JPRS ID: 9760 EAST EUROPE REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400010056-5
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• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 56
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9760
- 29 May 1981
East ~uro e ~ Re ort
p p
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS -
- CFOUO 6/81)
~ FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION S~RVI~;E -
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3PR~ L/9760
29 May J.981 _
'
EAST EUROPE REPORT '
POLI7ICAL, SOCIQLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 6/81) ~
I
CONTENTS
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC -
European Ramifications of GDR-FRG Relationship Analyzed _
(Peter Bender; DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, Mar 81) 1
Paris Painting Exhibition Prompts Diacussion o~ GDR Art
(STERN, 12 M~r 81) 17 =
Past, Current Condition, by Rolf Schneider
Artistic Freedom and Limitations, Willi Sitte Interview
ROMt~NIA ,
Repressive Treatment of Reiigiuus Figures Described
(Lia Wainstein; LA STAMPA, 25 Mar 81) 22
- a- IIII - EE - 63 FOUO]
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, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUIiLIC
EUROPEAN RAMIFICATIONS OF GDR-FRG RELATIONSHIP ANALYZED
Cologne DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV in Germ.an Vol 13 No 3, Mar 81 signed to press 20 Feb 81
pp 251-264
_ [Chapter of book, "Das End.e des ideologischen Zeitalters--Die Europaeisierung
, Europas" (The End of the Ideological Era--The Europeaniza.tion of Europe), by
' Dr Peter Bender, correspondent, West German Radio (WDR), West Berlin; ARD radio
correspondent in Warsaw for many years; author of "Offensive Entspannung--Moeglich-
keiten fuer Deutschland" (Active Detente--Possibilities for Germany), Cologne-
Berlin, 1954: "Europe and the Germans: The Alleviation of a Problem"]
-I
i [Text] The following text is the Germany chapter of a book on
Europe, which will be published---under the title "Das Ende des
~ ideologischen Zeitalters--Die Europaeisierung Europas" [The End
~ of the Ideolo ical Era--The Euro eanization of Euro e
g p p ]--by Severin
I und Siedler, West Berlin (269 p, cloth-bound, DM 32). Peter Bender,
, who delivered a report on this subject at the 13th Conference on
- Research on the GDR in May 1980, proceeds from the decline of ide-
i ology as a spiritual force in the East and sh~ws the resulting
i consequences in regard to East-West relations (reduced to power
, and interests), the relations between the Europeans of both sides
~ and the great powers USSR and Unite d States, the rivalries of the
great powers and the need for solidarity among the Europeans.
' Bender's principal thesis: the rivalry of the world powers neces-
sitates solidarity among the Europeans in East and West. (The editors)
I~ 1. History and the Remembra~ce of It
= In 1965, Henry Kissinger wrote : "For at least 300 years, the status of Germany has
~ been the key to Europe's stability"; and after a historical illustration, he con-
~ tinued: "Germany has always been either too weak or too strong in regard to peace
in Europe."
~~n the period following World War II, this experience was confirnied anew. At
first, the entirely powerless Germany, whicr:~ras divided into zones of occupation,
was a bone of contention between East and West; since the 1960's, the two develop-
ing German states have again become a prablem, this time in the opposite way--on
account of their weight, which is threatening to turn into preponderance. Germany
was and has remained a--literally--central concern of Europe and the "German prob-
l.em" (the existence of which is called into question only in Germany) is a problem
of the entire continent.
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This becomes fully comprehensible only if it is viewed in a broader--not merely
- political--con.text. Neither of the two German states has fully achieved normaliza-
- tion of relations with the world arotmd it and the reasons for this are similar on
both sides. After the war, the Federal Republic and the GDR turned into allies too -
" quickly--they ~,~ere drawn into agreements, ties and integrated systems, without
there having ~een estab lished the necessary psychological framework. Both the East
:~id the West made the Germans allies out of necessity, not out of conviction or
inclination.
" As a result, both Bonn and East Berlin showed a tremendous need for compensation. -
~ The SED be came more communist, and the West German parties, more democratic than
the Communists and Democrats elsewhere. The Federal Repu~lic and the GDR submitted
more readily to the influence of "their" leading power than did the other Europeans.
Consequently, West Germany has long been considered by its neighbors a mini-America, -
and East Germany is regarded by many Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Romanians as a
Soviet republic advanced to the West. The Germans were--and have in part remained--
the most anxious and zealous members of their alliances--both states alert toward
either side: toward the enemy across the border and toward the lame friends within
that border. This certainly did not make them poptilar; rather, it served to con-
firm the old, all-European view of the Germans, who always try--austere ly, doggedly
a~nd terrib ly efficiently--to be the best and who--to the annoyance of the others--
generally do come out on top. _
_ Both the FRG and the GDR also had to prove to their neighbors that Nazism was defi-
nitely a thing of the past; in different ways, however, they both failed. The FRG
compensated for excesses of the Western allies' "denazification" through pronounced
- nonchalance in the selection of the new civil sFrvants; as a resu~t o� this, there
was no end to the scandals over Nazis in posi~~ions of leadership and these scandals
will eventually end not for political, but for biological reasor.s. The GDR was
radical and consistent in eliminating brown restdues; but the traces of the old it
had eliminated immediately grew back from within ~ts own system.
Moreove r, as an authoritarian party, the SED was very receptive to all traditions
_ of the German authoritarian state. The firm conviction to have totally eradicated
Nazism made the East German Comm~mists oblivious to the f act that they ~themselves--
with reversed premises--were continuing wilat they had thought they had eliminated. -
This seli-righteousness has negatively affected the GDR's foreign relations. In
placing--with autosuggestive persistence--the blame for all the errors of Germany's
past on the Federal Republic, the GDR gradually came to repudiate all historical
responsibility. The functionaries expected the "fraternal countries" to tre~at them ~
- as comrades an d they were greatly surprised to learn that the others re garded them
first and foremost as Germans. But the majority of the population, too, heard
about the German crimes only in connection with the Federal Republic and many peo-
~ ple got used to the idea that they the~selves had nothing to do with it. To mcist
of the East Germans, Poles and Czechs are no longer the enemies of old; rather, -
they are fellow-sufferers from the "adjoining camp hut."
Thus there is little room for guilt feelings or even considerateness. And this is
why East Germans in East Europe often conduct themselves in a totally free manner,
which conduct then is viewed by the host countries as very "German." The loudness
- of GDR visitors in Polish restavrants is by now almost proverbial; and no one is
likely to forget the statement in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND to the effect that the GDR--as
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a socialist count_ry--could count itself among the "victor nations of history" (tiie
= author was always one of the "victors": NSDAP member since 1936; presently deputy
editor in chief of the SED party orgar.j. At the end of October 1.980, when the GllR
had sealed itself off vis-a-vis PoJ and, there followed a second statement in NI;ULS
DEUTSCHLAND, which will not be `~rgotten: "In the attempt to solve the pending
complex problems and to consc~iidate socialism, ~11 truly Polish patriots can count
on the unrestricted support of the German Democratic Republic." Germans who
instruct Poles on Polish patriotism!
Until the mid-1960's, however, the Federal Republic did not pr~sent itseli in a
much better light. East Europe suffered much more heavily from th~ war and the
German accupation than did the West Europeans, but Bonn never took note of this.
In regard to the Saar question, Adenauer was willing zo malce a sacrifice that
proved unnecessary; in regard to the Oder-Neisse problem, he insisted--as did the
other West German parties--on a revision that was impractical. In regard to the
West, the FRG knew it had to carry the burden of a dark past and it acted accord-
ingly; in regard to the East, most people believed that since Communism was in.
_ power there they were fre~ from any responsib ility and that was the way they acted.
In doing so, almost all people repressed the fact that it was Hitler's war that had
given rise to the Communist regimes extending up to the Elbe River. The nations of
, East Europe were pimished by the Germans for having fallen--through Germany's
, fault--into the sphere of ~nfluence of the Soviet Union.
