JPRS ID: 9687 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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- JPI~S L/9687
- 24 April 1981
U SSR Re ort
p
POLITICAL AND St7CIOLOGICAI AFFAIRS
CFOUO 1 1 /81)
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JPRS L/9687
24 April 1981
- USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOVO il/81)
CONTENTS
INTERNATIONAL
Azeri Academy Journal on Soviet-Iranian Political, Cultural
Relations
(IZVESTIYA AKA,DENIII NAUK AZERBAYDZHANSKOY SSR: SERIYA
ISTORII, FIZOSOFII I PRAVA, No 3, 1980) 1
Soviet-Iranian Relations; 1962-1975, by G. D. Alibeyli
_ Soviet-Iranian Cultural Ti es: 19b0-1980, by R. Shurkyurova
_ REGIOAiAL
SultangaliyeJism Attacked by Tatar Authors
- (TATARSKAYA ASSR: REAL~NOST~ I BURZHUAZNYYE MIFY, 1977).... 20
- a - (III - USSR - 35 FOUO]
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INTERNATIONAL
AZERI AC_.i~EMY JOURNAL ON SOVIET-IRANIAN POI,ITICAL~ CULTURAL RELATIONS
aoviet-Iranian Relations: 1962--1975
Baku IZIfESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK AZERPpYDZHANSgOY SSR: SER"LYA ISTORII, FILOSOFII I
PRAVA in Russian Ne 3a 19~ pp 29-~6
~Article by G. D. Alibeyli: "'Soviet-Iranian Relat~onss 1962--1975'J
~TextJ The beginning of ~he 196()'s was marked by the entranoe of Soviet-Iranian
- relations onto a new phase~ characterized by a nomalization and development of
intergovernmental relations and a deepening o~ technical and e~onomic ties.
Iran's tu~.n in the direction of devEloping relations xith the USSR was preceded by
its orrn econ.omic and political causes. The failure of the attempt to extricate
the country from its difficult economic situation by means of the policy of the
so-~alled "stabilization of the economy;"*~ the difficulties encountered by the ru1=
ing circles in promulgating the agrarian refozm laws of 1960 and 196z~ and Iran's
dependence on the imperialist countries in a mlitical and ecanomic regard consti-
tuted the principal causes of the currency-:financial crisis in tha late 1950's a.nd
early 1960's.
The country's progressive public figures and Iran's realistically minded political
leaders came to understand that the proble~ns encountered on the path of socio-
political and economic deve3.opnent of the country were basically the result of Iran~s~
participation in the military-political plans of world 9mperialism. Under the
circumstances of the acute currency-financial cris~s there xas an intensification
of the movement to conduct an independent foreign-policy course~ based on the prin-
ciples of neutrality, a restoration of tne ;ra.ditional trade and economic ties with
_ the So~viet Union and other countries of ti~e sociallst catnp. Under the pressure of
these factors the Iranian ruling circles xere compelled to re-examine~ to a cer-
~cain extent, the principles of' Iran's foreign economic policy~ its one-sidecl
orientation toward the Western countries~ and to enter upon the path of technical
and economic cooperation With the countries of' the socialist world.
� The change which took pla~e in Iran's foreign policy course was also strongly
influenced by the major scientific and technical achievements of the s~cialist
countries, prim~rily those of the USSR~ the undisputed gro~stla of the Soviet Union's
authority in the international arena~ and the upsurge of the national liberation
movement in the countries of As3.a and Africa.
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As far back as the early 1960'e the Saviet governn?ent, in meeting the desires of
the Iranian side~ agreed to receive an Iranian governniental delegation in Moscox
and to examine Kith it questions of no~alising Ixanian-5oviet relations~ which
had been bmken off in the preceding years. I~oreover, the hope was expressed that _
_ ways would be found to improve relations betxeen Iran and the Soviet Union. Howe-
ver~ in connection xith the elections to the Iranian parliament, this trip did not
take place.
Despite the opposition of imperialist diplomacy and that of reactionary circles
within Iran itself, definite shifts Kere outlined in Tranian-Soviet relations.
_ On 15 September 1962 an exchange of notes #,ook pla~ce in Tehran between the ambas-
sador of the USSR and Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs ~3~ 305J. In its note ,
the government of Iran gave assurances to the governmant of the USSR that it rrould
not allox any forei~n state to have the possibility of setting up rocket bases on
~ Ira,n's territory 3~--365: 5,J� ~ its ansKering note the U5SR stated that the
government of the USSR received with satisfaction the infozmation contained in the
note of the government of Iran ~6J.
- The exchange of notes betrreen the USSR and Iran, as well as Iran's refusal �e maIGe
its own territory available for the stationing of foreign rocket bases~ facilitated
the strengthening of the foundations of mutually advantageous relations between the
two countries~ and it corresponded to the interests of the peoples of both coun-~
- tries, along xith preserving peace and security in the region of the Neax and
Middle East as a whole.
Based on the normalization of Soviet-Ira.nian relations~ definite shifts took place
in Iran's foreign policy toward restoring and developing trade and economic ties
with the countries of the socialist camp, primarily with the Soviet Union. The =
negotiations xhich were conducted on regularizing a nw:iber of questions concerning
trans3.t and boiYier matters served as a confinnation of this. Thus, in October 196z ,
there was an exchange of ratified document'~ with regard to transit problems, and
- on 20 December of that same year the parties exchanged. ratified docwnents with res-
pect to the treaty on the regime of the Soviet-Iranianturder and on the procedure
for adjusting border conflict and incidentsi~ subsequently these played a great ~
- role in expanding economic ties between the two countries and in settling all tran-
sit and border questions.
The restoration of nozmal relations with the Soviet Union al.lowed Iran to utilize
the financial and technical aid of the USSR a.nd other socialist ccuntries in order
to solve the problems of its economic development. In chaxacterizing the policy
of the Soviet Union with regard to the developing countrios~ the ne�.rspaper AZER-
BAYDZHAN wrote as folloxs: "It is impo~sible to say that the mighty Soviet state
- desires to see a weak~ poor country as its neigh'aor. On the contrary~ the relations
of the above-mentioned pow er with all countries~ in pax~icular, with the countries _
- adjacent to it, such as Afghanistan~ demonstrate that the Soviet Unicn is carrying
out a policy whereby ;ts neighboring countries can achieve economic development as -
soon as possible and.within brief periods of time can become advanced industrial
and agricultural countries" ~7J.
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~
During the peri~~d which elaps8d after World War II the imperialists and their
supporters within Iran itself strove by all possible means to xorsen the mutual ~
rela~tions betxeeri the twc~ neighboring countries~ utilising in this matter financial
and technical "aid" to Iian and mythical "threa,ts 'from the north. " Iz~ this business
_ imperialist diploa~acy aft~;r ~he coup d'etat in August 1953 ~1id not encoun~~r any
sort of seMous obstacle~c. Iran's ruling circles~ proceedi:ig from their own nar-
row class interests~ threK the doors o:f their country Hide open to monopolistic
capita.l to the detriment of mutually advantageous Soviet-Iranian trade and economic
relations, despite the fact that the Soviet Union Ka,s striving and is .;till striving
to establish truly goud-neighborly relations Kith Ira~n~ based on the following
Leninist principles of foreign policys equality, mutual respect for sovereignty,
non-interference in the internal affaira of each other; this is the genexai line of
the USSR's policy with regard to a11 countries~ in.cluding Iran.
As far ba,ck as 1962 the newspaper~SAPAHR declared that "xhen our economy xas in
danger, when the Soviet Union with its great scientific achievements and defense
_ of the cause of peaceful coexistence without any sort of ~elf-seeking purposes or
to disseminate its own ideology~ stretches ~orth the hand of fMendship and is _
offering to us during this period of economic crisis aid without any conditions,
it would be correct if our leaders for the sake of maintaining our independence
_ and prestige xould gras~p this hand and save Iran from its crisis" ~8J.
- As a result of the strivings by both sides to establish mutually advantageous ~
trade and econamic relations~ on z7 Juiy i963 an Agreement was signed on economic
_ and technical c~operation bet~een the Soviet Union and Iran ~9, 676--681,J, which
played a positiva role in the suba~quent developaent of economic ties between the
txo countries.
In accorclance with this agree.rnent ~he Soviet Union took part in the construction
of the hydro comFle+x on the Araks River. Following the successful construction
of the "Araks" complex Iran acquired the possibility of developing as much as 40~000
- hec~ta,res of nex lands and providing fbr the . needs of the population of the northern
regions with regard to electric power produced by the electric power station con-
structed on the Araks. The devel~pment of the nex lands facilitated the development
of the economy of Iranian Azerbaijano since these lands produced approximately -
3U,000 tons of gra.in and 25~000 tons of cotton annuall,}~ ~10, 350J. In this regard
the nerrspaper AZERBAYDZHAN wrote that "if dams are built on the Araks River, then
- in the f~ture ~Che Mugan Steppe will be transformed into a fertile region~ and this
will have a~ fav~orable effect on the lives of the Azerba,i janian population" jiiJ.
The joint Soviet-Iranian construction of the "Araks" hydro complex also had. great
_ political reverberations in Iran. At the ceremony of commissioning this dam Iran's
Minister of Water Resources and Ele~tric Po~rer declared that "we have only hearci.
the expression 'peaceful coexistence~' but today we have fully understood its mean-
_ ing.... With~al?rength. ;cnowledge, and ability our peoples have tamed the wild Araks
= and can nox reap fruits to improve our own lives. What our peoples have achieved -
- as a result of effective cooperation is the beginning of our future pro3ects" C12J.
And the organ of Iran's official circles, the newspaper ETTELA'AT emphasized that
- the "dam on the Araks River is an outstanding symbol of Soviet-Iranian cooperation"
113J.
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In 1974 a nerr agre~nent was concluded betWeen the tko countries ~ providing for the
construction of a seaond hydro-poxer complex on the Araks River in the region of
= y~hodaaferin ~14,1. Plans xere made to build txo electric power plants with a ca-
pacity of 20Q~000 kW. The putting into operation of this complex s~ade it possible
to develop as much as 300 ~ 000 hectares of nex lands C15J. This plan provided for
~ the construction of a man-made reservoir Kith a volwne capacity of about 2 billion
cubic mete~s of xater ~16, 20~. _
A new affinnation of good-neighborly relations Kas the official visit b;~ theChair-
man of the Presidi~ of tha USSR Supreme Soviet~ L. I. Brezhnev~ to Iran~ which
took place on 16--23 November i963. In Iran great importance xas attached to L. I.
Brezt~.nev's visit. "The visit of L. I. Brszhnev to our country facilitates the
i strengthening of good-neighborly relations betxeen ~~ur countries" ~17,J, wrote the
nexspaper KEYHAN. And PAYGAi%1-E EMRUZ asserted tha,t this visit would open up a new
page in Iranian-Soviet relations ~18J.
