JPRS ID: 9631 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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~ JPRS L/9631
26 March 1981
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USSR Report
NlILI-TARY AFFAIR%co
(FOUO 1/8 1)
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JPRS L/9631
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10
USSR REPORT
:r.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 1/81)
CONTENTS
MILITARY SCIIIQCE, THEORY, STRATFGY
Forecasting in Ntilitary Affairs
- (SOVETSKAYA VOYIIVnYA ENTSIKLOPIDIYA, vol 6, 1978 1
ARMED FORGES
History of Soviet Military Thought
(ISTORIYA SOVETSKOY VOYENNOY MYSLI. KRA'I'I{IY OCHERK. 1917-TYUrI' 191+1,
1980) ...........................................o................ 6
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO]
cno nccrr* � T r rcr nNi v
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MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY
FORECASTING IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
Moscow SOVETSKAYA VOYENNAYA ENTSIKLOPIDIYA in Russian Vol 6, 1978 pp 558-560
[Encyclopedia entry]
- [Text] Forecasting in military affairs [Prognozirovaniye v voyennom deie], The
determination of future probabilities for possible directions and trends in the
develogment of armed forces, military technology and military art, both in one's
own nation (or coalition of nations) and that of a likely or real enemy, and for
the course and outcome of an armed conflict or an entire war. Forecasting deals
with more narrow tasks of a theoretical military and practical nature than does
foresight, of which it is a component. The term "forecasting" came into broad
usaga in the 1950's when Zarge advances ware made in the development of mathe-
matics, cybernetics and computer technolugy, making it possible to model more
accurately future events in the organizational development of armies and innova-
tions in methods and forms of combat operations and in troop management. Certain
forecasting methods were actually employed considerably earlier.
The methodology used for forecasting in the Armed Forces of the USSR and the
armies of other socialist nations is rlarxism-Leninism, which provides a truly
scientific ideological basis for determining general prospects for the develop-
ment of military affairs and for modeling this process.
The main areas of forecaszing in military affairs are the strategic military,
operational, tactical, military-economi.c and technical military fields, which are
interrelated and mutually conditioned.
Strategic military for.ecasting is used as tfie hasis for determining the possible
y nature of a future war, the degree to which nuclear weapons and other mPans of
mass destruction will be employed, and by what methods; the characterist,ics of a
war involving the use of conventional means of destruction and the possibility
that :Lt will develop into a nuclear war; the nature of local wars; the quanti-
tative makeup and qualitative state of a likely enemy's armed forces, as well as
strategic variants (or plans) for their employment at the outset and during the
course of a war. On the basis of the forecast information obtained, requirements
and recommendatiuns are worked out for the future denelopment of the armed forces,
the development.of new armaments, military equipment and transport; the stockpil.ing
of supply reserves needed to conduct awar; and the training of the armed forces
and preparation of the nation as a whole.
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Operational and tactical forecasting are used for revealing the nature of future
operations and battles and methods of conducting them with prospective new ineans
of armed conflict; for determining the possible effects of massive employment of
nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction; and for develoging ways of
counteracting an enemy's employment of nuclear and other weapons and of protecting
troops and rear service installations, as well as ways of restoring their
- fighting efficiency. The forecasting of probable enemy operations 3uring a war
' reveals the enemy's possible concept for the use of troop~i (or forces), nuclear
and other weapons.
= This is used as the basis for developing the concept for upcoming operations,
making the decision for achieving the enemy's defeat iti impending operations,
creating the appropriate groupings of troops and resources f.or its implementation
, and the necessary reserves of materials and equipment, for organizing troop
control and for carrying out other measures. While combat operations are under
way, a determination is made as to how the situation will be changed by the use
of nuclear weapons and by troop operations, the creation of areas of radioactive
contamination and areas which would be flooded by the destruction of hy3raulic
works, and measi�res to facilitate the timely removal of troops to safe areas.
Forecasting is ain performed with respect to water conditions, tt;e ice situation
in bodies of :uucer, the condition of seas, oceans and straits, weather conditi.ons
for selecting the time for the beginning and the conc'.uct of active combat opera-
tions, missile launchings, plane and helicopter flights, for conducting artillery
fire, and so forth.
Mili-tary-economic forecasting makes it r,cssible to reveal the future development
- of the military-economic capabilities of one's own nation and thase of a likely
enemy with respect to outfitting the armed forces with everything necessary for
conducting combat operations in the future; to provide onP's state and military
leadership with data for achieving the best possible quantitative and qualitative
composition of qrmed forces, their -_rvices and branches of troops, and the most
practical organization of operatic,nn'. field forces, formatfons and units; to
ascertain the budgetary allocations necessary to maintain them, and to estimate
- outlays of economic resources in -eacetime and after the war has begun.
Technical military forecasting provides information on possible tactical and
technical characteristics of weapons and military equipment models and prospects
for their future development and improvement, and on the development of new
weapons.
Forecasting is usually broken down into short-term forecasting, which determines
the prospecu- for the development of events in the immediate future, a period of
up to five )..ars- medium-range forecasting, which covers a period of 5 to 10
years; and long-rai.`- forecasting, for a period of more than 10 years. Short-term
forecasts are the most detailed and precise. Long-range foreca3s indicate only
the general trend in the development of military affairs or of the constituents
thereof, and a gen(ral concepL of a possible war. Forecasting in military affairs
is handled by the general staffs and the staffs of services of the armed forces,
main and central directorates of ministries of defense., scientific research and
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military educational institutions, special troop formations (or units) and,other
military organizations. Mathematical, heuristic and combined research methods
are used in forecasting.
- Mathematic forecasting metlxods are arbitrarily broken down into two groups:
mathematical modeling and extrapolation (statistical methods). Mathematical
model3ng consists in transferring summarized data obtained frotn modeling to a
future situation. This method involves the determination of quantitative'charac-
teristics of the processes involved in an armed conflict by means of mathematical
modeling of the battle and the operation. It is used with good results for fore-
_ casting Che characteristics of weapons models. Various data describing the battle
- and the op?rat ion are subjected to mathematical processing, which establishes
their quantitative relationship. Mathematical models are then built, and the
values are cal culated for the relevant characteristics of the processes being
studied. Stat istical forecasting consists in using statistical methods for
processing existing data on the target process of the foxecasting, deriving the
dependencies 1 inking these data to time, and calculating its anticipated
(probable) properties. Mathematical methods make it possible to achieve good
operativeness by means of modern computer equipment and eliminate or significantly
iimit the subjective factor. Errors are possible even with the use of these
- methods, however, caused by incorrect selection of the mathematical model, changes
occurring in the nature of the process since it began, the presence of indeter-
minate forms ("obstacles"), and so forth. Nor are such qualities of commanders
(or military chiefs) as experience and intuition pxoperly manifested in this
process. For this reason other forecasting methods, particularly heuristic and
expert appraisal methods, are not ruled out in the modern situation. They make
it possible to draw upon a large team of specialists (or expeLts) for the fore-
casting. They base their conclusions primarily upon experience and intuition,
which makes it possible to derive more correct conclusions from the data obtained
by mathematical methods. Logical analysis, which makes it possible to cut fore-
casting errors, is extensively employed for revealing and eliminating contra-
_ dictions aris ing in the forecasting process. Logical analysis plays an espedally
great role in the forecasting of irregular processes. Combined forecasting
methods should be used to supplement each other (with mathematical methods as
the decisive factor) for deriving the most reliable data on stochastic processes
in the development of military affairs.
