JPRS ID: 9589 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090011-7
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9589
5 March 1981
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latir~ America Re ~rt
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(FOUO 5/81)
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NOTE
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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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Washinqton, D. C. 20013
2fi February 1981
_i
NOTE FROI~1 TFIE DIRL�CTOF, FBIS:
Forty years ago, tlie U.S. Government inaugurated a new
service to monitor foreign public broadcasts. A few years later
a similar group was established to exploit the forei~n press.
Prom the merger of t}iese organizations evolved the present-day
FBIS. Our constant goal througiiout has been to provide our readers
witl~ rapicl, accurate, anci comprellensive reporting from tlie public
meclia worlclwicle.
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JPRS L/9589
5 March 1981
- LATIN AMERICA REPORT
(k'OUO 5/81)
CONTENTS
COUNTRY SECTION
IN7~R-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
~ Colu~iat Surveys South Atlantic Role in U.S.-L.A. RelaCions
(Sergio Ceron; LA OPINION, 11 3a~n 81),...........o.....~~....... 1
Jamaican Youths Studying in Cuba Brought Home
(PRELA, 26 Jan 81; St George's Domestic Service, 3 Feb 81)..... S
" Brtgade Program Criticized
Jamai can S tuden ts P ro tes t
" Venezuelan Paper on Actions Against Human Rights Seminar
(PRELA, 17 Feb 81) 6
ARGENTINA
Firmenich Grants Interview to Cuban Magazine
(Mario Firmenich Interview; BOHEIrffA, 9 Jan 81) . . . . . . . . a o . . 8
CUB A
Figures �or 1981 Budget, 1981-1985 Plan Reported
(BOHEMIA, 2 Jan 81) ...........................o.........o~..o.0 25
Five-Year Development Plan
_ 1981 Development Plan
1981 State Budget
_ Effects of Divorce on Children Discussed
(Luis Cil; BOHEMIA, 9 Jan 81) 28
Natianal Center for Animal Health Activities Noted
(H. Nunez Lemus; BOHEMIA, 9 Jan 81)............o 3].
- - a - [III - LA - 144 FOUO]
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~ EL SALVADOR
= CI:~iES Reports I7isease Outbreaks at Refugee Centers ~3
(PREI~, 19 Jan 81) .................d..................
.
HON DURAS
�
- Briefs 34
Priest Arrested After Charging Massacres
JAMAICA
Britain's Ridley Visits; Loan Agreement Signed 35
(PRELA, 23 Jan 81) ....................o.....................
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COUNTRY SECTION INTER-P.MERICAN AFFAIRS -
COLUMNISTSURVEYS SOUTH ATLANTIC ROLE IN U.S.-L.A. RELATIONS
Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 11 Jan 81 p 10
[Article by Sergio Ceron: "U.S. Wants To Consolidate Argentina in the South Atlantic")
[Text] The strategic and e~onomic importance of the South Atlantic is constantly re-
ceiving recognition by the specialists who outline new doctrin~as in which that re- -
gion takes on special significance. Starting with the first manifestations of this
phenomenon,ths southern part of America has ceased being regarded a marginal terri-
tory for experts in strategy and, on the contrary, is rapidly rising to a priority
ranking.
Of course, this implies that Argentina is also losing its former marginal status -
- and is becoming, consequently, a nation that must be taken into account.
Last week offers us two definite examples of what is happening in this field, with
the visit of the Egyptian minister of foreign relations (sic; should read minister
of state for foreign affairs], Butrus Ghali, to Buenos Aires and with statements by
Repuk~lican spokesmen made in Washington and emphasizing that Ronald Reagan's Admin-
istration will attempt to reqain the "friends" of the United States, especially
Latin American qovernments stirred up by the Carter Administration under pretext of
the struggle for human rights.
But let us proceed step by step and begin by analyzing the mission carried out by
the Egyptian foreign minister [sic]. It is possible to infer from the movement
and talks held by Ghali in Argentina that the government of Anwar E1-Sadat, turned
perceptibly toward the West and held in check in his area of influence by the Arab
nations uncompromisingly opposed to Israel, is seeking to expand his maneuvering
- field on a worldwide basis. Consequently, he is proposing the establishment of a
dialog between Africa and Latin America and, specifically, between Egypt and Argen-
tina. For obvious reasons, rapprochement between the two continents may give the
nations on them a greater margin of negotiating capability with regard to the great
powers. -
"I believe that it is absolutely necessary to strengthen solidarity between the '
various regions of the south," the visitor said. "Our two continents have one and
the same ocean and, just as Europe, the United States and Canada have consolidated -
a dialog that is enabling them to design a common poiicy, in the same way we must
set up a dialog between Latin America and Africa, between Egypt and Argentina."
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Sadat is definitely not unaware that, while strategic and political interests are
bringing the great powers in confrontation with each other, on the other hand in-
terests of an economic nature are beginning to coincide when it is a question of
establishing tY~e rules of the game for negotiating with developing countries. In
general, ther~~ is talk of a North-South dialoq in which the northern hemisphere
would represent the industrialized countries and the southern hemisphere the sup-
pliers of raw materials and importers of capital goods and technology.
Therefore, the paradox occurs that while Egypt has placed itself unhesitatingly cn the
side of the West in its confrontation in the sphere of the power dispute with the -
Soviet Union, its economic interP:ts~~�ten clash with the interests of its allies. -
The same is true of Argentina, a country with a Western propensity, which has been
compelled to trade with the Soviet world owing to the clumsiness, blindness and
egoism of the large European nations and of the United States.
- We can perceive, moreover, that Butros Ghali is expressing the understanding of his
government concerning the increasing role played by the South Atlantic and, likewise,
concerning the leadership incumbent on Argentina and Brazil in that region. With
an appreciable difference between these two nations. While, because of its energy _
and food production capacity, Argentina is in a position to handle a policy indepen-
dent of any kind of pressure, IIrazil, on the other hand, is subject to the good will
of the oil exporting countries, among which the influence of a leftist ideology is
, evident. A break with the socialist regime of Iraq, for example, might cut off sup-
ply of almost half of Brazil's oil requirements and bring it to the brink of collapse.
"_"herefore, Egypt is mentioning explicitly its interest in establishing a dialog with _
Argentina, in which, undoubtedly, greater elasticity is noted for carrying out a
~ foreign policy of its own and, in a certain way, a bold policy.
The Beagle Channel and the Falkland Islands
At the same time, wire agencie~ send us echoes from Washington concerning confiden-
tial remarks made to press correspondents by spckesmen of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee belonging to the Republican Party.
_ They state that the new admit.istration of Ronald Reagan is concerned with finding a
rapid solution to pr.oblems that, like the border dispute between Argentina and Chile
_ and the dispute over the Falkland Islands, may create prospects of instability in
the hemisphere.
Associated Press maintains, in a 5 January dispatch, that "in sources close to the
new Senate Foreign Relations Committee it has been learned that the possibility of
~ encouraqing an early return of the Falkland Islands to Argentina is�$aid to be under
consideration."
The American agency adds that Argentina has been negotiating return of the southern
archipelago, but the steps taken in accordance with the provisions of the United Na-
tions with regard to decolonization have been evasive up to now.
Altnough tlze sources dc,~lined to commit the opinion of the new Republican administra-
tion any further on this thorny dispute, they 3id not fail to admit that, at other
~ times, Washington has used its influence with Great Britain for settling other de-
- colonization problems. The example of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) was mentioned as the most
evident one. _
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The question is why the Americans must be partzcu~.arly interested in having Argen-
tina recover its unredeemed lands. And here c:e have to apply the old, but never
wornout statement made by Disraeli about Enuland: "Great Britain has no permanent
allies. It has permanent interests."
The concern of the world strategy of the United States aims at obtaining control of
the vital navigation routes passing by South America. Only an alliance with Brazil
and especially with Argentina can make it easy for its flezt, occupied in a large num-
ber of areas of the world,to confront the increasing presence of the modern, powerful
Soviet fleet off the coasts of Africa. A constant threat impends from there over the
transportation of bulk oil, food and strategic minerals to the United States, Western
Europe and Japan. 'Ifao-thirds of the raw materials that move American indus=ry come
by way of the sea accesses of South American and southern Africa.
Similar reasons can be put forth with regard to the Beagle :.'hannel problem. In the
eyes of Washington, it seems advisable for Argentina to settle its disputes in that
region and consolidate its sea presence in the South Atlantic. The possibility of
having bases in its southern ports, on the Falklands and on the Georgia and South
Sandwich islands would qive the Argentine fleet whase techological renovation has
- been announced for the next 5-year period the possibiiity of becoming a valuable
strategic ally of the United States. Great Britain, occupied in ~urope and havinq
_ abandoned its responsibility in the Far East and Middle East in the last few decades,
can in no way make up, at a distance of thousands of miles, for the presence of Ar-
gentina.
Latin ,America, a Priority
The men who interpret the foreign policy that the new administration will apply have
stated that they do not want Latin America to be the backyard of the United States,
but, rather, its vestibule.
The new doctrine has its authors in the sector of professors in Georgetown University
and Stanford University who supported the Republican candidate and who are now pre-
paring to cover in part the posts of advisers and officials in the State Department
and on the National Security Council. We can recall, among their spokesmen, Rpger
Fontaine who visited Buenos Aires several times in the second half of 1980, accom-
- panied on one of them by LtGen L~aniel Graham, Reagan's strategic adviser on hemi-
sphere affairs. Both justified ~the role of Latin America in their country's over-
all foreign policy and they proclaimed that, beyond the State Department's ideologi-.
- cal lucubrations in the Derian [assistant secretary for human fights and humanitarian
Affairsj era, they would be treated as friends to the extent to which it would suit
American interests. Subsequently, Alexander Haig, nominated by Reagan for the post
_ of secretary of state, said explicitly that the moderately military governments in
Latin America were actually the ones that were protecting man's rights and dignity
in the face of the envassalment imposed by subversive terrorism.