Trro yeaxs later the Soviet governaient, in proceeding to meet the desires of the
Irai:ian side~ agreed to render financial and technical assistance to Iran in cre-
ating a number of enterprises in heavy i.ndustry j19, 272~. _
In the light of this spirit of a.greement a nwuber of ineetings and negotiations were _
held during the course of 1965 betwe~en the appropriate organizations of the Soviet
Union and Iran; tr?se ended Kith the signing of a new agreement on economic coope-
ratior. between the txo countries, dated 1.3 January 1966 j20, 161--165J.
In accordance with this agreement the Soviet Union took upon itself the obligation
~ to render aid to Iran in building a metallurgical plant in the Isfahan region, in -
the construction of a main gas pipellne in the Save-At~~ax section (with a length
of 495 km)~ and in the construction of a nachine-build.ing plant in Arak with a
productivity of 30, 000 mechanical units per year. Ir~ order to build these pro-
jects, the Scviet Union granted Iran credits amounting to 250 million rubl.es.
The 3mportance of this agreement for Iran consisted in the fact that it was direct-
ed at creating heavy industrial enterprises of great national economic significance =
for Iran ~zi, 31J.
In the technical and economic cooperation betxeen the Soviet Union and Iran the
fore3nost place is rightfully occupied by the construction of a metallurgical com-
9 bine in Isfahan Province. ~see 22~ 77--122= 23s 24= 25; 26J.
The contract for building thia plant was concluded on conditions which were very
advanta.geous for Iran. In accordance with the agreeanent the planning work was
carried out by the Soviet side. The Soviet Union also supplied the comprehen-
sive technical equipment, the metal structural components~ the electrical a pa.-
ratus, the wiring products~ and the basic building materials ~27~ 970--975~ In
accordance with the plan the first stage of the plant had a specified capacity of
approximately 600,000 tons of steel per year.*~'
Despite the opposition of internatidnal, monopolistic capital and that of its -
agents within Iran, the construction of the first stage of this plant was com-
pletecl ~uccess,fully. The cooperation of the two countries in building this plant,
as acknowledged by the Iranian side, became a model for the peaceful coexistence
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of countries with differing sociopolitical systea~s C30J. On the basis of this ma-
jor industrial compl.ex plans xere outlined to develop other sectora of fieavy'in-
dustry as well ~31, 59--7~,J.
In accordance xith the agxeement of 13 January 19~ the 5oviet Union rendere3 fi-
nancial and technical aid tn the constzuction and development of a ~xachine-build-
ing plant in Arak, designed to turn out ~aterials-handling equipment, steam boil-
ars~ equipdient f~r sugar F~nd cement plants~ mine rail-cars, metallurgical struc-
tural components of vario~us typea~ poxer-transm3ssion line poles~ facilities for
storing petroleum products and xater~ agricul~~ural machinery~ and spaxe parts for
it.
Another important project of Soviet-Iranian cooperation is the Ix~nian main gas
pipeline on the Sava-Astara section (4~95 Im?) and the branch to Tehran (11,5 Ian) ~
along with supplying equi~ment and machinery for the compressor stations, located
along the entir~e length (1100 of the gas pipeline ~21~ 22--27,J.
The construction of this gas pipeline is of great economic advanta.ge for Iran.
This gas ~ipeline aupplies previously unused natural gas from the petroleum-beax-
ing regions of the country to the Soviet Union~ while it aZso provides for the gas
needs of the major Iranian cities~ including the large indus;rial complexes ~32~
7J. The gas deliveries to the Soviet Un~on serve to amortize the credits granted
to Iran by the Soviet Union for financing the construction of a number of industri-
- al enterprises.*~. On the xhole fox a 15-year period~ i. e.~ beginning in 1970,
it Kas planned to supply the Soviet Union xith as much as 140 billion cubic meters
of Iranian natural gas. In 1974 the USSR received 9.1 billion cubic meters of gas~
and by the middle of 1975--about 33 billion cubic meters ~34~ f7J.
A neK step on the path of cooperation between the two countries in the field of
the gas industry was the signing of an agreement in 1975 in a,cGOrdance with which
Iranian na~tural gas was to ~e transported to the countries of Western Europe
across the territory of the USSR ~35; 36~ 129t 37,J. The privileged conditions of
Soviet credit are highly thought of among Iran's business circles. "The Soviet
government is not taking money from us," wrAte the nev.spa.per KAYHAN~ "it is ac-
ce~,ting goods to balance its accounts.... The interest rate for the credit extend-
ed. amounts to 2.5 percent a year, and this is the loKest percent possible."
~
In addition to the enterpises listed above~ the Soviet Union has rendered financial
and technical aid i.n the construction of a t~exmal electric power station in Ta-
briz, planning and surveying operations for the Muga,n Irrigation Canal~ seismic ex-
ploratory operations for petroleum and gas in the Iranian territorial waters of the
Caspian Sea, bottom-deepening ~dredging~ operations in the ports of Enzali and
Noushekhr~ glanning and testing operations on a refrigeration plant in Tehran with
a capacity ~f 10,000 tons, xith the possibility of expanding to 16~000 tons, and
on developing a technical and economic report on iouilding a new port on the shore
of the Caspian Sea.
_ The USSR has rei~dered considerable a~d to Iran so that the latter may carry out its
plans for economic development. During the period of the Third Five-Year Plan
~1963--1967) the 5oviet Union rendered assistance in building grain elevators
which are of great importance to the nationa.l economy. 7~renty-two grain elevators
were built with a total capacity of 300~000 tons, and the capacities of existing
_ elevators were expanded. to 57~000 tons ~38� 23i 39J. Iran xas granted credits in
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order to carry out these projects. And the amortization of these credits was ac-
coinplished by the Iranian side by deliveries to the USSR of tra,ditional export
commodities.
In 1967 Iran Was visited by a Soviet goverrnaental delegation. During the meetings
which were held there took place a broad exchsnge of opinion~ with regard to prob-
lems of Soviet-Iranian economic ties and xays to expand such ties. In accord with
the xishes of both sides a decision Kas adopted to develop economic cooperation
between the two countries also during the period of ~peration of the Fourth Five-
Yeax Plan for the development of Iran's economy (1968--1.972) ~+0, 20J. At the
desire of the Iranian side during the period of the Fourth Five-Yeax Flan Soviet
specialists rendered aid in the field of improving the irrigation system~ build-
_ ing dams, prospecting for and exploiting mi~es~ metal2urgy, the construction and
_ equipping of ports~ supplying equipnent arui machinery for building and operating
roads. For the purpose of making operational decisions on the questions of Soviet-
Zranian ecor~omic cooperation, a Peamanent Soviet-Iranian Commission was created in
_ .Tune 1968 ~41~ 204; 4?~.
The Soviet Union also rendered aid to Iran in the creation of non-ferrous metallur--
gy. In accordance with a protoaol aigned on 22 July 1967 and an agreement con-
cluded in June 19~ the appropriate Soviet organizations took part in buildi.ng a
_ lead-and-zin~ plant~ conducting geoiogical prospecting operations~ equipping ap-
- propriate mines~ and building an enriching mill' for this plant.
Soviet-Irani~n technical and economic cooperation developed successfully from year
to yeax~ and this made it feasible to su~ply it on a long-tenu basis. In order to
_ achiees these goals~ a treaty was signed in October 1972 between the Soviet Union
_ and Iran for a 15-year period (45)~ this opened up broad possibilities for coopera-
tion between the two countries in the matter of building nex industrial and agri-
cultural complexes in Iran ~+3; 44i 46, 26~. In accordance with this treaty co-
operat~on betWeen the txo countries dveloped in the areas of ferrous and non-ferr-
ous metallurgy, the petroleutn~ gas~ and chemical indus~ries~ machine-building,
- agriculture, irrigation and fishing~ the planning and construction of electric po-
wer plants~ conducting geological prospecting operations~ and training .Tra.nian
- technical personnel ~47, i99J� In exchange for supplying compiete sets of equip-
ment and machinery for the pro3ects under construction with the aid of the Soviet
Union and f~r renderi technical services~ the USSR has received the traditional
Iranian export items ~48~ 50J.
In carrying out the provisions of the 15-year treaty the Soviet Union and Iran
signed a protocol on the construction of txo cement plants with a productivity of
1600 and 3000 tons a day ~49, 54J= theae are of great importance in the matter of
- pmviding an uninterruptecl supply of building materials to projects under
construction.
Tn all~ some 150 various national economic pro3ects have been built in Iran with
_ the aid of Soviet organizations; these are of great importance for its socioeconomic
deve]~opnient ~jUJ.
For Iran's industrial developnent providing technical personnel for facilities in
operation or under construction is of extramely great importance. At the same
time the situation in this matter has been exacerbated by the fact that the pro-
cess of the "brain drain" from Iran for socioeconomic and political motives has
become an acu~e social problem. Hen~e, the training of Iranian technical
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personnel came to occupy an important place in the country's do;nestic policy.
_ Cooperation betxeen the two countries in the business of training Iranian techni-
ca1 personnel has been carried out by the folloxing three methods: organization o~
~vocational-technical centers in Iran~ by means of the so-called production-brigade _
training~ and the recruitment of Iranians for the purpose of on-the-job training at
industrial enterprises of the Soviet Union. Prior to 1970 foux educational centers
Were organized in Iran~ and by 1975 approximately 7,200 persons had been trained
there.
Production-brigade training has been the most mass method of tra~ining tech:~ical
personnel. Up to 19?�S this method w~s employed to train about 30~000 skilled. wor-
kers. Prior to 1974 some 130A persons xere trained at metallurgical and machine-
building enter,prises of the Soviet Union ~51~ 12i 38~ 22J.
And, on the whole~ with the aid of Soviet specialists~ workin~ in various industri-
al enterprises and agricultural pro3ects of Iran~ about 100,000 skilled Iranian
workers and technicians have been trained ~jOJ.
In summing up the results of the dedelopment of Soviet-Iranian technical and eco-
_ nomic relations~ one can reach the conclusion that they have developed on an equi- -
table and mutuP.lly a,dvantageous basis, have not been accompanied by any sort of
conditions of a political or military nature, Khile they have facilitated the _
- strengthening of Iran's positions in trade and economic questions with the devel-
oped capitalist countries. Soviet technical and economic aid to Iran has been
aimed basically at industrializing the country and~ for the most part, at creating
heavy industrial enterprises. It has facilitated the expansion of the state sec-
tor~ created real possibilities for solving important socioeconomic problems, in-
cluding solving the question of employment for working people,*~~~ and it has
- placed limits on the sphere of penetration by interna.tional monopoly capital into
the country's economy.
The victory of the anti-monarchist, anti-imperialis~ revolution in Ira.n has poten-
tially created still broader possibiltties for fruitful cooperation between the
L`SSR and Iran.
In speaking to the voters of the Baumanskiy Rayon of the city of Moscow~ Comrade
L. I. Brezhnev declared as follows: "...we wish success and prosperity for the
new~ revolutionary Iran, and we hope that the good-neighborly relations between the
peoples of the Soviet Union and Iran under the new conditions will receive fruit-
ful developnent ~n the fixm basis of mutual respect, good will~ and non-interfe-
rence in each other's internal affairs" ~53J�
F"OOTNOTFS
~ The policy of "stabilizing the economy" was a complex of ineasures providing for
the improvement of Iran's financial position by means of attracting foreign ca-
, pital into the country's economic development ~1~1--5; 2~1--10~.
