JPRS ID: 9328 USSR REPORT CYBERNETICS, COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION TECHNOLOGY

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JPRS Ll9645
3 A~pril 1981
- Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO (~o. 716
,
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JPRS L/9645
- 3 Apri1. 1981
' SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT ~
. FOUO No. 716
CONTENTS
INTER-AF'RICAN AFFAIRS
Thesis on 'Monetary Repression of Africa' Examined
(Jehan I?uha.mel; MARCAES TROPTCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Jan 81) 1
Francophone Movement Seen at Crossroac3s
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEE~TS, 13 Feb 81) 8
- CEPGL-E~EC Cooperation Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.ANEENS, 13 Fe~ 81) 12
Briefs
Guinesn-Cameroonian Treaty l~
EEC Aid for OMVS . 1!~
ANGOLA
Cooperation With France Reviewed, Improvement Hopes Expressed
(MARCFiES TROPI.CAUX ET MEDTTERRANEENS, 20 Feb 81) 15
BURUNDI �
Briefa
_ Cotton Crop 17
Cultural Agreement With Cuba , i7
CAMEROON
Briefs
~ Agreement With North Korea l~
Swiss Cooperation 18
~ COMORO ISLANDS
Briefs
JapanESe Aid 19
~ Air Agreement With Mauritius 19
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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, ETHIOPIA .
Attack Aeportedly ~'lanned To Crush Eritrean Resistance
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Ma,r 81) 20
GABON ~
- Mixed Commisaion With France Reaches Partial Agreemer_t
(MARCHES TROPT~,AUX ET MEDITERRAIVEIIVS, 13 Feb 81) 21 '
GHANA
Briefs
Foreign Aid 23
Cooperatinn With Ita1y Studied 23
- Flights to Rome Curtailed 23
GU.LNEA
Briefs
Toure' s Warning on Currency 2~+
IVORY COAST
Long-Awaited Cabinet Reshuffle Examined
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRTQUE, 11 Feb 81) 25
Houphouet-BoigrW Says Responsibility Must Go to Younger Generation
(Felix Houphouet-Boigny Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, Feb 81) 28
Background of New Abid~an Mayor
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRTQUE, l~+ Jan 81) 33
MALAWI
Financial Aid for E`thanol Production .
(MARG`I~S TROPICAUX ET N~ITERRANEENS, 20 Feb 81) 35
Briefa
International Aid Li~ted 36
MALI ,
Economic Liberalization Over 5 Years Said To Prevent Crisis ~
(MARCHES TROFiCAUX ET Z~DITERRANEIIQS, 27 Feb 81) 37
Briefs
Deputies' F`rugality 39
- b -
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NIGERIA
Briefs
- Shell Nigeria Denial
Oil Production Zncrease
' Agreement With East Germany ~p
Pam Construction
Cooperation With Thailand ~l
' Fetroleum Prospecting ~l
SOMAI,IA
- Briefs ~
_ PRC MiG Deliveries ~2
TOGO
Extension Granted on Foreign Debt
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET NP~,DTTERRANEENS, 27 Feb 81) 1+3
Briefs
Prod.uction, Export Statistics l~l~
- UGANDA I
~
' In dustrial Crops Renewal Studied
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAI~EIIVS, 30 Jan 81) 1+5
- Briers
Economic Measures '
ZAIRE
~ Briefs
Petroleum Production !~7
- Brazil Pro,jects ~7
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
THESIS ON 'MONE'~ARY REPRESSTON OF AFRTCA' EXAMCNED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Jan 81 pp 65-67
[Review by Jehan Duhamel of the book "Monnr,ie, servitude et liberte. La repression
monetaire de 1'Afrique" [Money, Servitude and Freedom. The Monetary Repression of
APrica), by Joseph Tchundjang Pouemi. Preface by Mohamed T. Diawara. One volume
15:5 x 22.5, Editions J. A., Paris, 286 pp]
[Text] Recently, in July 1980, the Editions J. A. published the
work by Prof Joseph Tchundjang Pouemi "Monnaie, servitude et liberte" -
[Money, Servitude and Freedom J, with a preface by Mohamed Diawara,
former minister of the plan of the Ivory Coast and president of the
Dakar Club. The title of the work is somewhat.aggressive and the
_ subtitle is even more so: "The Monetary Repression of Africa." The
author is a professor of economics at the Abijan University. Pre- -
viously he was professor at the University of Yaounde. He graduated
in 1964 from the University of Clermont-Ferrand and the schooi of
application of the INSFE [National Institute of Statistics and
Economic Studies] in Paris. _
We asked Mr Jehan Duhamel, former director of the BCEAO [Central
Bank of Western African States] in Dakar (1961-1965), director of -
studies of the Banque de France (1965-1970), and general director -
of the BIAO in Paris (1971-1975).to camment an this work and
evaluate the ideas it supports,
"Money, Servitude and Freedom." Such is the title of a work which a brilliant
African university professor, Joseph Tchundjang Pouemi, has just published. In s
sharp style he describes the role of money as the bearer of progress and, therefore,
of emancipation, but also, inversely, as a generator of liens and, therefore, of
~ bondage. The tone of the work, however, is provided by the subtitle, which in fact
could have been the main title of the book: "The Monetary Repression of Africa."
' I. Professor Pouemi's Theses �
In general,the thesis is clear: the e~onomic and social development of the African
continent has been artificially restrained by a monetary policy systematically
oriented toward the continent's impoverishment. _
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In the period of colonization i~ was logical, if not legitimate, for money to be -
managed with a view to the tota.l implementation of the colonial pact whose purpose
was to exploit overseas territories to serve, in the best possible mann~r, the -
interests of the colonizer, who was looking for both a source of ~nexpensive raW
materials an an outlet for its industry.
Conversely to what might have been expected, the acquisition of independence by the
African states hardly changed thP situation. It barely involved modifications, more
- theoretical than real, in the structurea cf the monetary and financial apparatus, the ~ -
- modalities of the creation of a monetary system, and the management of foreign currenCy
reserves.
A. Self-Repression Techniques -
As far as the former French empire is concerned, the old mother country remained the
center of the real decisi~ns and, through its virtually absolute control over the
granting of credits and the orientation of sauinga, to exert a delayed impexiaZism
which safeguarded the essential features of its economic interest. With a few nuances
the same occurred in the other former colonial systems whose monetary and credit
structures, even though differently conceived in colonial times, kept and continued =
to keep the African economies in a state of skillfully organized dependence and ex- "
ploitation. ~
To stick tr~ the French example, which is the main topic of the author's study, and
_ which he considers particularly illustrative, the delegation of powers granted the
local monetary organs in the area of credita were manifested to the extent to which
they remained locked within a very strict joint system controlled by a group of French
technical advisors who were remarkably vigilant. After all:
Th e guarantee given by France concerning the franc of the African fir.ancial cammunity
(the CFA franc) has remained illusory, for it represents an operations account which
the Frenct? authorities have always been very careful to maintain positive;
The fixed rate of exchange between the CFA and the French franc deprives the monetary
policy of the different countries within the zone of all independence, for it forbids
Lhem to adapt the parity of their currency to the development of their economies.
Within the context of political independence, such a situation of monetary and, con-
sequently, economic subordination could be maintained only with the agreement, one
would be almost tempted to say the complicity, of the African leadership. The latter
have been led to accept it either as a result of blindness or fear of change. Further- �
_ more, while the monetary order controlled by the former colonial power hindered
development by measuring out the indispensable loans required to meet the initiatives
of entrepreneurs, artisans and peasants, it was also such to benefit a small .~frican �
elite, politici,~ns and officials and other administrators of state-owned companies.
Obviously, the countries which demanded total monetary independence--Guinea, Mali and
- Mauritania--had no reason to be pleased with the economic consequences of their eman-
cipation. Zhe reason was that their experiments were too isolated to be viable by `
themselves.
~ Such are, according to Professor Pouemi, the main characteristics of what he describes
as African monetary and, therefore, economic self-repressxon. -
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_I
B. International Monetary Repression
Added to the self-repressive methods applied with the agreement of African political
- leaders is a worldwide system of external repression supported by the sum total of
_ industrialized countries, who are concerned with the durable preservati on of their
privileges. In effect, this is one of the dominant orientations in th e international
� monetary order which keeps ttie African economies in a state of dependence directly
prejudicial to their expansian. �
' The world monetary order, developed at the end of the last war, was, in fact, ~tructured
on the basis of three main mechanisms which, orig~nally, were as follow s:
The existence of a ruling currency, the American dollar, which was asked virtually to
play the role of single currency imposed upon everyone in economic and financial ex-
changes on a global scale:
The fixed ratio of exchange between the dollar and all other currencies. This deprived
- the members of the system, the African countries especially, of the pos sibility to
have recourse to deliberate variations in the exchange rate in order to pursue an '
autonomous economic policy;
Th e International Monetary Fund, which, in fact, gave quite useful loans to mcmber
countries but which tied its aid to extreme~y constraining conditions as to the way
their economic policy was oriented. Proceeding on the basis of very conservative
and rather rigid views, the stipulations of the fund mostly conflicted with the pursuit
of social progress activities in the developing countries.
