JPRS ID: 9679 JAPAN REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100042-1
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• Sequence Number: 42
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9679
~ 22 April 1981
Ja an Re ort
. p p
CFOUO 26/81 ~
~
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/9679
- 22 April 1981
; JAPAN REPORT
~ (FOUO 26/81)
CONTENTS .
MILITARY
Military Buildup Budget Curtailment Examined
(Hi deo Ohtske; ASAHI JANARU, 3~ Jan 81) 1
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ~
Japan's Science, Technology Policies Reviewed
~
~Various soarcea; various dates) 13
Diet S& T Co.-mnittee Chairman
Industries' Views, by Sadakazu Shindo
- Finan~ial Reaources, by Kozo Sasaki
'NIHOiu KEIZAI SHIMBUN' Editorial ~
Review of Government Progra:ns
STA Director Genersl
Aspects of L~.ser Plasma Researeh Discussed
(NUCLEAR FUSION RESEARCH, No 1[no date given] 27
, Plasa~a Counter-Streazns, by Masamitsu Aizawa
Magnetic Field Generation, by Toshio Okada, et al.
~ Role o~ Autoi:ation Technology in Plants Today, in Futux~e
; (Yu~i Yoshikawa; 1VIHICEI SANGYO SHIMBUN, 22 Jan 81) 4~+
Entry of Private Sector Into Data Communication Industry Under Study
(NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, ~+-13 Jan 81; 1VIKKAN KOGYO SI~INIDUN, 5 Feb 81) 69
~
~ Feasibility Stuc~y -
~ ~NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN'Editorial
~ LDP Committee
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_ ~
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~ ~ - a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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MILITARY
MZLITARY BUILDUP BUDGET CURTAILMENT EXAMINED
Tokyo ASAHI JANARU in Japanese 30 .Tan 81 pp 10-17
[Article by Hideo Ohtake, Assistant Professor of Law, Tohoku University: "Inside
Story of the Making of a Military Build-tip Plan"] ~
[Text) (Foreword by editorial staff) In spite of the widely expressed contention
that wiChout an increase of at least 9.7 percent over the preceding year Japan-United
States relations would deteriorate, next fiscal y~ar's defense budget increase has
been held down to 7.61 perc~nt. This shortfall came about in spite of loud and broad
support for a strc:~ger def Ense force accompanying anti-USSR propaganda and a trend
toward conservatism.
What happened during the process of putting rhe defense budget to~ether?
- What actions were taken by the 'hawk' factions in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
'defense dietmen' [Self Defense Forces and the Defense t~gency Officials turned diet-
men], and former Director General ~f the defense agency, to defend the 9.7 percent
increase? When Prtme Minister Suzuki suddenly announced a political decision to put
the defense budget under wraps by saying that "If the subject is forced at this point,
we are going to lose all." Why didn't the various factions within the party react
and resist vigorously?
The ensuing article investigates the political structure power plays within. the
LDP which had been aiming at broad increases in the defense budget and the general
public's opinion with regard to defense spendiag. '
[Text of Article] The decision as expressed in the government's proposed Japan Fiscal
Year [JFY] 1981 budget, to increase the defense portion at a 7.61 percent rate,has
given rise to two lines of reaction fram both those who desired a defense budget in-
crease and those who were a~ainst it. For example, the mass conununication media
which is normally critical of defense spend~ng increase~, is of two opinions: On
- the one hand, there are editorials which attach much significance to the f act that
in a total budget which has been held down to an.increase of 4.3 percent, defense
not only has a proportionately much larger increase but, though small, the increase is
more than that apportioned to socal welfare measures (7.6 per~ent); other editorials
question the wisdom of cutting by more than 2 percent, the minimum increase of 9.7
percent pressed on Japan by the United States, particularly at a time when it is
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showing a turning-to-the-right trend, The situation is the same in opposite camp,
the poli,tical power camp, which in a self-laudatory way, claims that even this period ,
vf economic crisis, the fact that defense expenditures have been alloted a higher
_ r~te of increase than that for the total budget should indelibly impress all concern-
ed that Japan is a full member of the western bloc. But there are those who apolo-
_ getically say that because there is still inadequate ur~derstanding by the general
- public, surrendering to the Finance Ministry's pressure was unavo~dable.
~
_ Needless to say, these varied comments reflect differing policy positions and polit-
ical postures; it is necessary to note, however, th~t the budget is considered in
the light of d iff ereing levels of priorities. Basically, during the 70's there was ~
an increasing trend to the right and during the past two or three years, a growing
. "second cold war" atmosphere. With this as a backdrop, the increase of 7.61 percent
--emphasis placed on frontline equipment--ref lects a breakthrough in def ense spending
- which has been in a stalled state for the past 10 years. In contrast to that view- -
point, in spite of the landslide victory in the douhle elections which enhanced the
hawks' position and the bold pressure applied bq the United States which lead to an
official agreement that there would be an increase of 9.7 percent (11.9 percent with
the inciusion of personnel expenditure), counterattack from public opinion and
- Finance Ministry forced the paring of the increase to the 7 percent level during the
actual compilation of the budget.
This article is aimed at investigating the elements which influenced the making of
the budget, pa rticularly during the September-December period of Ias* year. Although
it will be weighted to the developments during that last period, the political sit- ~
uation which lead to incraase consciousness will be viewed to prevent losing sight
of the big picture before making detailed analyses of events and situations and
describe the making of the f inal budget in terms of its political significance. ~
By the summ er of 1980 several reasons f 3voring a broad based increase in defense
sper?~iing had become clearly def ined and made ready for introduction to the political
arena. With~a basic demand that the defense u;:dget be considered as a separate
entity, ;,�upporters seemed to be in a position to overu~helm the Finance Ministry's
cry for a compressed budget to cope with the economic crisis. The increase in Soviet
naval power in the Far East during the 70's and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979
gave the right wingers in the LDP excellent justification for their demand. �
_ The easing of U.S.-China, Japan-China relations, the SALT I representing progress in
detente, and the slowing of economic growth rate during the mid-70's had been rea-
sons for the government and the LDP to voluntarily apply a degree of restraint
against increase in military spending. The Fourth Defense Plan drawn up by the then
Director General of Defense Agency Nakasone was broadly whittled down and furCh~r
reduced in its implementation stage. Thia left such a la~ge lag in planned~ defense
measures that the long range def ense plan (Fifth Defense Plan) which was due during
the tenure of Sakata as the Director General of the defense agency, had to be
scrapped in its formative stage. This not only led to giving up on plans to attain
defense plans lst through 4th at a faster pace, but also inar~ased the rear service
support and equipment structure with cammensurate increase in personnel expenditures,
! and spending on research and development lowered. With worsened economic situation
- under the lowe growth per.iod during the tenure of Prime Minister Miki and Defense ~
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~ Agency Director General Sakata, the basic concept of defense forces and its deiense
guideline, defense spending was limited by the cabinet to no more than 1 percent of
GNP which had the effect of being highly supportive of detente.
AC this point, it is important to note that t~ao ma~or changes came into being. The
first was that the `Salc.ata line' which gave up on rapid increases in defense strength,
- created a situation under which dependence on United States military was increased,
and manifested itself in the strategic plans involving the United States. We do not
have the space here but it is an undeniable fact that this will intensify and affect
more facets during the 80's.
The other point is that then Director General Sakata launched a vigorous public re-
lations campaign to promote "ui,derstanding" of the Self Defense Forces. Curtailment
of def ense spendin~ was a very convenient tool to soften the impact on public opinion
(footnote 1). The Fukuda cabinet gave its support to the public relations campai.gn
and boldly took up defense problems, a turn about from the taboo that had been put
on defense discussions, and vigorously worked on the PR pro3ect. Subjects pertain-
ing to strategic planning and constitutional revision were brought up successively,
forcing the opposition political parties to make a 180 degree turn to the defense.
Without these two changes, the joint military strategic plan with the United States
refered to above, never could have been effected.
These measures taken in the 70's set the stage--objectively, if not sub~ectively--
for the move to incr~ase defense rorces during the 80's.
, In this atmosphere, the Afghanistan problem presented the 'right wing' of the LUP
with a golden opportunity to accelerate its move to gain power. Of even more sig-
nif icance, however, was that during the past 2 years, pressure applied by the United
States on Japan was being radically increased; using rising eeonomic friction between
- Japan and the United States as a backdrop, congressional criticism of Japan's "secur-
ity free ride" intensif ied. This lead t~ gaining the support of the group which
viewed the Soviet threat lightly but which felt a need for eased pressure from the
United States. In other words, the concept of keeping a lid on Japan's defense
powers for the purpose of promoting cooperation of the United States ha.d to be
replaced by one which requir.ed lncreased defense force to achieve the same purpose.
The LDP was not alone in seeing the need for this change; the viewpoint became
widely accepted in the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry for International Trade and
~ Industry [MTTI], and in private financial and economic circles which put much weight
on relations with the United States for political and economic reasons. This was
how a new consensus was formed among Japan's elite.
In this flow of events, an estimated increase of 9.7 pereent was decided. This f ig-
_ ure gave the footing for the Defense Agency to request a 12 percent increase includ-
:ing the increase in personnel expenses and also to request that there be provisions
f.or further increases should there be changes in the situation. To the latter
request, Fin~ance M.inister Watanabe replied: "Let`s discuss that case by case as
the situatio.n changes" which was taken as a'response with understanding [positive].'
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Defense Agency Accepts 9.7 Percent Increase Ceiling
When the political manipulations--which took place during the whole year [198d]--is ~
viewed on the assumption that the entire procesa was aimed at an increased ceiling -
of 7.61 percent, a certain rationale can be discerned; confrontations and arguments
during the process of putting the budget together since last fall, all concerned
themselves with this upper limit. However, there is room to suspect that the
defense agency and the 'defense diet-men' were not fully appreciative of the rigidity
of this ceiling decision and because of that, the defense agency was guilty of mak-
ing two tactical errors in handling the ceiling problem.
~ The first error lay in the fact that during the summer months, it had failed to ob-
tain clarification on whether the increase in the rate of expenses pertaining to
personnel matters was included in the 9.7 percent rate of increase. It is believed
that the government's leadership purposely left this point vague to assure i~self
room for laCer maneuverability. The Defense Agency, therefore, ent ered into the
f inal stage of formulating budget without clarif ication. As will b e deacribed later,
_ when the budget enters into the final stage of compilation, conflicts and coordina-
tion with other elements come to the surface, the defense oriented Diet members have
dispersed and support of the foreign ministry becomes undependable. Under such cir- -
` cumstances, it is only natural that the consensus which had existed earlier breaks ;
~ down. Therefore, the decision-making time for budgetary requests is the only time
to obtain favorable decisions on such as personnel cost matters. By letting this
opportunity slip throu~h its f ingers, the defense agency forfeited the chance to '
_ obtain appropriations Co cover increased expenses pertaining to personnel matters.