1. MADZHALLE-YE BANK-E MARKAZI-YE IRAN~ 1340, No 4.
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2. MADZHALLE-YE BANK-E MARKAZI-YE IRAN~ 1341, No 13.
3. Doctor B. Pazargad, "Kronolozhi-ye tarikh-e Iran," Tehran (Other publication
- data not indicated).
4. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1962. Sb. dokwaentov" ~Foreign Pblicy
� of the Sovi et Union ~ i96z : Collected. DociunentsJ, Moscow, 1963. `
5. IZVESTIYA~ 16 September 1962. -
6. PRAVDA, 16 September, 1962. _
~ This treaty was signed as far back as 14 May 1957 ~d 'ratifie` by the Presi-
dium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 26 November 1957. and in Iran's Senate and
Majlis on 19 June 1958�
7. AZERBAYDZHAN, 1 Aw6ust 1962.
8. SAPAHR,14 August 1962.
9. For text see: VIDOMOSTI YERKHOVNOGO SOVETA S5SR, 5 August 1965, No 3.
10. 'te. A. Orlov, "Soviet-Iranian Relations in the Present Stage," in the book:
"Kolonial'naya politika i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noye dvizheniye" ~Colonial
Policy and the National Liberation MovementJ~ Kishinev~ i965.
11. AZERAAYDZHAN~ 7 March~ 1963�
12. SIDA-YE MARDOM, 21 July 1970.
13. ETTELA�AT, 30 June 1970.
15. ZHtiRNAL llE TEI~iRAN ~ 1 April 1974.
16. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA~ No 2~ 19?~�
17. KAYHAN, 27 Nove~ber~ i963.
18. PAYGAN EMi3UZ ~ 16 November 1963 �
19. Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1964--1965. Sb. dokumentov" ~Foreign
'Aolicy of the Soviet Union, 196~--1965: Collected Documenzs,J~ Moscow~ 1966. _
' 20. For text see: "Madzhmue-ye moakhedat-e dzhanebe-ye motaba.re dolat-e shakhen-
shaki-ye Iran~" Vol 1, Tehran.
21. MADZHALLE-YE BuRS, 13~I~6~ xo 51.
22. TAKHCIGAT-E EGTESADI, 1348~ No 1~--20.
23. "Tarikh-e sakhteman-e karakhane-ye zob-e akhan dax Iran," 1349.
_ 8
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24. Ali Zahedi, "Sanaye-; ~~e Iran ba.d az d$hang Tehran ~ 1342.
25. SALNAME-YE "DONYA"~ 1340, No 3.
26. TF.~iRAN EKONOMIST ~ 134-1. No 466--470.
27. MADZHALI.E-YE BANK-E MARKAZ I-YE IRAN ~ 134~4 ~ No 4~4.
On 16 March 1973 there occurred theofficial openirg of the first stage of the
metallurgical plant. Taking part in this ceremony was the ChaiYman of the
USSR Council of Ministers~ A. N. Kosygin. In March 1973 an agr.eement was
signed prc~viding for an expansion o~ the plant to a capacity of 4 million tons _
of steel per yeax ~28; 29J.
- 28. I'LVESTIYA, i8 r[a,rch 1973�
_ 29. ETTELA'AT~ 1~ March 1973� ~
30. I{AYHAN INTER'vATIONAL, 17 March 1971.
31. MADZHALLE-YE BANK-E MARKAZI-YE IRAN~ i34,5, No 61. �
32 . IQiANDANIHA, 1970 ~ No 15.
The Soviet Union granted Iran credits amounting to 260 million rubles for a _
teYm of 12 years at an annual interest rate of 2.5 peraent. These credits _
were amortized by Iran by supplying natural gas to the Soviet Union~ as well
as the traditional Iranian export items. The credits being received by Iran
- from the countries of Western E~rope and the United States are being amor-
- tized by currency with an annua.l interest ra.te computed, on an average, at
_ 5~5 Percent; this is one of the methods used.to plunder Iran. Thus~ coope- -
ration with the Soviet Union is very advantageous for Iran; it facilttates
the creation of a national Iranian heavy industry and the development of its
foreign trade ~33~ 53J�
33� YNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA~ 1967, No 1.
34. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA~ 1975r No 6.
35� MARBUM~ 1354~ No 149.
36. MIHOVAYA EKONOMIKA I NIEZFIDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA~ i975~ No 9� _
37. TINES ~THE TIME5 ?J~ 10 July 1975�
- 38. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA~ 1974~ No 2.
39. In accordance with a contract concluded in 1975~ Soviet specialists are taking
part in the construction of eight more grain elevators in Iran. ,
44. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA~ 1970~ No 1.
9 _
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41. "Vneshnyaya politika Savetskogo Soyuza. 1967. 5b. dokumentov" ~Foreign Po-
licy of the S~viet Union, 1967 s Collected ~7ocumentsJ, Moacow ~ 1968. -
- 42 ~ ETTF~I,A'AT, 30 July 196? � ~
_ ~3. ETTELA'A�r~ il October 1972. '
~ 44. PRAVDA~ 13 July 1972,
45. The necessity of concluding such an agree~ent Kas noted even as far back as �
the high-Zevel Soviet-Iranian meeting in October 1968 ~r6, 263J.
46. '"Vneshnyay~ Politika Sovet~;cogo Soyuza. 1g68. Sb. dokumentov~" Moscox~ -
. 1969. -
47. "Yneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1972� Sb. dokumentov," Moscok,
- i973.
48. VNFSHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, i973~ No 2,
49, MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', 1974~ No 5.
- 50 . ~imA, 13 March 1979 �
51. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA~ 1973, No 4.
52. ETTII,A'AT, i7 Max,ch 1973� -
Suffice it to sa.y that during the construction of the Isfahan Metallurgical
Plant and its ancillarW facilities some 60~000 xorkers and engineering per-
sonnel were empluyed ~j~J.
53 � P~VDA. 3 March 1'979.
- COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Elm", 1980 _
-
Soviet-Iranian Cultural Ties : 1960--1980
Briku IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK AZERBAYDZHANSKOY SSR: SERIYA ISTORII, FILOSOFII I ~
PRAVA in Russian No 3~ 198o PP 38-46
~ ~Article by R. Shurkyurovas "Soviet-Iranian Cultural Ties during the 1960's and
_ 197o's";
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~TextJ The foreign policy of the Soviet Union ~ directed at stret~gtheri~:ng peace
and. international cooperation~ at aiding the developing countries, has won des- -
erved recognitiori on the pa,rt of pragreasive public opinion throughout the world~
As long ago as a, year before the Octeber Revolu~Cion V. I. Lenin~ in {'ozmulating the
principles of the pc~licy of the future socialist state with regard the oppressed
~eoples, wrots as follows :"We axe applying all our efforts to draw close to a.nd
merge with Mongolians, Persians, Indians, and Egypti;ins. We ar~ attempting to
render to these peoples, who axe more ba.ckward and oppressed than we axe, 'non-
_ mercenary cultuxal aid, ' in the splendid expression of the Polish Social-Democrats~
= i.e.~ to aid them in making the transition to using machinery~ to lightening
- their labor, and to democracy...." ~1~ 120~.
_ These humane Leninist principles constituted the moral foundation of the Soviet
state's foreign-policy course, its developing technical, economic, and cultural
- cooperation with the countries of the non-Soviet East, including Iran. -
The victory of the October Revolution in Rus~ia, a.s well as the creation of the
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics~ ensured Iran the possibility of developing
its own relations with other countries, including those xith the major powers,
on an equitable basis. From the first fex days of its existence the Soviet state
adopted the principle of equal Mghts in its relations with Iran, while at the
same time rendeMng considera,ble aid and facilitating the strengthening of its
sovereignty, along with the developnent of its productive forces and cultural life.
Cultural ties began to develop. They found their most notable reflection in the
sphere of literature (translations of works by Russian pre-revolutionary and Soviet
wMters into Persian and translations of xorks by the Ira.nian classical ~riters -
, and modern writers into Russian and the national languages of the Soviet republics),
as wel~ as organizations for art exhibits, motion pictur~s, and concert perfor-
mances by Soviet masters. ~
Considerable assistance to the further develo~ent of Soviet-Irania,n cultural ties
was rendered by the creation in the autumn of 1943 on the initiative of Iran's
progresaive public opinion of the Iranian 3ociety for Cultural Ties with the
Soviet Union~ which set as its goal the universal developnent of cultura.l ties
between the two countries~ acquaintance Kith the life of the Soviet peoples~
~ and the strengthening of friendship a,nd cooperation ~2J.
Nevertheless~ it should be noted that cultural ties with Iran~ as well as political
relations, developed unevenly; this xas linked with the intensification of reac- "
_ tionary, anti-Soviet tendencies in the foreign policy of the Iraniar_ state in one
phase or another. They became particulaxly ba,d, during the 195o's, after the over-
throw of Mossadegh's government and the establishment in the country of a police
regime which relied. on the United States. _
However, the policy of unilateral oMentation to the Western countries~ and pri-
= maxily to the United States, which led to a deepening of the economic, social~ and
domestic political crisis in Iran, mad.e it necessary to revise this policy within -
- the country's ruling circles~ inasmuch as their positions and the position of the
shah himself xere being threatened. As a result the ruling circles of Iran were
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compelled to nonnalize relations xith the USSR and other socialist countries; this
was done in the early 1960's. Of great importance for layin,~ down the path of
Soviet-Iranian cooperation was the visit to Iran 3n November 1963 of the Chaixman
of the Presidit.im of the US5R Supre~ne Soviet, L. I. Brezhnev~ xhich was greeted
with great waxmth by the Iranian people.
In evaluating the results of the years past~ the Iranian press emphasized that the
"friendship betxeen the peoples of Iran and the 5oviet Union is an historical
necessity" ~3J. It also emphasized the superiority of the Soviet eystem of educa-
tion and science. Thus~ the journ~al KHANDANIHA in its article "The Soviet Union
in Attracting Foreign Students Has Won the Competition Kith the West" wrote as
follows: "The Soviet Union is the first country to create a special university for
teaching foreign students.... Now stuc~ying there are students from 80 of the
world's countries, and the number of those desiring to go there is growing with
each passing year.... The system of education in the USSR, according to the opinion
of Western specialists~ is much more serious and productive, and after studying the
- situation in the higher educational institutions of the Sov3et Union, they reconunend
' that its example be folloxed" ~5~ 7J� _
The shift which has been noted in the mutual relations betxeen the two countries -
gave an impetus to the developnent of cultural ties~ which xere enriched by new
tendencies. This corresponcied. fully to the interests of progressive Iranian pub-
lic opinion which has alxays striven for cultural cooperation with the USSR. In -
August 1966 an agreement was signed in 7'ehran providing for cultural ties with the
USSR for a period of three years with the right to subsequently extend it for the -
same time periods. As was stated in the preamble of this agreeu?ent~ it was con-
cluded "proceeding frorn the striving to strengthen and continue cooperation between
both cour~tries in the fields of education, science, culture~ axt, and sports for
the purpose of implementing and becoming acquainted xith the above-mentioned. fields
by means of friendly cooperation." This agreetaent provided for the "expansion of
scholarly contacts betxeen the scientists of both countries, exchanges in the field
of education, the development of ties in the sphere of the theatrical arts~ music,
ballet, the exchange of dramatic and scientific films, the e sion of book ex-
change~ and other types of cultural ties, including sports" 6, 123--124J. The -
fruitfulness of these ties led to the conclusion of Soviet-Iranian cultural agree~-
- ments for a longer time period. Thus~ in October 1972 a plan was signed for
cultural exchanges between Iran and the USSR for a pariod of five years 79J�
Annd six years later, in June 197~~ a Soviet-Iranian protocnl xas signed in Moscow
- concerning cooperation in the field of culture for the years i978--1979~ provi-
ding, in particular, for an increase in the exchange of cultural delegations.
