JPRS ID: 9680 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100043-0
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 43
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9680
22 April 1981
W est E u ro e R e o rt ~
p p
cFOUO 21 is 1 ~
FBiS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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_ are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text)
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~ processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phon.etically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were riot clear in the
_ original but have been suppli~d as appropriate in context.
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- JPRS L/9680
22 Apri1 198~1
- WEST EUROPE REPORT
~ (FOUO 21/$1)
CONTENTS
THEATER FORC~,S
FRANCE
New ~Neutralizing~ Tac ~ical Weapons Described
- (Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 11~ Max 81) 1
POZITICAL
FEDERAL REPUBI,IC OF GERMANY
Poll Finds Gain in CDU/CSU Popularity
(AIS,ENSBACHER BF.~tICHTE, No 1~, 1981) 7
FRANCE
Development of Nation's Africa Palicy Reviewed
(MARCHES TROPICAU%, 13 Mar 81) 10
ITAI~Y '
Three Potential Successors to Zama as CG?:I, Head
(Alessandro Caprettini; IL MONDO, 20 Feb 81) 20
i
MIZITARY
FRANCE
Future of Ground Furces Aviation Explored
~ (Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 28 Feb 81) 23
Current Status of Ground Forces Aviation Reviewed
(Jean de Galard; AYR & COSMOS, 28 Feb 81) 26
~
~ - a - [III - WE - 150 .FOUO~
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Ga1ERAL
- P'R,ANCE
- Lack of Good Mechanics Seen Slowin~ Tech_nical Progress
(Geraxd Bonnot; I~E NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 16 Feb 81) 30
-b-
' .._..._..r.~ ,.~c n*TTv
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THEATER FORCES FRANCE
_i
~
i NEW 'NEUTRALIZING' TACTICAL WEAPONS DESCRIBED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 14 Mar 81 pp 14-15
(Article by Jean de Galard]
- [Text] Z'he visit made recently by Galley, minister of Defense, to the Luxeuil Air
Base, during which he had them show him the whole array of modern weapons of the
Tactical Air Force (cee AIR & COSMOS No 849), reveals the importanc~ attached by
the Air Force Staff and the FATAC [Taatical Air Force] Command to equippinq the air-
- craft in service in the units of the FATAC/1st RA [Air Region] with new neutralzing
weapons for tactical purposes, that is to say in the battlefield environment and for
attack missions on the ground, which are still the priority mission of every tacti-
cal air force in the world.
Experience in the conflicts that have occurred durinq the last few years has shown
- that there are at least four fields in which mastery belongs to the ane who has
highly specialized conventional tactical w~apons: destruction of aviation infra-
structure, attack on armored units, attack on hard targets with vertical develop-
ment, attack on wel.l-protected targets whose dispersal and mobility do not, however,
justify the use of weapons with a high degree of accuracy. .
'Thomson-Brandt, an armament specialist with much experience in the fields of ballis-
_ tics, explosives, propulsion and pyrotechnics, has produced and now proposes a whole
range of conventional weapons rockets and bombs some of which have been decided
on by the French Air Force and by foreign air forces. We shall discuss here more
_ particularly four kinds of munitions whose use proves to be effective in each of the
four fields mentioned above: the BAP-100 antirunway bomb, the BAT-120 tactical sup-
port bomb, the 100-millimeter rocket that can bE equipped with various kinds of war-
head, the modular bomb.
The BA.P-10 0
This bomb, which has been adop~e~.dby the French Air Force, has been designed for neu-
tralizinq runways (hence its acronym, BAP (anti.-runway bomb]) and airfield infra-
- structures made of concrete. The builder had to seek a compromise'between~two
- obvious requirement$ certainty of striking the runway and amount of destruction
in the design of this bomb. In order to be sure of striking the runway, the attack-
ing aircraft.has to carry a large number of bombs. In order for the destruction to
be substantial, the penptration speed has to be high. It is not so much the volume
of the bomb and its charge that has to be considered. 'I'he third requirement that
i 1
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the builder had to take into account'is not to make the pilot make more than one pass
- over the target, because of enemy antiair~raft defense, which is usually powerful on
an air base or even on a mere runway.
. �
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Under the wing of a Mirage F1, a CEM1 multiple carry-
ing container produced by Dessault, carrier to the
rear of six BAP-100 antirunway bombs.
The BAP-100 a.re droppe@ in a large number (from 12 at least to over 100) and form
strings of craters close together, large enougYi to prevent any aircraft movement and
to require mechanical repair ~acilities. The space betwEen two destru~tion zones must
be~less than 15 meters. Each BAP-100 causes damage requiring the repaix of 50
square meters. These results are achieved by usina a 3.5-kilogram explosive mass in
each bomb, which penetrates under the runway at a speed of 250 meter's a second on
impact. The 100-millimeter caliber was chosen.
It is important for the maximum number of bomhs to be c;arried usins~: the minimum
number of pylons, in order to allow fuel to be carried, or Ct+~ [electronic counter-
measure] pods, or else other weapons. Hence the solution of hanging in clusters
(se~ photograph) .
Seven minutes are all that is needed for attaching 18 BAP-100 unde:- one of the sup-
port points on a Jaguar or for placing 16 BAP-100 in tandem under two adapters in-
stalled under the wing structure of a Mirage III.
The dropping sequence was designed for very low altitude and it provides protection
of the aircraft from the explosion bursts. It als~ provides the best speed and
the best penetration angle of the bomb at impact.
_ Immediately after it has been ejected, the bom~b is braY:ed by parachute. At the de-
sired time, the propellent is ignited and causes the speed of the BAP-100 to in-
crease from 25 t~ 250 meters a second. After impact, the charge is "initiateci"
when the bomb is already under the concrete pavement. 7.'he BAP-100 is operational
ti
_ 2
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now. I' equips Air Force Jaguar and Mirage aircraft. It can also equip Alpha Jet
aircraft (mul~iple containers each capable of carrying 18 rockets and 6 BAP).
- , _
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~ ~
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' These 18 BAP-100 antirunway bombs, carried
by a 30-6-M2 launcher, arranged in groups
- of nine, are attached to the inside support
point of the right wing of a Jaguar.
~ ~ n
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I
i I
Sixteen BAP-100's under the fuse-
lage of a Mirage-III.
i 3 _
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A
f
1 .
Substantial damage caused by the impact and explo-
sion in depth of a BAP-100 antirunway bomb.
'I'he 120-millimeter BAT Bomb
7."he 120-millimeter tactical support bomb is an extrapolation of the BAP-100 with re-
qard to firing sequence. Produced for attacking columns of armored vehicles, it was _
designed to ~xplode on contact v~ith the ground, without an acceleration phase. The
BAT-120 is derived, with regard to the explosive head, from the 120-millimeter anti-
armored-vehicle rifled shell, which is the ammunition for the rifled mortar adopted
and ordered in large quantities by the French Army. Each sp~lin~er of the exploded _
bomb weighs 16 grams and is capable of penetrating 12 millimeters of armor in a
radius of 15 meters. The BAT-120 is very effective against all armored vehicles
and tanks on the battlefield.
,
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Eighteen BAT-120 tactical support
bombs under the fuselage of a
Jaguar. ~
4
Tr1n /~TTT/~TAT TTCF. '1~y~~Y
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~
100-millimeter R,~ckets
- For several years, Thomson-Brandt has been proposing a system of 100-millimeter
- L�OCkets, fired fsom a four-tube rocket-laun~her, for attacking :iard targets with
~ vertical development. This type of mcket and launcher has been adopzed and ordered
by the Air Force and by several foreign air forces. The four-tube launcher is des-
ic~natied as F-3.
Five differen�t warheads can be mounted on the propellent: inert training head, hol-
lo~v charge head, demolition head, general-purpose explosive head, multiprojectile
kinetic effect head. A rocket with a demolitioii warhead is accelerated to reach a
speed of 1,000 meters a second on impact. It explodes behind the armor plate with
~ a 0.5 millisecond delay.
I
I It can also penetrate 5 meters of earth and 30 centimeters of concrete before ex-
ploding. With a hollow-charge rocket, penetration is on the order of 60 centimeters.
~
- With modern fire-control methods, the pilot of an aircraft so equip~ed can fire
- accurately at aircract-target distanc;es on the order of 6,000 meters.
Modul ar Bomb ~.r?~
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_ Modular bomb. Top, under the wing and
fuselage of a Jaguar (total, three).
Bottom, under the wing of a Mirage-III
(total, two).
5
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Thomson-Brandt is completing, at present, adjustment trials of a specific bomb
called m~dular bomb ancl proposed in two versions 400 kilograms and 250 kilo-
grams for use agair,st armored vehicles whose armor is thicker than on VTT (all-
t~rrsin vehicles) and armored cars.