The second error was the Defense .~gency's failure to include supplementary appropria-
tions in the budgetary request to cover contingencie~ under which the increase of
9.7 percent was f ound to be inadequate. The absence of a mechanism to ask for sup-
plementary appropriations was taken as an admission that the 9.7 percent increase
was in itself an unachievable f igure. The fact that the defense ag ency accepted the
9.7 percent increase without a struggle was a source of disappointment and dissatis-
faction to defense oriented Diet and Foreign Ministry members. It is believed that
this passivity on the part of the defense agency resulted from pres sures appiied by _
agents dispatched to the budget people of the agency by the Finance Ministry and to
lingering legacy of defensiveness which kept it from riding the crest of the new
wave. In any event, by lim iting itself to a ceiling of 9.7 percent increase, it was
insvitable that it had to retreat from it in the final stages.
It can be said then, that the 9.7 percent ceiling was the cause f or the resultant
increase in the 7 to 8 percent level. 4J~at was the source of the power and how was
it manipulated to lower this 9.7 percent figure during the final stage of budget -
making during the September-December period? How did the defense agency and the '
national defense committee co~e with this force? What were the pol itical implica-
tions? It is our ir.tention to investigate these political power plays and through
it, study the causes for defense spending being held down. We wish to present these
facts to determine whether def ense spending can be controlled by the people itself.
_ We acknowledge that the Ohira-Charter agreement had a great impact on the situation
, at the time, the passing of former Prime Minister Ohira and the def eat in the Novem-
ber elections of Carter, it lost much of its clout. Because of space limitations,
= we will omit a detailed discussion of that aspect.
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'
Of the political entities which played ma~or roles in the formation of the budget,
we intend to focus on the principal Elements with the LDP in the investigative re- -
port which follows.
- Wi~hin the party in power, the ones who were most actively engaged in trying to in-
_ crease def ense appropriations were policy groups made up of those wh~ are commonly
called "defense dietmen." These men are members of the national de�ense committee
or security research association under the party's policy board. Using those organ-
izations as their point of departure, they worked hard to influence the party
leadership and the finance ministry. These organizations met jointly with the special
committee on military bases and frequently assembl~d formal and secondary conferences
and had the chief or deputy chief of the defense agency make status reports. Reso-
lutions were drawn up at such meetings and they were submitted to the prime minister,
the chief cab3.net secretary, the party's three directors, and the finance minister.
Sometimes its representatives would summon the accountants of the Finance Ministry's
bureau of accounts to brief them on the need for increasing defense expenditures in
support of the defense agency.
For example, on 24 December, a day in the highly critical period in the final stages -
of budget making, it is reported that the office of the chief cabinet secretary was
, taken over by about 25 members of the "defense dietmen" for about an hour and that
the atmosphere inside was Zikened to a"lynch Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa' (foot-
, note 2). However, such pressure tactics at decision time for appropriations occur
in the same way in other ministries and agencies and cann~~t be described as a depart- -
ure from the established pattern.
In the final analysis, the "defense dietmen" whose actions could be described as out-
going or f lamboyant, had no power base which could affect budgetary decision making
nor could they find any influential supporters to act for them behind the scenes. In
the first place, there were no "defense dietmen" who held influential political posi-
tions within the party and they lacked strong leadership. In the second place,
neither the Defense Agency nor the "defense dietmen" had any support from industrial _
or organiz~d grass-roots constituency groups. In the third place, they failed to
garner any backup from influential cliques or factions. '
- The leadership of theNational Defense Related Committee included such personages as
Minoro Ger.c~a (National Defense Committee chairman), Motoharu Arima (v~:ce chairman),
~1sao rlihara (Security Research i,ommittee chairman), Noboru Minowa (deputy chairman).
~ These were the men who were in the forefront of those who spoke in behalf of the
budger. One glance at the roster should be enough to show the lack of any realis-
tically influential Dietman--with the exception of Mihara--or any with a central
stature in the party. The one persori who was the most active and single minded in
his efforts, Minoru Genda, was apt to be an isolated figure within the party because
~f his militaristic personality. He is completely inappropriatF as a leader of the
national defense group. (footnote 3)
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There were rumors to the effect that the 'defense dietmen' and the party's leader-
ship we.re not in complete harmony. Credence was lent to them by the fact that wrer_
th~ party leadership decided to put the lid on at the 7 percent level, it enCtyun-
tered much difficulty in getting the 'defense dietmen' to "strike their colors." '
, Even after the Director General of the Defense Agency and the head of its adminis-
, trative office had come to terms in the f~nal stages, the 'defense dietmen' refused ;
to budge from their 9.7 percent position. The man who was assigned by the party ,
leaderahip to resolve this situation was a'defense dietman' himself, former Director ~
General of Defense Agency Mihara. By acting as the only conduit from the party
- leadexship, he was able tc talk the 'defense dietmen' into accepting a truce but
- the day to day relationship between the defense groups and the leadership was any-
thing but smooth. ~
Beside the situation described above, the men who have been described as 'defense
dietmen', had work to do on other budg~tary appropriations with the exception of
Genda. Most of the 'defense dietmen' had as the nucleus of their constituencies,
- members of the Families of Japan's War Dead Association. The finance ministry had
- issued warnings that if def ense spending was increased on a broad scale, survivor
benefits of those veterans could be adversely affected. TYtus the 'defense dietmen'
were placed under countering pressures. (footnote 4)
Within the party there were several members of the Diet who were former director ;
generals of the Defense Agency such as Shin Kanemaru, Michio Sakata, and Yoshio
Hosota (Mihara mentioned earlier could also be included). Their views were favorable
to the Defense~Agency's. Although these persons are key figures in the party struc-
ture, they had to give prior cor.cern to budgetary appropriations of other ministries
and agencies and for that reason could not make adequate efforts in behalf of the
- work on the defense budget. Kanemaru, for. iizstance, was primarily of the "highways
clan" and in that capacity had to concern himself mainly with construction appropri-
ations; Sakata represented the cultural and education family and the elderly and
ther+:fore had to become involved in education ministry's appropriatic~:~s. The for-
eign ministry and foreign relations groups in the LDP who had vigorously aided the
Defense Agency in the past, had to turn their atten;:ion to increasing the appropri:a-
tions for foreign aid rendering almost insignificant assistance to the prablem of ;
defense appropriations. Because decision making in the budget making process is
cyclical in nature with seasonal concentration of effort coming to a climax in
- December, the 'defense dietmen' who formed the pressure group in the party, found
themselves f ighting its battle in isolation (the trend of the consensus in the party
to the right stopped at the point of being the silent ma~ority and failed to exert
any practical inf luence.)
The minimal influence that the 'defense dietmen' could garner can be traced to the
failure of. those lliet members to get the backing of inf luential industrial groups
and of any grass-roots constituency elements to organize and actively support them.
They did not buld a footing through those who represented arms industries within :
the party.
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Defense BLd~et udking With No Link to Election Votes and Political Contributions.
~Defense dietmen' based their campaign so:lely on 'philosophy' (advocating the need
to have defense forces')--generally labeled as a'cenfidence game.' Their approach
to the Finance Ministry was to argue for iucreasing the total defense appropriation
~ without spelling out the requirQments in detail. According to persons concerned,
: those who sought increases in appropriations for road construction or expansion of
primary and secnndary school facilities requested favora~le consideration be given
to certain undertakings in given loc~l areas; the 'defense dietiaen' made no such
presentations for their requests to the Finance Ministry. If this is true, it be-
comes evident that iu the negotiations phase with the Finance Ministry, the LDP's
political interest structure was not concerning itself with the budget making proc-
ess. ~
Let us investigate this problem fran twn viewpoints. In the f irst place, Japan's
arms indus~ry complex is small; it has ndt develcped to the point where, in any given
, locality, it has a life or death gr~.p on stability of employment or business trend.
In the United States where the military-industrial complex is a gigantic establish-
~ ment, the labor unions oriented arms industrfes form the vanguard in lobbying for
increasing (o;- against reducing) def ense s~ending. Members of Congress whose con-
~tituencies contain such interests represent those interests and play an important
rol~ in influencing the various congressional committees concerr~ed with defense maC-
; ters. The hawkish arguments being put forth very recently by members bf the Japan
, Democratic Socialist Party [DSP] may be a germination of such a pattern but no indi-
cat~ons can be discPrned in the LDP that any of its Diet representatives is reacting
to pressure by such constituents.
In the second place, as was seen in the Lackheed incident, a distasteful connection
has been created between munitions manufacCurers and businesses and the leadership
of the LDP. This type of political rot has been sub~ected to c_lose s~rutiny of
industries which are recipients of contracts within the confines of the budget. In
other words, there seems to be no indication that the munitions industries have uni-
fied to ~he point of b~ing able to push up the total defense btidget ceiling. Inso-
far as the next fiscal year is concerned, there is no evidence that the arms industry
made any direct overtures to the finance ministry or the party of the government.
(Because of the natu.re of the matter, we have to qualify that statement wl.th 'as far
~ as the author can ascertain.') At least, defense costs have not been significantly
increased due to pressure from the munitions industry.
; From the above, it seems evident that the request for increase in defense appropria-
tion stems anly from ar overall trend to the right in LDP's ideology and that there
has been no close ties to vote getting atld politi~al fund raising which is the LDP's
source of power--its 'money-powered structure.' To the contrary, we beYieve that by
placing emphasis on vote getting, the party is striving to balance party ir.terest
with service to the constituency an.d deemphasizing the importance of politicaZ ideol-
ogy. The very structure ~f money politics i.~self is screening off the possibiZity
, of the recent appearance af cold-war sentiment fram filtering down to the mass level
and engulfing it.
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Of course, if, as is occasiona.lYy pointed out with reference to U.S. politics, right
wing ideclogy bpcome s enmeshed with special interests politics through a military-
industrial complex, it is probable that that ideolog}r and tho~e politics will be
nurtured and will sho w� growth. At the present time, however, we can discern no evi- !