What is new in the sphere of Soviet-Iranian cultural cooperation pertains prima-
rily to the development of scholasly ties~ which ha.s found its chief reflection in
the sphere of Iranian studies. The high level of development of such studies in
the Soviet Union, its comprehensiveness~ along with its broad grasp of the various
aspec~ts of the social and cultural life of the Iranian state beginning with its
most ancient times have had to be recognized by the scholars and state figures of
Iran .
Soviet-Iranian scholarly cooperation has been ca,xried out through various channels
and in diverse directions: in the form of contacts between the scholars of the two
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= countries who are engaged in stuc~,}r3.ng the languages~ history, literature, econo-
mics, and art of the peoples of the Neax and Middle East~ coopera.tion in the study
of the rich cultural heritage of the peoples of the USSR and Iran, working out the
problems with regard to the varioiis branches of knowledge, publication of works~
translations, book exchange, exchanges of scholarly del~gations, study trips, lec-
tures~ and so forth.
Iranian scholars kere delegates at the 25th International Congress of Orientalists,
which took place in Moscow in Augu~t 1960. This was the first Congress of ~rien-
talists at which the Iranian Section had Persian as its xorking language. Soviet
- scholars--l?cademicians A. M. Mirzoyev, A. A. Alizade~ A. S. Sumbatzade~ Correspond-
_ ing Members of the US5R Academy of Sciences M. N. Bogolyubov, I. S. Braginskiy,
Professors A. N. Boldyrev~ ~I. S. Ivanov, and others pa~rticipated in the work of the -
International Congress of Iranists~ Which was held in Iran ~n i967. The Soviet
scholars Academician G. B. Gafurov and Professor A. N. Boldyrev became members of
_ the Sta.nding Committee of the International Congress of Iranists. And since July
1974 Academician ~3. G. Gafurov has also been an honorary doctor of Tehran Univer-
sity. From the Iranian side the director of the Pahlavi Scholaxly Library, Sh.
, Shafa~ was elected an honoraxy doctor of the MGU ~Moscow Sta,te UniversityJ~ imeni M.
V . Lomonosov.
Many Soviet scholars have visited Iran on study trips. Iranian scholars who are in-
terested in the development of scholarship and culture~ as well as the state of
Iranian studies in the USSR~ have also been frequent guests in our country: the -
Institute of Eastern Studies of the U5SR Academy of Sciences~ the Academies of Sci-
encea of the Union republics, universities, and libraries.
The famous Iranian mathematician and profess~or of Tehran University, Khaslztrudi,
- upon his return in 1962 from a trip to the Soviet Union, emphasized that a great im-
pression had been made on him by becoming acquainted. with the achievements of So-
viet schol~rs in the field of physical mathematics. He pointed out that the co-
lossal achievements of Soviet science are guaranteed in the first place by the fine
training received by scientific personnel and by the educational system ~7~.
The great interest toward the Soviet Union among wide circles of the Iranian public -
is testified to by the words of the prominent writer and scholarly doctor, Paxviz
Natel Khanlari, chairn?an of Iran's Cultural F~nd. He visited the Soviet Union on
an intexnational symposium on modern Iranian poetry which was held in Dushanbe in
- 3anuary 1968. Doctor Khanlari also visited Moscow.~ Leningra.d, and Tashkent. "I
consider," said Khanlaxi~ "that cooperation between Iranian and Soviet scholars is
very useful; it must be developed in all possible ways" ~BJ. In the scholaxly li-
terary journal SOHAN ("The Word"~), which is edited by Doctor Khanlaxi, his impres-
sions of the trip to the USSR were published~ as well as poems by Tajik poets.
_ In !~'ebruary 1971 the newspaper FtiRMAN in an article entitled "The Development of
_ Cultural Coopera.tion between Iran and the USSR" wrote that scientific and cultural
cooperation was growing broader with each passing year. Working particularly ac-
tively in this direction axe the Pahlavi Library and the Research Center for Ira-
nia.n Culture ("Bon'yade farhange Iran"). The article states that now not only are
works by Soviet Iranian scholars being translated but scholarly research in this
field is being coordina.ted between the Research Center on Iran, the USSR Academy of
Sciences~ the Tajik SSR Aca.demy of Sciences, and the G~EOrgian SSR Academy of Sci-
ences ~9J.
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A significant contribution to the scholarly exploitation of the treasury of Ira-
nian poetry and prose was made by the Azerbaijanian scholar R. M. Aliyev. In Iran
alone some 20 of hia k~orks have been published~ including such major ones as the
critical textual edition of Vol 1 of Firdausi's "Shah-name" (prepared ~ith N. Os-
manov � the critical textual edition With research and commentaxies of "Sa'di-
name" ("Bustan")~ the critical textual edition with research and notes of the "Per-
sian Divan" by Nasim~ and many scholarly articles. In a foreKOrd to the "Sa'di-
name" ("Bustan") the prominent Iranian critic and literary scholar Faruzanfar notes
that this scholar "has done a great dea,l for Iranian literature." In speaking spe-
cifically about R. M. Aliyev's critical textual editing of the "Sa'di-name" ("Bus-
tan"), Faruzanfa,r emphasizes that "the reader will now be able to read this poetic
collection in the fozm in xhich it existed at a time close to that of its author~
with full confidence in the correctness of its vocabulary, phraseology~ and con-
tents, as well as being able to make judgements on the stylistics and method of
thought of the great sheikh" ~10,J.
Another fruit of the scholarly cooperation between the Research Center for Iranian
- Culture and the USSR's scholaxly institutions was the book "Khomay and Khomayun" by
Khaju Kezmani. The text of this epic poem~ a landmark of the 14th century, prepared
and researched from the oldest manuscripts from holdings in Iran~ Britain~ and the
USSP. by the Soviet Iranist K. S. Ayni, xas also published in Tehran. K. S. Ayni's
research received high praise both in Iran and in the USSR. The Iranian bibliogra-
phical journal RAKHNAMA-E KETAB included this book in its list of the year's best
books, h~hile the literary journals YAGMA and SOHAN called it a"model of textolo- _
- gical labor." This re~earch work was accorded a foreword by the general director
of the Research Center for Iranian Culture, Doctor P. N. Khanlari ~9J.
Another slgnificant cultural event was the publication in 1971 of the acadP.mic edi-
tion of the remarkable narrative poem by a classical writer of Persian literature~
- the Second-Century poet Fakhrad-din Gorgani~ "Vis and Raiain." The critical textual -
edition of this poem, based on all the extant manuscripts from holdings in the USSR,
Iran, Britain~ India~ and Turkey~ as well as the Ancient Georgian versions~ was pre-
pared by the Soviet Iranists M. A. Todua and K. S. Ayni under the directfon of Aca-
demician G. V. Tsereteli.
The level of development of Iranian studies in the Soviet Union is further testified
to by the fact that a Soviet bibliography on Iran nwnbers about 10~000 titles of mo-
nographs~ collections of articles~ and translations from Persian. Works by Soviet
scholars occupy a prominent place in the development of worldwide Iranian studies.
Intensive and valuable research is being conducted by the Iranists of Soviet Azer-
baijan. At the Institute of the Peopl~s of the Near and Middle East of the Azerbai-
janian SSR Academy of Sciences~ where the principal forces of the republic's Ira-
nists are concentrated, compreher~sive studies have been undertaken of the problems
of the history~ philology~ economics, and social thought of Iran. Widely renowned
are the works of ~zerbaijanian Iranists, devoted to agraxian relations~ questions of -
Iran's industrial development, the labor and trade-union movement, class formations~
the formation of pol~tical �2arties, problems in the developanent of Persian litera-
ture and language, the diss~:~nination of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in Iran, etc.
Literary ties undersrent a remarka.ble development during the 1960's and 197~~S� 'i'his
pertains, first of all~ to translations of belles lettres, which~ to the greatest _
extent, facilitates mutual understanding between peoples.
7-~.
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The Soviet publishing house "Progress~" which is well known to Iranian readers~
during the course of the 19~'s ana. 197o's prepared translations and published
editions of a nt~mber of korks by Russian and Soviet writers in 30 languages~ in-
cluding Persian. Among them are xorks by I. Turgenev~ A. Tolstoy~ A. Chekhov~ A.
Pushkin, M, Sholokhov~ and M. Gor'kiy. They also published. collections of poems
by Soviet poets, such as V. Mayakovskiy~ IK. Tursunzade~ K. Kuliyev~ and others.
F~rthermore, the Soviet reader obtained the possibility of becoming acquainted not
only with the creative Work of the classical writers of Persian literature, but
also with the xorks of present-day prose writers an~ poets of Iran~ such as Sa.d.ek
Khadayat~ Said Nafisi~ Shahriyar~ awnd others~ who are being published in Russian
a.nd many other languages of the peoples of the USSR. The works of Iranian writers
have made it possible for the Soviet reader to deepen his own ~deas about the da,ily
lives~ culture~ and world view of the peoples of Iran.
- In 19?1 on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the establishment of Iranian-
- Soviet state relations~ the goverrvnents of both countries decided to institute a
literaxy prize named after the outstanding poet Abol Hasem Firdausi. This prize
i s awarded once every two years to citizens of the USSR and Iran for outstanding
xorks in the flelds of scholarship, literature~ and art~ which facilitate the
strengthening of friendship and mutual understanding between the peoples of these
countries.
The first wiruiers of the Firdausi Prize xere a,s follows s the director of the Lenin- -
grad 5tateHeanitage Museum~ Academician B. Piotrovskiy--for his research studies
~ in the field of the ancient culture of the peoples of Transcaucasia and Iran; the
prorector of the Tashkent Sta.te University, Professor Sh. Shakhmukhammedov--for
his meritorious service in popularizing Ta3ik and Persian literature~ as well as
for training specialists in this field; the chairman of the Council on Cultural _
Ruestions of the Palace Ministry of Iran, Honorary Doctor of the MGU imeni M. V.
Lomonosov, and director of the Pahlavi Scholarly L,ibrary~ Sh. Shafa--for his
active work in collecting and popularizing the Iranian heritage in the field of
1 iteratureand language; the prominent Persian writer and philologist, president
of the Academy of Literature and Art of Iran, and publisher of the ~ournal SOHAN,
N. P. Khanlari--for his scholarly contribution in the field of Persian literature
~ and language Cii~.