2"he modular bomb serves as a vehicle with three large 100-kilogram modules ejected
in succession at predetermined times. Each module projects 700 calibrated 80-qram
- splinters on impact with the grcund at 2,000 meters a second. Each module is
d-ropped at ab~ut 200 meters from the preceding one and explodes in a vertical
attitude to the ground. Dropping is accomplished at low altitude and very high
speed. A dispersal weapon is involved.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1981
10,042
CSO: 3100
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_ _ . _ ~
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POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
~
; ~
~ POLL FINDS GAIN IN CDU/CSU POPULARITY
Allensbach ALLENSBACHER BERICHTE in German No 4, 1981 pp 1-3
I
[Report by Institut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach: "The Union Parties Have Caught Up:
I 48.4 Percent--Loss of Confidence in the Federal Chancellor"]
: [Text] Allensbach am Bodensee, ~arly March 1981--"If there were to be Bundestag '
= elections again next Sunday," the German Bundestag would have quite a different
configuration from that of 5 m~nths ago after the 5 Octoter elections. Instead of
. a clear ele:.ticn victory, the government parties would ~ust barely arrive at a
_ stalemate with the CDU/CSU, primarily because of the massive SPB reverses. Only
- ~ 38.4 percent of those eligible to vote would vote for the Federal chancellor's
party at this time (as compared to 42.9 percent in the S October elections). The
~ FDP, with a share of 9.9 percent of the votes (previously 10.6 percent), would
- experience slight losses also. The opposition parties, CDU and CSU, would be the
- ones to profit from that change of opinion. They could count on 48.4 percent of
the ballots (compared with 44.5 percent during the Bundestag elections). This is
the present sta~tus of the parties, as determined in an FRG-wide poll during Feb-
ruary 1981. -
The Federal chancellor's standing was impa3red also as a result of the Federal
~overnment's initial diff iculties and the SPD's crisis of style. On.ly 43 per~ent
of the FRG's citizens are still in agreement with the chancellor~s policies now,
- instead of the 55-percent approval he had immediately after the Bundestag elec- -
tions. This does not signify total disenchantment for many: the main increase -
_ did not so much occur among those registering definitive "disagree" but primarily
among the "undecideds." They are apparently keeping their judgmpnt in abeyance.
Technical Data for the Editor
~
Total number of persons polled: about 2,000
Population represented: FRG area including West Berlin; ages 16 and
= above
Duration of the poll: February 1981 ~
Number of interviewers: 358 ~ -
Questionnaire file nutnbers: 3,093; for the trend: 3,089, 3,090, 3,091,
3,092
7 -
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Table 1.
Tabelle 1 (1) -
Stand de~ Parteien (2) . 8undeaget~iet ohne Vest-8erlin
- Wahlberechtigte Bevolkerung
.
( 3) fRAGE: ~Menn achon n3chaten Sonntag ~ieder Bundeatagsv~hl ~~re: ~elche Partei wurden Sie dann -
v3hlen?' -
(4) (5)
COU/CSU SPD F.D.P. Grune Sonstige -
Parteien
x ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
( 6 ) 1980, Bundestags~ahl vo~
5. Oktober (Zvaitstf~en) ~~1.. 44,5 41,9 10,6 1,5 0,5 � 100
15. - 24, Dktober 45,0 43,6 9,T 1,5 0,2 . 100
31. akt. - 12.Mov . 46,2 40.~? 10~5 2,5 0~4 . 100
29. Mov. - 8. Dez . 46,1 a... 39~3 11~3 2~3 1~0 . 100 -
1981, 15. - 31, Januar ~6.6 39,? 10,1 2;6 1,0 � 100 -
7. - 19. Februar 48~4 38,4 9~9 2.7 O~ti � 100
Key:
1. FRG Area Exclusive of ~Test Berlin; Eiigible Voters.
_ 2. Party Standing
3. Question: "If there were to be Bundestag elections again next Sunday,
for ~hich party would you vote?"
= 4. Greens
5. Other Parties ~
, 6. 1980 Bundestag elections
7. Second Votes -
~g -
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Table 2.
� -
Tabelle 2 ~1~
~ Daa Einverst3n~nis ~it de~ Bundgskan:ler ~2~ 8undeagabiet ~it Yegt.Borlin
= Be~Slke~ung ab 16 Jahre
_ ( 3) FRAGE: 'Sind Sie i~ gro8~n und y'nzen ~it d~r Politik von 8und~skanzler SFh�idt einverstmden
oder nicht oinv~~atanden?'
(4) ~5) ~6)
Einverstmden Nicht einvera4aeden Unentachieden, -
~ kein Urteil
~ z x x
1980, Oktobo~ 55 2? 18 . 100 I
Move�bw~ 51 26 23 - 100
~
Nove~bor/Oe:e~bo~ 48 26 26 . 100
1981, Janu~r 48 26 ......n......... 25 � 100 -
Februar 43 28 29 - 100
.
Key:
1. FRG Area Including West B~rlin; Population Age 16 and Older.
2. Agreement with the Federal Chancellor
3. Question: "A11 thin~s considered, do you agree or disagree with Federal
Chancellor Schmidt's policies?"
- 4. Agree
5. Disagree
- 6. Undecided; no opinion
COFYRIGHT: Institut fuer Demoskopie Al:~ensbach
9273
CSO : 3103
9
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-i
- ' POLITICAL ~ FRANCE
, ~
~ _
DEVELOPMEDIT OF NATION'S AFRICA POLICY REVIEWID
Paris MARCHLS TROPICAUX in French 13 Mar 81 pp 647-650 '
i~
; [Article]
i [Text] On2 of the best-informed observers of French policy
I in Africa has prepared for readers of MARCAES TROPICAUX the
i following study in which he describes the difficult conversion
imposed on France by the accession to independence of its
_ , former African possessions.
- A Certain Concept of Africa
F:ench policy has not yet fully crystallized with regard to independent Africa.
It is a question, in reality, of cha.nging our perspective on a continent where, in
_ an unprecedented way, we have simultaneously held departments tha.t were an integral -
_ part of the national [French] tzrr.itory, protectorates, colonies, mandated coun-,
tries, and still more recently, an overseas territory. In Egypt, we were at one
- time successful in cultivating a unique and prestigious economic and cultural
establishment. Those forms of presence and those very diverse ties, for all sorts
_ of reasons, are a thing of the past.
This eclipse, these ruptures, which have sametimes assumed humiliating or even
tragic aspects, explain in large part the problems of accommodation which sti11
show through our political comportment 4rLth regard to Africa. Thi~ is what ex-
plains several zigzags which are perfectly excusable ix~ the development of a policy
that takes pains to distance itself from the past without lhowever repudiating the
positive a~pects, and to chart paths wiell adapted to the new post-independence can-
~ vas. �
This being the case, our reflexes are often not fast enough in the face of events
- which only yesterday were by definition inconceivable. We were accustomed, for -
example, to take for granCed the absence of dispute between Morocco, Algeria, and

_ Mauritania. Now such contention undeniably exists today. It is our part, undEr
the circumstances, not to underestimate our ability to sel�ve as mediators, Here as
elsewhere we must contrive to adJust our distance with respect to these henceforth
independent partners. It continues to happen today that we f ind ourselves too
close to some, or too distant from others.. Our concern not to incur the renroach
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of infringing on the prerogatives of sovereignty is only equalled by Che generallv
- unpredictable reactions of our int~rlocutors to the hesitant initiative. What we
mean, in the last analysis, is to accept the various governments but to choose our _
f riend s. -
Soon af ter the wave of independence, we had the tendency, faced with a newly-freed
Africa, to stamp on each country, in f iligree, the outlines of its former status.
The development of our policy today is in the direction of taking into account the
- new pecking order which rias been established among those states, not in terms of
henceforth abolished ties, but rather on the basis of the power relationships and
characteristics which rule their unique evolution and the destiny which must be
theirs. In order to come more easily to a better pereeption of this new aspect
- of things, it might havP been better to sweep away very quickly, at the Parisian
level, the sometimes skimpy administraCive apparatus through which, in theory, ~ur
Africa policy was expressed. In reality, most of the work was done in the field,
for all, or nearly all, of the responsibilities were found in the hands of resident
- minist~rs and governors general.
In the mi~tistry of overseas France, the officials at the head of golitical affairs
provided a mode3t staff ing level and reduced activities. In the department of
foreign affairs, one gleans from the diplomatic yearbook of 1937 that~tihe -
"Africa-Middle East division" consisted of only eight agents and one assistant,
responsible "for correspondence and political, commercial, and financial work and
disputes regarding Tunisia, Morocco, Euro~ean possessions in Africa, Egypt, _
Abyssinia [Ethiopia], Turkey, Syrla, Palestine, Iraq, and Arabia." At that time,
the "service of French overseas activities" consisted, in truth, of seven people
to deal with "questions concerning French iYitellectual expansion abroad."
This relaxation of our political in~tiatives in Africa should merit a long couQnen-
tary. In that regard, events suggested three kinds of analysis: in black Africa,
~ the activities of our high-ranking officials, in the field, undoubtedly played a
' decisive role in implementing a peaceful process leading to independence. In
Morocco, by contrast, when things started to become difficult, it was realized too
late that the concept of protectorate had been so emptied in the field of its -
original content that it could no langer serve the dynamics of independence as had `
- been hoped, but to the contrary it was impeding it, with results we all know. One
last mistake, and not the least, for which we have paid a heavy price: the -
presence, at the head of the three A1gerlan departments, not of a regional prefect,
which would ha.ve been normal and useful, but of a"governor general" who ran
A~.geria o~t of an overgrown administrative headquarters all of those officials came
from the homeland.