But the one who, at this time, is actually calling the shots is the nominee for am-
- bassadorship to the United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, a conservative Democrat, pro-
fessor in Georgetown University and connected with the American Enterprise Institute.
Kirkpatrick attacked, in several lectures and periodical articles, Brzezinski's
position that decreed a strateqic disregar.d for Latin America and that, instead,
focused attention of United States polic,y on the Middle East and Furope.
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Of course, no one is trying to deny the priori_ty that these two theaters represent _
for :�7asnington, but Kirkpatrick and her friends realize that an overall view of the
- world strategic and political situation requires the United States to conso lidate
- its rearguard firmly. Otherwise, it will not- have specific weight for ope rating in_
other areas much ~arther from its primary bases of operation. The three Americas -
forgive the expression must become a bulwark from which the Union may ~s tablish a
very solid economic and military structure that will enable it to have ai.wor ldwide man-
euvering depth on the basis of very strong loqistic support.
Although Brzezinski laid the philosophical groundwork for Carter's policy in the
hemisphere, the doctrine has its background in Henry Kissinger and was carried out
by a Republican administration. The phenomenon can be explained from a cultural
point of view. Both are native-born Europeans. Culturally speaking, they are _
"European-centric" and view the world with the distorted eyesight with which states-
men in that region are accustomed to viEwing it. It does not fail to be revealing
that, when the new conceptions of United States foreign policy are beginning to open
a way and, among other points, aim at justifying the roZ~ of Latin America, their
spokesmen represent intellectual ~rends emerging from universities least influenced
by European culture. Today, without doubt, the social democracy of the Ol d Continent
and American liberal progressism influence each other mutually. The first high-level
reaction has beeii given, precisel;~, by the rejection of the Democrat admin istration
by the people of the United States. `I'herefore, we said once that a new po litical
era seems to opening up in the nation to the north. ~
~ 'I'he announcement of a visit by two House af Representa~ives committees to Bueiios
Aires is contributing to an intensification of our appraisals of the changes looming
up, already very evident in the Union.
The president of the nation, Jorge Rafael Videla, and the ambassador of the United
States, Harry Schlaudeman, spoke of this matter during a talk held Wednesd ay in the
executive mansion. Diplomatic observers believe that the length of the talk makes
it possible to infer that in its course topics broader than a mere parliamentary
visit were discussed within the spectrum of matters involving bilateral re lations.
The first open, and to some extent spectac:ular, step toward rapprochement with the
reqion was taken last Monday by Ronald Rea~an who talked extensively with the pre-
sident of Mexico, Jose Lopez Portillo. The latter, who did not fail to display his
fear that the Republican presence in the White House and in the Capitol would mean
a return to the "big stick" policy, was comforted, apparently, by the frankness and
- clearness with which Reagan expressed his desire to consolidate the ties w ith his
neighbor and to hold constant consultations with Mexico on every bilateral problem
or problerns common to the hemisphere.
Th~:refore, it is premature to anticipate in detail what the lines of United States
L-oreign policy will be, but there can be no doubt already that changas will be evi-
dent and that in them a better r.elationship with Latin America and especi ally with
our country is contemplated.
CuPYRIGHT: LA OPINION, 1981 -
10,042
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COUNTRY SECTION INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
.TAMAICAN YOUTHS STUDYING IN CUBA BROUGHT HOME
Brigade Program Criticized
PA262015 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1556 ~MT 26 J~n 81
[Text] Kingston, 23 Jan (i+FP)--One hundred and twenty young Jamaican men and
- women who were in Cuba participating in the controversial brigade program returned
' to the island yesterday by go~~ernment plane.
Under the brigade program established by former leftist Prime Minister Michael
Manley, since 1975 Jamaican youths were sent to Cuba for the apparent purpose of
receiving training in construction technique~. Nevertheless, upon their return
several brigade members formed j.deological groups.
The program has been severely criticized here since 30 October 1980, the day o�
- the general elections, when documents concerning the brigades disappeared
mysteriously from the Housing Ministry.
Jamaican Students Protest
I'L032331 St George's Domestic Service in English 2300 GMT 3 Feb 81
[Excerpts] An organization uf .Jamaican students in Cuba has written to Prime
~ Minister Edward Seaga expressing concern and disappointment over the government'~
termination of what is known as the brigadista program. Our correspondent in
Jamaica has the details to that story:
[begin recording] This program, which dates back to 1975, allowed unemployed
' Jamaican youths to go to Cuba for 1 year o.f training in construc~ion skills.
In its letter ta the prime minister, the organization of Jamaican students in
Cuba criticized thc. g~vernment for recalling the brigadistas when most of them
had only 1 month tn go before completin~; their course and graduating. The
organization questioned whether this move ~aas as a resu].t of previous JLP [Jamaica
Labor Party] charges that the youths were receiving military training. It denied
these allegations ~nd called on the JLP to either provide evidence or to withdraw
them. The sCudents said the recal? of the brigadistas could not be to the best
interest of the Jamaican youths, especially as the government had no plan to
provide them with jobs or ~oith further training. The organization of Jamaican
students in Cuba has also brought the matter to the attention of the Jamaica ~
Council of Churches and the Jamaic~ Council for Human Ri~hts. [end recording]
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High-ranking political and diplomatic leaders in San J~se, information center of
the area, have speculated about the reasons the Sandinist junta had to make a deci-
sion with such a high political price. One of the most obvious deductions is that
5andinism is at a juncture of es calation within the totalitarianization of its
_ political condu~t.
Newsmen who have taken the time to review the agenda of the seminar attribute the
Nicaraguan Government's angry reaction to the fact that the meeting had planned to
- analyze not or~ly freedom of express~o^. under the Sandinist regime, but also decree
511 by which the Sandinist junta estab lished a strict system of censorship. It is
so rigorous that these latest events are placed completely outside the knowledge
of the Nicaraguan people since the news media are banned from dealing with the sub-
- ject. Central American political circles are also speculat9.ng about the next steps
_ of Jose Estaban Gonzalez~ cin tthecex essesdof thetsuccessiveidetfacto
regimeswof _
since 1967 has been deno g
force which have ruled Nicaragua.
Gonzalez was to land in the Augusto Cesar Sandino airport in Managua a few hours
after th e Human Rights Commission was declared illegal, its headquarters raided
and its files confiscated by the police. Gonzalez was coming from Rome where he
met in private with the pope.
One of the possibilities is that Gonzalez wi11 be imprisoned. This would lead to
a direct clash with Christian democracy, particularly with the Venezuelan Govern- _
. ment of Luis Herrera Can~p~ns which since the hard days of the anti-Somozist strug-
gle expresse d its regard for Jose Esteban Gonzalez.
These events are particularly important for Yenezuela since the precarious Nicara-
guan economy depends on the supply of Venezuelan petroleum at subsidized prices as
part of a joint supply plan with Mexico. This plan would collapse if there were
serious complications such as the imprisonment of Jose Esteban Gonzalez.
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COUNTRY SECTION ARGENTINA
~ FIRMENICH GRANTS INTERVIEW TO CUBAN MAGAZINE
Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 9 Jan 81 pp 66-71
[Interview with Mario E. Firmenich, secretary general of the Peronist Montonero
Movement, by Pedro Rioseco in Havana; date not given]
[Text] With the ovation with which the delegates to the Second Congress of the
Coffinunist Party of Cuba responded to the resounding final phrases of the ceutral
report read b y our commander in chief still ringing in o ur ears, we left the
Convention Palace to keep the appointment made with the highest leader of the
Argentine Montoneros. He is in addition one of the youngest zevolutionary leaders
on the continent, one of those most experienced in the struggle against the re-
pressive bodies throughout the Southern Cone, which in view of the demands of the
Argentine military regime, are uniting their efforts in order p:;ysically to
= eliminate and destroy the combative organizations. Shortly before midnight, we
arrived at the house where the outstanding Argentine revolutionary leader, who in
his 33 years of life tias spent more than 10 under the difficult conditions of
clandestine struggle, is staying as a guest. We were prepared to make use of the
opportunity, in the style suggested by the very name of the Montoneros (which
dates back to the last century, when the cowboys of the Argentine plains attacked
the troops of the pro-Briti_sh oligarchy en masse ["monton" means mass or pile]) ,
and so armed with a"monton" of qiiestions, we launched our journalistic attack.
[Question] Could you, Comrade Firmenich, give us a characterization of the present
political situation in Argentina?
[Answer] Iz~ the current political situation, we must distinguish two ingredients:
one~~e can call of a temporary nature, and the other of a strategic sort.
To understand this sj_tuation, which is synthesized in the political phenomenon of
Viola's appointment to succeed Videla in usurping the ~,residential authority, we
can say very briefly, from the strategic viewpoint, that this military dictatorship
set for itself secret plans, and drafted a strategy with three political-military
stages prior to the consolidation of the economic model.
These three phases were, first of all, the coup d'etat as such, pursuant to the
_ so-called "ripe fruit" theory, carrying off a coup d`etat against an entirely
deteriorated political regime, and thereby cuntrolling the po~itical power while
- simultaneously liquidating the operation of political parties and unions, trade
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associations in general, not only of the workers but of the owners as well. This -
was phase one.
Phase two, called "reorganiz.ation," was strictly spea'~cing the phase of repressivn.
In other words that in which the successive annihilation of the noii-Peronist
guerrilla oxganizations, first of all, wtzs sought, and then the Montoneros second,
and thirdly the base level of the workers' movement.
This reorganization stage was to conclude in theory with the reorganization of new -
political parties and trade unions. In other words, it was presumed that by then
the preexisting forces wo u1d have been politically and militarily liquidated.