A prominent place in the cultural ties between Iran and the USSR is occupied by
the exchange of motion pictures. Iranian screens have shown the best-known Soviet
films, while the Soviet viewer has had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with
the films of the Iranian national cinematography, Iran was an active participant -
i n the Moscow and Tashkent International FiLn Festivals. Vaxious cities in the
5oviet Union have on more than one oceasion conducted Iranian Film Weeks, during
which such motion pictures as the following have b~en shown: "Sunrise~" "The
Tiger of Mazandaran," "European Bride," "The Long Night~" "The Eighth Day of the
Week~" and others; these have been wanuly received, by Soviet viewers.
- At the lOth International Festival of Scientific and Educational Films, which was -
h eld in Iran in December 1973~ Soviet films were awarded two gold medals and one
s ilver medal. The winners of the festival were the Soviet films "Bird X~" "The
Structure of a Stem," "The Polarization of Light," and "I Want to Understand You"
~12J.
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M
In June 1975 the largest cities in Iran--Tehran, Tabriz, Is.fahan~ and Abadan--
with great success conducted a festival of Soviet films devoted to the 30th Anni-~
- versary of the Victory over Gern?an Fascism. Iranian vierrers became acquainted
with Soviet documentary and feature motion pictures about the Great Patriotic WIlr~
such as "Tr+o Soldiers," "Ballad of a Solcller~" "The Great Battle on the Volga,"
"900 Unforgettable Days~" and others which produced an enonnous impression. At
the end of 197? an International Festival for Children and Young People was held
in Tehran. The highest award at the Tehran Festival xas won by the film "The
Wishing Tree~" Which was made by the Georgian director T. Abuladze.
Great popularity in Iran is enjoyed by Soviet performing artists~ composers~ and
musicians. In January 1978 a~uccessful tour was ma.de by the Moscow State Sym-
- phony Orchestra under the direction of V. Dudarova. The Iranian press~ in -
commenting on the perforn?ances by the Soviet musicians~ emphasized their high deg-
ree of perfozming skills~ the outstanding conducting talent of V. Dudarova, and
the virtuoso perfozmances of works by Ru~ssian and Soviet composers by the young
pianist from Azerbaijan, F. Badalbeyli.
An enormous impression was produced in Iran by the USSR's art of ballet~ which was
- demonstrated on the Iranian stage. The nexspa,pers KAYHAN, JOURNAL DE TEHRAN, and
AYANDEGAN wrote in their pages about the production of the ballet "5?~ran Lake" by
-Tchaikovskiy, as staged by the well-knoxn Georgian choreographex�~ V. Chabukiani~
participa.ting in which were soloists from the Theater of Oper~a, and Ballet of the
Georgian SSR~ as well as Iranian perforniing artists. The ne~+spapers gave high
maxks to the perfoimances by the Georgian ballet artists in the two leading parts
in the traditions of the "splendid school of Russian ballet~ which is distinguished
for its purity. lightness, and expressiveness of dance" ~13J. ~
In June 1979 the Tr~HRAN DZHORNEL published a long axticle on the Soviet ballet
film "Spartacus~" set to the music of A. Khachaturyan. Calling this film a pearl
of Soviet cinematography~ ~~;he author of the article reaaarked on the outstanding
mastery of the performers V. Yasil'ev, N. Bessmertnnva~ M. Liyepa, and N. Timo-
- feyeva, as well as the ma,gnificent music by A. Khachaturyan and the choreography
by Grigolbvich. The showing of such films~ noted the newspaper~ facilitates the -
development of the Iranian na.tional ballet ~14J. Anoth~r Iranian newspaper~
ETTELA'AT~ wrote in its pages about the Soviet art of ballet and about the most
famous productions of the Bol'shoy Theaters "Swan Lake," "Giselle," and "The
Sleeping Beauty" ~15J.
Visits by A. Khachaturyan, Niyazi~ F. Amirov~ R. Barshay~ M. Magomayev~ R. Beybutov,
G. Gasparyan, and others xere events of enornious importance in the cultural life
of Iran. Great popularity was enjoyed by the Soviet circus, the dance ensemble
under the direction of I. Moiseyev, the symphony orchestra of the Moscow State
Philharmonic under the direction of Yu. Temirk~(aaov.
- Exhibits have had great importance for the mutual understanding of the cultures
of the peoples. Numerous monuments of Iranian culture and art have been preserved
in the lasgest museums of the USSR--the State Hermita.ge in Leningrad, the State
Museum of the Arts of the Peoples of the ~ast in Moscow, as well as in the museums
of Baku~ Tashkent, Tbilisi~ and other cities of the Soviet Union. Their exhibitions
have been represented at the thematic exhibits of Iranian pure and applied arts~
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Persian manuscripts, and rugs~ which have been held on m~re than one occasion in
the Soviet Union.
In December 1963 an exhibit of Iranian miniatures wa.s helci in the State Museum of
the Arts of the Peoples of the East; it xas organized by the Administration of Fine
Arts of Iran and the USSR Ministry of Culture. This exhibit~ which numbered about
200 works from the collections of Iranian musewas~ oFened up for Soviet people one
, of the splendid pages of Iranian pictorial art.
Both countries have held more than one photo exhibit; these exhibitions have told
the story~ in particular, of the achiev~nents in the field of culture in Iran and
the USSR. In May 1974 the capital of Iran conducted an exhibit entitled "The USSR
_ --The Country and Its People in Photographs." During the seme yeax an exhibit de-
voted to Iran was organized in the P~lytechnical Museum in Moscow. These exhibits
invariably attracted a great deal of attention from the peo~le attending them.
Great scholarly interest was evoked by the Second Conference on the Art and Archeo-
- logy of Iran vrhich was held in October 1973 in Moscow at the State Museum of the
Arts of the Peoples of the Ea,st ~ith the participation of scholaxs from Oriental
studies institutions from tnroughout the coun.try--Moscok~ Leningrad~ Baku, Tbilisi~
. Tashkent, and other cities of the Soviet Union~ and the large exhibit wizich was or-
ganized in conjunction with it of Iranian painting of the 17th~ 18th, and 19th cen-
turies, consistin~ of items preserved in the Sta.te Museum of the Arts of the
Peoples of the East~ the Herniitage~ and the Museirm=.of:�Georgian Arts.
Cultural ties in certain other fields, including sports~ were also developed during
the 1964's and 1970's. _
A br.oad exchange of cultural delegatians took place, including some at a high level.
Thus, the Soviet Union was visited by the following personsi the minister of cul-
ture ar?d the arts~ the minister of science and higher education~ the minister ~f en-
- lightentnent, the director of the center for scholarly documentation~ the director -
of sports societies~ and a number of other highly placed persons. Iran, in turn~
has been visited by Soviet scholars~ writers, and cultural figures. In the field
of the press Iran has been visited by 3ournalists and correspondents from the cen-
- tral newspapers and journals, while the Soviet Union has been visited by the lead-
ing editors and publishers of ETTELA'AT~ KAYHAN, PAYGAME EMRUZ~ TEHRANA MOSAWAR,
KHANDANIHA, and others ~4~ 79--80J.
J The indubitable importa.nce of the Soviet-Iranian cultural contacts which develoged
during the 1960's and 1970's consisted primarily in the fact that they mad.e it pos-
sible for the Iranian public to become acquainted with the level of cultural de-
velopment of the peoples of the USSR, including its Eastern peoples, xith the le-
vel of scholarly reseaxch in the USSR with regaxd to Iran, to receive direct scho-
laxly aid from Sovi,et s~holaxs in working on the landmarks of Iranian culture~ and
to get a look at the masterpieces of the art of Soviet masters who have made a n~-
table mark in the develo~ent of Iran's cultural life. Tnese contacts have permi.t-
ted various circles of the Soviet public to become more closely acquainted with
- many spheres of the ver,y rich Iranian culture--the literary landmar.ks and master-
pieces of Iranian art--~ and to esta,blish direct cooperation Hith Iranian scholars
_ and other cultural figures; this~ in twrn~ has enriched our ideas about Iran and
stimulated the develoFenent of Iranian studies in the USSR. _
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~ The 19?8--1979 ~ti-monarchist~ anti-imperialist revolution in Iran, after over-
throwing the shah's regime, proclaimed kith the lips of the pe~ple the striving
to create and develop an independent society. The Soviet state, true to its Lenin-
iet principles of foreign policy~ dec].ared its readiness to develop the broadest
possible ties with r.evolutionaxy Iran. Shortly after the victory of the Iranian
revolution~ on 2 hlaxch 1979 in his speech in a meeting with the voters of the
Baumanskiy Electoral District in the ci_ty of Moscox~ the leader of our party and
state~ Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, said as follows: "We kish success and prosperity
to the nex revolutionary Iran, and we hope that relations of good-neighborliness
betHeen the peoples of the Soviet Union and Iran will dsvelop fruitfully under the
new conditions on a firm basis of mutual respect~ goodwill~ and non-interference
in the internal affairs of each other" ~
16J.
Despite the complexity of the internal political situation in Iran, which undoubt-
ed.ly has affected Iranian-Soviet relations, including those in the field of culture~
_ it is gratifying to note that sharply defined tendencies have begun to appear in
Iran torrard a further recognition of the merits of Soviet ~cholarship on the level
of studying the history and culture of their country~ as xell as 5oviet literature. _
A specific manifestation of this xas, for example, the translation of the section
on the history of Iran during the first half oi the 19th century (author N. A.
- Kuznetsova} from the book "Outline of Modern Iranian History" (Moscow, 1978)~ as
caxried out by the Tehran publishing house "Neshr-e beynolmelyali~" R. A. Seidov's
book "The Iranian ~ourgeoisie in the Late 19th and Ea.rly 20th Centuries" (Moscow~
197~;, 0. S. Melikov's book "The Establishment of Reza-Shah's Dictatorship in
Iran" fMosco-~, 1960); this last-named work shows the path to power taken by the
first 1?ahlavi monarch, following the methods of despotism in the country's com-
plicated internal political circwastances of that time.
~ In Apr.il 1980 the press released the news of the publication by the Tehran publish-
ing house "Solkh" of selected works by the Azerbaijanian poet Nabi Khazri in Azer-
~ baijani and Persian. In the introduction by the translator of this collection~
the well-knorrn Iranian poet Moha,mmed Ali Niahmid~ awarded high marks to the level
- of literature and culture of Soviet Azerbaijan ~17J. -
The further strengthening and developnent of cultural contacts between the two -
countries will bring undoubted aid to the peoples of Iran and those of the USSR.
- FOOTNOTES
1. V. I. Lenin, Caricature of Marxism~" in PSS ~Complete Collected. WorksJ~
Vol 30.
2. For the development of Soviet-Iranian ties prior to the 1960's see: D. Valiyev~
"5ovetsko-iranskiye kul'turnyye svyazi" ~oviet-Iranian Cultural Ties~,
Tashkent~ 1y6~.