~ Institutional change proved haltin.g: in 1962, for example, a ministry of state for
- Algerian affairs was created, rather than entrusting them without further delay
to the Quai d'Orsay which, it was said at the time, "did not want to hear abo~it
it." A lack of realism, a disguised denial? We do not know. That persistent lag
between the political realities in which we are living and our mode of approach
is probably a defect in old countries. These dead weights, often set out explicit-
ly, still result in the survival of poorly adapted institutions, particularly .
inadequate for understanding African political problems in their totality. Certain-
- ly, some praiseworthy efforCs have oeen made, but nothing convincing has yet seen
the light of day.
11
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It goes without saying that the conditions of disengagement we had to face were,
obviously, burdened significantly by the polt.tical behavior which cam.e to be ours.
- Our relations with the Maghreb--whether we speak of Morocco, Tunisia, or a
fortiori of Algeria--still bear the imprint of transition periods that were not
lacking in confrontations and even tragPdy. As soon as delicate subjects are
' broached, the effects of those traumas re~.~pear and embarrass cs. In this con-
, nection, our relations with Algeria unequivocally reflect the weight of a still
- too-recent past.
In black Africa, by contrast, independence was achieved without violence or hatred.
This remarkable difference has had a striking impact on French o=ficials and on
the general public, at the same time as it has prov4ked a renewal of interest in
the sub-Saharan part of the continent. After having most often won over public
opinion and French political observers, the black African coimtries went through
two promotional operations: first, the 1931 Exposition, which aroused French
_ pride and gave birth to the concept of empire; then, the "independence" process
which, indubitably, excited a form of attention that was not without the stale
flavor of somewhat retrograde colonialism, but was still sympathetic enough to
hold its own against empire-building. People say ecstatically or with a knowing
; air tha.t "they have not changed the way they regard us." No, of course not. But
! the times, however, ha.ve indeed changed.
i
~ Now that Africa is closer to us, thanks to the facilities now provided by the
~
i. airlines, we consider that Africa is now in an accessible environment. 4Ie give
, it a special place in the ranking of our political concerns. For we continue
i to have Che feeling--not without foundation-that our interests are there, more
than elsewhere, along with our means. The widely known and even homely image
~ France has on this continent derives from the multiplicity and quality of our
I personal relations, and from the political, economic, and cultural ties we have
~ come to s ustain and develop.
;
� ~ It remains for us to liberate our perspective still further from a certain his-
~ torical framework, in order better to balance our field of action; to make our-
~ selves better understood in some counfiries, without for all that neglecti.ng our
longstanding friends.
I
' The Francophone Dogma and the Taste of Bilateral Action
_i
On the list of reactions and ~otivations of which we have just been speaking, the
notion--or rather, the criterion--of "francophoneness" has had a preponderant in-
fluence on the quality of the ties we have decided to maintain in Africa. This
"hexagonal" dimension, which pervades the choices we have made, led to forming
the ministry of cooperation, which implements the bilateral accords which have
been signed with 26 countries, 21 of which are on the African continent. The
geographic ~urisdiction of this department, which extends from the Indian Ocean
- to the Caribbean (economic investments ~tn Haiti) is characterized by fairly wide
dispersion. This absence of homogeneity is in part compensated by methods of
, work and an spproach that give French assistance its uniqueness and, it must be -
said without false modesty, an often enviable record of effectiveness. The times,
geographic realities, and political connections have 3ustified French authorities
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in a prudent and limited extension [o� assistance activities] beyond groups in
- which our language is predominant. Thus accords have been signed in recent years
with Portuguese-speaking countries such as the Republic of Cape Verde, Guinea- _
$issau, and Sao-Tame, as well as with the formerly Spanish Equatorial Guinea.
It must be recognized that the francophone base on which most of our aid rests
leads one to identify disparities between certain contributions which belie the
relative importance of the countries concerned, when taken apart from the franco-
phone consideration. Thus Togo, �or example, is getting from France (the ministry
' of cooperation) six times as much assistance as the mini~try of foreign affairs
pours out ta the Nigerian Federation. As f or the Republic of Djibouti, it enjoys
French assistance which in total is some 50 times what we are allotting to Kenya.
Another feature of the homogenous treatment given to francophone countries: the
existence of a monetary zone covered by the franc and which gives its members some
not insignificant advantages: integral convertibility and f ixed parties with
- respect to the franc, spscial dra~,ring rights, "domination of the CFA Fr over nei-
boring currencies barred from any quotation and whose real value is considerably
below the off icial rates.
This relatively closed facility, which contrasts openly w~th the worldwide concept
adopted--one might say, preserved--by the British in their Department of Overseas
Development, which deals with more than 100 countries, seems to ~ustify the French
concern to make certain kinds of bilateral aid privileged. ,
The decade just ended saw France increase, sometimes significantly (one thinks of _
the UNDP), its t~tal subscriptions to groups promoting multilateral aid. But sti11
- in the last analysis it seems clear that this type of activity continues to repel
_ us, precisely because of its cumbersome procedures, 3ts anonymity, and the facti- -
tious but basically inconsequential prestige these organizations boast.
Cooperative Action in Which Creative Imagination Must Conquer Routine
This is not the place for us to detail the various forms assumed by our initiatives
or to make the more or less convincing judgments on the record; but rather we will
limit ourselves to judging the direction of our progress, its ability to adjust
itself to the pace of development, its pitfalls.
The grand ob~ectives remain training, self-subsistence, improvement of administra-
tion, financial balance, and security. The ma~or threats are termed demographic
pressure, unemployment, negligence, financial problems, overt or larval conf licts.
One must give separate consideration to political instability, the causes of which
are the subjects of analysis and not identifiable problems capable of being resolved ~
_ through external activities. Finally, the predica~~-t:nt of the poorest countries
constitutes, in the eyes of our country, a matter which now, more tha.n ever, re- -
quires special attention, or in other werds specially tailored forms of assistance.
Before going further, it would not perhaps be irrelevant to emphasize that- in
Africa--and still today--the mode [of assistance] offered is of greater importance _
tha.n either the value or the volume of what is offerede The gift given wisely
becomes a pledge of friendship and even a talisman. In this connection, it is
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appropriate to keep in mind that drilling a well could easily rival the grant o~
a hundred scholarships, in terms of psychological impacC.
This scale of values, rather foreign to our own, presents a dimension of our
activities that should not be neglected.
With respect to training, our personnel effort in the teaching corps has far and
away the highest priority (more than 8,000 out of a total of 11,000 aid personnel).
This privileged calling that is entrusted to us must in no way be underestimated;
- the weight of its impact is only equalled by the uncertainty of the consequen~es
of this vast "acquisition of knowledge" operation. Too often the benp.ficiaries
find themselves in channels not well adapted to supplying the count~~~y ~ith the
dynamism desired. We can do nothing, or very littie, about the danger of growing
, unemployment among intellectuals. Unless w~ decide to adopt a policy which would
i be exerted in a particular direction at the start, and which w�ould consist in
, reserving a significant percentage of the requests for teachers and scholarships
~ to positions with institutions of technical education and, more generally, to
training leading to qualifications other tha.n purely intellectual ones. President
Senghor decided one day to "hunt out the law graduates": he returned empty-handed
and gave up restricting their proliferation. These options and these orientations,
~ for lack of restraining their anarchic development, are preparing perilous tomor-
' rows for the African countries. In this especially sensitive f ield, it is rarely
~ expedient to give lavish advice, even to one's best friends.
The efforts made in rural development are tied to the problem of reaching self-
.I
subsistence, with its corollary, a controversia.l sub~ect, food aid. The multiple
I efforts to improve the level of productivity in these countries are part of a
pattern inside which are hidden the essence of Africa: its customs, its super-
stitions, the very roots of its birth. One must not forget the primordial role of
i "possessors of the land" in the state structures of pre-colonial~Africa. Tha~t is
, to say the place occupied, both physically and socio-culturally, by those immense
- i rural areas on which most of the human potenti.31 of Africa still lives. A world
of slowness and the precision of ritual acts, an atemporal world where every effort
' to change shakes an edifice of unimaginable dimensions the largest part of which
remains invisible. The colonial administration, aware ~f the fortress-like nature
of even the most humble rural bush community, applied itself to a course of action
! that was both prudent and cautious. The actual establishment of mutual benefit
~ associations which ultimately became an effective network of protection against
' drought years and the vagaries of harvests were concrete expressions of the success
i of an activity which offered the double advantage of physical presenGe and con-
tinuity.
One could of course mention the spectacular agricultural developments achieved in
Africa under European colonialism: the French and Italians in North Africa, the
British in Zimbabwe and Kenya, the Portuguese in Angola, and the Boers in South
Africa. But the natural tendency to compare these successes with the modest per-
- formances of the independent states would be no more fair than the idea of com-
paring the results obtained by those colonists to those obtained by an Ardechois
or Breton sma.llholder.