Forecast data obtained by specific state agencies and institutions are used for
forecasting in military aff airs. Unlike forecasting in many natural sciences,
in which case the objective is to adapt activities to an anticipated condition,
the significance of forecasting in military affairs is determined by the degree
to which the data obtained can be used for altering the situation. The complexity
of forecasting in military affairs lies in the fact that it is necessary to
appraise the capabilities and the nature of two opposing sides, which closely
guard their concepts and designs. Al1 of the data must be reliable, and in a
combat situation it must be obtained as rapidly as possible for purposes of
adopting a timely and correct decision on the operations of one's own armed
forces, one which conforms to the current situation.
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The inability correctly to evaluate all of the factors affecting changes in the
situation can result in irreparable errors. In the secand half of November, 1941,
for example, the strategic situation in the Moscow sector was developing in
favor of the Soviet forces. It was this fact which led the German fascist com-
mand to conclude that they could take Moscow within a very short period of time.
_ This forecast turned out to be wrong, of course. The fascist military leader-
ship was not able to objectively evaluate the entire situation. Among other
things, it ignored information on the concentration of Soviet reserves near
Moscow, the high morale of the Soviet people and of army personnel, the growing
- military strength of the Soviet Nation and the improved combat skill of its
fighting men. Another forecast was made at Headquarters, Soviet Supreme Command.
Headquarters took all the factors into account, defined the capabilities of the
= Soviet state, its people and its army, correctly identified the noticeable
weakening of the enemy offensive and made the correct decision to wear down the
attacking enemy in defensive batt.Les, switch to a counter.offensive with the com-
_ mitment of large reserves to the engagement, rout the German fascist forces and
drive them back from Moscow (see "The Battle of Moscow, 1941-1942"). By
thoroughly considering all of the factors influencing the situation and capable
of altering it hy the sumuner of 1943, Headquarters was able correctly to determine
the axis of the main thrust by the German fascist forces and to take steps in
advance to roui, a large enemy grouping on the Kursk sector (see "The Battle of
Kursk, 1943"). A tendentious assessment of possible development of the military-
political situation on the eve of World War II by the WestPrn nations, on the
other hand, caused the war to begin and be conducted in a manner not consistent
with the desires of the imperialists.
Forecasting has become considerably�mo-ce complicated in a modern war: The volume
_ of information necessary for forecasting has increased greatly, and the substance
of the information has changed; and the enemy has greater possibilities for
rapid maneuvering and for taking various camouflage steps to conceal preparations
for an operation and to mislead its dversary as to its concepts. At the same
time, the exceptional power of we-.,prnis of mass destruction and the adoption of
other new weapons have increased the need for military forecasting. It has taken
on an extremely great role as a r-:sult of the accelerated rates of development of
_ weapons and military equipment and the increased cost of their production. The
~ need for scientific forecasting has naturally increased today as a result of the
increased danger posed by the ruinous effects of powerful new weapons and their
increased cost. Special institutions--corporations, commissioiis, institutes,
societies and centers--were created for this kind of forecasting in the 1960's
and 1970's in the developed nations. Numerous kinds of computer equipment were
- created for forecasting the developing situation in operations, which make it
possible rapidly to "run through" various alternate plans, taking into account
possible ch. ges in the situation, in order to adopt the most expedient (optimal)
one. Despite the :,doption of the most advanced computer equipment, however, man's
role in forecasting has not only not decreased but has actually increased.
Heuristic forecasts are still a product of man's creativity, while mathematical
forecasts require participat:,u by man as an element essential for the scientific
preparation and analysis of the data. A large number of people directed by a
commander (komandir, komanduyushchiy) tcke part in the forecasting of processes
involved in combat operations, and his dccision provides the basis for the
<
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employment of all personnel and equipment participating in the battle and the
operation. All of this places extremely great deman3s upon commanders at all
levels snd requires that they possess in-depth professional knowledge and the
ability rapidly to grasp and analyze a drastically changing situation and to
derive the proper conclusions therefrom. As they perf.orm these tasks they must
make skillful use of the various kinds of computer equipment avilab le in the
forces to determine with great accuracy possible changes in the situation and the
effects of their decisions.
Bibliography: Vishnev, S. M. "Osnovy kompleksnogo prognozirovaniya" [The.
Principles of Comprehensive Forecasting], Moscow, 1977; "Veroyatnostnoye
prognozirovaniye v deyatel`nosti cheloveka" [Probability Forecasting in the =
Activities of Man], Moscow, 1977; Dobrov, G. M. "Prognozirovaniye nauki i
tekhniki" [Forecasting nf Science and Technology], second ed ition, Moscow, 1977;
Chuyev, Yu. V. and Mikhaylov, Yu. B. "Progr.ozirovaniye v voyennom dele"
[Forecasting in Military Affair.s], Moscow, 1975, bibliography, pp 276-277;
Konoplev, V. K. "Nauchnoye predvideniye v voyennom dele" [Scientific Foresight in -
Military Affairs], Moscow, 1974; Lisichkin, V. A. "Otraslevoye nauchno-
teckhnicheskoye prognozirovaniye. (Voprosy teorii i praktiki)" [Branch
Scientific and Technological Forecasting: Practical and Theoretical Questions],
Moscow, 1971. .
M. M. Kir' yan, N. I. Reut
COPYRIGHT: "Voyenizdat", 1978
11499
CSO: 8144/0760
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ARMED FORCES
HISTORY OF SOVIET MLLITARY THOiTQiT
Moscow ISTORIYA SOVETSKOY VOYENNOY MYSLI. KRATKIY OQiERK. 1917-IYUN' 1941
(Historp of Soviet Military Thought. A Brief Outline. 1917-June 1941) in
Russian 1980 signed to press 12 Feb 80 pp 185-220
[Chapter 6 0f book by I. A. Korotkov, Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 2,900 copies,
272 pages; tran.slation of pp 2-16 and 221-240 published in JPRS L/9450, 18 Dec 80
(FOUO 17/80) o. this report series] [Text]
Chapter 6. Theory of Military Ecoaomics: The Nation's Material-Technological
Foundation
Theory of Militarp Economics
Expenditures for combat equipment have increased drastically in the 20th century.
They accounted for 50 percent of all military outlaya in World War I and 70 per-
cent in World War II.1 Despite an 3ncrease in the size of armies the proportion
~ of expenditures for personal supp13as and clothing has bee;l reduced.
A drastic increase in the role of the economy as the main source af military
strength for nations and coaliti.,ns of nations has made the economic aspects of
war one of the prime problems. The branch of economic science knawn as the theory
of military economics has begun handling the theoretical resolution of these
problems. A part of political ecanomics, it is directly involved with military
science in the estimation and forecasting of the prob able material needs in a war.
' The theory of military economics is therefore regarded as a component of economic
scie.nce as a whole and an important part of military science. The Soviet military
press na,r sometimes refers to the theory of military economics as military economic
science.