3. NEDA-E IRAN-E ;~lOVIN~ 4 July 1965. C1ted in ~4~ 76J.
_ 4. N. 5. Tikhanov, "Desyat' let plodotvornogo sotrudnichestva (spets. vypusk)"
~Ten Years of Fruitful Cooperation (Special EditionjJ~ Izd. TSNION pri AN
Azerb. SSR~ Baku~ 19~4.
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5. KHANllANIHA~ 1345 (1966;, tvo 6i.
- 6. For text see: VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNuGO SOVETA SSR, 20 March 1968~ No 12.
* After the Revolution of February 1979 i.n Iran many institutions of the fonner
shah's regime were abolished~ and their officials were replacedcorrespondingly.
A reorganization was also carried out in the system of higher educational in-
, stitutions and in the press.
7. IZVESTIYA, 22 November 19~.
8. IZVESTIYA, 16 January 1968.
- 9. FARtiAN~ 30 February 1971.
10. "Sa'di-name ya Bustan," Entesharat-e ibn-Sina. Tehran, 13~7 (19~).
li. IZVESTIYA, 15 ,Tanuary 197~.
12. VYSHKA, 26 December 1973�
13. KAYHAN, JOUR'VAL DE TEHRAN, AYANDEGAN, 2 February 1972�
14. TEHRAIV D'LHORhAL~ 4 June 1978.
15. ETTELA'AT~ 14 June 1978.
16. PRAVDA, 3 Ma,rch i979.
17. BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY~ 17 June 19g0.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Elm", 1980
23~
Cso: 1807/069
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REGIONAL
SULTANGALIYEVISM ATTACKED BY TATAR AUTHORS
Kazan' TATARSKAYA ASSR: REAL'NOST' I BURZHUAZNYYE MIFY in Russian 1977 (signed to
press 14 Jun 77) pp 123-138
_ /Chapter 6 from the book "The Tatarskaya ASSR: Reality and Bourgeois Myths", Tatar-
- skoye knizhnoye izdatel'stvo/
/Text/ Sultangaliyevism and Its Bourgeois Defenders
The establishment of Soviet power enabled the Tatar workers to proceed to solve
numerous and difficult problems of building the nation. The main ways of solving
them were outlined by the Program of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)
and the resolutions on the national problem, which were passed by the lOth and 12th
party congresses. Whereas the elimination of the legal inequality of nations was
the first step of the socialist revolution, the abolition of their de facto (eco- -
nomic and cultural) inequality ~hould have become its next step. In the end the _
goal of the party was to help the workers of the non-Russian nations and nationali- -
ties to catch up with the advanced nations, to eliminate the vestiges of the former
national discord and to unite in one harmonious multinational family.
The attainment of this goal did not 4!.it the Tatar bourgeoisie, just as the bour- -
geoisie of the other nations of Russia. Therefore the Tatar bourgeoisie inter-
- preted the formation of Soviet autonomy in a nationalistic spirit--as the creation
of a state system, which was not connected by any bonds with the Russian Federation
and was not dependent on it. ~he nationalist bourgeoisie perceived the declaration
of the Tatarskaya ASSR as an act of the separation of the Tatar people from the Rus- _
~ sian people, as a unique "partition." Former State Duma member K. Khasanov let out
the cherished thoughts of the Tatar bourgeoisie when he said: "We, the Tatar na-
tion, for several centuries vegetated at the Russian Court. This day (the day of
the declaration of the Tatarskaya ASSR--M. A. and S. B.) we achieved partition"
~ (113, p 36).
The goal of the bourgeoisie was to set the Tatar people against other peoples and
to kindle national enmity and hatred in the name of maintaining class domination
over "their own" workers. Sultangall.yevism was precisely an expression of the _
- organized protest of the nationalist bourgeoisie against the policy of the Commu-
_ nist Party (113, p 7).
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_ Bourgeois authors have exerted considerable effort in trying to prove that Sultan- _
galiyevism reflected the ~~iew not of the bourgeoisie, but of the broad masses. At
the same time "Sovietologists" and Tatar nationalist emigres are not sparing in
their compliments for M. Sultan-Galiyev, calling him a"revolutionary," "national
communist" and even a"genuine Marxist." Thus, A. Bennigsen and C. Quelquejay extol
Sultan-Galiyev, int~erpreting his views as the application of Marxist-Leninist doc-
trine to the colonial East and himself as a revolutionary who ostensibly set as a
goal "to direct the October Revoluticn toward Asia" (178, p 323). -
As a result the question of the social roots of Sultangaliyevism is veiled, while
the problem of its ideological sources is solved in an obviously idealized light. _
It is impossible to understand the essence of Sultangaliyevism with~ut taking into
account the spiritual relationship between it and the views of the Tatar national-
ist bourgeoisie~ The ideas of Sultan-Galiyev were in many ways in keeping with the -
conceptions of the ideologists of the Tatar bourgeoisie.
First, there is the "theory" of the "united multitude." Like other.Pan-Islamists,
Sultan-Galiyev believed that the Tatar bourgeois nation prio r to the October Revo-
lution had not undergone or had hardly undergone sociai diff erentiation. In his
opinion, the increased class differentiation among Tatars b egan only in 1918. -
Thereby Sultan-Galiyev ignored the fact of the existence among Tatars of a prole-
tariat and a bourgeoisie and of the class struggle between them.
Second, there is the recognition of the special "cultural mission of the Tatars" _
with respect to the other peoples of the East, the need for the constant orienta-
tion of the Turkic peoples toward Kazan' as the spiritual and cultural center of
Islam. The aspiration of Sultan-Galiyev to make the eastern peoples of Russia de-
pendent on the Tatar bourgeois nation was concealed behind the formulation about a _
"cultural mission."
Third, there is the recognition of the pqsitive role of the Islamic religion and
the Islamic clergy in the life of the Tatar workers. Thus, with respect to
Shari'ah laws Sultan-Galiyev wrote that ostensibly among them there are "very many
which are of a quite positive nature." As to the fanatic reactionary Tatar clergy,
as Sultan-Galiyev claims, it had disappeared before the February Revolution, while
_ "a new clergy, which promoted the weakening of the religiaus fanaticism of the
_ Tatars, appeared in its place" (117, pp 24, 29, 36-37).
Fourth, there is the rejection of the idea of the class cooperation of the workers
of various nations. Nothing whatsoever remained of it after the fact of a class
differentiation among Tatars was repudiated, a special role in the East was ascribed
to them and the importance of Islam as a common ideology for the Turkic people was
emphasized in every possible way.
Thus, the conceptions of Sultan-Galiyev were thoroughly permeated with Pan-Islami-
cism and Fan-Turkism. In order to conceal their essence, Sultan-Galiev attempted
- to disguise his nationalist arguments by means of Marxist phraseology.
_ This, of course, is not an accident: in 1917, when Sultan-Galiyev became associ-
ated with the Bolshevik Party, he already had behind him experience in cooperating
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with the Moslem bourgeoisie in the spreading of nationalist ideas. By this activ-
ity of his, in his own words, he earned the gratitude of prominent Pan-Islamists -
and Pan-Turkists.
Consequently, it is necessary to seek the ideological saurces of Sultangaliyevism
in bourgeois nationalism. Having joined the Communist Party, Sultan-Galiyev
"changed color" only on the outside. He di.d not become a Marxist. He was de-
scribed very accurately by the prominent figure of our party S. Ordzhonikidze,
- who in 1923 pointed out: "...The participation of one Moslem intellectual or an-
other in the struggle against the reaction... still does not prove anything. This
does not mean that one is a communist. It means only that one is our fellow
traveler" (113, p 71) .
The rating of Sultan-Galiyev as a fellow traveler of the party denotes the tempor-
_ ary, tactical nature of his participation in the revolution. The views of this na-
tionalist reflected the vacillatiens of the class which was between the proletariat
and the bouxgeoisie, that is, the petty bourgeoisie. Tiierefore Sultangaliyevism,
_ like the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, was characterized by all its negative
traits: a metaphysical, one-sided approach to the assessment of phenomena of social
life, the failure ~o understand the guiding role af the proletariat in societ~, in-
consistency, "evasiveness and influence with respect to socialist ideology (32, _
p 374), nationalism. The treatment of questions of the socio-economic and politi-
cal development of the eastern peoples from the point of view of this ideology
- meant not "the application of Marxism-Leninism" to the national problem, as bour- _
geois falsifiers claim, but its right-wing opportunist revision. Objectively
Sultangaliyevism played into the hands of the bourgeoisie. _
Citing the articles of Sultan-Galiyev, which were published in October-November 1919, _
American "Sovietologist" R. Pipes attempts to fQrce upon the readers the idea that -
"the ideology of Sultan-Galiyev was not at variance with the Bolshevik strategy of
1919-1920...." But it is enough to compare the views of Sultan-Galiyev with Len- .
- in's theses on the fundamental questions of the national liberation struggle for
the incompatibility of his ideological stand with the general line of the party to
become immediately clear.
V. I. Lenin, in regarding the October Revolution in Russia as the first act of the
commenced world socialist revolution, pointed out that it would not be able to
triumph, having only struck the "front" of. imperialism, that is, the mother coun-
tries, it should also strike its "rear," that is, the colonies. The collapse of
world imperialism will occur as a result of the combination of socialist revolu-
tions in the countries of the West with the national liberation struggle of the
oppressed peoples of the East. V. I. Lenin expressed a high opinion of the anti-
imperialist movement of the colonial peoples. In his report at the Second All-
Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East (Novem-
ber 1919) he noted that these peoples "have to play a great role in the revolution- _
ary struggle, in the revolutionary movement...." At the same time V. I. Lenin did
not forget for one moment that,in the end the fate of world imperialism would be
~ decided not in the colonies, but in the mother countries, that is, where its main -
positions are. Therefore, V. I. Lenin said, "only the proleratiat of all the ad-
vanced countries of the world can finally triumph..." (7, pp 328, 330).
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The conception of Sultan-Galiyev was based on completely opposite conclusions. It
_ was based on the fact that ostensibly the national liberation movement of the
peoples of the East would strike the final biow to world imperialism. According to
Sultan-Galiyev, the victory of the national democratic revolutions and the aboli-
tion of the colonial system would lead to the automatic collapse of international
imperialism. "Deprived of the East and cut off from India, Afghanistan, Persia and
i.ts other Asian and African colonies," he declared, "West European imperialism
should go into decline and die a natural death" (117, p 38). Taking this concep-
tion as his basis, Sultan-Galiyev called upon revolutionaries to direct their main
attention not to the West, but to the East, where the fate of international imperi- ~
alism was ostensibly being decided.... When reading these arguments of Sultan-
Galiyev, it seems that you are dealing with a contemporary Maoist exponent, who is
prophesying that "the center of the revolutionary storms has moved to the East," -
that henceforth "the wind from the East prevails over the wind from the West" and
so forth.
~
Lenin's conception of the world revolutionary process is based, as is known, on the
recognition of the need for a stable alliance of the international proletariat with ~
the oppressed peoples of the East, who are peasants for the most part, as the most
important condition of the success of their struggle against imperialism. In this
alliance the leading role should belong to the proletariat as the main, leading
force of the anti-imperialist camp. Only the proletariat is capable of uniting the
various currents of the revolutionary movement, of pointing out to them clear ob-
_ jectives of the struggle and of leading them into a decisive assault on capitalism.
