JPRS ID: 9581 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPR~ L/9581
2 March 1981 ~
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Near East North Africa Re ort
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CFOUO 9l81)
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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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26 February 1981
~ i~10TE FRODi THE DIRECTOR, FBIS:
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JPRS L/9581
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i . 2.March 1981
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NEAR EAST/NORTH RFRICA REPORT
(k'OUO 9/81)
_ CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Results of Arab People's Congress Discussed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 23-29 Jan 81) ....o...ooooo.o.ooo.... 1
Ref lections on Arab Disunity, Differences
(AL-WATAN AL~'A~ABI, 23-29 Jan 81) .....o,oo,o.....a.o.... 7
ALGERIA ~ ~
U.S.-Iran Mediation Sea.ls Algeria's Interna.tional StaCus
(John Howe; AFRICA, Feb 81) ..oooo .............ooooo000000 17
~ Leaders Seek To Reduce Dependency on Oil, Gas
(Caroline Verhack; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 5 Jan 81) o000000.,,0,.0. 19
France Accused of Not Honoring Agreement
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 5 Jan 81) ...o..o.o......oo..oo.....oo..... 22
IRAQ
RivaY Iranian Factions Sa.id To Have Caused War Between Iraq, Iran
(Tariq 'Aziz; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 23-29 Jan 81) ,oo,.o..o, 23
MAURITANIA
Nation's Internationa.l Relations Problems Noted
- (MA,RCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Jan 81) ....,;.oo. 29
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- a- ~III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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INTER-A12AB AFFAIRS
RESULTS OF ARAB PEOPLE'S CONGRESS DI~CUSSE~
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 23-29 Jan 81 pp 28-29
~
~ [Article: "f~rab People's Congress Is~ Convened in the Name of Nasirism in the
Absence of Nasir.ists: In~lependence of the Arab Will ia Central Point in Dis-
pute; 'Abd-al-Majid Farid Says, 'Ailiance Between Libyans and Communists Suspended
the Historic Role of Che Congreas'
[TextJ The second session of the Ar~b People~s Congress that was held in Tripoli
on 15, 16 and 17 January coincided with the aaniversary of 'Abd-al-Nasir's birth-
day. Thexe was a major contradiction about convening this congress: Nasirists
were absent from it. The chairman of the congress himself, who is a Nasirist, was
~ absent from it because he had not been invited. What is going ori inside the
Arab People's Congress? Has it turned into a new alliance to be added to the
' existing Arab alliances?
i
~ AL-WATAN AL-'EIRABI asked congress president Mr 'Abd-al-Majid Farid about the
' reason for his absence. He said, "I was elected congress president in 1977 at the
first session of the congress that was held after al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.
; I was truly hoping that this congress would accurately express the wishes of the
Arab foxces in opposing the new for~ns of the Israeli aggression and not turn into,
as it has unfortunately, a narrow, regional, self-created partisan b1oc."
~ He added, "The representatives of the 140 Arab organizations and parties who
elected me undoubtedly share my surprise that the second session of the congress
! should convene without inviting me to attend even though the official Libyan agency
did spread the news that this session was taking place with the presence and partic-
ipation of all the found2rs."
; Mr Farid explained, "There is a lateral alliance between the secretary general of
' the congress, Mr 'Umar al-Hamidi, who extended the invitation, and one of the
Egyptian comm~iz~ist parties--thP Egyptian Communist Party--which is locateci in
~ Paris. This is the allianr_e that blocked my invitation. I regret that the Nasirists
~ were not invited to the conference on the anniversary of 'Abd-al-Nasir's birthday.
~ It seems to me that I am one of the closest people to Nasirism.
; "Did you exercise your authority as congress president in the first session?"
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"In the first session hearts were open, intentions were sincere and directions
were clear. Today, however, the ma.tter is different."
"How do you see the future of the congress?"
"The organization of the congress must be reconsidered on the basis of restor3.ng
representation to the national forces so that they can embark upon an effective
strategy that utilizes creative dialogue and group participation. The congress
should not be founded on local blocs because it would thus forfeit its historical
role."
"Who were those who did not participate in th.e second session?"
- "I don't know exactly, but Mr Ahmad 'Abbas Sa1ih--a non-communist Egyptian writer--
did withdraw and so did 'Abd-al-Mun'im Ghazalah--from an Egyptian co~nunist group
--after the Iraqi delegation withdrew from the general secretariat session in Aden."
"Are you prepared to participate in an alterna~ive Arab front?"
"I am prepared to work within any proper Arab organization which represents all
the national forces."
- Who Is Responsible?
The deliberate act of "puGhing aside" the president of the Arab People's Congrss
from the presidency after 3 years of his first session raises more than one ques-
tion. Why does the congress limit the representation of the Egyptian opposi~ion
to a communist group and excludes other national for~es? Has the congress become
a tool of circumstantial action after it was supposed to become a pan-Arab organi-
- zation with a clear constitution, bylaws and an agenda? Who is responsible for
suspending the role of the congress with these unilateral practices?
After the visit of Egyptian president Anwar a1-Sadat to Jerusalem, the an~er was
universal among the regimes and among the people in the Arab homeland. This anger
had to manifest itself in purposeful action.
When the representative5 of the various opposing forces met in Tripoli, the meeting
was not merely a political meeting. It was a historic, political and popular
mobilization of all the organizations and the active forces in the Arab homeland
to affirm the Arab right in PalesGine. The confrontation assumed a pan-Arab
character in the light of a clear conviction that it was necessary to establish a
popular front that was aware and that would rise above the traditional conflicf~s
to correct the formidable negative consequences of al-Sadat's choices.
The first indicators of al-Sadat's d~viation had appeared in the Sinai agreements.
