JPRS ID: 9736 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: REPORTS

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_ JPRS L/9736
14 May 1981 -
- USSR Re ort
p
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
CFOUd 13/81)
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JPR5 L/9736
14 May 1981
USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND SOGIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 13/81) -
~ CONT~NTS
INTERNATTONAL
Book Discusses Problems, Prospecta of Disarmament
(G, M. Korniyenko; 0 PROBLEMAKH RAZORUZHENIYA, 1980) 1
NATIONAL ~
Myth of 'Religious Renaiss3nce' in USSR Refuted
(A. Belov; AGITATOR TADZHIKISTANA, Feb 81) 13
REGIONAL
Azeri Academician on Profitability of Research
(H. Abdullayev; AZARB,AYJAN KOMMUNISTI, No 10, 1980) 16
- a - [III - USSR - 35 FOUO]
Fl1R (1FFT('T A T T iCF liNi V .
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INTERNATIONAL
~ BOOK DISCi!5SES PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS OF DISARMAMENT
' Mosccw O PROBLEMAECH RAZORUZHENIYA in Russian 198U (signed to press 19 Sep 801
pp 1-2, 63-77, 270
[Annotation, table of contents, foreword, anci chapter three from book "The Problems
of Disarma?nent" edited by G. M. Korniyenko, Izdatel'stvo "Nlezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya",
10,000 copies, 272 pages]
[TPxt] Prepared by a group of well-known Soviet diplomats and specialists in inter-
national affairs, thi s collection offers a deep analysis og the complex problem of -
controlling the arms race. _
The authors persuasive ly demonstrate the tremendous harm done by the arms race
to each country of the world individually, and to the entire w'orld community as a
whole. They reveal the depth and scope of Soviet political initiatives aimed at
bridling the arms race, at disarmament.
Contents Page
- G. Korniyenko, "Foreword" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
, V. Petrovskiy, "The Ultimate Question" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
V. Yemel'yanov, "The Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race" 46
-
V. Karpov, D. Asatiani, Problems and Prospects of Limitinc~
~trategic Arms" . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A. Petros'yants, "honproliferation of Nuclear Weapons--the Most
Important Element o f Consolidating Peace and International Security" 78
V. Shustov, "Negotiat ions on Mutual Reduction of P.rmed Forces
and Arms in Central Europe" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
R. Timerbayev, "Proh ibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A. Vavilov, "Problems in Prohibiting the Use of Scientific-Technical
, Discoveries to Create Mass Destruc.*.ion Weapons" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
~ Yu. Tomilin, "Nonuse of Force in International Relations. The
Guarantees for the Security of Nonnuclear States�' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 _
Ye. Fedorov, Yu. Fedorov, "The G?obal Problems of Mankind and Disarmament" 215
G. Stashevskiy, "Ces s ation cf the Production of Nuclear Weagons and
Liquidation of Thei r Stockpxles--the Key Direction in the Struggle
to Halt the Arms Race and Eliminate the Threat nf World War" 244
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F~reword
It is sometimes said that the history of htunan society is the history of wars. If
there is some element of truth to such an assertion, it would be no less valid to
~ay that man has always drea~d of a time in which wars would leave his life forever.
The biblical prophecy that a day will come when men will "beat their sabers into `
plowshares" was a reflection of this dream.
Today this is no longer simply an alleqorical image, sculptured in bronze by the
Soviet sculptor Ye. V. Vuchetich and standing before the United Nations buildii,y
in New York.
- Since the time that the creator of the world's first sociali~t state, V. I. Itrnin, -
named disarmament the ideal of socialism, the task of implementing man's age-old
- dream of reforging death-dealing weapons into the implements of peaceful labor
became a matter of practical policy of the Soviet state and, later on, of other
� socialist cauntYies as well.