Sultan-Galiyev set the national liberation movement against the struggle of the
international working class. He in fact struck out Lenin's brilliant idea about
the need far an alliance of the oppressed peoples w3th the international proletari-
_ at by his thesis that since nearly all the classes of colonial society are op-
pressed by capitalism, they all ostensibly "have the right to be called proletari-
- ans." Having thus replaced the Marxist interpretation of the term "proletariat"
with the petty bourgeois interpretation, Sultan-Galiyev thereby cleared the way for
the conclusion about the needlessness of the proletarian leadership of the national
liberation movement. This is so obvious to any reader who is in any way acquainted
with Marxism-Leninism that even the revisionist (R. Garodi) was compelled to call -
Sultan-Galiyev's thesis "nationalistic," "alien to the fundamental principles of _
. Marxi~t analysis" (182, p 88).
The negative attitude of Sultan-Galiyev toward the idea of the proletarian leader-
ship of the national liberation movement was based on his deep lack of faith in the
revolutionary abilities of the international working class. Without understanding
- the revolutionary essence of its strategy and tactics in the national liberation
movement, Sultan-Galiyev accused the international and Russian proletariat of "one�-
sidedness," "impotence" and their failure to fulfill "the prosise to support the
revolutionary aspirations of the East." He completely ignored the assistance and
support which was given by Soviet Russia to the struggling countries of the East--
Turkey, Afghanistan, China, India and so on. Lenin's idea that, having broken the
chain of imperialism at one link and having split the world into two systems, the
October Socialist Revolution thereby gave enormous assistance to the structure of -
the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries for their liberation, was
fundamentally alien to Sultan-Galiyev.
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To counterbalance Lenin's conception Sultan-Galiyev advanced the idea of turning ~
over the leadership of the national liberation movement to the more developed east-
ern peoples of Soviet Russia (for example, the Tatars), who, as peoples close in
, lsnguage and culture, should lead them. Thus, Sultan-Galiyev replaced the class
principle of the leadership of the national liberation movement by the national
principle.
As a result of this substitution the distinct class outlook of the development of
national democratic movements was lost. Under these conditions the national bour- _
geoisie, the revolutionary nature of which was transitory, while the opposition of
its interests to the interests of the proletariat was perma.nent, was able to make
its way to the leadership under the cover of outwardly "revolutionary" slogans.
Even the briefest survey of Sultan-Galiyev's main conceptions on the questions of
- the national liberation movement reveal their petty bourgeois, anti-Leninist na-
- ture. 7'hese conceptions were at variance with the party program, which was adopted
- at the eighth congress in 1919 and indicated that in the area of national relations
"the policy of the convergence of the proletarians and semiproletarians of differ-
ent nationalities for the joint revolutionary struggle to overthrow the lando~aners
and bourgeoisie is regarded as of paramount importance" (56, p 45).
- But the matter was not limited only to the "theoretical exercises" of Sultan-
Galiyev, which in itself already upset the ideological unity of the ranks of the
party. His anti-Leninist views fed his nationalist political line. It was a poli-
cy of opposing the movement of peoples for the creation of their own national state
system to the general party policy of building socialism. Takiiig refuge in social-
ist phraseology, the Sultangaliyevists persistently pursued a policy of separating
the non-Russian peoples from the Russian proletariat. For these purposes they used -
extensively the slogan of creating a united state system of the peoples of the
Volga River region and the Urals and initially linked the realization of their
plans with the creation of a Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic.
Sultan-Galiyev and his sympathizers, proceeding from their hegemonic plans, did not
want to hear anything about the formation of a separate Bashkir autonomy. The con-
clusion by the Soviet Government of an agreement with the Bashkir nationalist gov-
ernment on the creation of a Soviet autonomy evoked a negative reaction among the
Sultangaliyevists. On 27 February 1919, soon after the Bashkir troops, who prior ~
to this had fought in the camp of the Whites, went over to the side of the Red Army,
Sultan-Galiyev in a direct-line telephone conversation said to A.-Z. Validov, the
leader of the Bashkir nationalists: "You were in too much of a hurry, you uselessly
went over to the side of the Bolsheviks and thereby ruined the matter..." (159,
- p 71). By "the matter" Sultan-Galiyev meant the idea of creating a united Tatar-
Bashkir state.
Sultan-Galiyev attempted "to rectify the situation" at the Second Congress of Com-
munist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, again dragging out the slogan of
the formatian of a Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic. But this venture of his failed.
Then Sultan-Galiyev attempted to achieve his goals in a roundabout way, through the
inclusion in the Tatar autonomy being created of territories with a Tatar-Bashkir
population, which were not a part of the Bashkirskaya ASSR. He set forth his
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plans in a letter dated 21 February 1920 to the well-known nationalist G. Baimbe-
tov, stating that henceforth "there is only one... chance to create a Tatar-Bashkir
Republic: ...to declare the remaining area the Tatar Republic, to consolidate it,
and then to merge with Bashkiria" (94, p 94).
However, the creation of a Tatar-Bashkir ~epublic was not the ultimate goal of
Sultan-Galiyev--he regarded it only as an intei-mediate stage on the road to the
_ creation of a Turanian Republic, which should have included the Volga River region,
the Urals, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. This idea was borrowed in full by Sultan-
Galiyev from militant Pan-Turkists liks Rashid-kazyy Ibragimov, who back in 1905
wrote about the need to unite the peoples of the Middle and Lower Volga River re-
gion, the Urals and Siberia in a Pan-Turkic state.
After the failure to create a Tatar-Bashkir Republic, Sultan-Galiyev advanced the
slogan of forming a"Volga-Kama Federation," which should have included the Tatars,
Chuvash, Mari and Udmurts. This federation was conceived by him as a state ensur-
- ing the hegemony of the Tatars over the small nationalities of the region. But
this attempt of the Sultangaliyevi~ts also failed owing to the reluctance of the
peoples of the Volga River and Urals regions to create such a federation. Sultan-
Galiyev admitted that "the Chuvash and Mari were wary of this idea and did not espe-
cially aspire to a union with the Tatars."
The foreign defenders of the Sultangaliyevists also justify their attempt to cre-
ate a separate "Moslem Communist Party," citing, in particular, their desire osten-
sibly "to leave free the hands" r,f the Tatar revolutionaries for leading the so-
cialist revolution in the East. As the first step in this direction the Sultan-
galiyevists were prepared to use the sectioizs of communists of the eastern peoples,
which had been set up in the party in the interests of taking into account the na- ~
tional peculiarities of local party work. The national-deviationists sought the
recognition of the federative principle of interrelations between the party and
these sections, having as a goal in the end to detach them from the Russian Commu-
nist Party (of Bolsheviks) and to form them into an independent party. The Sultan-
galiyevists and their sympathizers were obsessed with the idea of uniting the com-
munist organizations in the eastern republics in a"Colonial International," which
_ was separate from Comintern and was opposed to it. Such separatism in organiza-
tional matters inevitably led to the separation of the arisen communist movement in
the East from the international communist movement and only played into the hands
of the bourgeoisie. Therefore the Second Congress of Communist Organizations of
the Peoples of the East, having supported the retention of national sections in the
party, at the same time indicated the need for their subordination to lo.cal party -
organizations. This was the only correct solution, which was dictat~d by the in-
terests of uniting the communists of all nationalities of the country into a uni-
fied Communist Party.
_ Reluctant to recognize the objective laws of the failure of the nationalist plans _
of the Sultangaliyevists for building a state and a party, bourgeois authors cite
other reasons to substantiate their anti-Soviet ideas. Thus, Bennigsen and Quel-
que~ay see the main cause of the defeat of Sultan-Galiyev in the fact that all his
proposals "came up against the insurmountable opposition of Stalin" (178, p 371). ~
In this way the "Sovietologists" wish to achieve two goals at once: first, to
_ prove the purely "chance" nature of the failure of the nationalist conceptions of
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Sultan-Galiyev; second, to play on the criticism of the personality cult of Stalin
by the 20th CPSU Congr~ss.
Bourgeois ideologists ignore the basic fact that the nationalist policy of the
Sultzngaliyevists went against the national policy of the entire party. Not oniy
Stalin, who held the position of People's Commissar of NaCionalities, but also the
highest party organs, its Central Committee and V. I. Lenin personally gave a ~
negative characterization to the plans of Sultan-Galiyev. Thus, the plan to create
a Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic was rejected in the end by V. I. Lenin, who during
a discussion with the representatives of the Cent~al Bureau of Coa~unist Organiza-
tions of the Peoples of the East, which was held on 22 March 1920, gave, in the
words of Chairman of the Tatarskaya ASSR Council of People's Commissars S. G. Said-
Galiyev, "a spleudid lesson in how one of the just liberated nationalities, which is
comparatively stronger, should not assume the role of a benefac~or with respect to ,
a less stronger nationality, and especially should not act contrary to its wishes"
(51, p 339).
In exactly the same way the "Sovietologists" interpret the defeat of the Sultan-
galiyevists in the matter of creating a"Moslem Communist Party" as a result of the
interference of Stalin. Meanwhile it is well known that the organizational princi-
ples of the building and activity of the Communist Party were developed by V. I.
Lenin, who stood up for them in the fierce struggle against the Bundists, Menshe-
viks and other opportunists. Back on the eve of the Second Congress of the Rus-
sian Social Democratic Workers' Party V. I. Lenin emphasized the duty of the Rus-
sian Social Democrats not to create separately operating organizations,�each in
its own direction, not to lessen the force of the onslaught by splitting into numer-
ous independent political parties, not to spread estrangement and isolation..."
(21, p 122). Stalin in his speech at the First Congress of Communist Organizations
of the Peoples of the East, having noted the need to retain the international prin-
ciple of building our party, said: "Such is the opinion of the party, which the
party Central Committee instructed me to report" (138, p 90).
Meanwhile the Sultangaliyevists wanted at all costs to defend their anti-Leninist
conceptions without reckoning with the majority of the party. The tactics of their
= leader at the Second Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East
consisted, by Sultan-Galiyev's own admission, in the following: to force through,
in defiance of the party Central Committee, the question of est~blishing a Tatar-
Bashkir Republic or, in case of defeat, to declare the formation of the "Eastern
Communist Party." In both instances the Sul.tangaliyevists intended to impose
their collective point of view on the party.