' Of the many probless of military economic theory of the 1920's bnd 1930's we have
to single out certain problems of current importance today. These are general
problems of military econom.tr, and rearmament matters.
Soviet militarp theoreticians have been guided by the Leninist p.r.inciple that
econom3,cs are of crueial importance in ony war. As early as 1917 V. I. Lenin
sfiated the matter with absolute frankness: "...Either perish or catch the advanced
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natians and surpass them economically as well."2 With respect to the nation's
preparatioa for defense, he stated at the third All-Russian Congress of Coiuicils
_ of National Economp in 1920: "War includes all types and a11 areas of construc-
_ titm and development."3 This was to say that war embraces all aspects of the
functioning of the state. It was also pointed out that the natian's preparat3.on
for defease demands "prolonged, intense... and di3ciplined work on a massive
scale."4
Lenin's statement anout the crucial importance of economics in the strengthening
of the nation's defense and subsequent decisions Qdopted at congresses and by the
Communist Party Central Committee oa this matter set the general trend for the
development of military eGOnomic theory.
~ As it implemented the party's decisions the military leadership took the position
that atty future war would be coaducted bp the entire nation< This brought out new
taeks aad advareced new methods for preparing the nation for defense, and a"new
role for rear services themselves as direct participants in the struggle."5
Sovi,et econc+m3.sts and military theoreticians pointed out that World War I had
produced : new method oi overt warfare--economic strangulation of the eaemy--ahich
could render one of the paxticipants incapable of fighting,6 that the army was not
the single, the all-important force determining the outcame of the campaign. New
factors affecting chances for victory were brought out: The "rear," that is, the
sum total of the nationfs econom:ic and ltilman resources, had assumed crucial
importance.7 They therefore saw the certaintq of trictory not alane as a matter of
- mai.ntaining a powerful army, but also in the n.wtion's ability to support combat
operattons up to the final minute of the war.8
The military press discussed a broad range of questions pertaining to economic
support for the socialist state�s defense. M. V. Trunze believed that the natiou's
defense tasks would not fit within the framework oi a single wa-z department. He
_ proposed that tlie same sort of operational plan be created for setting up the
nation's economy during a war as that worked out at the General Staff for the
~ forces.9 In the article "The Front and the Rear in a Future War" written in 1924
he described a defense preparation plan, which included beefing up the armeed
forces (creating officer reserves, making the aviatian a crucial branch of troops,
converting the artillery from horse-drawn to tractor-mounted transport, and so
forth) and making decisions on defense matters under the jurisdiction of the
uation's civilian administration (mobilizing industry, commtm3cation and transport
facilities and the national economy in general, teaching military subjzcts in
- schools and WZ�s, and so forth).l~
B. M. Shaposhnikov shared the opinion that there had to be a p1an of economic
- preparation for the nation's defense: "The econ.om:i.c plan for war," he wrote,
"should not only cover preparation of the army and the theater of mi,litary opera-
tions for war and should not just include the 'military aspect' in the sense of
providing the army with everything it needs but should al.so deal in geueral with
the economic policy to be follawed by the nation in time of war."11
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Thi,s broad understaading of the nation's defense tasks meant that the command and
political staff of the armed forces would have to study not only military affairs
= but also the material foundation for the n3tion's deiense. The idea was expressed
that all the work of preparing the armed forces and all defense matters for the
- USSR as a whole should be combined under a war department.12 Headquarters, RKKA
[Workers and Peasants Red Army], began carrying this out.
A special course, "The Economics of War," was instituted at academies.13 A two-
year course for the training of leading personnel for the defense agencies of
'civl.lian people's commissariats be an functioning at the Military Academy imeni
M. V. Frimze in February of 1931.1~ Publicatiocz of a special scientific and
theoretical symposium was initiated for purposes of achieving a broad exchange of
milit.ary economic expertise, working out comman views on defense matters and
developing the theoretical perspective of m3.litary economists at Headquarters,
RKKA.15
Many military and civilian economists, including N. Vasil'yev, S. Volkov, V.
Dyagilev, Ya. Ioffe, A. Manikovskiy, N. Movchin, S. Shapurin, G. Shigalin,
Y a. Shlyakhter and uttiers, studied specific areas of the nation's economy and
their role in a possib le war: ma.terial resources, the financing of war, the role
of industry, ~-riculture and transport in war, and haw a blockade would affect
the course of a war. A central military journal raised for discussion the matter
of the ecvnoury's role in the nverall system of defense preparations.16
As part of this multifaceted prob lem the theoreticians were interested in the ~
matter of achievi.ng mobilizational readiness for the armed forces and the nation
as a whole. Various theoretical approaches were brought out in the investigation. -
Some theoreticians were for permanent economic mobilization. In their scheme the
material supplies stockpiled by the beginning of the war were regarded as the
first echelon of supply, intended to meet the needs of the front during the period _
: of development of military operatior;. A special wartime industry was considered
as the second echelon, which would make it possible for the front to hold out .
until final mobilization of the re:;--- of the nation's industry had been achieved.
_ And finally, the third echelon--activation of civilian industry--which was to `
provtde the army and the natior. aith material supplies after the mobilization
stockpiles had been exhausted. The decision to increase military productian to
the maximum was only to be made at an indication of a munitions crisis at the _
front.17 Such views objectively oriente3 conversion of the economy to a wartime
footing on a long-term basis as had been the case in World War I. The advantages
of the Soviet economic system were not taken into accoimt in preparing the nation =
for defense.
Other theoYeticians offered specific recommendations for keeping a record of stock-
piles of raw mat_~rials and food for the front and the rear and for improving
transport operations. It was also proposed that provisions Ue made for, providing
industry with a skilled work force and production with complete blueprints,
_ patterns and so forth for n-� models of equipmerit.18
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Soviet econom3,sts felt that it was necessary before the beginning of a war to
involve most of the plants engaged in peacetime production in the prodtiction of
goods to meet defense needs. "The imperialists' strategy reqiiires that we build
_ up large resources and achieve all-round economic, mobil3zational readiness to
actively inflict a coimterblow during the initial period of intervention. The
- specific situation of intervention makes the inltial period of the war tremendously
important. Be�ore this period begins we must prepare enormous quantities of all
- types of combat supplies for the army, making it possible to satisfy fully all
the needs of the front."19
Mainly experien.ce in World War I was taken into accomt for analyzing the economdc
conditions of a possible war. The imperialist natians had begun preparing for
_ war tnilitarily and economically long before the beginzting of military operations.