Lebanon had paid the price for those agreements in continuous disturbances, and it
soon turned into a test field and a battleground for the feuding forces. But it
was the visit to Jerusalem followed by the Camp David Accords that constituted the
serious shift in Arab relations wi~k~ Israel, and opposing that shift was an urgent
mattex that was-not to be post;~oned.
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Interest in the Egyptian Delegation
And so the representatives of the national parties and forces and the popular
groups met in Tripoli. There was special interest in those who were representi.:~g
Egypt from inside Egypt because ulti.mately the confrontation was with the Egyptian
regime. What was required was the mobilization and the support of the Egyptian
forces in this mission. From the first moment it seemed that the Fgyptians were
to have a distinguished role in the conference b ecause preparations began for al-
Sadat's trial--the trial did take place some months later in Tripoli and Baghdad--
and f or proceeding from that trial to a universal popular action to oppose the
conspiracy that had not only targated the rights of the Palestinian people, but
also the history and the civilization of a whole nation.
However, the reassurance that was brought about by the fact that all the various
gYoups of the Egyptian Nationalist Movement were represented--Nasirists, progressive
memb ers and communists with various inclinations--did not last long. After the
first sessions of the congress a few Egyptian communists tried to ga3n control of
the secretariat general and to limit the representation of the Egyptian Nationalist
M~ovement to themselves, thereby excluding the others because the others in their
opinion "were tied to existing Arab regimes, most of which negotiat~." Observers
noted that this communist attempt was relying on outside support represented by the
leftist delegations that were taking part in the con~rPSS. These delegations were
European, Asian, American and Latin American. Following the unilateral practices '
_ of the secretary general of the congress, the delegations had met with Mr 'Umar
al-Hamidi, who is a Libyan citi~en. This led many congress participants, and the
Iraqi delegation was among them, to caution that the congrebs was not linked to
the policy of a specific country or to a s~ecific ideology and that, therefore, if
such a link did exist, it had to be eliminated so that the historic role and the
effectiveness of the congress can be preserved.
Broad Debate
T~is position that was assumed by a few Egyptian communists aroused broad debate
within the congress. In general, most of the participants do not attribute to the
communist parties thQ characteristic of national struggle. Accordingly, they do
not consider them advanced in this struggle. The Egyptian communists, for example,
do not acknowledge the 23 July Revolution [as a revolution]. They describe it as
no more than a military operation that enabled the military to gain power in Egypt.
The history of some Arab communist parties provides more than one piece of evidence
that they have had dealings with Israel.
- This debate soon turned into a kind of struggle between two points of view within
- the secretariat general of the congress. There were two different positions and
- trends. One trend wanted to confine the confrontation with al-Sadat to those
regimes that are described as progressive, and the other trend tried and is trying
_ to form a comprehensive pan-Arab front that would bring about the isolation of the
Egyptian president trom the Arabs and the international community. Whereas the
Libyan Jamahiriyah sided with the com~,nunists on the basis of the fact that the
battle was a progressive battle against Arab reactionaries--and there is more than
enough revolutionary obtrusiveness in this position--the other opinion, which
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stated that what was required first and foremost was the formation of a strong
Arab front regardless of the difference among the regimes, was victorious. This
was the view that was later expressed at the 1979 Baghdad Summit; afterwards, the
boycott yielded its obvious results.
Thus the opinion was advanced stating that an emotional decision that is satisfied
with proclaiming slogans will not yield the results that are hoped for. Even
though it may satisfy feelings temporarily, it is unlike the position that hardens
on substance but is flexible in style, thereby achieving its objectives without
having to negotiate on fundamental principles.
The Tacit Alliance
As the business o.f the congress progressed, a few facts began to take shape and to
reveal a tacit a1l.iance betureen Libya and the Egyptian co~unists. When the
communist campaign against Iraq intens3fied, the co~?unists asked that the Socialist
Arab Ba'th party be removed from the congress. The Libyans encouraged this request.
_ Mr 'Umar al-Hamidi, the secretary general of the congress claimed he was indepen-
dent of the Libyan regime, even though his conducL and all his positions suppor~ed
[the notion] that he was closely tied to ~he Libyan decision. At the same time
Tripoli, without asking anyone, claimed the leadership role of the entire Arab
nation for itself. Thus the congress began to shift from [being a forum] for
expressing an Arab position, united in solidarity to [being a forum] for expressing
Libyan ambitions that were f.ar from being realistic.
Cases of misunderstnndings accumulated and [eventuallyJ led to what resembled an
explos~on. When the psrmanent secretariat of the congress met in Aden in 1979,
there was a dispute about the basic rules regarding the representation of Arab
communist parties. It was said then, "Originally there was a decision to delegate
this task to the Sudanese co~unist party." When Iraq's delegation objected to
that decision and asked that the basic rules be utilized in such a representation,
this objection sparked an emotional campaign against Iraq that forced it to with-
draw from the session. It seemed to the conference participants that day that the
Libyan-Syrian alliance had had an immediate effect on Libya's permanent bias in
the secretariat general of the congr~ss towards the side oppos3ng Iraq.
The non-communist representatives of the Egyptian National Movement withdrew from
the congress before Iraq, and Egyptian representation was confined to one of the
groups of the communist party and a few leftists. This enabled those coa�nunists to
direct the congress and its resolutions. And once again the deep conflict emerged
between some Arab communists, who hide behind the Soviet Union to achieve their
own interests, and the progressive Arab position that proclaims Arab-Soviet friend-
ship without using that friendship for local objectives and w3.thout (turning that
friendship] into total subordination.