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The administrative and financial mechaniams these countries have created leaee much
to be desired, both fram th~ point of view of their design and from that of their
operation. -
Inadequate most of the time, they respond poorly in the hands of newly trained
officials whose basic comportment and consequently whose scale of values cor-
responds at best very imperfectly to the administrative norms which those institu-
tions are supposed to apply and enforce. A single example should suffice to illu~-
trate the serious harm caused by the use of regulations conceived in accordance
- with a certain definition of tasks which most often is very distant from 1oca1 no-
tions: thus the idea of a wage, in Africa, does not express, at least not yet,
the idea of reward for labor, but is instead tied to the concept of a periodic
contribution, the re gularity of which is enviable and sought after, ar~d which
does not involve them, as beneficiaries, in a corresponding obligation in the form
of service rendered with the same regularity. This gives rise to the negligence
which marks most administrations. One could assuxedly dwell at length on irritating
instances of this sta te of affairs, to which a number. of palliatives have been
applied, without conclusiv~, results. It suffices, however, to recall that this is
a problem linked to the not~on of authorfty, and consequently to the idea of
sovereignty, to be able to realize without going any further tha.t there is no i
practical solution, and that progress basically depends on the pace of development ;
itself . I
M
A day will come when the western models will have undergone enough modification to ~
become th~ unique systems required by the Af rican c~untries. We, along with our
partners, should never lose sight of this process of adaptation which all too
often, it must be admitted, yields to a purely outward mimicry and ineff icient ~
routine that con'sists in preserving arrangements tha.t have come from elsewhere.
Among the ma~or concerns of developing countries--and some continue to be astonished
by it--is security. It seems, in fact, tha.t this concern, which is proper to
any government, is s till resented, here and there, as a reprehensible, even
unhealthy concern to procure arms and practice some sort of intemperate militarism .
instead of devoting themselves peacefully, in the bucolic manner, to the tasks
oi' progress. This kind of angelic behavior, which no developed country can justify
in his own country's behavior, cannot withstand the sometimes anguishing realities
that inspire the anxiety of the countries concerned. Both internally and externally,
these states need to provide themselves with means of safeguarding public order and -
guarding their borders. The euphoria of the f irst years of independence is already
- long gone. Now it is a question of reckoning with subversion, attempts at destabili- -
zation, the appetite s of the most powerful. Events long ago, as well as otihers more
recent, confirm the fact that these worries are well-founded and the risks are ,
re~l.
' French cooperation, for~its part, has taken the measure of this problem and is
~ trying, in accordanc e with its means, to respond to the demands for technical
% assistance that are made of it in this particular field. One might recall, in this
; connection, that in the very first days after Algerian independence, our partners
made haste to ask, a s the first e~ression of Franco-Algerian cooperation, for
a golice academy with French instructors, which was set up in great haste at
Sidi-bel-Abbes, in a still-disorganized country.
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To help these countries in establishing their security forces does not mean pro-
viding them with unsuited armaments that are costly and difficult to use.
Norietheless, this ord~r of concerns is an.'.integral part of the imperatives of
development, because :~t is so true that nothing can be achieved under the sway ~~f
fear or in a clima.te ~f insecurity. it is, in fact, to do ~ustice to a lu~i.3
= notion of independence and a modern c:onception of aid to new countries when one
- agrees to work with them on improvements that both psychologica.lly and p~actically
re~pond to a certain ethic of order, respect for law, and ter.ritorial integrity.
~he taboos on sub~ects of coaperation only exist to the degree that they are de-
~ fined together and classed as such.
To complete the ~utline uf this hastily traced sketch of French aid, there rpmain
to be said a few ~.~ords about the least developed countries, with emphasis on the
; attention France intends to devote to them, in hopes bf dividing that interest-- �
~ which can be 3ustified and sustained for a number of reasons--among the greatest
i possible number of donor states. There are, in reality, in the present state of
i affairs, forms of destitution which tend to be permanent. This process must be
~ broken, and, to that end, means other than the procedur~s that have become standard
~ for almost all the donor c:oimtries and specialized institutions must be.used. To
~ arrest this spiral of poverty, one must necessarily transcend the accepted rules,
in order to apply a treatment that is capable of attacking the very Sources of the
malady. It is no longer a question, in fact, of financing some particular rural
project ~r training program, but rather of trping to.save states that are adrift,
whose foundations ar~e endangered. One must hope that the conference on the LLDCts
(least developed countries), which ia to be held in Paris in September 1981, will
be able to tackle this sub~ect clearly and resolutely.
~
~ The Political Climate of Today's Africa
~
i
I In today's Africa, France must simultaneously define its objectives, measure the
~ extent of its possibilities, and express its political will by identifying, as
events unfold, its points of application.
, The life of the continent arouses sustained interest on the part of the media.
; Taking the place, in a manner of speaking, of the once habitual chronicle of South
~ American revolutions, Africa gets sensational treatment and big headlines, though
t perhaps fabricated. Even Asia and its spectacular misfortunes--one thinks of the
boat-people--have had some difficiilty in staying on the front pages of the news-
; papers. This attention tends to set up a sort of screen, between the public and
' the reality of things, on which pell-mell appear wild beasts, fantastic tyrants,
murderous famines, illustrated by unbearable photographs, etc. Behind this
_ chronicle, from which one mc+stly retains the anecdotal and exotic aspects, Africa's
political relations with the rest of the world are woven, strained, strengthened.
Responsible French authorities, for their.part, are regularly called to account
for their actions, either by the government or on the demand of the mass media.
Qnly a few years ago, an Englishman claimed that out of 10 people questioned at
random on the streets oE London, at least half maintained that India. was still a
part of the British Empire. In Erance, no question posed about fran,.ophone Africa,
no matter who the author, is entirely free of a certain feeling of haughty
' proprietorship.
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To act as in the colonial times, to do "something," to do nothing at all: those
_ are, in essence~, the most frequently recorded questions. In his January 27 press .
conference the president of the republic stated, at the start of the event, that
_ up to a certain point he felt the need, every time a question on francopr.one Aftica
- was posed, to confirm the unspoken assumptions that still pervade the public--and
even the specialists.
Another burden whicn weighs on that Africa policy which the French expect of their
_ leaders, it is true, is the set of material azd moral re.sponsibilities entrusted
forever to the old colonizers, always deliberately invoked by our ex-charges,
particularly at the instigation of the progressive countries, always invoked by
the Soviet bloc, to e~.ude any co~itment on development. Though one must r.atarally
re3ect any feeling of culpability, it is not dishonorable--quite the contrary--to _
imagine that in our behavior toward AfriGa the idea of moral co~nitment remains
present and active. _
More, perhaps, than the British, the Belgians, or the Italians, we have retained
from our overseas adventure an emotional imprint, most probably due to the fact
that the relative poverty of our ex-colonies led us to concern ourselves abovs all
~ with the l~ving conditions of their inhabitants.
I-
It is for all these reasons that our policy shows itself to be the most compact, (
or, if one prefers, the most integrated. Its register extends from drilling a
well to armed intervention.
Its complexity allows some to fault it for not being "French" enough, for being
rather too "African," 01 vice versa. It is hard to say who is right. One fact
remains: this policy o~cupies a place all its own in our network of foreign rela-
tions. It is no longer the apanage of a specialized ministry, but an integral part
of our international mission.
The Incisive Thrust of Islam
But we are not alone in our interest in Africa's development. This continent has -
welcomed, in varying degrees of enthusiasm, several ideological and political
optians which are given free rein there. Ma.rxism, patiently offered by the
, Soviets, wherever they ha~:pen to be, has ended up finding some openings and suc-
~ ceeded, here and there, in at least partially positive demonstrations: some African
~ leaders are discovering in it--at least until disproved--a means of holdi.ng on to
~ power; they also draw from it a style of relations with the people which seems
` comfortable for them, to the extent that everything that is accomplished, for good
or for i11, arises from the initiative and on the responsibility of the people.
Also, the Soviets offer--in addition to weapons, which are always appreciated--
scholarships that permit young Africans to go to the USSR and satisfy, at least
initially, their taste for travel.
i In the field, among all the "sub-contractors" used by Moscow, the East Germans-- ~
one should have expected it--who have shown themselves m,ost effective.
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This promotion of collectivism gladly shelters itself behind the particularly
incisive thrust of Islam, which has founa a standard-bearer in the person of the
Libyan leader Moammar E1 Qadhdhafi.
Next year the 1350th anni.versary of the death of the Prophet will be celebrated.
Some are already thinking aUout celebrating the beginning of the 15th century after
the Hegira with special pomp. This Muslim renewal is accompanied by a pan-
Arabism in the face of Israel, and by its petrodollar wealth. This conquering
face of Islam and its proselytizers is appearing over the whole central part of
- Africa, in a singular manner, along the sub-Saharan border, at the level of the
13th paral.lel. This exaggerated kind of proselytizing which is nibbling away on
- its northern limits is worrying the blacks, and more especially the Christian and
= animist communities. It cannot be forgotten that Islam's implantation in black
~ Africa occurred in close connection with the development of the slave traffic.