And phase three, the so-called consolidation stage, sought to consolidate the
preceding two phases politically. It was planned to achieve this consolidation
with the creation of a political movement of a majority nature in support of the
military government. This was the idea.
The coup d'etat phase, as everyone knows, came off without major problems, for in
fact, the mistakes of Isabel Peron made that task relatively easy. Then came the
phase of repression, which left the balance now internationally famous--30,000
individuals who have "disappeared."
On one occasion General Viola admitted in a p ublic address that there were 8,000
unidentified dead. The number in prison is rather difficult to specify, since
often individuals are reported released when they have not been. But the basic
_ outcome frc-n the point of view of repression is 30,000 disappeared. And this
figure is not exaggerated.
- The problem is that in this phase of repression or military annihilation, the
dictatorship has failed to achieve its goals. It has not achieved them with us
nor has it with the workers` movement, despite the fact that both we and the
workers' movement suffered great losses in this brutal offensive of the "dirty
war," as it has been officially termed.
fo illustrate the figures, the casualties we have suffered come to some 5,000 men,
while the casualties of the base-level workers` movement come to some 10,000
representatives.
- It is obvious that the cost to us, to the people as we11 as the organization in
general, has been high, but in no way was the enemy able to achieve his goal. On
- the contrary, political phenomena which were the opposite of those predicted
occurred. Beginning last year, there has been an increasing process of accumula-
tion of popular powe r in various sectors, various mass organizations, such that
the cotisolidation phase which Viola intended to carry out lost any meaning, since
there is politically nothing to consolidate, there is no ci.vil confirma.tion of what
was achieved in the repressive phase, that is to say the outcome of that repres- ~
sion. This is the situation from the strategic point of view. There was,
following the death of General Peron, a very clear deterioration of the balance of ~
forces caorking against the popular sector and in favor of the oligarcho-
imperialists, consummate d in the coup d'etat and thP final offensive launched
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= against the workers' movement, the people's movement. But beginning in 1979, this
process was reversed, and currently the process is adding forces favorable to the
people. Obviously, it has not yet succeeded in imbalancing, or even balancing,
the ratio of forces, but what we are stressing is the change in the trend in the
process.
While the balance of forces was changing in favor of the enemy during his offensive,
due to the destruction of popular organizations, since 20 April 1979, the date of
the general strike called by the combative sector of the trade union movement, and
the launching of the counteroffensive we pursued last year, a reversal in this
process of deterioration in the resistance of the people's forces occurred, con-
-.~erting it into a growing process of accumulation of power in organizations in the
people's sector, wieh the reactionary forces in the country steadily deteriorating
politically. This is the strategic situation.
From the situatianal point of view, we should have arrived by this date at the
beginning of the consolidation phase, according to the time schedule established
prior to the coup d'etat. This was to involve the appointment of a high-ranking
retired officer to be the leader of this political movement, intended mainly~to
support the dictatorial process. The person chosen for this function was
General Viola.
In other words, this gentleman was chosen at that time to serve as president,
presumably during the consolidation phase.
J
But as the balance of forces has not developed in the way that they hoped, the
_ reality of matters will have nothing to do with their intentions. And moreover,
the fact is that in order to be able to pursue a minimal policy of winning over
certain sectors by the regime, a change in ;:he economic policy is absolutely
essential.
It is not possible to establish bases, either on the level of the middle strata--
what do 1 mean by middle strata?--not even on the level of the middle bourgeois -
sectors, or even the oligarchic sectors in the interior who are opposed to the
economic policy today. They may be for or against the dictatorial process, but
they are certainly against the economic policy.
In other words, it is essential in order to pursue any effort to establish a -
political movement, to change the economic policy in such a way as to obtain
concessions for the social base which is to be won over, and this is incompatible
with the present economic model, which is not of a situational but of a strategic -
nature, and which has n.ot been completed.
In this connection we could differentiate Argentina, if you will, from Chile. With
identical economic models being pursued in both countries, the degree of completion
of this economic model in Argentina is lagging far behind in terms of the level of
concentration of capital achieved, the level of unemployment achieved, and the
modification of the economic infrastructure is far behind.
As a point of reference: when it comes to railroad policy, Argentina has a
network of about 40,000 kilometers of railroad line. It was announced in 1976
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that only 10,000 kilometers of railroad lines would be left, known as the trunk
network, while the other 30,000 kilometers would be taken up, including branch
lines, and eliminated completely. This has a historic background somecahat more
complex where the regions are concernec~, b ut this was the intention.
Concretely, some 5,000 kilometers of the scheduled 30,000 kilometers of railroad
track were closed down and taken up. Why? Because whenever they began to take
up tracks, the railroacl network in the country stopped. T:ie trade union struggie
of the railroad workers prevented the continuation of the economic plan ~ahere the
railroad policy was concerned. And th3s is happening in various sectors of
political life.
Thus currently, with Viola, we have three ma~or guidelines which will come in
conflict as soon as Viola takes office as president.
One is the intention of the mil.itary dictatorship and Viola himself in this plan
for political consolidation.
Second is the line set forth very clearly to Viola by Rockefeller, during his last
visit to Argentina, calling for no change in the economic policy.
- Third is the pop uiar expectation of making use of the objective weakness involved
in the takeover by Viola from Videla to overthrow the dictatorship, as has
repeatedly occurred in Ar.gentina with preceding dictatorships.
In other words, if there is an expectation on the level of the popular movement in
Argentina today, it is to transform Viola into Lanusse. Not that Viola is
democratic, and Lanusse was not either. However if the cycle of the defeat of
dictatarships repeats itself, there is a possibility of forcing a retreat and
obtaining concessions of sectors of power for the popular movement.
This is the hope for triumph, an approximate idea of the hope for triumph for the
, people's movement, based on an abjective weakness in the dictatorship.
This weakness is the result of political deterioration and the fact that under the
present circumstances--this is a very ambitious strategic project for the reaction-
ary classes, but one half-accomplished--the changeover represents an objective
~
break in the continuity Rockefeller and Martinez de Hoz want.
~ Although they are no �.nore than demagogic and minimal actions directed at oligarchic
sectors in the interior, or cer~ain strata of the bourgeoisie, from whom what is
wanted are economic concessions to be used as a political base, this interrupts,
weakens or delays the process of concentration of capital. This is a process
which has not been concluded and which has to deal with the reaction of a popular
movement wtiich is advancing in a counteroffensive against an enemy it has perfectly
identified.
_ i
_ [Question] After a brief pause, we questioned our interlocutor, who speaks
rapidly, but with precise ideas, and without much of a Buenos Aires accent, about
- a second aspect, having to do with the role Argentina plays in the imperia.list
strategy on the continent, its relationship to Brazil in this strategy, and on a
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more specific level, how the internal difficulties in the country are being
evidenced in the light of the pursuit of this global strategy. He drew briefly
- on his cigarette and began to speak again.
[Answer] Thi~ is obviously related to what we have seen recently. With the
passage of time it has become clearer wha.t the basic proposal pursued by this
dictatorship is and its links with the neighboring ~'ictatorial processes. It is
also indicative to all the political militants in the popular movements in the
Southern Cone that when we read documer.ts from other neighboring countries, we
think they are referring to our country. The process, the language, the trade
union laws, the political time schedules, the constitutional changes, the exchange
of repressive collaborations--it is all much the same, identical.
This uniformity, which has no recent precedent at least, is explained by the fact
that in the final analysis all of these regimes are supporting a given structure `
of a regional nature, a part of a strategy of a world nature.
None of khese regimes announced its i.ntentions at the beginning, since given their
reactionary nature, they would have had difficulty obtaining support, approval, a
consensus, or even acquiescence of any kind from any sec.*.or.
In other words, years had to pass before a1Z of these elem,~nts became clear as
they carried out their policy.
One of the elements which in our view has just revealed this strategy is the pact
signed by the dictatorship in Argentina and by Brazil during the two meetings
President Videla had with President Figueiredo. And to this must be added another
series of agreements charting a cuurse: between Argentina and Uruguay; between
Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay on the Plate River Basin; the establishment of the
Bolivian dictatorship by the Argentine dictatorship and with the acquiescence of
Brazil; and despite the lesser contradictions, the very clear identification with
the Pinochet dictatorship. The disagreer~ents with the latter have to do with _
power, the distribution of assets in order to negotiate ~aith imperialist capital.
At a recent meeting of th~ OAS, it was clearly seen how the Southern Cone Pact
functioned diplomatically in defense of the judgment of Argentina and Bolivia,
while Chile, supposedly at odds with Argentina over the Beagle Channel problem,
showed absolute solidarity with the Argentine dictatorship.
In other words, all of these dictatorships have the same intention, which is
regional reorganization, ~aithin the framework of world rQOrganization of the
international division of labor. All of this comes within the context of the
trilateral proposal to deal with the structural crisis in capitalism.
The recent tour by Rockef-eller~through South American countries, including Chile,
Argentina and Brazil, is no happenstance, nor is the fact that the same European _
enterprises--for energy and armaments--are those established in Argentina and
Brazil. The Argentine-Brazilian nuclear agreement is no accident. This plan for
reorganization is based on the alteration or reorganization of markets--they call
them "economic space"--which also presupposed the need for the destruction of the
LAFTA as well, in order to eliminate the hindrances of a legal nature existin~ for
regional trade, basically the compulsory nature of the LAFTA agreements of a
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~ multilateral nature, preventing the bilateral absorption of smaller markets by
Argentina and Brazil. It is no happenstance that Garcia Meza (Bolivia) withdrew
f rom the Andean Pact, nor is the economic boycott, since the Audean Pact is the
_ economic enemy cf this expansion or this model of regional reorganization in South
America. It is based on an axis--~ae might call it the Buenos Aires-Sao Paulo
axi.s--incorporating in a single market the whole of the southern part of Brazil,
Uruguay and the Argentine coast, which includes the entire pampas zone, which is
w ithout a daubt, in terms of number of inhabit3nts and income per capita, the most
important market in Latin America.