Naturally, the world monetary system was greatly changed after the convertibility of
the dollar was abandoned in 1971. However, this did not improve the situation of the
- Third World. The orderly repressive system was followed by the d~isorderly repressive
situation. There is no longer an international currency. Henceforth reciprocal
_ monetary relations are covered by the principle of floating exchange rates. :1 generalized
inflationary situation has spread among the industrial countries and the level of
interest rates demanded of borrowers has become unbearat~le.
The Third World countries are the principal victims of this state of th ings. They
become the unwilling importers of inflation, which they did not create, as a result of
which their balance of payments worsens, thus lowering the living standard of their
- populations.
Noting the repressive effects of the global monetary disorder with which the indus-
. trialized countries alone manage to cope, Professor Pouemi unhesitating ly concludes that
this disorder is deliberately maintained for the sake of keeping the developing countries
. in a position inferiority and dependence which could hav~ been avoided with the help
. of the initial results of their recent industrialization.
II. Comments Called For by Such a Sharp Thesis
Such was.the stern analysis of an African professor, an analysis which Mohamed Diawara,
president of the Dakar Club, labeled as "scouring." The preface provided by Mohamed
Diawara was as vigorous as it was brilliant.
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What makes this thesis even more s~ductive ia that i~ is talentediy written. The
author displays an excellent knowledge of monetary mechanisms and their ties with
" economic life and a remarkable facility in describing them clearly to the non-
iniCigted readers, whicl~, in itself, is a tour de force, This makes even more
regrettable the fact that the author has assumed a systematically critical and
virulent stand which deprives his work of a great deal of its ~orce of persuasion.
Unwittingly, the famous expression comes to mind that, "anything excessive becomes ~ -
unconvincing."
- A. On the Subject of Some Particular Views ~ `
Without listing all the arguments--numerous though they might be--with which Professar _
Pouemi's ideas could be challenged, several among them are worth expanding:
To maintain that the value of a currency is independent of the amount and type of
_ foreign currency reserves means to ignore the fact that a country cannot live per-
manentl~ in a deficit situation. It may be true that the systematic and steady
accumulation of foreign currency may ~,rove t:o be useless and to the detriment of the
living standard; it is no less true that trade imbalances and services must be com- -
pensated for through the movement of capital, i.e., by resorting to foreign indebtedness -
which, in turn; makes a receiving country dependent on the lenders; furthermore, should -
- the ~ituation with foreign exchange reserves become too negative, lenders become scarce;
To note that the system or floating exchange rates is "impure" because of ineas�res
taker~ to limit the exchange fluctuations and to assume, conversely, that it should be
"pure,". i.e., based on properly free fluctuations, means to forget that the factors -
- influencing the variation of exchange rates are not all of them economic and that the ~
- uncontrolled intervention of speculative operations might lead to erratic excesses
whose cansequences would be catastrophic to the economies of the affected countries;
_ To consider the mechanisms cperating in the franc zone have contributed to the member
countries nothing but economic subordination is not as overstated as it would be to -
deny the advantages which this system has brought to the French economy. The claim
that operational accour~ts are so conceived as never to be losing is inexact. Actually,
- even though, generally sp eaking, they have not been losing over a long period of time,
with the exception of Mali, which has always been in the red, the situation has been
turned around: starting with 1980 operations in the UMOA zone have been steadily
losing; this means that, in accordance with concluded agreements, France has supplied
these countries with the t'oreign exchange they required to see them thro~sgh a difficult
period.
Furthermore, the fact that the African countries within the franc zone have a currency ~
which is practically interchangeable with the French franc is, unquestionably, a factor
in attracting for.ei.gn private investments which find security in this type of monetary
system. ,
B. On the Concept of the Work
Notes on specific points are relatively secondary compared with two far more basic
- criticisms triggered by Professor Pouemi's theses.
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1. The basic argument of the work is that the currency or, rather, the creation of
currettcy is the almost exclusive key to economic expansion and thet by setting limits
to the growth of internal credit, agencies such�.as tiie Common Central Bank, the Franc
- Zone or the International Monetary Fund are engaged in a systematic and entirely
, illegitimate aetion of blocking the development of the Third World. In particular,
the author claims that the thus imposed enterprise self-financing is a heresy, for it
is nothing but a factor of price increases and that private savings, even though they
. largely consist of cash, should be used to a far greater extent in financing indus-
trialization and agricultural progress.
This means putting money on a rather high pedestal, for even though money is a means
for attaining progress, it is merely one of the development factors. It also me ans to
forget that entrepreneurs are always re~ady to ask for loans but are frequently in- _
sufficiently concerned with making sure that their project will generate sufficient ~
repayment funds. It means emphasizing the adverse effects of an excessive monetary =
supply, for the granting of loans has never been the absolute guarantee that there will .
be an increasing output which would back the money thus inserted within the economic
- circuit. It also means neglecting the fact that a very slim line separates money and -
savings always ready to be converted into money.
Above all, it means denying the fact that an investment, whatever its nature, cannot be _
based on cash alone. It is essentially based on a certain economic, socaal or even
political environment. So far, tY~e biggest obstacle to development in Africa has been
a sum total of insufficiencies in the vari~us areas of transportation, telecommuni-
cations, energy supplies, industrial infrastructures and, perhaps even more so, shortages -
of artisans and of vocationally trained personnel. The injection of currency, _
naturally, contributes to the remedy of this situation. However, it must be gradual
a nd organized in a way which would avoid distortions; progress in the various areas must
be achieved on a parallel basis. Otherwise a substantial risk of dislocation would
exist.
2. According to Professor Pouemi the generalized inflation and consequent global
monetary disorder are the manifestation of the opposition of the industrial world to
the legitimate aspirations of the Third World. The author offers a pertinent analysis
of this confrontation between two major types of civilization which seems, indeed, to
be the basis for a generalized increase in costs and prices and which is gradually
- leading the industrialized countries to withdraw behind a protectionist system adverse
to the development of Third World countries. -
, Here again, however, the author engages in an impassioned and excessive presentation of
the facts, a presentation which ~oes not sufficiently take realities into consideration.
He actually insinuates that the Western world is deliberately using inflation as the -
- , ultimate means~ of defense in opposing the claims of the poor countries. This amounts
_ to ascribing to the. Western world both a great deal of perseverance in its malice and _
of cohesion in the protection of its interests. Could anyone fail to see, conversely,
_ that the industrialized countries themselves are the first victims of inflation and -
' of the monetary chaos which distur~ their own economies and lead to the under-
utilization o~ their own manpower? -
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The origin of the crises which periodically shake up various civilizations *_nay be
found in the will of the least favored social classes to demand an improvemen t of
their living conditions and even an equal distribution of wealth. For a long time
this phenomenon existed only within the national borders where disparities we re ,
closer to home and more evident. In recent decades there has been a trend toward
extending it to the rest of the world. The development of information media brought
to light the unequal living stand.aras among different nations. Such inequalities were ~ _
_ worsened by 'the impact of a demographic expansion which varied substantially from one
- continent to another. Under these circumstances the claims of the poor nations called ,
for a substantial increase in raw material prices and for a more equitable redistri-
- bution of industrial activities.
The world's leaders--politicians or hesds of enterprises--have become aware of the
fact that a transfer of wealth ar~3 activities to the be~~efit of the Third Wor 1d is
inevitable. Such a transfer can be achieved only by taxing the haves. The e asiest
way to do ttris is the painless one, i.e., when a flourishing economy is taxE~ and, _
therefore, when such taxation is manifested in no more than a slight slowdown of the
= internal growth rate. It is infinitely more difficult to tax an economy in a state
_ of crisis, for this make such a taxation more evident. Added to this is the fact ~
_ that the Western nati.ons have democratic politi~cal systems, i.e., systems wh ich are
relatively unequipped to impose sacrifices upon their populations. They are reduced
to efforts to influence minds through the mass media, i.e., to operate throu gh ex-
tensive and gradual actions.