Differences of Principle
To continue [this account] the withdrawal of the representatives of the Egyptian
National Movement and of the Iraqi delegation emphasized the existing differences
between the groups of the Arab revolution that have a pan-Arab orientation and
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some Arab communists, especiatly the Egyptians. Those communists wPre intent on
invalidating the Arab struggles because they considered themselves the only
- fighters. Meanwhile, the Arab revolutionary movement was trying to distinguish
itself from Marxism and was esctzewing the class struggle in order to do away with
the various differences in popular alliances. The Arab revolutionary movement is
also concerned about the [divine] messages as sources of spiritual, intellectual
and cultural enrichment; it does not subscribe to the materialistic interpretation
that abolishes spirituality.
Once again it seemed that what united the Arab communists, or most of them with
the Arab national forces was not more than what separated them. In the Arab
revolutionary view the battle with Israel is a battle of survival or non-sur.vival.
That is, it is a battle between two cultures. According to the "new left" this
_ battle is no more than a class war for achieving certain interests against all
the Arab regimes. All the regimes here, including the Libyan regime, are equal in
the eyes of the communists.
Regarding relations with the Soviet Union the Arab communists are trying to outbid
others on the basis of erroneous assumptions while the Arab revolutionary move-
ment is trying to reject both the Islamic reform movement and the communists so
it can achieve a limited degree of social awareness and equa]_ relations with both
_ Moscow and Washington that would assure khe independence of Arab wi11. ~
In the absence of "the other opinion" inside the congress, the secretary general
arrogated to himself almost all the authorities and, with the participation of th~
S~viets, the congress turned inta a class conference financed by Libya and used by
it to serve its own positions. The other evidence for this lies in the fact that
when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia brought (O.X.) airplanes to watch its air space,
the s ecretariat general quickiy held a meeting in Cyprus for the Progressive and
National Forces in the Gulf and with the participation of leftist European forces
took an unf air decision against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There is nothing to
prevent this secretariat from meeting tomorrow to make a decision to support the
Libyan invasion of African Chad because such support serves botr the Soviet and
the Libyan strategy. Naturally, the congress 3s not expected to support Iraq
against Iran despite the fact that the Shah's Iran had waged war on Arab rights
and despite the fact that Khomeyni's Iran waged war on Iraq and on every Arab
- regime. In addition, it adopted [the policy of] reg3onal expansion which the Shah
had c alled for and thereby added one more conflict to the Iranian-Arab conflicts.
Such positions of the Arab People's Congress shattered many hopes that the congress
would be able to oppose al-~adat's courae with a clear program. The congress found
itself torn between the logic of the state and that of the revolution and clearly
subordinate to Libyan wishes and then to the clear control of a communist group
in the secretariat which the Libyan regime is tolerating temporarily even though
it ultimately does not agree with its Islamic slogans.
Far f rom the goals for which it was founded and far from the basic rules that had
been endorsed, the congress continues without a constitution, without legitimate
status, without an agenda and without clear objectives, unless those sporadic
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proposals that are presented in the manner of Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi coastitute
- an agenda.
~ Because the invitations that are sent by the secretariat ger.~eral of the congress
go through the Libyan embassies abroad, the congress has forfeited its last forms
of independence. It has become preoccupied with supporting Libya aRainst the
others. Such a tendency in itself makes the congress a circumst~ntial case for a
circunstantial action and nothing more than a tool through wh~Lc~i Tripoli practices
its own brand of revolution. However, what is required is that this congress be-
come the means ~or a historical confrontation in one of the most cruel stages of
history .
COPYRIGf'iT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-AItABI
8592
CSO: 4802
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
REFLECTIONS ON A?..AB DISUNITY, DIFFERENCES
; Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 23-29 Jan 81 pp 16-18
~ [Article: "Reflections on the Psychologic.al Reasons for Disputes and Divisions:
The 'Tragedy of the Arab Political Character from the Age of 'Antar to That of
al-Qadhdhafi"J
[Text] 'I'he parasitic radical trio in Damascus caused the
1967 defeat and the fa"11 of trie national wing of the
~ regime in Egypt.
, Arabs pay millions of dollars annually to American centers
of education to have their own history re-written in a
i muddled way.
What is the key to understanding and explaining the mysterious, surrealistic paintr
; in~ of Arab political relations?
~ What is the true na.ture of this fragmentation and disunity that have b een passed
' on~from one generation to the other among countries, regimes, governments, rulers
and leaders?
What is the secret behind this vehemence that characterizes our disputes and brings
about a rapid change in the climate of relations, from hot to cold and then from
cold to hot?
How can people who were friends yesterday easily become today's enemies? How can
today's friends turn tomorrow into opponents and enemies killing each other?
~ Traditional politicians may have the answer to that question in this well-known.
statement: "There are no lasting hostilities or friendships in politics."
~ And the radicals ma.y have the answer i.n this well-known, prepared cliche: "imperi-
~ alism, colonialism, Zionism, reactionaries."
i Both answers may be correct to a large extent. In politics "Th.ere are no lasting
~ ~riendships; but there are lasting interests." And yes, no nation has been subjected
' to all the forms of colonialist abuse--in politics, in exploitation, in economics
and in colonization--as the Arab nation has been and stiil is.
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But this sharp fragmentation; this excessive exchange of accusations and charac-
terizations; this hidden and blatant deception that is forcing relations to the
point of armed comb at; and this division in opinion on crucial issues---such as -
the position on the Iraq-Iran war, for example, which is dividing the Arabs into
two groups: Arab-supporting Arabs who are with Iraq, and non-Arab-supporting
- Arabs who zre with Iran~-are matt~~rs that are neither ordinary nor normal among -
fraternal states and regimes that govern a nation whose citizens share a common
history, a common language, commoi~ blood and a common religion.