In additi~n, it has abundant hydroelectric energy, which everyone knows is the
cheapest, and the infrastructure for the exploitation of this energy is being
developed. ~Jithin this, the main industrial base is Brazil, and this then is the
origin for the economic plan of the Argentine dictatorship, the economic plan of
Minister rlartinez de Hoz, to destroy Argentine industry, to destroy industry of
domestic ori~in, cahat we might call the national bourgeoisie, and the withdrawal of
industry of monopolistic foreign origin.
It will be recalled that General Motors withdrew from Argentina some years ago. It
_ simply packe~ up its factory plant and l~ft, leaving the empty premises behind.
The Fiat tractor plant has virtua.lly shut down, and the Deutz tractor plant has also
- closed, because it has been transferred to Brazil, so that farm machinery is now
imported from Brazil by Argentina. Even the cold storage industry is breaking down
in Argentina, because there are a number of ineasures in the Videla-Figueiredo
agreements, one pertaining to animal health in the frontier zones, and others in
the customs sector which in the final analysis permit the sale of cattle on the
- hoof by ~lrgentina tc Brazil for processing by the Brazilian slaughtering industry.
In other words, it is the dismantling of the Argentine industrial apparatus,
including that with capital of domestic origin, and not to speak of the capital of
state origin, the f.irst to be converted to the private sector for subsequent -
- liquidation. Then the capital of the national bourgeoisie is liquidated, and even
monopolistic Forei~;n r_apital, which is transferred, because it happens that these
same monopolistic enterprises have had branches in Argentina and Brazil for many
years.
!
The model has given Brazil industrial priority, because among other things it seems
to date to have offered the greatest political stability, lowest manpower costs, -
and most limited tradition of organized struggle, since the workers' movement in
Brazil is the youngest. The warkers' movement in Argentina could not be incorpor-
ated in the developmental model which was tried at the beginning of the 1960s.
For al1 these reasons, what the economic model presumes is a country with a
capacity for 15 million inhabitants at a maximum. Thus there are some 13 million -
excess inhabitants. An agroindustrial country, a model in which industry sur-
vives--this is what the Bunge and Born monopoly--~Y:e industrial monopoly which
processes food products, i.e. the industrial processing of farm crops, Icnown as -
industrial crops--represents for Argentina. _
And that is all, except that now oil chemistry may remain too, since brazil does
not have a significantly developed oil industry. Apparently oil chemistry would
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remain in Argentina, to work from Argentina toward Brazil, and Argentina would
, remain the financial center of this market.
_ The rest of the industrial development, includir.g agroindustrial undertakings, fgi~fit
- machinery and heavy macliinery, would be headc,uartered in the Sao Paulo zone. And ~
there is the development of the war industry as an inducement to the Argentine
armed forces te go along with such a model. The only element in the industrial -
model which presupposes industrial expansion. In any case this development of the
war industry would remain far below the level of the Brazilian war industry, which
has developed as a very important exporter of armaments. This bribe offered to
the Argentine armed forces is obvious, because there is even talk of transferring
this war industry to the private sector while it is still in state hands. ~
There are a number of generals, some of them retired--incluciing Gen Lopez Aufranc,
a famous reac.*.ionary from the Lanusse government era--who have publicly urged the
- need to transfer t}ie war industry to the private sector because "tiiere is the
- concern that this economic and strategic potential might fall into the hands of
an irresponsible civil government in the future." Thus the safe thing is to make
it private and obviously this benefits the military.
This is not an entii-ely new invention on the part of. the Argentine oligarchy. The
emergence of the Argentine oligarchy, with General Roca, during the conquest of
the desert in the last century, was based on the distribution of the land won
from the Inclians through genocide, to be distributed, given out, to the troops
which participated in ~he massacre, with che number of hectares Uased on rank. So
much for a general, so mucli for a soldier, so much for a sergeant, etc. Obviously,
with one great difference. The soldiers and sergeants, logically, were given a
few hectares in the middle of the desert, which they then sold for a bottle of
alcoliol, and so the concentration of the land in the hands of these military
commanders who make up ~he oligarcliy came about.
A similar phenomenon is occurring at present, when in the final analysis there is
no possibility of. the political implementat:ton of the oligarchic model, and
military implementation is needed.
The problem is to resolve political authority by means of military tyranny, and
- the way to guarantee unity of the armed forces in solid support of this project is
- to offer them membership i.n the dominant classes, in this case now with the war
industry.
This is the economic model we said is half-completed, because the unemployment _
index is not at the level. it shuuld be from the point of view of the oligarchic
interests, nor is the level of breakdown in our national industry, and even the
index of conversion of state enterprises into private ones is not where it should
be from the point uf view of their interests.
And when it comes to the destruction of state services, such as the railroads,
they are far from having reached a level satisfactory to them. This is the
situation. They have not even succeeded in controlling inflation, which is running
at about 100 percent per year.
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~
'I'htis this model, ~v:f.th its gradualist technique, would require some years more to
achlevQ its goals. OtherwLse, it would have to be made more profouncl in terms of
what is known as a shock policy, which is to some extent ~ahat has been done this
year, 1980, the last year remaining for Minister Plartinez de Hoz, although thi~ ig
no longer politically tolerable in Argentina. This is the situation.
[Question] The questian arises as a logical continuation of what has been said -
~ above: How has th~s econoniic policy affected the Argentine workers' class and the
.3eteriaration of che standard of living, since A-rgentina is one country in the
South American area which has, because of it~ ir.dustrial power, had a certain
standard of living above that of neighboring countries, and does this policy
- directly affect the standard of living, of workers' sectors above all?
- The immediate answer was that of a man who understands the problems of his country
profound.ly.
[Answer] The first very clear indication, and it will also be seen that this is a -
textbook case, because the same thing is s~en in ali the countries of the area, is
the r.eduction of real wages by 50 perc:ent.
Concretel5~, this means decreasing the extent to which the wage-earners share in
the net product ~rom the 48-percent level reached in 1974 to the approximately
27 percent which is seen now. In monetary terms this means armed robbery, more or
less--it really is armed robbery--oi something like $10 billion per year from the
working class.
- As to the other indices, we can see, for example, in education, that dropouts from
the primary schools, which are supposedly free and attendance compulsory, is _
running about 50 percent prior to completion of the 7th grade, and the percentages
for school dropouts on the secondary and university levels are similar, or a little
less.
In addi~ion, whole ~iniversities have shut down, whole university courses, and
hospitals--one of Lhe most important hospitals in Argentina was clused in 1976,
and the chi.ldren's liospital has just been shut down and then reopened. -
Now i.t is necessary to pay rees for care at the hospitals, which were free, and
- one must also pay Fees riow at the tiniversities, which were free.
- As to housing, the rent law was promulgated, astronomically increasing rental -
sums by the end of 1 1/2 or 2 years.
This meant that about 200,000 families in Buenos Aires had to lose their homes for
lack of abili.ty to pay the rent, and therefore, as there is no construction of
low-cost housing, and no access to any other, the only othe~ practical solution
for people in these r.ircumstances was to go and live with relatives.
Well, one coulcl contemplate piles of figures. The increase in infant mortality, _
the increase in malnutrition. There has been a change in the diet. Everyone
knows that the Argentine diet was very good, because it is a country with more -
than enough meat. However, actually, the real consumption of ineat is decreasing,
and in addition there is a redistribution of consumption.
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- In the final analysis, all of the social indices, whether for pu~lic health,
housing, education, leisure activities or social projects are being seriously
affected.
- The social projects of the tradc. unions, which covered many aspects of public
health and leisure, ~aere confiscated, stolen away! These social projects involved
a total figure of about $1.5 to 2 billion per year, this sum coming from the wage
_ contributions of workers affiliated with the trade unions, and all the installa-
tions, such as vacation colonies and clinics of very fine quality in terms of
infrastructure and medical care, were built and their maintenance provided out of
the contributions of the workers, from withholdings from members' wages, obviously
shared and supported by all the members of the trade union-
This has been el.iminated, taken away from the trade unions, and they have
practically ceased to provide the aid services they formerly did. The conclusion
is that from the point of view of public health, education and housing, the
indices have been truly much wor.se than regrettable in these last 4 years.
From the point of view of organization, obviously again with regard to ttle trade `
union structure which existed historically in Argentina, the workers' movement
_ today has suffered a sub~tantial loss. For the first time in 35 years, tlie
Argentine movement lias been without its trade union organi2ations for a prolonged
period, and this has led to political changes in the country. Among other things, -
there has been a change in ttie trade union tactics, with implications of a
political nature already visible, and with greater future significance. Why?
Because the loss of the trade union apparatus was accompanied by repression on the -
level of factory representatives' bodies. In other words, blows were struck on
the levels of the structure, the superstructure of the trade union apparatus, and
the base organizations~
These were replaced in tl~e struggle by a new form of organization with a semi- -
clandestine basis, and a presumably broad, very collegiate and ^ollectivist
nature, if only for reasons of survival. For every representative with high
visibility in the direction of the trade union struggle throughout these years
has been kidnaped.
Therefore, it was necessary that there be no very outstanding leader, as a means
of survival, and that: all play a leadership role, one by one.
Thus in the necessary negotiations with the owners--an inherent part of the
trade union struggle--a different worker appeared for the negotiations each time,
in order to avoid individual L-ocus on the leaders. And this, naturally, has as
a consequence on the one hand the fact that no leader has an adequate opportunity
to acquire great representative support as an individual, and on the other, that
individuality in the struggle is not necessary. Taken into the political realm,
it presupposes above all the end of bossism. _
[Question] On the military level, there is talk of a so-called "international
military force," or a Southern Cone pact, in which Argentina has been playing an
outstancling role, and if it is not the leader, is at least the visible head. And
on the other hand, looking toward the domestic level, some observers see a certain
weakening in the monolithic ~inity of. the army. What can you tell us about this?