As long as a way to rebalance the distribution of wealth, acceptable to the majority, _
has not been found, disagreement between the feeling of impatience of the deprived
and the conservatism of the richer nations will be manifested by an inflation which
~ will be more or Iess poorly controlled. Such is the ~ature of the phenomenon which
took place in Fra,nce in recent decades and such is the~process which is devel oping on -
a world scale ever since the sudden unilateral increase in the cost of energy products.
- II?. The Chances of an African Monetary Zone
In the face of this entire disorder which he dissected with impassioned stric tness,
Professor Pouemi did not fail to try to suggest a solution. In a few pages, the volume
~ of which could seem too small compared with the very long critical analysis which -
accounts for the substance of his book, he suggests that Africa set up its own -
monetary zone which would encompass all underdeveloped countzi~s on the caniinent but
_ would be totally independent of the other monetary systems in the world. Such a
union would draw its own strength from its internal cohesion and economic dynamism
within the recovered independence of its own power of th�e generation of money and the ,
adjustment of the exchange rates. The management of resel-ves and~the granting of
credits would be controlled by a joint central bank whose governor and mana.gement would
- be largely independent of national political powers. , -
Such suggestions seem rather unrealistic.
It would be hard to imagine African governments, so different from each othe r in -
terms of historical and linguistic traditions or ideologies, to become delibe rately
involved in a process of monetary and, consequently, ecor~omic rapprochement which would
- imply the los3 of a substantial percentage of th eir sovereignty.
~
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It would be hard to imagine that the new monetary union--assuming khat it has been
organized and is functioning smoothly--could formulate a purely African line of
behaviar, totally independent of the other global monetary systems. Such a n~:a associ-
etion cauld not allow itself to transgress on a durable basis the traditiona:. rules of
monetary generation, any mora than the existing monetary unions, by plunging into an
excessively generous loan-granting policy.
Finally, co~,~ld we agree with professor Pouemi that a manetary union would be sufficient
to 'oring about an economic union? The old question of determining which one should
� precede the other has long remained unanswered. It is clear, nevertheless, that an
- economic or mone*_ary union would be viable only if it rallies peoples who have
imperative reasons to unite both because they complement each other and because they
share a ~oint vision of development'and, even more so, of numan society. One could
only wish that such were to become the case of the countries in thP African continent.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Faris 1981
5157
cSO: 4400
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_
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS ~
_ FRANCOPHONE MOVEMENT SEEN AT CROSSROADS ~
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Feb 81 pp 34~3-349
[Repor~: "Francophone Movement Questioned; Failure or Growing Pains"]
[Text] We know that a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs ~
of francophone countries was to take place last December in Dakar. ~
At the last moment, however, it had to be postponed sine die be-
cause of differences existing between France and Canada on
- Quebec's representation. The purpose of the meeting was to con-
sider a project which had been conceived and passionately sup- ,
ported by President Leopold Sedar Senghor. It dealt with the
. basic francophone community. As Olivier Stirn, secretary of
state for foreign affairs, pointed out in Dakar on 15 January, ~
- it is a plan which France hopes to implement one day and to
which ir. gives its continuing support. After the postponement ~
of the Dakar meeting, which, we would like to hope, will be no
more than a transient incident, we asked a specialist in franco-
phone affairs to give us an interpretation of this matter.
The ministers of foreign affairs of francophone countries did not meet in Dakar,
as President Senghor had planned, to promote the idea of the organization of an -
organic francophone community. Since, meanwhile, the Senegalese chief of state
had proclaimed his witl:drawal from national political life, one may ask if the -
- postponement of the meeting was not equivalent to aborting the idea itself.
~ The reason which motivates the francophone countries to organize is their desire
- to co;nbine their affinities and cultural complements and to apply them in an
- effort to establish a zone of solidarity and co-prosperity. L?nquestionably, this
. is an ambitious undertaking which is justified by the current international situa-
tion, which is characterized by unequal development, the steady weakening of the
poorest countries, and the risks which this state of things entails in terms of
_ maintaining the peace. It is legitimate for groups based on the use of the same _
language of international communications and a background of reciprocal understand- ,
ing and shared values, to be concerned with the study of the reasons for the situa-
_ tion and of possible remedies.
_ Project Started in 1965
- The project has been described as the francophone version of the Commonwealth; ~
the history of the latter is both long and noted by happenstances which prevented
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neither its development nor its activities. Conceived in 1839, organized in 1931,
and considerably expancied after World War II, the withdrawal of Pakistan, Ireland
and South Africa notwithstanding, and completed, in the course of time, through
the addition of subsidiary agencies such as the Foundation (1966), it was finally
in 1971 that the Commonwealth adopted a declaration according to which its part-
- ners acknowledged the fact that the application of common principles could have
a worldwide beneFicial influence.
The francophone project was initiated in 1965 by Yresidents Bourguiba and Senghor.
The latter deserves credit for having formulated it to his peers, in Kigali, in
1979, and in Nice, in 1980, at the meeting of heads of French and African states.
The implementation schedule called for a consultation to be held by the ministers
_ of foreign affairs at the end of 1980. Construing as a failure the fact that a
, casual incident prevented the holding of this meeting would be the equivalent of
- having little faith in the fact that such an undertaking is of sufficient interest
to remedy the situation in the very near future.
What was it, in fact, that happened? A difference became apparent concerning the
= nature of the problems which were to be discussed in the course of the high level
francophone meetings. On the basis of Senghor's analysis of global relations,
- it is a question, first of all, of going beyond the "cultural scorn" shown by the
industrialized countries of the underdeveloped countries, and of reestablishing
- the balance of all spiritual contributions to the human community; this implies
reciprocal respect and acknowledgment, as well as training, transfer of techno-
logy, and combination of intellectual and financial means leading to harmonious
, development. There is also the further possibility of adopting joinr platforms
- in the areas of economics, basic human rights, and changes in the development of
aggressive militarization policies.
It was precisely the ministers, meeting in Dakar, who were to define their own
- targets and formulate their priorities. However, this question was shunted as
a result of the current Canadian viewpoint. Involved with its provinces in a dis-
cussion on Canada's constitutional future, the federal government in Ottawa re-
served for itself the right to represent Canada at the Dakar meeting, considering
- this to be the outline of an international agency in which, from the strict legal
viewpoint, it would be t:~e sole legitimate representative. In this case, Quebec
would have '~een reduced to a representation on a level which it deemed unaccept-
able. As of that point the French government pressed for a postponement of the
meeting, for it considered that such a francophone predominately cultural meeting
was the most important and the most permanent feature of its policy according to
- which Quebecers must be represented in francophone bodies.
Was the desire for solidarity expressed by the members of the francophone group
to gain the upper hand over circumstantial considerations? There were three fea-
tures favoring an affirmative answer: the existence of already institutionalized
ties, the number and diversity of countries interested in a cohesive francophone
group, and the nature of the problems they had to discuss.
Like the Commonwealth, the francophone group is so structured as to enable its
members to think, engage in research and exchange of ideas and cooperation in all
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, areas of activity. Ministers of eriucation and of youth and sports have been meet-
ing regularly since, respectively, 1960 and 1969; they have even set up in Dakar .
a permanent secretariat in charge of organizing their conferences. Other heads
_ of technical departments have followed their example (the ministers of scientific
research and justice), or about to do so (agriculture, culture, etc.).
The francophone unification movement is triggering an intense and dynamic confron-
_ tation of ideas among parliamentarians, journalists, jurists, university members,
economists, historians, physicians, artists, engineers, etc. '
- The ACCT Rostrum and Place of Gathering
- However, the institutionalization of relations among francophone countries
achieved its best progress with the establishment of the Cultural and Technical Co-
operation Agency (ACCT). Established in Niamey, in 1970, by 22 countries, current-
- ly it lists 34 members spread over all continents. Its special aspect is that
it offers an outlet for expression and a place where countries who are entirely
or partially French-speaking, countries where the French language is in daily use
without having an official status, or provincial governments such as that of ,
Quebec and New Brunswick, may gather. The agency, operating on a budget of 70
billion francs, implements training, exchange, and production of cultural goods
programs; it has a special development fund for specific activities related to
the enhancement of the human and economic potential of its members.