_ For example, Germany had created a system for mobilizing the economy to meet war-
time needs while there was still peace. The functioning of this system made it
= possible to replace i.mports of strategic raw materials from other natians w-Lth the
production of synthetic gasoline, synthetic rubber and ferrous-metal substituCes,
and to procure the raw materials of war (metals, oil and so forth) in advance.
m
In view of the increased size of thP armies and their increased mobility it was
assumed that the strength of the armed forces would have to be increased _
considerably in order to load the front with equipment. The difficulty of this -
- task lay in the fact that the rear also required a large number of workers to -
manufacture and repair the combat equipment. It was believed that 6 workers
would be required in the rear to produce and repair a single machine gtm, 76
workers for a tank and 125 for a single aircraft.20
Certain Niriters advanced unfounded suppositions about the mobilizatianal capa-
bilities of the imperialists, who, they maintained, would find themselves facing
unsolvable conflicts in matters of mobilizing the broad masses of workers to meet -
the needs of the front.21 Such assertions were convincingly refuted. It was
pointed out that the imperialists tried to prepare themselves politically and
economically for war while there was still peace.22 Tttis was confirmed--b-3,-----
substantial studies made of the economic foundation of modern war.23 Reality _
- bore out the fact that prior to the beginning of a war the aggressive nations
would destroy democratic institutians, intimidate the people with acts of
repression an.d create armies with a strength of millions. ~
Soviet economists and military theoreticians were highly interested in the develop-
ment of new, technical means of conducting warfare. The operational success of
the armed forces began to depend greatly upon a powerful new factor-tpchnological
initiative in the development of new combat vehicles and the achievement of
qualitative and quantitative superiority in military technology. It was therefore
important to foresee means of warfare which might be used by the enemy, but most
i importantly--to achieve the rapid introduction of ineans of opposition or more
_ pawerful offensive weapons.
I
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Questions pertaining to the technologi,cal initiative and to frequency and scope
_ with respect to the updating of weaponry in 'a probable war became enormously
, important in national defense preparations. The nationaZ economy and military
economic theory were faced with problems af accomplishing this.24 In view of the
fact that weapons and other military equipment were becoming obsolete more and
more rapidly, M. V. Frunze was convinced that it was imfeasible or actually -
dan.gerous "to spend enormous amoimts of money to procure stockpiles of mobilization
materiel."25
Many Soviet military economists felt that it would be impossible to procure
munitions and equipment in peacetime for an L~nttre war, mainly because of their
rapid ob5olescence. The mass production of new models would have meant falting
behind new technology or endless work on new models, for which no budget, no
matter how large, would have been adequate. Consequently, the building up of
large stockpiles of technical war materiel could have found the army with obsolete
eQuipment at the beginning of the war. It was thereforc: recommended that means of
combat be stockpi,led only for the initial period of the war,26 or that the forces
be outfitted with the b as-c models, while keeping a close eye o:z the development
of new equipment, ir.ipro~~ing the old equipment and providing mass-production
capabilities. "Che monyant a war became inevitable wc,uld be the time to switch to
mass producti.,( of th~a latest models of weapons and other combat equipment.27 _
A study published by S. M. Vishnev, "Problems of Updating Weaponry in Foreign
Armies," is of interest in this respect.28 He proposed a number of well-supported
theoretical tenets pertaining to the updating of weaponry in peacetime, b ased on _
an analysis of the postwar experience of foreign armies. The author concentrated
_ mainly on the time factor in the updat--ng of weaponry. Since this matter is of
prime importance to a nation's milit,-.ry preparedness for defense, it must be
discussed in somewhat greater detail.
- S. M. Vishnev's study confirms certain important p rincip les, which have not lost
their validity today. No matten cr,,a good new weapons are, they do not produce the
proper result�when used initially ci insignificant quantities in a war. Further-
more, using new means of warfare in this manner has a reverse effect: It tips
one's hand prematurely to the c.r._-my, and one's awn forces are demoralized by
failure. This was true, as an example, of the use of super-long-range guns by the
Germans against Paris in 1918, the use of tanks by the British and so forth. On
the other hand, the old and well-known means of combat--machine guns and
artillery--employed in unexpectedly large quantities (concentrations) had an
in comparably greater qualitative effect.
Important economic and financial difficulties stand in the way of the massive
_ updating of ,.he army wi,th new weaponry. At the increased rate of development of
military technu~ ib-y weapons become obsolete consi,derably faster than they were out.
. That is, their desigm becomes outmoded sooner, as a result of which they are
tmsuitah le for use after lengthy storage. Consequently, the expenditure of
enormous amounts of money cn 'he updating of weaponry may prove to have been a
waste after a short period of time. WEiat is the solution to this prob lem?
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S. M. Vishnev disagreed with the suggestion that the massive updating of
weaponry not be carried out in peacetime but that o.*.ily experimentaZ models be
developed. If a nation puts off their production until a war begins it rtms the
risk of finding itself with inadequate and obsolete armaments when the aggressor
begins an inv3sion. In his opinion the conversian to new weapons wi11 sharply
affect the rate of development of mass production (or large-scale series produc-
tion), which will require considerab 1e time (new materials, different processing
methods, new machine-tool attachments, inspection gages and so forth will be
needed).

- The arrival of new models of equipment i.n the forces during a war entails a
number of difficult organizational steps: the training af the personnel, the
development of new tactical procedures, the issuing of new manuals and so forth.
The author recommended that the renewal of military equipment be accomplished in
peacetime. He essentially proposed the stockpiling of new equipment with
- simultaneous "rejuvenation" of the materiel. The modernization would result in
the forces receiving what are actually new models with improved tactical and
technical features.
S. M. Vishnev designated the prewar period as the main phase in the updating of
weaponry when the imperialist nations look for all sorts of loopholes for setting
out on a path of massive updating of weaponry, in order to complete the fin.al
stage during the period immediately prior to the beginning of war. The aggressor
wants to create a prolonged period of political tensions with a slaw "slidi.ng
into war," in order to force the mass production of those models which have
already undergone the preliminary stages of preparation and are only waiting to
be placed into series production.
It was not the author's purpose in writing the article to describe the difference
between preparatic,ns for war by aggressive nations, which plan in advance the
beginning of the war and the completion of large-scale rearmament with the latest
models of equipment, and those of the peace-loving states, which have not always
been ab le to detect the beginning of aggression promptly an.d accurately, in order
to estab lish for themselves the period of political tensions.
It must be borne in mind that this was one of the dif.f.icult theoretical and
practical problems of national defense in the 1920's and 1930's. The problem
was essentially one of determining when to begin updating the army and navy with
the latest in weapons and other combat equipment, in order to cou!plete the
process and make it possible for army and navy personnel to master the new equip-
ment before the aggressor attacked. It was not a matter of replacing a few
models of weapons and other equipment, but a large-scale updating. TEie question
can only be answered by carefully analyzing the international situation and the
state of the economy and the armed forces of 1ikely enemies.
After analyzing the events of Wor1d War I, Soniet theoreticians considered it
unfeasible to procure munitions and equipment for an entire war far in advance,
because of their rapid obsolescence. Tfte stockpiling of large quantities of
technicaY means of combat could result in a situat3.on in which an army would find
itself outfitted with obsolete equipment when the war begi.ns.
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= Any premature, large-scale manufacture of weapons and other equipment places an
; enormous burder. upan a nation's budget, without achievi,ng the r.eeded effect.
The wrong decision in this matter can result in large, unjustified outlays.
The large-scale manufacture of new models of aircraft, tanks and other equipment
far in advaace of the aggressor's invasion may result in the spending of enormous
sums without proper justification, tfie equipment becoming absolete within a
short time and having to be replaced.
