JPRS ID: 9623 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Document Page Count: 75
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 45
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9623
23 March 1981
,
\l1/e~t E u ro e R e o rt ~
p p _
(FOUO 17/81) =
FB~$ FOREiGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERV~CE
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NOTE
_ JPRS Fublications contain information primarily from foreign
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mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically ~r transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
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The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISS'r'.MINATIQN
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NOTICE
Beginning with this issue, this report will be divided into the following sub~ect
categories:
THEATER FORCES
TERRORISM
- ENERGY ECONOMICS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL
= MILITARY
GENERAL
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~ JPRS L/9623
2 3 March 19 81
I
W~EST EUROPE REPOP,T
(FOUO 17/81)
CONTENTS
ZHEATER FORCES
FRANCE ' -
Military Forces Command Qzanges Noted
~ (Frederic Pons; VALEURS AGTUELLES s 9 Feb 81) o. 0 1
IxAI.Y -
- Pro~ect Goorriinator Describes New ~fEI-80 Weapcros System
(Armando Caputo Interview; RIVISTA MILITARY, May-Jw1 8Q~ o. o o.., 4
E CONOML C
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
New Weather Satellite Planned: First Meteosat's Impact
(FUTURiBLES, Nov 80) .............o.oo.o..o........o...ooa.o.o. 13 -
- System's Function, Future, by DrieCer Lennertz
Economic Impact, by Jean Bernard Lagarde
Industrial Use, by Patrice Brer.dle
ITALY
~
Fiat's 1980 Progress Report by Sector -
(IL SOLE-24 ORE, 23 Jan 81)......o.o.o.oo.ooooooo.o...oo..o... 28
' POLITICAL
I TALY
Poll Shaws PCI as Gaining Ground in Rome
(Mario De Scalzi; IL MONDO, 13 Feb 81)............oo.oo.o.o.0 32
- a - [III - WE - 150 .FOUQ)
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Document Issued on Medium--Term Economic Ptan
(ENERGIA E MATERIE PRIME, NowDec 80) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
GENERAL
- ITALY
Min~s~ers Reveal Their Programs for 1981
(IL MONDO, 6 Feb 81) ................oo....a..........o..o..... 49 -
- b -
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THEATER F~CES FRANCE
MILITARY FORCES COMMAND CAANGES NOTED
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 9 Feb 81 p 25
[Article by Frederic Pons: "Army--Giscard's Generals"]
[TextJ Yn less than 6 months the two most important commands of the French armed
_ forces hsve changed hands: Th.e chief-of-staff of the armed forces [3oint chief of
staff] was changed on 2 July 1980 for the first time and then again on 28 January
1981, while the army chief-of-staff was changed on 3 September 1980.
Underlying these changes is the specif ic resolve of the French president. By
personally appointing these two general officer~, the head of state did not hesitate
to circumvent the tradition (seniority and pramotion) of the military hierarchy to
place men with a chosen "profile" in these key positions. The individuals
involved are slated to remain in office until 1985 and to designate the generals of
the caming decades.
Heading the army in replacement of Gen Jean Lagarde, who resigned at the end of
July 1980, is Gen Jean-Yven Delaunay, 58 years of age, a tank specialist. President
Valery Giscard d'Estaing had met Delaunay, whose personalitq is completely different
from his predecessor's, for the first time in Mourmelon in May 1975. The follawing
year General Delaunay appeared at the head oF his lOth Mechanized Brigade in Paris
at the 14th of July parade. He was already "programmed."
Delaunay subsequently was assigned to co~oand the Saumnr echoel, the "Mecca of
:cnights," and then all the army schools. His lightx~ing-lilce advancement astonished
his peers: In 2 months he was promoted fram the rank of division general (three
stars) to that of army general (five stars). On 3 Sep~ember 1980 he was appointed
army chief of staff, short-circuiting the expected proniotic,n to this post of Gen
Bertrand de Mantaudouin, personal chi~ef of staff to the Fr~nch pr~sident since June
1979 but deemed too difficult to get along with.
At the Rue Saint Domf.nique [street], in the recently modernized offices of the
general staff, the French president's choice was e~plained as f ollows:
"After General Lagarde, an administrative head, 3 real military chief was needed--
- General Delaunay."
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A great sporting enthusiast, enamoured of horseback riding and mountain-climbing.
Gen Delauna.y is well-acqusinted ~ith co~ibat. It has left him a lifelong waund: As -
lieutenant in Indochina, he lost his right hand on 17 August 1949 when he was blown
up by a mine.
He is a man of military language unencumber~d by any complex. He g.Lves priority to
discipline and eff iciency. In his "sights" (as he puts it) Delaunay targets lazy
units with mediocre officers. His purpose is to endo~ his forces with tl~e best ~
possibl~e operational level and to defend the authority necessary to achieve this
goal.
"The French president probably prompted Gen Lagarde to leave his post. Legarde's
structur~l revamping of the armed forces which he effected in the 5 years of his
command succeeded, but there was no longer harmony between him and hia ma~or aides,"
it is now recognized in the general staff.
This impression is confirmed by annual reports of ax~y morale. A man at home with
f iles rather than in the field, Gen Lagarde had sustained a setback in January 1980:
Against his advice, President Giscard d�Estaing refused to reduce the number of
French paratroop regiments. It was a victory for the "operational" forces.
The appointment of Gen Delaunay should ease the task of Gen Jeannou Lacaze, 57 years
old, new chief-of-staff of the armed forces. Long-time friends, the two men are
slated to work together until 1985.
Gen Lacaze's promotion was not a surprise. Since July 1980 his name had been
mentioned in connection with taking over from the outgoing Gen Guy Mery. In
- fa�roring Gen Claud~e Vambremeersch, 60 years, over Gen Lacaze at that time, President
Giscard d'Estaing had chosen a strong military personality and a trustworthy man.
But the former chief-of-staff of the French president (from June 1975 to June 1979),
this "strong functionalist," this valedictorian of his graduating class at Saint Cyr
[military academy], was to be only a transition, as we know today. Already due to
reach the age limit in January 1982, Gen Vambremeersch had to tiand over his respon-
sibilities early for health reasons, following the French preaidential elections:
His appointment made the step up of Gen Lacaze easier by c,ne notch.
The illness of Gen Vambremeersch,who was hospitalized early in January 1981 with
seri:ous viral hepatitis, only acce~.erated things. Promoted in September 1980 to the -
position of military governor of the Pzris region, commander of the III Army Corps, -
Gen Lacaze was in reality "kept in reserve."
A former f ighter in the [World War II] French ~'orces of the Interior, thia Gascon
born in Vietnam served for 4 years in the "llth shock troops," the armed unit of the
~ French secret aerv~ce. A paratrooper legionnaire, he commanded the 2nd Rep. [sic--
possibly Reg. for Regiment]. Then, for 5 y~ears, from April 1971 to June 1976, he
headed the intelligence-gathering unit in the SDECE [Fo.reign Intelligence and Caunter- _
intelligence Service--France]. There he acquired the nickname of "The Sphinx" and a
= reputation fo'r discretion and efficiency. He cammanded the llth Paratroop Division _
at the time of the operations in Chad, Zaire, and Lebanon. His promotion occurred
at a crucial ~uncture: The sequels of the Chadian operation and the French setback.
. 2
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t~enerals Lacaze and Delaunay will likely gradually modify the command of the major
army units. The first of these, the Toulouse paratroop division, spearhead of
foreign operations forces, wili have a new head this coming sumomer.. An individual
ha5 already been designated, namely Gen Jean Schmidt, 51 years old, former eorps
- coromander in the 8th Navai Paratroop Infantry Regiment. This combat-hardened
general now commands the lst Army. His promotion will be the first of a new wave
of generals.
~OPYRIGHT~ 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"
2662
CSO: 3100
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~IEATER FORCES 1TPi1,y
PROJECT COORDINATOR DESCRIBES NEW MEI-80 WEAPONS SYSTEM
Rome RIVISTA MILITARY in Italian May-Jun SO pp 73-77
[Interview with LtCol Armando Caputo, head of the Artillery Section of the Bureau
of Research and Studies of the Army Staff, by the editorial staff of RIVISTA MILI-
TARE]
[Text] Within the framework of an equipment policy for increasing
the overall effectiveness of the instrument, the Army staff intends
to give special impetus to the air defense sector by operating
with two guidelines: carrying out an improvement program for al-
ready existing systems and acquiring new weapon systems suitable for
making it possible to overcome the present deficiencies in the low
and very low altitude range.
While a modernization program has already been carried out with re-
� gard to the HAWK medium-range missile system, improded ar~a air de-
fense at madium and low altitudes, steps of a technical and adminis-
trative nature were taken at t;ze same time, in this context, for ac-
~ quisition, in the medium term (by 1986), of a light, short-range, -
all-weather, self-propelled missile system the I~I-80 for area
air defense of major elementary units and of vital components oP�the
field army against air attacks conducted primarily at low and very
_ low altitude. In addition, on a short-term basis (starting in
1983),acquisition has been scheduled of very short range conven-
tional air defense systems (multigunned 25 millimeters self-
- propelled) capable of providing self-defense for minor mechanized
and armored units against direct air attacks at low and very low
altitude. All the above-mentioned light and self-defense systems
will be incorporated subsequently in a tactical command and control
- detection system for air defense of the field army, capable of
er~suring distant detection, early identification of the invader
_ and rational control of action, A definition study has already
been starte~ for this system and production is scheduled for the
secon3 half of the 1980's.
Within the overall framework outlined above, the MEI-80 program
takes on great importance. in fact, the system, which is charac-
terized by a capability of independent oNEration at the firing
unit level, without, however, ruling out the possibility of cen-
- tralized use by means of battery command posts or air defense
~
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aontrol centers, or both, is to be capable of all-weather operation
(radar) and under fair-weather conditions (optical tracking TV
of the target? , in_or~ler� to ensure engagement of helicopters ~and air-
craft at low altitudes or in the presence of very. intensive electronic
countermeasures (ECM), and also of antiradiation missiles, with ex-
tremely short detection and engagement times.
Its maximum range, on the order of 10 kilometers, is compatible
with the maximum masking distance anticipated for low and very low
altitude atL�acks, providing, at the same time, connection in alti-
tude with systems of a higher or lower category. The high d~gree
of on-road and off-road mobility requited of a light system is
obtained by means of installation on tracked vehicles that also
makespossible rapid preparation for launchinq and moving times.
' Good resistance against saturation and high degree of survival ca-
pability are guarantees of appropriate technical measures (large
number of missiles on the launchers, sho~t enqagement a~nd reloading
times, NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical] nrotection, employment
discre~ion, and so on).
Finally, in view of the burdensome specialization of the persennel
assigned to employment of the system, simpiicity of employment and
- maintenance at the employment unit level is regarded as qualifying,
deferring specialized maintenance to higher levels.
It should also be pointed out that the nation's industries most
qualified in this special sector are devoting their best technical
resources to development of the MEI program. After an ad~quate
period of studies and technological research on the whole subject
of missile system, these industries have a acquired a good degree
of technological qualification that leaves good expectations of
the completion of a program of great importance to the Italian
Army .
_ Approval of the prototype firing unit is scheduled for 1984. When
positive completion of the experimental tests has been verified,
a program wi11 be started for acquisition of a certain number of
systems (firing units with *nissiles, battery command posts, simu-
lators and other training equipment, maintenance and repair equip-
ment, and so on) entailing sizable economic resources to be drawn
from the funds qran~ed by the special law on modernization of the
Army's weapons, materiel, equipment and facilities, within the
framework of air defense.
RIVISTA MILITARE, therefore, believes that it is useful to pro-
- vide its readers with advance information on the most important
technical and operational features ~f the MEI-80 system, illus-
trating its essential characteri~tics and performance in an in-
terview with the Army Staff officer who follows and coordinates
the v�rious activities connection with the program's development.
The questions were asked of LtCol Armando Caputo, Army General
. Staff, l~ead of the artillery section in the Army Staff Research
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and Studies Bureau, and, therefore, coordinator of activities con-
- nected with the ME~-80 program.
- This officer attended the Military Academy, the Artillery Applica-
tion School, the War College, the Interforce Military Studies In-
stitute.
He has served in the Ariete Arm~red Division and has been head of
the planning section in the Army Staff Operations Bureau. He has
commanded the Capua Self-propelled 12th Field Artillery Group and
since 1977 he has been serving in his present assignment as sec-
tion head in the Army Staff Research and Studies Bureau.
Coexistence of Several Field Army Air Defense Systems
[Question] In the Italian Army's policy on equipment, the acquisition of several
systems for air defense of the same objectives has been scheduled. Why?
~ [Answer] In order to provide effective air defense for the units of the field army,
it is necessary to have a uniform incorporation of weapon systems varying in cate-
gory and nature, each perfected for operating at well specified altitudes and
ranges that will provide, on an overall basis, a high degree of impenerrability of
the space to be defended.
As an example, a medium-range (30 to 40 kilometers) mi.ssile system, not perfected
for low and very low altitudes (0 to 600 meters), would be "redundant" and, at any
rate, "unacceptable" for opposing an air threat at tho5e altitude ranges. In fact,
- because of' natural obstacles (vegetation, buildings, and so on) and the terrain
morphology, invading aircraft will be "masked" at. distances ranging from 5 to 2(1
kilometeres and at low and very low altitudes. Therefore, they can be engaged only
at ranges included between a few kilometers and 10 kilometers, obviously taking into
account the system's reaction time and the missile's flight time. Moreover, longer
range for a system involves weights and impediments incompatible with the charac-
teristics of mobility and support required of air defense systems for the smaller
units of the field army.
On the other hand, it may be pointed out that light, self-defense systems per-
fected, respectively, for low and very low altitude although limited in weight
and impediments and, therefore, mobile and acceptable for the action of smaller
units, have natural limitations in engaging targets at medium altitudes and at
supersonic speeds.
_ Finally, it should be pointed out that every missile system can be neutralized by
intensive, sophisticated electronic countermeasures of the potential enemy.
In those emergency situations, anly conventional optical aiming systems can pro-
vide a certain degree of. effectiveness to air defense.
Therefore, it seems obvious that it is necessary to have a mix of guns, machineguns
and missiles with a variety of categories and performance, in order to offe r ef-
fective oppostion to the infinite variety of the: air threat in the post-1980 years.
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~ [Question] How is that mix in field a~my units proposed to be accomplished?
[Answer] The Army Staff expects to achieve an effective integration of conventional
and missile air defense systems by means of a well-designed, gradual program compa-
tible wi:h the funds available. A first stage of the mix which is to be Com-
bined in altitude with the HAWK-HELIP medium-range missile system will be carried
out around the middle of the 1980's by means of the introduction into service of
a light missile system, tlie I~I-80, and a conventional self-dEfense system, the
multigunned 25 millimeter self-propelled sysem.
For purposes of integration of missile systems with conventi.onal systems, finall.y,
consideration should also be given with regard to the conventional component
to the 40/70 system, which, even with the well-known limitations awing primarily
- to restrictea tactical mobility, provides, in any case, good effectiveness in air
defense of special objectives.
_ Operational Configuration of the MEI-80 System
CQuestion] What is the MEI-80?
(Answer] First of all, MEI-80 means Air Defense Missile of the Italian Army of the
1980's.
An acronym that may, perhaps, seem to be inappropriate is involved, because MEI-80
is used def.initely to indicate the whole weapon system and not only the missile.
_ Nevertheless, it was preferred to retain an acronym that, althoiigh created origi-
nally with a different meani.ng, represents basically the synthesis of years of in-
tense, complicated activity devoted to achieving an Italian designed air defense
- missile weapon system.
The MEI-80, therefore, emerged from experiments started at the end of the 1960's
and developed in subsequent years by means of a series of success and failures
that, however, enabled the experts, both military and civilian, to acquire a very
great and important amount of knowledge in a sector so complex and constantly more
sophisticated.
The MEI-80's roots go d~wn into the past, but it is intended to be the answer to
present rather strict technical and operational requirements, specified in the
system's military requirements worked out by the Army Staff at the end of the 1970's
to face the threat of th~ 1980's and post-1990's.
It takes the shape of an all-weather light air defense missile system, installed on
an M-548 self-propelled chassis, intended for defense of the elementary major units
and of the vital co~nponents of the field army, primarily at low and very low alti-
tudes, against attacking aircraft with a maxim~n speed less than or equal to
Mach 1 . 2 .
The basic structure of the system consists of the firing unit, assembled in three
functional modules, all installed on an M-548 vehicle and defined as Unit 1, Unit 2
and Unit 3.
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[Question] Could you provide us with a description of the individual modules of the
system? -
[Answer] Very briefly, they are defined in accordance with the essential comportents -
- of the system.
Unit 1(U-1) is the heart of the system. It includes the search radar with identi.-
~'ication friend or foe (IFF) and the tracking radar, optical aiming and trackinq
devices and missile guidance remote control devices, computer system (engagement,
aiming, launching and missile guidance computers operations console and telecom-
= munications system.
The m~ ssion of th:~s modular unit is carried out by means of detection and identifi-
catiori of any aircraft appearing in the surveillance area (radius of about 20 kilo-
meters) , enqagemant and tracking of the target with fire contr~l radar or with
rem~te camera, computation of data for aiming the launcher and for guiding the
missile and transmission of commands to the missile, in order to make it possible
- to intercept the target. It should be pointed out that the above-described sequence
- of operations can be performed in an all-weather .*node, by means of the fire control
_ radar, and in a fair-weather mode, by means of the remote camera and the IR (infra- -
red) detector. The fair-weather mode, in particu~ar, makes it possible for the
system to continue operating e~~en in the presence of massive electronic counter-
measures on the part of the enemy.
- Unit 2(U-2) consists Arimarilv of two~lawT~~ers , each with an INDIGO six-missile -
- launcher firing box.
This missi~e is equipped with a guidance and remote control system and is propelled _
by a single stage solid propellant motor with very low emission of smoke providing ~
~ a maximum speed of 850 metera a second (Macn 2.6) . In addition, it has a preformed _
fragmentation warhead with proximity and impact fuze.
~ Compa~ed with other missiles for light systems, INDIGO is preferred, especially
because of the longer range 10 kilometers) expressed in a decrease in ths num-
bez of systems needed for covering an area of a specific size and because of the
high degree of lethality of the warhead. In addition, its excellent maneuverabil-
ity espPCially at ranges on the order of 5 to 6 kilometers makes it superior
- to others of the same type.
From a technological point of view, the INDIGO missile, although in existence for
= several years now, is placed in the same class as similar "light" missiles in ex-
istence at present and in some respects it is more advanced today still. In par-
ticular, the remote control guidance system almost universally preferred in the
category of "light" missile systems makes it possible to "load" on ground units
the complex guidance sophistications, consequently reducing the weight and cost of
- the missile with obvious technical, economic and logistic advantages in supplying
and operating the system.
Unit 3(i)-3) consists of the logistic module of the firing unit. Ia fact, the ne-
hicle transports 12 replenishment missile immediately following the unit, thereby
making it possible to resupply the launcher firing boxes (U-2) during action by
means of servomechanisms for rapid loading of t`~e launchers.