A study of the geographic breakdown of the francophone group will show that the
_ 34 members of the ACCT includes countries having a great variety of systems: West-
ern capitalist countries such as France, Belgium and Ganada; Commonwealth members
such as Mauritius, the Seychelles, Vanuatu and Canada; socialist countries such
- as Vietnam, Laos and Benin; and countries within the Arab-Islamic sphere, such
as Tunisia, Lebanon and the Comoro Islands. In all these countries, specifically
those within the African bloc; the French language may be a common denominator
but is not necessarily the language spoken by the entire population. This proves
that internal linguistic cleavages are not an obstacle to affiliation with the
francophone group; this argument, which applies to countries where other cultural
languages exist and are developing, equally applied to francophone minorities with-
in countries whose national language is different. For this reason, the franco-
phone community feels the existence of a bond with the Acadians of the Canadian
maritime provinces, the Franco-Americans in New England and Louisiana, the Val- ~
dotans and the "French-speaking people" of Kampuchea.
Al1 these groups are following with interest the development of the francophone .
idea which, in a way, represents a chance for their ethnic survival. It is likely
- that, should this idea convert into reality, other countries would not ignore the
advantages offered by a spontaneous regrouping which would offer them a security �
- in transcending systems and circumstances. It would be difficult in this respect
to imagine a community so rich in terms of its diversity where Morocco would not
be represented, as well as Algeria which could challenge Quebec for the position
of the second largest French-speaking community in the world in terms of the num-
_ ber of peopJ.e who use the French language in their work, educational activities
or culture.
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The attractiveness of an organic community woul.d obviously apply in the choice
of topics it could discuss. Comparing, once again, this situation with the Common-
wealth, let us recall that the latter is not exclusively an economic or monetary
asSociation or a military alliance. We find in the Commonwealth as many po3itical ~
differences as there are in the ACCT. What remains, essentially, fs the usage
of a common language and the awareness and practical work of public institutions
' based on similar cultural foundations. Discussions among English-speaking part-
ners, at the highest level, may cover a large number of subjects, "However, where-
as efforts are being made to resolve the major problems of today, no specific
_ policy is formulated, for the target is "to reach the highest possible level of
understanding rather than even the lowest level of agreement." Unquestionably,
_ this is also the wish of the promoters of the francophone community. A dialogue
~ which has been initiated by the concern for reaching an equal level of cultural -
development and knowledge it would be natural for its consequences to lead to more -
specific economic and political realities. -
Belgium offers as much as Canada grounds for a debate on the future of its French-
_ speaking population. Need we recall the fact that the Flemings in Belgium have
concluded a linguistic union agreement with the Netherlands, based on their cul-
tural similarity. Who could say that this agreement is merely intellectual and
, is not translated by the wish for a greater mutual understanding on other levels
and for purpo~es which would benefit the interests of both parties? -
After the conference of ministers of foreign affairs was adjourned, several coun-
= tries, France among them, expressed the wish that this project be resumed soon.
Obviously, the French-sgeaking community does not have an agency on the highest
level as that c~f the Commonwealth with its conference of heads of governments.
It would be desirable for such an agency to be organized and For individual prob-
lems to be surmounted for the sake of attaining a level of co-prosperity and soli-
- darity among voluntarily and fully participating countries; by its vocation this
level may be intellectual but it would also be economic by necessity and, finally,
political by conviction, and would be able to meet the challenge of the current _
international order.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
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INTER- AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- CEPGL-EEC COOPERATION REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Feb 81 p 383 ~
- [Text] The Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) have a special-
_ ized energy agency known as the EGL or, in other words, the Organization of the _
CEPGL for Energy of the Great Lakes Countries. The agency's seat is in Bujumbura,
in the Republic of Burundi.
Let us recall that on 15 July 1970 the ambassadors of Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire
(the three members of the community) signed in Brussels an agreement protocol
according to which the three countries were to cooperate in the area of energy.
The first step in the implementation of this agreement was taken on 20 August 1974
in Kinshasa with the signing of a convention creating the Nonprofit Association
for the Electrification of the Great Lakes Region. This marked the theoretical
birth of the EGL. On 15 January 1977 the EGL General Assembly represented by mini-
sters (Rwanda-Burundi) and a state commissioner (Zaire), who were in charge of -
energy problems, met in Bujumbura to name the members of the management committee.
= This represented the physical birth of the EGL. The committee consists of a :
_ director general and two directors, respectively appointed by Zaire, Rwanda and -
Burundi.
With a view to establishing functional relations between the EGL and the CEPGL,
the 10 September 1978 second ordinary session of the conference of heads of states, _
held in Gisenyi (Rwanda) decided to make the EGL part of the CEPGL. The manner
in which this integration was to be accomplished was formulated at the third ordi-
- nary session of the conference of heads of states, held in Lubumbashi (Zaire),
- on 9 December 1979.
It was thus that the EGL became a specialized agency of the CEPGL. It enjoys ad-
_ ministrative, technical and finai?cial autonomy. The integrated EGL was renamed,
as we mentioned at the beginning of this note. It deals with energy in all its ~
aspects. ~
The EGL work program covers the entire energy sector of the community: wood, peat, ~
coal, hydroelectric, solar, wind and ~eothermal energy, natural gas, methane gas `
and hydrocarbons, and the interconnection and coordination of energy use policies.
The first project undertaken by the EGL is the development of a second hydroelec-
tric power plant on the Ruzizi River, known as "Ru zizi II Project." The main pur- -
pose of this project, the study of which has been completed, will be to insure ~
reliable electric power supplies between 1985 and 1990. This will make it possible
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for the CEPGL members to prepare for the expansion of their programs for energy- ~
generating equipment. Its implementation will involve the building of a dam and
' a hydroelectric power plant at the Kitimba site. It will generate about 40 mega-
watts and will have an annual output of 140 million kilowatt hours of electric
power. -
The EGL will neither manage nor implement plans but will be in charge of their
study. It is, above all, a study bureau whose role, therefore, is conceptual.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux eL Cie Paris 1981 -
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
,
BRIEFS �
GUINEAN-CAMEROONIAN TREATY--From 17 to 21 February, President Ahmed Sekou Toure
made an official visit to Cameroon on itrvitation of President Ahmadou Ahidjo.
- According to their joint communique: "They decided to conclude a friendship and
= cooperation treaty and to set up commercial and cul tural agreements." [Excerpts] -
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Mar 81 p 620]
EE~ AID FOR OMVS--Thanks to a new very important f inancial effort on the part of
the EEC, over 80 percent of the financing of the OMVS (Organization for the Devel- _
opment of'the Senegal River) project may soon have adequate financing. As the
- result of the visit by Robert N'daw, Mali's minist er of industrial development
and current president of the OMVS Council of Minis ters and Mokhtar Ould Haiba,
OMVS high commissioner (see MTM of 16 January 1981, p 133) to Brussels, on
22 January, 30 million ecus were pledged as region al cooperation (in addition to
15 million ecus granted as the fourth FED regional cooperation project for the
access route to the~Manantali Dam). Other funds, totaling 30 million ecus will
be added to the project on the basis of the nation al programs of the three ~
interested countries: Mali (13.4 million), Senegal (10.3 million) and Mauritania
(6.3 millionj. Eighty percent of the total financ ing has thus been reached.
The figure could become even higher thanks to the additional financing of Saudia
Arabia totaling $50 million (about 38 million ecus). The OMVS, which is making
plans for a meeting of lenders in the near future, in order definitively to secure
the financing for the different aspects of the project, could thus consider the
opening of negotiations with low bidders for the D iama Dam and call for bids �or
_ the Manantali Dam. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
_ 13 Feb 81 p 367] 5157
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~ ANGOLA
COOPERATION WITH FRANCE REVIEWED,~IMPROVEMENT HOPES EXPRESSED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Feb 81 p 446
[Text] The situation in southern Africa received prominent mention during Jean
Francois-Poncet's visit to Angola last month. On this occasion, France and Angola
noted that they shared the same concerns regarding the Namibian problem (cf. MTM,
No. 1837, 23 January, p 208). The French parliamentary delegation, which arrived _
shortly afterward (cf. MTM, No. 1839, 6 February, p 329), also proved to be sensi- -
tive to this question, while it was also able to observe the Angolan people's
_ commitment to national construction and to building a society that answers their _
aspirations.
Even though its heart was in the socialist camp, the MPLA [Ponular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola] decided from the start, in 1956, long before becoming
the ruling party, to maintain relations with /all/ [in italics] countries. After
independence, those relations were easier to establish with the Eastern countries
that had helped Angola in its struggle against the colonial power than with most -
of the Western countries which ostracized the new state to the extent that, in
1976 for example, it was refused subscriptions to western newspapers.