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[Answer] Let us say that tlie Argenrine armed forces are in the lead in this
international military~foice. Now being in the lead might not mean being the
leader, but ttie battering r.am. We believe it is the latter case. We believe that
the leader is Brazil, and thac the forceful shock role is being played by
Argentina. This i~ nothing new in Sou~h American history.
Tn the Triple Alliance war in 1865, or if you will, that erroneously so termed, -
because the Triple Alliance presupposed the participation of Brazil, Uruguay and
Argentina, whereas in order for Uruguay to participate, there had been a previous
Brazilian-Argentine alliance and an invasion of Uruguay to overthrow the
existing government, impose a puppet president and then make the alliance "triple."
In that war in which the gradual genocide of that epoch was imposed upon Paraguay,
. it is obvious, from the historic results of the process, that the beneficiary and
promoter was Brazil. It was the beneficiary because it annexed territory, while
Argentina did not, as a result of the war.
However, Gen IIartolome rfitre, president of the Argentine Republic at that time,
coimnanded the unified Triple Alliance army, until he was replaced toward the end
~ of the war by the Brazil.ian Duke of Caxias.
Why was he replaced? Because there were uprisings in the Argentine interior.
The Montoneros rebelled against the oligarchic government of Mitre, and in support
- of the government of Paraguay, to halt that genocide.
During that period, the two most celebrated Montonero forces, those of
"Chacho" Penaloza and Felipe Varela, rebelled. Then the Brazilian empire relieved
General Mitre of command of the joint army against Paraguay. It appointed the
Duke of Caxias, sending General Mitre to head the oligarchic army headquarters in
Buenos Aires, wtiich had to proceed then to wage a war against the Montoneros in
- the interior, allied wiL-h Paraguay.
ThereEore, the historical game in which the Brazilian dominant class was the
greatest beneficiar.y and the "dirty work" was done by the Argentine dominant
c lass becomes very clear. _
lt is not that the ArgPiir_ine dominant class was more stupl.d than that in Brazil,
but it was historically r.e7.ati.vely weaker. And therefore whenever an alliance
betz~~een Argentina and 13razil occurred irl history on the oligarchic level, the
Argentine oligarchy lost. It made concessions. At that time it was the aristocracy
of Brazilian nobility, while i.t is now the new Brazilian bourgeoisie.
'I'tiis was due to ttie f.act ~hat ~here was a continuity in the Arger~tine civil wars
tohicti did not exist ~oithi.n firazil, and therefore this weakness, this laclc of
consolidation in the Argentine oligarchy placed it at a disadvantage in negotia-
tions witti Brazil, and it turned to such an alliance precisely because of its
weakness. And in doing so, then, the other party imposed the "dirty work" upon it. -
Therefore we say that Argentina today, the dictatorship it has, is indeed in the
lead of this international military force, but as the battering ram. It is
- Argentina which is paying the political price of imposing Garcia Meza on
Bolivia. -
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This Southern Cone pact exists. 'ihere are thousands of witnesses to demonstrate
that it does. It represents a unification of repressive doctrines in which once
again the sad vanguard role in the "dirty work" falls to the Argentine dictator-
ship, as compared with the Uri~guayan, the Chilean, the Bolivian dictatorstiips.
The Paraguayan dictatorship represents a preexisting model, associated with the
others, but not tlle same. It is more back;aard. I~ has joined in the process, but
it comes from an earlier concept, and that in Brazil is in a di~ferent situation,
because it has been in power 15 years. This is evidenced in the number of those
who have disappeared, the torture methods, this whole mechanism of sadism, uf
human destruction, in which the Argentine regime is far ahead of its Southern Cone
counterparts. And t}iis is even recognized by the torturers and jailers. There
- are a number of witnesses to the fact that some of the jailers in Uruguay have
made a point of telling certain prisoners that they do not use the same methods as
the Argentine military.
Obviously, such a statement does not excuse them. Some of them commit very serious
violations against hticnan dignity, and ottiers simply serious violations, nothing !
more. But our being in the lead is not an accident eittler, nor a matter of
greater sadism or intrinsic cruelty on the part of the individuals who head the
- Argentine armed forces. 'Che fact is that in the final analysis the social struggle
is very much more violenr, tl~e social re,jection of the model they are seeking to ~
impose is much more violent. And this shows that the triumph is much mara v~ol.ent.
- It shows that the popular triumph of 1973 shook the foundations of the power of
the regime.
This triumph was not equal to str.iking at the enemy and liquidating the oligarchy,
and now we have the co~intercoup of the reactionary garrisons, but it comes with -
all the fear they felt witti the masses in the streets beginning in 19,'3, and with
~ the clear awareness that :it is "now or never." Either they triumph over the
popular movement once and for all or they succumb. And they have said this
publicly. Videla liimself t~as said on more than one occasion--when sectors, even
conservative ones, have appealed for a more open democracy--in words more or less
exactly as fallows: "Gentlemen, understand that if we do not triumph, those who
will capitalize on ~liis are not the political parties, but the subversives. The
subversives have come to he ourselves, that is the fact.
It means in the final_ ana].ysis t}iat either this reactionary model will triumph for
100 years, as Gener.al C;altieri, commander in chief of the army, has proclaimed, or
a revolutionary model will triiimph.
And why do they need to i_mpose terrorism?
Becatise. if they do not, they ~aill lose power.
This is the basic pr.oblem found in all dictatorships. -
The popular upsurge was evidenced in Argentina in 1973, it was evidenced in Chile
with the Popular Unity ~overnment of President Salvador Allende, it was manifested
in Bolivia with the government of General Torres in 1971, and the triumph now, in
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these elections, of Siles Suazo, and it was seen in the upsurge which tlie Broad
Front achi.eved at one time in Uruguay.
In other words, the development of. tlie popular movement at the baginning of the
1970s, varying in background and in the degree of challenging power, achieved a
level of challenge to the status quo which made it necessary for the economic
reorganization ttie imperialists sought to implement to be effected in a repressive
fashion never. before seen in any of these countries.
This level of violence, of sadism, in order to contain the popular mobilization is
a sine qua non for the defense of the regime and the reorganization of the inter-
national division of labor on the regional level.
Concerning the internal contr.adicl-ions within the Argentine armed forces, I will -
first clarify one tliing. If these contradictions d.o exist, what is not certain is
that pro-Pinochet and democratic sectors are involved. The contradictions exist.
_ And why is this?
These contradictions exist due to weakness, because the alternative ways of
continuing the Process are being discussed. This is the basis of the debate. _
They exist between the army and the navy, and within the army as well. What is =
being debated in this whole process? How far can this concei:tration of capital _
without a political base continue? How ].ong is it possible to continue without
losing everything?
- This is the debate between General Viola and General Menendez, which has its
public manifestation in the press, involving a seemingly historical discussion.
It is a discussion of tactics, of procedures, on intensification of the war or
_ regarding it as fini.shed. it is not a difference on the strategic model, or a
e~isagreement between democrats and pro-Pinochet factions.
There are other sectors whicti, although they do not believe that the victory over
the popular movement is c~ron, tried to urge (the public manifestation of this was _
Lanusse in 1977) ttiat it was necessary to stop where they were and begin democratic
institutionalization, or else be faced with an insurrection.
At that time, as is kno~an, General Lanusse was imprisoned, and his press secretary
and editor of the boolc in wiiich he maintained that thesis, was kidnaped. In other
words, this concept clearly losC out.
'I'hese individuals might have been regarded as democrats, but they ended up in
prison or kidnaped.
The differences existing between Vi.ola, Videla, Menendez, Suarez Mason, Galtieri,
etc., are differences of. a tactical nature, as well as personal ambitions which
also exist and private individual economic interests, within these same class
interests, which at a given moment could also come into conflict. This is the
case with the individual interests of Viola with regard to the plan of
r[artinez de Hoz. Vi.ola belongs to the oligarchy of the interior, the livestoclc _
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breeders, and therefore he has an interest in the reactivation of the slaughtering
and cold storage industry and the exclusion from the plan for agreement with
Br8zi1 of the sale of livestock on the hoof to Brazil, since this affects his
personal interests as a landowner. ,
This is the origin of the contradictions which exist and of their curr~nt mani-
festations.
The designation of Viola, on the basis of an internal agreement in the armed `
forces, should have been unanimous. In other words, each of the th.ree commanders
in chief has the veto right, and Viola was vetoed by the navy, in a political
power play by the navy against the army. For the navy vetoed Viola as a candidate
and proposed the present commander in chief, General Galtieri, in order to break
up the alliance between Galtieri and Viola. And if Galtieri accepted the presi- ~
dency, he would have had to retire, that ~s he would also have lost the command of
the army troops.
In this type of power struggle, a political proposal supporting the navy, through
Massera, was put forth, seeking to speed up the development of a movement in
support of the armed forces somewhat farther to the left than Viola wanted, with
more c~ncessions--because of a clearer and closer view of the dangers, in an
attempt to establish a social base.
The navy adopted this proposal and challenged the ~ower of the army in the
leadership of the joint command. This is one contradiction.
The other within the army lies in the fact that there are two factions of officers
fearful about the Viola period. One o~ these is defined by its economic program.
It is the line which sustains and supports Minister P~Iartinez de Hoz at all costs
and beyond, and which therefore fears that Viola's political project will cut off
the development of t}ie economic model. The others are more closely linked with
repression and they fear that the effort toward a political maneuver to win forces
in support oF the dictatorship presupposes that those who are most publicly com-
promised in connection with the torture, kidnapir~gs and assassinations will be
subject to negotiation. In other words, they fear that they will be sub3ects or -
pawns in the negotiation---being individually identified as agents of the filthy
war, in the polit:Lcal alliance which Viola might seek in order to form a movement
in support of the government.