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;Question] Can the firing unit operate independently, or is its incorporution in a
higher unit anticipated?
[Atiswer) 'I"he firing unit whose prototype is in the process of production at present
~ Can operate either independently or incorporated in a battery command post (PCB).
It is pointed out, however, that independent employment of the individual firing
units must be regarded as normal, just as is true of similar systems already in
service. For. the Roland system, for example, a PCB is being prepared only now,
although it has bee:~ service for several years in the form of indivi.dual independent -
firing units.
In any case, the unit of employment of the 1~I-80 is the battery for which a P~B _
capable of operating three to four firing units, coordinating their action and sys-
temati zing operational control, has been provided.
Developments Achieved and Future Expectations
[QuestionJ In the area of the NIEI program, what has already been achieved, what
activities are in progress and what forecasts can be made for their completion?
[Answer] It seems useful to state, first of all, that every complete project i.s
always marked with a certain number of operational, technological and financial
limitations that have to be accepted at the time it is started. Subsequently, if
the development of a program is evaluated with regard to parameters different from
the ones on wnich it was originally based, the conclusions that are drawn may, per-
haps, prove to be critical with regard to the program itself, especially from the
~echnological point of view.
In any case, as pointed out already, at the end of the 197p's, the Army Staff sur-
- veyed the situation and put in final form the r,l.ilitary requirements of the MEI-80
by designing a system fully adequate for the threat and in line with the present
state of the art.
Having stated that, in order to answer your question it is necessary to make a
brief "historical" outline of the principal activities ~onnected with developmer.t
of the I~I.
Tn a first phase (1967-1976), primarily theo.retical studies were made that led to
the production of a first prototype of a mechanically towed firing unit with search -
_ radar and a fire control center for guiding INDIGO missiles. Subsequent experimen-
tal trials made it possible to produce a preprototype self-propelled unit on which
foreign-made radars were installed. It represented the first embryo of Unit 1, as
provided at present by the program. Trac;king mission activities were also carried
out, in order to develop the radar component of the system and several dozen INDIGO
~ missiles were launched primarily to ascertain its behavior in flight, lethality of -
the warhead and guidance accuracy.
In a second phase (1976-1980), the radar components were subjected to critical re-
view, also in the light of evolution of the 'th~`2~t and of tecnnological progress.
It was decided to replace them, in order to adapt their performance to the new
military requirements providing better coverage in altitude by the search radar,
- tracking capability at very low altitude even in the presence of ground echoes
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(clutter), multiple target discrimination capability, and also adequate defense
against electronic countermeasures.
In ~ddition, equipment was developed in that phase for guidance in fair-~weather -
- mode and the launching unit (Unit 2) was produced on a self-propelled M-548.
The activities performed up to now have taken time judged by some to be excessively
long. Nevertheless, specialists in this work know full well that projects with a
high degree of technological sophistication require times on the order of 10 tu 15
years, both in Italy and other countries better equipped for that kind of work.
The time taken to arrive finally at the third phase that is to be concluded with
approval and production of the system can definitely be regarde.d as ratYier real-
istic.
All the components of the system have been specified at present and the most criti- '
cal phase of the MEI-80 program is starting, that is to say the phase that differs
substantially f.rom the two preceding phases in concreteness and decision. Today,
the quite necessary experimental tests of the past are replaced by a very specific
- turning toward choice of the various components of the system, with access to al-
ready existing materials that, when opportunely incorporated and developed for the _
- specific technical and operational requirements of the Armed Forces, can achieve -
completion of the MEI-80 in a reasonably short time.
The DG AMAT [expansion unknown; possibly Directorate General of Weapons and Mater-
iel] is operating in that connection and within the scope of its constitutional
powers.
In fact, evaluations for choice of the firing center and simultaneous development
of equipment for the fair-weather operational mode will merge, at the end of 1981,
in a completed pro*_otype configuration of the system that will subsequently be sub-
jected to technical and operational trials for approval.
- [Question] What is being done in the same sector "elsewhere"?
[Answer] 'I'he best known light missile systems produced abroad are the Rpland
(France-Federal Republic of Germany), adopted recently with some modifications also
- by the United States, the Rapier (Great Britain), the Chaparral (United States),
the SA-9 GASKIN and the SA-8 GECKO of Soviet production, the Crotale (France).
- The expected performance of the MEI-80 is superior, in various aspects, to the above-
mentioned systems, because they were designed and produced first and, therefore,
were unable to use certain technological innovations that will, on the other hand,
be present in the MEI system. -
This superiority is especially evident, because it concerns the maximum range and
the lethality of the warhead, while it can reasonably be assumed owing to the
obvious secrecy in that sector with regard to the system's overall defense
against electronic countermeasures. A substantial equivalence in performance can
be pointed oui: in comparison with the SA-8 system (Soviet Union) . -
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Obviously, the MEI firing unit assembled on several operational vehicles has
a mobility that is slightly inferior to the mobility of monovehicular versions
(produced abroad: Roland, Chaparral, SA-9). On the other hand, it is less vul-
nerable than the above-mentioned systems, owing to distribution of the various -
pieces of equipment on several vehicles.
It is emphasized, moreover, that the maneuverability of the INDIGO missile re-
garded by some critics as not entirely satisfactory is excellent at medium
- ranges (5 to 6 kilometers), while it decreases at maximum ranges.
The phenomenon finds its technical explanation in the missile's st~ru~ture itself, in
which it has been preferred to adopt a launching motor (booster) that achieves an
excellent initial thrust, optimum velocity values (Vo = 850 meters a second) and
maneuverability (30 g) for intermediate ranges of 5 to 6 kilometers, where the re-
quirement is most felt.
Other similar systems (for example Roland) also have, on~:the other hand~ a�
- cruising motor (sustainer) that keeps the missile's speed and maneuverability
values constant during the entire trajectory. These values are, however, in-
ferior to the values attained by INDIGO in the first part of its trajectory.
- Passing, then, to our domestic productions, the intrinsic validity of certain Ital-
ian missile systems, produced by the intelligence and the optimum degree~ of techno-
logy attained by the Italian industry operating in the sector, cannot be disregarded.
In particular, the Spada/Aspide system, produced for the requirements of the Air
_ Force, was, in its time, compared with the MEI for a possible standardization in
o~ the national area. The result of that comparison was that the intrinsic qualities
of Spada/Aspide, absolutely valid, placed it in a superior category with regard to
all that was required of the I~I system, giving rise to an unnecessary redundancy
because it was already covered by other systems that founci expression in a greater =
financial and logistic burden for the Armed Forces.
For these reasons, at that time until proved to the contrary the MEI was pre-
ferred, because it was regarded as more compatible with the air defense requirements
of the field army.
[Question) Is the MEI program still valid?
[AnswerJ The answer can only be affirmative, when account is taken of the fact
that the system now in completion phase has technical and operational character-
istics that are up-to-date from the technological point of view and are perfectly
consistent with the severe conditions imposed by the threat. _
It should be realized, moreover, that the N1EI-80 is a project that Army Staff in-
tends to pursue completely in the national area, using components and subassemblies
- already produced by industry and that only require uniform, functional incorporation
to make the system, as a whole, meet the military requirements. Only after making
all the necessary and.sufficient evaluations and in the presence of an unfortunate
failure of the qualified national industries assigned to produce the system, will
the Army Staff be able to examine other solutions that, although with characteris-
tics different from the present ones, can cover the operational requirement in
- some way.
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The latest credibility goal has been set, at any rate, for the end of 1981, in or-
der to allow a possible alternative choice and to obligate to it the funds avail-
able, within the validity limits of the Special Law.
In any case, the Army Staff believes in the validity of the MEI-8~ program, because
_ its basic requirements are in line with the operational conceptions and the techno-
logical progress of the 1980's and it believes that an adequate endeavor by Italian
industry can make it possib].e to produce the system in a reasonably short time. _
Deployment of the Firing Section
, ~
UNITA' 1
1~ Semovente M 54a 2~ Comandante di Sezione
Radar di scoperta Operatori
Radar di inseg4imento Personale vario
Sistema controllo tiro
~ Generatore di potenza
r ~l
_ � ~ � 1
3 ) , 3 )
; i �
e i
~ Segnali di asservimento Segnali di asservimento
ed intertonico ^ ed intertonico
v rwt~arn�rrr~m.s~ ~ f. ........w.y.w. r..~~~r...m+.~.r.ru.......~.... a+~~'.
Segnali di consenso 4) ~ Segnali di consenso 4)
,
UNITA' 2 51 UNITA' 2 5~
Semovente M 54$ Semovente M 5 8
Rampa di lancfo sesfupla Rampa di lancio sestupla
Asservimenti . 6) Asservimenti
Generatore di potenza . Unita 3 Generatore di potenza
Semovente M 548
- Supporto logistico
Key: 1. Unit 1, self-propelled M-548 [tracked cargo carrier], search radar, track-
ing radar, fire control system, power generator; 2. section commanding officer, _
operators [2], various personnel; 3. servo link and intercom; 4. firing box link;
5. Unit 2, self-propelled M-548, sextuple launcher, firing box, power generator;
6. Unit 3, self-propelled M-548, logistic support. _
COPYRIGHT: RIVISTA MILITARE PERIODICO DELL'ESERCITO~ ANNO CIII, NUMERO 3/1980
10,042
CSO: 3104
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E(~JNOM[C INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
~ NEW WEATHER SATELLITE PLANNED: FIRST METEOSAT'S IMPACT
System's Function, Future
Paris FUTURIBLES in French No 38, Nov 80 pp 31-39
[Article by Drieter Lennertz of the European Space Agency's Earth Observation Pro-
_ gram Department, Toulouse, France: "Meteosat Program"]
[Text] Meteosat, the European weather-forecasting satellite program, is an
exemplary pro~ect in more ways than one. It ~.s one of the very first applications
satellites successf ully placed into orbit by European countries. It i$ also a
project with a large economic impact: saving a fe~a days, even a few hours in
forecasting the weather produces considerable savings in such f3elds as agriculture
and construction. Lastly, Meteosat is a typical example of the vicissitudes of `
= space research: an unprecedented technological success, Meteosat-1 was launched
in 1977, but it became partially inoperative on 24 November 1979 and now no longer
transmits weather photos of the earth.
All efforts made thus far to correct the satellites malfunction have been unsuccess-
_ ful. We will undoubtedly have to wait until Meteosat-2 becomes operational--its
launch by an Ariane rocket is scheduled for early 1981--to have weather pictures
of Europe once again.
Meteosat-1's malfunction has been identified as originating in a resistor costing
- only a few hundred francs. Its failure has blinded a satellite whose estimated
cost is several 100 million francs.
For all these reasons, we consider it useful to describe all aspects of the Me~eo-
- sat pro~ect, namely its complexity, eGOnomic impact, and industrial applications.
Meteosat-1, the European Space Agency's (ESA) first meteorological and first syn-
chronous-orbiting satellite was launched successfully in November 1977. Meteo-
_ sat-2 is scheduled for launch in February 1981 by ESA's Ariane launch vehicle.
These two satellites, their associated ground facilities, and this system's utiliza-
- tion constitute the preoperational Meteosat program which ESA is conducting for
_ eight of its 11 member countries, namely Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
_ Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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In addition to meeting the demands of European weather services, the Meteosat
_ program is Europe's contribution to two programs sponso~ed by the World Metecrolo-
- gical Organization (WMO): the Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP) and the
- World Weather Watch.
- This contribution includes Meteosat's participation in a network of five geo- -
stationary weather satellites distributed around the equator. Their missions and
functions are technically and operationally coordinated by a committee whose members,
in addition to Europe, are Japan, th e United States, the USSR and India.
Meteosat has three nrimary missions. These call for:
a. Imaging of the earth's surface and cloud cover every half hour in the visible
and infrared spectra, and transmission of the raw (unprocessed) data to a ground
processing facility.
b. Retransnrission to user stations via the satellite of Meteosat data processed
and put into suitable formats by the Meteosat main ground station. `
_ c. Collection and relay to a ground facility via the satellite of data acquired
by sensors of self-tim~d or interrogated stationary or mobile platforms.
The diversity of missions and the large amount of data to be processed in real time
required installation of a highly comFlex systP:n viewed at the time as a veritable
_ techno].ogical ehalLenge. The system's diffprent ~omponents--satellite and ground
- facilities--are briefly described below:
a. The geostationary spin-stabilized--100 revolutions per minute--placed on station
- at 0� longitude and carrying the following subsystems necessary to performance of `
its missions:
_ (1) Earth obser~vation unit consisting of a telescope-equipped radiometer for
taking pictures of the earth and cloud cever in the visible and infrared spectra,
and a digital link handling the routing of image data and general synchonization.
(2). Data transmission and relay unit.
b. A ground segment consisting of:
(1) Meteosat groundfacilities housed in the ESA Operations Center at Darmstadt and
in the ~denwald Hills, Germany. These facilities include:
(a). A data acquisition, command control, and tracking station that receives data
from the radiometer and on-board aEtitude control and maintenance system, and mes-
sages from data-collecti.ng platforms, and that transmits, over two independent chan-
nels, platform interrogation signals, couunand control signals, and data in two for-
mats: high-resolution using digital signals and Wefax data using analog signals.
(b). A ground responder beacon for measuring distances.
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- (c). An operations control center that m~nitors and controls proper functioning _
of the satellite and its ground faeilities.
(d). A data preparation and annotat~on center that establishes correla[ions betita~en
radiometers data, and that permits image rectification, pro~ection conversian, and
information transfo rmation.
(e.) A meteorological information extraction center that processes the radiometer
data to derine such specific meteorological information as sea surface temperature,
wind fields and cloud analys-;.s.
(2). User stations and other remote elements of the ground segment. These are of
three types: primary data user stations, secondary d~ta user stations, and surface
data collection platforms for the remote collection of ineteorological and environ-
mental data.
Operation of the System
Meteosat-1 functioned very satisfactorily and achieved all of its mission goals
during its two active years in orbit, i.e. until late November 1979. -
The satellite accomplished the following during that period:
a. Transmitted more than 140,000 images--about 130 per day--in the three bands
of the spectrum to the main ground station in Germany
- b. Relayed more than 200,000 image formats to approximately 200 users in 34 dif-
ferent countries. This represented about 13,000 image formats per month during that
2 year period.
c. Transmitted more than 3,700 messages per month from surface data-collection
platforms operating from land, sea--buoys or ships--, and on board Boeing 147
aircraft.
d. Furnished data needed to calculate various meteorologicaZ parameters such as
sea surface temperatures, cloud analysis including cloud-top altitudes, and wind
speeds (maximum of 32,000 per month). A large part of this data was provided in
support of GARP's first global experiments from December 1978 to November 1979. -
Degradation of an electronic component in the satellite's undervoltage protection
device in late November 1979 caused a failure of the imaging and image data trans-
mission functions, two of the satellite's three primary missions. Inasmuch as all
attempts to recover these.two missions have failed, this means Meteosat-1's ser-
vices have been reduced to data collection. ~
To avoid the problems eneotmtered with Meteosat-1, Meteosat-2 has been modified.
The latter is now being prepared ror an early 1981 launch by ESA's Ariane rocket.
Meteosat's Future
In early 1979, the meteorological services of the eight s~ember countries participat-
ing in the preoperational program asked ESA to prepare a proposal for an operational
Meteosat program consisting of, in its basic version, five satellites for the period
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19a4-1994. ESA prepared the requested proposal and submitted it to the ~eteorologi-
~ cal services in mid-1980. Plans call for this program to start in 1981, in which
cae~ the first operational satell~te, Meteosat-3, could be launched in 1985~
- Meteosat-~ Characteristics
Weight: 697 kilograms (at launch), including 345 kilograms for t~:ie jettisonable
apogee motor and 60 kilograms for apogee motor and third stage fastening devices.
Dimensions: diameter of 210 centimeters and height of 319.5 centimeters without apogee
motor.
On-board power: 210 watts at end of service life.
Stabil.ization: spin-stabilized, 100 revolutions per minute.
Service life: 3 years.
Reliability: 0.4 minimum, the goal being 0.5 (without degradation of any misaion or
recourse to back-up operating modes).
Orbit: geostationary at 0� longitude.
Station keeping: + 0.8� north-south, + 1� east-west, for 3 years.
Images are Qbtained by a telescope-equipped radiometer using the satellite's spinning
motion to scan the earth line by line and the north-south shift of the radiometer's '
optical axis after each line scanning, the sp~In axis itslef remaining,perpendicular
to the orbital plane.
The radiometer comprises: two adjacent channels in the 0.5~-0.9 micron visible band,
R one channel (window) in the 10.5-12.5 micron infrared band, and one water vapor
absorption chanriel in the 5.7-7.1 micron infrared band. When in service, the lattar
- channel repiaces one of the two visible channel.s.
Each infrared image is composed of 2,500 lines and 2,500 image elements with a
spatial resolution of 5 kilometers at the subsatellite point. In the visible
spectrum, this resalution is twice better--S,C100 lines and image elements, and
a resolution of 2.5 kilometers--when the two visible channels are in operation,
in other words, when the water vapor channel is not in use.
Under normal operating conditions, data produced by the "image" system are "time-
- stretched" by an electronic buffer storage unit (synchronizer) ~hat enables the
bit rate to be reduced from 2.7 million bits per second to 116,000 bits per second
before the data are transmitted to the DATTS.
If the on-board buffer storage unit fails, image data ~re transmitted "in bursts"
but with a higher PIRE.
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~
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:17 :
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Meteosat's Zone of Coverage
The above map depicts Meteosat's zone of coverage. The satell.ite is geostation~ry,
in other words it remains in orbit at the same position above the equator. This
restriction is said to have caused more than one British meteorologist to grumble.
In f act, a glance at the above map shows that Great Britain is rather poorly situated
to benefit from Meteosat's pictures. There is even an area in the north which the
satellite does not cover. Considering the great interest the British have in any-
thing rela~ed tc the weather, one can ~udge how angry some meteorologists across the
Channel must be.
FIGURE 2
M�'~�~.~'ia�~`.~~~`. ( Les missions de Met~osaf METEOSAT MISSIONS
.ObN~v~tiOn{ 11WQ~YMS ` 1 ~
~II (umi~1~ vi/1~~ ~t M
infr~rouq~ .