Over the years, relations improved, particularly with France. They are now
' "bright and sunny," satisfactory to both sides. Angola, in its quest for develop-
ment, is after the technology that suits it best. It can get it either from the
East or the West, except that the infrastructure it inherited from Portugal came
from the West and cannot ~ust be discarded.
It was inevitable--political goodwill being evident on both sides--that Angola
and France should move toward better relations "in their mutual attachment to
respect for the independence and respective political choices of the two states"; -
~ the establishment of diplomatic missions in Luanda and Paris and the visits of
Jean Francois-Poncet and the French delegation to Angola were concrete manifesta-
tions of that positive evolution.
In terms of economic relations, one sees growth in French-Angolan trade, f~cili-
tated by the signing of important bank agreements; those purchasing credits are
going to enable the Angolans to proceed to major investments in several sectors
(oil, agro-industry, mining).
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_ In 1980, Angola subscribed for ~x 949,226,~0~ in contracts t~ith ~rance, and all
indications are that, in 1981, tfie trend w311 become even stronger. In the oil -
sector, the two oil groups, ToCal and Elf-Aquitaine, will begin "offshore" pros-
pecting after the installation phase, according to previous agreements, to deter-
mine if the Angolan coast holds the reserves of black gold about which there has
been so much ta1k. The other most important contracts have been wi.th Renault- -
Industrie, Peugeot, Titan, Creusot-Loire, Schaeffer, Bas-Rhone Languedoc, Alsthom-
Atlantique, Potain-Poclain, Dumez, SNIAS, Degremont, and Sulzer. To balance the
trade, Angola will sell France oil, cement, minerals, and even coffee. '
- The two countries want to see their relations expand to new domains. The joint
- statement published following Jean Francois-Poncet's visit emphasized the pros-
pects for cooperation in the sectors of energy, construction, transport, fishing
and ancillary activities, the textile industry, etc. A general framework agree-
ment for cultural, scientific, and technical cooperation may be contemplated. It
was decided to discuss the sub~ect, and missions will be exchanged to develop
such an agreement.
In political terms, Angola thinks that France could, and should, play an important
role in solving the problems of southern Africa for many reasons: because France
has direct relations with South Africa; because it is a part of the Five contact ~
group (with Great Britain, the FRG, Canada, and the United States), which is com-
mitted to helping the South African Government move forward on the Namibian ques-
tion; because it has interests both in South Africa and in Namibia, and because _
if it wants to preserve its present interests in Namibia, it must work to insure
that future relations with the future independent Namibian state are on a promis-
- ing path.
Mr de Almeida has worked hard to strengthen Franco-Angolan ties and to communicate =
what Angola has wanted to say to France. He has let it be known that he will
probably soon be leaving his embassy in Paris and returning to Luanda (where a
ministerial portfolio will be entrusted to him). We do not doubt that his suc- ~
- cessor will cox~tinue the tradition of resolute courtesy he established during his
_ stay in the French capital.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
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- BURUNDI
BRIEFS
COTTON CROP At a cost of 38.5 million i3urundi francs the Burundi Government has
3ust bought out the Ruziz~ cotton gin. From now on, it will be in the hands of
CO,TERCO ~Committee for Managing the Cotton Reserves Fund). Therefore, the State
intends to control all textile activities, following a decree of 1 February 1979,
- � deciding to purchase the Ruzizi gin. COJERCO wants to restart Burundi's cotton -
productioZ by expanding planted areas in order to obtain greater nrofit. In _
1979-80 6,400 hectares of cotton were planted and the yield was 6,600 tons/
fiectare. This fiscal year was balanced with a deficit of 4 million Burundi
- francs for COJERCO. From now on this organization intends to market part of the
cotton crop in th.e premis~s, thanks to the needs of COTEBUL (Textile Works of
Bu~umbura). The first delivery to this gin was 500 tons. [Text] [Paris
. MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Feb 81 p 321] 9626
CULTURAL AGREII~NT WITfI CUBA The Republic of Burundi and the Republic of Cuba
ha.ve signed an agreement for cultural exchange for the 1981-82 period, on 27
January in Bu~umbura. According to this document, the two countries will study
th,e possibility of cooperation and exchange of theatrical groups between the
Cubartist agency and the Burundi Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Feb 81 p 322] 9626
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CAMEROON
, $RIEFS
AGREEMENT WTTEI NORTH KOREA Pierre-Desire Engo, Cameroon's Vice~iinister foi _
- Economy and Planning, and Kim Pak-son, Vice-Minister for Foreign Ma.rketing for
- People's Democratic Republic of KArea, signed a commercial agreement on 16
January ~n Yaounde supporting a merchandise exchange, catalogued on two l~sts,
A and The two parties agree that this merchandise will be paid in negotiable
currency, that certain merchandise categories will be exempt from customs and
that their transit will be facilitated. Fairs and exhibits will be organized -
and a mixed commission will be set up. Ttis commission will meet alternately
- ~n Yaounde and Pyong}rang. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
Frencfi 30 Jan 81 p 256] 9626
SWISS COOPERATTON Switzer].and will grant Cameroon a credit mi.x of 20 million
Swiss francs ~2. S b~L].lion CFA francs) and a donation of 2 million Swiss francs
for development projects. According to the agreement signed 21 January in Bern -
- by Cameroon`s Vice-Minister of Economy, Pierre-Desire Engo, half this credit will
be financed by the Helveti.c Confederation for a term of 20 years, without interest. _
T.'he remainder will be granted by a consortium of Sc~riss banks at conditions close
to those of the. market. The donation will finance projects approved by Swiss
experts. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Jan
81 p 256] 9626 -
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COMORO ISLANDS
= BRIEFS _
JAPANESE AID--Japan has put at the disposal of the Comoro Islands an amount equiva-
lent to 7 million French francs or 350 million Comoro francs for the purchasing
of rescue boats. The agreement was initialed on 6 February, in Moroni, by Hiko
Furusawa, Japanese ambassador to the Comoro Islands, with embassy in Antananarivo,
and Ali Mroudjae, Comoro's minister of foreign affairs and cooperation. Both
Mroudjae and Furusawa emphasized the need to strengthen cooperation between the
two countries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
13 Feb 81 p 387] 5157
l
AIR AGREEMENT WITH MAURITIUS--On 6 February Mauritius and the Comoros signed in ~
Port-Louis an agreement on flights between the two countries. The agreement was
signed by Dr B. Ghurburrun, minister of health and interim minister of communica-
tions and Dr Mtara Maecha, Comoros minister of transportation, tourism, posts and
telecommunications. It stipulates that Air Mauritius airplanes will be allowed
to land in the Comoros while Air Comoros airplanes will be all'owed to land in
- Mauritius. Currently flights between the two countries are handled by Air
Tanzania. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Feb 81
_ p 387] 5157
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ETH IOP IA
ATTACK REPORTEDLY PLANNED TO CRUSH ERITREAN RESISTANCE
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Mar 81 p 44
[Text) Strongly armed with new Soviet materiel, 309000 men will soon launch an
attack on the last bastion of the Eritrean liberation movements: Nakfa, 240 kms
north of Asma.ra, defended by some 2,000 guerrilla troops. Conceived by the Soviet
military advisors to the Der g(the junta governing Ethiopia since 1974), this
attack should reportedly ach ie~~e the submission ot all Eritrean cities.
. ,
This achievement has taken th e Derg r.~arly 5 years. In 1976 the Eritrean liberation
movements were in control of all major centers with the exception of Asmara. Two
years later, another war would benefit the Ethiopian Government; the Ogaden war
opposing it to Somalia, for wh ich it received massive assistance from the Sov iets,
and especially the Cubans with a 15,000-man expeditionary corps. Somalia experi-
enced a serious defeat and th e Cubans stayed on. The Derg could therefore turn
toward the northern front in Eritrea. One by one, the strongholds of the secession
- were recaptured. Only Nakfa remained; it was ruthlessly defended and hundreds of
- Ethiopian soldiers were killed there in 1979. ~ao years later, the Derg is reaping
its revenge: by razing Nakfa, it will deal a mortal blow to Eritrean secession.
However, this does not signify the end of the Eritrean revolt. Some 30,000 guer-
rillas could continue to harass the Ethiopian troops. However, one condition
should first be met: the Eritrean liberation movements, now embroiled in
- dissension, should settle their differences and coordinate their struggle. 1'liis
is today's wager.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
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GABON
- MIXED COMMISSION WITFL FRANCE REA.CHES PARTIAL AGREEMENT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Feb 81 p 380
_ [Text] The mixed France-Gabonese commission which convened on 5 and 6 February
_ in Libreville for the first time (MTM 6 February 1981 p 316), reach~d an agreement
on cultural, scientific and technical points.