The "Sovietologists" strive to reduce the danger of the nationalist activity of
Sultan-Galiyev, asserting that he was not really an enemy of the party, but only
"a representative of the intraparty opposition." This is nothing other than an
attempt to legitimize factional activity in the Communist Party. Not by chance do
- Bennigsen and Quelquejay attack the resolution "On the Unity of the Party," which
was adopted by tl~~ lOth congress on the suggestion of V. I. Lenin and which ordered
all groups to be disbanded and a stricter watch to be kept over not allowing fac-
tional actions. The bourgeois ideologists accuse the lOth congress of the fact
that it "opened the way to a monolirhic party. Hence it is only on~ step to the
justification of ~he counterrevolutionary activity of Sultan-Galiyev: since after
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the congress for him "legal opposition was impoFSible, only illegal activity re-
mained for him" (178, p 365). It turns out that the party itself prompted Sultan-
~ Galiyev to antiparty and anti-Soviet activity
The "Sovietologists" and renegades try to justify the activity of Sultan-Galiyev by
interpreting it as a natural reaction to great power chauvinism. But these attempts
are not original. Such an "argument" was advanced by his supporters back in the
1920's, and at that time it was severely criticized by our party. The Fourth Con-
- ference of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolshevi~,s)
with responsible party workers of the national republics and oblasts, which was
- held in 1923, noted that whereas at the initial stage the nationalist activity of
Sultan~-Galiyev to some extent could have been regarded as a reaction against Great
Russian chauvinism, such an approach was compleCely unsuitable for explaining his
~ activity at subsequent stages. In the resolution of the conference it was stated: -
"The antiparty and objectively counterrevolut ianary tasks set by Sultan-Galiyev and
the very logic of anti-party work le d Sultan-Galiyev to a traitorous search for an
alliance with clearly counterrevolut ionaryforces which are aimed at overthrowing
- the Soviet system..." (56, p 487).
The clear-cut political appraisal of Sultangaliyevism as a counterrevolutionary
trend, which was given by the party, does not suit the "Sovietologists." They would
like at any cost to moderate this app raisal o r to cast doubt upon it. A. Bennigsen, -
for example, acts this way by includ ing the resolution of the Fourth Central Com-
mittee Conference "On the Case of Sultan-Galiyev" in th2 category of "detective
- literature" (177, p 653).
Bennigsen, of course, knows about the secret contacts of Sultan-Galiyev with Turk-
ish and Persian bourgeois figures and about his attempt to make contact with the
leaders of the Turkestan basmachi. Thus, in a letter to Persian bourgeois politi-
cal figure Tadzhi Bakshi, Sultan-Gal iyev wrote about his intention to unite the
Moslem communists and the bourgeois leaders of the East in order to oppose them to
_ Comintern and the Soviet Government (95, p 28). In another secret letter addressed
to Bashkir bourgeois nationalist A. Adigamov, he gave the assignment to establish
contact with basmachi leader A.-Z. Validov. These secret le+tters are convincing -
evidence that "Sultan-Galiyev had gone over f rom the camp of the communists to the
camp of the basmachi" (47, p 303).
The Tatar national-deviationists, j ust like Bennigsen, at one time attempted to ex- -
press doubt about the authenticity o f the ant i-Soviet documents which exposed their
leader. But this attempt of theirs ended in complete failure. At the Fourth Cen-
tral Committee Conference Stalin fit t ingly rebuked the national-deviationists, stat-
ing that the conducted investigation had provQn the authenticity of the letters of
= Sultan-Galiyev. Moreover, in Stalin's words, "Sultan-Galiyev himself acknowledged
their authenticity, moreover he let more be known about his offenses than is stated
in the documents, thoroughly acknowledged his guilt..." (47, p 305). Why, then,
did Bennigsen have to raise a quest ion which was clarified long ago? Apparently,
only in order to express his liking for the anti-Soviet nationalist who was ex-
posed by the party. -
In their monograph Bennigsen and Quzlque~ay claim that Sultan-Galiyev, by maintain-
ing contacts with the opponents of the Soviet regime, ostensibly "no longer had in
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mind the creation of a truly counterrevolutionary organization, but simply a'front
of the diacontent (175, p 168). As "proof" the French "Sovietologists" cite the
statement of Firdevs, Yenbayev, Mukhtarov and so on, that is, the very national-
deviationists who supported Sultan-Galiyev in every possible way. The facts attest
that the so-called front of the discontent was the nucleus of the fox~ned counter- -
revolutionary organization.
The Tatar nationalists played a leading role in this organization. They set the -
tone in the work, instructed sympathizers, set specific tasks for them and made
arrangements on concerted actions. Sultan-Galiyev constantly informed the Bashkir,
Turkestan, Crimean and other nationalists and gave them recommendations on what
policy to pursue. In December 1922 he organized in Moscow an illegal conference of
a number of delegates of the lOth All-Russian Congress of Soviets from the eastern
republics, at which the question of joint actions at the congress was agreed upon.
In fulfil.ling the decision of this conference, several delegates came forth with
nationalist demands at the meeting of the party faction of the lOth All-Russian Con- _
gress. The nationalists also carried out similar preparation for organized action
before the 12th party congress, which discussed the national question.
While the party headed by V. I. Lenin acted as the organizer of the unification
movement of the Soviet peoples, the Sultangaliyevists acted in counterbalance to
its policy. They interpreted the party policy of creating a multinational Soviet
socialist state as the aspiration of the "Pan-Russians" to reestablish "an actually -
united, indivisible Russia." The bourgeois nationalists supported the partition of
the RSFSR and the formation of a separate federation of republics of the Turkic
peoples. In the end it was a question of isolating the Turkic peoples from the '
other peoples of the USSR and, as Sultan-Galiyev stated, of surrounding "Great Rus-
sia" with independent (that is, bourgeois) states which had been separated from it.
' Ali Akysh, who dreams that along with "Ural-Volga ~tates" "Siberian states" in the
east, a"Great Turkestan" in the southeast, a"Caucasian Federation~" in the south
- and a"Great Ukraine" in the west would appear on the map of the Soviet Union, today
praises precisely this ideal of Sultan-Galiyev (171, 26).
The plans of the Sultangaliyevists played into the han~s of both the internal and
the foreign enemies of the Soviet state, for they were designed for the elimination
of the USSR as the base of the building of socialism and a reliable bulwark of the
international communist and workers movement. Therefore the party acted quite just-
ly in removing Sultan-Galiyev for his criminal actions from the collegium of the
People's Commissariat of Nationalities and expelling him from the ranks of the Rus--
sian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).
All the subsequent activity of Sultan-Galiyev attests that the conclusions of the
Fourth Central Committee Conference correctly reflected the counterrevolutionary
orientation of Sultangaliyevism. After being expelled from the party he did not -
cease the struggle against the Soviet Government. The Sultangaliyevist center di-
rected underground organizations in Kazan', the Crimea and Astrakhan', conducted
hostile anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, studied the political sentiments of
the population and recruited new members. Under the conditions where the party was
waging a fierce struggle against the Trotskiy-Zinov'yev and Bukharin oppositions,
the Sultangaliyevists agreed to a merge with antiparty elements. At the same time
they strengthened ties with foreign countries. The Sultangaliyevists were linked
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through Crimean n.ationalists with the ruling circles of landowning Poland, and
through the Central Asian basmachi and White emigre G. Iskhaki with the British
General Staff. Using their official position, the sympathizers of Sultan-Galiyev
turned over to the capitalist powers secret documents and decrees of the party Cen-
tral Commit~ee and the Soviet Government. All this was done in the hope of an at-
tack in the next few years of international imperialism on the USSR and its parti-
tion in the future into separate states. For Sultan-Galiyev the question of the
collapse of the Soviet Government had been decided in advance. In 1928 he stated
that "now one does not have to speak of the coming collapse ~f the Soviet Govern-
ment, rather it is necessary to speak about how it will fall...."
The hostile activity of the Sultangaliyevists was properly appraised by the party.
In the resolution of the Bureau of the Tatarskaya Oblast Committee of the All-
Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), which was adopted on 26 September 1929, it
was qualified with every reason as "a part of the common bourgeois front," which
"is performing under the conditions of the national republics work on undermining
the fraternal alliance between the workers of the previously oppressed nationali-
ties and the revolutionary proletariat in order to guarantee the victory of the
reaction and the counterrevolution" (113, p 43).
The "Sovietologists" pass over in complete silence the fact that Sultangaliyevism
as a political trend never had a mass base, for it was alien and hostile to the
interests of the workers. Even some politically immature elements, which initially
stood behind the platform of the Sultangal.iyevists, gradually abandoned it and be-
gan to follow the party. Characterizing this process, PRAVDA in the issue from
4 November 1929 wrote: "...The evolution of Sultangaliyevism in the direction of
open counterrevolution took place at the same time as its isolation from the work-
ing masses.... Sultangaliyevism was transformed in 1929 into a narrow group of
leaders of the right-wing nationalists and the reactionary nationalist intelli-
gentsia."
The measures of the Central Committee, which were aimed at overcoming bourgeois
nationalism and cliqiiishness in the Tatar Party Organization, found extensive sup-
p~rt among the workinv masses. At gather~tn?a and meetings the w~rkers, peasantg,
Red Army men and employees said that they completely supported the policy of the
Communist Party. Thus, the meeting of the party aktiv of Verkhne-Gorodskoy Rayon
of Kazan' in a resolution of 22 November 1929 noted with complete satisfaction the
timeliness of the exposure by the oblast party committee of Sultangaliyevism as a
display of the militant bourgeois nationalism of the counterrevolution. The meet-
ing of the instructors and students of the Tatar Department of the Artemovo Party
School in the Donbass, which was held on 1 November 1929, qualified the attempts of
the Sultangaliyevists to spread their ideology among the masses of workers and
peasants at a trend which ran counter to the national policy of the party and was
aimed at the realization of the plans of the White emigration. The workers of the
Galaktionovskiy Factory in Kazan' in a resolution adopted in December 1929 empha-
- sized that the workers and the bulk of the peasants had closed ranks even more
closely around the implementation of the slogans of the party and the Soviet Gov-
ernment. The workers of the city and the countryside angrily condemned Sultan-
galiyevism as an obstacle in the way of the buildi:~g of socialism in the USSR and
demanded of the party that it henceforth properly repulse all manifestations of
~
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nationalism and "cut the root from under" the shoots of cliquishnesa.* Such was
the impartial aentence passed on Sultangaliyevism by history itself. It was equi-
valent to the acknowledgement of its political death.
The 15th Oblast Canference, which was held in June 1930, in the resolution on the ,
report of the oblast committee of the All-Union Counnunist Party (of Bolsheviks)
- appraised in the following manner the importance of the activity of the party or-
ganization on overcoming nationalism and chauvinism: "The ideological and organ-
izational rout of counterrevolutionary Sultangaliyevism, the gains in the struggle
against the veatiges of great power chauvinism and local nationalism, the increase
of the activeness of the entire party organization in the practical implementation
of the Leninist national policy and the overall economical and cultural growth of
the TR (that is, the Tatar Republic--M. A. and S. B.) on the basis of the strength-
ening of the socialist sector of the economy are creating favorable conditions for
the more rapid overcoming of the economic and cultural backwardness of the working
Tatars and national minorities" (66, pp 399-400).
The complete exposure and rout of Sultangaliyevism promoted the closing of the
party ranks on the principles of proletarian internationalism and the strengthen-
ing of the ties of party organizations with the masses and provided the conditions _
for the elimination of the vestiges of national enmity and the building of new,
socialist social relations.
*
See the issue of the newspaper KZYL TATARSTAN for October-December 1929.
COPYRIGHT: Tatarskoye knizhnoye izdatel'stvo, 1937
7807 .
cso: isoo/355 ~D
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