In the midst of these currents which refer to an anachronistic and sometimes
~ f raudulent interpretation of Marx and the Koran, one comes to realize that the
; most innovative ideas are probably those that belong in the framework of a liberal
' doctine of ideas derived from the Declaration of the Rights of Man. In a~ociety
; strongly marked by superstition-.and magic, the magic of words included, modern
! notions of liberty and equality are, in the last analysis, muc~ more revolutionary
i than Marxlst principles or the "populist" concepts preached by Qadhdhafi in his
i Yamahiriya. In this regard, it is remarkable that we have been able in several
_ cases to contain Soviet penetration primarily because of ~conomic success which
bore fruit in spite of the weakness and the paralyzing ref 1 exes of the political
and administrative apparatus inspired by the collectivist ideology. Beyond
doctrinal options, it seems clear that African countries are first of a:11
- searching for the personalization of a principle of authority without which the
state could not survive. This results, in many cases, in the responsibility for
_I government being assumed by the soldiers: Niger, Upper Vo lta, Mali, Togo, Congo,
_ Ghana, Benin, Liberia, and Mauritania.
In the complexity of the African political climate, we cannot pass over in silence
~ the "apartheid" system that exists in the South African Rep ublic. Expressly
i opposed by the ethical principles of the Rights of Man which prevail in the West,
which clearly denounces it at every opportunity, it is als o denounced by the
~ Eastern bloc of countries, on the basis of the same principles. The Pretoria regime
I is, naturally, pilloried by all the countries of Che Third World. Now the hier-
archy of c~ste is still flourishing in India; similarly, in some African countries
_j the practice of household prisoners and even slavery* still persists.
~ What Political Evolution?
Throughout the different tendencies which coast along, blend into each other, and
sometimes oppose each other, it is easier to note symptoms than to predict the
political evolution of the continent. No one believes, however, that there will be
a progressive withdrawal of AFrica back into itself, a settling of local or
* Officially abolished by the Islamic Republic of Mauritania less than a year ago.
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r-
regional accounts that would in effect leave Africa entirely in the ha~ds of the
Africans. Already one finds among the Libyans, the Nigerians, and the Algerians
a mission as the policemen of Africa. The Chad affair seems to lend credence to
this hypothesis. One fac*_ remains: history past and present confirms that the
black countries on the coast are nourishi*~g apprehensions when they see fresh
signs, in the Sahara, of the symptoms of Islamic dynamism from which they expect
_ no good to come.
The oppo,sition which that expansion toward the south will encounter is showing it- -
self to be measured, careful, and not without evasions. It is not unthinka.ble,
moreov~r, to imagine that the Islamic flood may recede by itself. A successor
to Colonel Qadhdhafi does not seem guaranteed, for he is linked to a series of
zealots drawn from a small number of molds: the Sudanese Mahdi and the Algerian
Bou Maza preceded him, creating problems that were both violent and ephemeral.
Another sign of evolution or reflection of assimilation: on this new political
chessboard of Africa, rules of the game based on convenience and necessities are
already being accepted without reservation. The former, of an id~ological nat~ares
are on the left, with nonalignment, the "natural" ally of the sucia.list coimtries, ;
the constant attacks again st neocolonialism, racism, etc. The latter, of a
practical nature, invoke the longstanding ties with the western world, its tech- ~
nicians, its lending institutions, its capacity to give. The effects of this
double allegiance are particularly felt in international bodies where a Third
World style of discourse prevails, (and one must regret it in passing) which con- ;
tributes in an unfortunate way to lock~.ng in the North-South positions by
embedding them in formulations that leave little from negotiation. Thus the
Group of 77 ended by sterilizing, from the start, any effort toward discussion,
- once the great mass of poor countries, who liaten in silence to the spokesmen for
their leaders, were lumped all together.
It is fashionable to predict, in the medium or long term, the development of unique
_ political models able to reflect and express the essential characteristics of these -
countries that are so anxious to read more clearly into their future. For the ;
moment, and for a long time to come, African reactions can scarcely be expected to
free themselves from the atavistic weight of the pre-colonial past. Africans
~ indeed might well embrace that phenomenon observed many times throughout the
continent, as long as we can remember, which consists in countenancing the per-.
� petuation of soc3.opolitical systems tha.t put in a dependent status communities of
a size totally incommensurate with the numbers of those imposing the rules. Be- f
fore, during, and after colonization, that principle has been confirmed: One
recent example: Libera took more than a century to shake off the hold of a Negro-
American oligarchy which had confiscated nower. The wide spaces and the great
size of ~the rural masses partly explain this apparent paradox. For Africa, the
era of active minorities and subject majorities seems far from ended. It will
come gradually to an end with progressive development in the peasant world which,
y it cannot be doubted, holds--without being fully aware of it--both the deepest
secrets of ancestral Africa and most of the keys to its destiny. ,
CO~XRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Ci.e, ~ar~s, 1481
~ 9516
CSO: 3100
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, POLITICAL ITALY
~ THREE POTENTIAL SUCCESSORS TO LAMA AS CGIL flEAD
! Milan IL MONDO in Italian 20 Feb 81 rp 24-25
i :
~ [Article by Alessandro Caprettini: "Three Dauphins for Lama"J ~
[Text] It is not possible to repJ.ace the secretary general at present, but it is
i necessary to prepare for his successor. There are three candidates, but one starts
out as the favorite...
Even if one cannot actually speak of a small boat (there were more than 4.5 millivn
members in 1980; a huge apparatus of 7,500 employees; a budget of approximately
I 7 billion last year), the prevalent view that is circulating in labor union centers
is that the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of LaborJ is a ship at the mercy of
j big waves. A tarnished image, an aged leadership staff and with few replacements,
a certain lack of innovative purpose, combined with the attacks that now arri.ve
~ daily from the Botteghe Oscure and from the rank and file cotmnunist staffs
I (especially in the North), have recently given quite a~olt to the Italian General
- I Confederation of Labor. It has never been in such a state of crisis, not even in
~ t he dark years of the cold war, as on this eve of its lOth Congress, planned for -
thi~ coming 16--21 November, in Rome. -
"Problems? Of course, but as in all of the labor unions," minimize those in the
i red building on Corso [main street] Italia in Rome, the location ~f the main
offices of the confederation. But they all agree that it is necessary to impart
~ a sharp, sudden turn to the course of things. And conflicts on this very change
in course were aired in recent days in a series of more or less private meetings
which, in addition to planning for a date for the congress, are supplying the input
for the strategy of future years. T~ao very closely related main questions are
under discussion: men and the political line.
However, there i~ no talk of a replacement at the top for Luciano Lama. The
following factors work in favor of the 60-year-old labor unionist from Romagna,
who has been at the head of the CGIL since 1970 (and in spite of the letters of -
protest from the rank and file and the open outbursts at the Montecitorio of a
PCI [Italian Communist Party] supporter, who spoke of him as one "who h~s racked
his brain:"): the need to avoid rough jolts, to not let relations with ~he
socialists in the confederation wither (definite signs of opposition to PCI
_ pressure for a change have already emanated from the offices of Agostino Marianetti);
but above a:~l the lack of an official heir, and the shock that resulted from the
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calling in question of democratic centralism, which duplicated in the CGIL the
same divisions that are divined to be in the PCI.
In addition to Lama's line (Lama is an ortnodox supporter of Enrico Berlinguer
regarding national unity, but on the other hand is always more at odds with the -
communist leader because of a"too great quest for autonomy by the party" and
- now on positions very close to those of Gtorgio Napolitan~), there are currently
at least three other trends.
~e first ~"a veteran Stalinist one," maintain some of the CGIL young blood)
3s headed by 58-year-old Rinaldo S cheda, of Bologna, always strictly in conformity
with the positions of the PCI for which, according to a statement by Agostino
Novella some time ago, he enjoys an unquestionably pre-eminent position in the
labor movement.
However, apart from the small group of supporters in the labor union (in Emilia,
~ in Milan, and in some categories), Scheda does not seem to en~oy the credit needed -
from the top levels of the co~unist apparatus. Up to now, Berlinguer has not
accorded him his support. Listening to him, Napolitano allegedly pointed out
that "it is necessary also for politicians and labor unionists t~ retire in dig-
nity"; and there have been no openings fram the Ingrao leftist files. -
Bruno Trentin, on the other hand, does not lack the last-mentioned support. He `
is SS years old;cvasborn in France, but is of Venetian descent; ~s a former secre-
tary of the metalworkers federation and considered by quite a few as the most
brilliant ideologist (along with Eraldo Crea, CISL [ICalian Confederation of Labor
Unions]) of the entire labor union movement. Trentin's "programmatic" line demands
- a labor union change in the sense of a greater opening for the new emerging
classes (young people, women, the unemployed) combining the whole in a program.
In the political field, Trentin has always counted on a very close relationship
with Pietro Ingrao, but recently, because of the Salerno turning point, he is
said to have also won back a standing in the secretariat, for which he might even
become the connecting link with the left in a possible evolvement of the internal
;i situation.