. Tr+ntmi~aio~ di~~ct~ Miwion~ ( 2) du ut~ltit~-
d'impM ~rut~s ~ 1� . R~c~ption dM impe
~t~tlon c~ntr~l~. ~t ~ua � i , tr~itMs ~t d~~ donnMS ~ 2 ~
nationa utiliwtrit~s ~ yy~ti~
princi0~ln ~ .OiMvdon dM impN
' k~ t..;t~...t a.s d�,~i,. ~
,'.;p. Wdu ~w sauom
- utiliaatrien
~
~ ~
~ 3)
,o .er ~
~O~ p~~ ~ ~o~ ~ J Miuion~(31du~~t~llit�
O~F p~~ ~o ~ Auprditd~spbto�form~~
~ ~ ~ 3 wtomriiqun ~1 d~~
Qo .~~M ~ ~ ~ ! ut~llitw d~rilanet
' ~4 �~~~``pP ~ j ~ 1i 'p �Rdai~dnim~rroqNiom
~ ~p~ � ~ ; ~y . Cratt~ct~ d~s donnMs ms~ur~s
f ~ a~ s ~ ~a ~t r~tnn~miuion vsn
( 5) l i d~ �i~ nstion c~ntr~l~
. c � ~
O~ ~ ~ F 3 ~
; o o,
_ ~
�it� ~4~ ~ ^ ~8~ ~S\'~i~~ ~~0~7~
e ~ O
~ (6)
STATION CENTRALE : s. - --BS~
_
c.~~,. a. ca~vei. 9 �
�t d~ VNtr~it~m~nt ~
. � t~tioe , .
Sdtion~ principdw Statloro IouIN, hqwbot hydrolopiy}~PUTES-FORMES
,7t.,�
.,�.:lO STATIONS UTIl18AT111CE5 ts[w'11 DECOLLECTES13~
� DES DONNEES
- KEY: 1. First mission: cloud observatians in visible and infrared light; direct
transmission of raw images to the main ground processing station and principal
user stations . 2. Second miss ion : reception of processed images and Wefax data;
dissemination of processed images and Wefax data to user stations. 3. Third
mission in behalf of automatic platforms and other satellites: relaying inter-
rogation; collecting measured data and retransmitting them to the main ground
processing station. 4. Raw images 5. Replies from platforms. 6. Processed
images and Wefax data. 7. Interrogation of platforms. 8. Wefax data. 9. Main
ground station, control and preprocessing center. 10. User stations; principal
stations, local stations, passenger lines. 11. Ground station. 12. Hydrologic
station. 13. Data-collecrion platforms. 14. Ship. 15. Buoy
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FIGURE 3
Meteosat Infrared Photo
~y S 4
~ , ~ ,
~',~i7al~~~~rl ~~~'cC~r~~, . . ~ ,
` \
/ ~
I
M
~l " y~,. _ ' . .
t
j
~
, ~
, ~ 4~ . ,
tii
~N'.
J. ~ w
~ ' ~ .
. ~
~
i'~,
hy<
f yy��~ L
~~`4'~'.~~ 'r F r ~e~
Ti ~ "S~ ~a-
This imagery uses th e channel (window) in the 11-micron infrared band in which
- the scale of "grays" represents temperatures. Space and high cold clouds appear
white, lower clouds grey, and hot deserts appear very dark.
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FIGURE 4
Meteosat Photo in Water Vapor Channel
_ ~ ~ r
, ~ .
rt:c�~~~ t.
~ ,t ,`r~liM~~~
i~' t~'.
~3
y. ~A
~ ti
- . . . . t ' ~i IIII t ~ .
~ ~
'~~,1.+ �`""V 4 ' I ~t ~
- v
~ ~
�
' . . . ~1~:.::,~~ y~,i~ijq~! ~
a~,..~
. . ~ ~.h~ ~ . .
. . . . m5. . . .a.
This imagery uses the channel in the water vapor 6-micron infrared band. The white
areas represent low temperatures and these areas can be correlated with areas ~f
high humidity. The dark shades indicate ar.eas of lesser high humidity. This image
_ shows solely the upper atmosphere and is not a photograph of the earth itself.
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Economic Impact
paris FUTURIBL~S in French No 38, Nov 80 pp 40-45
[Article by Jean Bernard Lagarde, systems promotion department, Eurosat Corporation,
Geneva: "Meteosat's Economic Impact"]
[Text] Meteorology has made very great progress since the publication of the first
weather forecasts in the early 1900's. 'I'he numb~er of observations, their dissemina-
' tic,n, and their processing are improving everyday along with the theoretical ~:.now-
ledge of ineteorological phenomena proper. In this global process of enhancing
- forecasting meteorological satellites have shown their usefulness for the past 2
decades by supplementing or replacing conventional ground-based or seaborne means
' of observation. In late 1977, Europe launched Meteosat-1. And now it must decide
whether to move on to operational--and no long~r experimental--use of satellites of
the same family providing continuous service.
In the final analysis, justification for weather satellites lies in the impact they
may have on the different sectors of economic activity. The sequence from cause
to effect is, of course, very long: weather forecastin g would improve even if there
_ were no satell~.tes, and moreover there are numerous systems in place to protect
certain highly weather-sensitive activities from extreme changes in the weather that
are inordinately different from the expected weather or ideal weather.
In 1979, the Eurosat Corporation conducted a detailed study for the European Space
- Agency. The purpose of this study was to determine the quantitative and qualitative
economic impact that can be expected during the period 1979-1990 from the operation-
al availability of a Meteosat type European satellite system covering the entire
area of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The findings of this study were then
compared with the pro~ected costs of maintaining the system in continuous operation.
The resultant profit-cost ratios were incorporated in the supporting documen~~s the
different European meteorological services use to ~ustify their budget estimates for
the period in question. These will undoubtedly lead to establishment of a~oint
agency made up of European meteorological sat~llite users, namely Eumetsat.
The methodology employed was based on a combination of the following: a comprehen-
sive statistical compilation, multiple interactions with European meteorological
experts, and application of asampling pr:Cnciple followed by extrapolation, with
direct access to the principal users involved in order to check or consolidate pro-
_ ~ected quantifications. The paragraphs that follow outline the analytical process
used and the results obtained.
The compilation work was organized along three main lines: updating and coordinating
the gross national product figures of the most significant countries within the geo-
graphical area concerned, classigying the ecanomic sectors common to all countries,
and ranking the ultimately selected eight sectors according to their degree of
responsiveness to improvem~nts in weather forecasting. ~'he "figures" aspect of the
compilation necessitated certain assumptions and simplifying extrapolations, because
of the extreme variety of national currencies and the years of reference. In classi-
fying the economic sectors, certain activities were grouped and the following eight
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sectors were fi~ally selected: manufacturing and processing ind~istry, wholesale
and retail trade, services at the individual or community level of society, con-
struction, transportation, agriculture, electricity-gas-water, mining and extractive
- activities in general. ~
Ranking the eight sectors according to their capacity to benefit from improved fore-
casts necessitated making a multicriteria analysis in three stages: intrinsic
influence of the weather on the initial parameters within the sectors and on the
facilities used, climatic factors according to the number of seasons per year and
the orography of the countries concerned, reactivity of the sectors to improved
forecasting according to the economic development level of the countries and
_ the aggregation rate of the sectors.
A special accivity within the comprehensive study was the effort to determine the ~
specific contribution of satel.lite's to the improvement of conventional m_.teorologi-
, cal services. Th is task was difficult because of the novelty of using geosGationary
- satellite data in the area concerned--Meteosat-1 was launched in November 1977--and
because of C11E fact that weather forecasting is not an exact science and has nc~t
even reached maturity. The cooperation and conatructive criticism of most of thc
European meteorological agencies were extremely valuable in this special activity
which had to strictly separate improvements due to satellites from those due to
the general improvement of weather forecasting. It was determined that three cate-
gories of conventional meteorological services or products were especially improvable
by Meteosat. These three are: ~ery short-range forecasts of less than 12 hours,
short-range forecasts of 12 to 96 hours, and~ medium=range forecasts of 4 to 10 d ays.
The accuracy of forecasts is an essentially asymptotic parameter which varies with -
the quality and quantity of the observation facilities and associated processing
_ techniques. Hence determining that accuracy was the sub~ect of many discussions.
The reference periad of 1979-1990 was divided into two equal parts so as to make
allowance for the ~ime required to obtain a working knowledge of how to integrate
satellite-produced data. Because of the degree of expertise already acquired on the
Old Continent, improvements in Eu~ope were also separated from those expected -
in Af rica and the Middle East. The percentages of error reduction ultimately e xpected -
are given in Table l.
Table 1
Percentages of Forecas[ing Error Reduction Obtained With Meteosat '
Forecasts Europe Africa- Middle East
1979-1984 1985-1990 1979-1984 1985-1990
: Very short-range 4 5.3 11 20
Short-range 7 8 14 23 -
Medium-range 7 13 16 25
Sampling followed by extrapolation was the method chosen to estimate the benefits
or profits the different sectors derive from improved forecasting. The limited
time and manpower allotted to the study dictated this choice of inethod, as did also
the guidirig principle followed in the entire study, namely, minimizing the benefits
as much as possible and estimating them quantitatively only in the most sensitive crr _
responsive fields, hence where there is the least margin ~f error. The mechanism
linking sectors to benef its was subjected to thorough investigations, namely for
agriculture in France and .construction i.n the rederal Republic of Ger.nany, by using
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certain verification points in Spain, Turkey, and the West A�rican coun~ries, The
compilation of similar studies, but of ineteorology in general, discussions with
persons directly involved in these two sectors, a survey of the use of specialized
meteorological services and products in each sector, and the ~arification of orde~s
of magnitude with recognized experts, all served to produce the following two figurea.
in percentage of the sector's value added:
a, 0.1 percent for agriculture in France~ the equivalent of 100 million francs in
prof its per year;
b. 0.06 percent for construction in the FRG, the equivalent of 57 million deutschmark
in profits per year.
These figures were then extrapolated to the other si~t sectors in both countries,
and subsequently to all other economically significant cotmtries within the area -
being considered.
The cost analysis of an operational European weather satellite system was limited
to integrating ESA's recent cost figures on the space segment with the assumed deploy-
ment of a certain number of receiving stations and data-collection plat~or7ns. The
accepted order of magnitude is s lightly higher than 20 milllon francs per year. A
standard discount rate of lfl percent was then applied to all prof its and costs,
by making allowance for a certain nn~ber of assumptions on the grouwth of the var-
_ ious gross naCional products for the period 1979-1990.
The ratio of profits to costs thus obtained is 16 to 1 for Europe, Africa, and the
Middle East as a whole, assuming there is an optimum increase in the use of satel-
lite data. For Europe alone, this ratio is a minimum of 2.9 to 1 in the most
conservative case, and some 8 to 1 if Meteosat data rapidly comes into general use.
A more refined analysis of the most conservative case was made for the eight Euro-
pean countries that have contributed to tHe Meteosat-1 program~-with the Netiher~ands
and Spain in addition--,so as to allow for each one's specific aharacteristics, such
as climatic conditions, latitude, relative sizE of the different sectors, and the
recent Meteosat data utilization ratio. These countries are the natural candidates
for f unding the European operational program in the 1980's, and the benefits they can
individually expect therefrom may decisively influence their participation in this
funding. By postulating standard participation percentages identical to the contri-
butions of these countries to ESA's general and scientif ic budget, and by considering
that these countries alone will assume financial responsibility for the entire system,
the corresponding ratios of profit to cost were calculated and are giv~n in Table 2
below.
It will be noted that potential profits are relatively higher in southern countries
--Spain, France, and Italy--than in northern countries. Qualitative factors that
account for these differences include: climatic conditions and their variability,
the preponderant importance of agriculture in the south, and the better accommoda-
tion of the northern countries to coverage provided by satellites in low polar orbit.
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Table 2
Profit-Cost Ratios for European Countries
Country Assumed share of Profit-cost ratio
_ funding
Belgium 4.29 2,3
Denmark 2.29 3.3
Spain 4.73 ' 7.8
France 21.07 3.4
Italy 12.19 4.3 -
Netherlands 5. 60 1.1 ~
- FRG 25.57 2.6
United Kingdom 15.35 1.6
Sweden 4.41 1.7
- Switzerland 3.96 1.7
Overall profit-cost
ration 2.9
- In conclusion,, it may be said that meteorology in Europe is preparing itself for
a new evolution thanks to the geostationary satellite. Sectors of economic activity
are becoming aware of the quality of weather forecasts and are go ing to increase
their reactivity to these forecasts. The resultant general profits will exceed
corresponding expenditures by a factor of approximately 3, and possibly as high as 7
in certain countries. Consequently there is no doubt whatever about the fact that
~ operational strengthening of such a tool is warranted. ~
~
_ ~
~ ~.a, -
~
~M
_ ~
.*~4i
f C' ~x
1
_ x
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Industrial Use
_ Paris FUTURIBLES in French No 38, Nov 80 pp 46-48
[Article by Patrice Brendle, research fellow in the Department of Theoretical and
Applied Economics, Louis Pasteur University, Strasbourg: "Meteosat`e Effects on
European Industry"]
[Text] The preceding articles shed liCtle light on an important aspect of the Meteo-
- sat pro~ect, namely the fact that producing such a complicated system mobilized
a large number of engineers--up to 800 persons during peak periods--including the .
most competent, in some 50 European firms for approx3matelq 5 years. Like all
European Space Agency programs. it demanded of these firms not only a considerable
research and development effort but also a major organization and coordination effort.
While these efforts definitel~ had a direct pffect, namely successful completion of
the pro~ect, ~hey also had some indirect effects for the firms involved.
Technological Repercussions
These indirect effects stemmed from the novelty and extreme complexity of certain
components of the Meteosat system. A.l.though thP spacecraft itself was of relatively
standard configuration, production of its payload, and particularly the radiometer--
the first optieal system of such importance installed in a European satellite-- -
occasioned the development and application o� new techniques: fabrication and _
installation of the telescope, improvement of infrare,d and water vapor sensor,~, etc.
The considerable innovative work done by man~facturers involved in this project
produced considerable technological fallout, including the following:
a. Acquisition of skills in space instrumentation, optics, and electro-optics.
b. Increased knowledge in the field of cleanina procedures, knowledge which has -
been reused in the manufacture of printed circuits.
c. Development of a heat-leak detector derived from the satellite's infrared sensor.
This device can be used in mines and in the construction business.
d. Meteosat has enabled some contractors to develop new products. For instance,
one European company has been able to sell about 200 sets of a data preprocessing,
correction, and filing system developed for the Meteosat project. In addition, it
has negotiated a very large contract with an American firm for production of this
same aystem under license.
Commercial Repercussions
~ These are related to the importance of the system and its applications. First, the
mere fact of having participated in such aprogram gives the firms involved a"space
quality seal of approval," because of the strict reliability, performance, and other
standards required of space equipment. This "seal" can at times be the clinching
sales argument. Secondly, and this effect is truly apecific to the Meteosat pro-
ject, the advantages of the Meteosat system as a weather forecasting instrument are
capable of interesting a large number of countries within the satellite's area of
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coverage. This represents a substantial market for the firms to which ESA has
8~signed the task of developing user stations, a market that includes 14 Europegn
countries, 10 Middle East countries, and 22 African countries.
Organization and Management Repercussions
These positive effects result from the great mastery of international project
management problems, a mastery that participation in a project like Meteosat
implies. For example, in carrying out its responsibi].ities for systems analysis,
integration, tests, cabling, etc., the satellite's prime contractor has prafited
especially from an improvement in~the skills of its employees in such areas as:
task analysis and definition plus cost control of a complex project, technical
modification management with the help of computerized programs, and quality control
by monitoring the eontrol procedures of its subcontractors,
The following are examples of the benefits society can derive from Meteosat's
enhancement of the quality of weather forecasts.
For agriculture:
a, Farmers will be able to make more judicious use of fertilizers and tree-care
products by preventing them from being washed away by rain.
b. Crop losses due to frost or hail will be appreciably reduced.
For the construction industry:
a. Savings will be possible through more ~udicious deployment of construction equip- '
ment.
b. Certain "inclement weather" indemnities charged to construction costs could be
avoided.
For airlines and shipping lines:
a, The safety and profitability of air and sea traffic will be enhanced.
b. Flights and ocean crossings will be optimized with large fuel savings and re-
duced idle periods.
For highway traf f ic :
Rain, s now, and ice will have less harmful effects on road traffic: timely sanding
of superhighways, heating of bridges, etc.
For the production of electric power:
Electric power producers will be able to coordinate demand for electric power with
available resources more efficiently.
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' In this article, we have outlined only a part of the findings of a study now being
conducted in Strasbourg, a study meant to determine the indirect benefits European
- industry can derive from participation in a project like Meteosat. If, as theee
f~w lines show, this project's contractors benefited from induced effects dealing
with all the essential f unctions of a business enterprise--production, sales, organi-
_ zation--it is certainlq because of the project's particular characteristics. As
a matter of fact, the projectitnpli.~d research and development efforts rich in pos-
sible applications. Furthermore, the importance of Meteosat's mission, coupled with
the size of its area of coverage, has opened a^romising market to European industry.
COPYRIGHT: Association Internationale Futuribles 1980
8041
CSO: 3100
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E CONOML C ITALY -
FTAT'S 1980 PROGRESS REPORT BY SECTaR
Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 23 Jan 81 p 9
jArticle: "Af ter the Crisis, FIAT on the Rebound"]
[Text] 1980 was a year of deep change for the FIAT group. Many innovation, all
of great relevance, have occurred. The group is preparing to face the decade
witIi its house in order, to be capable of stopping the competition from making
further gains.
The graph here shown indicates the performance of FIAT stocks in the stock market..
- Tiie gain ha.s been consis tent and the trend also continued af ter the holding
completed a capital increase, a sign that savers still have faith in the most
important Italian group.
We are indicating here relevant data on the performance of various FIAT sectors -
dur~ng tlie las t f iscal year .
Automobiles
The sector's gross receipts were 8,540 billion lire (7,115 billion in 1979). FIAT _
plants in Ttaly produced 1,278,000 motor vehicles with a decline of 2.4 percent
compared to 1979. In Ttaly, 933,000 Fiat, Lancia and Autobianchi cars and
commercial vehicles were sold, against 767,800 in 1979. Tfle group's share of the
- market in Ttaly was 51.6 percent (50.3 percent in 1979). Abroad, FIAT has
seriously suffered from the market's widespread crisis and from the strong gains .
o~ Japanese automakers. In all, exports diminished by 20 percent compared to
1979, reaching a number of 458,000 vehicles. The good results obtained in Italy
fiave more than made up for the decline of foreign sales in terms of market share:
the FIAT quota in Europe increased from 11.4 percent to 12.8 percent in 1980,
into a clear second place. From a financial point of view, 1980 will not achieve
better results than 1979. The actions to reduce stock inventory and the mandated
capital increase of 500 billion lire will produce in 1981 an improvement in the
~inancial position.
Iridustri:al Vehicles
T[te gross receipts of the sector in 1980 iaere 4,080 billion lire (3,534 billion in
1979}. I'yECO produced, in 1980, 111,000 industrial vehicles with an increase of
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1 percent compared ta t.~;e previous year. Sales have also registered a small
increase versus 1979, thanks to the fact that the Italian market held its own
and that non-European markets sustained a positive performance. Other West
European markets, instead, suffered a decrease in demand. Programs planned
perm~t a certain optimistic outlook for 1981. In spite of the fact that a
market rebound is not foreseeable, the economic results should substantially
improve.
