare
capabilities.
The ASMP missile, which has a nuclear warhead and is intended to equip Mirage 2000
, penetration aircraft and 15 r~conditioned Mirage IV aircraft, was presented in the
torm of a full-scale mockup. Slightly more than 5 meters long, this missile will
weigh less than 1 ton and its warhead should have a force of 100 to 300 kilotons.
Propelled by a ramjet, its inertial navigation system is controlled by the inertial
navigation system of the carrier aircraft, which eliminates the requirements of
guidance once readjustment has been made prior to f iring. This missile has good
mane~tvering capability, in particular due to the broad contro2 surfaces, and can
appraach its target at low altitude, using terrain-following radar. The missile's
speed will be approximately between Mach 2 and Mach and its range will vary from
- a few dozen to a few hundred kilometers, depending on the nature of the mission and
the altitude of firing. This missile i.s intended to attack predetermined military
r.argets located far behind enemy lines. ItG *..4'_LL targets will therefore be air bases
. ~
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and camps, necessary crossing points with asstnned high concentrations of enemy forces,
important centers of communication, and depots and other storage sites. The f irst
- mis~iles will be delivered in 1985 and the program should be completed around 1990;
the first missile should be fired somexime in 1982 or 1983.
= COPYRIGHT: DEFENSE Editions 1981
_ 11915
CSO: 3100/681
3
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THEATER FORCES ITALY
- COMMENTARY ON MEDITERRANEAN UEFENSE
Milan EUROPEO in Italian 13 April 81 p 13
[Article by Stefano Silvestri: "But Ships Do Not Have Wings"]
[Text] Italy, the Germany of the Mediterranesn; Italy that guarantees Malta's neu- -
trality; Italy that PRAVDA accuses of militari,3tic delirium. Accusations, slogans
and treaties oblige us now to assume the role of one of the most muscular countries
in the basin of the Mediterranean Sea.
Gec.erals, admirals and polemists are getting exercised about new scenarios. Oppose
~he USSR all alone? Do not even mention it. And what if the enemy is L~ibya? "It
' is an entirely theoretical possibility," Lelio Lagorio, minister of Denfese stated,
"and nothing l~ads to the thought that it might come about in the future. But among
so many fanciful exercises that we are ma.king, this one at least might teach us
something."
We too have engaged in fancifying. What would happen in the Mediterranean if our
"Blues" should clash w~th the "Greens"? Would everything go smoothly? A strate-
gist replies cryptically: "The Italian Navy would immediately relapse into the
- Matapan syndrome."
The reference is to an unfcrtunate naval battle in March 1941. Our ships had already
been humiliated several times at Punta Stilo, in Sicily, and in the Taranto road-
stead. The British had radar and naval aircraft, while our units had to await the _
support of the land-based Italian-German Air Force. Coordinations and recognition
signals never worked and the Italian ships played the part of defenseless targets.
At Cape Matapan, we lost three cruisers and two destroyers. The battleship "Vittorio
Veneto" was seriously damaged. The Italian Navy was wounded to death.
Let us come back to the fiction of "strategic games." Lib~a does not have a large
- navy, but it has already received the first three of six Russian submarines ordered,
and also 14 missile-carrying attack craft capable of sinking warships. It also has _
- 400 combat aircraft, almost 100 more than Italy. It does not have pilots, but it _
can easily enlist them from allies and clients of Moscow. _
Not-so bad if Italy had its forces in order. And, instead, 40 years later, we are
lacking the same things that we lacked at Cape Matapan: radar (not radar on the
the ships, but rather radar for dEfense and coordination of air attacks from land)
and aircraft capable of operating 2t sea. "Pi~ors are not improvised," a naval
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officer warns. "ours are trained for land battles. They might not find the ships
or confuse friendly ships with enemy ships. The Air Force does not yet have anti-
= ship missiles."
The recent case of the L~byan fighter aircraft that crashed in Calabria without any-
one's being aware of it demonstrates the state of the air defenses in the South.
"We lack radar," Admiral Torrisi, Defense chief of staff admits�.: It will not be easy
to obtain any. The new American tridimensional radars will cost around 700 billion
_ lire, a truly impressive figure.
"We do not have much money for arm.ament," Lelio Lagorio confirmed to us, "e~~en though
this year's Defense budget has been increased by 30 percent. But this is more ap-
parent than real money." Calculations can be made quickly. "Let us bear in mind
that the inflation rate has been 22 percent. Very well, in current terms, our ex-
penditures for new armament have increased II percent in comparison with last year.
In other words, in real terms they have decreased 14 percent. The largest increases
are in entirely other sectors. Training has had 59 percent more. The cost of per-
sonnel has increased by 36 percent. Infrastructures hav~ absorbed another 27 percent
and aiaintenance has required a 26-percent increase.
And these are also the reasons for a fear of a second Matapan: "Imagine strong air
pressure agains t our almost defenseless bases in the South. The Air Force would
have to think about saving itself and defenciing itself. The Navy would have to
- take carc f itself. But four fighter aircraft suffice for saturating the defense
capabilit~ ~f onf of our ships. The fif~h aircraft can sink it. If we add to the
- ~lir threat the threat of the missile-launching attack craft..." Our naval officer
~s pessimistic.