However, two factors may work against him: the image that he has created of him-
self within the CGIL ("an ideologisC, yes, and even a very good one," admit some
~f' supporters in the directorate, "but when it comes to management, he would not
be able to manage even a porter's lodge") and a certain opposition from CISL and
t' UIL [Italian Union of Labor] circles, where some have already announced that they
; are against "the pernicious hypothesis of a return to the TBC (Trentin, Giorgio
Benvenuto, and Pierre Carniti who, togethe~, were at the head of the metalworkers
_f, federation in recent years).
;
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Third, ~nd for:~ now also the Iast of the three lines that the CGIL is now
_ experiencing, is that of 55-year-old Sergio Garavini, already municipal counsel~r
of the PCI ~n the chief city of the Piedmont and at the head of the textile
federation (FILTEA) from 1970 to 1976. Garavini, who last week was a~~igned the -
Caek of opening the committee debate on congreasianal topics, alsc~ asks f~r a '
~ renewal, but always in the wake of the choices that have been pursued up to now.
I More cautious than Lama in the quest for autonoruy and unit~ with the CISL and UIL -
at all costs (precisely in last week's meeting he did not hesitate to delivar ~
a harsh attack against Carniti and the CISL), in the view of many has "bet on the ~
i victnry of the Salerno 1ine, which moreover su3.ts his labor union view of labor
unionism." And Berlinguer, himself, now appears to be mentioning him in politicgl k-
I c~rcles, obtaining quite a few supporters in the apparatuses of the Botteghe
~ Oscure and of Corso Italia. `
~
a
The only negative aspect that can be attributed to him is insufficient experience _
~ at the top levels of management categories. But there might already be a ready
solution for this. In fact, according to a prevalent rumor that is circulating �
! within the CGIL, at the next congress Garavini is r.o head the metdlworkers federa-
~ tion (FIOM) [Federation of Those Employed in Metallurgical Industries], which is
still in a state of shock after the FIAT event and the critical rema.rks of the
PCI because of the adherence in the international fpderation of a categorq close to
the CISL. "No retrocession, let this be clear," says a socialist representa*_ive
of the metalworkers, "but maybe an apprenticeship that is necessary in view of
- the succession to Lama who could disappear at the next political elections."
If one may therefore still speak of lines ("but this does not mean that they cannot
be intersected by time...," say some sources close to those concerned), when it
comes to the men, the cards seem to have been already selected--and not only -
for the determination of an heir to Lama. Aware of having to renew their image ;
on the outside, the CGIL top level people are preparing to shuffl~ the cards that
' are to be presented precis~ly at the congress and that are to cause at Zeast two
' new communist names to enter the secretariat. At the moment, there are no offi~ial
~ candidates, according to what one hears, but they will all be young labor �
~ unionists, quite combative, with labor union experience, like the regional secretary
I of the P iedmont, Fausto Bertinotti; the Milan labor union secretary, Antonio
Pizzinata; the secretary of the transportation federation, Lucio De Carlini; and _
Silvano Rid3, secretary of the Campania region.
Paradoxically (after the many criticisms that have been directed at the CGIL) there
does not seem to be hopeful talk from the CISL and UIL with respect to this revolu-
tion that is being prepared on Corso Italia. "I think that the situation is deter-
iorating," says a UIL secretary, "because it does not seem to me that the now quite
apparent choice of Garavini can lead us t~ any greater unity that what we have _
_ today."
"The truth~ in turn booms Pietro Merli Brandini, secretary of the CISL confedera-
tion, "is that the CGIL once more seems to prefer to run after the siren of the
of the politician. But the PCI, too, must be very careful: like Medea, iC risks
not surviving, even though she did kill her children..."
COPYRTGHT: IL MONDO 1981
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MILITARY FRqNCE
' FUTURE OF GROUND FORCES AVIqTION EXPLORED
Paris AIR F~ COSMOS in French 28 Feb 81 p 31 ~
i
[Article by Jean de Galard: "Ground Forces Air Tactical Sup}~ort in 1981"]
[Excerpts] In this issue of AIR COSMOS we are publish ing the first two installments
in a series of three articles devoted to ALAT, Ground Forces Tactical Air Support,
commanded by Major GeneraZ Maurice Cannet, ALAT has clianged in recent years, and
its units iaere 'reorganiz~d after ~ reo'rRariization of the Army itself. This change
. was accompanied by radical change (General Cannet does not hesitate to call it a
revolution) in the methods of instruction and training of students at Dax, where
~ the Specialization School of Ground Forces Air Tactical Support, ESALAT, is located.
General Cannet was asked about the evaluation that might be made today of a plan of
action that was drawn up in 1977 and was to be gradually implemented by 1980. Gene-
ral Cannet said answered that some of its objectives h ad been met or were soon to be
met. This category could no doubt include everything concerning problems of materiel
and personnel use (ALAT has 6,OOO~men, including 3,000 recruits) and instruction.
In other areas concerning operations--night flying, f.ly~ng on instruments, for
' example-=rea1 progress has been made, but there is still a lot to do, even though
a recent demonstration of firing Hot missiles at night from an Aerospace Dauphin
; helicopter makes it possible to look forward to future good results.
I As for the deployment and choice of future materiel, it can be said that the delay
~ that has been incurred is due in part to the new conditions of tank vs helicopter
~ combat.
~ We summarize here the ALAT conunanding general's point of view as he explained it in
~ the journal DEFENSE NATIONALE. Three facts have modified the conditions of tank-heli-
, copter duels: the deployment of helicopters armed with a utomatic cannon; the inesca-
pable disappearance of the advantage that the helicopter has had over the tank:
. being practically tindetectable at 3,U00 meters and yet ~ eing able to discover combat
vehicles auickly from this altitude from its stable position (it will not be long
before tanks will be able to spot hslicopters first); and the increasing capacity
that land units will have to ec{ual or surpass heli~:opters in firing range through
the use of self-g~iiding missiles working on higher frequencies than th~y now do.
General Cannet analyzed the characteristics of both categories of projects intended
to meet the problem: multipurpose fi eavy helicapters an d light antitank helicopters;
he then summed up the debate:
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"7'wo main categoxies of solutions axe open to the ~xmi.es that want to keep an a~r- _
borne antitank capacit~ beyond the 1gS0's,
- "The first categor~ leads to t}ie formation of two types of antitank helicopters:
first, fi eavy macfiines protected against medium-caliber missiles and capalile of
shooting down enemy helicopters witli cannon fire as well as firing antitank missiles
day or night; second, possibly- light surveillance helicopters manned liy oliSFrvation
teams to spot and identify targets.
~~...The second category tends to extend the tactical concept cliosen by the rrench
Army, which integrates different kinds of helicopters and crews to ground forces."
The two categcries, according to General Cannet, lead to very different kinds of
helicopters. The choice will depend on both tfie teclinological optimism of the
decision-makers and the financial effort tfiat eacFi branch of the armed forces can
mak e .
"All the countries that have equipped themselves with modern helicopters are finding
out how much it costs to keep them in shape.
"For the next generation of antitank helicopters, if we keep on ec{uipping tllem at I~
the present rate, it is reasonable to estimate that the annual cost of ma~ntaining
them in operational condition will correspond to 20 or 25 percent of the purchase ~
price. _
"Cost analysis shows that cost is proportional to botli the mass of the helicopters
and the number of crews aboard them. This factor is obvicusly going to favor the
- development of the second kind of helicopter described above."
- Night Operations
ALAT has been studying for a few years now various kinds of materiel intended to
facilitate night operations and used in troop training.
Originally the goal was to have crews whose average night-flight experience was
i greater than 120 hours. This goal has been met by Puma pilots and will be met
~ by the end of the year by light helicopter pilots. ALAT command wants its pilots'
~ night-flying experience to average ultimately 250 hours for about 2,300 clayliglit
flying hours.
w -
Experiments made so far lead to some practical conclusions: (1) training is an essen-
'i tial factor in night flying; (2) no crews are specialized in night flying; (3) instru-
-
ment flying aptitt~de is inciispensable for night flying; (4) nighttime anritank com at
is very different from daytime antitank combat; (5) more equipment--and this is going
- to add to the cost of the fleet--is necessary: ALAT, for one, has equipped its Gazelles
and Pumas with an automatic pilot, two artificial horizons and a radio altimiter.
At the moment, ALAT's specifications for everything concerning night operations can
be summed up as follows:
(1) for observation and target acquisition, periscope sights are needed; observation
~ mechanisms are needed above the rotor;
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~2) the comhat helicopter must be reduced ~n size and its con.�~guxation ada~ted
to limiting its detection and targeting by enemy sel~~guidi..ig m~ssiles;
(3) at first, helicopter night piloting will be done with third~generation light-
intensifying glasses; heat imaging will be used later on;
(4) missile firing capacity is needed either from easily heliportiBle ground points
or from an antitank fielicopter that need show itself only at the moment of firing;
(5) a radar warning light is desirable.
But when it comes to equipment, General Cannet notes, there ought not to be too much,
and its cost should be kept reasonable. We in the Army intend to remain "country
boys."