- Farm Tractors
In a year of unfavorable economic conditions, sales of FIAT tractors were lower
tflan those of 1979 witfi respect to assembled tractors (60,058 against 64,287 of
1.979~, wfiile shipments abroad of parts destined to be assembled locally came out
considerably fiigher(approximately 16,000, against 9,800 of 1979). FIAT tractors
once again took first place in the number of vehicles registered in Europe.
Excavators
FIAT-Allis sales reached a number of 9,830 vehicles against the 10,053 of 1979.
~e U.S, market resnained at rather low levels, while in Europe the signs of a
substantial market arrest were confirmed. In Italy the market held its own with
an excellent performance of sales for all product lines.
_ Metal Tndustry
_ T[ie gross receipts of the sector were 1.695 billion lire, (1.426 billion in 1979).
TfLe fall in the demand for steel in Europe prompted the EEC to declare a crisis for
th~s sector and to apply drastic reductions in production; as far as Teksid is
concerned, results for the period from January to July were positive, while from
September a reversal in the tendency was experienced. Regarding the economic
results, the anomalous behavior of the last part of 1980 has practically wiped
out the profits registered in the first part of the year. The result, neverthe-
less, is better than that of the previous year.
Components
Gross receipts were 1,780 billion (1,454 billion in 1979). The market situation
varied in function of the activities in which the sector is involved, and the
performances were irregular throughout the year. The sector's profitability,
though always at high levels, underwent a contraction due to the automobile crisis.
Tool-making Ma.chinery and Production Systems
In spite of the internationl crisis of the automobile industry, companies in this
sector managed to regenerate their sales portfolio which, up to 31 December, 1980,
totaled 400 billion lire, of which more than 70 percent was for foreign sales.
One of the most important contracts was the furnishing of Robogate plants to
_ General Motors USA.
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CiV:L.I., and Envirornnental Engineering
Gro~e receipts of tfie sector were 1,356 billion lire (955 billion in 1979).
_ . Construct~on f~rms still ach~eved good results, winning a record number of new
contracts for over 1,500 million dollars.
Energy
In the field of aeronautic and civil motors, the great success achieved by the
joint-venture FIAT Aviation, Pratt and Whitney, and MTU, which managed to win the
contract to supply engines for the new Boeing 757, must be pointed out. FIAT
Ttg is completing numerous turbogas plants in Italy and abroad.
Railroad Products and Systems
Gross receipts were 200 billion lire (136 billion in 1979). The success
attained in 1979 will allow FIAT Railroad Savigliano to achieve favorable results.
Tourism and Transportation
1980 was characterized by a certain arrest in the national tourist market.
Th,e sector`s gross receip ts improved from 72 billion lire in 1979 to 90 billion
~n 1980.
~ As far as other companies in the group are concerned, Telettra, in spite of a
critical operational situation, confirms positive results. Nebiolo increased its
gross receipts by more than 40 percent. In spite of these improvements, 1980
remained an unprofitable year. Biomedical activities in 1980 registered an
increase in gross receipts of 34 percent compared to 1979. FIAT made its
appearance in the publishing sector with the establishment of a new company,
Itedi, which, when transfer is completed, will control the publishing house
La Stampa, Publikompass, Publihertz and will maintain minority interests in
oth.er companies. Sava's undertakings registered a 5 percent increase. In
1980 the FIAT research center carried out more advanced and innovative research
and development activities. Fidis underwent deep changes. Last November this
company in fact increased its capital from 15 to 125 billion lire. The new
- financial means were utilized to purchase a substantial ic?terest in some of the
leading companies of the FIAT group. As is known, Mediobanca is about to issue
- bonds in the amount of 250 billion lire, partially convertible into Fidis shares
starting in 1982. It is foreseen that Mediobanca Fidis bonds will soon be quoted
in the Italian fi.nancial markets.
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Le azioni Fiat nei 1980
2-' And~n~o d~i doo0 Fi~t, on9nuio . p~ivilpisto
eisp~tto all'i~dba ddu Bona di M(lano
Zooo -4: pndia di 8on~ b~a ~�t-a0 ~ t000) , ~
5. Mie -
~soo _
_
: _
. 6. Fiat Ord.
-
tooo Fi~t Priv.
-
_
' ..f�~"l..:.i ' -
9 f' m a m ~ l a � o n d
KEX:
l. FIAT Stocks in 1980
- 2. Performance of FI'AT coffinorc and pre.ferred stocks
3. compared to the index of the M~l.an Stock Exchange
4. (Stock Excfia~ge Ihdex base Feb. 1, 80 = 1,000
5. M/'~ Milan S`tock Excfiange
fi. Fiat CornmoR S`tocks
7. Fiat Preferred Stocks
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editrice I1 Sole-24 Ore s.r.l.
9758
CSO: 3104
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ITALY
pOLTTICAL
POLL SHdhTS PCI AS GAINING GROUND IN RO1~
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 13 Feb 81 pp 14-15
~Article by Mario De Scalzi~
~Text~ Four months away from elections, the parties are already sharpening
their weapons. Voting for the Reme government will take place in May, and
already there are those who can count on the results of public opinion surveys.
This is the case of the PCI ~Italian Communist Party~: According to a private
poll, the salient details of which IL MONDO is able to provide, the communists
should strengthen the supremacy they won in the 1980 regional elections. After
having plunged to 29.7 percent in the 1979 political elections, the PCI obtained
31.7 percent last year and, in May, should rise to around 33 percent. This is
a trend that is being underscored with much satisfaction at the Rome federation
of the PCI, since such a result would be approaching the vote it achieved in the
last municipal elections in 197fi: 35.5 percent. -
The communist poll was taken about 1 month ago by camouflaged activists, door to
door, using the conventional simulated-voting method. Its other results indicate
a DC ~Christian Democratic Party~ that wi~ll lose ground: 34.2 percent (1979
politicals), 31.6 percent (1980 regionals), 30-31 percent according to the fore-
cast. In the last municipals, the DC got 33 percent of the vote.
The poll further shows the PSI ~Italian Socialist Party~ standing still at its
_ 9.8-percent level in the 1980 regionals: In the politi~cals it had got 8..3 percent
of the vote and in the 1976 municipals 7.6 percent. A big surprise is in store
~ for the PR ~Radical Party~, to which the PCI (using as a basis for comparison
the PR's 7.1 percent in the politicals, since it did not run in the regionals)
attributes a loss of one third of its votes: It would thus obtain 4.5 percent
(although at the las~ municipals the PR obtained only 1.74 percent). The PSDI -
~Italian Social Democratic Party~, which the communist poll places at the same
results it obtained in the 1980 regionals (almost 5 percent), merits a further
comment: "It is the only party, however," the PCI's Rome federation admits, "that
never respects our forecasts." As regards the other parties, only ,very minor
- fluctuations:are indicated. At Piazza Nicosia, headquarters of DC in Rome, the
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order of the day is to block the communist advance: "in the 1980 regionals,"
recalls Deputy Salvatore La Rocca, "the PCI got one councillar more than did the
DC� thanks to a difference of only 1,000 votes. Everything, therefore, teeters
OA a razor-edge."
The battle has begun within the parties, meanwhile, to draw up their lists of
candidates. The fact is that the Rome municipals are well-known for havinq a
political significance that goes beyond their results in terms of having chosen
the capital's administrative officials. The PCI has no problem with its list:
Heading it will be the incumbent Mayor Luigi Petroselli, who 5 years ago won a
smashing personal victory with 82,000 votes, almost double the number given to
his opponent, Giulio Andreotti.
In the DC, on the other hand, the qu~stion i~ still up in the air. It has dis-
carded Milan-type solutions (wherein the list was headed by former Prefect Libero
Mazza, "who recovered the votes of the moderates," according to Piazza Nicosia,
"but left those of the left wide open"), and has decided to resort to a name of
undisputed prestige. Favored by the National Secretariat of the party was
- Giuseppe Lazzati, rector of Catholic University. Notwithstanding the imprimatur
of approval by the Catholic world, particularly by Cardinal Ugo Poletti, his
approval by 1~mintore Fanfani, and his acceptance by the DC's left wing, it
appears that Lazzati's designation has been blocked by complications originating
with Andreotti, who would prefer "more youthful solutions." In substance, the
_ former prime minister has Iaunched the candidacy bid of Publio Fiori, who entered
. Parliament with 100,000 votes. In the stalemate that has developed between
Lazzati and Fiori, the name of Antonino Zichichi, president of the Europeanbody of '
physicists and probable upcoming candidate for the Nobel Prize, has come forth.
But the Catholic reaction toward it has been cool. The DC's Rome committee has
recently given consideration also to the name of Giorgio Pedrocchi, dean of the
Faculty of Law in Rom~, thus reflecting an evident preoccupation with finding
a likeable personality that can also run strongly on his qualifications as a
mayoral candidate--that is, one having a certair~ amount of adm inistrative
experience.
_ Viewed by some as unfortunate, by others with indifference, and by still others
with concern, there is also the unknown of whether or not the PR will run in
the municipals. Having bypassed the regionals, Marco Pannella has stated to IL
MONDO: "For the time being, we are still gathering up all the pros and cons. The
~boccia~ balls have not yet come to a stop: In fact, with all the other games
being played, it seems to me no one has even picked them up to start the play as
yet." But several facts make it hard to believe the PR will no t run: First of
_ all, Rome is the radicals' stronghold. Secondly, viewing the PSI and PR results
in the 1979 po].iticals (8.3 percent and 7.1 percent respectivel~), the radicals
- are cherishing the idea of becoming~the capital's third party. And lastly, there
_ is the prospect of taking on the MSI ~Italian Social Movement~, which is also
very strong in Rome "but two thirds of whose constituency." Pannella emphasizes
with satisfaction, "in the referendum on divorce, disregarde@ Giorgio Almirante's
exhortations."
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The PSI finds itself in a problematic situation. To begin with, its national
congress is close at hand and internal wrangling over its candidacy list has been
~ttr aside. Secondly, its left-wing leaders are involved in talks with the PCI
- on the tense climate that exists between the two parties. The Rome Socialists,
- for example, are complaining against "constant attacks" by the daily PAESE SERA,
which leans toward the PCI. "It is a serious matter," says Paris Dell'Unto,
socialist deputy from Rome, "and PAFSE SERA must change its tune."
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981
9238
CSO: 3104
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POLITICAL ITALY
DOCZJMENT ISSUED ON I~DIUM-TERM ECONOMIC PLAN
Rome ENERGIA E MATERIE PRIME in Italian Nov-Dec 80 (Insert)
~Titled: "Draft Medium-Term Plan (1981-1983) - Document Issued by Ministry of
Budget and Economic Planning"~
- CText~ Preamble
In three meetings on 12 November, 10 and 18 December, the CIPE ~Interministerial
Committee for Economic Planning~ has approved the underlying policy, content and
- procedure of a draft economic plan for the 3-year period 1981-1983.
The proceedings and outcome of these policy deliberations are summarized in the
following report of 18 December:
In today's meeting; the CIPE agreed that the Medium-Term Plan (1981-1983) is a
body of sectoral policies designed to foster increased investments within a de- ~
flationary framework.
Specifically, the CIPE has agreed on the following points:
1) The Medium Term Plan (1981-1983) will be in the form of plans of action drawn
up by the administrative bodies concerned, in agreement raith the Ministry of
Budget, and in accordance with the following objectives: _
--reduce dependency on foreign sources of energy, food products and wood prod-
ucts, and increa~e exports of manufactured goods and tourism;
--reduce tne wasting of resources at the crisis points (centered in the steel,
_ chemical and shipbuilding sectors) and improve the use of resources through
restructuring and reorganization processes with government assistance;
--use the opportunities thus created to improve essential public services (hous-
ing, health, transportation) and the activity of some sectors(such as infrastruc-
tures, industrial farming, electronic components, telecommunications, technolo-
gical innovation) capable of raising the average productivity of our system.
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2) The broadened public ~ector's budget performance must evidence the following
simultaneous characteristics: a downtrend in the current deficit with respect to
- Che GPD ~Gross Domestic Product~; an uptrend in capital investment expenditures
with respect to the GDP.
3) The reconstruction and development plan for the zone damaged by the 23 Novem-
ber earthquake is an integral part of the Medium-Term Plan and the related
financial requirements are to be considered high-prioritied.
4) vecisions to f~nd plans are made subject to an overall verification of their
effectiveness toward attainment of the objectives of growth in national inco.me,
employment, and an increased level of investments in Southern Italy, all within
an economic framework characterized by a reduction of inflation and of the
current balance of payments deficit.
5) For the evaluation of plans from the standpoint of responses to these objec-
' tives, it recommends the creation of an "Evaluation Group under the General
- Secretaria~ for Economic Planning, to be responsible for evaluation of the '
technical aspects of proposed capital expenditures submitted to the CIPE for -
approval."
The CIPE also approved in its initial meeting of 12 ;vovember the index af the
document the General SQcretariat for Economic Planning has assumed responsibitity
for drawing up in cooperation with the ministries concerned.. During that meeting,
it was explicitly requested that a 3-year plan be included for tourism and one
for the aeronautics sector; the latter was passed over in the course of work for -
~ lack of an organic plan .
The directory index of the 1981--1983 Plan approved by the CIPE now stands as
follows:
1. Terms of Reference
1.1 Problem of recovery of economic sovereignty over cost centers: raw materials
market; labor mark e t; capital market, ~
1.2 Problem of reduction of the destabilizing impacts of the public sector
budget.
1.3 Problem of expanding the develop:nental function of budget policy.
1.4 Problem of self-reliance of the productive sector.
1.5 Problem of size of business.
2. Correction of Trends Produced in the Economic System by International and
Domestic Impalses
2.1 Plans for direct reduction of foreign dependency (2.1.1 3-Year Energy Plan; �
2.1.2 3-Year Farming Plan; 2.1.3 3-Year Forestry Plan; 2.1.4 3-Year Export
Plan; 2.1.5 3-Year Tourism Plan).
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2.2 Plan for reabsorption of inefficient use (at crisis points) of resources
_ (2.2.1 3-Year Chemical Plan; 2,2.2 3-Year Steel P1~1n; 2.2.3 3-Year Shipbuild-
ing Plan; 2.2.4 Law 675).
~ 2.3 Plans for take-up of the current slack in domestic demand (subdivided into
- 2.3.1 P2ans for Public Services, and 2.3.2 Plans for Development of Production
and Employment. The first of these are further subdivided into 2.3.1.1 3-Year
Housing Plan; 2.3.1.2 3-Year Hea~.th Plan; 2.3.1.3 3-Year Transportation Plan.
The second are subdivided into 2.3.i.1 Special Intervention in Southern ItaJ.y; -
2.3.2.2 Plan for Resurgence of Earthquake-Stricken Zones; 2.3.2.3 3-Year Plan
for Expansion of Infrastructures; 2.3.2.4 3-Year Farming Industry Plan; 2.3.2.5
_ 3-Year Electronic Components P1an; 2.3.2.6 3-Year Telecommunications Plan;
2.3.2.7 3-Year Technological Innovation Plan) .
2.4 Plans for reorganization and development of the tertiary sector (2.4.1 3-Year
Plan for Commercial Intermediation; 2.4.2 3-Year Plan for Financial Intermedia-
tion) .
3. Growth-Oriented Public Sector Budget Plans
- 3.1 3-Year Current Outflow Plan.
3.2 3-Year Current Inflow Plan.
3.3 3-Year Capital Accounts Outflow Plan (3.3.1 Regional Distribution of Funds) .
3.4 3-Year Public Finance Summary Plan.
4. Behavior of Marketplace Operators
4.1 Labor Policy.
4.2 Capital Policy.
4.3 Procurement Policy.
4.4 Public Administration Policy.
Wherein exports and tourism--which respond to the demands of essential national
economic activities in difficulties owing to loss of competitiveness--are omitted -
from the body of the Plan, their i nclusion as separate individualized Plans mu s t
respond to the requiz~ements explicated in the CIPE's report and set forth in more
subsequent detailv
The inclusion of separate individualized Plans or interventional policies in the _
Medium-Term D1an (1981-1983) is, at the current stage of deliberations, a choice
on principle~ on the assumption of their potential response to at least one of -
the three requirements set forth herein, namely, reduction of foreign dependency, _
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improvement in utilization of resources, and growth of employment and collective
- well-being, partiaularly in Southern Italy. Approval of publ,ic funding foc
separate Plans must nevertheless be canditioned upon verification, by a Group
constituted for this purpose, of their effective contribution to the five ecOno~
mic policy objectives: real growth, inflation, employment, investments in
Southern Italy, and foreign trade balance.
For this reason as well--besides that of the different stages mf completion--the
Plan is, for the time being, divided into two documents, of which the first alone
represents a policy commitment of the proponent ministry; to this commitment is
added that of putting the ministry in the position ot an active promotional body
within the planning.
The Terms of Reference
The Medium-Term Plan (1981-1983) consists of a body of sectoral plans and of
polioies on budgets and on operative production-factors within the framework of a
fight against inflation; it is aimed at the policy objective of increasing
employment and :~roadening the productive base of Southern Italy.
- To attain this objective, it has been deemed necessary to operate sectorially,
as well as on the aggregate level with regard to tax and monetary policies,
toward obtaining the following results, valid for the entire econorny:
--reduction of dependency on foreign sources for energy, food products and wood
products, and development of exports;
_ --reduction of wastage of resources at current points of crisis (centered in the
= steel, chemical and shipbuilding sectors), and improvement in the use of resources -
through restructuring and reorganization processes;
--utilization of the gaps thus created to improve certain essential public
- services (housing, health, transportation) and the activity of certain sectors
(such as the infrastructure, the farming industry, electronic components, tele- -
communications, technological innovation) capable of raising the average produc- ~
; tivity of our system.
Economic debate in the past has focused above all on the issues of income dis-
tribution and financial imbalances. Despite their diverse interpretations, the ~
problems raised by that debate maintain their economic validity, but the times
required to transform the proposed solutions into policy decisions have proven
longer than the times required for the precipitation of sectoral and balance-of-
payments crises. _
_ The seeking of coherent behaviors and confoimance to compatibilities are the ,
- natural approach to adjustment of the imbalances in the Italian economy. An
increase in the productivity of capital, within the many constraints of cost,
has nevertheless been considered an instrument still available to the economic
policy authorities to start the crisis on its way to a solution; investment is
the vehicle of this productivity.
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By means of the Plan, the economic policy authoritx seeks to give rise to the _
coherent behavior among the market operators that is necessary to leac] the coun-
try definitively out of the crisis; specifically, to bring about a solution to
the age-old problem of the labor-cost, financing-cost, capital-returns dynamic.
Nevertheless, the government has decided to start its interventional program even
while awaiting positive developments in these three variables.
The inability of our economic system to give rise to more employment and to
promote the development of Southern Italy is owing to the economic system's poor
_ average productivity performance in the face of rising costs with which it is
unar,le to deal. The poor productivity is undoubtedly linked to the economy's low
ove�rall capitalization, but also to a deliberate policy of reducing optimal use
of existing capital, a policy that has crystallized recently in the new configur-
ation of the factors involved.
