JPRS ID: 9705 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400010001-5
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9705
- 1 May 1981
~
- Near ~~st ~orth Africa Re ~rt
p
CFOUO ~ 4/81)
~
~BIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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~ NOTE
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_ newspapers, p exiodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. l~iaterials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from Engl ish-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and -
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
- are sugpl ied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [TextJ
or [ExcerptJ in the first line of Each item, or following the
- Iast line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in p arentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
- tion m,ark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
. original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an _
, item origina te with the source. Times within items zre as ,
given by source. '
The contents of this publication in no way represeat the poli-
cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government.
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JPRS L/9705 _
_ 1 M~,y 19 81 -
- r
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT -
- (FOUO 14/81) ~ -
CONTENTS ~
AFGHANIS`i~'1N
Grena3e I.auncher Taken in Afg'~a*:istan -
(TIIE GiJARDIAN, 1 Apr i31) 1 -
LFBANON ~
Peaceful Coexis~ence Among Various Sects iJrged
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 13-19 Feb fil) 3
_ Problems Facing Industry Discussed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 13-19 Feb 81) 13 -
LIBYA =
~
Milan Paper Cites al-Qadhdhafi TV Interview
(COK~IEP.E DELLA SEkA, 6 Apr 81) 17
Soviet Experts Aid Army Despite Mutual Dislike
- (Mohamed Selhami; JEtrNE AFRIQUE, 28 Jan isi) 19 _
French Di.plomat Gives His Impres~ions of al-Qadhdhafi
- ' (Guy C:eorgy Interview; JEUNE AFRIaUE, 11 Feb 81) 21 -
~
. a - ( III - NE & - 121 FOUO] '
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~ AFGHANISTAN
~
GRENADE LAUNCHER TAKEN IN AFGHANISTAN _
- LDOli~''9 London THE GUARDIAN in Eng].ish 1 Apr 81 p 4
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_ ~Dispatch by "our own correspnndent~.": "New Soviet 'wtspctZ Captured"] _
~
_ [Text] Fashaw3r--One of the ~atest Soviet infantry support weapons, brought into
- service last year and previously seen u:~ly in shadowy, snatched pha~ographs9 has -
been captured :In hfQh~:listan and is now in Western hands.
- It is an AGS~O, a cc~llapsible grenade launcher capab3.e of wurking like a machine- _
gun.and throwing out gr2nades at the~rate of 300 per ~inutes Co a~aximum range of
- 1,500 yards.
,
= I)efence experts believe this weapan has seriously eroded the Western technologi.cal
- lead in medium-range support for infantry. It is also known as tt~.e PZa,ymya, the
Russian word for "flame." -
~
~ The Soviets are using the Afghan war as a proving ground .for much of their latest
- eauipment, including items so f.ar restricted to the Red Army. In clashes with the '
_ Mojahedin (MusZim rebels) some inevitably are beir.g captured. "
- If the guerrillas are uncertain wh.at the weapon~ are, or ii they do not have suffi-
~ cient amanun~fiior_ for them, the booty is brought over the mountains into Pakistan, ~
and offered for sale in t:his northwest frontier city, or in the gunshops of the -
- neaYb} tribal t~wn of Barra Adam Khel.
- ~.ready the West ras been :~ble to examine the latest Soviet assault rifle, the
AK74 together with its special a~unition which tumbles on penetratio~, causing
~ ~ppsLl.ing wounds~ ~
` ?t is not knowr~ how lc:ng the AGS30 has beer. in service in Afghanistan. The ?mpli- =
s r_ation is that it must bA fairly recent, b~ecause there are no reliable reports of `
. a new ar~d poter.tially devastating weapan in use. The Saviets will presumably begir.
~ to deploy it in earnest ~:hen the snows melt and the tempo of f~ght3.ng picks up.
- ThE a~itomaticheskiy g~anatomjot stankovi is operated by a crew of two or three. _
= It c~lla~se~ down to f it into ~wo separatp bags and is eqaipped ~ith an optical sight _
= of advanced design. _
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The grenades themselves look like thick bullets;, and are understood to nave a lethal
zone with a radius of just over 10 feet. gecause of its mounting and rapid-fire
capabiltties, the AGS30 can shift targets swiftly, causing considera~ly more damage
than any machine-gun tecause of thP pattern of shrapnel fragments from each of the
= exploding grenades.
COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers Li:4ited, 1981
- CSO: 4920/265 ,
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LEBArION
' PEACEFUL COEY.ISTENCE AAfONG \~ARIOUS SECTS UP.GED
Paris AL-WAT:~N AL-'ARABI in Ara.bic 13-19 Feb 81 r,p 19-21 .
[Article: "tJho Cru~ified Christ in the Lebanese War? The Option of Politi-
cal and Social Change by Force Is N~t Possible in a Country That Has 16
_ Sects and Denominations"]
[Text] In their cont~rontation wi;:~1 the Resistance and
_ the Nation~l ~lovement the Maronites lost many times
r~ore what rhey would have lost in a confrontation with
- Israel.