Being the greatest pragmatist, V. I. Lenin, in distinction from bourgeois pacifists
- who are satisfied with si~ly talking nostalgically about peace, perpetually emphasized
- that only real disarmament efforts can narrow down the material-techniral base of
warfare, and that only total disarmament is a real guarantee of peace, and the mos*
- dependable means of eradicating wars in general. Having a perfect understanding of
_ history and being able to predict its development ir. many ways, V. I. Lenin warned
back in 1915--30 years before the first atomic bomb was exploded--that war based on
the latest mighty achievements of science and technology "may lead, and will in-
variably lead, to destruction of the conditions themselves of human society's
existence."*
L~enin's warning is all the more valid today, and it is no coincidence that many of
, L. I. Brezhnev's speeches have it as one of their obvious themes. "Peace cannot be _
strong," he said in one of them, "until we put an end to the arms race we are now
engaged in, to inflation of military budgets, and to creation of increasingly more
terrifying mass destruction weapons. It has now come to the point where if the
weagons now stockpiled were to be launched, mankind would be completely annihilated."**
~ Owing to the efforts of the Soviet Union, other socialist countrie~, and all peace-
loving forces, certain results were achieved~in the effort to restrain the arms
race in the 1960's and 1970's. Had this not been so, there could be no doubt that
the world situation would have been worse today, and the danger of war would have
been.greater.
But at the same time it is entirely obvious that the rate of progress and the so.ale
of agreement on limitation of arms are still behind the rate and scale of the arms
race. Nbreover at the turn of the present decade the most aggressive circles of the
USA and other imperialist powers assumed a course, in collaboration with Chinese
- *Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 396.
**Brezhnev, L. I., "O vneshney politike KPSS i Sovetskogo gosudarstva. Rechi i
stat'i" [On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. Speeches and
Articles], M~oscow, 1978, p 597.
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hegemonists, toward further intensification of the arms race, in their desire to
disturb the prese~ntly evolved military balance in the world in their favor and to
the detrimen:; of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to the detriment
_ af international ~:letente and the security of r~ations.
But this ha~ not discouraged the proponents of peace and disarniament. Rather than
weakening, they are increasing their efforts to preserve and deepen detente, to
bridle the arms race, a,-~d to achieve a turning point toward real disarmament. And
they look at the future with optimism because, as A. A. Gramyko noted, "now that
the idea of disarmament has captured the imaginations of the massE~~ it is playing
an increasingly greater role as a material force in world policy."*
The collection offered here describes what has been done to limit arms and achieve
disarmament, why more has not been achieved yet, and what specifically is being done
in this direction today.
Problems and Prospects of Limiting Strategic Arms
Strategic arms limitation holds a special place in the effort to halt the arms race,
reduce the military danqer, and preserve international peace. Z'his probl~m has
- essentially become the key direction in Soviet-American relations. Beinq the two
mightiest powers of modern times, the USSR and the USA must not permit the strategic
arms they possess to grow in quantity in the course of an uncontrollable arzns race,
since this would increase the danger of nuclear war and undermine the prospects of
consolidating peace and security.
Implementation of existing strategic arms limitation treaties and achievement of
new ones may open new possibilities not only for halting the growth of nuclear
missile arsenals and insuring their effective quantitative and qualitative limita-
tion, but also for successively traveling the road of their significant reductien,
having in mind full cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, and liquidation
_ of their stockpiles in the end.
The Soviet Uion's consistent struggle to bridle the arms race is based upon a
meticulous analysis of the balance of power in the world, and on a full ~onsidera-
tion of the military-strategic situation, the trends and prospects of its develop-
ment, and the material-technical factors of armed forces development. In this
~ struggle, the USSR bases itself on the need for both respecting the interests of
the security of each state in dividually, and consolidation of international peace
_ and security in general.
'The process of limiting strategic arms began in November 1969 with initiation of
Soviet-American negotiations alternately in tielsinki and Vienna. Their chief result
was the signing, on 26 May 1972 during a Soviet-American summit conference in Moscow,
of the permanent Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Systems,
and the five-year Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the
*"Sovremennaya diolomatiya burzhuaznykh gosudarstv" [Modern Diplomacy of
Bourgeois States], Foreword, by A. A. Gromyko, Nbscow, 1980, p 15.
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Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms.l Somewhat earlier, on 30 September 1971,
the permanent Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuciear War
was signed between the USSR and the USA; it can rightfully be interpreted as part
of the general complex of SALT-ONE agreements. -
By signinq the ABM limitation treaty, the USSR and the USA pledged to deploy not more
than two ABM complexes on the territory of either of the sides. Z'he treaty
established the principle of the national technical means of verification in accord-
ance with the universally recognized rules of international law. The sides pledged
not to interfere with national technical means of verification, and not to employ
intentional camouflage measures that would hinder veri~ication. A joint Soviet-
American Permanent Consultative Commission was created to promote achievement of the
aims and satisfaction of the provisions of the treaty.