And if imperialism and colonialism had in the past imposed their occupation or
their direct mandate on the Arabs and tried to break up their ranks, it must also
be acknowledged with a great deal of courage and responsibility that these forces
have lost much of their authority, their controZ, their effective forces anci their
operative and effective tools. There is thus no longer any reasonable justification
for saying that they are stiJ_1 the cause and the origin of every dispute, every
fight or every break-up.
Attentive Arab public opinion that used to accept in the past the statement, "Look
for the British," whenever a catastrophe befelJ. th~e Arabs, is today not convinced
that everything that takes place on the surface and beneath the surface of Arab
policy is the work of the Americans, the Soviets or the Zionists. Arab public
- opinion [accepts the fact]--with considerable courage and responsibility also--
that such things are done, arranged and planned by Arabs. Foreign powers come
into the picture later to take advantage of this fragmentation and division.
The subject of this discussion is not to impeach the regimes and the non-regimes
for the state of deterioration to which Arab relations have sunk. But the objec-
tive of this study is simp ly to look for the key to the riddle, the riddle of the
chronic Arab disease. This is L-he riddle of accelerating divisions in the Arab
political structure; it is the riddle of the distribution and effusiveness of these
divisions into this astounding number of opinions, positions and points of view
along with all the accompanying interventions and contradictions between them
and the ensuing tension, depletion snd ~oaste of effort and energies.
As is the case. in every disease, an ana'lysis [of the case] is esse~itial to find
ot~t the reasons f~r the disease. We must thus go back to the distant past in
ouz investigation of this perplexing riddle of the continuous Arab divisions, and
we must look for the psychological roots of the Arab character.
The Historical Features of the Arab G'haracte:.
Factors of psycholagical stability, se1P-assurance and an interval of time have
not been available to the Arab charactex throughout history to allow it to become
settled and established on.a broad, firm foundat~on of maturity. The Arab character
has retained in its uncons cious many of its pre-Islamic features: it naively
accepts objects and events with their defects without much careful examination; it
becomes excessively moved by the appearances of these objects and events to the
point of appearing to be over-sensitive. This over-sensitivity sometimes reaches
the point of a turbulent emotional outburst that sweeps everything around it.
Other times the Arab character descends to the lowest level of a rigid and an -
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inflexible surrender to fate, or it resorts to an attitude of individualism or
one of independer~t tribalism that is deep-rooted. Such an attitude refuses to
yield ta public wishes; it clashes with them and contradicts them.
The advent of Islam was a historic opportunity for uniting the Arabs and for
modifying and refining their character. The character of the Prophet Muhammad, may
God bless him and gran t him salvation, was a model of maturity and mental stabil-
ity. The fact that he sought divine inspiration before making his decision on
crucial questions was a practical expression of the fact that he relied on the
decree of reason and wisdom which constitutes the wishes and the wisdom of God.
The Arabs rallied around the banner of Islam, and the;~ became preoccupied during
the dawn and the early period of Islam with conquests. The short period of the
Umayyad age in Syria, during which Arabs were utilized in government and manage-
ment, was not long enough for the procesa of fusion that had begun with the early
_ days of Islam. The Umayyad age did not last long enough to dissolve the sensitiv-
ities and the traditions and prepare the c].imate that was necsssary for crystalli-
zing public feelings and the distinctive, independent Arab character.
A worse catastrophe befell the Arabs when government shifted gradually from their
hands to the hands of non-Arabs who were Persians, Turks or Mamelukes. All those
persecuted the ethnic Arabs: they repressed authentic Arab sentiments; and then
they held back the Arabs with the various dis~ointed nations of the Islamic nation
in a a-eposito~ry of back~aardness for hundreds of years. During that harsh and
gloomy period with all the civil strife, insurrections, invasions, wars, tyranny
and persecution that accompanied it, it was also impossible for the Arab character
to have the means for its fo rmation, its growth, its awareness, its maturity and
its stability.
During the new Arab Renaissance at the end of the 19th century the national feel-
- ings of the Arabs assumed the fcrm of transparent emotional, spontaneous sentiments
_ that characterized the course of their liberation from the Turks and then the
course of the struggle against all forms of European colonialism: occupation,
colonization or mandate.
- This sentimental romanticism was necessary to kindle the feelings of struggle and
to stimulate and direct the power of the masses to act. However, this sentimental
romanticism also kept the national Arab character a prisoner of i.mpassioned emo-
tions and of an extreme individualism and a pure sub~ectivism that accompany all
these chivalrous phenomena. [This s ituation] manifested itself in the separation
and fragmentation of those who were working in the national arena. Consequently,
the national struggle movements found themselves incapable of unifying themselves.
Thus, s~rious attempts to philosophize the Arab nationalist movement and to lib-
erate it from its emotional context were delayed until the first half of this
century. The teachings and the ideas of the intellectual elite of the early
Ba'thists as well as the written worl~s of the nationalist thinkers sought to
formulate a general theory of Arab nationalism on firm and stable scientific
foundations and *_o make Arabs of all ages aware of it.
This ideological ef�ort came late, b ut it was the only means for giving the Arab
characther its form, its distinguishing features, its national proportions and its
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humanist mission. It was the only means for defining its political and national
goals and for liberating it from the individualism, the division and the frag-
net?tation that had tainted the early struggle.
In theory, tliis was the goal of scientific national thought, but in practice, the
previous negatxve factors remained in control [of the ~ituation] for reasons be-
yond the conCrol of the nationalist thinkers. This is because the political
circumstances that prevailed in the forties and in the fifties did not provide
them with the full opportunity foi enriching the nationalist body of ideas with
- serious s cientific works in this area and then spreading these ideas all over the
; Arab homeland .