On the other hand, delaying the large-scale production of new ID11i.fi:-ry equipment
and the training of groups of inen mustered fram the reserves in its operation and
maintenance was dangerous because it meant that the army might not be fully
prepared to repel the enemyts attack.
Objectively, the aggressor was i.n an advantageous position at that time. It had
made precise calculations for� reoutfitting the army and navy by the time it
planned to begin militsry operations.
This matter requirF.s constant atten.tion. Information provided by lang-range
reconnaissance ind the scientific Ir-orecasting of the possib le time o� the enemy's
attack were e--...rtionally important in this respect. They could make it possible
to reoutfit the army and navy, train the forces on the new equipr,ent and create
essential mobilization stockpiles and state reserves in good time.
To sum up this brief survey of views on the most important aspects of m3litary
- economic theory, we might say that Soviet military leaders, economists and
theoreticians took a broad approach in working out problems perta3ning to the
nation's economic strength in case of war. The CPSU Central Committee and the
Soviet gavernment endeavored to prevent the possibility of a war.
The Struggle for Peace and to Bui1d Up the Defense Strength of the USSR
While pursuing the Leninist policy of peaceful eoexisp-nce with the capitalist
nations, the political leadership of the socialist nations saw the ruinous policy
of the aggressive nations' govEZ~ments and produced specific disarmament pro-
- pos als. The Soviet government was the first tn suggest discussing the issue of '
universal arms reductions and the banning of the destructive means of warfare,
including toxic substances (gas), aircraft and others. This was at the 1922 Genoa
Conference. In November, 1927, the Soviet government submitted to the Disarmament
_ Conference Preparatory Committee for consideration a proposal calling for the
total disarmament of all nations. The proposal was rejected, hawever. In 1928
the imperialists rejected another Soviet proposal calling for partial disarmament.
They began a:-ranging armed conflicts along Soviet borders. With their agreement
- and encourabemer.-, Chinese militarisfis in 1929 seized the KVZhD [Chinese Eastern
Railway], which belonged to the USSR at that time and invaded Soviet territory.
It was not gossible to settle the cbnflict by peaceful means. The forces of the
Chinese militarists we.re def-ted by the Special Far East Army, created in
August of 1929.
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The economic crisis w{iich began in the capitaX3.st world 3,n 1929 caused
reactionary, capi,talist circles to step up their afforts to prevent the'building
of socialism in the USSR and to frustrate fulf3,llment of the first five-year .
plen. The imperialist forces saw a way out of thE crisis through a new war
against the socialist aation.
The establishment of a fa,gcist dictatorship in Germaziy in 1933 an.d the initiation
of Japanese aggression in the Far East ir. 1931 created new and difficult problems
in Soviet foreign policy.
The Soviet government's call for the creation of a collective security system and
for the ra?lying of a1], anti war forces against the aggressive nations was
consistent with the new canditions for the struggle against imperialist
aggression. At the Geneva Disarmament Conference held in February of 1938 the
Soviet Union proposed that the participants conclude a convention, which included
the definition of an aggressor.z9 Representatives of the capitalist nations did
not support the Soviet draft convention, since it conflicted with their policy of
encouraging aggression against the USCR.
At the London Economi.c Conference held in June of 1938 the Soviet Union submitted
for consideration a protocol calling for economic nonaggression and the rejection
of all forms of economic discrimination, which was b ased upon the principle of
peaceful ccexistence among nations, regardless of their social system. The
conference ended wi.thout taking action.
The struggle for collective security in Europe became one of the central issues
in the Soviet Union's foreign policy. Security would be based on the principle
that each nation would receive equal and mutually effective guarantees of
assistance from all the other member-nations of the collective security system.
Such a system would have protected the national independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of all peoples, given them complete equality and insured
noninterference in their internal affairs. It would have ruled out military
conflicts as a means of resolving disputes. At the end of 1933 the Soviet govern-
- ment proposed the conclusion of an Eastern Pact,which could become the foundation
for colYective security in Europe if it were signed by the USSR, France, Poland,
Finland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic countries and Germany.
Hawever,the signing of the pact was not in the tnterest of the governments of
England atdtive United States,which were coimting on a military confrontatian between
Germany and the USSR. Germany and the bourgeois government of Poland also refused
to sign the Eastern Pact. The Soviet Union concluded a mutual assistance pact
with France on 2 May 1935. Under the pact, should one of the parties involved be
attacked, the other would immediately come to its assistance. A similar agreement
A was signed by the USSR and Czechoslovakia at the insistence of Czechoslovaki.a's
government, hawever, the rer.cird of signing included the stipulation that, "mutual
aid commitments wi11 be in effect between them only so long... France also aids
the party which is the victim of aggression."30 The governing circles in
bourgeois Czechoslovakia had provided in advance for refusing assistance from the
_ USSR.
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And so, the Soviet government's efforts to create a collective security system in
_ Europe were frustrated by tne 3moerialist powers. The rar East Pact was not
concluded for the same reasons.
Encouraged by the governments of the Western nations the aggressive countries
continued their actions. In March of 1936 fascist Germany took its troops into
the demilitarized Rhineland. That summer the governments of GE:rmany and Italy
interfered in the internal affairs of Spain, supporting Franco's fascist
3.nsurgence against the republican government of the Popular Front.
Because of the "noninterference" and "neutrality" of the governments of England,
France and the United States the Spanish Republic found itself solidly ringed by
an economic blockade, which was extremely advantageous to Franco and his supportars,
the fascist governments of Italy and Germany.
The situation of encouraging the aggressor gave new lifu to the process of uniting
3,mperialism's reactionary forces. A military and political alliance was concluded
between Germany and Italy (the "Berlin-Rome Axis") in Berlin an 25 October 1936.
A month later German and Japanese militarists sigr.ed the "Anti-Comintern Pact."
Wor1d war was k" �awing near.
The USSR touk new steps to prevent the fascists from imleashing a war in Europe.
The Soviet government proposed that Fran,ce and Czechoslovakia begin talks on the
general staff level. It simultaneously advanced the idea of a"General Mutual
Assi.stance Pact among the USSR, France, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and
Turkey." The Soviet initiative was not supported by the capitalist powers.
When, at, the end of 1937 and the begj..ming of 1938, Daladier and Chamberlain--
advocates of a direct agreement with the fascisfi pawers--came to pawer in France
and England, anti-Sovietism became the dominant trend in the policy of "noninter-
vention." Capitulatory circles in England and France were ready to make a deal
with the aggressors at the expense )f the USSR.
Events did not develop in the way goveming circles in England and France would
have liked, hawever. Germany rrItaly continued to occupy small Europeaa
nations. Evenx then, however, it would not have been too late to halt fascist
aggression., had the governments of England and France given effective aid to
Romania, Poland, Greece and other nations in their struggle against fascist
aggression.
The governments of England and France engaged in talks with the Soviet Union in
the spring of 1939 and then in August of-that year about concluding a collective
security pact against the fascist states, and attempted to get our government to _
- make unilat.:ral ^ommitments which could not be fulfilled. All of this was an _
indication of their desire to isolate our country and not create any obstacles to
fascist Germanp's aggression.