~ CO?YRIGH;: A F. C 1981
~
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AiILITARY FRANCE
CURRENT STATUS OF GROUND FORCES AVIATION REVIEWED
Paris AIR COSr10S in French 28 Feb 81 pp 32-34
_ [Article by Jean de Galard; '�ALAT's Activities in 1980"]
[Text] As of 31 December 1980, ALAT's air force included a�ew more than 1~0 planes,
50 of which were operational (35 L-19's a~?d 15 Broussards) and 580 helicopt~rs, 510
of which were operational.
These aircraft flew more than 171,000 hours last year, more than in 1979 (see AIR ~
COSMOS No 800). The total flying time breaks down as follows: 14,000 hours for planes -
and 157,000 hours for }ielicopters (witfi 11,860 }iours at night). The helicopter force
is made up of: 190 Alouette II's; 170 SA 34~'s (Gazelles) about 40 of which are
equipped with Hot antitank missiles; 19 SA 342's (Gazelles) equipped with Hot mis-
siles; 70 Alouette III/SS-11's; 133 Puma SA 330 tactical helicopters. -
In percentages, the 1980 share in the four main helicopter activity areas in ALAT
was as follows: tactical forces 54.5 percent (a little more than the year before);
; schools 28.01 percent (a little less than in 1979); security forces 14.44 percent
(the same as in 197~); and overseas missions 3.05 percent (a little less than in
1979) .
i
j; In the combat helicopter regiments, activity in percentage of flying hours was
' divided thus: 32.2 percent for light helicopters; 36.5 percent for armed helicopters
(Alouette III/SS 11's; SA 341/Hot's and SA 342/Hot's) and 31.3 percent for tactical
helicopters.
Diversified Activities
-i ALAT units' activAties in 1980 was marked by the diversification of missions: over-
seas presence (e.g. in Chad, Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Tunisia);
' participation in various exercises in France and abroad; instruction, training,
~ practice and specialization; civilian missions, and humanitarian assistance missions.
; Once again, ALAT's participation in foreign action on behalf of countries tied to
France by cooperation agreements has demonstrated the high level of readiness and
the quick reaction time of all the units participating in these actions; the relia- -
bility of the materiel in operation has also been proved by these actions.
26
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_ Last year three ALAT units participated in troop exercises, 'fhe 5th RHC jHelicopter
Comb at Regiment] logged 203 ~light hours i.n June in a French~Spani.sh exercises
named Gallia UTT in the Salamanca region, The 2nd RHC logged 300 flight hours
- in the Pegasus exercises, which took place in Decemlier and in which elements of
the 3rd DB [armored divisionJ took part. But the most hours on maneuver, 1,670,
were put in by the helicopters of the lst Army Corps reinforced by elements of
: the 2nd RHC in the rlarne 80 interservice exercise of 6-9 October, -
At various demonstrations, the 5th RHC logged 160 hours in one' day ~
~ (with 15 light helicopters, 9 armed helicopters and 12 tactical helicopters) and
the 3rd RHC, 100 hours (with 16 light helicopters, 24 armed helicopters, and 18 =
, tactical heliconters).
i "Instructional" activity at school accounted for a little less than 30 percent of -
the.total flight hours in 1980 in ALAT, and this activity also took place in the
j units. A future issue of AIR $ COSMOS dated 14 b9arch 1981 will deal with the new
conditions under which the instruction and training of helicopter pilots is done
at the ALAT school in Dax. =
Experiments were also made on new materiel in the units last year. Units ec{uipped
with SA 342 Gazelle/Hot's were satisfied with the performance of their arms system,
while the evaluation of night-sight materiel (.light intensification glasses) con-
tinued under satisfactory conditions, It may be recalled at this point (see AIR F,
COSMOS No 845) that the first night firing of Hot antitank missiles from a Dauphin
helicopter equipped with a Venus night aiming system and manned by a pilot wearing
BNL [ expansion unknown ] hovexing 15 meters above the ground took place suc-
cessfully on 20 and 21 January 1981.
- ALAT helicopters and personnel were again assigned to help civilian organizations
last year and did so considerably.
I
For highway assistance, the helicopters of the lst, 2nd and 5th RHC's at Montpellier,
Dijon, aiid Toulouse carried out about 100 ambulance missions with 172 flying hours.
Under the Polmar plan, the helicopters of the 3rd GHL [Light Helicopter Group] in
the Tanio mission flew more than 150 liours and carried out about 40 reconnaissance
missions and transportation errands for various authorities. In fighting forest
fires in July and August 1980, 3 Puma SA 330's transported 95 firefighters, 3.2
~ tons of water and 800 kg of materiel in 8 flying hours. The begi-~ning of 1981
~ was also marked by a new use of ALAT helicopters: on 5 and 6 January, forest fires
I in the Kice region caused two Pumas to be mobilized; they flew 13 hours. From 12
to 17 January, the implementation of the Orsec plan in the Pyrenees-Orientales
department and Aude department following heavy snowfalls took 35 flying hours and .
resulted in the movement of 30 tons of xescue materiel by two Pumas.
Two important humanitarian n~issions were carried out in 1980, and ALAT played a large
part. In January, two Pumas from the Sth RHC at Pau and the ALAT detachment in Dji-
bouti were detached to Retmion Island to assist the population in the wake of typhoon
Hyachinth, They flew a total of 11Q hours, transported 128 tons of inedicine, food,
bedding and construction materials, and they evacuated 1,655 people.
In June, three Pumas from the 6th and 2nd R.HC flew almost 80 hours on a technical
assi.stance mission for the Republic of Sierra Leone, -
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In August, two Pumas brought in bY Tz~ansall and Boeing 747 ~lew alinost 200 hours,
of which 190 hours were operational, on a humanitaxian missa.on to Ur~ng ~ood and
medicine to Uganda. They �lew out about 20 people on ambulance missions and carried
nearly 175 tons of inedicine and food.
High Readiness
ALAT helicopters' average overall readiness was greater in 1980 than in 1979: 76,8
- percent against 74 percent in 1979. and 73,6 percent in 1378,
The number of maintenance liours per flight hour appears in the following table:
type~ of helicopter 1979 1980
Alouette II 2,46 2.22
Alouette III 5,10 4.81
Gazelle SA 341 3.46 4.48
Puma SA 330 8,54 9.27
There is an appreciable decrease in the number of inechanics' hours per flight hour
for older equipment, t~e Alouette II and III's, This decrease is due to better
knowledge of the devices mounted in these kinds of aircraft. On the other hand,
" when it comes to more modern equipment, the Pumas and Gazelles, the maintenance to
flight-hours ratio increased in 1980 over 1979. This increase is due to the instal-
lation aboard these helicopters of new equipment requiring initial installation and
adaptation work and routine maintenance: installation of the Athos observation scope
- on the Gazelles, increasing the power of the SA 341's and the SA 341/Hot's, trans-
formation of the Puma SA 330B with metal rotor blades to Pumas SA 330Ba with compo-
sition blades, and installation of automatic navigation equipment on the Pumas.
' A Still Satisfactory Level of Safety
Let us review the definitions of aerial accident and serious aerial incident as
formulated iii ALA1'.
,
;~1 An aerial accident is one in which materiel is destroyed or a crew member is mortally
injured. A serious aerial incident is one in which there is serious material damage
(requi.ring 4th-echelon intervention) or serious injuries to a crew member.
H'';
~ In 1980, ALAT had four accidents (SA 341, Alouette II, Puma and Broussard), twa more
than in 197~, which had been an outstanding year in this respect. ~Considering the
number of flying hours, 1980 registered 0,23 accidents for 10,000 flying hours, which
~`tt was greater than in 1979 (0.12). Hor~ever, this rate is still less than the average
between 1973 and 1980: 0.25 accidents for 10,000 flying hours. No accident happened
last year during night flying.
' ALAT officers responsible for flight safety are particularly interested in three
kinds of accidents: night flying, collisions with cables and accidents resulting
- from motor breakdowns.
From 1973 to 1976, only one serious aerial incident happened in 7,286 r~ight flying
' hours; the strict orders given to tFie units were effective.
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Prom 1973 to 1~80, 16 cable accidents were noted ~n 75,330 ,f1Y~ng houxs, The r~sk
o~ an accident hap~ening tiy h~.tti.ng a cab~.e is much h~.ghex than hy motor hxeakdowns,
The cost of an accident of this type, ~t haS been �ound, ~s generally very high:
materiel destroyed and aircraft occupants killed, The 16 accidents mentioned above
- le.ft 11 dead and 7 wounded; 6 helicopters were destroyed, But contrary to wfi at
flight security officers had thought, tactical flights F~ad no accidents caused
init~ally by fiitting a cable witfi a rotor blade or the cabin, In fact, there has j
_ never been an accident caused by hitting a cafile during tactical flights, which is
no doubt explained liy botfi tfi e crew's watchfulness and its knowledge of the terrain
in which it is �lying.
~
In any case, ALAT is interested in all ~neans of protecting equipment, especially ~
cable cutters (see AIR ~ COSMOS No 97, p 2) and cable detectors.