This intellectual elite was able to send from Damascus and Beirut glimpses of their
new scientific ideas with a gene�ration of young people from ti:e Arab east who
studied in the two capitals. But these glimpses did not penetrate the Arab soul.
In Egypt and Sudan they were pale or they arrived late. They were scattered with
, the sand and did not penetrate the colonialist barrie-rs and psychological road-
blocks to reach the young, educated and intellectual generations in the countries
of the great Arab P~Iaghreb.
This f ailure or interruption [in the effort to] spread nationalist ideas through-
out the greater homeland was accompanied by the involvement of the nationalist -
thinkers themselves, willingly or unwillingly, in the fury of political and popular
action. This was enough to distract them from t~.eir intellectual effort and to
create for them political and personal animosities in the ranks of government and
in the ranks of the traditional opposition. Then came the dispute and the struggle
between the national political leaders--or to put it more candidly, between the -
Ba'thists and the Nasirists--with which everybody was preoccupied for relatively
- many years that were actually lost from the life of the educational period of
scientific nationalism.
t'Iarxist Attempts To Contain the Nationalist Message
The principal factors that exposed the scientific nationalist ideas and [eventually]
mutila ted those ideas were not only the subversive elements of the nationalist
movements. Nationalist ideas were also subjected to a poisoned lateral process of
erosion and mutilation.
In the early fifties nationalist ideas became infused with Marxist ideas, and there
were seri ous attempts to implant the Marxist analytical scientific method into the
nationali st theory. This may be acceptable inasmuch as Marxism is almost the only
ideology that offers an integrative, rational method for analyzing and viewing the
course of huma.n societies.
These limited attempts, however, soon turned to a deliberate tendency to favor =
Ma.rxism over nationalism under progressive and radical revolutionary slogans. _
These attempts reached ttieir peak when the parasitic radicals gained control of
the Ba'th Party and the governmen~ in Sy ria. This happened after the coup of 23
February 1966 and the removal of the nationalist leadership from power.
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This period was truly a gloomy period in the history of nationalist action. The
deflection of the nationalist course in Syria was accompanied by the fall of the
party in Iraq into the shackles of formalism. It was this that forced Michel
`Aflaq, the founder of the party, to make his famous proclamation as he left
Damascus, "I am innocent of this part~!" Then the disaster befell all the Arabs
when the trio of Jadid, al-'Atasi and Za'in prepared the suitable conditions for
Israel to attack the Arabs before thzy were adequately prepared and while they
were waiting for the Soviets to intervene--something the Soviets never did. The
immediate result of the defeat was the loss of the Golan, the West Bank, Gaza
and Sinai. Then, the nationalist course of the regime in Egypt fell and Jamal
'Abd-al-Nasir, subdued and griefstruck, died shortly afterwards.
Attempts to give Marxism the upperhand over nationalism have now regressed with
the Ba'th party correcting its course and regaining power in Iraq under the
leadership of Saddam Husayn. However, local communists in the Arab east, supported
by Marxist factions in Arab movements, are still trying to implant Marxism into
the theory and the practice of the Arab [nationalist] appeal. They are trying to
enlist Arab nationalism into the political service of Soviet strategy in the Middle
East and to.portray it to the young generations as a chauvinistic or a reactionary
message whose time has passed. .
The danger Gtill stands. The conspiracy against the nationalist movement devel-
oped into an alliance between the eastern communists, the Marxists and the sectar-
' , ian faction which surfaced in the government in Syria and in the termperamental
regime in Libya as an Arab cover-up of the Shu'ubiyah [translator's note: a
movement among nations in the early days of Islam that refused to acknowledge the
privileged position of the Arabs] Persian attack on the nationalist regime in
Iraq.
The fact that al-Sadat's Egypt renounced the nationalist course and allied itself
with Zionism, which advocates the creation of sectarian and denominational enti-
ties in the area, was tantamount to a stab in the back of the Arab movement.
T'hen came the Lebanese war with a11 its terrors, its massacres and its mistak.es,
and the Arab factions became involved in it. It was a golden opportunity for the
Ma.ronite right to disassociate itself from everything that linked it with the area,
to turn towards "the good neighbor" and to hold the Arab movement responsible for
what happened in Lebanon.
- At the same time increasir.gly determined obscure and clandestine attempts were under-
way to stimulate and to arouse religious and sectarian feelings and to turn them
against the nationalist tide by claiming that Arabism was incompatible and at odds
with religion.
This unscheduled encounter between Marxism and sectarian trends to fight the appeal
for nationalism shows the extent of the prejudice ~oith which the Arabs are afflic-
ted. Sometimes under the cover of internationalism and other times under the
[guiseJ of religious slogans, the Arabs were forbidden from thinking about or
striving to achieve their national uniiy. It is curious and amazing indeed that
the religious regime in Iran maintains its natural unity which includes five
distinct nations, while the Ayatollah forbids the Arabs from forming a single
nation under the pretext that this would be i~~compatib~e with Islam.
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The international polarization in the area wi1Z [eventually] eliminate the dis-
- tance that se~arates what is white from what is black. Although the United States
and the Soviet Union are approaching a confrontation at the gateways to the area
and around the area, both want the local regimes to revolve in this or the other
orbit. It is self-evident that Washington and Moscow would resist the Arab nation-
alist trend that adheres to its independence and its freedom of action.
We can deduce from a11 this that the nature of the struggle in which the natifln-
alist movement is engaged has pr~vented and is preventing it from devoting its
attention to the [process of] crystallizing the Arab character and reshaping it so
that it would have psychological stabI.lity, a firm will, rational thinking and an
ability to make a rational analysis and to see things realistically.