- 7.'he InterimAgreement on Certain Measures i�litn Respect to Limitations of Strategic Offpnsive Arms
"froze" the number of land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers
possessed by the sides at those levels which were in existence as o~ 1 July 1972, and
~ it set the limit on launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's).
2'hese agreements were significant in that for the first time there was consent on
concrete measures that would in fact restrain the growth of the quantity of offen-
_ sive arms. Also of importance is the fact that the USSR and the USA agreed to inter- -
pret the signed SALT-ONE treaties only as the first step in efforts to further limit
_ strategic arms. In a joint communique dated 30 May 1972, both sides emphasized that I
they "intended to continue active negotiations to limit strategic offensive arms,
ai~d conduct them in the spirit of good will, respect of the legal interests of one
another, and compliance with the principle of equal security."~
The SALT-ONE documents signed in Moscow were met with great satisfaction on the part
of the broad world public. But at the same time the ~nemies of disarmament and
- detente, both within the USA and in NATO, attemptec~ to block snactment of the
strategic arms limitation treaty. ;
A major struggle began between the treaty's proponents and opponents in the U.S. ~
Senate and House of Representatives. In compliance with the USA's constitutional ~
procedure, at the end of September 1972 the Senate approved ratification of the ;
Treaty on the Limitation o: ~tiballistic Missile Systems, while the 5enate and '
House of Representatives co, .rmed the Interim Agreement. On 29 September 1972 the ~
Treaty on the Limitation of Ai..�: Systems and Interim Agreement were approved by the ~
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and on 3 October 1972 USSR Minister of Foreign
Affairs A. A. Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State W. Rogers exchanged certificates
attesting to the treaty's ratification and adoption of the Interim Agreement at a
White House ceremony. The treaty and agreement became law.
- For the first time, the Soviet-American SALT-ONE docun?ents spelled out the solutions
to highly complex problems in national and international security, ones which
appeared insoluble just 5-10 years previously. Together with the important docu-
_ ment "Fundamental Pri:~ciples of M~~~uai ?at~~^~ y~tween the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics an~ t~e united States of America," th~se agreements on limiting -
strategic arms were an important step helping to weaken the threat of nuclear war ~
and restrain the arms race. _
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~ in November 1972 the Soviet-Am~rican Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Phase Ztao -
(SALT-Zin10) began in Geneva. 27:e Soviet side consistently led the talks toward
agreement, and it submitted concrete proposals on new measures that would effectiv'e-
~ ly limit strategic arms, pror~ote stabilization of t;~e military-strategic situation
in mutuai relations between the USSR and the USA, and strengthen the cause of peaCe
and international security.
In June 1973, during a Soviet-American summit confarence in Washington, a document
spelling out the fundamental principles of negotiations for further limitation of -
strategic offensive arnis was signed. It emphasized that the sides would follow the _
principles of equal security, and with the recognition that attempts to obtain uni-
lateral advantages would be incompatible with reinforcement of peaceful relations
between both states. The document asserted the need for introducing limitations
affecting not only quantitative indicators but also qualitative improvements in
strategic offensive arms. The sides confirmed the premise that the limits on
strategic offensive arms must be subjected to verification by national technical
r~sources.
~ The next step advancing the cause of limiting strategic arms was the signing of the
Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems, which _
- foresaw reducing the number of ABM deployment areas for each of the sides from ~
the two permitted by the treaty to one.
As far as negotiations on a treaty to limit strategic offensive arms were concerned,
they went on at a time of acute struggle between the proponents of the SALT treaty
- and reactionary militant circles in the USA which hdd formerly attempted to block
. enactment of the SALT-ONE treaty and were now making an effort to force SALT-~10
into a stalemate. Thus the talks proceeded irregularly, and periods of prolonged
stagnation were observed. In his memoirs, former President R. Nixon admitted for
example that in sunm?er 1974 the Pentagon bloaked the signing of the treaty by
- submitting the knowingly unacceptable demand of unilateral concessions on the part
of the USSR.3
- A certain shift occurred in SALT-TWO during a working conference between CPSU
Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President G, Ford in
Vladivostok in November 1974. `Phe intention of the sides to sign a new long-term
agreement to limit strategic offensive arms effective until 31 December 1985 was
confirmed. It was proposed that tr.is agreement, based on the principle of equality
and identical security of the sides, would include, besides the appropriate provi-
sions of the Interim Agreement, the following limitations:
"a) Both sides will have the right to possess certain prearranged total quantities
of strategic weapon delivery systems;
"b) both sides will have the right to possess certain prearranged total quantities
of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles -
with independer_tly targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's)."4 _
Thus a ceiling for the total number of strategic weapon delivery systems was set,
to include strategic bombers, which were not included in the previous agreement.