"Histo ry" is the cue for another element the two Germanys have in common--the lack
of historical consciousness. After the collapse of the German Reich, most Germans
ran away from their past and sought refuge in ideology or internationalism. In the
East, it was communism, and in the West, anti co~nuniam; in the East, it was the
socialist community, and in the West, the European coramunity, in which the politi-
cal elites tried to find refuge and a sense of purpose, after the Germans as a
_ nati.on had failed so dreadfully. But the neighbors have a very good memory; they
live with and through their history. This is evident not only in France and
Poland, but also in the small states bordering on Germany. Thus there have arisen
many misunderstandings. The Germaiis do not s ufficiently imderstand that while for
Germans rapprochement is quite easy, rapprochement with Germans is another story.
Since they have repressed the past, they feel considerateness and tact have become
less important. Since they orientate their foreign relations according to the
power of the partners, they overlook that now as before the others (above all the
_ French and the Poles) regard their relationship to the Germans as a special rela-
- tionship. Since the Germans--starting in 1945 at zero, as it were--have continu-
~ ously been ascending, they hardly understand what it means to old world powers such
as England and France to be constantly on th e decline. Since the Germans have
recovered so well, they forget that it was the y who inflicted the wounds from which
the others have trouble recuperating. Since they have totally devoted themselves
to producing measurable results, triey are not aware of the concern they arouse in
others: whether one ~an match the German achievp~~nts, without "selling one's
- soul" (Robert Held). '
For the most part, this applies to both East and West Germans. They have become an
_ ahistorical people--practically a foreign body in the Old World. Only gradually is
this becoming attenuated. The German achievements are admired by all, but most
people do not want to live in Germany--and in regard to FRG citizens, this has even
been confirmed by a public opinion poll. The other countries expect the Germans to
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lend ecanomic assistance, but they are somewhat ill at ease about it. The govern-
ments are on friendly terms and the borders are open, even for the East Germans in
the East (leaving aside the special case of Poland in 1980). As regards everyday
living, the fashions and customs--especially those of the young people--show a sur-
p rising degree of conformity. German visitors are no longer a problem in any Euro-
pean cotnltry; fair, ~ust--albeit sub~ective--reports, in fact entire books on the
Germans have been published in almost all cotm tries. Nevertheless, there remains
something unresolved.
One of the reasons for this is the understandable distrust, which--since it is
irrational--is insurmountable; it will disappear only when the generation that con-
sciously experienced war and occupation passes away. Another reason is the charac-
ter of the Germans, which remains mysterious to the other Europeans--precisely
because it appears to be innocuous. The Germans have no national identity; they
have nothing but their affluence--but what is go~ng to happen, if that affluence
shows the first cracks? In brief, this was the question a critical, b ut quite
~ benevolent Frenchman asked in the mid-1970's. One can put this in a different way:
After the war, the Germans were dazed. They did what was necessary and practical
. and concentrated on material progress. They became affluent and thus further
numbe d themselves. Not until the mid-1960's, when an unbiased generation reached
maturity, did the West Germans gradually recover their senses. Not until then did
people ask the question who and what the FRG citizens really are and what they
should be. In the GDR, this process began even later, if it began at all.
_ Neve rtheless, the Germans are beginning to search. They are becoming aware of the
loss of the past and they are realizing that therefore there is no future, either.
The other Europeans see or sense this; and they are worried about what this fer-
_ mentation process may produce: a new German nationalism or two ordinary European
states? The others can attain a normal relationship to the Germans only if the
Germans appear normal to them--and this is still not quite possible. Europe will
come to terrns with the Germans only when the Germans have come to terms with them-
selves.
2. German Strength and Want of Clarity
In any political discussion of Germany, the most important consideration is the
fact that both German states have grown much stronger than expected--in part abso-
lutely and in part relatively, i.e. as compared with their weakened allies. The
- Fed~ral Republic even grew into the strongest state in Europe, aside from the great
powers; and it has thus created--irrespective of the German question--a problem for
its alliance. Henry Kissinger reports on the America visit of Georges Pompidou in
1970, when the French president explained to the Nixon government his Europe pol-
icy: "It was the fear of a rest~red Germany, said Pompidou, that ha~ prompted him
to give up de Gaulle's oppositian against Great Britain's accession to a united
~ Europe. Pompidou's arguments did not differ at all that much from those expressed
by Wilson 2 weeks previously. Great Britain was supposed to join the Common Market
so as to keep Germany in check. Pompidou even spoke of a London-Paris axis as a
counterweight to the uncontrolled German nationalism.... Most likely, Pompidou was
~ concerr.ed above all with the legacy of Richelieu. In his view, prevention of the
recovery of Germany at France's borders took precedence over the fear of a more
distant Russia, which--after all--was in the sphere of influence of American for-
eign po.licy."
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That was in 1970. In the meantime, the relative weight of the Federal Republ~c
vis-a-vis its West European partners has further increase d and this is no less
worrisome to the East Europeans.
The GDR gives rise to a similar concern: As much as it is needed--politically as
well as economically--in the East, its German virtues--industry and efficiency,
order and discipline--provoke both admiration and alarm. In addition, there are -
all those traits that are felt there to be so obtrusively German. The "ever ready"
roar of ara ~'DJ [Free German YouthJ roll call, the Prussiar, r~scches, the Wehrmacht-
style wnifurms, the drill-sergeant ways of many border guards, the official cor-
rectness turning into disputatiousness, the petit-bourgeois narrow-mindedness that
poses as the new culture, the dogmatism that degenerates into didacticism: "Only
the people from the SED know what socialism is--even the Russians are not so sure
about that." Tlze GDR is the maximum of German ways that the East Europeans will
put up with. Warsaw fears the GDR may become the second state of the Eastern Alli-
- ance and in critical periods the GDR even generates the old nightmare: Poland
hemmed in by Russians and Germans.
Thus, in view of the fact that either side has difficulty in coping with its German
hunk, nearly 80 million Germans united in one state would be intolerable to all .
Europeans. Even the Soviet Union probab ly just pretends to be able to afford to
accept a~mified Germany. The Americans--the only country that could actually
afford to accept it--are likewise concerned, albeit for a different reason. The
Europeans and Moscow feel threatened above all by the powev concentration of a
unified Germany--no matter whether it would be neutral or leaning toward the West
or the East. The Americans, on the other hand, are afraid of losing "their" Ger-
many, the Federal Republic. The Eastern equivalent was s upplied by Petr Abrassimov,
- the Soviet ambassador to East Berlin, who told representatives of the Western -
_ p~wers: "You control your Germans; we will control ours."
The fact that the Germans are closely watched by the other states is attributable
- above all to the combination of historical guilt and newly acquired power. Another
factor is the policy pursued by the Federal Republic. The Grand Coalition and--
even more so--the Social-Liberal Coalition attempted to free Europe from the dis-
turbances caused by the German problem. Bonn wanted to p resent itself to the West
European community as a reliable member that no longer has any tmsettled border
problems in the East. It wanted to become a trustwortl~y partner for all East -
European states, a partner who--even though it does not approve of the East-West
- split--respects it as a fact, firstly in order to establish a normal relationship
- between the Federal Republic and the East and secondly, in order not to impede any -
longer the European detente desired by all.
This intention has largely, but not entirely, been realized. The agreements con-
tained reservations: the qualification that the Warsaw Agreement applies only to
the Federal Republic, not to a unified Germany; the "letter conce rning German
unity" and then the well-known peculiarities of the inner-German relations. The
East accepted these r~servations, because legally Bonn had no alternative and
because the Eas~ hoped that formalities would remain formalities .~~td would gradu-
ally become politically insignificant. But these expectations proved illusory:
The Federal ~onstitutional Court declares the border between the Federal Repub lic
- and the GDR to be "similar" to the borders "between the states of the Federal
- Republic of Germany." The Federal So~ial Court pronounces judgments, as though a -
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Warsaw Agreement was never concluded; and the strongest party, the CDU/CSU, bases
its Ostp~litik on an all-party Bundestag jLower House] resolution, according to
which the East Treaties "do not establish a legal basis for the presently existing
- borders." Thus Franz Josef Strauss, the union parties' candidate for the chancel-
lorship, stated that as long as there was no peace treaty to the contrary Sil.esia
was German. As a result of all this, the political intent of the treaties is per-
verted and the foundation of the entire Ostpolitik, the recognition of the status
quo (including finality of the Oder-Neisse border) is called into question. Indi-
vidual Germans are for the most part trusted in tlie East, but the Federal Republic
is still suspected--by the West as well--of double-dealing.