On the other fiand it was not possible to come to terms on economic and financial -
m.atters. Another meeting will take place in the next trimester to re-examine the
_ pra~ects which remained in abeyance.
Martin Bongo, minister of foreign affairs, headed the Gabonese delegation, while
the French delegation was headed by Rober t Galley, minister of cooperation.
On th.e subj ect of technical cooperation France announced its decision to increase -
_ by 10 p ercent its annual contribution to the expenses of the French technical ~
gersonnel in Gabon. TE~s is in the framework of a"Gabonization" policy which
would make Gabon responsible for a part of theexpenses. TEie French contribution
will rise from Fr 69.5 million to Fr 76.5 million. Ln addition France has added -
a lump su:n of Fr 2 million destined for the equipment to be used for completing
housing for overseas personnel.
In the field of scientific research, France wishes to offer its help in trainin~
Gabonese research workers. -
According to French sources both delegations came to an agreement to develop the
pxoduction of raw matexial (uranium and manganese) and other inves Unent projects
- in the field of ene.rgy, rural development, telecommunications and small and
medtum-sized businsses.
The deterioration of French commercial balance with Gabon was brought up by
the French delegation. According to some important Gabonese, the poor results
� re.corded by France in recent years are due to the "drop in competitiveness in
_ some French products such as the competition of Japa.zese cars." -
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Tn considering the results of this f irst meeting of the Franco-Gabonese mixed
commission, it should be noted that the absence of an agreement in the economic
and financial field is balanced by the signing of a cultural accord which renews
gciei~tific cooperation between the two partners, which had considerably decreased
. in recent pears. Also the agreement of 21 January 1978 on the movement of people,
_ wfiich had not been applied up to th.e present time, could take effect quite ~
rapidly in view of the continuing negotiations between both parties.
Ifi sh.ould al:>o be noted that in the economic f~i.eld France will examine with great ~
~.nCerest some Gabonese projects, such as those relating to SOGAFERRO's [Gabonese
Fexroalloys Company], need for electric energy (for the production of ferro-
manganese near Francevtlle), mine prospecting, village hydraulics, and the
- es;ablishment of a new airport in Libreville. Also of note is the fact that FAC _
(Aid and Cooperation Fund) c~rtll grant financial aid for the exploitation of the
Lihreville-Moyabi wireless beams. As regards PM~ (small and medium size busi.~sses),
- PROPARCO, a branch of CCCE (Central Fund for economic Cooperation) could intervene
in Gabon and COFACE (French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade) could study the
. financing of the equipment for this sector. FAC will probably continue its aid -
- for food and frui,t-bearing projects in Franceville, while CCCE will concern _
- itself with hevea culture near Mitzic, a project for which a meeting of the
fin.ancial backers is expected in Libreville next March.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
7993
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GHANA
BRIEFS
FOREIGN AID--According to Dr George Benneh, the Ghanaian minister of finance and
economic planning, the new civilian admi:nifitration of President Limann, has already
- received in 15 months of rule about 1~illion cedis in foreign aid in the form~of
loans and grants. He estimated that by September 1983 such assistance could amont
- to about 10 billion cedis. The minister made this known through his vice-minist,:r
Dr E. L. Ivyakoteh during the 13th annual general assembly of the Institute of
Ghanaian Engineers. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDTTERRANEENS in French
27 Feb 81 p 489] 9735
COOPERATION WITH ITALY STUDIED--In the course of the discussion held in February
in Ac~ra hetween leaders of the Ghanaian Chamber of Commerce and the Ttalian-African
Chamber of Commerce of Milan, the two consular assemblies decided to cooperate more
closely to further Italian-Ghanaian exchanges and to encourage interest in Ghana
among Italian investors. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 27 Feb 81 p 489] 9735
FLIGHTS TO ROME CURTAILED--Italian aviation authorities decided unilaterally to reduce
the number of weekly flights of Ghana Airways from Accra to Rome from two to one
because the company has put a DC-10 into service on its European flights. Ghanaian
authorities consider this measure an infringement of the accords concluded between
the two countries. The latter propose to refer the dispute to international arbitiration.
It will be recalled that when the Italian company Alitalia decided, in 1976, to
replace its DC-8 with a DC-10 on the route, it did not inform Ghana, which did not
not hold it strictly to account. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER~ANEENS
in French 27 Feb 81 p 489] 9735
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. I
GUINEA
~ .
~
BRIEFS
- TOURE'S WARNING ON CURRENCY--The Economy: Warning From President Sekou Toure. ~
President Ahmed Sekou Toure severely criticized the "futile hoarding" of Guinean
- currency, called the syli, by private Guinean businessmen, and threatened to
"propose that the hoarded bills be no longer of equal value to those deposited in
the bank." In a speech at the clasing session of the capital's regional revolu-
tionary council, Sekou T~ure asserted that the banks are being more liberal on ;
withdrawals. As a result, he continued, the hoarding constitutes "aggresa:Lon
against the Guinean economy." Sekou Toure said bluntly to businessmen, carriers,
and the holders of big fortunes: "If the government mu~t one day issue new bills, -
- I would be among those who would propose that bills outside the banks not have
the same value as those bills ~hat, because of confidence in the regime, have been
- deposited in the bank. We are giving," he added, "a very brief reprieve to bad
Guineans. If they do not move quickly, they will be sorry." The Guinean chief
of state also stated that private Guinean diamond mining operators--there are already
100,000, he said, only 2 months after the opening of the Kerouane mine--were en-
- gaging in fraudulent traffic in stones, and the mine would be closed if such traffic
were not stopped. Sekou Toure also deplored the fact that his country, which he -
said has more tractors than most other African countries as well as very fertile
and well-watered land, must get international food assistance in order to "make
ends meet." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET Z~iEDITERRANEENS ir~ French 20 Feb -
81 p 426] 95I6
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- IVORY COAST
LONG-AWAITED CAEINET RESHUFFLE EXAMINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Feb 81 pp 28-29
[Article by S:Iradiou Diallo] -
- [Text) After the election marathon from July to Becember that wrought far-reaching
_ changes at top levels of the single party, the PDCI (Democratic Yarty of the Ivory
Coast, whose leader is the chief of state), the National Assembly and among mayors
of the major cities, the new political edifice could be crowned only by a govern-
ment shakeup.
Enigmatic Phrases
Awaited with hope mir_gled with concern by some and dreaded by others, President
Houphouet-Boigny's decision did not come until 2 February. Even so, it was preci--_
pitated, some say, by the accidental death of the minister of state charged with
public health and population, Jean-Baptiste Mockey, on the Grand Bassam-Abid~an
road on 20 January. A prominent figure on the Ivorian political scene, Mockey,
who until October 1980 had cherished the dream of succeeding his eternal rival
Philippe Yace as secretary general of the party, left a vacuum in the political
arena.
Nevertheless, the ministerial shakeup of 2 February was not as thorough as antici-
pated. Following the Seventh Congress of the PDCI (29 September to 1 October 1980 -
in Abidjan), speculation had run its course. Had the chief of state not slipped a
few enigmatic phrases and loaded words into his general report on policy and orien-
tation and waved a veritable sword of Damocles over the heads of the ministers?
, Suddenly, most of them began to lose sleep, convinced that the shakeup would turn
out to be a clean sweep. .
;
_ ' In the end, nothing of the sort was true. Except for National Defense and Interior,
the main ministerial posts did not change hands. Defense falls to a newcomer,
Konan Jean Banny. About 50, his hair peppered with grey framing a massive head
planted on a bull-like neck, the president of the Order of the Bar of the Ivory
_ Coast had actually occupied the post until his arrest at the time of th~ famous
1963 "conspiracy." Sentenced to death, freed and granted amnesty, Jean Banny was
elected deputy in 1975 and was triumphantly reelected in November 1980 from Yamous-
soukro, his native city. _
; _
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Since the Seventh Congress, this authoritarian and eloauent man, steeped in classi-
cal culture, has become one of the top three leaders of the party. During the
= legislative e lection campaign, the entire political world in Abidjan expected to
see him run f or the National Assembly perch, creating serious difficulties for
- Henri Konan B edie. But in the end, Banny good-heartedly abstained on behalf o~
_ the former minister of economy, who therefore had no trouble succeeding Philippe ,
- Yace. He lost nothing because in so doing, he goes back to Defense, where he
succeeds Mbahia Ble Kouadio, holder of the post for 17 years without interruption
and somewhat weakened by the serious surgical operation he underwent last year. .