Palestinian excesses weakened popular sympathy for the
Palestinians, an~l the Maronites used that as an excuse
to bear arms against the Resistance.
Palestinians forgot to consider that the Ur;ited States
was capahle of finding an Arab alternative to its
direct inte=vention in Lebanon.
During thE last visit that Lebanese leader, f:ar!al Junblat made t~,T
Damascus, Mr Junblat told 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, the Syrian minister of
forei~n affairs, "In a few days we will invite you, AbL Jamal, for lunch
wir.h us in Bikfayya." .
. Bikfayya is the home town of Pierre al-Jumayyil, the leader of the
Lebanese Phalan~ist party. At that time the Palestinian forces and their
allies, the Lebanese National Movemznt were close to the mountain towri.
Khaddam smiled a diplomatic smile, but he did not unswer.
F.vents then succee~ied each other rapidly. Bikfayya did not fall, and the
_ Syrian truops continued their advance in the al-Biqa' valley and in north .
Lebanon. Then they climbed the mountain and descended on Beirut. The
- Palestinian forces and the National Movement fell back in front of them,
and 1 year aFter their entry into Beirut Kamal Junblat himself was _
assassinated.
Junblat is ~i rare ki.nd of leader. }Ie used to triumph over all his asso-
- ciates in politics with his mastery of the fundamentals of the tr.aditional
l.ebanese political ~ame. At the same time he was able to extend his
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bridges beyond his Druze sect and establish close communications with
the intellectuals and the new generatior,s of other sects. He was helped
~ �.n this by a daring intellect, a thorough education, an eminent per-
a sor:ality, a:oble spirit and a sincere faith in Arabism. Junblat was
aspirin~; to the establishment of a unified Lebanese society wherein a
flexible socialism would provide social justice that would be broader than
' the manifestations of false prosQerity in which Lebanon has been living.
it may be that these aspirations which Junblat had before his contempora-
ries and associates in Lebanese politics were at some point--and after a
long period of hesitation about carrying weapons=-the incentives that made ~
' him believe that force was the means for imposing political and social
change in Lebanon, or rath~r, on th~ Christian Maronite sect which is the
more power�ui and the wealthier se~ct as well as the ruling sect in Lebanon.
~ It may be that eating a meal in the home town of al-Jumayyil symbolizes
in Junblat`s mind and imagination t!~e destruction of the political and
economic control as well as the psychological control that al-Jumayyil's
" sect practised on all the other sects of Le anon. - -
Junblat was right: chan~e was inevitable. But Tunblat was wrong ~ec3use
force i.ri;~ country like 1.ebanon was not the m~ans for brin~ing about
change.
- I.et us go back and emphasize that [t}!'e use of] force was no~ J~nblat's
preferred c.t~~oice; nor was it close to his heart. The evidence for this _
- li.es in the~ Eact tiiat when the Lebanese war broke out, Junblat's party and
sect did n~~t have the quant~ty of weapons that could be cor~pared with the
quantit~ of weapons that the othzr sects or organizations owned. Howaver,
the fact that he turned to the option of force occurred ~ater when adver-
saries and allies tempted and provoked Juntlat, his sect and hi.s aarty.
This was after Junblat had seen the easy victories that the Palestini.ans
achieved early in the war and after the voice of the Palestinian leader �
, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyyad) had echoed, "The road to Palestine goes through ~
Juniyah!" Tl~e Palestinian forces were on the rnountain tops o~~erlt~oking ;
- this por.t~that used to be considered the last major ~trongh~ld of the
- Maronit^ militia.
revoltition or [the use of] force may be a suitable tool .for brin~ing
about political and social change in a unified country that has a racial?.y
and religiously homogeneous and harmonious mass of humanity, a country i
that is prepared to accept chnnge induced by violence as a resulC of the
prevailing feeling that there was no other choice. And so it was that
change was brought about by force in ~hina and European Russia; despite
all the tra~edies [that accompany it] the violence did not shake the
nature of the people and did not do away with their unity and their human
and psychological hari~ony.
I.oyalty to Che Sect First
But the matter in Let�anon was different. Despite its meager size, area
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~ and popuiati::n--3 million people in 10.:~~~d square kilo~neters--this country
has ~6 different sects that live in closed ghettos and are subject to -
a system whose appearance is democratic but whose suhstance is a manifes-
tation of this incongruous sectarian and denominational division. So much
so that the ^taronite presi~ent of the republi~c did not consider himself
the presidei~t of all the Lebanese, but rather the political head of his
sect, the protector oE its interests and the defender of its supremacy.
The case was the same regarding ~the Sunni prime minister and....
� ~ L~yalty to the sect then was the rule and the foundation. Sectarian soli-
, darity was stronge~ than professional or trade union solidarity. There-
fore, arousin~, sectarian feelings was easier and much more effective than -
arousing feelings of political injcstice or social oppression.
� The INraronite sect is a living example of this. Education is sectarian-
- in the hnme, i.n the school, in the monasr_ery, in the church, in the party,
~ in life, in busi