Achievement of agreement to introduce a maximum limit upon strategic arms would
doubtlessly have been a major step foxward in the effort to limit the most
destructive types of weapons.
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A fundamenta~ly new elementin the Vladivostok agreement was establishment of maximum
_ levels for ICBM's and SLBbi's outfitted with multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicles. For this purpose the Soviet Union insisted during the strategic
~ arms limitation talks that the production and deployment of missiles with indepen-
dently targetable reentry vehicles be prohibited, thus averting an arms rs~e in
this area. The importance of the Soviet proposal for real limitation of the strategic
arms race can be seen at least from the fact that in the last ~0 years the number
of nuclear warheads in the USA increased by about 1,000 units per year, while the
number of delivery systems remained almost constant.5 Therefore although it was
r.~t a radical solution, practical implementation of an agreement concerning the .
numbers of MIRVed missiles would 'nave set a certain limit on the unrestrained race
in this area.
In order to achieve practical implementation of the decisions made in Vladivastok,
at the beginning of 1975 the work of the Soviet and American delegations was resumed
in Geneva with the job of preparing the texts of the appropriate documents or~ the
basis of the Vladivostok agreement. Fundamental problems associated with limiting
strategic offensive arms were discussed in a meeting between CPSU Central Committee
General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and J.S. President G. Ford during the time af the
. Helsinki Conference in August 1975. Negotiations conducted in 1975-1976 between
L. I. Brezhnev, A. A. Gromyko, and H. Kissinger had important significance to pro-
gress in strategic arms limitations.
Throughout the entire time of SALT-TWO, the Soviet Union persistently followed the
line of achieving the greatest possible lim.itations of strategic arms. In the
- 3ccountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress,
L. I. Brezhnev noted: "Attaching extremely important significance to this entire .
~~roblem, we have persistently asked, and more than once, the United States not to
close the matter with just limiting the existing forms o= strategic weapons. We
ielt it possible to go further. Specifically,we suggested reaching agreement to
~~rohibit crea~ion of new, even more-destructive armament systems, particularly the
new Trident class submarines with ballistic missiles and the new B-1 strategic
bombers in the USA, and similar systems in the USSR. Unfortunately these proposals
were not accepted by the American side."6
Following J. Carter's election to the U.S. presidency in fall 1976, the Soviet-
Aanerican SALT-TWO negotiations drew to a halt, and in some areas there was even a
digression from the approach agreed upon previously. Such was the case, for example,
in March 1977, when ~he American delegation came to Moscow with an openly unilateral
- proposal which could in no way serve as the basis for a mutually acceptable solution.
It is now becoming clear that the American administration, the U.S. Congress, and
the American delegation in Geneva contained i:~~,~ential individuals who worked
= not to complete the effort of preparing the draft treaty, but essentially to block
it. Many months of purposeful, meticulous work were required to return the negotia-
tions to the mainstream of the Vladivostok agreement, and implement the directive
of the 25th CPSU Congress--to prepare a new treaty between the USSR and the USA on
limiting and reducing strategic arms.
CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President J. Carter met in Vienna on 15-18
June 1979. On 18 June they signed the Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on
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Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation, the protocol to this treaty, and the Joint
Declaration on the Principles and Basic Directions of Subsequent Negotiations on
Limitation of Strategic ~rms.
As is stated in a document of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the Presidium
_ of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Minister on the results of the
Vienna Conference, "agreement on these issues became possible as a result of the
lcng and hard work of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers, and L. I. Brezhnev's
personal contri.bution to preparing and conducting the conferences, to consolidating
universal peace, to bridling the arms race, and to developing mutually advantageous =
cooperation among states with different social structures."~
Full implementation of the documents signed in Vienna would have opened up new
possibilities not only for halting the build-up of strategic offensive arms and
achieving their effective quantitative and qualitative limitation, but also for
achieving a real reduction in these arms for the fir~t time.