These two factions in contradiction are fearful of the Viola period more than of
Viola himself. For I repeat that Viola's political plan is not the man, but was
drafted by the joint general staff and approved by the military junta. The very
political personality of. Viola, what he must say, do and how he should dress, is
planned on the general sLaff level. That is the case. This is no invention, for
there is evidence in written documents.
Thus the fear is of. the new era he is trying to inaugurate, theoretically one of
consolidation, but they are aware that there is no balance of forces to justify
this consolidation in the final analysis. And therefore, the maneuver can be
_ very dangerous for them and could end in defeat, bearing in mind the previous
Argentine political experience. _
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These are the contradictions existing within the armed forces, which are to be
found currently.
T'a the extent that the political deterioration of the dictatorship becomes more
acute, a development which in our view is irreversible, these contradictions will -
increase. Naturally, all of these contradictions will become more acute and others
- will even appear, and at a given moment, the process will take on the aspect of
Gtreet clashes between mobilized r~asses and the repressive forces. And there is
no need to stress that other types of contradictions whicli if they exist today are
still latent and without manifestation will develop then.
7'his also takes into account the class composition of the Argentine army, in which
all of the soldiers are of the people, the noncommissioned officers are of very
humble origin, and a large number o� the officers are of petit bourgeois extraction.
In a process in which all of the social strata in the national structure clash, it
is logical that these petit bourgeois sectors would feel a serious conflict of
interests if they have to impose mass renression in the street, as happened with -
the Cordobazo.
[Question] Co:nrr~de Firmenich, the long tradition of struggle in the organization
you head, not only on Argentine territory, but even its solidarity with and support
of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua, and other revolutionary processes in
I,atin America, is well known.
In this connection, you have also spoken of the sizable casualties the movement has _
suffered. For this reason we would like to ask you what the i~nediate prospects
for the struggle are, and at the same t3me, what are the main tasks you propose to
carry out?
[Answer] As to our solidarity with other liberation movements and political _
parties in Latin America, there is a very clear political explanation. Obviously
the model and example of San Martin in Argentina is something that each of us
learned from early childhood. Latin American integration is an inherent part of
the Montonero project, not just now, but since the last century. The Montonero
leader Felipe Varela himself, who rebelled in an expression. of solidarity with
Paraguay, in the province of Catamarca, ad~acent to Chile, i.e. very far away from
Yaraguay, rebelled under the slogan of "American union," which is the only solution
to the problem posed by the developing oligarchies. If one studies the continent
he will find that there were also Montoneros in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, that the
fir~t Montonero leader in the Pl.ate River renion was Artigas, and, naturally, in
the war of independence the closest link in the army of San Martin was with the
Chilean people, and then in Peru, the Peruvian army was built on the basis of the
Montoneros. In other words, being a Montonero has always meant being pro-Latin -
American.
The popular Argentine movement deriving from the Montoneros has come through the -
Irigoyen and the Peron eras, making it inevitable that the current Montoneros, the
- present Peronist Montonero, is a Latin American by origin. And we do not conceive
- of our liberation other than within the framework of the Great. Fatherland, an
e~ ression very dear to us and almost binding upon a militant in the Argentine
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popular movement. In other words the Great Fatherland of Bolivar and San Martin.
This is a part of our origin and is the basic and fundamental explanation for our
political attitude.
In addition, it is obvious that there exist popular movements within this political
framework--the case of the Sandinists which you mentioned--which are meritorious in
themselves, although they do not have this background, in full solidarity against
a tyranny such as that of Somoza. There is a true revolution which is shaking the
reactionary foundations on the continent and which, naturally, the Argentine people
are following with the greatest attention, with great solidariCy and with full
awareness that the Argentine dictatorship put its own prestige and its own future
salvation at risk in the def.ense of Somoza. It did so publicly, moreover, and with
- logistic support. Therefore, the support of the Sandinist revolution was for us a _
moral obligation, from every point of view. It was a most fully justified political
need, based on the origins of our Latin American brotherhood, justified by the very
merits of the Sandinist Front, which was able to win the solidarity of numerous
forces in other parts of the world which had nothing to do with the Latin American
brotherhood or our historic roots.
Concerning our casualties and the future. Very often, many other comrades and
political forces have asked us about the problem of the casualties, that is to say
the cost in lives, in cadres, of the struggle we have waged. With the tacit
motive of undermining the struggle to safeguard the cadres or the organization.
We maintain another, entirely different, concept. To begin with, when we say
"Fattierland or death," it means just that, and is an absolutely categorical option.
We have historic background in this. The Montoneros of the last century were to
be annihilated to the last man. In that era they represented a social force which
had no historical possibility of imposing itself, because it rep'resented an
emerging bourgeoisie which was technically very backward in its de~~2lopment, facing
the expanding British imperialism. But currently, these Mon*_:,neros represent the
workers' class against capitalism in crisis. In other words, the destiny of the
- proposal from the point of view of its social base is very different. And on the
other hand, we maintain that if the role of the Montoneros of the last century
y fell to us, we have lived it, for the simple reason that the only way to develop
the main contradiction in favor of the popular sector is by fighting. From what
litt7.e we know, the contradiction is defined as the unity and struggle of oppo-
sites. Only through this struggle is con~:radiction developed. Thus we, with all
of these definitions, have taken on the struggle whatever the final outcome may be.
Even if a computer cot~ld have shown us 50 or 20 years ago that this struggle would
be impossible, as the triumph of the Montonerc,s ln the last century was impossible,
we would have done rhe same. Exactly the same, for we would have changed nothing.
It is our decision to fight. For we do not fight for triumph for ourselves or for
_ our generation, but for our people, which does not end with us. We have said many
times that we will never suffer the dishonor of having our children tell us
tomorrow that they lack a given situation due to the lack of our ability to
struggle. This is the basis of our decision to fight. On the other hand, there
is a political assessment. We have very great faith in our people, and in our -
_ working class .
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_ The theme of Peronism is very controversial outside Argentina. There are those
who think that it is a disgrace that the Argentine people have been Peronists,
whi1P we think quite the con*rary. We believe that this political identity in-
corporates a class identity and national identity, both things, and a clear
antioligarchic and anti-imperialist identification from the beginning. Peron won
the elections under the slogan "Braden or Peron" (Braden was the U.S. ambassador).
The most ltuninous example of our best ori~ins was Evita. Eva Peron, who defined
Peronism from the beginning as an antioligarchic force, has bequeathed us several
phrases which are eternal slogans for us, such as the following: "With or without
b loodshed, the damned race of the oligarchs will disappear in this century" and
"The fatherland wi.ll cease to be colonial, or the flag will fly over its ruins." ~
Thus the origins of our confidence in belonging to this movement lie in all these
- elements. Confidence in its capacity for scruggle, confidence in its own historic -
transformation, having encountered hindrances preventing the revolution from
b ecoming more profound. With its founding leader dead, having had slifficient
vitality and awareness of its internal contradictions to develop and transform
itself and overcome those hindrances which blocked the revolution, both in 1955
and in 1976. Other revolutionary forces in Argentina, at the time of the coup
d'etat, believed first that a very rapid advance would be made toward rebellion, _
because with Peron dead, the brake on the masses was gone. This did not occur.
With the death oF Peron, the leader who unified the masses disappeared, aiid now
= this leadership must be replaced with qualitatively superior leadership, not only
in thinking but in organization. IVot the leadership of a single hero, but
organizational leadership. And then, many became discouraged, because they
presumed there would be dictatorship for a time and that the popular movement
would remain crushed.
_ We pursued our entire initial struggle alone, aware that there was an ebb of the
masses at this time, with the following idea: We needed, as an organized force,
as a single organized force of the popular movement at that time, to develop the
battle to hinder the advance nf the dictatorial project, which would allow the -
- reorganization of the popular movement from which the counteroffensive force
would emerge. With this forn:ulation, we launched the resistance in 1976, on the
day after the coup d'etat. We believe that the basis for triumph lies always
with ttie masses, essentially in the masses. It is not in the limited weapons a
= revolutionary movement may have, but in depriving the enemy of its weapons, its
many weapons. Disarming the enemy. Not only taking its weapons from it physi-
cally, btit disarming it morally, politically, and incapacitating it to use these
weapons. And we would cite the recent revolutionary examples of which we know, in
Iran and Nicaragua, where we see that in the end it was thus. It is the people
in the streets, along with the vanguard directing the struggle, which disarm and
in the end crush the reactionary military force.
We make of organization a weapon, simply a weapon, and therefore, we sacrifice
organization in the battle for political prestige. We have 5,000 fewer men, but
- how many more masses? This is the important thing.
We do not aspl.re to a little organization of 5,000 men, but to a movement of _
millions. We are fighting for leadership of the entire Peronist movement, not
just our little part. We are fighting for historical transformation, this
historical improvement in Peronism. And this is being done with political
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leadership, essentially, with a political line which wins over the masses, which
proves correct, which has moral force, which is politically correct, which has
combat and organizational capacity, no matter how many deaths it takes. This 3e
our political line, and for this reason we have consciously sacri~ied our
organization, adapting ourselves to this political value, and we are persuaa~d
that we are winning, and not losing.
COPYRIGHT: Bohemia, 1981.
- 5157
CSO: 3010
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COUNTRY SECTION CUBA
FIGURES FOR 1981 BUDGET, 1981-1985 PLAN REPORTED
Five-Year Development Plan
Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 2 Jan 81 p 56
[Text] The national socioeconom~c development plan for the 1981-1985 period gov- -
erns the activities for each one of the years of the 5-year period. It is obliga-
- tory for all central organs and organisms of the state, local people's government
organs and production and service enterprises and units.