The formal and rhetorical ambiguities are irritating primarily '~ecause Bonn's for- _
eign policy lacks ultimate clarity. What is the interrelationship between West-
and Ostpolitik? Officially, it is supposed to be an integrated whole, but even
terminologically, there are two different pol.icies: "Europe" policy is concerned
exclusively with West Europe; the other things fall tmder "Ostpolitik." The ulti- `
~ mate objectives of the latter--and the interrelationship of these objectives--have
never been clearly defined. Is Ostpolitik pursued for its own sake or is it merely
an instrument of Germany policy? And what is the objective of Germany policy, if
it is to be more than GDR policy? What is meant by "European peace system"? This
concept is hardly used any longer: Is this because it was a meaningless formula or
because the underlying intentions have flagged? The list of questions could be
extended, but it shows at least one thing: The Federal Republic has not yet found
- its political place in Europe.
Bonn is committed in equal measure to European detente and to Germany's unity; but
these two objectives--if they are to be translated into policy--are irreconcilable;
and even if this is mere ly rhetoric, Bonn still arouses understandaL le distrust.
- Detente is based on equilibrium--one reads this in the newspapers almost every day;
but the division of Germany is an integral part of the equilibrium--and this is
- much less talked about. Naturally, this European equilibrium is a very subjective
matter: Nobody can prove that precisely two-th irds of Germany should be on the _
Western side, and one-third, on the Eastern side for the forces of the two alli-
ances to be balanced. But in other situations, too, equilibrium frequently is
nothing but a distribution of weight that one has become accustomed to. Unless _
there is a blatant disp roportion, a long-standing situati~~n is gradually seen and
eventually defined as Pquilibrium.
In practice, the crucial factor in regard to equilibrium is the general consensus
and that means: the existence of two German states has become a constituent ele-
ment of European detente. The abnormality of the division of Germany is the condi-
tion indispensable for normalization in divided Europe. We have seen it in many
discussions--the last argument always rtms as follows: "Even though your right to
national unity is well-founded and even though your wish to attain it is im der-
standable--you are disturbing the status quo." In present-day E urope, to upset the
equilibrium is a sacrilege.
Naturally, the objective is not--not even in the medium term--the ultimate: polit-
ical unification of Germany, a German confederation, a German economic community.
There will be no major shifting of the ground--it is the nuances that are problem-
atic: Even minor tampering with the equilibrium generates fear; even insignificant
chang~s are seen as the beginning of major changes. Both the West and the East
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~
~ -
~ pay close attention when Bonn and East Berlin conclude agreements worth billions
; and they watch even more closely any notable accord between Bonn and Moscow.
~ The increased strength uf the Federal Republic, the uncertainry concerning the
Federal Republic's long-range objectives, and the concern about European detente--
i these three--largely new--elements explain why in both East and West the German -
~ question keeps generating latent anxiety and why the Europeans and the great pow~~;-~~
~ want just one thing: The Germans must not disturb. They must not again impede (a.
~ they did before 1969) the rapprochement of the other Eurol~ea.is and they must ~.ot
get too close to each other. They shoLld come to terms with each other, but they
~ must not fraternize.
In practice, this means: The Germans can never do things quite right. Whenever
Bonn and East Berlin clash--e.g. in or around Berlin, where there still is no lack
~ of matters in dispute--the Allies and also the Soviet Union e~ert a dampening
inf].uence; and when Bonn and East Berlin communicate through confidential channels,
~ some observers immediately suspect a conspiracy. That a stable relationship
betweeti the German states is a stabilizing factor for Europe is not recognized
everywhere--not even theoretica~ly.
The international framework governing the relation5hip between the Federal Republic
and the GDR does not grant much latitude. The relations between Bonn and East
BerJ_in ~^ay benefit either German state, but they must not benef:.t Germany. The
European requirements are to take precedence over the German demands--in short: A
Germany policy oriented toward Europe has the best chance of getting European sup-
port.
3. The Germans and Europe
For a long time, the Federal Republic and the GDR were the least "European" states
of Europe; not until the mid-1960's--and in the GDR not until the mid-1970's--did
this change, but the change was not thorough. "Least European" means: Both in
Bonn and in East Berlin, the sense of the unity of the continent remained under-
developed; political thought and action were restricted to their own half of Europe
and to the national question. In contrast to the respective other part of Europe, _
Bonn and East Berlin for a long time fi~sated on their German opposite number, and
depending on the given circ~stances, fear and demand alternated.
No politician in the East would have committed the blunder Ulbricht made in the
~ summer of 1968, when he stated the goal of "West German imperialism" was "hegemony
~ not only over Europe, but up to the Bug River." "Europe" here has the same meaning
it has in Eonn, namely West Europe; this proves that at that time the East German
~ Communists had no political concept of Europe. They knew only two things: the
"socialist camp" and the 11European policy" pursued by Bonn, i.e, a West-European
power concentration they considered dangerous. At that time, Poles, Czechs,
Hungarians and Romanians had already developed conceptions of their own, concep- -
tions disting~iished by their emphasis on Europe as a whole. Prague and Budapest -
~ made propaganda for themselves by pointing to their location "in the heart of
Europe." But East Berlin did not progress beyond the Eur~pean disguise of its
- desire for recognition. Aside from the Leipzig Fair with its solid economic func-
~ tion, the GDR has been able to launch just one European event: the "$altic Sea
' Week"--which was discontinued after the GDR had been recognized. Those who in the
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1960's drew attention to European perspectives for the Germans met in East Berlin
with distrust or lack of comprehension.
T'his did not change until the GDR was internationally recognized, but the changps
were not sufficiently comprehensive. For one thing, a deeply rooted complex can
be ove rcome only with difficuZty. To East Germany, West Europe and America remained
an alien, even uncanny world. Moreover, there were practical difficulties, evi-
dence of which was the hectic atmosphere characterizing the mid-1970's, when many
_ functionaries disappeared for months so as to learn English in intensive or short
courses .
On the Wester:~ side, however, the process of changing thought patterns proceeds at
~ least equally slowly. The resumpti.on of diplomatic relations with the GDR by th2
whole world, including their own allies, was the calculated consequence of the
social-liberal Ostpolitik--but it was an unavoidable, not a desired consequence.
It was the entrance fee that the FRG had to pay to be able to gain a political
foothold in East Europe. And no one in Bonn would be likely to be enthusiastic, if
East Beriin's relations with Paris and Washington developed as vigorously as Bonn's
relations with Warsa.w and Moscow. However, since most NATO states take only a
limited interest in East Germany, the GDR's relations with West Europe have been
developing very slowly. For a long time, the GDR was excluded from the European
exchange of diplomatic visits. At the end of 1980, Honecker paid his first state
visit to a Western country, namely Austria; and ~.m til then, the only leading poli-
- ticians to visit East Berlin had come from neutral cotmtries. From NATO countries,
three foreign ministers visited East Berlin; among them was the French foreign
minister, on account of whose visit Honecker even interrupted his vacation. The
- Federal Chancellor's visit to the GDR did not get of.f the ground for several years.
Legally, the GDR is a member of the commtmity of European states, but "sccially"
it has not yet been integrated into this community.