_ dence of such a development. The insignificant influence that the 'defense diet~en'
can muster attests that fact.
The leaders of ths Fukuda faction, particularly Takeo Fukuda and Shintaro Abe who
were heavily imbue~ with hawkish philosophies and who held influential positions in
the power structurE within the party, have the potential of turning the situation ~
around.
Fukuda as the leader of a key faction, is an element essential to the stability of
the Suzuki government; Abe is onc of the LDP's troika--the comptroller of political
aff airs, a position which controls budget making. (footnote 5) Moreover, since the
Afghanistan incident, the Fukuda faction be~an to show considerable sympathetic
undersnanding of Minoru Genda's defense philosophy. (Footnote 6)
It is a fact that on 23 December, a climactic date for final budget decision makiug,
Diet members of this Fukuda faction together with the Nakagawa group, mobbed the
joint committee on national defense matters and created quiLe a scene. This was .
instigated by the fear that if no overt steps were taken Prime Minister Suzuki's low
~ key approach would b e written into the budget 4s was. It was carried out as a f inal
demons_~ation of protest. However, the assumption of an overly tough attitude ~t
this point w~ould hav e upset the budget making schedule and would drive the Suzuki
cabinet which was admini.stratively responsible for making budgetary decisions, into
an embarrassing spat. It is said that with this in mind, the ~overnment approached
th.e Directcr General of the Defense Agency through many channels and obtained con-
- ce~~sions from him.
Thus, ~he activities of the Fukuda graup went beyond the bounds of policy confron-
tation and could eas ily have developed into an intraparty power struggle. For this
group to push on, it had to be prepared for a change in the government and, under
certain circumstances, cause a split in the party. Conversely, from the mainlin~rs
standpoint, it was essential that the group for increased defense spending which was
conducting its campa ign in the manner described above, be sealed off by all avail-
able means. It is r eported that the reason that former Director General of Defense
Agency Kanemaru of the Tanaka faction who had been exceedingly vociferous in support-
ing increased spending in the fall became silent in December is traceable to these
politicai contingencies. The same consideration lead Executive Council Chairman
Susumu Nikaido who had, togeCher with Policy Affairs Research Council Chairman Abe
proclaimed that if defense spending had to exceed welfare's, so be it, to become
d iscreetly quiet. S o, af ter 10 December when Prime Minister Suzuki made his position
clear, a large crimp was put in the demand for 3ncreased defense spending.
There was no other channel through whic:h matters concerning defense budget decisions
could be voiced except through Director General of Science and Technology Agency
Ichiro Nakagawa who could make comments from his seat in the cabinet since his is in
an uncommitted, caref ree position.
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_ As demonstrated by the typical response to the Fukuda faction's activities, budgetary
decision making is a very important administrative r~sponsibility for thE cabinet
~t1d the fact that the time schedule has to be strictly adhered toy maintenance of
the status quo gained ~r~omzntum. So at the final accounting, Director General of
Defense Agency Omura and Deputy Chief for Administration Hara had to play the role
of concilliators with 'def ense dietmen'. In this instance, the balance thvugh -
delicate, among the =actions supporting the Suzuki cabinet favored maintaining the
status quo.
In addition to the above described factors, it must be pointed out that the budget -
making process inherently contains a'gradualisn:' quality which leans to conservatism
and to keeping things as they were. This 'conservatism' tends to restrain rapid '
increase in spending but simultaneously offers strong resistence to spending cuts.
_ That the 'welfare dietmen' who were in a mora vulnerable position than even the
defense people (footnote 7) were able to assure themselves a growth rate equal to
defense's can be attributed to this quality. -
Budgets of most countries are, as a general rule, inf~uenced by this tendency for
'gradualism' or 'incrementalism.' In this particular one in which each ministry and
agency tried to draw appropriations from the others, it had the effect of dampening
a t~road scaled increase in the defense budget. In otrzr words, ii~ the government
- leadership and the Finance Ministry made concessions to defense, there was a fear
that the other committees of the LDP would interpret it as a breakthrough and make
demands of their own which could not be repressed. As a point in f act, when approval -
was given in August to handle defense's budgetary estimates as a special item,
"other ~+ommittees within the party, feeling that the 'defense dietmen' had just
- about succeeded in getting the increas~, showed signs of forming a'me, too' move-
_ ment in unison." Discerning this, the party leadership lamented that "special hand-
ling of the defense budget has set all other committees on fire." (footnote 8)
' Because of thi.s bitter experience, matters pertaining to the defense Y~udg2t cot.ld
not be cut out and handled separately after the autumn of the year. Moreover, since
. the Finance Ministry assumed a tough attitude in keepi*?g the total budget under
control, defense costs and other appropriation items were held to a'zero sum' rela-
tion. For that reason, not only did it fail to gain the unfettered assistance of
the defense family and the su pport of other Dietmen who might have formed a cheering
section but instea.d, met opposition from the welfare group which charged that defense -
. should be held down. As you already know, MinisCer of Health and Welfare Sonoda
lead this group but the social aff airs committee of the LDP worked toward curtailing
any increase in defense costs. In this atmosphere a"balance" philosophy began to
Ue heard and. it became the instrument which was the determinant in budget decisions.
However, it would be incorrect Co place the bla~e only on the lack of influence oi~
the part of "defense dietmen" and on nebulous "gradualism" or "ix~crementalism." We
must noz forget that within the LDP there were elements which were int�ent on repres-
sing defense spending and exercised their politi~al clout to achieve it.
Tt is safe to assume that since the Ohira government these elements which consis-
tently adhered to that line, existed in the party. Pritr.e Minister Suzuki who suc-
- ceeded Ohira, vigorously upheld that thinking. Although until December, Suzuki
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' avoided making the increased defense budget problem from publicly becoming an issue
f or prime ministerial decision making, he assum.ed a clearcut leadership role in the -
- f inal stages of budget making in December. The decisive action which was to influ- ~
_ erace the final outcome came immedi~,tely prior to the visit of Defense Secretary Brown '
- of the Un3ted States on 10 December when he summoned top administrative officexs of '
the Foreign Ministry and Defense Agency. Ref errin,�, to the strongly presented re-
quests by the leadership o~ those administrative :,~.`ices for the acceptance of a 9.7 j
percent increase, the prime min3.ster said: "The line of thinking (taken by those ;
offices) that Japan-United States relations would be impai.red if the 9.7 percent
increase was not achieved is erroneous." With those strong words, he made it clear
that the requested appropriation would not be approved. During the meeting meeting
with Secretary Brown, he stated that considerations had to be given to welfare and
education and to a balance in expenditures and f inances to shift the pressure. Then, ;
- on the 15th while briefing the conference of leaders of the gover~ent party on his
talks with Secretary Brown, it i:s reported that he mzde the following observation: ~
"Our country'~s def ense consciousness has finally been aroused. Unfortunately, it ~
comes at a time when we ar e confronted with economic prublems entailing t;~e need for ;
tax increases. If the def ense issue is puahed too hard now, there is a dan~er that
- it [def ense consciousness] will fade away. Under these circumstances, the wisdom
- of giving prominence to defense spending must be questioned." ;
This judgment clearly indicated that the policy would be to hold the increase to ,
below 9.7 percent. After that the three dir~ctorates of the party each stated that
"the lowering of the 9.7 percent cannot be avoided," and ttie promise to the United '
States had to be withdrawn. After 20 [December] the defense agency shifted to
improvement of frontline equipment to keep within the reduced increase.
Under such circumstances, the pro-defense members' subsequent activities in behalf :
of 'increase to 9.7 percent' was met by the Defense Agency as a mixed blessing. ~
In the meantime, Prime Minister Suzuki advanced to argument in def ense of his dis- ;
avowal of the 9.7 percent increase. One was to the eff ect that "to push up only
defense appropriation could arouse the people's ire which could develop into obsta-
cles to realizing adequate defense budgets subsequent to JFY 1982." This is similar
to the line used in his briefing of Secretary Brown and to the statement to govern-
ment's party leaders' conference. The argument, with an eye to bringing in higher
consumer taxes, was along the following line: "Curtailing social welfare programs ~
wh ich directly aff ect the people, while increasing def ense spending on a broad range ,
could ar.ouse violent criticism against increased taxes and could put economic
. revival in jeopardy." In essence, the argument was for the maintenance of balance
between welfare and defense.
Behind these arguments is the conviction that the "leaning to the right" of public
opinion isn't strong enough to accept a big rise in def ense spending. This convic-
tion stems frcm confidence as a politician in party politics. We cannot overlook
the fact that economic revival is the primary objective of the Suzuki cabinet. In
o ther words, the Finance Ministry's philosophy had succeeded in infiltrating the
Defense Agency, the Foreign Ministry, and the "defense dietmen." The argument for
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carrying out measures to rejuvenate economics even at the cost of some public oppo-
siCion was given the higher griority; increasing defense strength was judged not to
be quite as important.
In any event, public opinion was the determifling factor in the governm~ent leader-
ship's decision to clamp a lid ~n defense spending. Furthermore, thez~e is very
little daubt that the majority of Diet representatives of the LDP was in agreement
with this estimate of public opinion. Regardless of a Diet member's views nn in-
- ternational affairs or his position on nationalism, he felt that the people would�
ob~ect strenuously to any broad scaled increase in defense spending accompanied by
_ curs in funding public undertakings or welfare while taxes were increased. This
assumption wa~ common throughout the LDP. LDP members have the reputation of keep- -
ing in close touch with the grassroots in order to serve their respective constit- ~
uencies better. This practice has earned them the common saying that they are the
"hom e on Friday, back on Tuesday" bunch but it has made them very sensitive to public
opinion~~ particularly as it pertains to the elections. They attribute the in-garty's
def eat in 1979 to Prime Minister Ohira's tax increase program and have guarded
~ against having that issued get tied into increase in defense spending. To cope with
- reactions of public opinion, it has been. pursuing a very pragmatic policy. It has
been able to maintain its position as the party in power for four and a half decades
by its f lexibility and by keeping itself free of any ideological label. In this -
instance too, as seen in his statement referred to earlier, the prime minister -
exercised considerable discretion when he said in effect, "forcing the issue here
might result in retrogressing," in spite of the careful buildup of sympathy for
defense over the years since Director General Sakata's time.
Summing up the above points, it is evident that paralleling the Finance Ministry's
budgetary restrictions, public opinion with the LDP as intermediary, played an
important role in keeping defense spending increases under control.