The following indicators are for the entire economy:
1981-1985
Growth in overall social product (annual 5.1
Volume of gross investment ( Nl~]P ) 15 , 400
Growth in retail trade (annual 3.5
; Growth in work productivity (annual 3.3
By sectors: ~
Industry 2.3
Construction 3.9
Agricultural-livestock 2�6
- 'IY~ansportation 3.2
Growth in wage fund (annual 3.6
The following standard of livin~ indicators are guaranteed:
1g81-1985
Housing units finished 200,000 -
Growth in installed capacity of daycare centers (annual 2.5
Growth in number of students beginnin~ semiboarding primary
- education (annual 1.6
Growth in enrollment of students in intermediate education
( annual 0 .5 .
Of this, growth in boarding system (annual 2�~
Growth in enrollment of students in advanced education
( annual 4 .5
Growth in number of beds in medical care facilities (annual 2.1 -
25
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1981 Development Plan
Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 2 Jan 81 p 57
[Text) The national socioeconomic development plan for 1981 governs ac tivities
from 1 January 1981 to 31 December 1g81. It is obligatory for all central organs
and organisms of the state, local people's government organs and production and
~ service enterprises and units.
- The following indicators are for the entire economy in 1981:
Growth in over�all social product 3�9%
Volume of gr~oss investment ( NIl~IP ) 2~ 85 ~
Growth in retail trade 3�7%
Growth in work productivity 3.0%
By sec tor s :
Industry 2.0%
Construction 4.7/�
AgricultL~ra1-livestock 2�4%
'IY~ansportation 3.5% _
Growth in wage i'und 6'7%
- The following standard of living indicators are guaranteed:
_ Housing units t'inished 20,000
Growth in installed capacity of daycare centers 2�~%
Growth in number of students begirLning semiboarding primary
educati~n 1.0%
Growth in enrollment of students in intermediate boar ding
schools 2'~%
Growth in enr~ollment of students in advanced education 4.0�/a
Growth in number of beds ir, medical care facilities 2�0%
_ 1981 State Budget
Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 2 Jan 81 p 58
[Text] The 1981 state budget is composed of the following income and expenditures.
Millions of
Income Pesos -
Contributions From state sector of the economy 11,082.2
Taxes and other contributions from nonstate sector of
economy 20.2
, Taxes and fees From the people 9$�9
Total income 11,201.3
~
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Millions of
Expenditures Pesos
Financing of productive sphere 4,672.3
Financing of housing and community services 412.1
Financing of education and public health 1,848.3
Financing of other social, cultural and scientific
activities 1,436.4
Financing of administration expenses of people's govern-
ment organs, courts, attorney general's office and
other state organs and organisms 675.1
Financing of defense and internal order 842.1
Financing of other activities 766.8
Reser~�e 544 . 3
Total expenditures 11,197.4
Surplus 3.9
The central budget for 1981 is:
Millions of
Pesos
Income 8,g64.6
Expenditures 8,960.7
- Surplus 3�9
COPYRIGHT: Bohemia 1981
7717
CSO: 3010
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COUNTRY SECTION
F'FFECTS OF DIVORCE ON CHILDRIIJ DI5CUSSED
Havana BOHII~IIA in Spanish 9 Jan 81 pp 32-33
~Article by Dr Luis Gil, prof~ssor of inedical psychology at the Plaza de la
Revo.lucion Community Teaching Polyclinfc~
[Text~ One of the most difficult issues to tackle, one of the most discussed and
one that is an object of concern fQr parents is divorce and how it is handled,
Before going ini;o detail as to how to proceed when faced with euch a situation,
we feel it neceaeary to lay emphasis on certain quetttions.
When they have once produced a family, pareats ought to give eerious thou~t as to -
how they are goin8 to g~o about it if they decide to separate and, ttiirthermore, _
they must think about how they are g~oix~ to break the nerrs to their children in
order to avoid inflictin~ on them, through ignorance, some traw~aa which may perhaps
be irregarable in later years. Moreover, a family ou~t to explore all possible
avenues leadin~ to a solution before arriving at the extreme atep of separation -
and oug~t to profoundly analyze wha.t stability in the home means to the children.
When a couple decides to get m~cried wi.th an eye to producing a family, both paxt-
ners ought to be quite sure of 'che atep they are taking, of the responsibility it
involves and of the change they will have to undergo in terms of their ftiiture f~nc-
tions as husband and wife and later ae father and mother.
~ We are not going to give a literal definition of divorce, but~ roughly speaking,
we can say that it is the disaolution of the lawful bond~
t~has~united two
people who at one time thought that they would be happy
If in the course of the marriage there have been no offspring, we do not believe
th.a,t many problems are involved in a aeparation;but if there are children, all this -
changes and proper hemdling of the situation is required to avoid paychological
traumas or changes in the children.
" Man.y writers regaxd a child of divorced pasents as a"'problem child" or assum.e
that he may be a neurotic individual. As for us, we feel that, if the dinorce ia
properly handled by the couple, the alterations or symptoms referred to can be
- avoided~
From the legal point of view, divorce guarantees the child social aecurity, but
this has nothin~ to do with the changes that may take place in hia emotional develop-
ment, The avoidance of these problems is up to the parenta who, even though they
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may be divorced, still have the same obligationa~ Thi.s is the same image that the
children should reta3n, that is, that divorce is no reason for losing one of one's -
parents,
Fa~ced with havjng to stop living with mama or papa, it ia natural and normal for
a child to feel somewhat strange and for him to insiat on the presence of the
former~
We would say that divorce is a kind of "ad3ustanent" sitaa.tion to rrhich the child
must adapt himself with the aid of hia own parents and other membera of the
- family with whom he lives,
We have often observed that, when they divorce one another, parents do not give
any thought to how to satisfy the psycholog3cal needs of the child, f~ndamentally
that of love, which is one of the most important uf them, and they remove them-
selves from the home and the ch ild~ And they are precisely the ones primarily
responsible for providing the child rith the love he needs for, if he is not given -
enough love, the child may readily think that he has lost one of those deaxest to
him.
Occasionally we notice that this separation or creation of distance from the child-
ren is produced becauae the parents retain animoaity torrard one another, re~ect
one another and have feelings of aggression, eometimee to an extreme degree~ And
this ia transmitted to the child in the form of Words, gestures~ judgments, actions,
comments, etc.
We feel that both the mother and �,he father ha.ve aa obligation to provide their
cP~.ldren with a good opinion of the other spouse so that the child retains the
most appropriate image of each of them, -
We must ta.ke into account the fact that being a huaband or wife is one function
and being a.father or mother is another~ A spouse may have behaved very badly
_ for specific reasons and be a"bad man" as a husband but be very g+ood a,s a father
and capable of psychologically satisfying his children.
As for the wife, she may be a great mother, with all of the necessary qualities~
but ~na.y have stapped loving or does not g+et along harmoniously w~th her husband. -
- This aspect of the two functions ia vital in the handling of childr~n of divorced
parents. It must be ma.de clear tha,t thia point ia incumbent not only on the
parents, but also on the rest of the family living With the child becauae a11 of
them have the obligation to help maintain a positive imag~e of the parents,
We have also seen cases where the parente delegate thi$ function to grandparenta,
uncles and aunts, etc, This is a serious mistake. Not even out of the feeling of
pity that sometimes emerg~es within the family should parenta delegate their re-
sponsibilities to other persona~
A very important point in the handling of the dinorce is communication, the social
relation the divorced couple ahould maintain. We believe tha.t this i~ not easy -
and requires a great deal of maturity on the part of both spouses, but let us
remember what we sa.id at the outsets The child hae and ought to have the best _
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image of his papa or his mama, to see that both of them do not live together but
- talk th.ings over, are capable of convereing with one another and of being interested
- in his problema, that is, his health, his 8ames, his friends, his club, hie school,
etc.
-i
If this is achieved, the child will Peel secure, understan~i tha.t the two most iIIr-
portant figures for him are concerned with his affairs, with wha.t happena to him' _
- with his achievements and see that they are capable of helping him to solve his
problems.
idhen children ask questions about the aituation9 we must not afraid to confront
them with the truth, but with a truth that is compatible with their level of develop-
ment. In simple language they should be told that maa~a, and Papa are not g~oing to
go on living together but tha.t they will still be their parents and stiJ.l Iove
them and take case of them, as always. If this is not left at mere words, if it
is carried out in the form of real deeds, the child will achieve a perfect ad3ust-
ment.
- 7~ere is ene point which we also want to stress and that is what happens to the
child if the parents remarry.
Just as before, Vie must always tell the r,hild the truth, but each of the partners
must be certain that the person with whom he or she is going to set up a new house-
hold will also play the role of mothe r oi father, even ~hough he or she has never
done so before. Sometimes this does not ha,ppen and we forget that we have married
a woman who has one or more children or vice versa and, on the contrazy, rre must
bear well in mind what this involves and the responsibility we have taken on. The
child must fully accept the other figure, aee in him or her an extension of the
father or the mother, someone who is ~ust as concerned as or has the same authority
ae his true paxents.
~ We must emphasize the fact that, in conversations with their children, the father
or the mother should help them accept this other person as a new father or mother.
It is, therefore, important that, prior to the new maz.~riage, the kind of affection
that exa.stg between the partner who hae been chosen and the children he or she has
from a previous marriage be considered. Love must not be imposed on someone;
rather it has to grow little by little as a result of affectiona.te ar�d proper treat-
ment.
If we are capable of doing this, if we are capable of achieving communi~cation
amon.g the members of this group of people, a social relation that decisively shapes
the child's family, everything will be completely accepted and nothing [adverse]
will happen. We lrnow that affection plays ~n importarlt role, but more important
is the child's emotional balance and ad3ustn~ent, which is why we have to bear this
well in mind.