The Europe-related deficiencies of the Federal Republic were less evident, because
Bonn--in the We~tern part of the continent--was zealously striving for the occi-
dental spirit and supranational integration. For a long time, however, the Euro-
pean commitment of the West Ge rmans was lacking the ultimate credibility, because
- vis-a-vis the East Bonn maintained a narrow-mindedly national position. Adenauer
- demanded unification of Germany, regardless of Europe; he refused even to discuss
the qu~estion all Europeans considered crucial--the military and political status of
a unified Germany. Only very slowly did Bonn come ta admit that German unity and
- European security are interrelated. Nevertheless, the Adenauer and Erhard govern-
ments insisted on an "isolated" Germany "solution," i.e. a settlement to be con-
cluded only by the Four Powers an d extending only to ~ermany. When de Gaulle
stated that th e German question was a European question to be decided by all Euro-
peans, this caused as much indignation in the FRG capital as did the statement of
the French president to the effect that a unified Germany was conceivable only upon
recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. Eventually, Bonn's policy reached the point
of arrogance, when Erhard az~d his forei~n minister, Schroeder, demanded that at any
- given time European detente go no farther than the advances made in regard to
German unification.
- It was the Kiesinger/Brandt Government that introduced changes in this respect: It
reversed the Schrceder poctrine and proclaimed the primacy of European detente,
statin~ that without that detente improvements in Germany would not be feasible,
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either. On 17 June 1967, Kiesinger made his- by now near-classical--statement con~-
cerning the "critical order of magnitude" of a imified Germany: "It is too big not
to play a role in tre balance of forceG, and it is too small to keep in balance the
_ forces surrounding ir,..... Consequently, the growing together of the divide d parts
of Germany can be conceived only within thz framework of the process of ove rcoming
the East-West conflict in Europe."
_ Subsequently, however, the Grand Coalition was not r~nsistent. Whereas the govern-
ment preceding it had acted in an excessively German and :_.is~fficiently Eurcpean '
manner, the Christian and Social Democrats after 1966--while showing a European
spirit--could not bring themselves to do the necessary Garman step~. They offered
to establish diplomatic relations with all East European states except for the GDR. -
The~ overlooked or glossed over the fact that at that time Europe was dependent on
Germany and that no p~ogress could be made in regard to essential, above all multi-
lateral matters, as long as Bonn was keeping out the GDR, relying in this on the--
increasingly reluctant--support of its allies.
At th e end of 1969, the Social-Liberal Coalition drew the following conclusions
from this: Both Ostpolitik and Germany policy must be an integrated whole; the one
cannot be pursued without the other; they must jointly be charted and carried out.
The offer Brandt made in his first government declaration--"two states in Germany~'--
was addressed abr~ve all to Moscow and Warsaw and only in the second place to the
GDR. And indeed, that was the way it functioned: It took a decisive step in
- regard to Germany policy--recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state--to get the
Ostpolitik off the ground. But without the Ostpolitik, i.e. the agreements with
Moscow and Warsaw, the Germany policy would have remained blocked by Ulbricht`s
maximal demands .
Subsequently, this interconnection has repeatedly been confirmed, but it does not
- look as if the Federal Republic has fully learned its European lesson. Ostpolitik
' and Germany policy are still two differer_t things in Bonn. Both are equally com-
mitted to detente, but in other respects--aside from exceptional situations --they
are separate rather than integrated.
One of the reasons for this is the constitutional framework that separates Germany ,
policy fro~ foreign policy. The second reason is more deeply rooted. The West -
Germans are still fixated on Germany. In the mid-1960's, all Bundestag [Lower -
House ] parties began to realize that th~~ building of German bridges presupposes
- European bridges. They firmly believe in tne "state of peace in Europe, in which
the Ge rnian peo~le--freely determining its own destiny--will regain its unity"; but
only very few appear to haue fully comprehended this formula. Most people use it
to state the claim to German unity, but the European precondition is thereby dis-
torted past recognition. The "state of peace in Europe" is the reunification for-
- rnula of the 1970's; essentially, it means no more than the demand for "free elec-
tions" in the 1950's. And listei~ing to the politicians--irrespective of the party
or th e occasion--one gains the impression they think as though only Germany, not
Europe, were divided. Some politicians--and they are in the minority--have drawn
the conclusion that the Federal ~epublic must for~o German unity in every form. ~
But even if this were legally practicable--which is not the case--the other coun-
tries, e.g. France or Poland, would not believe it. But even more important is the
� fo?lowing: The West Germans cannot forgo something that is claimed and desired as
much by the East Germans--as far as we know, the desire for unity is stronger there -
than here. -
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a
It is not a question of renunciation, but of clarity and consistency in regard to -
the objectives' order of precedence. In this respect, it becomes apparent that the
unification of Germany is a historical prospect, not a possibility of practical _
politics. But even if there were such a possibility, i~ would be less important
rhan the primary objectives, peace and European unity. But the order oi precedence
is not everything. For the unification of Germany--if it is pursued politically--
is at variance with the primary objectives. Both peace and the rapprochement of
_ East and West Europeans presuppose detente; detente presupposes equilibrium, and
equilibrium presupposes the continuing division of Germany. Insistent and continu-
ing e~nphasis on German unity, the continuous talking of "keeping open" the German
question produce the exact opposite of what is desired. They interfere with
detente and thereby impede both the improvement o� the situation in Europe and
improvement of the situation in Germany.
4. Bonn's Place in Europe
What the Federal Republic has since Adenauer's time come to consider a matter of -
- course in the West, it will have to accept in the East as well: the necessity to
give precedence to European requirements over German demands. This should not he =
difficult, since the matter at issue is no longer hal~, but all of Europe. For the =
West Germans, the best way of reducing the doubts concerning their long-range
~ objectives would be to set themselves reasonable goals: neither reunification--
which would mean upsetting the European equilibrium--nor the total submergence in _
West Europe that had been Adenauer's goal--for that would be a degree of national -
renunciation that would be equally suspect. The Federal Republic needs to define
- what it must do, what it can do and what it wants. Whatever it is, it must not
exceed the FRG's strength or upset the entire continent, but it must meet its
national needs .
The situation of West Berlin has been improved immensely by the Four-Power Agree-
ment; fundamentally, however, it has not been changed, since beography cannot be
changed. The city remains the trouble spot of the West; even slight pressure
causes sharp pain. Such pressure can be exerted even without direct violation of
the Four-Power Agreement, and this can be prevented only through political means,
not through agreements. In this respect, Bonn's possibilities are limited. It can
purstie two lines of approach: In the West, it caa try to influence its allies, if
~ thei.r actions become too drastic; i.n the East, especially in Moscow, it can keep
alive the interest in the Federal Republic, which--on account of consideration for
the Federal Republic-~would suggest consideration for West Berlin as well.
It is obvious that the GDR, too, exerts pressure on Bonn in regard to Ostpolitik.
The less reference is made to the "special" relationship, the more it becomes
apparent how special it still is. Even if the last formal reservations were elimi-
nated (citizenship, etc.), the East Germans would remain oriented toward West Ger- _
many to such an extent that every Bonn government will be compelled to give in to _
this expectation-related pressure (which pressure will come from its own populace
as well) . Every Bonn government is forced to maintain and establish the maximum
level of relations of all kinds--no matter whether it views and justifies this from _
a national, European or humanitarian point of view~
In addition to these special co~mnitments--GDR and West Berlin--there is a third
~ element. The West Germans are closer to the East than are all other West
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Europeans---closer in almost every sense: geographically, historically, economi-
cally, technically, politically, militarilyy and to some extent also in regard to ~
mentality. The annoying ignorance one often encounters notwithstanding, the Fed-
eral Republi.c still showe the greatest awareness of the fsct that peoples speaking
Slavic tongues and writing in Cyrillic letters are Europeans, too. `rh~e West Ger-
mans and the East Europeans are in closer contact; they take a greater interest in
each other and they are more dependent on each other. This is txue in both the
positive and the negative sense; it is fraught with danger, but it also contains
opportunities and even responsibilities.