Should the productive diligence shown in the recent past by the work force con-
tinue and all efforts be centered on greater productivity alone to resolve the
_ crisis, existing capital would be insufficient to guarantee a growth capable of
meeting the demands arising from the increases in the "rea], take" by countries
_ that produce goods essential to our economy, and, at the same time, leaving
resources for the creation of new jobs. -
The real facts on which the Plan is based therefore justify the emphasis it
places on investments and on productivity, but do not diminish, and indeed they
point up, the need for a contribution which a slower growth in the cost of labc,r,
cost of money and cost of raw materials would make, enabling action on the
determining causes of these, toward a solution of the economic crisis in which
the country is immersed.
- Considering that changes in the international markets ar,e leading to a pYOgres-
sive deterioration in the rates of exchange between Italian and foreign products
--which is reflected in an ongoing manner in declining exports and rising
imports--the Plan deems it insufficient to aim at investments for the sake alone
of investment; its aim must rather be those investments that guarantee first and
foremost a lesser degree of dependency on foreign sources by our economy: speci-
fically, investments to satisfy domestically part of our energy needs (which
during 1981-1983 will represent oil billings total~ng 95,000 billion lire), part
of our food needs (which during the same period will give rise to a�oreign trade
imbalance of 18,000 billion lire), part of our wood products needs (estimated at
9,000 billion for the period) and other needs, to satisfy which the country is
currently net dependent upon foreign sources. Of course, the more that can be
, saved by internal economic management, absorbing the substantial deficits being
incurred at the crisis centers (estimated at not less than 3,000 billion lire -
during 1980), the less need there is to operate on imports. It is preferable, _
however, to devote these potential savings, flowinq from a more rational manage-
_ ment of existing resources, to the collective well-being, employment and growth
in Southern Italy, rather than to outpayments abroad. This explains the 3-tier
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- layering of plans and interventional laws, and their sequence, which responds to
a precise choice of the manner of proceeding to satisfy the mentionecl needs: the
diminishing of foreign dependency, recovery of efficient use of resources, and
Use ofthe "opportunities" thus created toward collective well-being and growth.
As to the m~nner.in which the Plan operates with regard to the market, the choice
that has been made has no~ been that of predetermining in a detailed interven- -
tional program the public expenditure and the private onp implicit in the econ-
omic policy design, but rather that of establishing a' .~,..ing praxis" that will
enable the evaluation of the Plans and the timely ident~~,,cation of divergences
between actual domestic and international conditions and the desired ones, as
they affect the qrowth of employment and of Southern Italy, taking into account
the behavior of inflation. The principal instrument for this action will be
management of th.e public sector's budget rather than direct involvement in the
productive activi~ity; this management will be directed, more so than in the past,
toward encouraging market behaviors that operate conjointly in the direction of
the desired growth.
Policies with regard to the sectors of market and credit intermediation and with
regard to the productive factors--which involve the entire economy--will operate
together with this supply-oriented policy and are a necessary adjunct for the
attainment of the Plan's objectives. Their explication differs qualitatively
from that of the sectoral plans and interventional laws, these being predomin-
antly interlinked with the government's investment approach, while the others
depend predominantly,in the current legal and de facto institutional configura-
tion, upon forces outside the economic policy authority (with the sole exception
_ of procurement policy).
The articulation defined herein is a nontraditional one of a complex industrial
policy and, more generally, of an economic policy that unfolds vertically (sec-
toral plans and incentive laws), ;~~izontally (intermediational and productive-
factors policies) and territorially~(regionalization of interventions and of
Southern Italy). An integral part of this scheme is a policy of tariffs and of
prices that are government=administered or -supervised, oriented toward growth
and employment.
In this context, each sectoral Plan (or interventional law) is analyzed from �he
standpoint of its contribution to the attainment of the five intermediate objec-
tives, and it is with respect to this contribution that policy involvement is
being undertaken, not with regard to macroeconomic outlooks the results of which -
are beyond the control of the economic policy authority. Of course, the scopes
and motivations of the separate Plans extend well beyond this evaluation as to
"ends"; but those aspects are explicated in the detailed regulations, outside
the Plan, administered by the various ministries concerned.
These policies do not deny to aggregate demand its role as the "natural" frame
of reference for market operators, but aggregate demand is not given the central
position to which an economic policy aimed at cyclical control of the economy
had accustomed us. Control of aggregate demand is therefore coupled with supply- _
side policies, both having structural aims.
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Precisely because of this, the policies described herein impoae, in the current -
circumstances of the Italian economy, a policy of rest.riction of the "current"
clomestic demand--nourished by vague indications in the productive activity and
in the public sector's budget--aimed at creating the deflationary climate that
is deemed essential to the desired growth of employment and to the international
acceptability of the Plan under our financing needs.
Moreover, exchange rate stability during the entire operative period o� the Plan
is another essential condition for determining real adjustments and heading off
attempts at inflationary adjustments by market operators.
These policies appear capable--as has also been suggested by the CNEL in its
memorandum of 6 December--of modifying the economic trend lines, but they cannot
~ affect substantially the cyclical variations in the principal economic factors,
- above all if these variations are induced by international events (price rises
of the principal products, energy source shortages, armed conflictual events,
etc) and by domestic events beyond the control of these policies (earthquake,
- crises of various ori~ins). The Plan therefore excludes frequent policy changes
for purposes of cyclical control.
Although the Plan does not set out to compel the Ztalian economy to adhere to
= a predetermined conjuctural course, it nevertheless provides a positive contribu-
tion--appropriately quantified--to the five macrovariables cho~en as intermediate
objectives: real growth, inflation, employment, extent of investment in Southern
Italy and rectification of current account imbalances abroad. The instrumentali-
- ties being used will be reexamined on a regular semiannual basis from the stand-
point of improving their effectiveness.
The decision to set forth quantitative objectives even in '_:?e face of uncertain- -
ties exposes the Plan to crises of credibility during its implementation, but it
- has the advantage of providing to the operators a road map and a more solid
policy base to gain their consensus around it.
In this context, budget variables, expressed as percentages of the GDP, will be _
manipulated in accordance with attainment of the following intermediate objec-
tives, which, once attained, will make it possible for the five macrovariables
to make the contributions originally expected of them.
1981 1982 1983
Total revenues 44.0 44.0 44.0 -
Curzent deficit 4.5 3.5 2.5
Capital account outlays 5.5 6.5 7.5
The assumed freezing of the percentage of GDP absorbed by total revenues in the
broadened~public sector not only responds to the need to stabilize the impulses
to the economy arising from this aspect of the public budget, but also enables
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implementation of an equitable tax policy by way of structural modifications in
the total revenues, backed by the benefits of the fight against tax evasion, and
_ the cotrection of the tax drain to the benefit of those who pay taxes.
The cho'.ce of this objective commits the economic policy authority to an energetic
legislative effort around which it is necessary to obtain a broad consensus. It
is specified that, without legislative changes, the public budget would bring
about a spontaneous rise in revenues, as well as in expenditures in the opposite
direction to the desired one of growth of employment and of Southern Italy; the
higher the rise of inflation, the greater would be this twofold effect.
The stabilization of revenues is an implicit counterpart to the reduction of the
current deficit--imposed by the need to utilize the savings to develop employ-
- ment--and hence of current expenditures, to a level comparable to that of the
rest of the world. This stabilization also implies, over the short term, a
greater direct burden on the citizen in payment for public services, but a more
stable supply of such services over the medium term. Attainment of the objectives
of real growth of income and of employment will in fact enable the financing of
more public services based on the creati~on of product and not on the creation
of money and credYt as is currently being done.
As regards budgetary choices, it was decided to maintain the total need~of the
broadened public sector to be satisfied by the domestic budget constant at 37,500
billion lire, that is, at the 1980 level, to enable a lowering of the dynamic
- of monetary factors without mortifying, as to quantities and cost, the productive
sector's credit needs.
The rising percentaye of capital account public investments, for a constant value
of domestic needs being satisfied, entails a requirement for international credit
to satisfy the needs justified in individualized 3-year plans which, having
successfully passed the joint tests as to efficiency of proposed implementation
and policy advisability of their undertakings, cannot be satisfied out of the
public sector's capital budget.
Access to international cre~~it resides in the acceptability of our economic
policy according to standards acceptable to other nations. At this time there-
fore, and with a12 the more reason, the Medium-term Plan must needs be accom-
panied by restrictive "internal" budgetary and monetary policies and ~y a
coherent exchange policy within the E~ ~European Monetary System~ and with
respect to the dollar. Financing, the need for which will be substantial at
full operation of the Plan, must be backed by a number of international banks;
the possibility of obtaining this backing will not depend, as in the past, upon
our presenting a total need by the Italian state--either from the standpoint of
our public budget or from that of our trade balance--but upon a showing that
the individual Plans are economically viable and adequate to the attainment of
their stated objectives. The Plans will therefore be accompanied by a real and
true detailed study made by an appropriate Evaluation Group reporting to the
General Secretariat for Economic Planning and operating according to ~tandard
interna.tional evaluation criteria.
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As regards the Plan's.necessary accompanying policies, it is planned to impose
on the "internal" monetary variables a decremental rate of not less than two -
percentage points annually with respect to current values, even through circum-
_ gtantial sterilization of foreign flows.
The Medium-Term Plan (1981-1983) also addresses five problem areas: recovery of
sovereiqnty over production cost control; reduction of cyclical impulses deriving
from public inflows and outflows as well as from financing of deficits related
thereto; increased use of the broadened public sector's budget to stimulate
growth; increased areas of self-reliance on the part of productive enterprises;
_ resolution of the imbalances that contradistinguish the operations of enterprises
of different sizes. These problem areas are examined briefly under respective
headings that follow herein but--where mention is not made of an undertaking in
regard to overall revenues, current public expenditures and funding needs to be
- satisfied internally by the broadened public sector--their solutions are not yet
integral parts of the Plan's policy commitments, depending as they do im large
part upon factors outside the province of the authorities and/or upon unknown
factors. Nonetheless, the Plan contributes positively, even though not exactly
quantifiably, to their solutions; wherever possible, it stipulates what Plans,
laws or policies are to provide these contributions.
Problem of Recovery of Economic Sovereignty over Cost Centers: Raw Materials Mar-
kets; Labor Market; Capital Diarket
A nation, like Italy, whose foreign trade involvement in terms of imports and _
exports is of the magnitude observed in 1980 of over 50 percent ((imports +
exports)/GDP) and is situated, from the standpoint of the international division
of labor, within the class of products characterized by high price-elasticity
and hence subject to foreign competition, is compelled to maintain its interna-
tional competitiveness in costs and prices. The steering of the ultimate fate
of such an economy necessitates the exercise of a sufficient degree of economic
~ sovereignty over its cost centers: raw materials; labor; capital. Those respon-
sible for these centers must be capable of and in a position to settle on
combined costs of production factors, and hence the final prices of products,
such as will keep the enterprise competitive in the international markets as well
as in a domestic market open to the sale of toreign products. Durinq the past
several years, this sovereignty has been largely lost and th~ Italian aconomy has
- been left exposed to foreign impulses instead of being steered by its internal
forces; under these conditions, economic policy undergoes changes imposed by
events and is reduced to mere stopgap actions.
Some of the institutional remedies created by the nation--such as the indexation
of public expenditures and that of wages, revenue shelters (protectionist poli-
cies) and inefficiency shelters (rescue policies)--have exposed the economy's
flank to foreign attacks on the question of its soundness and on its outlook
for growth and employment. Throughout the period since 1973, moreover, Italy
_ has been involved in world conflicts on the distribution of incomes and wealth,
with characteristics and effects not unlike those observed throughout the 1960's -
issuing from the distributive conflicts of capital and labor.
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The nation has still not found consensus on an unambig~ous response to the array
of domestic and foreign conflicts and is therefore still not in a position to
exercise a sufficient degree of control over the imported raw materials, labor
arid financing cost centers.
The procurement policy, labor policy and capital policy (the latter together with
- the 3-Year Plan for Financial Intermediation) provide an initial contribution to
the solution of the problem. The fight against inflation, together with the
stabilization of exchange rates during the implementation of the Plan, are more-
- over a useful supplement to consensual cost-center interventions.
In the institutional structure of our Republic, cost centers are not under the
airect control of the economic policy authorities. This connotation of our econ-
omy requires that there be independent participation in the choices under the
Plan by the potential holders of sovereignty over cost centers: the union move-
ment associations of workers and the associations of enterprisers in real and _
financial assets.
Having not yet had the benefit, for reasons beyond the control of the Plan, of -
the awaited contribution from the cited organizations, it has been decided to
draw up independent proposals, using the instrumentalities still available to the
authority; this necessitates a completion of action by the social entities and
the Regions, which, by way of consultations to define their proposed actions,
will indicate the contributions these are intended to make to the effectiveness
of the proposed policies.
Problem of the Reduction of Destabilizing Impulses from the Public Sector Budget .
The fact notwithstanding that the intellectual climate remains favorable to the
use cf fiscal policy as an instrumentality of economic growth, the fact is now
~ openly admitted that fiscal policy in Italy has not accomplished the task of _
steering the economy toward full employment while maintaining a noninflationary
environment.
The fact is that during the 1960's, OECD ~Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development~ studies, and subsequently other empirical studies, had already _
warned that Italy's fiscal policy, instead of acting as a counterweight, had
frequently exacerbated the spontaneous evolution of the economic cycle, the lat-
ter itself in turn becoming the origin of destabilizing impulses.
The causes are numerous and not easily removable. The legislative process is
too slow ~ith respect to the rapidity necessitated by an anticyclical fiscal _
policy; budget expenditures are more easily disbursed independently of the
legislative authority than in other industrialized nations; the basis of know-
ledge underlying circumstantial policy choices is weak, if not misleading.
The magnitude attained by Italy's public budget and by its deficit has reduced
even :nore the role of fiscal policy in the steering of the economy and has ever~
taken over mastery of monetary policy to satisfy the cash requirements of the -
treasury.
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The ineffectiveness of fiscal policy has been transferred to monetary policy and
together they vie with each other in impartinq impulses to the economy in direc-
tions opposite to those required for growth and employment.
The channels by way o� which these impulses are radiated are numerous and tend
to increase the unproductive use of resources with respect to the need for their
efficient allocation, this need having now been rendered increasingly compelling
by the income-redistributional effects that have taken place within the country
and that are conkinuing to take place in the country's relations with the rest
of the world.
In the last several years, the category of public expenditure that has expanded
the most and that can be considered a summary indicator of the progressive loss
of effectiveness of the fiscal policy is that of total financing charges, which
has reached a magnitude greater than the overall current-balance deficit of the
broadened public sector.
The use of the resources available to the public administration has now attained
a cost which, measured against the interest rate being paid on the public debt,
exceeds the possible yield from alternative uses.
_ The Medium-Term Plan intends to reverse this trend during the 1981-1983 period,
bringing the returns on public investment expenditures back into proper alinement
with the costs of financing, measuring them against returns on alternative
investments and thus restoring to the public sector its role as a moving force of
growth.
Problem of Enhancing the Public Budget's Function as a Growth Factor
The supply-oriented policy proposed by the Medi~m-Term Plan is the equivalent of
a recharacterization of the public expenditure that energizes fiscal impulses,
increasing productional opportunities.
The public budget is positioned in the Plan as the instrument of a modern state
called upon to fulfill three principal roles: the state as a producer of assets;
- the state as the sustainer of certain key psoductive sectors; and the state as
the regulator of the economic operators. As a producer of assets, the Italian
state, through public enterprises and state participations, performs a support-
_ ive function in the economy. The state of bankruptcy of many large public
enterprises reflects a profound crisis of objectives and of management criteria.
The objectives and criteria chosen by the Plan of~er new points of reference
on which to base the action of the state as a producer.
- As sustainer of certain key productive sectors, the Italian state has more and
more enlarged its own role, without setting for itself rigorous critieria
governing the efficient allocation of resources. The Plan identifies the key
sectors that are to receive assistance, but imposes that their projects satisfy
comparative yield criteria. The Plan provides for allocating sufficient resour-
ces to take them out of crisis, on condition that their prospects for recovery
be such as to compensate the requisite costs.
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As regulator of the behavior of the economic operators, the Italian state has
followed lines of action unlike those oE many other industrialized nations,
- abCenting individua3 encumbrances and authorizations to the detriment of even~
~ handed regulation of the markets. The Plan embodies policies in regard to the
productional factors (in accordance with heading 4) aimecl at selected growth
objectives that are parameterized in terms of yield for each initiative proposed.
This choice entails the planning of a public budget that is consistent with its
objectives (compare heading 3).
Problem of the Self-Reliance of the Productive Sector
The planning and implementation of inedium-term economic policies in a democratic
- frame of reference, characterized.by a noncentralized sovereignty over its cost
centers, requires time and complex proceedings.
In an economic situation characterized by profound and rapid changes requiring
equally profound and rapid responses, a response to the uncertainties by the
"medium-term plans~~ cannot reasonably be expected to be forthcoming. These
plans can only create points of reference for the operators, tha t will be all the
- more reliable, the more they are positioned within normative and behavioral
frames of reference that empower the decision-making centers, allowing them a
maximum of authority but requiring of them a maximum of responsibleness.
During the period the Medium-Term Plan (1981-1983) is operative, economic legis-
lation, understood also as including the deregulation of encumbrances the pur-
_ poses of which are not aimed at growth of employment and Southern Italy, and the
public administrative activity will be based on the approach set forth in the
Plan, as regards prices and tariffs as well.
The public administration will equip itself with structures adequate to the
purpose of instituting a close relationship between self-reliance and responsi-
bleness and will organize itself for effective dir.ect interventional action based
on use of the market forces.
The planned reorganization of the Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning and
the setting up of the Plans Evaluati~n Group under the General Secretariat for
Economic Planning recommended by the CIPE in its 18 December meeting will be
based on the stipulated guidelines.
Problem of the Size of Enterprises
The problem of the size of enterprises--defined as the overall set of conditions
by virtue of which the form of an enterprise represents an obstacle to the
attainment of the Plan's objectives--has until now been addressed fragmentarily
and has in some of its aspects presented strong sociological connotations (exal-
tation of the small-sized enterprise) or ideological ones (the cooperationist
"movement").
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An evaluation of the contribution made by the different sizes to the growth
- of the five macroeconomic variables in the frame of reference has yielded the
following results: -
_ Average Annual Percentage
Small Total
Variable Period Large Medium ~1~ Enterprises
. (2)
1. Development 1972-78 + 2.9 + 4.5 + 3.7 + 3.1
*3. Employment 1972-78 + 0.1 - 0.1 - 2.8 + 0.1
4. Investment
in Southern
Italy (3) 1971-78 -19.4 -20.4 -14.0 -17.1
5. Exports (4) 1975-78 +24.9 +30.8 +28.4 +28.0
(1) Exclusive of firms with less than 20 employees.
(2) This total, with the exception of Variable 4, includes firms with less -
than 20 employees.