' However, we believe that the leadership of the LDP estimated that there would be no -
criticism of defense cost increases if they did not relate to a tax increase or to
cuts in welfare spending. An upturn in the economy could present a turning point in
the f ortunes of the defense budget. It is of great concern to the LDP that its
estimate of public opinion agrees with actual public consensus.
Footnotes
1. It is almost impossible to estunate the extent of contribution made by the var-
ious activities in the "turn to the right" movement since Sakata's incumbency.
Within the LDP itself, there is a strong inclination to credit autious discr~tion
as the gutding force in achieving results. Exemplifying this was Prime Minister
Suzuki's statement to the effect that since the efforts had brought us this far, let
us not lose the source and the momentum at this point by forcing a broad scaled
_ increase in defense spending. This attitude was given clear approval within the
party. It is notable in this regard, that Sakata who had become a key figure among -
_ the "defense dietmen", sounded a warning for discreet action as early as the summer
of 1980. (MAINICHI SHiTNiBUN 30 Aug 80)
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2. NIHON KEIZAI SHII~UN 25 Dec 80
- 3. Ref er to my paper "The Def ense Issue in the Liber~l Demucratic Party," a Hupple-~ ~
ment to Law Studies Seminar publication "The Constitution and Defense" (recent ~
_ pbulication) with regard to Genda's personal history and philosophy. ~
,
4. Generally speaking, bonus related lobbies are among the best result getters of -
all organizations that support the LDP; probably f or that reason they have been
assured of getting the entire amount requested included in the budgetary draf t.
5. With regard to the interplay between overt lobbying among party policy groups ~
and undercover activities involv ing factional leaders pertaining to budgetary decis- ;
ions, an interesting behind the scenes article appeared in the ASAHI SHIMBUN 31 Dec -
80. I t pertains to the establishment nf an annual postal fund f or individuals,
describing in detail how the Ministry of Posts and Communications oriented Diet
re~res entatives and Kakuei Tanaka/Susumu Nikaido (Chairman of the LDP Executive
Council) combined to overcome resistance from the Finance Ministry. It is also
alleged that actions were taken involving subsidization of school text books by the ~
education clan of the Fukuda faction (ASAHI 25 Dec 80) There was a potential for '
= similar battle lines being formed between the pro-defense members and the Fukuda
faction. -
6. With Mutsuki Kato and Ichire Nakanisi as key figures, the Fukuda f action's re-
search group took up the defense issue and with Takeo Fukuda as supervisory editor,
published "Japan From Now On; Defending Our Country In Violently Changing Times"
(Asahiya, pub].isher) in October 1980.
7. With regard to the welfar e budget and the "welfare dietmen" of the LDP, a publi- ;
cation by Tetsu Ashizaki "Tales of Welf are Ministry's Cruelty" (Yale Publications,
1980) is a reference item.
I
8. CHUNICHI SHUMBUN 12 Aug 80.
~
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbunsha 1981
;
8358
CSO: 4105
;
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'
SCIENCE AND TECI~NOLOGY
JAPAN'S SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY POLICIES REVIEWID
Diet S& T Committee Cha.irman
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGY(1 SHIMBUN in Japanese 19 Dec 80 p l
[Interview with Hiromi Nakamura, Chairman of the Diet S and T Committee--place and
date not given]
[TextJ [Rep~orter] tde often hear the phrase "building the country on the basis of
technology." Where should the emphasis be placed in carrying out Japan's future
sc ience and technology policy?
[Nakamura] We live in a small country, poor in physical resources such as energy
and raw materials. We face the 21st century under these restrictions. Promotion
of science and technology is essential to a stable economy and a better life for
the nation. Where should the emphasis be placed in a policy for~:promotion of
science and technology? As indicated by Director General Nakagawa of the Science
and Technology Agency, there are four main needs. The first is to secure funding
for research and development. Such funds in. 1978 constituted 2.15 percent of the
national income. The plan is to extend this to 2.5 percent soon and to 3 percent
over the long term. The amount borne by the government in this will be expanded
from the present 28 percent to SO percent. The second need is joint promotion and
improvement through government, education, and private business. The government
research facilities, universities, and various private research facilities should
be organically related. Third is greater development of independent technology.
Previous dependence on imported technology must be overcome by promoting original
technological development. Fourth is promotion of international cooperation. It
is necessary to actively promote cooperation with the developing countries as well
as with the advanced countries.
'Phese four measures will be given priority and in the iuanediate future, science
and technology related to energy, especially atomic energy, and raw materials
will be actively developed. In addition it will be important to push ahead with
development of space, the ocean, the life sciences, and disaster prevention tech-
- nology,
[Question) In rebuilding public finances, the Ministry of Finance keeps a tight
drawstring on the money bags. What is the best way to squeeze out the necessary
money for research and development?
~
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Also, I wouZd like to know wi~at you think of issuing national science and technology
bonds as suggested by former Keidanren president Tsuchimitsu.
;
[Answer] We were fortunate to have science and technology included as a top ~
priority in the budget structure in spite of difficult financial conditions. ~'his
is proof that building the country on the basis of technolog3~ has become our go~l. :
The Scientific and Technical Counci]. says that research and development expenses ~
should be increased to 3 percent o� the national income. We must increase them at ;
least that much.
In order to do this, whether we use Mr Tsuchimitsu's suggestion of national science
~ and technology bonds or not, some special revenue sources will have to be develop ed. -
The Tsuchimitsu plan will have to be studied carefully but since we are presently :
trying to reduce the amount of public bonds, the timing is bad for this. I would
like to consider this as a special revenue source after a certain interval.
[Question] In technological development, the relationship between universities, '
government and public research institutions, and private industry often becomes
a matter of controversq. What do you think is the best system for carrying out
such research. ;
[Answer] I think it is best to have a division of roles--the university perforur '
ing basic research, the government institutions doing applied research, and private
industry working on industrialization and commercialization. At present, the
private sector is shouldering at least 70 percent of the burden so I think it is ,
necessary to in crease the government's share. In addition, an organic relation i s
- necessary between government, education, and private business. The Science and
- Technology Agency is planning to establish the "Original Science and Technology :
- Promotion System" next year. In this unique system, the best brains wtll be
gathered from the universities, special public corporations, and the private sec tor
and under a le~der they will develop certain advance~ technologies. For a start, ~
four subjects ha.ve been chosen for development including ultra-fine particulates
and f ine polymers. We definitely want to institute this fluid system of changing ~
researchers.
[Question] Government and public research facilities are accused of being less ~
efficient than private institutions. There are even those who advocate a system
of contracting research out to private industry. What do you think about this?
And what is the best way to raise efficiency? ,
~Answer] In view of the national character, I don't think that a research contrac t ,
system would sit we11 with the Japanese people. "Piecework payment" also seems ~
strange but I would like to consider it in the light of the contract system used ~
by other countries. The significance of building the Tsukuba garden city for re-
search lay in this area but I would like to watch its development further to see
if it works well or not. My true feeling is that I'm a little doubtful tha.t we
can get results by imitating foreign methods. '
However, it is necessary to eliminate redundancy in mutual research efforts and I _
would like to see cooperation and exchange of information.
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[Question] Training of human resourcea is necessary for development of independent
technology. Some gay that with our present uniform education we cannot develop
creativity. How do you feel about this?
[Answer] Training of human resources is not only important for science and tech-
nology but it is urgent to train and secure superior �~ientists and eng~_neers. It
- is often sain that there is a shortage of scientists and engineers but.as of April
: 1979 there were 280,000 scientists and engineers in the country. That is 24 re-
searchers for every 10,000 people. This is third in the world behind 39 per 10,000 -
, in the Soviet Union and 27 per 10,000 in the United States. In view of this, we
cannot state flatly that there is a shortage.
Furthermore, in 1979 there were 150,000 students who graduated from colleges in
scientific and technical sub~ects. However, quality is more of an issue than
- quantity. For example, the study of ultimate materials and the life sciences is
urgently needed and a shortage of researchers in this area will become an issue. -
It is claimed that the Japanese are low in creativity. We need to think aboiit re-
forming the present "examination hell" type of examination system and create an
education 5ystem that will train people to be more creative. In this sense, hold-
_ ing the International Science and Technology Exposition in 1985 should give motiva- -
~ tion to our young people. We expect a great deal from this exposition. (Special
~ Technology News Gathering Team) ~ _
COPYR.IGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsa 1980
Industries' Views
Tokyo KOGYO GIJUTSU in Japanese Vol 22 Jan 81 pp 30-31
[Article by Sadakazu Shindo, Chairman, Committee on Industrial Technology, the
Japan FederaCion of Economic Organizations]
~ [Text] Today, as we enter the 80's Japan is working toward building itself on the _
basis of technology. In order to achieve long-term stable economic growth and im-
; prove the structure of industry, the development of creative independent technology
~ is an urgent task. It is necessary for the entire country to work together to pro-
mote innovation. ~
There has been a strong tendency for our country to depend on foreign imports for
the seeds of innovation. We have built up our present economic power chiefly by
impreving technology for use in mass production. However, from now on, while cul-
tivating more original technology than in the past and warking to revolutionize
industrial technology, we must make greater contributions to the maintenance and
development of international economic society. We must develop technology to break
out of the restrictions on resources and energy, and to preserve the environment
as well as providing technological cooperation to the developing countries.
The industrial sector, through the Keidanren Industrial Technology Committee,
thoroughly studied measures for promoting innovation and put out "Our Views on
Promotion o~ Technological Development" in Ma.y 1979 and, together with the -
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Technology Aesociatiaa, prepared Che "9ieWS on Promotion of Techaological Innova- ~
tion." Below I would like to introduce a few of the main ideas from these reports. '
Promotion of Lead and Basic Technology Development ,
Lead technology and basic technology will play a ma~or role in dramatically expand- ~
ing technological development and nurturing the seeds of innovation to make progress
in technological development in many fields. The history of technology demonstrates
this, even without the prime example of the Apollo pro~ect in the United States. ~
Keidanren took an opinion poll in February 1979 about ma3or technology development ,
issues. It asked which technological fields Japan should emphasize in future
development. The questionnaire was given to 165 top executives in charge of tech-
~ nology mainly in manufacturing industries and they were asked for their evaluation :
of 75 categories of technological development helpful to the long-term advancement
of the Japanese econo~?y. '
The top fifteen categories selected as a result of the survey as the most important
items are shown below grouped according to general areas of technology.