The Official Patriarchal 2'heory of Public O~inion
It is perhaps distressing that the official media policy deals with Arab public
opinion from a patriarchal perspective that views it not as a sound and healtY~y
child, but rather as a reL-arded or a naive human being. Public opinion is fed
general, prepackaged ir_formation that is trivial or superficial; it makes the
public vulne-rable to confusion and leaves it a prey to [sundry] interpretations
and rumors. This official media policy robs the public of the ability to make
analogies, to analy9e, to distinguish, to make judgments and to explore. Not only
is Arab public opinion deprived of pu-rsuing the intellectual output of L-he countries
of its own homeland, biit it is also sheltered from human knowledge if that knowl-
edge is not consistent with the standards of the narrow view of the censorship
imposed by the state on the media, on ideas, knowledge, culture and education.
This effort to keep Arab public opinion in the dark under the pretext of protecting
it and preserving its innocence has afflictied the Arab character with stupidity
and frailty. It has caused the Arab cnaracter to lose its balance and its cohesion
in front of the rush of events and the succession of defeats and disasters.
- This intellectual confinement of the Arab character was often accompanied by
psychological terror and physical repression. As a result, the Arab character
lost any experience [it may have had] in practical political practice, and this
practice came to be governed by controls that were imposed by the security agencies
or by the party that was in power. Such practices were confined to demonstrating
to welcome a guest of the regime, cheering for a leader who escaped an assassina-
tion attempt or invading and burning an embassy.
The psychological terror and the physical repression spread despair, disappointment
and bitterness in the Arab character and imparted to the Arab movement, to its
thought and to its conduct a fatalistic, pessimistic or submissive character.
= The deep split in the Arab character may be probed if these new "acquisitions " were
added to the pile of inherited and ancestral traits that have already been mentioned:
excessive emotionalism and sensitivity, a tendency to exaggerate and to engage in
excessive abstractions; an inclination to passive individualism; and an unruly
desire to be petulant and quarrelsome.
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Perhaps one of the most significant conseque:~ces of these traits, acquisitions
~ and restrictions is the fact that the Arab character lost its ability to deal on
a daily basis with the politicai reality in its own homeland, on its borders and
in the world. Thus the broad line on which the vast majority of public opininh can
agree disappeared. It is such a broad line that provides the minimum of agreement
[necessary] for assuming a position, making a decision or accepting an existing
siCuation.
A political observer does not need much evidence to prove this. It is enough to
say that the Arab regimes entered Palestine in 1948 without telling their people
that inevitable defeat was awaiting them there because these regimes were inca-
pahle of opposing the international conspiracy, of providing the necessary military
materiel, of organizing the Palestinian popular resistance movement and of estab-
lishing the minimum coordination between the operations of the armies.
The February regime in Syria did not have th~: courage to make a single statement
criticizing itself for losing the Golan in the 1967 war. Nasir, meanwhile, rushed
to a limited process of self-criticism. The Egyptian media, however, was pre-
occupied for several years with [the process of] philosophizing the defeat, col-
oring it with bright, radiant colors and turning it into a victory for Egyptian
public opinion.
The world press abounds daily with scores of analyses about the military strength
and the political positions of the two ma~or international camps. These analyses
convey the most precise figures and details about the number of strategic missiles
--intercontinental and transoceanic--[the number of] tactical weapons--intermediate
or short range--and the number of divisions and soldiers.
But can a single Arab journalist keep his head if he states that according to a
field marshal, a general, a colonel or even a corporal the number of tanks or
airplanes in an Arab army is so many tank.s or so ma.ny airplanes?
Or rather can a single Arab journalist publish candidly and accurately the point
of view that some officials in a regime or an organization have on one of the
crucial questions?
Why is that? It is because we do not have the courage to face facts, and we do not
like public opinion to have a picture that approximates these facts. This situa-
tion is closer to being self-decption or false pride and pomposity both on the
part of the official and on the part of public opinion. Ultimately, it is one of
the deep splits in the Arab psychology or character.
We had stated that the purpose of this discussion and this analysis was not to
examine the conscience of. others or to 1ay the responsibility on this regime or
the other or on this or the other school of thought. The purpose of this dis-
cussion is rather to speak out and to declare frankly our flaws and our psychological
and character weaknesses which leave their negative, worthless products on contem-
porary Arab political life.
And now, how do we go about rebuilding the Arab Character?
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Quite simply there is no potion, injection, magic elixir or even an incantation
to remedy the frailty and the weakness of aur political character that we suffer
from.
Perhaps the simplest statement that can be made in this regard is that we mus~
take the course that nations before us took to build their nat3onal unities, their
cohesive political characters and their modern societies.
The proceso is quite complicated, and it is impossible for a journalist or a poli-
tical commentator to summarize in a few lines or pages that course that a[partic-
ular] nation pursued to rebuild itself and its society.
This statement is not being made to avoid prescribing a remedy or to express
despair of remedying an incurable case. Nor is it made to abandon the reader delib-
erately on the threshold of despair from a bitter political re~lity.
A11 that can be said as an introduction as we begin taking the right road towards
rebuilding the Arab character is that our entire history must be re-written. This
may be the key that will solve and resolve the riddle that surrounds our disturbed
political relations and our capricious, sharply temperamental character that is
- out of step with the reality around it.
The process of writing the history of a nation is not easy, especially since a
nation like the Arab nation has a long and a ful.l political and cultural history.
The true history is not that which is written by the writers and teachers of poli-
tical regimes and then printed under the supervision of an "honorable" or a
"discriminating" ministry of education. The true history is not that which is
written by some of our ancient and modern historians with b oastfulness, pride,
empty exaggeration and (an effort to] cover-up the flaws and shortcomings and to
beat about the bush regarding anything that is embarrassing or shameful.