- There was also a policy of encouraging the aggressor in the case of Japan. The
, 1937 Brussels Conference, which was coavened for purposes of halting Japanese
- aggreasion in China, did not achieve pocttive results. The representatives of
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xhe Uni,ted States, England and France did n4 more than state their desire for the
Japaaese gove*-*+mPnt to review its pos3t3.on and move toward a peaceful settlement
of Che cactflict. The proposal pc:c forth by the Chinese government for the agp]:ica-
Cion of ecouomic sanctions against Japan, which was supported by the delegatittn
from the USSR was not accepted bp the other delegations.
' In the summer of. 1937 the Japanese command renewed military operations in the
_ North and in Central China, capturing Shanghai and Nanking, and by the end of
October 1938 Jaganese forces occupied an eaormous territory in the south of G'hina,
cutting it off from the outside world.
Hoping for a confrontation between Japan and the USSR, governing circles of the .
imperialist powers did not tm.dertake effective steps against the aggressor in the
Far East. In the summter of 1939 the U.S. Congress reconfirmed the 1935-37
neutrality laws. In 1939 the American monopolies were continuing to supply Japan
with war materials and strategic raw materials.31
The Soviet Unian faced the danger of being drawn into an armed struggle on two
_ fronts at ance--in the West and the East--at a time when governing reactionary
circles in England, France and the United States were hostile taward it. In order
- to change a situatian unfavorable to the Soviet Union and to delay the aggressor's
attack, the Communist Partyr aad the Soviet government in August of 1939 accepted
Germany's proposal of a nonaggression pact. This was a forced move, but it was
the only correct one, predetermining to an enormous degree the outcome of World
War II, whicli was favorable for the Soviet Uaioa and for all other freedom-loving
' peop les .
Following the defeat of Poland the British and French government could see that
their hopes for directing fascist aggression against the USSR were baseless, and
they advanced the idea of a joint military campaign by all the imperialist powers
_ against the Soviet state.
The "Munich" strategy consisted in turning World War II from armed antagonism
among the capitalist pawers into a imited campaign against the Soviet Union.
- Intensive, anti-Soviet diplomatic and propaganda activities were initiated in
October of 1939. The military staffs of England and France were working along
the same line.32
Despite the enormous effort put forth by the Communist Party and the Soviet govern-
ment in the 1930's, war could not be avoided because of the b alance of power in
the world at that time and the anti-Soviet policy of the Western powers.
The Party and the Soviet government assessed the adverse i.nternational situation
and took the steps necessary to further strengthen the natian's defense capa-
bility. This was not contrary to the party's foreign policy line of peaceful
coexistence. L. I. Brezhnev stated at the 25th party congress that the CPSU
"relies upon the nation's economic and defense strength" in its internatian.al
activities.32a
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~ The Soviet Republi.c was i.n a di,fficult economic situation follawing the civil -
_ war. "We had to hegin our peacet3:me development at a level so law that large
industry's output was only one-seventh and smelted metal production less than
five percent of the prewar figure. Agricultural output had dropped almost to
half the prewar production.03 The situation was unique, as V. I. Lenin poirited
out in 1918, i.n that our economic strength did not measure up to our political
strength. With respect to our political structure, he stated, and the political
pawer of the workers, the Soviet Republic is "ahea3 of any England... and at the
= same time behind the mos t backward of the Western European states... with respect
to cultural level and de gree of preparedness for the mate ri al-p ro duction
`
- ,'estahlishment' of socialism."34 We had the enormous revolutionary enthusiasm
- of the masses, however, and this made it possible for the Soviet Union to
accomplish what appeare d to be the impossible. By the end of the reconstruction
period ~1925) large industry's gross output was 75.5 percent of the prewar
. figure. 5 However, there was a shortage of iron and steel and especially of the
nonferrous metals so essential to the defense industry. K. Ye. Voroshilov, who
attached great importarLCe to the nation's defense strength, express-id concern
about the fact that in 1927 the nation was forced to import 50 perc.nt of the -
- copper it needed and 70 percent of certain nonferreus metals. The Soviet Union
was in last pl.- �e in the world in the production of nitrogen, the basic material
- in all explosi--. We wers behind the advanced capitalist nations in machine-
hui,ldi,ng. Mac same year, for example, our nation had a total of only 22,000 -
passenger cars and trucks, including those in operating cot:dition and those in
disrepair., while the United States had 23.45 million motor vehicles.36 Our lack
of a developed automob ile indusCry made the manufacture of tanks difficult.
Restoration of rail transport involved great difficulties. More than 1,000 steam
locomoti,ves were inoperab le. There w-:re very few surfaced roads: We had only
0.5 kilometer of surfaced road to 100 square kilometers of territory, while the
- United States of Americ a had 54 kilometers.37
At the beginning of the 1920's Che en Army was outfitted with obsolete small
arms left over from World War I unrl the Civil War. Industry had a Lninimal
capacity for providing the army wicn the most essential supplies: It could supply
only 8 percent of the rifle shel'.s the army needed, 30 percent of the rifles,
14 percent of the submachine guns and 1.5 percent of the binoculars.38 M. V.
Frunze had every basis for stating "that in all areas of technology we lagged
behind the armies of the lar.gest bourgeois natians."39 The updating of the Red
Army's weaponry *aas further complicated by a shortage of ineans. For this reason
we did not t*e on the task of achieving any kind of technological progress
immediately.40 Even af ter the reconstruction of industry the Soviet Union still
did not have the necess ary material resources or the production-technology
capabilitie:- to overcome the backwardness in military technology which we had
inherited , om t.he old army afCer two devastating wars.
In order to replace the obsolete armaments we had to spend enormous amounts of
material means and time to recons truct and develop our own defense industry. -
This was not a rapid pro ces". 3y the end of the reconstruction period the state
of our war materiel industry was cotsidered the weakest spot in the state's
defense.41
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, The difficulties involved in reconstructiazg and developing the defense industry
were for the mest part objective ones--a shortage of ineans and material resources,
our inabilitp to obtain foreign loans and a shortage of skilled workers, engineers
and technicians. Other difficulties were caused by acts of sabotage and by harm
ful anti-Soviet elements, negligence taward the machines and tools and violations
of labor discipline.
The ditficulty of the military theoreticians' work lay in the fact that they had
to consider the nation's temporary economic and technological backwardness, on the
one hand, and the general state of military affairs abroad and the future level
of tectutological development, on the other. That is, they had o deal with the
current situation while at the same time looking to the future.~2 The resolution
of many matters pertaining to military theory and to the practical organizational
development of the armed forces was difficult tmder those circumstances. The
replacement of old weapons and combat equipment, as an example was accomplished
in stages. Ia 1922 each rifle regiment, for example, had only one model company
armed with light machine gLms and trained in group tactics. The other eight
compani,es lacked light machine guns, since it was not tmtil the end of 1924 that
we were able to organize the production of automatic weapans and train the
necessary cadres of junior commanders for all the infantry companies. This
accoimted for the fact that in the early 1920's "we did not have and could not
have had either common organization or identical tactics throughout."43
The first updating of the Red Army`s small arms took place in the early 1930's.