As we said at the outset, divorce i.n itself traumatizes no one; wha.t can cause -
trouble is the way it is handled~ We must be extremely careful in the way we
behave after a separation to see to it that the children's emotional davelopment is
not a.ffected due to an improper atti~ude ma.intained by the adults. -
co~rxzc~r: eo~~ ~ 981
11,466 -
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COIINTRY SECTION CURA
NATIONAL CEJ~I~R FOR ANIMAL HF~ALTH ACTIVITIES NOTID
Havana BOHII~A in 5panish 9 Jan a~ pp 9a9~
[Article by H. Nunez I,~mus~
[Text] The National Center for Animal Health (CF~+TSA) came into being at the ini-
tiative of our comm~ndex-in-chief, Fidel Castro, who in 1969 pointed out the need
for creating a research center of th3e type to conduct all sorts of pro~ects de-
signed to develop our livestock industry, At that time, since they could not
count on gettin~ the 60 veterinarians the project called for~ a group of practi-
tioners of human medicine was selected to g^et things g+oing under the jurisdiction
of the Nationa.l Centex for Scientific Research (CII~IC).
~ENSA's g~oals were oriented toward research in the field of ani.mal health, g~enetias,
and reproduction, offering industries apecialized in these areas scientific and
technical services and, lastly, training hi~ly specialized ecientific persannel.
Since its foundin~, veterinariana, biologists and biochemists, who have been con-
- ducting studies on these sub~ects abroad, have been added to the specialists in
human medicine~
With the acquisition of land in 1970, construction was begun on the CFaTSA, since
all actiuity relating to anima.l health continued to xema,in within the CF~1IC Fa.rm
and Livestock Department, And it was in 1976 during the procees of political and.
aclmi.nist ative reor~anization of the country that the Nationa,l Center for Animal
Health ca.me i.nto being with its present organizational structure,
- Work Completed
Deapite the undeniable "youth" o� the center, to date T43 research prohects have
- been co~pleted, 474 scientific and technical servicea for liveatock enterprises
have been provided, the defonse of 31 theses written by doctoral candidates in
the seience;~ ha.s been made possible, it has participated in 34 national and 33
- international conferences, 23 resolutions to expand production and 10 to introduee
new production have been passedf 15 contracts are in force with livestock enteri
prises and 23 topics of reaearch are or will be in their final phases during this
5-yeax period,
In the field of scientific and technical production, this yeax the CENSA outlined
190 tasks pertaining to animals as a wholes ~estation and birth rates of cattle,
31
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reducin~ the mortality rate au?ong calves and more suitable breeds of beef cattle
for the oountxy.
~ To do this job, the C~iSb relies on a sta.ff of ~32 workers, 214 or whom are women.
AY~o~her detail worth noting is the fact that 108 of the 133 comrades devoting ~hem-
selves to reaeaxch are women,
Basic Science
IInder the direction of D~ Liber�~,~:3 Garcia, the Department of Genetics and Production
has five laboratories for research on g~enetics, cytogenetica, reproduction and sperm
biochemistry.
The clinic is hea.d.ed by Dr Elisa Azrsar. This is a department tha.t is unique in
Cuba and, in~ofar as it is a clinic in the aervice of veterinary medicine, its
departments include internal medicine, X-ray,~obste~rics, gynecology and a cli.nical
laboratory. All the techniques the department uses have been experimented with
- before in the iTSSR, but later developed and modifi.ed to conform to our realities
and with the advice of Soviet experts,
The department has cubicles fox the hospitalization of animals, treatment rooms,
pre- and postoperative, operation rooms for major and minor surgery and also, for
the analysie of viscera, it depends on the modern system of paxascopy. There are
also animal delivery and radiology rooms.
As for the Department o� Microbiology,; headed by Dr Lidia Tablada, it has five re-
seaxch laboratories and two more th~i.t ,~erve them. Their ftiuictions are concentrated
on infectioue and contagi.ous diseaseP ~�:~~~h rttaek newborn or adult livestock and
inflict dama~re on the reproductive -~rg~aas, such as parasitosis, brucellosis,
- mastitis, hepatic facciol.a and the terrible U'~B, this last-named one of those
diseases th~t tias most decim.ated tl~e livestock population.
The CENSA is headed by Dr Rosa ~1ena Simeon, who explaineds
"There ie no other center, nor even one that xesembles this one, in Latin America.
To be sure, there axe some institutions devoted to specific specialtiea, but not
to so'lving overall problem~, They are simply institntions in the service of given
firms, Thexe is no institu~ti.on in Latin America organized like ours, comprehensive
and one which is tackling the livestock situation, that can count on any investment."
Reg~arding the p.ro~osals ma.de by Fidel at the end of the 1960�s~ Dr Simeon said:
"T believe that we cannot yet aay that we have responded to everything our supreme
leader progosed. But we are working on all his directives and we ca~n say th.at,
while some will require years to attain the goals involved, we g+o on workin~ toward
them and do not slacken our effort~,"
GOFYRIGHT: BOHII~IIA 1981
~ 11,466 ~
CSO: 3010
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COUNTRY SECTION EL SALVADOR
CDHES REPORTS DISEASE OUTBREAKS AT REFUGEE CENTERS
PA200324 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1759 GMT 19 Jan 81
[Pool item] ~
[Text] San Salvador, 19 Jan (ANN)--The Human Rights Commission of El Salvador
[CDHES] has reported outbreaks of ineasles, smallpox [viruela], chicken pox and
poliomyelitis in the shelters maintained by the Catholic Church for thousands of
Salvadorans who fled from rural areas because of repression. _
Msgr Oscar Arnulfo Romero, bishop [as received] of San Salvador who was killed by
rightists in this coimtry in March, 1980, had opened the doors of the churches in
the name of "the commitment to the poor, the helpless and the oppressed and the -
thousands of persons who are being persecuted by the armed forces and the paramili-
tary organizations."
The shelters began to receive increasing numbers of persons as the army and the na-
tional guard began to carry out "clean-up" operatj.qns late last year. These oper- _
ations consist of burnin~ towns and forcing the peasants to leave the areas where
they reside in an attempt to reduce support for the guerrillas.
The CDHES made tl-~is charge and asked local authorities to bury "the number of
bodies which are in the streets ~f towns as a result of the confrontations." -
The CDHES has been attacked seve�ral times and several of its me~nbers were killed
as a result of its campaign to denounce the repression, the disappearance of per-
sons and the '"atrocious" murders committed by military forces and paramilitary
organizations.
For the past 5 days, the CDHES h.eadquarters has been without communications because
the authorities suspended its telephone service.
The CDHES also reports that factories, government agencies, banks and the Salvadoran -
Social Security Tnstitute are under military control.
In addition, the commission reiterates a charge made by employees of the Central -
Reserve Bank, who maintained that the bank's management hed cooperated with repre-
sentatives of the Criminal Investigations Section who came to obtain the names and
addresses of labor leaders and workers. Finally, the CDHES reported that at the
National Children's Home in San Miguel, 164 km from this capital, there are 300 re-
fugees who came from the northern part of San Miguel and Morazan departments.
- CSO: 5400
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~OUNTRY SECTION HONDURAS
~
BRIEFS
PRIEST ARRESTED AFTER CHARGING MASSAI'.RES--San Jose, 16 Feb (PL)--Priest Fausto Mil-
las was arrested in Honduras when he returned from Mexico City where he charged
that more than 600 persons were m~~~acred by the Honduran and Salvadoran armies.
Father Millas was arrested last Saturday ~t the airport in San Pedro Sula, the
Christian Movement for Justice in Honduras reported today. Father Millas said at
the Tribimal of the Peoples which met last week in Mexico City, that the Honduran
and Salvadoran armies killed more than 600 persons along the banks of the Sumpul -
- River which is the border between Honduras and E1 Salvador. The Christian Movement
for Justice i:~ Honduras says that during the last 3 months, the Honduran Army has
been persecuting priests and persons in the departments along the border with E1
Salvador because of the aid they are giving to some 30,000 Salvadoran refugees.
Father Millas charged that a horrible partnership ex.Lsts between the Honduran Go-
~ernment and the Salvadoran Ci~iristian Democratic Milita~y Junta with the complicity
of the Honduran church top officials, who have not said anything regarding the
arrest of Father Millas. [Text] [PA170428 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2153 GMT 16 Feb
81J
CSO: 3010
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COUNTRY SECTION JAMAICA
BRITAIN'S RIDLEY VISITS; LOAN AGREEMENT SIGNED
PA241328 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2340 GMT 23 Jan 81
[Text) Kingston, 23 Jan (PL)--Great Britain has granted Jamaica a loan of $14.4
million to be used beginning 31 March.
The agreement was signed today by Prime Minister Edward Seaga and British Min ister
of State Nicholas Ridley, who is on an official 3-day visit to this country.
The loan is p ayable in 25 years at 6 percent interest, with a grace period of
3 years.
On signing the agreement, Seaga said that one part of the loan will be used to
purchase electrical generating equipment and another part for police vehicles.
The remainder will be placed at the disposal of the private sector for purchases
abroad and fo r paying debts.
- As part of his visit to Jamaica, Ridley held a news conference today. In referring _
to the situation in E1 Salvador. he said that Great Britain will not intervene -
- on behalf of any of the parties, although he refused to criticize the violations
of human rights committed by the Christian Democratic junta.
Ridley defended the sale of British weapons to Chile, sayin~ that he saw ntohing
improper in this action, since the forme.r labor government sold arms to Argentina
where, he said, conditions are very similar to those of Chile. Ridley said that
his country se11s arms to practically anyone, as long as the weapons are not used ~
against their peoples or against Great Britain.
~
CSO: 3010 END
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