While cable cutters da not eliminate the risk of a collision, they may be very effec-
tive, and their mass is not too great a handicap.
Accidents due to motor breakdowns are generally very rare: 0,043 accidents per 10,000 ~
flying hours, and they come to barely 10 percent of all the accidents noted in the '
1.2 million flying hours from 1973 to 1980.
i
Generally speaking, we can say that in the last 8 years only 20 percent of the acci-
~ dents had a cause of inec}ianical origin; the other 80 percent were caused by the per-
i sonnel, and this has led ALAT command to insist on quality instruction, of course,
from the very beginning of training on. This quality will become apparent to our -
readers in the article we shall print in a future issue concerning the ALAT specia-
lization school at Dax.
COPYRIGHT: A. F~ C. 1981
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GENERAL FRANGE
~
~
~ LACK OF GOOD MECHANICS SEEN SLOWING TECHNICAI~ PROGRESS
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 16 Feb 81 pp 42-43
[Article by Gerard Bonnot--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]
[Text] I~uclear energy, solar energy, date processing, biologi-
cal engineering: the "musts" of French industry could collapse
unless we create a new generation of "mechanics."
- ` Will we be seeing a"Mister Mechanic" in the government tomorrow, as in the past
we have had a"Mister Prostitution" or a"Mister Noise"? For the Academy of
5ciences, which ordinarily does not get involved in public affairs, the measure
_ is mandatory. It said so to the president of the republic in the report it
turned in last winter on France's industrial future.*
In reality, mechanics, that /"science of the laws of motion and balance and the
application of those laws to construction and the utilization of machines,"/ as
Pierre Larousse wrote in his "Great Dictionary of the Nineteenth Century," in 1973,
is not just another science. In a world transformed by technology, and dominated
by industry, it has also become an affair of state.
France anc~ Eurupe want their share of the space markets of the future. But the
second prototype of the Ariane rocket, which is the vehicle of their ambitions,
_ was destiroyed in flight on 23 May I980, 108 seconds after launch. Combusticn in-
stability in the form of high-frequency vibrations, appeared. It caused the break-
up of the thin covering of liquid fuel that protected the inject~r and refrigerated
i the nozzle. It was a mechanical problem, and a difficult one, which does not at
= the moment admit of a theoretical solution a priori and which took the Americans
! 18 m~nths to solve on the engines of the Saturn rocket.
The trend is toward electronics. We are assured that more and more it is going to
- replace traditional mechanical or electro-mechanical appliances used in everyday
life. Doubtless. But, to perfect its revolution, electronics itself needs re-
placeable parts. By way of example, the Academy of Sciences report details the
stages in the production of magnetic bubble memories. Depositing a magnetic
layer on a garnet base. Depositing a material of high magnetic permeability on
top of that layer. Putting into this layer, by means of photogravure, a network
of patterns with a precision greater than one micron (a thousandth part of a milli-
meter). Superposing patterns made of a conducting material on this network. And
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so on. To perform all these operations new machines are required which are them-
selves run by computers and calling for revolutionary machine-finishing techniques, -
which at present French mechanics would be hard pressed to provide.
The report does not claim to reduce all industrial activity to mechanics. It con- _
fines itself to emphasizing that there can be no real industry, even in the vanguard
of development,--whether in solar energy, data processing, or biology--without some
mechanics. And especially mechanical invention.
The Quality of the Individuals
For mechanics, even if it was the first of the exact sciences to define, in the
Seventeenth Century, its principles and methods, is in no way a closed discipline, '
finished, obsolete, in which all problems can be solved by simply consulting the :
archives. It is coritinually evolving, becoming more complicated, diversifiying,
along with the new problems it is asked to solve. The meter used to be defined
as a fraction of latitude represented by a bar of irradiated platinum. Today, it
has become a multiple of the wavelength of the radiation of a krypton atom in
a vacuum. Even in a field as trad~tional as large-scale construction, the appear-
ance of a new mat~rial is enough to change the rules of the game. Thus, "reinforced" ~
earth, like reinforced concrete, patented by a French engineer in 1963, is used ~
- today in 32 countries. '
'
France is gambling on the advanced-technology industries. Without denying the im-
portance of political will, financial boldness, and commercial dynamism in this
strategy, the report points out convincingly that success depends above all on the
quality of the individuals and the level of their skill. Because there can be no
advanced-technology industry without advanced-technology mechanics.
~ How well do French mechanics measure up? The assessment put together by the Academy
of Sciences in not reassuring on first inspection. Though we have excellent special- ~
ists in optics, we do not know how to manufacture photographic apparatus. Or type-
writers. Or the scientific measuring and and analyzing equipment used in medicine
and laboratories. We export conventional machine-tools and we import sophisticated
~ machinery. In digital-control machinery and robots we are not only behind the
Japanese and the Americans, but even behind the Italians.
T~
4. In a fie~d, however, where we have proven our ability--the automobile--we are
beginning to lose ground to the Americans and Japanese in the battle against pollu- ~
tion, and to the Japanese in engine and driver assistance electronics. We know how
to make diesel engines, but we have not mastered injection systems. ~
In reading the report, one is struck by the number of inechanical sub-specialities
in which France does not shine, or indeed in which specialized training cannot even
be obtained in France.
/"It is not as bad as it could be,"/ according to the permanent secretary of the
Academy of Sciences, Paul Germain, himself a specialist in fluid mechanics, former
director of the National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research (ONERA), which
~ played a decisi.ve part in the preparation of the report. /"The field of inechanics
- is immense, and France's resources necessarily limited,"/ he says. /"If need be,
we could always send our students to study abroad, and buy the licenses for :.he
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processes which we have still not mastered. This is the policy which Japan has ~
been following for 20 years and you see the reeults today."/
The danger, as he sees it, is elsewhere. /"What does not work,"/ he says, /"ie
for the teaching of sciences in the high-schools to remain purely theoretical,
wtthout ever putting the French youth into contact with th~e physical reality,
for our future engineers to be selected exclusively on their ability to pass
abstract mathematical tests, for the most brilliant students in our big colleges
to be oriented toward careers in administration or commerce rather than devoting
themselves to research and technology."/
In France, one never finds successful researchers heading companies as they do in
the United States, Germany, and above all in Japan; one finds only financiers and
~ former officials. The government had to enact a special tax to force companies to
finance professional community research centers, and many of these centers are veg-
i etating. There is no big association in France, as there is in the United States,
~ where all those involved in mechanics--in the university, in the laboratory, in
- the factory--could meet, discuss their ideas and needs, and protect their interests.
One finds only associations of specialists, whose activities are generally confi-
dential. /"What is wrong," Paul Gerniain concludes, /"is that France has not yet
- understood the fundamental role of inechanics and does not give it the place that
rightfully belongs to it."/
One War Behind
An indifference which is all the more regrettable because, despite appearances, he
does not think French mechanics is doing all that poorly. /"Ever since the war, _
whenever a large company or the state decided to make a serious effort to solve a
problem that industry did not know how to resolv~e, they ended by finding the men
and the means to solve it,"/ he observes. And as examples he cites, in no particu-
lar order, liquid sodium pumps for breeder reactors, the compressors in uranium en-
richment plants, the inertial navigation systems found on our combat aircraft, and
the aerodynamic research on supersonic fli.ght for the Concorde.
~ -
Overall, French mechanics contributes a net plus to our commercial balance. Aero-
spatiale's helicopters are as good as those of the Americans. The Michelin radial
tire has beaten all competitors. Before the war, the teleprinters used in France
I were all of foreign make; today, France is the world's second largest exporter
I of teleprinters. The first cars of the future high-speed train ~TGV) are rolling
I at 260 kilometers per hour. Now for 10 years the Japanese have been unable to go
beyond 220 kilometers per hour, apart from which the stability of the vehicles is
becoming very difficult ta maintain. Also, the French train can sustain consid- ~
erably more weight on its axles, and consumes less energy, than the Japanese trains.
It is true that we often give the impression of being one battle or one war behind,
the Academy acknowledges in its report. But it must also not be forgotten where
we started, 30 years ago. While we were struggling to catch up with our most
advanced competitors, these latter were not standing still waiting for us. They
continued to move ahead. Overall, the gap seems to be closing, rather than widen-
ing .
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Only nowadays the inspired Jacobin methods which up to now have brought us success
in big, high-prestige projects will no longer suffice. For one cannot isolate
mechanica from the entirety of industrial activity. It is like the blood that cir-
Culates in an organism. To finish catching up, France must now completely rendvate
its industrial network, convert small and medium-sized enterprises to research,
train people, create vocations. One of the weaknesses in the Airbus program, at .
present, is the problem Ae,~ospatiale has in recruiting competent specialists.
- And this is where the shoe pinches. The Academy of Sciences has taken the
measure of a problem which extends far beyond the habitual field of its activities.
Its diagnosis is excellent. But, to remove the impediments which are still holding
back the take-off of French industry, it will take much more than one report, even
if it is written with lucidity and without complacency. Nothing will have been
accomplished until public opinion is mobilized and convinced that mechanics, as
much as data processing or biology, merits becoming a national priority.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Le Nouvel Observateur"
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