The Federal Republic has an--unparalleled--national interast in Europe. As a 60-
million state in the center of the continent, it also can do more good and more
damage than the other Europeans and it profits the most from an3~ improvements in -
East-West relations. Finally, the FRG is burdened by its recent history. In the
name of Germany, Hitler destroqed Europe. Thus it is Ge~?any's responsib ility to
save and restore as much of Europe as is possible.
The queation concerning the Federal Republic's political place in Europe is self-
evident. Willy-nilly--West Germany has a European function (not a"role" or even a
- "task"--that would be presumptuous). It has a fim ction and this means: It exerts
itself for Europ~ not onlv f.or "German" reasons, but also in its capacity as fron- _
tier country between East and West; even if there were no Germans beyond the Elbe
River, it would ex~ert itself .
In political terms, what does this mean? First of all, it largely means continua-
tion of what Chancellor Brandt began and what Chancellor Schmidt--in his own way--
- developed further. Bonn does not "vacillate1� between the ailiances, but it uses
_ its position in the Western Alliance for helping settle conflicts between the alli-
ances. Bonn's Ostpolitik begins in the West; it begins with the effort to intro-
duce the all-European point of view into the EC and NATO discussions: Bonn as the _
"expert" and "lobbyist," as the "advocate" of European requirements, trying to make
the "European Community" attend to the Eastern part of its own continent at least -
as much as to the Third World; trying to ma~ce the West pursue vis-a-vis the East
not only a trade and security policy (with the subcategory "detente"), but also a
_ European poltcy; trying to insure that the CSCE is not viewe d primarily as competi-
tion of the EC or as a test for the "EPZ" (West European political cooperation) and
not abused as an arena for propaganda bouts, b ut that it is used as the practically
only instrument available for a European policy. -
But advocates also speak with the opposing party. G`hancellor Brandt made possible
what formerly nobody dared to think: a German as mediator between the "camps"; a
German who was almost as close to Brezhnev as to Kissinger; a German who did and
achieved more than mere promotion of German interests. Schmidt's Moscow visit in
the summer of 1980--undertaken in spite of and on account of Afghanistan--is
another example, which is also remarkable on account of its effect on the West.
The chancellor�s desire to pay a visit to Brezhnev was the subject of public -
debates for months; unexpectedly, however, Giscard d'Estaing--anticipating
Schmidt--met with the Soviet general secretaiy in Warsaw. If competition was the _
primary motive here (and this must be assumed), the West German Ostpolitik was suc-
cessful, for without Schmidt's travel plans Giscard would hardly have gone to
Warsaw.
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Playing the main role or the vanguard ca~ot be in Bonn's interest--on the con-
- trary. If Bonn were alone in the tricky East-West arena--the old suspicions would
be rampant: Rapallo, disengagement, self-Finlandization, neutralization. A close
alliance with France --even if it occasionally turns into rivalry--is extremely
_ helpful to the Federal Republic. Paris and Bonn complement each other and they .
hoth benefit from this in their relations with Mos cow and Washington: Whereas
Paris wants to attract attention, Bonn must not be conspicuous; Paris needs German
support for its independent policy, since by itself it is not strong enough; $onn
needs a French Ostpolitik for its own Ostpolitik, because politically, the French _
can afford to be more daring.
But of course not only the French. Any policy for Europe is also a policy for Ger- -
_ many. Whatever the Europeans of either side do to reduce the rift between them--it
is of benefit to the Germans. Every agreement, every state visit, every private
- encounter is a step in the German interest, even if Germans are not involved. The _
objective is not a preferential detente for the Federal Republic-for this would
soon lead to its isolation- b ut detente in general. The ~ore the West Europeans,
and above all, the more the Americans coiunnit themselves to this objective, the bet-
te r for the Germans on either side. Bonn's function is restricted ro inspiring and
provoking the commitment of its allies. _
Thus the Federal Republic cannot be a mediator between the alliances, without at ~
the same time championing its own alliance. Formerly, such a dual role was repeat-
edly played by Poland, from the other side. This comparison shows that in playing
this dual role the Federal Republic is not going to slide into a"third" position;
- it is true, however, that it is linked with the nonaligned and neutral nations by
- stronQ common interests. Bonn needs detente as much as Belgrade, Vienna and Stock-
holm r~eed it. However, the preconditions are quite different: The Yugoslavs,
Austrians and Swedes derive their importance from the freedom from ties, whereas
the Federal Republic derives its importance from the strength of its ties with the
Western alliance. It is precisely because of Bonn's membership in this alliance
that it carries weight in the West, and it carries we.ight in the East, because it
is one of the principal powers in the EC and NATO.
The Federal Republic will not only remain a member of the Western communities: In
- the Euture, it will invest more energ~ in the consolidation of these communities
than in the building of bridges to the East. When the chips are down, the FRG will
vote for its allies here and against the partners there. But it considers it to be
of special importance to prevent situations in which such a decision would be
necessary. And it remains committed to the ob3ecti~ve to promote understanding and _
thus agreement by pleading in the West for the requirements of the East, and in the
East, for ttsose of the West.
A European policy entails consequences for Germa.ny policy. What the Federal Repub-
lic arid the GDR for understar_dable reasons failed to do and made up for only in
part must now be made good. Thus the aim of an up-to-date Germany policy would be
- the Europeanization of Ge rmany. The consequences extend to various areas.
_ 1. In regard to their thoughts, statements and actions, the West Germans should `
now do the exact opposite of their previous ways. If it is true that the Federal
Republic makes headway not by the all-German approach, but only through an all- _
European policy, it must no longer lament the German calamity and remain fi~ted on !
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- German unity; rather, its main concern must be the division of Europe and its main
objective must be the unification of Europe. The Federal Republic will then have
to prove that this is not a trick, not a European detour with a German destination.
It will then have to overcome the contradiction of the 1950's--European toward the -
West and German toward the East. _
Thus, in regard to the attempt to establish good relations with East Euro~e, there
should not be any order of precedence, but this does not preclude special consider- -
ation for the great power USSR: There are no attempts of p:i~.ying off one membe.r o1`
the Warsaw Pact against any other member. The cooperation offer is addressed to
- Prague as much as to Warsaw, to Sofia as much as to Bukarest. And in regard to
- East Berlin and Moscow, Bonn must take special care not to pro duce the impression
of s iding with one against the other. In practice, not all relations will develop
equally well, hut this should be for no other reason than the given circumstances,
i.e. the given internal state of the Eastern partners.
2. Thus Bonn must refrain from doing anything that could impede the "Europeaniza- -
tion" of the GDR. Competition-related concerns are quite out of place here, since
the Federal Republic is the naturally preponderant state; b ut such concerns are
politically unjustified as well. Both German states have seen that as they break
away from the necessities and dependencies of the German question, they become _
less restricted in their foreign policies. At one time, Bonn gave itself more
latitude through the social-liberal Ostpolitik, and as a result of this Ostpolitik,
East Berlin obtained greater latitude as well. The outcome was a normalization in
the literal sense. It is only since the GDR stopped exhausting its strength in the
struggle for recognition that it has been able to turn to other objectives; not
until the GDR stopped staring at Bonn like the rabbit at the snake has it been able
slowly to break away from its second fixation, the fixation on Moscow (but this _
does not mean: disen gagement from Moscow). It is only since that momEnt that the
GDR has begun to turn into a totally--in contrast to a partially--European state.
The competition between the two Germanys is not going to stop; it can only be miti-
gated. But in this competition, the Federal Republic--as the stronger state--can
affo rd greater farsightedness. Thus it was not disadvantageous to Bonn that in the
course of the 1970's East Berlin and Warsaw effected a certain rapprochement, even
in their views on detente in Europe; and it was a loss, not a gain, for the Federal
Republic and West Berlin, when in the fall of 1980 the GDR rigorously and offen-
sive ly "delimited" itself vis-a-vis its Eastern neighbor.