Some of the Arab countries, including Lit,ya, donate millions of dollars every year
to educational institutions that are affiliated with universities and educational
centers in the United States for the publication of studies and research about the
various aspects of modern and ancient Arab history. Most of these studies contain
political instruction that ultimately serves the interests of U.S. strategy.
These studies usually concentrate on looking for the factors of separation, divi-
sion and schizophrenia in the Arab character and Arab society more than they do on
the factors and the causes for unity and harmony.
Perhaps the Arab countries can offer the Arab League a service if they helped it
establish a unified and a neutral scientific center for writing Arab history. Arab
countries could lend that cen*.er thEir best historians and.their top intellectuals,
their top sociologists and their top economists and provide them with an atmosphere
of calm and freedom so they can carry out this glorious work.
But what wi11 be the use of re-writin~ history?
TEie political and cultural heritage of the past constitute the solid foundation
upon which any nation stands. It is from this foundation that a nation derives its
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psychological roots and the components of its intellectual and political character.
Inasmuch as this past is written and presented truthfully and inasmuch as it is
ev3.dent to the attentive eye with all its advantages and its blemishes, peonle will
be capable of controlling their view of their present, their future and their
issues, and they ~aill be capable of focusing on those matters.
We have to accept beforehand that our history is not a series of miracles, glorious
_ events and victories just as we have to accept that it ~.s not a pile of refuse and
a gloomy series of injustices and persecutions, as is claimed by some Shu'ubis,
orientalists and "progressive" writers who focus on the dark side of [our] history
and disregard its bright sides.
Re-introducing people to modern Arab history is not less important than re-writing
ancient history. There are deliberate attempts to keep the new Arab generations
in the dark about the history of the characteristics, the society, the masses
and the circumstances of the modern Arab renaissance. What is even more offensive
is that shameless aggression which is being perpetrated for narrow political and
ideological objectives against the leaders and the notable men of modern Arab
history to obscure their names, their actions and their roles.
The realities of modern history are not the exclusi.ve property or possession of the
g~~vernment's narrow direction. It is shameful for a student or a university gradu-
ate of any Arab university to know nothing about the life and the role of Pifa'ah
al-Tahtawi, 'Urabi, al-Kawakibi, Muhammad 'Abduh, Sa'd Zaghlul, 'Abd-al-Ghani
al-'Arisi, Faris al-Khuri, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Shahbandar, Mustafa al-Nahhae, Salah
al-Sin al-Sabbagh, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and ICamal Junblat while bookstores on Arab
sidewalks overflow with volumes by Stalin and books about the life of Lincoln,
Castro and Guevara.
Reading ancient and modern history helps the generations fix the features of their
- psychological stability and helps them form and derive the features and character-
istice of their intellectual, social and political character. It assists them in
looking at the future with considerable assurance and tenacity; in confronting
crucial as well as occasional questions with unexaggerated realism; in prepari.ng
_ themselves for relations and for dialogue [with others] and in accepting cri~icism
as well as opposing and different opinions.
But is this everything [that is necessary] to rebuild the Arab political character?
N~. This is merely getting hold of the key to the riddle--the riddle of the
capricious, restless and unbalanced political Arab psyche.
It is not strange that the destiny of the Arab nation is controlleci by figures such
, as al-Sadat, al-Qadhdhafi, al-Za'im or Qasim who do not have the mEans for psycho-
logical stability and who lack the profound ability to analyae and to perceive
- [matters]. [These two faculties] are based on a thorough knowledge of history, of
the past and of the intellectual and cultural heritage of the Arab nation. In
their emotionalism these characters are still quite similar to the mythical
characters of pre-Islamic days such as 'Antarah al-'Abasi and those like him.
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What is curious is that so far we have remained incapable of knowing ox~e of the
pxincipal reasons for our moral and material defeats. It lies here: in our
hearts, in ourselves and in the essence of our frail and non-teaacious charac~er.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
CSO: 4802
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ALGERIA
~
U. S.-IRAN MEDIATION SEALS ALGERIA'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS
London AFKICA in English Feb 81 pp 21-22
[Article by John Howe]
[Text] ~-iE role played by Algeria in the first of its kind Algeria had conducted
I protracted negotiations for the recently. It is believed that it played a
release of Amenca's embassy similar role in the release of several ~
' hostages in Iran, successfully conclud- hundred Libyan soldiers captured by
ed last month, will undoubtedly give the Tanzanians during the war which
President Chadli Bendjedid's Govern- overthrew the Ugandan ryrant Idi
. ment some political credit in widely Amin. Despite its alliance with Libya,
differing quarters. A sup~orter, with concluded at Hassi-Messaoud in 1975
' reservations, of the Islamic revolution by Colonel Gaddafy and the late Presi-
in Iran, Algeria has never allowed its dent Houari Boumedienne, Algiers
, anti-imperialist stance, which can be was not disposed to follow Gaddafy
; quite strident, to interfere with its into any kind of support for Amin
~ business dealings with the United whom it regarded as brutal and politi-
; States (mainly involving oil, gas and cally backward. Officially, the
the equipment and technologies Algerian Government concurred with
i needed to handle them). the views of President Ny~rere and at
~ Chadli's men, like Boumedienne's the height of Uganda's war of libera-
before them, have proved able to tion, it is believed, delivered a much-
confront embarrassing contradictions needed arms shipment to the Tanzan-
' by dealing with each issue as it arose, ians. The goodwill thus earned put
' and being slow to take, sides. Thus, Algeria in a~osition to secure the sw~ft
' while applauding the overthrow of the release of the Libyan prisoners of war.