(3) Absent d2tailed information, the estimate is based on employees in new
firms and indicates the average annual variation of the new employment _
_ arising from "new" initiatives.
_ (4) This figure represents variations in billings.
Source: Study by General Secretariat for Planning based on ISTAT ~Central
Statistics Institute~ and SVIMEZ ~Association for the Industrial
Development of the South~ statistics.
* ~as published~
- . As regards prices an inairect indication has been obtained �rom an examination
of the frequency distribution of:sectoral price rises prior to the heavy 1973-1974
inflation and following it. The results show a displacement of the frequency
and of the intensity of rises in the sectors in which large industries do not
prevail. The Medium-Term Plan (1981-19a3) is not in a position to provide an _
_ itemization of its interventions according to size, but it is oriented toward
solutions that take into account the fact that the growth of ~mployment and that
of incomes, as we11. as contribution to the development of Southern Italy and to
the balancing of the payments account, are sometimes more prevalent in the
medium- and large-enterprise sectors than in the small-enterprise one; and that, -
_ moreover, the rate of inflation is lower in the large-enterprise sector, the
latter evidently being more exposed to international competition and less to
revenue shelters.
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During the operative period oE the Plan, economic legislation and the behavior
of the public administrative bodies will take into account the contribution being
_ made by the different variables to the chosen policy objectives, not, however,
imparting to policy actions the variations in cri.teria with respect to large and
small sizes that have characterized the past. The orientation shall be toward an
equalization of treatment that eliminates the disadvantages of size.
Based on this choice, the approach to solutions of the crisis centers (concen-
trat~d in the large-enterprise sector) will also include taking into account in
the 3-year plans for exports, tourism, housing, the farming industry, commercial
intermediation, and special intervention in Southern Italy, as well as in sec-
toral plans in which the problem arises, the operative conditions of small enter-
prises (small industrial and commercial firms, handicraftsmen, owner-farmers) and
of the cooperatives.
The needs of small business as yet unsatisfied are given specific treatment in
the 3-Year Plan for Financial Intesmediation, as regards credi t and its cost, and
in the Plan for Technological Innovation, as regards their aspects concerning
_ dissemination of technology.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "Energia e materie prime"
9399
CSO: 3104
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GE NE RAL ITALY
MINISTERS REVEAL TE:.cIR PROGRAMS FOR 1981
Milan IL MONDO in Ttalian 6 Feb 81 pp 33-38, 71-76
[Text] What are the programs which each minister wants to
carry out in 1981? And through what initiatives does each
minister intend to improve his ministry's operations?
IL MONDO asked every one of the 26 members of the Forlani
Cabinet this question. Ou~ of the 26 ministers in the
administration of Arnaldo Forlani, 21 answered the question
put to them by IL MONDO. The following did not respond:
Treasury Minister Beniamino Andreatta, Tran~portation Minister
Rino Formica, Justice Minister Adolfo Sarti, Merchant Marine
Min3ster Francesco Compagna, and Minister for Relations with
- Parliament Antonio Gava.
_ Introduction by Donato Speroni--Promises Made by Ministers
I
What programs do you think your ministry can realistically complete during 1981?
What are the major initiatives on which you will ask your stewardship to he judged
and what is the time frame within which you expect to attain your objectives?
IL MONDO asked these two questions of all ministers in the Arnaldo Forlani Cabinet.
In the following pages"we publi:h their answers, preceded by a statement from the
premier for IL MONDO.
The document can be read as a sum total of intentions and good pa-oposals and we
may be allowed a pinch of skepticism if we compare everything the ministers would
like to do with what little has been done over so many years.
But these promises are interesting fro.n two angles. After the earthquake and the
events under the heading of terrorism, it is a good idea to look into the other
problems which the administration believes it has already focused upon and which
it intends to tackle right away. Within some time, furthermore, it will be possible
to compare the good intentions expressed here with results obtained by each minis-
ter. Even if the cabinet Ghould fall. Upon taking over, each n~w minister receives
the work load of the outgoing minister (there is a term for this type of document
which the top bureaucracy must frequently produce and that word is: the charge
sheet) and the new minister rejects that charge sheet only in case of a drastic
political turnabout--a rather rare passibility in Italy. It will therefore always
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be possible to check the resslts. But this document right now offers some starting
_ points concerning considerations regarding the wor~C method of the men in power.
The premier clearly outlines three priorities: earthquake, terrorism, and three-
year plan, the latter also being used as an instrument for the coordination of the
sector tasks. We miist ask ourselves whether this same clear sense of priorities
emerges from the statements made by the other members of the administration. Be-
sides, the programs almost never contain any coordiuated efforts, any j oint initia-
' tives involving several ministries. .
There is a sense of precariousness which dominates the operatior_s of many ministers. _
Giovanni De Michelis even goes so far as to consider the req~iest for a program for "
each year to be provocator;~. We should not be astonished that even the most
= capable persons in the end wind up concentrating on initiatives which can yield im-
~ mediate political divider.3s.
For many, the job of being a minister consists in promoting or waiting for reforms.
- For each minister, that involves his own sector, the various subdivisions of his _
own ministry, reforms to be worked out or to get parliament's approval on. In some
cases, the program merely consists in asking parliament to approve the ministry's
reform; in summary, the minister could also close his shop down and ga to Monte-
citorio. More generally speaking, for almost all of them, legislative activities
seem to call for more attention than administrative activities.
But there is no lack of positive aspects, at least on paper. Ministers from all
majority parties proved to be committed to achieving specific results: from Franco
Reviglio, who announces 3nitiatives in the fight against tax evasion, to Filippo _
M~ria Pandolfi, who stakes his credibility on the launching of new electric power
plants; from Michele ni Giesa., who seeks to remedy the postal mess without too
many illus3ons; to Oddo Biasini who focuses most of his activities on the recovery
of cultural assets damaged by the earthquake.
Will these commitments and those assumed by the other ministers and by the prime
minister himself be pursued? We will see sometime soon, without having to stray
- from the general excuse to the effect that political uncertainties make it impos-
sible to accomplish any more. Every delay, every failure to accomplish something =
~ entail specific responsibilities in the ministries or in parliament. By publishing
this document, IL MONDO also tries to bring out these areas of responsibility.
Forlani: My Commitment Ts To Tssue Clear Directives-~By Premier Arnaldo Forlani
On the occasion of the latest parliamentary debate, which ended with another vote
of confidence for the administration, I showed how busy we had been and how un-
founded was the impression of paralysis which the opposition and a part of the
press were trying to spread. All you have to do is re-read the weekly reports to
see that every cabinet meeting brought important and working decisions of an eco-
nomic, social, and institutional operations character.
_ The earthquake in Basilicata and Campan~.a then produced an exceptional action pro-
gram and an unexpected mobilization of money and resources. Tn spite of the dif-
ficulties, the demagogy and the political speculations which arose in connection ~
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with this tragedy, T believe that the steps taken and those in the proces~ of
being taken will enable us, with the active participat3on of the local a+ . i�e-
gional entities (but also associations and private individuals) , to c~:r.ry out t~?e
reCbr~struction program better than would fiave happened under other cir.cumstances
of this kind.
Regarding terrorism (but I could also mention here the mafia and crime in general),
those who were supposed to take action did have clear directives because the
administration's ideas are clear. Naturally, every assur?ption relative to possible
international links is being considered and every bit of information which has a
reasonable foundation is included in the ogerations and sEarch plans of our agencies.
We did not allow ourselves and we will not allow ourselves to be distracted and
confused by artificial polemics. Criminals on the loose must be arrested and .
stashed away in a secure place; that is the problem and to solve it we must have
ever better government security facilities.
Looking at government activities in general, our main concern is not to move beyond
an overall view and a well-reasoned attempt at harmonizing the various programs,
also in terms of steps in various sectors and in correspondence to certain particu-
lar requirements. This means that we must consider the drafting of the 3-year
plan to be a central reference fact. That plan is now going to be examined by the
cabinet, after getting together with the social and production forces, so that the
adm3nistration may fully assume its responsibility with relation to the most im-
por~ant aspects of compatibility between spending and revenues; among other major
~ssues under discussion, we have the policy for the South, the policy for the
state participations, the energy plan, the health plan, steps for housing construc-
tion and the program for the reconstriiction of earthquake-damaged areas. And we
must not forget that economic policy in support of productiaa activities and social
- policy in support of modernization will be tailored to the requirement for a pro-
gressive reduction of inflatio n and a restoration of our balance of trade.
= Pandolfi: Moving Energetically--By Industry Nlinister Fi.lip{~o Maria Pandolfi
Energy, energy, and more energy. Here is the top priority which I have assigned
to myself from the very first moment I entered the cabinet as minister of industry.
Some people might argue that I have other fundamental objectives I must deal with,
such as industrial policy aud, more generally, rhe policy for the production system
which also includes the so-called market third. That is true: my program comprises
a strict commitment also in that sector and it could not be otherwise. In connec-
tion with that T would only like to say that I have also already laid the founda-
tions--with my college Gianni De Michelis--for a unified industrial policy for the
- public sector and the private sector and, along with him, I worked out complete
understanding with Minister Giorgio La Ma.lfa to fit industrial policy actions
rapidly into the directions and procedures of the medium-term program.
- So long as people do not ask me for a manifesto but for a listing of specific opera-
- tions, I will assume responsibility and I will rake upon myself the risk of asking
that I be judged, in the energy f ields, on the basis of the number and the output
capacity of the power plants whose construction will be decided upon and started
in 1981. I know that we need cor.sensus, above all. But I also know that the
country needs to know, not in abstract terms, who has to make the decisions and =
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what i.s to be done, in other words, the country needs to know that there ~.s some-
� bo-~ who in the final analysis will decide something. We are preparing what I -
would call the prerequisites for consensus. T would like to Iist four of them
here: security, energy savings, commitment toward renewable forms of energy, in-
tegrated development policies for areas in which power plants are to be construCted.
- The itinerary, whose first stages I have outlined here, is very long. And the
- stakes are very high.
- Colombo: Will Put Out Fires of War--By Foreign Affairs Minister Emilio Colombo
There are tao many variables, unknowns, and unforeseeable situations to which a
foreign policy program must respond. Such a program therefore presupposes the
existence of a solid framework, of reliable coardinates which will furnish a pre-
cise frame of reference for problems and situations in which the country might _
find itself on the international scene. With the Atlantic framework, on which our
security and, in the final analysis, depend, remaining strong, the other fundamen-
taI coordinate for Ttaly in 1981 3s the community effort which unitesus with other
European countries in an original, peaceful, and democratic construction under-
= taking.
Under this umbrella of certainties, Italy intends to pursue an active policy, to-
- gether with other friendly and aliied countries, to eliminate tensions and foci
of war. Above all, ;ae must do this by actively working toward the success of the
Madrid Conference and, hence, inter-European developments in the humanitarian
sector and within the prospects of the convocation of a European disarmament con- -
�erence. Regarding the European pro~ections of East-West rel~tions, the contri-
bution which, in the context of NATO, firmly sticking to tf modernization deci-
sion, we will make tu support negotiations on long-range th~at~r nv^1.ear systems
_ will be just as active, with a view to their reduction to progressively lower
levels. It is our conviction that sgecific achievements in each sector of dis-
armament can be recorded only wit?lin the framework of an effective detente, which
requires all power concerned to act in such a manner as to respect its global na-
ture and indivisibility, hence also going beyond the European orbit, starting with
- Afghanistan. ~
~ We will furthermore commit our efforts roward the effective pursuit of peace in-
itiatives in the Middle East. If thESe initiatives are successful, they will make -
themselves felt in a positive manner also regarding stab3lity in the Mediterranean
--another priority objective which we assign ourselves here in a quite coherent
fashion. In a similar manner, we will never fail to make our contribution to the
resolution of problems which threaten world peace, ranging from Cambodia to Namibia, -
- from the Horn of Africa to Latin America.
Looking at the economic situation, we intend to pursue the consolidation and di-
versification of community policies. For this purpose, we will launch initiatives
so that the mandate of the European Council ~,iven to the foreign mini.sters--to
review the balance criterta for a restoration of the balance in community spending
_ --may lead to concrete results. We will pursue our action aimed at a search for
new markets for Ttalian exports, in add~.tion to the search for the safest possible
energy sources. On this last poin~, the resumption of the dialogue which we have
just achieved with Saudi Arabia will be followed by further contacts with other
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petroleum producing countries. Finally ~ve will push the initiatives ~lready under- ~
taken within the UN also at home.
Lack of space does not allow me adequately to cover the other salient aspects of
Italian foreign policy, such as care for emigrants or aid for emerging countries,
_ since the peculiar nature of these sub~ects obviously does not enable us to es-
tablish a rigid time frame for the implementation of the various initiatives.
The thing that counts ~s that Ttaly's action abroad can }ie carried out to the
maximum extent within the country's Possibilities. Those possibilities certainly
are not negligible, provided they are supported by operational continuity, by a
certain degree of political stabil3ty, without which any action undertaken loses _
a large part of the credibility necessary to pursue it to its successful end.
Rognoni: Three Reforms to Be Instituted--Interior Minister Virginio Rognoni
I balieve that the activity of the interior mini~ter in 1981 cannot involve any
break in continuity as compared to the actions last year in the course of which the
adrninistration was heavily committed in three fundamental ~,.nstitutional sectors:
law and order, territorial affairs (local autonomous levels of government, regional,
provincial, and community affairs), civil defense and fire-fighting.
- The Senate is reviewing the bill on the reform of the police which has already been _
passed by the Chamber. It is the administration's intention rapidly to complete
parliamentary processing of tfiis bill wfi ich certainly is a major initiative of
ministerial action, especially since it is intended to give the administration of
public safety a higher degree of efficiency and operational effectiveness.
Terrorism will be granted no truce in operational terms. The fight against sub-
vers:_~n will be a long and bitter one and, in addition to the effort of the
security services, it will demand the united commitment of all citizens.
Regarding the second sector--the sector of local autonomous government levels--the
ministry is drafting its own b311 through which--fully recognizing the fundamental
function of the plurality of local entities in which the territorial administra-
- tion is organized--we try to bring into tieing a system of interconnection on the
various levels of government between the federal government and the local autonomous
, government levels so--while absolutely implementing the constitution--we may re-
store unity and efficiency to public administration.
We are furthermore going to tackle the problem of reforming the civil protection
services and the fire department in the light, also, of the experiences of the
23 November earthquake. In othQr words, we are going to have to revise the 1970
Law on civil defense in order to ad~ust the standards to the
requirements of more effective and vaster preventive efforts (in addition to earth-
quakes and floods, we must also properly take into account phenomena of land, ~
maritime, and atmospheric pollution due to the most varied causes) and a greater
_ action capacity on the part oP the most representative local organs of government
(prefectures and local commun3ties).
Through the reform of the police, uf local entities, and of civil defense, the
interior ministry therefore promises to define its own organization in a unified
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framework which wtll not break the adm~ni.strat~.on up ~nto Chree separate compart-
ments but which w311 br3ng about better coordination among the agencies of the
~ federal government and between the latter and the local entities which make up the
republic's organizat~on. ~
This is why T believe that 1981 can be called the year of relacions between the
federal gover~ent and the autonomous levels of government.
- La Malfa: Will Carry Out Plan--Budget Minister Giorgio La Malfa
The year 1981 began under tfie sign of the medium-term 1981-1983 economic plan. The
challenge which awaits the fiudget ministry this year.therefore is the challenge
of translating the plan into a specific and efficient programming policy. That is -
no easy task. Operationally speaking, we are goin~ to have to go through three
stages: the stage of the political processing of the 3-year plan, along with its
examination by the cabinet and parliament and consultation with the social partners;
the stage of determining the economic and technical premises for its implementation, _
above all regarding the revision of public spending and the establishment of organs
_ which will have to evaluate the validity of the investment programs of the indi-
vidual ministries and their correspondence to the plan's objectives; finally we
are going to have to make the individual sector plans operational in an overall
fashion. That is a task for the various money-spending administrations which the
plans spell out.
The budget minister's commitment is quickly to move along that line and to show,
through actual facts, that tYie new econamic policy management method--which will
have to be adopted in order to carry out the planning effort specifically--makes it
- possible to make public spending more efficient and to identify additional resources `
at home and abroad which are capable of guaranteeing that economic growth which will _
be compatible with the fight against inflation, something which otherwise, under
the conditions prevailing in Italy's economy today, would not be absolutely pos-
sible.
Reviglio: Recovering 3 Trillions--By Finance Minister Franco Reviglio
The fight against tax evasion--tfiat ~aill be tiie main commitment of the finance
ministry also in 1981 with the objective of recovering 3 trillions in unpaid taxes
this year. The fiscal agenda for 1981 is rich in innovations to be proved by
specific facts. First of all we have those which were introduced into our system `
through the 1980 financial law. That includes "concentrated" tax assessments,
the corps of superinspectors, and the service centers. Starting in January, as a -
matter of fact, the internal revenue service will conduct its checks on the basis
_ of objective criteria to concentrate assessment activities on the most dangerous
categories and taxpayers. Starting as of the beginning of this year likewise we .
' are going to have our tax superinspectors after so many di�ficulties; they ~nvalve
- a new instrument created in order to make the taxation system efficient and to
control the ethics involved in it. Tfie Milan and Rome service centers will become
- operational this year and will help speed up the processing and thus release re-
sources for assessment activities; in substance, they will serve to handle the
income tax declarations in a managerial fashion.
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To continue on the road of max3mvm openness in relations between the citizen and
the internal revenue service, we will publish our books starting in Feliruary.
- The Red Book, dealing with presumed TRPEF [individual income tax?] evaders, the _
- similar book dealing with the companies, and those dealing with presumed VAT
evaders. We will also publish volumes with statistical data and studies concernirig
' the IRPEF declarations submitted in 1978 (including an analysis of the Form 101,
for the f irst time) and the VAT statements submitted in 1979. We will start this
publishing effort in February and we will continue it, book by book, until June.
_ Very shortly, we are thus going to publish three white books which will constitute
not only a contribution in terms of knowledge and information but which above all
will provide a stimulus for a pol3tical debate which must lead to three reforms:
real estate tax, family taxat3on, and state monopoly company taxation.
- I would like to underscore the importance of FY 1981 because of the other aspects
which together involve the activities of the finance ministry and those of parlia- -
ment and the political forces: parliament is right now examining three highly
important bills. The reform of the finance administration, a necessary condition
for modernizing the treasury, so as to equip our administration to move agaiast
tax evaders, and to improve tax services to citizens. Next we have the law for
- the imprisonment of tax evaders in order, at last, to deprive dishonest taxpayers
of the criminal impunity which they have as a matter of fact enjoyed so far.
Finally, we have the bill which will on a mandatory basis call for the use of cash
registers [recorders] for certain categories of economic operators.
Growing public opinion concern must be paralleled by the commitment of the political
forces toward a rapid examination of these legislative initiatives.
Here, in su~ary, is the year 1981 which, as far as the taxation system is con- -
cerned, looks to be full of cocnmitments in the light of which we can then evaluate
every level of responsibility.