The same applies to the relations between East Berlin and West Europe. It is in _
the West Gerwan, German and European interest fully to integrate the GDR into the
- framewurk of European politics. Any state that is admitted to a community must -
open itself to it; it assumes obligations and will not so easily kick over the
traces. The FRG should support any venture that would serve to give the GDR Euro-
pean functions (for a state in the cent~r of the continent, there are qui~e a few
~ conceivable possibilities), as long as this cioes not harm the Federal Republic or
West Berlin. It is interesting to imagine the effect of a visit to East Germany by _
the British Queen. Would only Honecker feel flatt~ered? Or would perhaps all GDR
citi zens come to feel respected and no longer so totally excluded from the world?
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The citizens of the Federal Republic and those of the GDR are linked by the -
circumstance that they are both German; but as regards the relations between the
~ two states, the opposite is true. The fact that both are German is not an asset,
but an obstacle to thean. Thua they need a~reater com~on denominator and that de-
nominator can only be Europe. East Berlin does not tolerate anq rapprochement in
the name of Germany and the other Europeane become extremely suspicious, whenever
the Germans come togeth~r as Germana. !?.wever paradoxical it may sound: For nation-
al reasons, the Germans are dependent on Europe. Europe creates the distance needed
by the GDR leadership and it makes poasible the rapproche.-nent desired by the FRG. -
An excellent instrument is available for this purpose--the CSCE. At the first all-
European suirmit conference at Helsinki in 1975, Schmidt and Aonecker had the oppor-
tunity to get to know each other in an informal manner. Thanks to the CSCE, one -
can now justify bilateral agreements with reference to European requirements. For
example, had there been European transport agreements, the inner-German repair of
the Berlin-Helmatedt Autobahn could have been presented as a European requirement,
for it also serves to link Moscow with Paris. With time, this could even function
the other way round: Ventures that are of benefit to Europe would then become
practicable on a bilateral level as well. To continue thia line of thought: It may
turn out that a great many projects exceed the level of bilateral agreements, since
they can be implemented only in a European framework. In the Western part of the -
continsnt, this stage has been reached for some time.
4. As is well known, the ultimate cause of the West Berlin traubles is the loss of
the old economic, national and ideological ("outpost of freedom") functions. Hamburg
and Cologne can exist without functions; they are important cities in the FRG--that _
is sufficient. West Berlin is different: An island embedded in an alien, even
hostile state ia unparalleled in the world; at a time when German unitq is utterly
remote, this is becoming more and more absurd. If it is to endure, a city in such
a position muat have a raison d'etre. It can and will revive only to the extent
that it knows what it lives for. It will gain a new function only if the location-
related disadvantage can be turned into an advantage, if the former battlefield
between E ast and West can be turned into a place of inediation.
IIut this will not be possible without the Federal xepublic. The old wisdom that an
~'isolated" Berlin solution is impoasible appliea also to the role of the city in a =
divided Europe. Politically, West Berlin cannot be different from Weat Germany.
With the Federal Republic posing (or having to pose) as the frontline state of NATO,
West Berlin muat be the frontline citq of the West. The sooner the FRG can
turn into the mediator between the "camps", the sooner the island in the East will
be given its European chance.
It is of little use to West Berlin, if the world keeps regarding and treating it
exclusively as a West German and West European city. It is located as much "in the
}ieart of Europe" as are Prague, Vienna or Budapest. It is a European city and that
means: Not until it is ~~nsidered a European, not merely a German city~can it
change from an appendix of the Federal Republic into a place with its own function. -
~ European policy is Berlin policy as well.
5. Reflection on Europe may aid national stock-taking. As a rule, the West Germans
have run into difficulties with themselves, whenever they wanted to be both Germans
and West Europeans. The atruggle of the 1950's revolved around the question: German
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�,nity or European integration. This old--as yet unsettled--conflict will be sooner
resoi~;d, if the FIZG citizens tr~ really to be what they are, namely Germans and
Europeuns. These two qualitiea are not mutually exclusive, but complementary: The
Federal Republic would thus be able to rsmain allied and anchored in the West and to
be a partner in the La~t.
Equally important is a second consideration: If the West Germans consider them-
selves (as is generally the case) Europeans in the sense of West Europeana, where
does that leave the i7 million people in the GDR? Are tl~y East Europeans? Or ar.~
- they possibly merely Germans and nothing else? Garmans as candidates for West
Euroge? This would certainly be in accord with the thoughtlessneas and self-cen-
teredness of FRG citizena. In the discus~eions on "self-image" and "identity" (as it
is called today), one is struck by the f act that the Germane on the other side most-
ly remain outside; hardly anyone in the FRG reflects on what they are and what they
could be. In this respect, too, there is only one answer: A nation that has a
state in both the western and the eastern part of Europe can neither be Western nor
Eastern; it can only be European.
~ 6. The Social Division of the Germans
~
i
; In the course of the 1~70~s at the latest, it became evident both in the Federal
; Republic and in the GDR that the Germans were becoming more German again. On either
~ side of the Elbe River, there aroae an increasingly strong 3enae.of being a German,
which subaequently developed into self-assurance. Examining the reasons, one finds
i the exact opposite of what is g~enerally assumed abroad: It is not growing all-
German sentiments that underlie this self-assurance, but the disappointrnent of
supranational hopes. After de Gaulle, the only goal. attainable in the West is a
~~Europe of fatherlands." For the foreseeable future, the national state will re-
I main the key political formation.
The same picture obtains in the "socialist connmanitq" in the East. In dealing with
~ ita allies and feZlow party members, the GDR, too, encounters nothing but national
-I
states and at times even a pronounced nationalism. In this reapect, the Soviet
Union is no exception.
i There is another important factor: Both the FRG and the GDR are among the most
stable members of their alliances. However annoying it may be always to be the
I '~traasurer" or the helper in need--these roles serve to boost the Germans' self-
! esteem. Thia is especially true when the Germans are told that in certain respects
they are better than the respective camp's leading state. The Eastern equivalent
of the relation between dollar and deutschmark is the arrogance of the old induetri-
al nation vis-a-vis East European backwardness. Finally, there is the decline of
CoTmnunism in the East and the weakening of anticommunism in the West. The German
queation--and this is senaed rather than consciouslq realized--is no longer a
_ question of ideology; rather, it is almost exclusively a question of power politics
and maintenance of control, with both elements appearing in ideological disguise.
Th~us, for the Germans in this Europe, is there an alternative to being German?
Thia is not to say that the other countries push them back into nationalism. But
it is obvious that in both parts of the continent national thinking is so prepon-
derant that it furthers--and even provokes--in the Germans the conaideration of
their nationality.
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A different matter is the relationship between ti:~ Federal Republic and the GDR.
In consequence of the Ostpolitik, there took place a certain rapproch~nent--between
the people as well as between the states. The millionfold personal encounters have
restozed u network of relationa and ties, the political aignificance of which is
immeasurable; it ia safe to say, however, that the faeling of fellowahip has been
strengthened. To go much further than that would be riaky, for the interest the
East and the West Germans take in each other must be examined Aa well. For what
reason do FRG citizens and West Berliners travel to the GDR? Primarily to visi.t
relatives and friends; those who do not have relatives oi friends in the GDR do not
~o, and there are not many exc~eptions. The danger of simplification notwithstanding,
- one can say: The West Germana have a predominantly private relationship to the
GDR; most of them are not opposed to unification on the state level, but thEy do not .
- see any prospect of this and they are satisfied to cultivate their personal rela- -
tions.
The East Germans' interest in West Germany is m~ch greater, not only because it is -
Germany, but above all because it is in the West. If the GDR bordered on k'rance,
many of its citizens would probabLy learn F~ench so as to be able to participate--
via TV and radio--in Western events. From the West come all the thin~s that--though
not alwAys pleaeing--are always interesting and stimulating and in any case "modern."
From the West come the atandards, the demands, even the dreams. To the East Ger-
mans, German unity has always been more important than to the West Germane, since
they wanted to eacape thereby the narrowness df GDR life. The more this life is
broadened and enriched, the sooner the East Germans can forgo German unitq. They,
too, hardly believe in it any more; hopes still arise, but only occasionally and
in spite of their better knowledge, originating less from logic than from psycho-
logical grounds.