Well then? The most skeptical among our aviators say that the Navy is trying to beat
the drum. "They are thinking about aircraft carriers. They want to equip the
''Giuseppe Garibaldi" w:th vertical takeoff aircraft, in order to make a shipborne
naval air force for themselves." The admirals deny this (but they go to see the per-
formance of the new Anglo-American vertical takeoff fighter aircraft). Everything
seems ready for one of those interservice quarrels typical of our Armed Forces.
'rhere is probably a way out. Why not think, for example, of the possibility of es-
tablishing a new service, a"Naval Air Force" consisting of land-based aircraft with
_ mixed capabilit ies both for action on land and at sea? The idea is circulating in
_ the Baracchini Palace. But the Navy and the Air Force still seem to be skeptical.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Rizzoli Editore
10,042
- CSO: 3104/238
5
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THEATER FORCES ITALY
DEFENSE MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON EUROMISSILES '
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 10 Apr 81 pp 24-26
[Interview with Lel~o Lagorio by Roberto Palladino: "I Have the Key to the
Pershings"]
[Text] The time has come for Italian foreign policy to make a choice: agree _
with American President Ronald Reagan's aggressiveness or opt for East-�West "
dialogue? The disturbing international picture directly involves Italy which, for
- the first time, is the target of violent palemics. The Soviets opened the offensive
against the Italian policy of security, accusing Minister of Defenae Lelio Laborio _
(a Socialist) of unbridled militarism. Within the governmental ma~ority too, some
criticisms regarding the high expenses of armanents have surfaced. Basically
_ though, where is Italy going? What is ite strategy? IL MONDO spoke about this
with Minister Lagor~lo.
Question: Tensions and rearmament characterize the international ~limate. What
is your opinion?
Answer: The situation is worrisome. Let us shore it up before it becomea alarming.
- At the base of it all are the bitter polemics and noncommunication over the question
of when and where the military balance was altered. This is the starting point -
toward new weapons. We Italians are making efforts so that the delicate thread of
a reasonable dialogue between East and Weat does not break. We do not like uncon-
trolled rearmament.
Question: However, Italy, along with other NATO countries decided to increase its
defense expenditures by 3 percent. How come?
Answer: That decision was made in 1978, when Giulio Andreotti was preaident of
~the Council of Ministers with the largest majority in Italy's history. It was not
applied until 1981, though. The increase affecta in large part the conditions of
military life rather than weapons. For the latter, an outlay equal to 20 percent -
of the entire budget coupled with an 8-percent increase over 1980 is being planned.
(The figures are in monetary terms, not real terms; the inflation figure is not
known)
Questiont All in all, however, ~expenses for defense have increased by 30 percent
in 1981.
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Answer: This is explained by recouping the increase not decided upon in 1980 and
taking into account the rate of inflation.
Question: How do you answer a critic who stated that you were too amenable in
accepting the 3-percent increase demanded by the United States?
Answer: I have no inferiority complex when it comes to dealing with the United
States. I firmly believe that the Atlantic Pact is an alliance between sovereign,
independent free nations. I didn't think up the 3-percent figure, but I find it
just. If we adhere to it, in the 1980' we will no longer have a B-string army, but
a flexible and modern army, to be used atrictly in a defensive manner.
Question: Some offices of the U.S. government believe a 3-percent increase is
insufficient for security: what is your opinion?
Answer: Up to now, no Ataeriean leader has said anything. We will see how things
go in Bonn, on 7 and 8 April, when the European defense ~inieters ~~et their
American colleague for the first time.
Question: And what will you say in Bonn?
- Answer: In Bonn in April or Brussels in May, where the interallied ministers will
meet, I will ask my colleagues if they share the ~.dea of a four-member directorate
to head the Atlantic Alliance. The hypothesis has been brought up by centess for
- strategic studies of. Paris, London, Bonn and Washington. I will explain that in
Ita1y's opinion it not only is an unacceptable idea but a dangerous one because it
- could have a centrifugal effect for the alliance.
- Question: Was the decision to acquire Euromissiles to balance NATO weapons with
. those of the East a correct one?
Answer: Atomic weapons are acquired together with an element of reluctance. How-
ever, the reasons that led NATO and the Italian Parliament at the end of 1979 to
approve Euromissiles are still valid. On the political plain, the choice was not
a mistake. We were told that Moscow would take a dim view of this, but it was
right after the Euromissile dscisions that the USSR agreed to a prenegotiation
meeting in Geneva dealing with these weapons. Now, in his own personal manner,
Leonid Brezhnev is offering a moratorium. The road to a treaty essentially had
not been obstructed. We were the ones who were right and not those prophets of
doom, who are all part time pacifists. They talk a gr~at deal about NATO weapons
and little of the weapons of oth ers.
Question: Last year you supported German Chancellor Helmut ~chmidt's proposal
- for a nuclear missile treaty; then, all initiative~ were dropped. Is that a
correct impression?
Answer: No. At the Paris European Socialist Confeience on Security and Disarma-
ment there was considerable agreement among the Germans, the French and the
Italians. We are in favor of negotiation but it isn't poseible to negotiate with
one hand ti~d behind one's back. The USSR M�.