Lagorio: Military Personnel Pay To Go Up--By Defense Minister Lelio Lagor io
I thinlc that 1981 will show two things: that the Defense Ministry is concerned not
only with weapons but also w3th the human component of the military establishment;
that the ministry has a policy for top military leadership but that it is devoting
special attention to the rank and file of the armed forces so that the military
establishment will open up toward civilian society. -
Indeed, half a million men in uniform plus 50,000 civilian employees have many
things to ask of the minister. In this respect, contacts between the minister and
parliament are good and are producing positive results. Long-awaited laws and
initiatives are as a matter of fact making headway. Let me recall those steps
which we can realistically expect to accomplish in 1981: the reform of the draft
and of officer and NCO careers, the law on military housing and i.ndividually owned
housing, the new operational allowance (which, among other things, should remedy
the m~.litary pilot drain), the reform bill for the new Criminal Code and the reform
of military courts, the increase 3n draftee pay, and an improvement in the tax
situation of civ~lian personnel. I think that 1981 will also be a year of three
big mass debates: on the institution of (voluntary) female military service; on _
the organ3zation, at last, of a mo6ile force to tackle c3vi1 defense problems;
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on relations between the armed forces and soc3ety (laws: local entities), on ~overn-
ment-owned real estate where the time fias come at last to restore such land to
the free use of our cities.
Ther~ of course we have the policy commitments which are connected to strategic
_ questions and the issue of peace. T think that in 1981 in particular we are going
to have to think of the Mediterranean and the countries along it in an effort to
get Italy to play a more authoritative role in creating an atmosphere of calm. _
Ambitions? If T had to indicate one, I would say that I would like to be a reform-
ist defense minister, in other words, a minister who feels that he must watch over
the best values of the armed forces and, starting with that, a minister committed
to making every effort so that the armed forces will not only be renewed and ef-
ficient but that they will be the armed forces of the Italian people.
Bodrato: Secondary School Reform--By Public Education Minister Guido Bodrato
It is undoubtedly risky for a minister to come up with remarks on the program he
intends to carry out within a year, considering the fact that the implementation
of such a program does not depend exclus3.vely, nor generally, on him alone but, in
- this case, also on the breadth and complexity of the problem.
As a matter of fact, no initiative can be completed without the cooperation of all
of the politicaJ_ and social components, especially parliament. Talking about my
bailiwick, in particular, the objectives which seem most urgent to me--but which
at the same time cannot be dropped in political terms--are as follows: the defini-
tion vf the senior high school reform and the start of the ministry's own reform.
These are two ob~ectives we cannot drop. The reform of senior high schools is
something we have been waiting for since 1963, in other words, ever since the
single middle school was instituted; from that moment on, we have increasingly
noted the urgent need for a liizk between what actually is the last 3-year period
of mandatory schooling and the following courses of study. The current state of
uncertainty aggravates the already noted aspects of crisis. Moving rapidly in
order to do away with this uncertainty does not mean moving blindly; it means -
using the large volume of wark done by parliament in order to make conclusive de- -
cisions.
The ministry's reorganization thus is a prerequisite for the implementation of all
of the necessary reforms in the school sector.
This topic involves not only the central structure but also the peripheral branches.
We must absolutely have a more flexible instrument in handl3.ng our administrative
procedures and in managing our personnel. This is why, as we know, we must now
put an end to the long phase of preliminary investigation and move on to a phase
of preparation, selection, updat3ng, in keeping with the requirements of a high- !
grade and efficient sr_hool system.
In judging how this ministry works, we have to keep ~.n mind that planning in the
school system means carrying out an operation which is extended in terms of time
to a much greater extent than in other fields.
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Di Giesi: No More Retiree Lines--By Post Office and Telecotmnunicat~ons Minister
Michele Di Giesi
There is one very immediate point that has to be brought out. By the end of January,
we complete our private TV and radio transmi~ters. Together with the planning of
frequencies, this will enable us to implement the regulation of private broadcasts.
In particular, this will Pnable My ministry to complete the now absolutely urgent
- law on private TV, on wh3ch we already have a study by a specific committee.
It should be evident to everybody that the solution to this problem can no longer
be postponed. The absence of a law has created a chaotic situation in the ether
and on the TV screen, a difficulty in relationships between public service and
- private television [network.s] and between the latter and the motion picture opera-
tors. We must as quickly as possible take care of that and I hope that the poli-
tical forces wi11 collaborate toward rapid processing of these provisions in parlia-
ment.
As a citizen, I an~ presently familiar with the trouble we are having in the opera-
tion of the postal service or, more accurately, the fa3lure of the service to
operate properly, but as a minister I intend to do whatever I can to try to improve
the service. Tn my opinion, some steps can be taken quite readily and it is my
intention in this connection also to ask the labor unions for the necessary coopera-
= tion. For example, I will try to find out whether it is possible, at least in the
big cities, to restoru twice-daily mail delivery. I would also like to study the
possi.bility of paying pensions no longer through posC offices but through treasurer's
checks.
Other initiatives might call for citizen cooperation. In earlier interviews I
already mentioned an idea of mine to stimulate the use of CAP [ZIP code?] which is
now absolutely indispensable because of the introduction of mail sorting machines.
This is what somebody called Free ZTP Week, a kind of exemption or faster handling
for those people who correctly give the ZTP code number on their correspondence.
I realize that these are not the only things that can create the kind of efficiency
in a postal service that is necessary in an industrially advanced country. The
1981 program as a matter of facr provides for specific allocations amounting to more
than 431 billions for the renewal of the operational and organizational structures
of the postal and telegraph services, for the strengthening of the offices, for the
mechanization of the postal network, and for the progressive automation of postal
- banking services, for the development of technology in the telecommunications sec-
tor and the progressive switch from the traditional system to the electronic system,
for the development of promotion in scientific research and job training.
:I will merely touch upon some of the other initiatives. They involve reorganization,
already planned by the two outfits, and, regarding the telephone sector, they caZl
for action aimed at restoring balance throughout the sector, with particular re-
ference to r~lations with the concessionaire and in particular the need for a re-
view of relations between the government agency and SIP [Italian Telephone Company).
During the year we also going to have to work out and get approval for the national
telecommunications plan, indicating the program dec~sions and the implementation
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~ deadlines. In thi.s connection T would like to underscore the really strategic
importance of the role of this ministry as a link--which is also going to be
tightened up--between the ministries of state participations and of scientific
research. �
A coordination and action policy between these three ministries is essential for
a planni.ng policy which--also through the role of industries with state participa-
tion--will pro~ote scientific research and will extricate the country from its
dependence on imported technology whose cost carries by no means minor ~aeight in
the balance of payments.
Hence, my commitment toward boosting the guiding and operational role of the Min-
istry of Post Office and Telegraph as a subject of a telecommunications policy.
I therefore intend to convene a national conference dedicated to this specific
topic for the end of March.
.
Bartolomei: EEC Draws the Line--By Agriculture and Forestry Minister Giuseppe
Bartolomei
- I can tell you what I would like to do, not what I imagine I might achieve: in this
sector, we have to deal with a widespread tendency to give preference to immediate
convenience to the detriment of more long-term action, typical of agricultural
seasons.
Among the urgent points which I can see most immediately we must make an effort
to restore an income level wh3ch today has been heavily eroded away by inflation.
Not everybody realizes the anti-inflationary role played by agriculture. But over-
looking this fact could cause investment loss phenomena with negative effects upon
employment and the food sfiortage.
This raises some immediate needs which can in part be satisfied by fixing new
community prices, by adequately handling taxation and farm credits plus channeling
a certain flow of investments toward the agricultural sector. All of this however
_ should not be done hastily and should be tackled in the context of Italq's member-
ship in the EEC and the ~atter's enlargement to include other Mediterranean coun-
~ tries. In other words, we must increasingly involve Italian agriculture in the
activities of other agricultural areas which are more favored by nature and which
are technically more advanced.
In conclusion I would therefore like to say that 1981 looks like a year of much hard
work, involving a very complex need for initiatives ranging from a profound review
of community agricultural policy to a rationalization of the Ttalian production
system with respect to a market policy that will be better supported by a more
modern and dynamic distribution organization, by research and experimentation
which also must be more modern and which must be more in keeping with the needs of
the da,rect operators.
I would therefore be very satisfied if, in 1981, I were to be successful at least .
in creating the premises for seriously tackling any of those problems.
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Nicolazzi: Getti.ng Housing Construction Moving Again--By Publ3c Works Minister -
Franco Nicolazz3
_ The general framework within which I propose to operate involves the transformation
Of the ministry from an agency that merely awards construction contracts to a
dynamic management center for achieving the high object3.ves illustrated in the
following points.
The following wi11 be ready for approval by the cabinet: a bill calling for the
refinancing of the 10-year plan for the completion of programs authorize3 during _
the first 4-year application period of Law No 457; starting the mechanisms provided
- for under Law No 25, concerning credit facilities for construction and home pur-
chase; a congruous increase in allocations for the urban development of areas; -
elimination of obstacles of an urban character which considerably interfere with
current construction efforts; simplification of procedures provided for under
Article 81, DPR [Presidential Decree) 616 for government construction projects and =
infrastructure facilities as well as the collection, in a single law, of all of
the regulations dealing with public and loan-supported residential housing construc-
- tion. Still looking at the residential housing construction sector, we must intro-
duce some amendments in Law No 10 and we must quickly take the necessary steps
deriving from the well-known ruling fianded by the Constitutional Court. We must
furthermore take specific steps in the matter of fair housing after the survey con- -
ducted in connection with the second reading. In this context, one urgent problem
is the problem of reorgan3zing the autonomous low-cast housing institute.
We now can no longer hold off on solving the problem of reorganizing the public
works administration; we mu:;t however figure on the delays deriving from the im-
_ possibility of achieving a complete reorganization outside the more general reor-
ganization of the entire administration. The ministry has already drafted a bill -
call~ng for a functional reorganization of some offices and we are furthermore
introducing the possibility of hirir.g technical personnel indispensable for the
operation of the outlying offices. This bill is currently being discussed by the
appropriate committees of the Chamber of Deputies.
Another important problem deals with soil conservation; we know all about the ef-
forts which the administration has made to secure the early passage of the various -
bi11s which have been submitted most often. We must as quickly as possible start
the discussion 3n the appropriate Senate committees on the latest bill which was
submitted and which constitutes the premise for the future hydrogeological setup -
of the entire country as well as the operational structure to be put up. _
= Regarding the highway code, it is to be hoped that parliament will soon pass a bill
authorizing the administration to draft the new code in order to standardize Italy's
norms with those of the other countries included in the EC.
For Venice we have a study in an advanced state concerning the search for a plan-
n:ing solution for the well-known problem of flood control; as a matter of fact, -
we have approval for the agreement asking a group of six consultants to draft a
- general blueprint, also taking into account the points brought out at the time of
the contract award.
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Regard3ng the highway sector, we hope that we wi11 see the sw~.ft passage of the -
- bill aimed at facilitating the adaptation of our higharays to the new traffic =
~ requirements, such as they sprang from the Fre~us tunnel and the need for links
deaigned to improve and increase the capacity of our big superhighways in order to
make up some of the delay in the completion of infrastructure facilities. In `
addition to the accomplishment of large h3ghway sections, these new steps will
have to include the definition of the problem of rearranging the economic and
financial situations of the concessionaire companies, the revision and reorganiza-
tion of the rate system, as well as the definition of relations with the central
guarantee fund.
Foschi: Will Work with Agency--By Latior Minister Franco Foschi
There are three main topics w3th which I would 13ke to characterize the activities
, of the Labor Ministry for 1981.
_ Regarding the employment serv3ce, I think that we car~ no longer postpone the
rapid passage of the pertinent law witfi its specific portions which should permit
the implementation of an active labor policy, a new territorial distribution for
our services, and the testing of a labor agency in special areas. This law will
also have to permit the use of jo~i-cfiangE methods W~1~Ct1 will be in keeping with
the new requirement~ of technological development and the need for resolving the
,sector crises which many companies are experiencing.
Regarding welfare, it will be possible to speed up procedures for the payment of
pensions and a new link between the welfare system and action to be taken in
_ situations where certain companies or sectors are in trouble, so as to eliminate
the current welfare approach and to stop the double labor market and tax evasions.
Looking at the earthquake areas, we will carry out the action plan of the Labor
M3.nistry above all to permit rapid economic recovery and support for employment. _
_ With the help of the Labor Ministry T would like to be able to promote an evolution _
in the role of the labor unions, with greater emphasis on the process of fund
accumulation and participation in the direct management of the economy.
There are many other questions whlch I would like to resolve, some of which however
depend greatly on the stability of the political situation, on the pace with which
parliament works, on its decisions as to priorities, and on the possibility of _
achieving sufficient agreement among the positions of the social forces. I there-
fore hope that the final judgment will be based on the a.ctual commi.tment made in _
overcoming the obstacles facing us. -
Manca: Will Increase Exports--By Foreign Trade Minister Enrico Manca =
The year 1981 likewise looks like a difficult year: competition among industrialized
countries wi11 become stiffer. We are going to have to control the situation of
Italy's balance of trade although we must not allow a situation where balancing
that account would mean the sacrifice of the country's economic growth and employ-
ment levels.
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The 3-year plan as matter of fact for the f~rst time includes an ox'ganic plan for
foreign trade. Tnat plan is based on the combined rejection of zero growth and
protectionist policy and assumes a quantitative growth of exports of 7 percent per
year for the 3-year term. We also stressed the need for making a qualitative ef-
~ort aimed at the reorganization of our export mix which can be derived only frbtn
a well-considered and timely industrial conversion policy.
The central nature of our international economic relations policy however first of
all calls for an internal redefinit3on of the relative action powers. For the
time being, as a matter of fact, export support functions are being carried out with
- limited funds and are being administered by a large number of organizations, each
_ with its own parochial view. The Ministry of Foreign Trade proposes to act as
coordinator of this large number of agencies and requirements in order to become
_ a center which will provide impetus and which will, for vast areas, spell out pro-
blems and types of action, which will identify a coherent and reliai~le framework
within which the market forces can be anticipated and oriented.
Our work method will involve certain projects so as to concentrate initiatives and
develop them in depth because they wi11 function as development poles in the various
geographic areas. It is our hope that the coordination formula be adopted also
by the other administrations and agencies acting in this sector and that we can
spell out their specific forms and mechanisms.
We have already begun to move along this road: at the end of January, we had the
first national conference on fore3gn trade whose introductory reports were presented
by Sabino Casses, by Guido Car1i, and by Romano Prodi.
De Michelis: Will Take Care of Public Enterprises--By Minister of State Participa-
tions Gianni De Michelis
Looking at the average lifetime of Italian cabinets, this quest:Ion seems slightly
provocatory to me. With tIle presentation of the "Report on State Participations"
which was rather incorrectly called the "Litiro bianco," I tried to outline the
conditions for the restoration and revival of business involving state participation
and of big business as well. These conditions must be implemented right away so
- that 1981 can reliably become the year during which these conditions must become
reality at least for the most part. Now, what are they?
The first one which it seems to me should be implemented through the 3-year plan of
Giorgio La Malfa and through the budget bill subm3.tted by~ Beniamino Andreatta is
to recapitalize the system of companies with state participation.
The second one, which likewise seems to me to be in the course of 3.mplementation,
, is to reactivate instruments for the support of industrial policy (reorganization,
technological innovation, etc.), so as to relieve the burden on all of the big
enterprises in this way.
The third one, on which T am working w~th the entities and finance compan~es, is,
with respect to specific projects, to reopen fihe conversation and resume coo~erat3,on
between the state part3cipations sector and ~~rivate enterpr3se, first in Ttaly and
then internationally. The success of this 3nitiat3ve wi.ll provi.de a su3,table at-
mosphere for the material3zation of tfie fourth condition.
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This involves the speed-up of the ~nvestment program in key sectars: electronics,
big civilian and military systems, energy, electrif3ed transportation, food indus-
try, etc.
The recovery of the original character of state participations (the presence Of
government capital and private capital in operating countries) is the fifth con-
dition: it will be materialized when the companies begin again to offer prospects
of earnings for capital invested in them; this is not really a full-fledged con-
_ dition here but we are working to make sure that we can brighten up the rather
desolate situation of recent years.
Ever since I took over the Ministry of State Participations, I considered this job
a challenge: aga3nst time, first of all, and against the objective difficulties
involved in a situation furthermore aggravated by the practically complete loss
of credib ility. T believe that the state participations system will in the coming
months regain its credibility to the point of once again being a proper conversa-
tion partner in the process of spelling out administration economic policy. This
is only a first step but it is impox~tant. Soon, in March or April, the"Report on
State Participations" will become the "Program Report." I would like to move fast
this year so that I may, on the one hand, achieve a correction in the course pur-
sued by the management agencies and, on the other hand, so that I may get ample
room f~,r discussion in parliament. Tf, as I hope, there will be still time to
do more, then I think I might launcli the reorganization of the ministry and the
revision of the statutes of the various entities. I have from the very beginning
moved with the long-range view in mind. T am convinced that this is the only way
to have effective government. You fiave to state things correctly so that they may
be implemenred according to my proposals, even when I am no longer in charge of
this ministry. This way of operating, T believe, is what T would like to be judged
on.
Aniasi: Health System Will Really Work--By Health Minister Aldo Aniasi
The year 1981 will bring the implementation of the health re�orm following an ini-
tial period characterized by considerable delay, caused only in part by inertia or
by inadequacies in tfie central institut3ons.
- There are two refor.ns which took effect almost simultaneously and which radically
altered the country's administrative and health organizations. The complexity of
the system to be implemented was not correctly estimated during the planning phase.
The transfer of authority to the regions and local entities and the new law, es--
tablishinG national health service, call upon us to make rhe system based on local
autonomot~ government levels operational. The f undamental problem therefore is to
implement democratic planning based on the choices made with the support of the
regions and the local entities and simultaneously to guarantee the gossibility of
running the system by making sure that the directions and decisions wi11 effectively
be translated into action and achievements. The debate in parliament therefore
must be conducted rapidly and the 1981-1983 health plan must be approved quickly.
During the first half vf 1981, it w3.11 be necessary, in all reg~.ons, to establish
the local health units, transferring to them the functions spelled out in national
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legislation, carrying out the prov:tsions in tfie refo~cm, and making u~+ for lost
- time.
Thp objective is to make the health services efficient and to improve the quality
of services rendered, to beg3n with, by activating the system of prevention, of
~ early diagnosis, and by earnestly tackling the topic of health education for citizens,
~ as well as training and upgrading of health workers. The Health Ministry will
dedicate itself to the pursuit of these objectives, faithful to the spirit of
reform but also convinced of the need that strategy and the ultimate goal must
be reconciled with the daily needs of the citizens.
Signorello: Has Tourist Plan--By Minister of Tourism and Recreation Nicola
Signorello
The year 1981 will be a year of particular hard work for every sector of the Ministry
of Tourism and Recreation.