Strong Man
The Ministry of Interior goes to Konan Koffi Leon, prefect of Bouak~, outwardly a
- simple, unaff ected man. About 40 and of average height, he has a relaxed, friendly
air. When we told him, on 12 October 1980, the day of the presidential elections,
of the rumors about his future appointment as minister of interior, Koffi Leon
was content t o smile and comment evasively and mysteriously: "I am fine where I~m."
The new min is ter of interior, who was very successful, it is said, at heading the ~
departments of Aaloa and Bouake, is considered a strong man. The Ivory Coast needed
_ such a man, it is added in top government circles, where no one has forgotten the
~ ease with whi ch on 7 Decemb er 1980,. on the occasion of festivities marking the
20th annivers ary of independence, an unknown person had no difficulty throwing a
bomb at the car of President Houphouet-Boigny.
Barons and Young Wolves
Accused of laxity, the minister of interior therefore traded his portfolio for that
of minister of state to the president of the republic. Alexis Thierry Lebbe, along
with Mathieu Ekra and Auguste.Denise, would henceforth form the trio of immovable
~ barons who, as state ministers, would provide the president with the advice and
- ideas stemming from their experience in office. The faithful companions of Felix
Houphouet-Boigny for some 30 years, they do not need to see or hear their master
to know what he likes or detests. At the slightest move or look, they can antici-
pate his daily thoughts.
This is not the case of the young ministers and state secretaries who are making
a resounding entry into government. In the furrow opened up by the Seventh Con-
gress, some d ozen young wolves will now serve their apprenticeship in the affairs
of state, either in the fu~.l ministries, as in the case of Amoakon Thiemele,
Balla Keita, Kouessi Apete, Eugene Niagne Lasme, Christian Lohourignon Zagote and ,
Duon Sadia, respectively ministers of commerce, scientific research, posts and
telecommunica tions, construction and city planning, water and forest resources and
tourism, or in posts of secretary of state where they will have to second known .
- figures. This is the case wiCh two former leaders.of the MEECI (Movement of
- Students and Pupils of the Ivory Coast), Gilles Laubhouet, promoted to the post of
secretary of agriculture, and Bernard Ehui, who, beaten in the recent legislative
elections, was named to the same office under the minister of planning and industry.
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- Curiously enough, ministers who as rumor would have it would be shufFled around, -
either because they had been in their posts for over 10 years, as in the ca5e of
Paul Akoto Yao in National Education, or because they quarreled with personnel in
their ministry, as in the case of Amadou Thiara in Information, have remained where -
they were. This is also true of the teehnocrats, whose retention constitutes both
a guarantee of competence and a proof of the stability of the governing team. This
� is the case wifih Laurent Dona Fologo in Youth, Abdoulaye Kone in Economy and Finance,
Ange Barry Battesti in Technical Education, Denis Bra Kanon in Agri�ulture, Lamine
Fadiga in the Navy and Simeon Ake in Foreign Affairs.
At a time when the Ivory Coast is engaged in difficult international negotiations -
aimed at obtaining fairer prices for its agricultural products (coffee and cacao), _
it was in fact indispensable that those who had followed those issues should remain
in place. The same concern undoubtedly dictated the transfer of Mauriee Seri
- Gnoleba from Commerce to Planning and Industry, where that great administrative
official will be able to give free rein to his knowledge of figures and graphs.
,
As for the eight ministers who are leaving the government, they are assured of ~
having somewhere to go. Between the National Assembly (of which three are already
members), the Economic Council, the embassies and the chairmanship of a board, they
_ will have too many possibilities to choose from, At any rate, with no exceptions,
rare indeed is the comrade that Houphouet abandons without resources and without
a life preserver on the banks of the Ebrie Lagoon.
- Constitutional Vacuum
And yet, the democratic edifice which the chief of state intends to set up is not
complete. After the different elections, the leadership of the mass organizations
affiliated with the party still has to be elected. This is the case of the General
Union of Ivory Coast Workers (3ingle union), whose secretary general, Ade Mensah,
- was beaten in Yopougon, a low-income suburb of Abid~an, in the November legislative
elections.
- Above all, the vi~e i r~~ ~~a.::. of the re~ublic, w[?u wuuld replace the ~~hiei rF ~
state in case of his death or if he were unable to perform the duties of his of-
- fice, has yet to be named. "There is no hurry," President Houphouet-Boigny told
us. But there is, for the remaining constitutional vacuum could well turn the
_ Ivorian democracy in.to an unfinished work, or at least a building without a
cornerstone.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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~
IVORY COAST
HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY SAYS RESPONSIBILITY MUST GO TO YOUNGER GENERATION
_ Pari~ 3EUNE AFRIQUE in French 4 Feb 81 pp 26-30 -
[Interview with President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, in Yamoussoukro, by Sennen
Andriamirado; date not given]
[Excerpts] Houphouet does not often go to the presidential office. To the local
headquarters in Abidjan and even to his Cocody residence, Felix Houphouet-Boigny
prefers his "village" of Yamoussoukro, 250 km from the capital, whence he handles
affairs of state by telephone. At times, he summons his aides, ministers, high
officials or those obscure members of the presidenttal entourage whose names are
scarcely known and who jealously protect the "Old Man's" retreat.
[Question] You have been criticized for preferring to retain the French, even in
positions of authority .
[Answer] I have been criticized by the young people, but they did not know that I
was working in their interest. I preferred to train the young. Now they are in
posts of responsibility because it was not fai~, after they were trained, to make
them cool their heels in the anterooms of responsibility.
[Question] But they were still excluded from political power.
[Answer] That is precisely the 1980 phase. Students, the competent, these young
people have headed all our departments, including our unfortunate companies. But
they were unknown to the public. They were not in Parliament.
In 20 years, the Ivory Coast has changed. We have the masses of its generation
- (laughter). My own is between 60 and 75, the mass of those who fought for indepen-
dence. The one born 15 years before independence was not represented in Parliament � .
and on the Economic and Social Council. Now then, there must be no break in the
chain of generatians. It is now that the young.people must take over.
[Question] Therefore, the democratization decided upon in 1980 is a turning point
in favor of a generation.
[Answer] It is not a turning points it is a phase. It is not a revolution; it is
an evolution. Those born in the 1940's did not know forced labor. They tell us;
"We would not have accepted that. We would have fought." But they did not live
through it. Tt is that generation gap that I tried to avoid.
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- [Question] At that point, was there any risk of upheavals in the Ivory Coast?
[Answer] You must hold out your hand to young people or else they will shove you
aeide. That is why I told my comrades: "We must not break the chain of generations
that is sacred with us. You must leave to those who come after you much more than
. you received from your predecessors."
That is what the young people expected of them. The time had therefore eome to
move from one generation to another, and the time had come to proceed to a free vote
� by the people. Our generation is leaving democracy to the new generation.
- [Question] Othe~wise, what woulri have happened?
[Answer] There would have been an explosion. What happened to De Gaulle in May
1968 impressed me a great deal. At that time, the young people of France who had
not known the German occupation knew about De Gaulle oniy what their parents or
elders told them. The ministers were 50 or 60 years old and the members of Parlia-
ment the same age. The young people lived on hope; the old in the p~st. There was
a break in the chain of generations. De Gaulle's aides did not do their duty. They
should have told him how impatient the.young people were.
[Question] Is that impatience of the young people the same throughout Africa?
More precisely, are all the African leaders doomed to follow your path, democratiza-
tion, or else be swept aside?
[Answer] Youth is universal; its impatience also. Today in Africa, the risks of
- explosion are greater than ever. Poverty is a good breeding ground for such up-
heavals. And what do we see? Economic crisis, poverty, a future without hope.
~ [Question] What African event struck you the most in 1980?
~ [Answer] It was not an event; it was a general situation: the economic crisis and
its corollary, poverty. For us Africans, it is a catastrophe. The prices of our
- products are lower than ever. W~ live off of our coffee, our cacao. And have you
seen the pitiful price they want to pay us for it?
_ [Question] Yes, those are your European or American friends. What is Giscard
doing to help you?
- [Answer) What do you want Giscard or Helmut Schmidt to do against the big French
or German capitalist firms? It is not the German or French government that buys
- . our products; it is those companies.
[Question] But have you Ivorians not suffered certain failures because you
were�deceived? In the case of sugar, for example?
[Answer] I was deceived, that is true.