As far as the basic content of the SALT-7.i~10 agreement is concerned, in distinction
from the Interim Agreement, which dealt only with two types of strategic offensive
- arms (ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers), the new agreement foresaw maximum levels -
for the aggregate number of ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-
surface ballistic missiles (ASM's). 'I'he treaty establishes equal maximum limits
for the nuclear weapon delivery systems of both sides; it foresees, as a start in
. the reduction process, reduction of existing nuclear arms; the treaty imposes, with =
the purposes of reducing the threat of the qualitative arms race, significant� limi-
tations on modernizing strategic offensive systems and on cre~ting new systems.
The aggregate levels set by the treaty cannot exceed 2,400 units initially, and -
later on they will have to be reduced to 2,250 units. The established sublevels
" of 1,320 units for the launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's outfitted with independently
targetable reentry vehicles ~nd heavy bombers arn?ed with cruise missiles having a
range greater than 600 km, and the sublevels of 1,200 units for the launchers of _
ICBM's and SLBM's with independently targetable reentry vehicles and 820 units for
the launchers of ICBM's with independently targetable reentry vehicles had the
objective of providing the fullest possible guarantee of a balance in strategic
forces, without providing unilateral advantages to one side or the other.
Also serving the same purposes are limitatio~s on the number of reentry vehicles
that may be installed in ICBM's and SLBM's and on the number of cruise missiles
with a range greater than 600 km that could be carried by heavy bombers. Prohibi-
tion of the creation of new types of ICBM's (not counting one new type of light
ICBM's) should limit the race in deployment of new, more-powerful types of ICBM's. ~
Permitting modernization of. strategic arms within certain bounds, the treaty simul-
taneously prohibits rebuilding launchers for light ICBM's into launchers for heavy
_ missiles, and creating ICBM's with a launch or cold launch weight greater than
that of heavy ICBM's possessed by each of the sides.
Prohibition of a number of new types of strategic offensive arms, foreseen by the
treaty, is a serious step in restraining the arms race. Article IX foresees, for
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example, prohibition of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 km for
launchers on floating platforms that a.re not submarines; prohibition of resources
for the launching of nuclear weapons or all other forms of mass destruction weapons
into near-earth orbit, to include fractional orbital bombarciment systems; prohibi-
tion of mobile launchers for heavy ICBM's, and so on.
' Establishment of the subliznit of 1,320 units and simultaneous limitation of the number
of cruise missiles with which a bomber may be supplied is equivalent in principle
to establishment of a limit on the aggregate number of aircraft-carried cruise
missiles with a range grea~ter than 600 km. Installing multip:Le independently
targetable reentry vehicles on cruise missiles is prohibited concurrently.
_ The protocol to the treaty, which will ~emain in force until 31 December 1981,
sets thP number of additional limits on cruise missiles with a range greater than
600 km, mainly prohibition of the deployment of sea- and~land-based cruise missiles
and pro?~ibition of the testing of such missiles with multiple independently target-
- able reentry vehicles. The protocol also prohibits deployment ~f mobile ICBN:
launchers, as well as flight tests of ICBM's with such launchers, and equally so,
_ the flight testing of ASM's or deployment of such missiles.
The mutual pledge not to circumvent the provisions of the treaty through any other
state or states, or by any other means, has independent and, moreover, extrenely
importan~c significance. This closes a dangerous loophole of possible erosion or
weakening of the set limits and provides a strong guarantee of their stability and
effectiveness. '
The practice of notification concerning the launchings of ICBM'~ LoYOnd the limits
of national territory was introduced by the previously signed Soviet-American
Agreement on Measures to T:educe the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War dated 30
September 1971 and the Agreement to Prevent Incidents on the High Seas and in the
Airspace Above Them dated 25 May 1972. The SALT-TWO treaty foresees a general `
and farther-reaching pledge on this account, foreseeing prompt notification as to
the performance of all planned test launchings of ICBM's, with the exception of
just single ICBM launchings planned within the limits of national territory. This
pledge is an important measure aimed at increasing the trust between the sides.