The German question is a socir~l rather than e national question. In the future,
the West Germans can live without the East Germans just as easily as have the ma-
jority of them for at least 20 years. The East Germans could accept the division, _
if the conditions in the GDR became tolerable in a way which wauld not evoke anew =
dissatisfaction and trigger comparisons with the freer and richer Germanq. The
urge for German unity is not the problem, but the never-ending misery of the GDR.
Since this ia also the miaery of all of Eastern Europe, it again becomes apparent
that the German and the European concerns are identical; they can be dealt with
jointly or not at all. To the extent that this can be done the German question
- Zoses its potential explosiveness. Europe need no longer fail on account of the
- Germans.
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GERMAN DEMOCR,ATiC REPUBLIC
PARIS PAI:NTING EXHIBITION PROMPTS DZ~CUS~ION aF GDR 6R~
_ Past, Current Condition
Hamburg STERN in German Vo1 34 Ho 12, 12 Mar 81 pp 251-252
- [Article by Rolf Schneider, East Berlin writer, about the development of socialist
art, on the occasion of the GDR painting exhibition in Parie: "GDR art I: No More
Red Flags"]
[Text] Immediately after the end of World War II, the hall of East Berlin's
Friedrichstrasse Railroad Station was decorated with a mural. It was an expressive,
_ technically original work--a male figure, divided into prisms. The painter was
Horst Strempel. For 12 years, the years of the Hitler period, the public had not
- se~n anything comparable and people reacted sccordingly: Approvingly or aggressive-
ly, but always loudly. The negative voices were in the majority and thus the au-
thorities removed Strempel's painting from Friedrichstrasse Station.
The event was symbolic, and it was not unique: For more than 20 qears, the visual
~ arts of the state that now called itself GDR aubmftted to the dictate stipulating
works agreeable to the public and refrained from all extravagances in regard to
form and subject matter. The visual arts thus disengaged from the development of
contemporary world art, including that of the neighboring states, the people~s
- democracies of the CSSR and Polanci. They also cut themaelves off from their own
art-historical foundations.
The artists repreaenting German Expreasionism and the New Objectivity in the 1920's
had for the most part been associated with the political Left; many of them had
been registered Cousnuniste. They considered the GDR--a state controlled by Cow-
munists--their natural political home. However, if they continued to follow the
- artistic trends they had developed before 1945, they were liable to ru~ into diffi-
cultiea.
For from 1950 on, the artistic doctrine of the young GDR was realism. The principal
enemy was formalism, a term denoting all of modern art. Reali~m meant a simple .
objectivity intelligible to anyone~ The artists were supposed to paint as though
they were contemporaries of Menzel and Thoma. Picasso never existed, as it were.
_ These stipulations pertained to method and form. As for subject matter, the follow-
ing were acceptable motifs: Work, construction, happiness, class atruggle,
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~ socialism. The objective behind all this was political agitation and c~ducation. _
Walter Ulbricht--at that time the leading man in the state--wiewed and put it this -
way: "In articulating these new, progressive elemente in the development of man-
kind, the artist helps to turn millions of people into progressive individuals."
- The works produced in this way and exhibited in the "German Art Exhibitions" (as
they were called at that time) showed machines, mus.nlar men, laughing women and
red flags. The artists ~requently tried to meet the high-blown artistic require-
- ments by way of l:arge format. The interest was focused on the "monumental"--a term
m~ich in vogue during that period.
Those not willing to submit to these demands wer~ liable to suffer untoward con-
- sequenGea. A large number of frustrated artiets--including a star such as Karl
Hofer--crossed the inner-German border, which at that time was still open. Others,
who out of conviction or stubbornness stayed in the country--and among these there
were extraordinary individnals such as Conrad Felixinueller, Curt Querner and Hans
: Grundig--paid dearly for it: They suffered aetbacks, exhaustion and anonymity.
Ernst Barlach, who had been praised and honored for his resistance against Hitler,
- was all of a sudden rebuked for his "pessimistic character"; at that time, this
_ was equivalent to an aesthetic death sentence.
Would GDR art ever be able to recovez from this philistinism? At that time, this
_ question was usually answered in the negative. Reality appeared to preclude a pos-
i itive outcome.
The colossal painting showing people working happily and waving the red flag may
have been the GDR cultural functionaries' ideal canvas, but it was not sufficient _
to maintain a diversified artistic ambience. Landscapes, still lives and portraits
were escapist motifs and the escapee would be rebuked only mildly, for landscapes,
still lives and portraits were time-honored and generally undisputed forms of pic-
torial expression. In th~ event of conflict, the only thing needed was a politi-
cally unequivocal signature.
This was one stratagem, but there were others. There were evasions, niches and
hiding-placea. The graphic arts--a field unsuitable for monumental works--were not
- subject as meich to official scrutiny as was painting and the graphic artists were
more uninhibited. Those who did not at any price want to give up their formalistic-
modern ways turned to industrial design or kept their work to themselves.
The art scene of that time brought forth peculiar individuals, one of whom was
Gerhard Altenbourg. This stubborn and solitary artist fram Thuringia and his sur-
realist work had for manq years been totally unknown in the GDR and even now he is
not very well known there. The GDR museums that bought hie worka stored them away
from public view. Moet of Altenbourg's works went--via GDR foreign trade channels
and West-Galerie [not further identified]--to capitalist Weet Euxope (thus yielding
coveted foreign currency), where they were in great demand. A.ltenbourg was the
firat GDR representative of the visnal arts to acquire an interna~tional reputation.
The public admired primarily his brilliant technique. And brilliant technique
came to be a hallmark of GDR art in general. For even in the darkest period of
GDR cultural policy two elements remained alive: The tech~?ical precision result-
ing from the continuous occupation with objective subject matter and the interest
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of the public generated by incessant propaganda.
Later, when regimentation was no longer so outrageous, both these elements turned
ou~ to be interest-yielding capital. The regiment~tion ended in 1970, when the
state leadership passed from Ulbricht to Honecker. The firet evidance of the
changed at~uoaphere in the studios was the Seventh GDR Art Exhibition, which wae
_ staged in Dresden in 1972. The international breakthrough occurred 5 years later,
at the Kassel ~'documQnta," an international modern art exhibition. The works ex-
hibited there by the GDR were so different from the other ,~rt shown that excitement
and attention were assured. The most important trend-setter in the country, Peter
Luri:~ig, a chocolate manufacturer and private collector from Aachen, promptly made
purchases. The visual arts have since been the GDR~s principal aesthetic export
article.
The GDR, too, now has all that is found in the rest of the world: Nonobjective as
well as objective art, surrealism, happening. According to the presently most in-
fluential art critic of the GDR, Lothar Lang, the country hae at its disposal "that
broad spectrum of expression and atyle that is appropriate to art."
To be sure, it is the imprint of the objective painters that has given GDR art its
- unique quality. Tuebke and Heisig, who perfected their technique through emulation
of the ~uropean Renaissance mastere, practically have no equal anywhere in regard to
technical skill. Wolfgang Mattheuer presently is the most coneistent practitioner
of the Hew Objectivity in painting. Moat of the regulationa concerning subject
matter are no longer observed. The GDR people portrayed by the GDR painters tend _
to be gloomy, sad and suffering. _
Mattheuer is one of the cult figures of the exhibition of GDR art that ia presently
being held at the Paris Musee d~Art. This exhibition is showing 130 works by 30 -
artists. According to the organizers, these works testifq to the "wealth and dyna-
mism of the cultural and intellectual life in the GDR.'~ As far as painting is con-
cerned, this atatement is undoubtedly true.
Artistic Freedom and Limitations
Hamburg ST~RN in German Vol 34 No 12, 12 Mar 81 pp 254-255
[Interview with Willi Sitte, president, GDR Association of Graphic Artists, by
Dieter Bub, STERN correspondent: ~'GDR Art II: I Am Concerned With the Tnner
Coctm~i t7nent" ]
[Text] [Question] The Paris Painting Exhibition is said to be representative.