(A) life sciences: (1) basic scientific research (2) application technology for ;
biochemical reactions, etc. (3) anti-cancer and anti-viral agents
(B) energy: (4) reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (5) ;radioactive waste disposal
(6) solar energy application technology (7) waste-heat application technology and ;
systems (8) energy storage and transport technology
~ (C) resources: (9) resource cultivation f~shing system (10) technology for effec-
tive utilization of water resources ,
(D) new materials: (11) energy conversion substance '
(E) electronics and information: (12) light technology (13) new substance
(F) municipal and social: (14) technology for prevention of natural disasters (15) ~
new city traffic system
On the basis of these questionnaire results, Keidanren further e~valuated the order
of priorities, etc., in the Industrial Technology Committee. As specific fields of
lead technology, i.t chose nuclear power, aerospace, oceans, life sciences, safety
and disaster prevention, information, and soft technology and the basis for these, ,
new dev:Lces and ultimate m;~terials, as important issues. And it has worked on the
government to promote tech~~;ological development in these fields.
Expansion of Research and Development Funds ~
Much of our country's technological development has been achieved through the ;
activity of the private sector. However, in lead and basic technology development, ;
there are many areas in which the risk is great and huge amounts of investment are
necessary pr the market mechanism does not work well. There are built-in limits ;
to what can be done by private investme.nt alone.
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Along with greatly expanding the science and technology budget, and increasing the
allocation to the private sector, it is desirable to bring in a resilient budget
system. Since Japan does not make huge expenditures for arms and aer~space as do
other countries so it is often pointed out that we are lacking in technological
influence from ultimate technology. Therefor,e, from n~w on more active financial
- � cooperation from the governm~ent will be necessb~ry in developing lead and basic tech--
- nology.
In "Our Views on r.t~'e Promotion of Technological Development," Keidanren asked that
the government resolve to double the science and technology budget for three years
beginning in 1980 and � that the goal set by the Scientific, and Technical Council
in Report No 5 of April 1971 of expanding research and development funds to 3 percent
of the national income be achieved earlp.
Also, the governments' share of the research expenses used by private enterprise
was only 1.7 percent in Japan (1977) compared to 34.9 percent in the United States
(1977). It is escimated that the effect of government aid extended to research ~
and development in the private sector is greater than that of public investment.
We have also worked hard to get the government to~increase the allocation of funds
to the private sector by large increases in subsidies and commissions.
PromoCion af Creative Science and Technology and Basic Technology for Next-
Generation Industry
On the basis of the circumstances mentioned above, the government has announced
major policies to be instituted from 1981 on. These fnclude the "Basic Technology
Research and Development System for Next-Generation Industry" according to which
MITI links the seeds of innovation to practical applications and the "Promotion
of Creative Science and Technology" under wh~ch the Science and Technology Agency
will search out the seeds of innovation. We of the industrial sector believe that
this plan is praiseworthy for its extremely good timing. The Keidanren and the
Technology Association together prepared the report "Views on Promotion of Tech-
nological Innovation" and have worked to have these aims realized.
~ In these plans we picked out new devices and ultima.te materials, as did the
Keidanren, as essential basic technology for establishing technologically advanced
industry from 1985 on. There are new industrial fields such as the cultivation of
biotechnology whi~h can have great influence on future technology and are suf-
Ficient causes for great hope. We believe that the industrial sector should
cooperate as fully as possible by having superior engineers and technicians parti-
cipate in these plans.
liowever, Japan must do its part internationally as a locomotive force in tech- .
, nological innovation, so it is not an exaggeration to say that the execution of
these plans is just the first step. A great deal of money and risk will probably
be required over the long term to develop innovative technology from now on. Also, _
it will be necessary to train people especially to link up highly original ideas
with creative technological development. With respect to this point, the govern-
ment will have a great role to play, in addition to its financial role, in
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- creating an effective alliance between government, education, and pri~ate business
by expanding the opportunities for exchanges between first-line researchers. ~
In the plans of both MITI and the Science and Technology Agency, tre utilizatidn of
the research and developmen.t capacity of private industry is emphasized. In order
for the private sectQr to actively promote Gechnological innovation 3.,t is of course
necessary for the industrial executives to be highly motivated and involved. How-~
- ever, the government must give sufficient consideration to the results of research
and development in order to bring out the crea.tivity of researchers and produce a ;
' large quantity of superior research. In other words, it will be more necessary
than in the past tio give incentives to the private sector in patent ~urisdiction
and licensing. ,
We believe that in Japan the industrial sector must take the leading role in pro-
moting innovation in the future as well as at present. As it does so, it wi11 be -
essential to strengthen the interaction and organic relationships between govern- ~
ment, education, and the private sector and carry out sufficient hasic research.
The new plans announced by the government to promote technological innovation will
be an important test case.
In conclusion, we would like to point out the need to seriously explore the role
to�be played by science and technology in opening up a more hopeful 21st century, ~
constantly paying attention to the harmony of society as we make progress. ,
Financial Resources
Tokyo NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 1 Jan 81 p 19
[Article by Kozo Sasaki, Editorial Staff]
~[Text] The phrase "building the country on the basis of technology" seems to have '
taken hold as the path which our country should travel in the 80`s. For this pur-
pose, it will be necessary for the government, private sector, and educational
establishments to work together even more actively than in the past to promote
research and development. Creative research which will produce the seeds of tech-
- nological innovation is especially needed. This w1.11 require large amounts of
research and development funds over the long term. The procurement of revenue
sources for future research and development is Uecoming a major issue fo-r this
year's science and technology administration.
- Private Sector's Burden Heavy in Japan
Total research expenses in Japan for 1979 were 4,080,100,000,000 yen. Of these,
the government (n~.?tional and local publi:c organizations) bore 29.8 percent. The
private share continued to be large. ?n all other advanced countries, the govern-
ment share is greater than in Japan. Tt is approximately 50 percent in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France. Even leaving out defense research ex-
penses, their governments' share of R& D expenses is greater than Japan's. The
percentage of the GNP (or national inc4me, NI) serves as a yar_dstick for measuring
the amount of research investment. In 1977, it was 1.81 percent. This is higher
than other advanced countries.
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. In respons~ to this situation, the 8cientific and Technical Council (advisory body
to the Prime T~Iinister) suggested in a report in May of 1977 that the percentage of.
= r_he NT be increased to 2.5 percent in the near future and to 3 percent over the
- lodg term. The Industrial Structure Council (advisory body to the Minister of
International Trade and Industry) made an interim xeport in April 1980 on its
vision of MITI policies and specified that the percentage of the GNP spent for R& D
� should be increased to 2.5 percent in the mid-80's and 3 perc~ent in the late 80's
and that the share borne by the government should be increased to at 3east 40 per- `
cent. In May 1979, the Keidanren proposed that thE science and technology related
budget be doubled over three years beginning in 1980 and the Kankeiren (Kansai
Federation of Economic Organizations) proposed in December of last year that the _
NI percentage should be increased to 3 percent and the government share of research
expenses should be doubled. Then at the end of last year, prior to formulation of
the 1981 budget, the Science and Technology Cabinet Liaison Committee (chairman,
Director General of the Prime Minister's Office Nakayama) specified in their
interim report "Concerning the Status of Science and Technology Policies" that the
GNP percentage should be increased to 2.5 percent in the near future and 3 percent
over the long term. In addition, the Technology Association and the Comprehensive
- Research and Development Organization have expressed similar views.
4 Trillion Yen for Atomic Energy Program
The scale of future technical development will tend to increase and many issues
must be faced which entail risks. Judging from projects in process now, huge
- expenditures are expected. Atomic energy is expected to be the leading alternative
energy source and approx3mately 4 trillion yen in research and development expenses
will be necessary from 1978 to 1997 for the long-term utilization plan for nuclear
research and development (established in September 1978). Space development will
_ require approximately 3 trillion yen from 1979 to 1992 (space development set in
March 1978). The Sunshine Plan is estimated at 700 billion yen and the rioonlight
Plan is also estimated at 700 billion yen.
How much R& D spending is necessary in the future? According to the calculations
o� the Research Investment Subcamtnittee of the Scientific and Technical Council
the government investmen.t from 1980 to 1990 will be 12 trillion yen. This is an
accumulated total of all the R& D expenses to be incurred in the various programs -
- of all the ministries and agencies. To achieve this will require a 21 percent
average annual rate of increase in government exp enditures. If this happens, the
percentage of the NI u~ed for R& D will be 2.8 p ercent and the government's share _
of the expenses wili be 41 percent, almost meeting the proposals of the various
related organizati.onso
Unless the government expenditures are increased at the rate of 21 percent every
year, the necessary R& D expenses cannot be sec ured. Therefore, it is essential
to search for new revenue sources. First, the limits of the budget must be removed
at the stage of roughly calculated requests. The 1981 budget was restricted to a
growth of 7.5 percenr over the previous year. As long a~ rhis system exists, we
cannat expect a large increase in science and tec hnology promotion expenses from
~eneral Accounts. -
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As new revenue sources, we can consider (1) switching of public corporation revenue ;
sources, (2) expanded object taxes, (3) national science and technology bonds, and
- (41 utilization of the government investment and loan progr~m. Included in the
pUblic coxporation revenue sources are special highway revenue so~~rces such ag
gasoline taxes and automobile weight taxes which are desired by a~any, ~organizati:lbna.
They are used for road maintenance and construction, but as of 1979 the percentage ,
- of paved roads in Japan was 85 percent so the roads are in rather good condition. ;
Some of this revenue source could be diverted to the science and techndlogy related
budget. '
- Beginning in 1980, an energy related R& D promotion policy was instituted with a
power plant development promotion tax and petroleum taxes as revenue sources. This
concept could be enlarged to establ~sh (1) a resource consumption tax and (2) an
- environmental destruction tax. With the resources consumption tax, those who con- '
sume exhausted resources would bear the research expenses for developing substitutes
for these resource s. This is being done in connection with energy now. In addition, ;
i.~sers of nickel, cobalt, or manganese, for ex~mple, would be made to pay the re-
search expenses for developing manganese deposits lying under deep ocean floors.
Also, the environmental destruction tax would tax those (automobile companies,
factories, civil engineering and construction businesses, etc.) who perform acts
adversely affecting the environmPnt even within the bounds of environmental stand-
ards or regulation s. It would be used for necessary R& D for environmental preser-
vation.