The ar:.illery had not yet been upgraded, however, since the Red Army had inherited
from the old army an artillery which included a small quantity of hawitzers and
an insignificant number of heavy artillery pieces.44 There were absolutely no
antiaircraft or antitank guns. Our artillery was not only obsolete. It had also
been subjected to great wear and tear in two wars. Restoration and modernization
of the materiel was therefore carried out between 1921 and 1932, and 1933 was the
beginning of a period of complete updating of the.artillery with new materiel.45
The outfitting of the Red Army with different means of combat also depended upon
the rate of restoration and development of industry, the training of cadres of
designers and the availability of skilled workers, engineers and technicians.
The armored forces, for example, were represented by separate heavy and light tank
b attalions outfitted mainly with foreign military equipment. Our industry was
able to begin production of the MS-1 (T-18) light tank series in 1928. During the
first five-year plan the tank industry produced 3,949 tanks and tankettes, 3,099
of which were produced in 1932.46 These formed the basis for our first experi-
mental tank and mechanized units.47 Foreign tanks were removed from the forces in
1931.
The aviation was being outfitted with new equipment at a faster rate. In 1922
- 90 percent of the aircraft were purchased abroad, while three years later foreign
aircraft purchases were halted.48 The aircraft plants were just getting on their
feet and, naturally, were not providing the armed forces with an adequate
number of quali.ty aircraft. The air fleet received 13 combat aircraft from Soviet
i.ndustry during the 1923/24 fiscal year, and 264 in 1924/25. It took Ionger to
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increase the ncmhex of sircraft produced and improve their quality because of a
lack uf Soviet engines. Imported engines made up 70 percent of the engine pool
in 1928.49
In 1929 the CPSU Central Committee defined as 'the most important task for the years
immediately ahead that of rapidly bringircg the qualitp of Soviet aircraft up to
the level of the advanced bourgeois nations, and recommended that we train our own,
Soviet, military designers as rapidly as possible, especially for engine building.
In 1930 the Soviet aircraft industry mastered the mass production Af Soviet air-
craft, which made it possible to update the Air Forces with new models, including
the I-5, the TB-3 and others. As of 1 January 1933 the number of a3rcraft in the
Air Forces had increased 2.7-fold, compared with the end of 1928.51
The Navy was being rebuilt relatively slawly. The decision to rebuild it had been
adopted at the lOth Congress of RKP (b) [Russian Coffiaunist Party (Bolsheviks)] in
- 1921, but economic difficulties prevented us from fully accomplishing the5plans
outlined. "The Navy," M. V. Frunze stated, "is a very expensive weapan." 3
While advocating the strengthening of the fleet in the Black and Baltic Seas, he
saw it as realistically possible onlp to restore the ships left over from the old
navy and then, 1s these vessels became obsolete, to replace them with new ones.54
The six-year program of military ship-building (1926-1932) called for completing
major repairs on the fleet and its motorization first of all, and this was
basically completed by 1928.
Circumstances conducive to the completion of the restoratlon and modernization of
Soviet naval ships were created in the Early 1930's. A cansiderable portion of
the military vessels were repaired, tT-e battleships were partially modernized, the
submarine fleet was bggfed up and coastal defenses were strengthened during the
first five-year plan.
Circumstances in the 1920's and ea-'.1 1930's prevented our nation from allocating
extensive resources to outfit thc. P.ed Army. "Our resources," K. Ye. Voroshilov
said in December of 1926, "place certain limitations upon the development of
technology.1156 We therefore laz-ed behind the Western armies in the outfitting of
our army with technical means of warfare.57
_ In the difficult situation existing during the period imder discussion Soviet
military theoreticians accurately determined the general trend in the development
- of ineans of warfare and the correct sequence for updating the arms and equipment
of the army and navy. In 1924 M. V. Frunze called for estab lishmen.t of the very
closest of ties between science and uiLitary affairs. He believed that any
important i.n.vention or discovery in the area of military technology could imme-
diately crt te siiperiority for one of the sides. In this respect Frunze advocated
the most rapid po:~ ;i.ble development of taz.k building, "even at the expense and
to the detriment of the other kinds of weaponry.',58 He pointed out that aviation
- would have an enormous role in any future war. A nation lacking a powerful, well
organized, trained and prep;-.zed air force would inevitably be doomed to defeat.59
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Soviet military thought assigned an importan.t place in a likely world war to radio
technology, whiclz would not onlp be a meaas of eommuaication but would also have
_ its own iinportance as a means of remote control. -Enormous prospects were fore-
seen for radio technology in the national defen6e.60
Military theoreticians poiated out that the development of aircraft and tanks would
lead to changes in the weapons used by the ground forces. Plans were made to
- replace e:cist3ng infantry and artillerp weapons with autamatic gtms, which would
operate against aircraft. Medium and large-caliber machine guns needed to be
developed for antitank and antiaircraft warfare.61
_ Aceording to Soviet military theoreticians two trends had taken shape in the post-
war development of technology. In the past there had been no draatic technnbgical
- changes in military affairs for decades at a time, whereas at the beginning of
the 20th century i.mprovements or discoveries were occurring every year in military
technology.62 Special attention was therefore given to the need to draw upan
workers in science and technology for strengtheihg the natian's defense
capability.63
The other trend was a significant growth in the nwnber of technical personnel
servicing the new means of warfare. A total of 4,000 pilots and 66,000 engine
- mechanics and technicians wexe required to operate and service 3,000 comb at air-
craft, foi example.64
B oth of these trends detected by Soviet theoreticians in the 1920's have developed
rapi.dly an.d now play a large role in the resolution of problems pertaining to the
nation's defense capability.
The detection of general, objective trends in the development of military affairs
was highly important *o the development of S oyiet mil;=ar.y thought and the
accomplishment of specific practical tasks involved in military organizational
development, based upon the natian's realis tic capabilities. With this in mind
the matter of building up the Red Army's technological strength began to be
discussed at the end of the 1920's at the initiative of the central theoretical
military magazine VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA. TEe editors appealed to military
scientists to explain their views, in order to plan the proper policy, "in order
to avoid costly errors." An editorial pointed ouC the need to provide "tactically
sound proposals, which can be achieved in our actual circumstances."65 One could
see a conflict between this requirement and the title of the article--"Tactics
and Weapons of the Future"--which indicated that we had to deal not only with the
actual circumstances existing at that time, but also with the future.
Many theoreticians and practical experts were active in working out this matter.66
The discussion contributed to the adoption of more thoroughly substantiated
scientific recommendations for the development of military technology. It brought
out erroneous opinions stan.di.ng in the way of proper resolution of the problem
- and essentially diverti.ng attention away from its discussion. Certain analysts
did not believe that it would be possible rapidly to overcome our lag in military
technology. Thi.s point of view was exemplified by an article published in the
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j ournal of the Academy of the RKKA (now the Acade.my i,meni M. V. Frim.ze). The
article stated tliat we were noti in a positi.on to oufifi,t the Red Armp with equip-
ment equalling that of the enemy. It maintai.ned that we would not even be able
to achieve technological superiority in the future.67 It therefore recommended
only those methods of conducting military operations, which would make the enemy's
technology less effective and also make it possible to employ existing means and
methods of warfare--partisan actions, the extensive employment of bodies of
mounted soldiers, taking skillful advantage of the terrain, and so forth. With
respect to aircraft and tanks, the article suggested that it would be better to
master methods of combating them than to learn how to employ them in comb at.68
The search for methods for contending with a technologically powerful enemy in the
situation of our nation's temporary technological backwardness b rought out views
inconsistent with the objective development of military afiairs. It was asserted,
as an example, that equipment was of less importance than the proper training of
comnanders and troops and their superior morale.fi9 Thi:; point of view was widely
held in the 1920's and in our opinion it reflected incorrect appraisal of the Red
Army's experience in the civil'war. Proponents of such tfieories were making an
invalid comparison between an army's morale and irs technological equipage.