Tourism: examination and passage of model law and reform of ENIT [Italian Tourist
_ Agency]. Buth of these bills are now in parliament.
Recreation: submission of a new motion picture law to the cabinet; resumption of
review, wi.thin appropriate parliamentary committees, of the law on the theater
and start of discussion on the law dealing with music.
Sports: submission snd completion of debate, in the Chamber, on the problem of the
status of professional athletes; start of discussion on model law for sports and
regulations for the reform of sports funding.
Whether all of these initiatives or only a part of them can be completed in 1981
will depend on various circumstances: political stability, work program of legis-
lative assemblies, commitment of parliamentary forces as well as the administration
itself. Here in detail are the initiatives which I consider most important.
_ Tourism: drafting of an outline plan for tourism by the spring of 1981. Italy de-
rives major advantages from tourist activities: but it is precisely in this sector
that we h.ave so far been lacking an organized and planned action policy. It is
important and necessary, from tfie very first weeks of r_ne year onward, to start
a promotion drive abraad; this is all the more urger.c following the earthquake which,
among other things, struck one of Italy's most interesting tourist areas.
Entertainment: on the basis of the agreements achieved in parliament, we should
consider it reasonable to make sure that at least one branch of parliament can pass
the law on the theater before the summer. During the first few months of 1981,
we must therefore achiev~: parliamentary passage of the various laws in support of
theatrical and musical activit3.es while the discussion on the laws for music and
movies must be started before the summer. Wherever this can be achievsd, we would
certainly be deriving extremely positive results regarding the activities of this
ministry.
Sports: it w311 be necessary to make every effort to complete as soon as possible
the passage of the law on professional sports which has already been passed by
- the Senate of the republic.
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Biasini: Will Save Herculaneum and Pompeii--By Cultural Assets Minister Oddo
Biasini
For our ministry, 1981 should be the year of planning. T am thinking above all in
terms of a method involving the technical secretariat of the National Council for
Cultural Assets which I established last June precisely fnr the purpose of effective .
and realistic planning in rhe various activity sectors (for artistic assets as well
as archivistic assets, for archeological as well as architectural assets). -
The ear~hquake certainly has shaken us up and has confronted the technical secre- -
- tariat and therefore also the Nationa'. Council as a whole with considering the
southern regions as the immediate te:;~ing groLnd for planning. It ~aould have made
- no sense to approve programs in December for Campania and Basilicata such as they
had been worked out before the tragic events of 23 November. Our efforts were
immediately concentrated on the most urgent actions in the regions struck by the
earthquake and other, considerably bigger efforts await u~; the overall spending
estimates, and these are only estimates and therefore may be corrected, call for
an allocation of more than 777 billion lire. In terms of reconstruction efforts--
wher= ~he administration has already indicated two different periods f ur the first
action assigned to special commissioner Giuseppe Zamberletti--and in the area of ~
real reconstruction, as provided for by the model law, we are faced with a specific
requirement, connected with the nature of the assets we must save. Let me ex-
plain what I mean by that: it is possible that there might be a long interval
between those two phases; by way of example, we are now thinking of Pompeii, the -
museum at Capodimonte or at Herculaneun, in other words, we are thinking of what
these and other archeological, historical, and artistics complexes represent to
th e economy of the South. Is it conceivable that this home-grown petroleum might
not be in proper shape this year, when we need that kind of money more than ever `
before? I really believe that the answer is no and this is why I must stress the
requirement that, in the case of an excessively long interval hetween the two
ph ases of the emergency and reconstruction, we put in an intermediate phase for
culttiral assets tied to the need for early overall spending.
As far as the most important initiatives are concerned, I must promise that the
restoration of t?~.s cultural heritage, which the earthquake has shaken up, certainly
cannot be referre:: to as an initiative but rather as a necessity on which neverthe- _
less I am convinced that my stewardship will be judged. But, as for the other
initiatives, there is one which is particularly significant and it involves the
- new guardianship law. This is a reform law, the laws of 1939 had many points of
merit but tney ar.e 1939 laws; and I am not saying thi; because they can all be
traced to fascism but beacause they are based too much on assumptions and implica-
tions which are now too far in the past. As for the rest, the reform was imple- `
mented through DPR 616 of 24 July which also gave it the job of spelling out the
administr.~tive functions of the regions and the local entities in the matter of -
- the historical and artistic heritage. _
It is my judgement that, on the basis of this new legislative instrument, we will
really be shaping the future of our cultural assets and we will have to try de-
cisively to alter the prospects from which cultural asaets have been viewed in the
past. It is in particular important to do away with ~he legal concept of inere "
administrative limitation of pr:ivate property and replace it with a new concept of
~
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cultural assets as assets for fruition. We have had consultations within the -
cultural community and the un3versity conmmunity; those with the regions are now
under way. By the spring T hope to be able to present the law to the cabinet for
approval. -
~tomita: Will Build Up Ministry--Sc3entific Research Minister Pierluigi Romita
The _esearch minister has been surrounded by a complex of functions without however
having the very minimum required for a stable structural setup. It is therefore
obvious that the minister's first task will be to see to it that the instruments
- of coordination w311 wcrk bett~r, with particular emphasis on the directions to be
given to the CNR [National Research Council].
But we must not fail to tackle the problem of stability and continuity 3n thase
instrument~; an initia.l legislative bill is therefore in an advanced study phase;
_ by developing past initiatives, it calls for the institutionalization of the figure -
of the minister wi+:h a permanent, flexible, and specialized structural set-up on
- the technical level; a second bill on the reform of the CNR is aimed at better
channeling the activities of the agency toward the country's social-economic re-
quirements, to speed up management, and to upgrade our researchers and engineers
more and more. In this context, special attention will be given to the completed -
~ projects many of which (18 out of 26) will get through the processing phase this
year.
_ We will have to decide how to follow up on these programs: closing them down, because
the}~ attained the predetermined scientific-technical objective or because these
objectives proved to be partly unattainable; continuation as technical services
because the scientific results attained must be made available to public or private
~ organizations; continuation in the form of mixed consortiums between public and
_ private institutions, because tfie results must filter down to the economic-industrial
structures; continuation toward further scientific objectives; or uther ways ot
_ handling this .
~ther major initiatives to be included in the 3-year economic plan undoubtedly are -
_ the revival of the special TMT. [Ttalian Credit Institute] fund for applied re-
search in indust-ry, where fund allocations for the next 3-year p~riod call for
1.85 trillion; zhe special project for research in the South whose programs for
the 2nd year are currently being studied by the ministry; handling the space plan -
for which the research minister must this year propose a specific organizational
formula; promotion and coordination of research activities aimed at earthquake �
protection, calling for the establishment, by the minister, of a national group
_ attached to the CNR.
Scotti: Will Implement EFC Directives--By European Affairs Minister Vincenzo Scotti
There ar.e two tasks which this administration has assigned to me: coordination of
community policies and, after that, coordination of the Committee of Ministers for
the Reconstruction of Earthquake-Stricken Zones. _
Regarding the first job, it is my intention to create an.~ operate the department
oL the off3ce of the prime min~stex for coordinat~.on of community policies. This
~
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department is part of a more general bluepr3nt for the refoz~n of the office of the
prime minister and during the preliminary phase was assigzied to a minister without
portfolio to facilitate its insertion among regular administrative agencies. Com-
mtttlity policy as a matter of fact must be considered a matter of general respon-
sibiYity of the administration as a whole, a responsibility which first of all tAttet
b e shouldered by the premier.
One of the initiatives which T will tackle with maximum urgency is to resolve the
conflict now in pr~gress w~th the Court of Justice of the European Community over
the fai.lure, by the Italian government, to accept Community standards. The Chamber
of Deputies is already discussing two government reform bills (already approved by
the Senate)--one for the implementation of 97 Community directives and the other
one for the reform of stock companies in line with Community standards.
- Another urgent problem is the coordinated and planned handling of the Community's
money flow. This management effort must not be developed outside the basic de-
cisions made by the national government (one of my actions along t~.~se lines has
already been taken in connection with the 3-year plan) and for this purpose I intend
to create a rotating fund which--leaving the powers and responsibilities of the
various administrations unchanged--will be capable of supplying, at the right time,
both the information and all of the funds, both national and community, which can
be obtained for the financing of various efforts. As for the job of coordinating
the interministerial committee for the reconstruction of the earthquake-stricken
zones, a bill will be submitted to parliament in January whose main objective is
to establish an understanding between the federal government and the regions so
- as to guarantee effective and coordinated reconstruction and development. The law
will have to deal with the proFilems of restoring the housing inventory, supporting
the resumption of economic act3vities by establishing development targets, keeping
in mind the particular characteristics of the regions stricken by the earthquake,
staying within the fundamental decisicns to safeguard the pre-existing economic-
social structure.
Mazzotta: Will Send Money to the Regions--Minister for Regions Roberto Mazzotta
The ministry's fundamental tasks inc]_udes the coordination of regional activities
and the link between them and the administrative initiatives and activities of the
various central government agencies wfiich are involved in matters of regional
competence.
This is a typical function of a cabinet minister under the office of the premier
which is still being carried out in a partial and insufficient manner precisely
because of the delay in the reorganization of the reform of the office of the
prime minister itself. Here, however, we have two different types of possible ob-
jectives. The first one involves the advisability of taking practical steps by
building a system of relations with the regions and with the sector ministries
which would establish the ministry of regional affairs as an agency under the of-
fice of the prime minister.
The second objective is more complex: it involves the need for presenting--for the
individual subject--basic and gui~'ance laws which are needed to permit regional
_ legislative aetivities to move along the right tr~ck, following completion of the
blueprint for the transfer and organic functions of related subject matter to the
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regions. In this connection, the foot-dragging and the failure on the part of the
administration and parliament are very serious. The action of the Ministry for
Regional Affairs i:s essential to correct a tendency that has prevailed so far.
On one point, above all, the initiative can be valuable and can be in keeping with
- tne aspect of "significant" as raised in the question put to us by IL MONDO: the
regional finance law is due to run out in December 1981. This year we therefore
must permit and secure approval of a new law which will enable us not only to be
working with updated criteria for the distribution of money from the common fund
or aid in support of the regional development plans, but also to introduce the
necessary procedural elements which will facilitate the specific start of a serious
planning effort that will enable us in turn to counteract the tendency of the cen-
tral administration to act as if the regional government did not exist.
Darida: Office Productivity To Go Up--By Civil Service Minister Clelio Darida
- The achievement of greater efficiency in public administration is one of the most
urgent but also one of the most difficult tasks. The basis of this general re-
organization effort is the "Giannini Report" and the subsequent directive issued
by the Senate last July. It is the task of the civil service minister to translate
this blueprint into specific acts of legislative and administrative initiatives and
to bring about a homogeneous arrangement of personnel in the public sector and to
implement hiring procedures which will be gui~ed by the above-mentioned document.
It is therefore urgent for parliament to pass (as repeatedly requested by the ad- -
ministration) the basic legislative act, that is, the model law on public employ-
ment (Chamber Act 678) which has for many months been examined by the first commit-
tee. Through this initiative we try above all to spell out what subjects relative
to public employment must be covered by law and which ones should be taken care of -
within the hiring procedure, at.. the same time defining procedures for the negotiation
and implementation of the agreements stipulated.
Next we have a reform of the office of the prime minister. This is a priority ini-
tiative to keep the administration functionally effective in line with the provisions
of Article 95 of the Constituticn.
The studies and the analysis of the debate within the Constituent Assembly clearly
show us that the Italian premier must be assigned functions similar to those of the
British prime minister. A committee is at work in this connection and it will
present its proposals in February.
This ~orings us to the reorganization of the ministries and the pertinent outlying
' agencies in relation to the decentralization of government functions. The objective
we want to attain here is likewise to propose an efficient grouping of these agencies,
on the basis of decisions tied to a more forceful presence of the regional govern-
ment setup. A committee will present its first proposal on this problem in February
and, af ter the necessary investigations, not only are they strickly of adminis::rative
nature, this proposal will be expanded into a draft bill. -
In the matter of government agency reform, the cabinet is already looking into a
model bill oa the restoration of autonomous government enterprises according to
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criteria of maximum autonomy, efficiency, and responsibility. Th~.s initiative
likewise is very important because, especially for the combined company and enter-
prise, it makes it possible to do away with old bureaucratic structures; it is
~ also very urgent because we have many reform initiatives in this field (government
railroads, flight assistance, Civil Aviation, Monopolies, ANAS [National Road
Board], Post Office and Telecommunications) on the part of the individual minis-
tries, which are pressed by ob~ective requirements and which are exposed to tough
labor union agitation, but without any unified point of reference.
Similar reforms are being studied for the other types of companies and groupings -
with emphasison the fire department, along with agreements des3gned to make them
- more operational and more autonomous.
Productivity and efficiency indicators in public administration are next. We have
already completed a first phase of endeavor by sending to all administrations a
pertineiit directive calling for the introduction of these indicators in government
agencies together with instruments for evaluating the output of government agencies.
All ministries have esta}ilished (or are establishing) the pertinent organizational
office which must be staffed with specialized personnel (analy sts) in which
connection the Public Administration Academy has been starting the necessary
training courses.
Administrative procedure reforms. According to the indications provided by
parliament, the idea is to carry out a unification program for training centers
- through electronic data processing machines so as to guarantee democratic control -
and the broadest possible right of access t~ the so-called data banks, although
the privacy of the citizens must be safeguarded.
_ Policy of reducing the vast numbers of laws. A scheme has already been worked out
and it will first be submitted to the cabinet for examination. The purpose of
these provisions is to simplify the administrative procedure while complying with
constitutional norms.
Auditing ciiscipline. During one of its last meetings, the cabinet approved a
bill, drafted by the civil service office, dealing with the control and jurisdic-
tion functions of the general accounting office and aimed at reducing preventive
auditing under the law only to acts of government in the strict sense of the word
and at the same time introducing subsequent auditing over management functions in
order to give the public agencies more responsibility for action. All of this _
also ca1.1s for the proper reorganization of the general accounting office.
Updatirig of laws. The need for providing a suitable instrument for determining
the administrative feasibility of laws in advance is closely tied to the simpli-
fication of administrative procedures and controls. A committee, under the ptablic
service office, is working on that. _
Administrat~.ve ~ustice. Various bills are now being examined in parliament and
all of them are aimed at guaranteeing faster and more efficient justice through -
less conf.used prncedures and ad,justments which now can no longer be postponed.
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Management problems. These perhaps are the most complex among all of the problems
involved in the reorganization of public employment in order to adapt it to the ~
- requirements of a modern society. We know of the effort to reduce the number of ~
managers and to increase their authority and responsibility along with adequate
pay, also providing direct access from abroad [from the outside]. There is no
doubt that this ob~ective cannot be divorced from the reorganization of the minis-
tries in relation to the functions which must be redefined in a rigorously more
- efficient ~ontext so as to enable us to achieve greater efficiency in government
agencies. The First Committee of the Chamber is therefore looking into a bill for
temporary controls in the matter of management procedures while the general problem
complex, briefly touched on above, is being studied--with a target date of
February--in order to spell out the directive approved by the Senate last July.
In the matter of public employment, the cabinet is also examining a bill for the
organization of unskilled and skilled government workers, according to the Senate
directive. Other initiatives are being completed and the pertinent schemes will
_ be published as soon as possible for coordination with the agencies involved.
Government, school, post office and telecommunications, monopolies, and ANAS
workers. The objective here is as soon as pos~ible to complete the negotiations
and thus to put an end to the deadlock situation ~ohich has arisen due to the de-
- lays in negotiations and to be able right away to start the new hiring procedures
for contract renewals starting with the next 3-year term of 1982-1984. These are
by no means easy negotiations, not only because of the well-known financial dif-
ficulti es, but also because the entire problem is very complex from the economic
viewpoint and from the organizational viewpoint (redefi~zition of parameters,
retroactive seniority, etc.). For the entire so-called enlarged public employment
~ sector, we nevertheless intend to continue--according to the commitment assumed
toward parliament--with a concrete policy of coordinating the organizational set-
up and equalizing the pay, although on the basis of an in-grade setup.
Capria: Gioia lauro Will Get Its Tndustries--By Minister for the South Nicola
Capria
_ There will be three particularly significant moments in 1981: the immediate start
of reconstruction and development of the earthquake-stricken areas; the reform
law on special action; and the elimination of the major crisis points in the south-
ern area with particular emphasis on the materialization of the major civilian and
industrial infrastructure complexes.
On this last point, we have the following special priorities: the completion of
port facilities and service areas for Gioia Tauro which will become one of Italy's
biggest ports; the simultaneous establishment in the area of some significant
industrial initiatives (Finsider [Iron and Steel Finance Corporation], Oto Melara,
_ and others); completion of big water power systems in Sicily, Puglia, and Calabria
which will lead to the solution of the problem of water for agricultural and in-
dustrial uses in regions with about 8 million inhabitants; the specific start of
big projects in the metropolitan areas of Naples and Palermo.
In line with these direct control actions by the Ministry for the South, we will
in particular cont3nue to address ourselves to the question of crisis points in
~ig southern estalilishments, partly connected to the special program itself (Gela,
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Ottana, Cagliari, Priolo, Bagnoli, and Taranto). Here we are go~.ng to look into
aspects dealing w3th the completion of the infrastructure facilitiea and those
connected with the system of national and European incentives.
Regarding the earthquake, T am convinced that we will be able quickly to proceed
to the reconstruction and development of Irpinia and Basilicata only by 1-~oosting
the local autonomous government levels as much as possible, with techn~cal,
financial, and guidance support from the federal gov~rnment. The F�:~d will be
used to the maximum degree for the priority implementation of actions in the
earthquake areas. By priority T mean here the i~ediate resumption of economic
activities because it would make no sense whatsoever--beyond mere words--to rebuild
anything beyond the framework of the logic of production development. But the
Fund will only be one of the government agencies which the local autonomous levels
will have available during a phase which will have to see them as undisputed pro-
tagonists. � ~
The year 1981 therefore is a testing ground for a vigorous resumption of the
action of the public administration. Connected with this topic is the renewal of
the law on special action which constitutes the opportunity for a profound review
of the philosophy of special action. The new law assigns an outstanding role to
the southern regions in the management of special regional projects for the entire
territory. The regions will not only b e submitting proposals but they will also
be taking action and they will be managing the various efforts. The reform of the
, system of incentives is also very important and it will be based on criteria of
automatic processing and absolute clarity. We will furthermore introduc~ incen-
tives regarding the cost of labor arising from newly employed individuals and
the range of real incentives will be extended.
Special action under central government control will only have the task of carrying
out the big interregional pro~ects of a strategic character as far as the national
economic system is concerned. In this connection, the year 1981 can be a year of
methane development in the S~uth. More than 300 co~unities wi11 be offered an
opportunity to use Algerian methane within 3 months, if the necessary operational
instruments are quickly set up; the federal go~ernment will supply all money
necessary for that in collaboration with the European Community.
~
COPYRIGHT: TL MQNDO 1981
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