Issuing Science and Technology Bonds
In addition, former President Tsuchi.mitsu of Keidanren is suggesting the issue of
national science and technology bonds. Under this concept the results of present
research on such things as nuclear fusion and cancer will benefit the next genera-
- tion of the people and these research and development expenses will be justly paid
by both the presen t and the future generation. Briefly, the present construction
bonds should be reevaluated, the R& D expenses should be viewed as productive
operating expenses from the point of view of the national economy, and part of the
construction bond s should be diverted to research investments. Furthermore, the
government investment and loan program should be actively utilized, for example, to
construct the fast breeder prototype reactor (the Monju), uranium enrichment pro-
totype plant and certified advanced converter reactors.
~ .Tapan is proclaiming the building of the country on the basis of technology in the
1980`s, but it cannot possibly secure the necessary R& D funds on the basis of
previous ways of thinking, Fortunately, the government created the Science and
Technology Cabinet Liaison Committee last year, and in the formulation of the 1981
budget, the "Voluntary Committee of Young Diet Members Concerned about Technology"
- of the LDP asked the government to give special consideration to the science and
technology budget. Through this activity, the "~?romotion of science and tech-
nology" was included as one of the five pillars of the LDP budget formulation pro-
posal and the imp ortance of science and technology development is gaining recogni-
tion from politicians, So as not to lose this opportunity, this is the year when
the Science and Technology Agency, which is responsible for science and technology
- administration, should act quickly to consider thorough-going policies to secure
revenue sources for research and development.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1981
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. 'NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN~Editorial
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIM~UN in JapanESe 5 Jan 81 p 2
[Editorial by Hideshi, Hasegawa, Chief., Science & Technnlogy Division;
["ext] Wa~s to Build Japan on the Basis of Technology in New Environment
The idea of building the country on the basis of technology is loudly proclaimed
by both the government and the private sector. In such books as Alvin Toffler's
"The Third Wave" and Schreiber's "The World Challenge," Japanese technology has a
high international reputation. Why teciuZOlogy now? Maybe it is because in this
age of restriction and uncertainty, technology seems to be the only bright point,
the only r_lear hope.
So then, what do the people of Japan expect from technology? What role do they
want it to play? If we analyze the reasons and background for the demand to Uuild
the country on the basis of technology, the first thing we find is the hope for
technological breakthroughs. The economy of the 80's will be trying to stave off
_ problems from all directions. The rest of the world and Japan are similarly deeply
troubled by multi-faceted growth-restricting factors such as energy, resources,
environment, food, and population. Cannot the ceiling and walls steadily closing
in on us be knocked away at one blow with some technological breakthrough like a
new energy source? It is probably natural that people look to technology as a way
out.
Next is the hope for improvement of daily life. A central breakthrough in large
- scale technology will not occur for some time but even if the economy is forced to
_ decelerate and grow slowly for a while, we cannot stand a stagnation and suspen-
sion of progress in society. If expans3.on of volume is restr.icted, we at least
_ want a deeper contpnt and higher quality. Fven in a small scale, if we introduce
many new and impruvel technologies in equipment, processes, and labor, added value
and productivj.~y will go up and the economy and quality of life will improve. The '
deterioratior~ of capital plant and equipment can be prevented and internaCional
competitiveness can be maintained. Consumers and businessmen both have these kinds
- of expectations of technology.
Third is the opening of new markets through technology. This is the hope of the
~ industrial sector for a new frontier. Japan is poor in both energy and resources
and has no other way of proceeding but to export as a factory for the world. The
pressure from friction in foreign markets is building against existing export indus-
tries such as shipbuilding, steel, automobiles, and hame appl3ances. Now is the
time to put in other players from the bench and we must cultivate new export indus-
y
. tries with appeal.ing products and international competitiveness. Even domestically,
the demand for old products and services is stabilizing and new products and ser-
vices must be developed to avoid saturation of the market. Therefore, the seeds of
' technological innovation are under scrutiny.
Fourth, from the point of view of comprehensive security, there is a demand for
securing a right to speak in international affairs, using Japanese technological
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strength for bargaining power. Japan is a great economic power but limited in '
_ resources and military power. It must get recngnition for its existence in terms
of East-West and North-South issues with technology as the only strength it can '
c~1]. its own. It is expected that, in the future, technology transfer will be $n
important item in transactions that can be changed into money and goods.
Autonomous Cultivation of Advanced Technology i
~
Now, does advanced technolo~y that could meet these demands actually exist in
Japan? One specif ic example is the VLST which has been developed with a public and
~ prfvate investment of 70 billion yen and is now bearing fruit in the age of micro-
computers. A second example is the program for developing optical industrial ~
technology started with cooperation between government and private indsstry. It ;
has already resulted in domestic production of the world's longest and bes~- .
performing optical fiber. Plans are moving ahead for laying a third Pacific cable ,
on the ocean floor around 1985 using aptical fibers. Development of optical com-
pL;ters is even included in the schedule. These are candidates for a new group of '
industr3:es based on technology. '
. ~
Technological innovations are also occurring in the area of materials. Chemical ~
raw materials were previously traded in ton quantities. Now new "f ine chemicals" ~
for medical use have high added value, up to several million yen per gram. New
ceramics are stronger than metals and susceptible to precision shaping. Trial
production has begun on ceramic engines for automobiles. The progress in life ~
sciences and biotechnology has potential strength to revolutionize chemis~ry,
medicine, and fermentation. Hope has appeared for mass producing a special drug
- for virus diseases, interferon, and for controlling cancer. ~
Nuclear fusion, known as the "no. 4 fire" can take an almost unlimited amount of
energp from the. ocean. The JT60 in Tokai Mura will attempt to create 100 million
degrees of heat. The ocean satellite will be launched in three years for aerial
observation of the econamic water region which ts 12 times the size of Japanese
land': Also, the linear motor car, which has bsen run at 500 kilometers per hour ;
without a driver, will soon be tested with a driver. ~11 of these things have
ra~sed the reputation of Japanese technology and they will certainly raise the
total strength of our security. -
- Theae are only a f ew examples. If all of the seeds of new technology which are
being worked on now or planned in Japan blossom together and bear fruit, it wi11
crea.te a huge surge of technological innovation. There is sufficient strength
iere to greatly extend the limits of growth. However, seeds alone are not enough.
- Independent efforts at development are essential zo nurture the seeds and make i
them blossom and bear fruit. This implies increasing government assistance, but
Japan is already the third largest research country in the world, behind the United
States and the Soviet Union. We should first consider measures for fully utilizing
the reaearch resources which we have, :
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National Concensus for Technology Policy
Japanese research investments are presently estimated at approximatel}� 5 trillion
Yen. There are about 600,000 persons involved in research. In both money and
~ersonnel, we rank third behind the United States and the Soviet Union. There are
not many coimtri~s in the world with this much research capacity. Japan has r.his
much responsibility for research not only for our own ec~nomy but toward inter-
national society. Science and technology research expenses for 197~ were 2.5 per-
- cent of the national income. The Scientific and Technical Council's long-term goal
of 3 percent should be achieved but it is time that we switched from quantity to
qua.lity, to an emphasis on output rather than input. It is important to give more
direction to research themes, to motivate researchers, and allocate research ex- .
- penses selectively.
There is no need to insist on the narrow framework of science and technology ex- _
penses. If the sub~ect research is truly original and the technology is innovative
ther�e will be many opportunities to apply and test it. ~ There will be no lack of
funds, nflt only for research but for education investment plant and equipment
investment, public corporation investment, and funds for application in social
welfare and foreign aid. How many technologies can pass the tests of utility,
_ economy, and socia?. relevance and be fully developed in the 80's. -
The Japanese like novelty and have been open to new technology but a subtle
psychological change has occurred in recent years. The problems nf environment
and saf ety and the appearance of test tube babies and DNA exchange have given the
average person a vague apprehension about science and technology. What is tech- ~
nology for and who is it for? The real starting point for a new Japan built on
the basis of technology is to reevaluate the essential nature of technological
- civilization.
In Japan, food and clothing are sufficient and over 90 percent of the people
feel that they are middle class but if we.look carefully around there are many
deficiencies and causes of dissatisfaction. We live buried under furniture in
small houses that have been likened to rabbit hutches. Every day we ride in
shaking commuter trains crowded to 2.37 times capacity where even the holding
straps have been mistaken for people. The important issue for technology from now
on is to p rovide and improve not only mass-consumption goods, but social cap ital and
services that are now lacking. If the faith and hope in technology are lost there -
will be no tomorrow for the Japanese race. So a national concensus on buildi.n g the
nation on the basis of technology a~ust be built thre~i;o ~ a proces�s of sufficient _
. dialogue and prior evaluation.
COPYRIGHT: PJihcm Keizai Shimbunsha 1981
Review of Government Programs _
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 26 Jan 81 p 1
(Text] Tsukuba Center Focuses on Important Points
T~ie Agency of Industrial Science and Technology of MCTI ha,s formulated a policy of
beginning soon to reevaluate the content of research in the Tsukuba Research
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Center (nine researcli organs) and the agency' a seven testing centers in order to
_ improve the research organization and respond to the need of building the country
on the basis of technology. The ~ polfcy is to clarify the character of the seven :
testing centers: ~ in all parts of the country as nucleus reaearch for facilities for ;
regional technology, bringing out the special characteristics and traditions of~ ;
each region. The organization of the Tsukuba Research Center was established last
March. Each of nine laboratories there does focus .research on selected advanced
technologi~s. It is thought that by this selective approach, they can better ful- !
fill their function as the "brain cenCers" of Japan. A personnel cut was proposed. ~
- due to financial difficulties, so it was ~udged necessaryfor each research organ
to do specialized research in its particular field and to avoid redundancy as much ;
as poss3.ble between laboratories and testing center s in order to increase the re-
search ef�ectiveness of the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology. There was
also a goal of preparing the resea.rch organization to respond to the present age of '
regionalism.