~ [Question] By whom? By your European partners or your own aides?
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- [Answer] My aides trusted their European advisers who did not play the game. Why?
The French do not know sugar cane. They kn~w sugar beets. The Cameroonians were _
more circumspect than we were.
On the advice of the World Bank, they went to Egypt, which was already producing
1 millian tons of sugar cane. In 3 months, the Egyptian experts.proved that out of _
the 21 billion CFA francs on the invoice of the European promoters, there was an
overbilling of nearly 5 billion. They oversaw the work and the Cameroonians had a
plant that cost 16.6 billion with a 50,000-ton capacity. It puts out sugar at .
100 CFA francs a kilogram.
We did not have that luck. From 21 billion CFA francs, the evaluation of our
proposals climbed to 35 billion and our sugar cost~s 250 CFA francs a kilogram to ~
- produce. On only three sugar complexes, we found an overbilling of 34 billion.
It was too late. We could only reduce our pro~ects from ten to six complexes.
[Question] You are very concerned by the economy? Are there not disturbing
~ political subjects in Africa?
[Answer] I am concerned by the widespread poverty I see, and poverty helps desta-
bilization.
- [Question] Ara you not concerne3 over the matter of the Sahara? ~
[Answer] The Sahara is an affair between Morocco and Algeria. When those two
countries come to an agreement, there will no longer be any issue of the Sahara.
[Question] Why were you not a member of the Committee of the Wise Men of the OAU
. on the Sahara?
[Answer] The time will come. At the present time, the Ivory Coast does not want
to be both a judge and a party to the dispute. Do you know the position of the
Ivory Coast? We are neutral. It is our current ministPr of foreign affairs
(Simeon Ake, then ivorian ambassador to the United Nations) who headed the UN
investigatian into the Sahara. But they will call on the Ivory Coast when they =
are ready for discussions.
[Question] Wi11 "destabilization," as you call it, now served by what you also
call "poverty," spread?
[Answer] Destabilization is not anything new~ Do you know why Idi Amin pulled
off his coup d'etat in 1971? It was not he who did it, but the British. He did ~ -
not even know what he wanted. Likewise, in Ghana, when the military ousted Nkrumah,
= they came to see me. I asked them why they staged their coup. They replied: -
- "Things were no longer going well." That is all! I also asked them what they were
going to do. They did not know. People abroad knew instead!
[Question] And yet, destabilization does not only come from the outside. In Iran,
the Shah fell because of the revolution.
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[Answer] I was the last chief of state received by the Shah of Iran, and I noticed
= then that there was nothing much for the people. In Iran, the land belongs to the
leaders and the leaders were all religious figures, the ayatollahs and the others.
The Shah had the courage to launch the green revolution, the redistribution of land.
The imams felt the danger. They put aside their mutual grievances and united. With
- respect to the~, the Shah's aides had not done their duty; they had not warned him.
- ' When I went there, they introduced me to a group of "peasants," but that was not
what they were. We farmers recognize one another. The Shah's priority wa5 indus-
trialization although in his country, scarcely 25 percent of the people had any
' schooling.
[Question] There was also another problem: human rights.
[AnswerJ The Westerners, especially since Jimmy Carter, can make no judgment except
on the basis of human rights! I once received representatives from the Human Rights
League. I told them: "You have come to the wrong place; go somewhere else. Her.e
in the Ivory Coast, we have gone beyond human rights."
- [Question] Is there a universal notion of human rights?
[Answer] The first right of man is the right to life. We respect human life.
- Corpses have no rights. Because here in the Ivory Coast we do not kill, we are
above human rights. We are ahead.
[QuestionJ Is information a human right?
[Answer] Yes (hesitation). Yes. Objective information. Every morning, I read
the newspapers and I realize that the same event is interpreted differently depend-
- ing on the ideology. You can make no sense out of it. Where is the information
in that case?
_ [Question] You have said that Bokassa's model was Napoleon. And what about your
_ own? First of all, what African statesman has impressed you the most?
[Answer] (Without yesitation.) Kwame Nkrumah. He was a great nationalist. We
were friends from the time of our very first meeting in Paris in 1947. And we
remained so. We were friends when his country gained independence in 1957. His
first trip abroad was to the Ivory Coast.
[Question] And you issued your fa~ous challenge to him!
- [Answer] (Shocked.) That is not true! They have twisted history. I never made
any such challenge! He came to my country as a friend. In Africa, one does not
~ ~ receive a friend a~nd then challenge him (JEUNE ATRIQUE, No 1043). I told him:
' "Your country is independent. You must prove that a black country headed by a
black can succeed. We will be behind you. We shall urge you on to succeed."
We were friends, I tell you. He loved Africa. It was thF. Padmores who deceived
_ him, making him engage in subversion in neighboring countrieso Otherwise, I loved
Nkrumah. Even his party was modeled after ours.
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[QuestionJ But you did not have the same idea of Africa unity?
[Answer] He went much further than I. He wanted Pan-Africanism, an Africa united '
from Bizerte to the Cape, with a single government, a single assembly. It was
a utopia! But if he made errors, he made them in good faith. He was poorly gtiided.
He undertook extravagant expenditures for nothing. ,
[QuestionJ And what non-African statesman would be your model?
[Answer] George Washington. He was a man who fought for his country's independence. '
Then he withdrew voluntarily to enjoy, as an observer, the results and successes of
his fight. He gave his land to the American Government. He was content with his -
residence at Mount Vernon.
I wanted to retire also to enjoy, like Washington, the results of my action. Un-
fortunately, the situation is not good and it would be giving up to le~ve now.
[Question] At any rate, you are not a man to retire. ~
[Answer] I believe that I could have been. I could have had an active, not passive,
retirement. They would have come to ask my advice and would have kept me up on
- the events of my country, the world. But I cannot.
[Question] Senghor is leaving (the interview *_ook place.before his departure).
[Answer] He did not even speak to me about it. I deplore the fact. He is a
friend, even if we have so~r.e misunderstandings. Th;3t is human, after all. What
could happen in Senegal cannot be a matter of indl.fference to the Ivory Coast. But
_ he is leaving (a sigh and a smile). The heart has its reasons when the head does
not.
[Question] And you will leave one day. What have you done to prepare for your -
succession?
_ [Answer] Do you think that Lenin had planned that Stalin would succeed him? That
Stalin himself thought of Khrushcheu? For myself, I trust men. I am rebuilding
_ a team and it is from that team that the person who will take my place will come.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 '
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= IVORY COAST
_ BACKGROUND OF NEW ABIDJAN MAYOR
Paris ~EUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Jan 81 p 43
[Article b;~ Senn~n Andriamirado: "The Young Wolf"]
_ [Text] The battle of Abidjan has not yet taken place. It was to pit the young wolf
Emmanuel Dioulo against the old fox of Ivorian politics, Arsene Usher Assouan, for
the conquest of the office of mayor of the capitzl. But on 4 January 1981, the
sole candidate, Emmanuel Dioulo, was elected by 55 out of the 60 municipal council
members (six representatives from each of the ten communes). Usher preferred to
remain in the background.
- Once more, as was the case at the time of the election of Henri Konan Bedie to the
office of president of the National Assemb ly (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1044), no final
duel pitted the old against the modern candidates. Once again, one of the old
hands, Assouan, preferred to yield the way to a newcomer ~is Philippe Yace had
- done for Bedie rather than to start a battle of leaders.
This was undoubtedly because once again, the only conductor of Ivorian political
life intervened at the last moment to prevent the battle: Felix Houphouet-Boigny,
whose immediate and avowed objective is to have the younger generation relieve the
old guard.
Mission Accomplished -
' At the age of 44, Emmanuel Dioulo, "Manu" to his close friends, divorced and the
father of five children, takes over the office of mayor of Greater Abidjan, succeed-
ing Antoine Kanga, an old traveling companion of Houphouet, mayor f or 20 years but
who did not even run in the municipal el.ections of 30 November 1980 (see JEUNE
AFRIQUE, No 1040). This new first citizen of a metropolis of 1.4 million inhabi-
~ tants joined with Henri Konan Bedie in leading the onslaught of the young in the
political arena.
~ The "easy cantact," "obsessed with his work," Emmanuel Dioulo completed his
studies, at the beginning of independence,�at the IHEOM (Overseas Institute of
Higher Learning), formerly the French National Overseas School (ENFOM), where -
African administrative officials were trained in Paris.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100008-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100008-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
= In 1962, Emmanuel Dioulo went home to become subprefect of Bouna, in the north. -
Six ye