V. I. Lenin rf-:bht us to regard people and combat equipffient, man and weapon,
their role 4;id place in warfare in the light of their interdependency, in
dialectical unity. No matter how sophisticated, the combat equipment and na matter
- what sort of destructive pawers the weapons possess, in the final analysis it is
only people, people with good morale and a high level of military skill, who can
use those weapons to gain victory in a war.70 V. I. Lenin also stressed the
following fact, hawever: "The very beFt army and people with the greatest of
- devotion to the revolution will be im:uediately destroyed by the enemy if they are
not adequately ar:aed, supplied with food and trained."71 War has taught us, V. I.
Lenin stated, "that he who has the greatest technology, the best organization and
discipline and the best machines gains the upper hand.... "72
And so the dialectical unity of rnar, and technology has two sides: a military-
technical side, which reflects thP interaction between technology and the physical,
biological and intellectual qua''ties of man, and the class-political side, which
defines the political objectives of a war and determines the use of military
_ technology in the war.
During that difficult period in the making of Soviet military thought, hawever, a
time when scientific cadres were at the stage of mastering Marxism as applicab le
to analysis of military problems, views were expressed which were not consistent
with prospects for the development of armed forces. For example, a number of
military sci:ntlsts called for us "to counter the enemy's technology with every-
thing withi,. the capabilj.ty of a republic technologically poor but rich in the
great morale and i~,;n will of its people." In a commentary on this article the
central military journal noted that cartain authors have a tendency to draw a
line hetaeen the army's "moraie" and the "material aspect" of military affairs,
traditional of the old schooi of military thought. The editors were aupported by
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writers who maintained that there is no basis for separating man from technology,
from the weapona, which are produced by man. "T[1e development of new weapons is
not a basis for formulatiing the question as one of man or machine.'r74
Certain theoreticiana rejected the process of contrasting man with technology and
formulated the matter in a different light: Man and machine compliment each
other and cannot be separated. Man remains the prime source of strength inteili-
gence and will, but man cannot exist without weapons in modern warfare.71
In the polemics on the role of technology in warfare attempts were made "to
justify" the existing lack of technology. Well-knawn military theoretician A. A.
Neznamov acknawledged infantry's crucial role in combat and called for an
expedient limit to the army's mechanization, "so that technology does not over-
shadow man in the army."76 A number of critical articles were written to coimter
this erroneous point of view. One of them contained the statement: "Perhaps
much of the technology is presently not within Russia's means--this is true, but
this is an entirely different aspect of the matter. We must not be lulled by
this situation into believing that we do not need technology."77 It was
recommended that a careful study be made to determine what was essential at that
time and what could be put off until the future.
Proceeding from the Marxist-Leninist position on the role of man and technology
and cognizant of the great revolutionary enthusiasm of the fighting men and ttieir
commanders, the mi.litary leaders warned us not to permit the Red Army's good
- morale to blind us to the need constantlp to improve and outfit it technologically.
They recommended thoroughly studyi.ng a11 means of warfare and establishing
patterns and their interrelationships, an3 pointed out technol.ogy's crucial role
- in war. 78
In their search for a solution to the Red Arnry's temporary technological backward-
ness, certain theoreticians appealed for a return to the Dragomir indoctrinatianal
methods, in which the training of the soldiers is oriented taward hand-to-hand
combat. 79 Arguing against their views, M. V. Erunze wrote in 1921: "You will
not get very far with 'savagery' alone."80 Suvorov's opinion that "a bullet is
- a fooi, a bayonet the valiant one," progressive f.or its time and taught by
Dragomirov, was already outdated at the end of the 19th century. Theoretically,
such views were due to a lack of understanding of the objective development of
- mil;tary affairs.
The Commission for writing the RKKA Tield Service Regulations frankly discussed
the underestimation of technology in an explanatory statement: "In the Red
' Army the theory has acquired currency that we will wage a future war not so much
- with technology as with the supremacy of our revolutiotLary activeness and class
self-awareness. While there was some basis for this opinion during the period of
devastation, now that our industry is returning to the prewdr level, it is an
extremely harmful and dangerous evil.',81
i
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The commi.ssion discredited the idea that we would have to reconcile ourselves
to the Red Army's technological backwardness, thereby affirming its respect
for material strength in combat and materiai resources in war. This in particular
distinguished the 1925 Field Service Regulations from our previous ones.
Technology's role was underestimated even after that, hawever. Certain delegates
- to the Conference of Chiefs of District and Fleet Political Directorates, held
in January of 1927, did not agree with the exp lanatory statement at the beginning
_ of the 1925 Field Service Regulations. R. A. Muklevich, for example, stated that
"in a future war our supremacy over the enemy will by no means lie in the area of
- mechanization, machi.nization, electrification or technology in general... our
supremacy w3.11 be provided by nothing other than our social nature, our ideals
- and our political work."82 Responding to such statements, M. N. Tulchachevskiy,
while acknowledging the extremely powerful influence of political indoctrination
in comb at, stated that "one does not repel a machine gun either with morale
alone or with one`s cap."83
At the same time the most prominent Soviet theoreticians were warning us not to
- make a saered thing o.f technology. "It is extremely dangerous to imderstimate
the role of technology, of course, but we can also not afford to be hypnotized by
it."84 This warning was especially needed in the 1920's, due to attempts by
bourgeois mil;_Lary theoreticians to intimidate the Soviet Union with their
- technological superiority. This is why M. V. Frunze saw the task of party'organi-
zations with respect to dissemi.nating the correct views on the problem of man and
technology in a future war as one of insuring that every Red Army man understood
what might be used against him. In this way, "we will achieve much in the sense
cf comb at indoctrination and combat conditioning for the personnel of our Red
Army."85 It was Frunze's opinion that we should give extensive publicity to
questions surroim.ding the improvement of technology and to its tactical and
technical possibilities, and should demonstrate the strang and the weak points of
new weapons. He recuested that this matter be brought to the attention of all
civilian institutions and organizations. "That side," M. V. Frunze wrote, "which
has personnel well trained in all Taspects and which has a proper concept of the
role of technology, of its true im)86tance and pawer, will never be crushed by an
enemy's technological superiority."
Fundamental economic and social reforms took place as a result of our successful
fulfillment of the first five-year plan. Far-reaching changes occurred in the
class composition of the Soviet society: The working class increased numerically
and grew stronger organizationally, and its leading role in Soviet society
- increased. Socialist production relations became predominant in the rural area,
and the roots of capitalism were stamped out in agriculture.
- A qualitati.v