The testing laboratories of the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology ar~ ;
composed of nine research organs which were transferred from Tokyo and its vicinity �
to the Tsukuba garden city for research, which comprise the Tsukuba Research Center,
and the technology testing centers in seven locations throughout the country. Of
these, the testing centers in the various regions, the Hokkaido IndustriaZ Develop-
ment Testing Center and the Tohoku, Nagoya, Osaka, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu
Industrial TPchnology Testing Centers, have achieved tremendous research results. ~
However, the testing centers rooted in regional characteristics and traditions
have a tendency to become weak and their work overlaps a great deal with the re- ;
search at the Tsukuba Research Center. Even though it seems natural for there to
be some overla�p in research content, it is necessary to take a new laok at policies ~
for utilizing the advantages and special character istics of the technology testing
cen ters. '
The Agency o.f Industrial Science and Technology has decided that regional charac-
teri�tics ca.n be brought out by selecting core research fields for such testing ~
center--coal related sub~ects for the Hokkaido testing center, geothermal energy ;
for Tohoku, ceramics for Nagoya, housing for Osaka, ocean development f or Chugoku,
paper pulp for Shikoku, and synthetic materials for Kyushu. In this way the agency
intends to bring out the character of the centers as central research organs for
the regions. The Osaka and Nagoya Industry Technology Testing Centers are larger
than the others and have a record of results so it wi1Z be difficult for them to act
~s centers concentrating on only one field. However, thepolicy for actually
carrying the measures out, is to investigate the actual situation in each testing
center and respect the opinions of people in the cen ters. ;
= The Tsukuba Research Ce:~ter, on the other hand, is composed of nine research
organs--the measurement laboratory, the machine techn ology laboratory, the chemical '
technology laboratory, the microorganism industrial technology laboratory, the
high pblymer fiber laboratory, the geological survey laboratory, the electronic
technology comprehensive Iaboratory, the product sc ience laboratory, and the pollu-
tion and resource laboratory. It aims to be the "brain center" of Japanese ~
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_ industrial technology research. There laboratories were maved completely from the
Tokyo area to Tsukuba by last March and all of them are operating smoothly now.
In order to further improve tlie research capacity, the agency says that ~ it will be
_ nec~ssary to narrow the focus on the particular research fiei~'s of each laboratory.
They will be working at the forefront of their resp~ctive fields. The agency policy
is to create organic links between all the laboratories and testing centers and -
construct a research organization which will corresp ond to bnth the building of the
country on the basis of technology and the age of regionalism.
, COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1981 -
STA Director General
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 2 Feb 81 p 1
[Interview with Ichiro Nakagawa, Science and Technology Agency Director General--
place and date not given]
[Text] [Reporter) The Scientific and Technical Council has been given a budget
- frame for the first time. I would like to ask whar your feeling is about this,
Minister.
[Nakagawa] For the first time, the Scientific and Technical Council has received
a budget of 3.35 billion yen in science and technology promotion coordinating
expenses. This means that the council will have greater coordinating power.s and
will work actively to promote our country's science and technology. Reasons for
this include the large gap between public and private research expenditures for
science and technology in comparison with the advanced countries of Europe and
the United States and the fact that this lag is becoming evident. Therefore, the
suggestion was made to give substantial powers of coordination to the Scientific
and Tec~nical Council, the advisory body to the Prime Minister. The Science and -
Technology Cabinet Liaison Committee also agreed and the plan was carried out.
Japan's budget for science and technology is about one trillion yen so in the be-
ginning tfiere were some who felt that the council should get 50 billion yen. But
- since we were just starting out it was decided to begin with 3.35 billion yen. _
[Question] It would seem that actual operations will be difficult. ~
[Answer] With the cooperation of the Science and Technology Agency; this is vnder
study right now. At any rate, it is a new venture and if it stumbles at this
stage it will cause difficulty for future science and technology administration.
Therefore, it is necessary to proceed carefully. At the same time, if it functior~s
well, the budget could easily be expanded to 50 or 100 billion yen as in the
original conception.
However, if it fails, it is reportEd that the Ministry of Finance will not provide
a budget next year.
The first use of this money will be to promote creative science and technology
_ using a flexible research system and to employ personnel to coordinate and promote
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special research. The problem is what sub~ects tu choose for research. Probably
research will be cancentrated on basic research areas in which we are generally con-
sidered to be laggin~ and in research and development at a top international level,
[t7uestion] When it comes to coordination, it will be necessary to obtain the co-
operation o~ the various ministri:es and agencies.
[Answer] In government offices, battles ov~r ~urisdiction and prexogatives always
occur. Unless this is controlled it will be impossible to have real research and
development. It is important to have competition in carrying out development but
unnecessary investment for this purpose should be avoided. If the Scientif ~c and
Technical Council has the executive authority for the science and technulogy pro-
motion budget, it must be obeyed. That's why the Scientific and Technical Council.
must be set up with coordination powers.
~ [Quest~on] When exactly will things be made definite?
[Answer] At present, we are making the views of the Scientific and Technical
Council members on research subjects and how they are to be allotted. And our
office ~is coordinating this with other ministries and agencies. I believe tha.t
things ~an be decided by Ma.rch.
[Question] The utilization of private efforts also requires attention, does it
not?
[Answer] As an example, the government is providing aid to the Asahi Chemical
Industry Company for research and development in uranium enrichment. I believe
that the government should go righC ahead providing aid as a means of utilizing
the activity of the private sector. Also, creative science and technology should
be promoted by the public and private sectors working together, this can be done
through the flexible research system involving government, education, and private
enterprise which will begin operating in 1981.
[Question] However, just throwing out money is not enough. It is important to
produce results.
[Answer] That's right. This must be dealt with carefully. However, some waste
is neces.sary in research and development. A completely rational approach that
says that the government should not get involved in a particular kind of research
be~ause it is being handled by the educational institutions is bad. Here is where
coordination becomes important.
[Question] How well is present science and technology understood?
[AnswerJ When we consider the development of nuclear power, space, and the oceans,
we know that a great deal of technological expertise and knowledge is necessary.
Science~and technology is very closely related to the life of the nation but some
aspects of it are difficult to understand. The Science and Technology Agency has
a similar role to the masked stagehands in the Kabuki theater. The people who
direct the actor's movements and arrange the stage settings so that the actors
perform well have a great deal of po*a'er an3 thi.s is the role of th.e Sc~ence and
Technology Agency.
COP:fRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimb~sha 198~
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SCIENCE AND TECHNaLOGY
ASPECTS OF LASER PLASMA RESEARCH DISCUSSED ~
Plasma Counter-Streams
Nagoya NUCLEAR FUSION RESEA1tCH in Japanese Vol 39, No 1[no date given), pp 101-107
[Article by Masamitsu Aizawa of the Faculty of Science, University of Tokyo: -
"Counter-Streams in Laser-Induced Plasma"]
[Text] 1. Introduction
An effective means to supply plasma to a magnetic container is to drop pellets
into a vacuum container, then directing a plasma beam at the pellets to form
the plasma in a practice which is sometimes used.l
As the magnetic container is made larger, a limit is reached in the quantity of
- plasma which can be generated per pass, and it may be necessary to resort to
multiple point formation.
When such a practice is adopted, there will necessarily be collisions between
separate plasmas. It wauld be desirable to minimize instability in order to
provide stable plasma.
i
This paper will describe plasma counter-streams in the collisionless region
based on experimental sfiudies which were conducted at the Sekuguchi Laboratory.
, 2. Plasma Stream in a Homogeneous Magnetic Field
According to certain experiments,2 plasma is generated by direction Nd-glass
, laser of 2 GW peak power and 20 nsec pulse width on a beryllium wire target in
a homo,geneous magnetic field. Measurements by the soft x-ray method indicate
the average electron temperature during laser irradiation to be about 300 eV. _
(It is thought that this is about Te-Ti.)
_ As a result, there is fairly good thermal conduction in the direction parallel
to the magnetic field, and the flow is roughly one-dimensional, while tempera-
ture changes take place in an adiabatic manner. This is why the thermal energy
of the ions is converted to kinetic energy together with the flow, and the kine-
tic energy of the plasma can be thought to be roughly the energy acquired by the
i ions. Measurements by the Thomson scattering method using laser show the
~ ~
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_ ~
electron tempexature to be about 30 eV approximately 6 cm from the point of
formation (300 nsec after genera tion.), and the ion temperature is about ?/10 i_
i
this value.
3. Simulation Model ~
A super particle model by the differencing twin pole method was adopted.3,4 i
The plasma flow along the magnetic field up to 300 nsec can be considered '
roughly uniform to 1-6 cm from the point of generation according to the ~
experimental evidence given in Paragraph 2. Here we will examine the most ~
simple situation in which there is spacewise uniformity.
1) These particles have shape with spread of Q(x) = q�S(x) (q: total charge).
Here S(x) is a shape factor which satisfies the following equation, and a
Gaussian form is used. .
f S(x) dx = 1 ~1~ i
The plasma formed by the laser will be assumed to flow essentially without -
charge separation, and it will be further assumed that the ions and electrons
_ both possess shifted Maxwell di stribution. That is to say, we consider the
following two cases:
, ~CIIAB 1 ~
( V- Vd~)9 ( V+V~e)~ !
_ _ ;
f~(~ e 2 V~e! + e 2 V~~,a . C2-e) ~
( V-Vd~)$ ( V~Vi~)~ I
f~(V) e 2Vc~~ -4- c 2Vt~$ (2-b) b -
~~tIHP `Z 1 , ~
( v-V~e~9 ~V~V,~~~ ~ . '
P( V) > C Z V s -I- C 2 V -I- I' � C Z V e (3 R) -
~ tc tc deb
~
(V-V~~)p (V-FVdi~' Ve
f~(V) c 2V~~Z + ~ 2Vt~~ -I- P~c 2VIib ~3~~~
Here we assume the density of the plasma flow in the flux to the opposite ~
direction to be roughly the same. P is a parameter which di~plays the dis-
tribution ratio. The values of these parameters are listed in [Table 1]. '
28 .
~
~
~
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Simulation parameter values are given in [Table 2]. The primary and secondary
moments for each distribution have been corrected.4 At the same time, as
ahown in [Fig 1], this model can be considered to be that of a collisionless
plasma in the time region under consideration.
Next, by considering the following quantity in terms of the electron, we can
establish a parameter for the state of instability of the system.
R~t~ _ 2 -
- ~V ~o~, _~~o~~ (4)
The in equation (4) indicates an average over velocity space.
- 4. Results
The changes in electric field excited by the plasma in the situation when there
was no background plasma were plotted every 2wP1, and this plot is shown in
[Fig 2a]. This phase space situation is shown fn [Fig 2bJ. Next, we consider
the situation in which there is plasma which can be considered to be background
present in the magnetic container (Case 2) and treat the situation in which
this background plasma and the plasma generated are about the same quantity
(P ~ 1 in equation [3]). As shown in [Fig 3c], it is evident that the pre-
dicted results were obtained. The time development of parameter R(t) described
in Paragraph 3 is shown in [Fig 4 a-b]. [Fig 4a] and [Fib 4b] correspond to
(Case 1) and (Case 2) respectively.