The fundamental principle of Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks is
the principle of equality and identical security. The new treaty was structured
mainly on the basis of this principle, and it expresses a just balance between the
interests of the USSR and the USA. It is the result of many years of effort. Each
provision of the treaty and of other documents associated with it was carefully ~
_ thought out, and no deviations from the achieved agreement can be considered per-
_ missible. At the Vienna talks L. I. Brezhnev pointed out that "any attempts at
shaking this intricate edifice, which was erected with such great difficulty, to
change any details in it, or to tilt it in ane's favor would be an unpromising
effort. The entire structure might collapse--with serious and even dangerous
consequences t.o our relations and to the situation in the world as a whole."8 ~
Formation of the principle of equality and identical security began long prior to
the opening of Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitation as a result of
Soviet disarmament initiatives in the early 1960's. Thus the text of the Joint
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Declaration of the Governments of the USSR and the USA on Prearranged Principles ~
for Negotiations on Disarmam~nt, which were approved by the UN General Assemt~ly
on 20 December 1961 contains the following provision: All measur~s of universal
and total disarmament must be balanced such that in no"phase of enactment of a
traa::~ would one state or a group of states be able to receive a military adv~tage,
and that security would b~ guaranteed equally to all."y Later this principle was
embodied in the Treaty on the Limitation of Ani:iballistic Missile Systems and the
Interim Agreement, and it was documented in the Fundamental Principles of Mutual
Relationships Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States
of America dated 29 May 1972, which confirmed the impermissibility of attempts "to
obtain ~.uiilateral advantages, directly or indirectly, at the expense of the other -
side";10 it is also dociunented in the Fundamental Principles of Negotiations on
_ Further Limitation of Strategic Ofrensive Arms dated 21 June 1973.
The preamble of the new treaty and `he Joint Declaration on the Principles and Basic
Directi.r,ns of Subsequent Negotiations on Limitation of Strategic Arms, signed in
Vienna by L. I. Bre zhnev and J. Carter, devote a special place to this principle.
Sectian One of the Joint Declaration states in particular: "Tne sides kill continue
to negotiate, in compliance with the principle of equality and identical security, ,
on measures to fur ther limit and reduce the qnantities of strategic arms, and to
further limit them in qualitative respects."1
In terms of limiting strategic arms, the principle of equality and identical -
security is essen~ially an expression of the recognition by both sides that parity
i.s needed in their strategic arms, and that a balance in strategic nuclear missile .
power must be maintained, be it peculiar and, at times, dynamic. The principle
of equality and identical security, the sole possible foundation for agreement on
strategic arms limitation, is organicaZly associated with the very natur~ of
modern weapons and the objectively existing balance ~f strategic forces between
the USSR and the USA.
During the Vienna talks in June 1979 between L. I. Brezhnev and J. Carter, each
- side declarad that it did not aspire and would not aspire to military supremacy,
inasmuch as this might lead only to dangerous instabil12y, generating a higher level _
of arms and not promoting the security of either side. -
Discussing provisions worked out in the course of the strategic anns limitation
talks and making up the basis of Soviet-American interaction in this area, we
should note the important signific~nce of combining quantitative and qualitati~~e
limitations. In this case the role of quaiitative limitations grows significantly
wher. equal maximiun levels of strategic arms are established for the sides, and
especially when these limits are reduced. Z'he need ~for combining quantitative and
- qualitative limitations is dictated by the principle of equality and identical
security, inasmuch as when quantitative limitations exist, it becomes even more
' important, than in their absence, to establish qualitative limitations that would
~ exclude the Fossibility either side might have for shooting ahead through improve-
ments in armament and obtaining unilateral advantages, even if the quantitative
limits remain the same. In other words there is a constant possibility of so-
called "technological breakthrough"--creation of new forms of weapuns which, whzn
placed in the hands of one of the parties t~ the strategic arins limitation talks,
could provide the latter a unilateral advantage.
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~
Thc~ provision of combining quantitative and qualitative lxmitations on strategic
arms was documented in the SALT documents as one of the ft~ndamental principles of
the negotiations.l3
In addition to establishing quantitative limits, in order to reduce the thre~~
posed by the qualitative arms race the SALT--TWO treaty imposes signi.ficant limi-
tations on ~