Is there a form of the visual arts that is peculiar to the GDR? �
[Answer] Our art is based on aocialist realism. This is no~ a rigid dogma, but a
foundation that is derived from reality and that must be realized at any given time
by the individual artist.
[Question) In your view, are the graphic arts and painting part of a GDR national
culture?
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[Answer] Yes, but not in the narrow sense of party policy. I believe that from
the development of the two German states one can infer basic differences. Our art -
_ is peculiar to the GDR. So I would not say there is e GDR national culture.
[Queation] A short time ago, you exhorted your colleaguea to ehow greater commit-
ment. In regard to class consciousnesa, do you see any tendencies toward slacken-
i ng?
[Answer] Partly in response to the wishes of the association's leadership, I -
addressed above all the younger generation. For not all of the qoung people show
sufficient commitment to the GDR and to internationaY problems, not as much as was
stiown in regard to Vietnam and Chile.
[Queation] Are you advocating artistfc productfon according to party directives? -
[~nswer] I do not mean that. I am concerned with subjective commitment, without
there necessarily being a need for ontside directives. I am concerned with the _
inner commitment; if that is preaent, there will always be a client.
[Question] But doesn't this mean that those who show party-oriented commitment
will then be honored and awarded prizes? ,
[Answer] That is not entirely correct, eince within a broad apectswn we consider
even Christian themea a permissible way of making an artistic statement about
pr~sent-day world eventa.
[Question] But a GDR painter will be more likely to find a buyer, if he or she
paints pictures that extol, let us say, the lOth SED Congress or International
Solidarity.
- CAnswer] It is true that as artists we are preparing for the lOth Pa..rt;? Congress.
But I doubt that our work is gnal-oriented. Rather, the problem is that we now =
, ~ave a public that takes a great interest in the visual arts; people now buy paint-
ings and works of the graphic arts for their own private enjoyment. So an artist
can be successful just by painting still livea and landscapes. I am somewhat
troubled about the fact that presently private demand for art is sharply increas-
ing, while the social commitlnent is stagnating.
[(luestion] Over the past few years, there ha~?e been more and more critical accents
and these were very much in evidence at the Eighth Dresden Art Exhibition: A
- dru:tken brigade at a worke party or the tristesse of new residential housir.g sec-
*_ors. Are the GDR artists now less optimistic in xegard to everydaq life, lesa _
confident about the future? IS the monwnental rejoicing part of a past that has `
been confronted and dealt with?
[Anewer] That period with its ostentatious optirulsm was not in accord with realitq.
And it was not typical of socialist realism. The past was no better than the
present. The world situation in the 1950~s was no less critical. We--an3 a large
part of the po~ulation--row identify ourselves with critical paintings. We derive
great benefit from that.
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[Question] According to Lh~ jo~i-rnal BILDENDE KUNST, nonobjective painting is in
disfavor.
- [Answer] In this field, we never imposed any restrictions. There are quite a few
colleagues who make uae of this mode of expression. They are allowed to exhibit
their works, even though this trend ie not entirely in accord with our ideals and -
is not given any special support.
[Question] How is it that international developments sucll 4J Minimal Art, Land Art
or Environments have never exerted any influence on GDR art?
_ _ [Answer] Why should we emulate--af ter many years--styles in regard to which we are
not even sure whether or not they can be considered art. One need not slavishly _
copy such trends. We have found our own waq in the divergent developments in the
socialist countries. But it is not necessarily the right way.
[Question] Could Jospph Beuys work today in the GDR?
[A~swer~ I would not champion Beuys in our country. He is of no intereat to me and
the public would not take note of him. He certainly could work here, but I doubt
that he would like it.
[Queatior_] Artistic freedom ia restricted--where are the limits? For example: The
exhibition of discarded doors in the Dresden Leonhardi Museum aroused qour indigna-
tion. Why?
- [Answer] We draw ~ line vis-a-vis things that have nothing to do with art. In my
- view, refuse exhibited in a muaeum is not art. I aai sorry--that ie the way I see
it. To declare non-art to be art--we do not take part in such nonsense and the
justifications advanced by art theoreticians are of no avail here. In this regard,
our position is clear.
- COPYRIGHT: Gruner & Jahr AG and Co. 1981
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ROMANIA
REPRESSIVE TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS FIGURES DESCRIBED
- LD300845 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 25 Mar 81 p 3 _
- [Report by Lia Wainstein: "Special Chain for Romanian Dissidents"] _
[Text] Two Romanian Baptists, ~aho, thanks to the accelerated program sought by
_ President Reagan, will soon be leaving for the United States, where they will
finally be able to study theology, are in Rome--one of them since the end of -
February and the other as of a few days ago. Dimitrie Ianculovici (born in 1948)
comes from a fa.rmily of Baptists-�-the Protestant sect which has been w3despread in
Romania since 1850 through the work of U.S. and German missionaries. At present,
- out of the 60 confessions recognized before World War II, only 14, which do not
include the Gre~k Catholic Church (Uniates), the Reformed Seventh Day Adventists -
or the Romanian Orthodox Movement "The Lord's Army," are officially allowed under
the strict control of the State Department for Religious Affairs.
A group of protestants (predominantly Baptists) founded the "Romanian Christian
Committee for the Defense of Freedom of Religion and Conscience" (ALRC) on
2 April 1978, which demanded "freedom of worship, an end to state interference in
ecclesiastical affairs, the right to propagate their convictions through the news
media and religious education in schools." Ianculovici--one of the founders of
the committee--was i~nediately d ismissed from his job and expelled from the
- 'Pheological. Seminary. .
Sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment for parasitism, he spent part of his sentence
in a tent set up in the courtyard, since the prison was crowded and there are no
- prison camps in Romania. He was then forced to apply for a passport and to
emigrate with his wife and four children. According to Ianculovici, among the
Romanian believers--about 95 percent of the populstion--the neoprotestants are
repressed and are debarred from enrolling in nine facultie5; for instance, inter-
national law, law, psychology, sociolo gy, economics and commerce and humanities.
Moreover, the authorities allow men of proven communist faith to become priests
_ who choose that path as one of the means of advancement. Information, even about
domestic affairs, is supplied by Radio Free Europe, which is called "The People's
_ University," and to which the Romanians can listen in their own homes.
The son of an Orthodox mother and a Catholic father, Ioan Tarziu (born in 1951)
decided at the age of 18 to follow the Baptist faith. In the electrical appliances
factory where he worked, he received a favorable "caracterizare" (good conduct
certificate) in 1976, when he wished to take the entrance examination for the
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Theological Seminary. Nevertheless, Ioan Stanca--a Baptist priest loyal to the
authorities--caused him to be rejected. In 197~STarziu became an active member of
the Christian Gommittee, which frequently met at his home. Some 2 years later,
he was arrested at work and accused of planning to hold a demonstration outside
the embassy [as publish~ed] in Bucharest and of founding an anarchist group.
At a trial in Camera, at which he was forced to appear handcuffed and partly
undressed, Tarziu was sentenced to 5 months' imprisonment. In the three prisons
_ (Timisoara, Rahova and Poarta Alba), in which h~ served t[ie sentence, he was abla
to observe a special treatment inflicted for an indeterminate space of time on
certain prisoners, either because they were deemed dangerous or because they had
attempted to escap e: their wrists were tied to their ankles by means of a special
"T-shaped chain." Sometimes several men were chained together.
A typical fi~ure of Romanian dissidence, Ianculovici and Tarziu agree, is not the
well known writer Paul Goma, who emigrated to Paris in 1977, but Father Calciu
Dumitreasa. This Orthodox priest, who had already been a political prisoner from
1949 to 1964, ~ras expelled from thQ Bucharest Theological Seminary in 1978 for
defending students belonging to an unauthorized sect. Father Calciu, who had
denounced the practice of chaining, was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment (in
1979). He is now a patient in the hospital following the hunger strike which was
begun last November in the hope of finally securing a public trial.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A. ~
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