~
~ Effective Collision Time
, ~03 _
0
0
o Fig . 1
: 10?
' 10 20 30 Ne,~
29
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~
,
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
~
i
,
~
i
,
~ . I
c ~
~ Field Energy ~
.
Q ,
. '
.
~
~4 ?
;
.
� ti
. i
.
. ~
. � . ~
i ~ ~
. .
10~ ~~~~~N~ ~ �
: � ' � : r.. .
. . � v �~;5~ 'ti ~
. � . . ' ~ '
. ~ . �
~ . ~ o .
. ' � ~
~
. �
. I
~ 02 ' ~
� i
Fig. 2a .
~ wr t ,
;
~ ~ 0 100 200 300
. '
_ . . . _ , ;
~ : : :
~ . ..~~e~~?o~~ ~ ~ ~o~
. . .
.
.
.
: ~ .
.
. .
:
. .
.
. . . .
. .
.
. . . . .
4 40 '
x : � : : : : w,.t '
~
. . .
.
. .
: :
.
,
. . z ; . . � .
' Fig.2b
. .
_ .
W.
. . . . . . : .
. ~ , _ .
. .
_ � :
. . . ~
_ . . . , . . :
. �
;
;
,
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
, . . : ~ ~
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f
(
..r
.C
~
.o Field Energy
~
Q ~
~
, 04
~
. �
.
. ~
~ :
. ' r ~ , .
~
.
.
~~3 ' ~ t�r ~
� ~ .
. . � M~ �
. . ~ � ~ �
� � ' �
~ ~
� ~ ~ ~ �
~ O~ �
~ Fig . 3a
W,, t
_ 10'
~ 0 100 200 300
, , ,
. . . . , .
'Eleelron: ton ( M�4m .
. . . . . . . .
. . . ~ . . . . .
.
. ~ . , .
. . . . .
:
. x . . . . .
. . w ~
F 3b
� . . . g.
. . . : . ~=o :
31
j FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONY.Y
i
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i
. . I_
~
i
~ .,r.....~ �
~
. . ~ w.~ '~~Y~� r .M~~ � . .....A ~ ~~l~ � 1 .....�..........�~.~...............A I
. e.~... ..�.1... . ..�.�.......�.....4..4...........w .~....lw.r~~~ n...w .
- . ~ '
~ . � I
~ . .~u.~.... . . ~~~...~w.~~~ ~ i
. .
� . ~.1 i 40 j
.
. . . . . � ;
.
. . . . . .
. . . . .
I
i
. .
. . . . . . .
.
. . . .
. . .
. . . . .
. ' � i
' ' . . M ' ;
I
, . Fi 3c ;
9
_ .
. ;
. . � ~ . :
.
.
. . .
.
. ~ ~ . ;
. . . ;
. . . . . . _ . . . _
_ ~ : ~ ;
~ . ~
!
~
i
R(t) Fig . 4a ;
_ . ,
2.0
. uJ~t ;
~.p ;
100 200 300
,
32
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R(t) Fig,4b _
2,0
u)~t
, .
100 200 300
REFERENCES
1. K. N. Sato, S. Okada, S. Kogoshi, S. Sudo, H. Tsuji, Y. Ohwadano, and
T. Sekiguchi: Proc. Fourth Workshop on "Laser Interaction and Related
Plasma Phenomena," Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, N.Y.,
November 8-12, 1976.
- 2. S. Sudo, K.N. Sato, and T. Sekiguchi: J. PHYS. (D) (to be published).
_ 3. W.L. Kruer, J.M. Dawson, and B. Rosen: J. COMP. PHYS., 13, (1973), 114.
- 4. Masamitsu Aizawa, Tadashi Sekuguchi: KAKU YUGO KENKYU, Vol 37 Special
Vol No 5, 41.
` Magnetic Field Generation
~ Nagoya NUCLEAR FUSION RESEARCH in Japanese Vol 39, No 1, pp 153-163
[Article by Toshio Okada of the Faculty of Engineering, University of Agricul-
tural Engineering, and Takashi Yabe and Keishiro Tansei of Tokyo Institute of
Technology: "Abnormal Thermal Conduction Due to Electromagnetic Instability"]
[Text] 1. Introduction
The generation of a strong self-induced magnetic field from within the plasma
has been observed in a laser plasma. There has been to date much research
from various standpoints related to the mechanism of the generation of this
magnetic field, and we were able to elucidate this mechanism in relationship
to the Weibel Instability. Furthermore, we analyzed the effects of this sel�-
generated magnetic field on transport phenomena within the plasma, particularly
on the thermal conductivity index, through the quasi linear theory approach and
- compared the resulCs with a simulation by the P:LC method.
33
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~
2. Basic Equation and Linear Theory
The so-called Weibel Instability can be considered a possible mechanism for ~
the generation of the self-induced magnetic field in a plasma. This is an ;
instability which occurs when a temperature anisotropy is created within the
plasma, and this situation is considered to be the most hazardous case for _
lateral waves. It is Chought that this instability also has great effect on ~
transport processes within the plasma. We will start off from the following i
linearized plasma equation in the analysis of Weibel Instab ility in laser
' plasma. ~ i
~
~f` + V n~ ( E~ + ~ V x gi aV = 0 (11
Here fo is the unperturbed distribution function of the electron, fl is the
perturbed distribution function, and E1 and B1 are the excited electric field
and magnetic field respectively. A1so, q and m are the charge and mass of the
electron and c is the velocity of light.
- We assume the following distribution function which takes into account the in-
fluences of small numbers of high speed electrons which have been experiment-
ally demonstrated in plasma laser to be used as the unperturbed distribution
function fo.
n?( v -~v~ mvs
fo = n~ m n~, 1-a) exp~- X ~ -
2nKTl 2~cc rx 2R X 2KTl
-F n ~ m ~ / a exp ~ _ m ~
v~ _ n~_ ~ , (2) ,
2rrcTi ~ 21C[TX ZK X ZKrl
Here n is the electron density, K is the Boltzman constant, T is temperature, ~
_ TX is the temperature in the x direction, T1 is the temperature in the direc- -
tion normal to x, vd is the drift rate, a is the fraction of high speed elec- ,
trons, suffix c denotes law temperature electrons, and h denotes high speed
electrons.
Assuming that the perturbation in equation (1) is proportional to exp ;
[i(K�r - wt)], the following distribution function can be derived for the
lateral waves using equations (1), (2), and the Maxwell equations.
(A) When the wave number spectrum K is selected in the y direction, (mode A), ,
the di5persion related equation assumes the following form.
_ 4
C C '
T mv
w~-(c=k4+ms)+{m~(1-a) x +u?s(1-a) d } W~ ~ ~ ~
P P ~pi P Tl ~ '
~ Tl .
k
m
s '
h h
-i- { u~= a ~ mY a mvh } W ~ ~ ~ = ~ , (3) ~
P T1 P K,~h
k ~ -
in
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Here wp is the plasma vibration number of Che electron and the function W is
~ definea in the following manner.
- - ~
w! _ ( 2 x f ,.5~ ~x~, ( - ~'/2 ) ~i t . (a)
c ,
! At the extreme limits of I m/k' ~ml I< 1, ~ m/k ~r~' 1'
equation (3) can be solved in the following a.pproximate form.
wr � ~ ~ (5)
! 9
2 cTx -F-ntva ~cTx +mvd ~skz
r 1-a) -F a - 1 - ~
c Tl c Ti u~~
P
s ~ s
~'P~ -F- tnv~ K'I'z~ -1-niv~ t
x ~ ( 1-a ) + a r , (6)
~ Tl k ~T1/m K Tl k K Ti/m
Here we let w= Wr + iY.
From equations (S) and (6), the wave number region where instability occurs is
the following:
~ 9
s m= KTX +mv~ KTX +mv~
~ G -3- ~ ( 1- a ) + a ~ - 1 ~
� `TJ `~'L
, The growth rate is maximum at the following wave number:
x
~ ~`z ~ 3 ~r ( 1--a ) K,~x mv~~ �1- a ~II'~t ~ t~?v~~. - 1
, , . ~'I~ ~ K,~,li ~
I
, (B) When the wave number vector K is selected in the x direction (mode B),
the distribution functional equation takes the tollowing form:
(1-a)m~'P~ m+kv~
_ cua ( m$ + kz c~ ) + ~ W ( ~ ~
- . N ,~,c
x k ~'I'~ /in
a ~u~ ~1~~ ru - k v .
-L V1' ( ) = 0 l9)
� ~~~x k K TX~/m
35 ~
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. . . _ _ _ _ . . _ . .
~ At ~~u?-hk i~ )/k x'I'x/m 1, ~(u?-kvd )/k sTY/m the Solutiori Of
equation (9) is as follows:
_ _ . _
~~~h ~h T~ ~
k ~a _L d - (1-a) 1 d
q,z K,~,~ rz r~rX~m .
7'1 j
~a (1-a) ~-1 , (10)
' 'I'%' ~r'rx'/m 'I'x K'I'X/m ~
. r'~~1 rI~C Y y ~I~!1 .
- r= ~~C.a,~i +ci-a~ ~1, =1)i.u `
i x ~ x ~P 7'X K 9'X~/m
+ ( ~-a ) rl .
.
.rX r-rXi~~
Instability occurs in the following wave length region:
,~,c ~~,h
k$ < ko - = ~ (1- a ) 1 a ~ - 1 ~ . (12
~ ,~~c
x x
The maximum growth rate is given by the following equation:
T~ Th s
r~,~ = Z8n _~'~(1-a) T~ + a~ - 1~s
x x
T~ ~,h
x~ ( 1-a ) 1- + a 1- ~-3 � (13)
TX K'~z /m TX ~t1'x ~m
3. Quasi Linear Theory
We will develop a quasi linear thtory in order to handle the effect of elec-
- tromagnetic instability on thermal conductivity. The basic equations are the
Vlasov equation and the Maxwell equation shown below.
3b
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~ -hV. ~ .l-m(E-I-~VXB). ~ =0, (14)
OX E ~ - r ~B '
~I~i)
Qxg_ 1 8E + 4nf
c ~ c ' (16)
In the above eqiiations f is the distr~bution function of the electron and j is
the current density.
- An ensemble average is indicated bq and expressing the pctential by S
from this average quantity leads to the following equations from equation (14). ~
r
- +V. a~~>-~~