Shah, they have been able to criticise
some subsequent developments in Embarrassing
Iran - and notably, the se~zure of 53 The reasons for an alliance which
; US di~lomats as hostages - without has often roved embarrassin to the
opposing the revolution ~tself. A1 erians are evident enou h A1 eria
i Sunilarly, the Algerians were able and Lib a share a lon desert border;
; to agree that Amenca had to answer both re ymes are Islamic and are, or
~ for 25 years of the Shah s tyranny, and sa the g are, revolutiona and anti-
~ at the same time understand the y y, rY .
danger posed to world peace by Iran's imperialist; they~ are allies in OPEC
i flouring of the most basic principle of and 4in reiation to the Middle East
' diplomacy. Beingon neitherside, and confl~ct) in the `rejection front'
' intellectually a cut above the average, oPPosed to the Egypt-Israel detente;
~ Algeria was acceptable to both both have military agreements with
i part~es. the Soviet Union, while their neigh-
~ The US-Iran mediation was not the bours do not; Libya has helped supply
; and finance the war mounted against
i Moroccan occupyinQ forces by
~
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- Sahara's Polisario Front from bases in Chadli's Government, which during
A1geria. ~ the last year has made large strides in
~ These factors all help to explain why ~menting relations with a Tunisia
the alliance still stands des,^.
ite the ~,~,hich must be regarded as being in
knocks it has received from the Libyan ~litical ~transition, and cleared away
side. There was no official reaction to $~yet~l of its outstanding disputes with
Libya's attempt to implicate Algeria in France dating from the war of
the Gafsa insurrection in Tunis~.a. independence.
Algiers has refrained from comment- Morocco, too, with its war in the -
ing on vacious Libyan attempts to jolt 5ahara going extremely badly, has
the diplomatic progress of the Sahara lat~ly multiplied its approaches to
conflict out of its groove. Gaddafy's A1gena in the hope of finding a work-
recent comments on the Sahara able solution to its dispute wrth the
Desert's Tuareg nomads, of whom polisario Front. Algiers of course
many live in Algeria, can hardly have maintains that it has no real quarrel
passed unnoticed by the Algerian
Government. In each case, Algeria With Morocco and is ready to mediate

- has ~een seriously annoyed, but has When Morocco is ready to recognize its
kept its annoyance to itself. adversaries.
Libya's foray into Chad and the Algeria is not without internal
the be~nning of January. problems. The `Arabisation' policy
countnes, is causing violent ripples in Which caused widespread disorders a
the OAU and alt round Algeria's year ago is still caus~ng trouble in a
southern borders in Niger and Mali. country some of whose inhabitants
Algiers has adopted a legalist stance, insists w~th perfect justice that there
supporting the Lagos accords and insist with perfect justice that they are
favouring elections before any major not Arabs. Chadli's assertion a few
months ago that there are now no poli-
policy shift - such as the fusion tical prisoners in the country was
pro~ect--canbejustified. contradicted by the case of army _
Despite the threat posed to stability officer-cadets jailed by a Blida court at
in the reg~on by Gaddafy's dubious th beginning of.Tanuary.
ambitions, Algiers is still standing by ~
the Hassi-Messaoud treaty which .
stipulates among other things that'any j~g
threat to one revolution will be regard-
ed as a threat to the other'. . ;plits in the administration are dis-
More than anything ti~i~ cernible behind last year's Govern-
explains why the idea fioated out of the ment reshuffles and Chadli's personal
lunatic end of Washington last month, intervention to secure the release from
that Egy~t might be persuaded to close surveillance of former President
invade Libya, is almost certainly a Ahmed Ben Bella, some weeks after it
non-starter. It is true that (as W ashing- had been ordered and announced. T'he
ton also said) the Libyan population is economy continues to give cause for
too small to support anythmg resembl- concern, one reason for the urgency
ing real military strength. By itself, With which SONATRACH is seeking
Libya could do ~ little to stop Egypt's uPWard revision of Liquefied natura
large and well-trained forces. gas rices. .
Algeria's opposition, almost certainly ~evertheless on some levels
means that the attempt will not be Chadli's Government, like its
made. But whea, as it inevitably will, pledecessor, functions unusually well:
Libya cuns into trouble in Chad, the handling of the El Asnam earth-
Algeria will be called on to help clear Guake, for example, contrasted with
up the mess. the chaos and corruption wimessed
in other earthquake mcidents in rec~nt
_ $p~~ times (Nicaragua, Iran, Italy). In the
The US-Iran mediation uts the seal diplomatic fieid this relative solidity of
P conduct gave Algeria the credibility to
on the international acceptability of undertake the Iran mediation, and is
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Africa the real reason for the advantages- if
any - which may now be expected
Journal Ltd . from its success. �
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ALGERIA
LEADERS SEIIC TO REDUCE DEPENDENCY ON OIL, GAS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 5 Jan 81 pp 21-22
_ [Article by Caroline Verhack: "Preserving Energy Independence"]
[Text] The negotiations that went on all s~mer and fall between Algiers and its
European and American customers concerning the price of gas did not lead to the
signing of new contracts on revised bases. However, positions clearly evolved on
both sides in a matter of months.
With respect to France, first of all, the gradual resumption of deliveries, seri-
ously slowed down for a time, lifted a major obstacle to discussions between the
two countries and by Ju1y, Paris had agreed to pay $3.20 per million BTU (British
thermal units; 1 million BTU = 252 thermal units) for Algerian GNL (liquefied na-
; tural gas) in advance.
~ In addition, while French Minister~of Industry Giraud's visit to Algiers in October
did not result in the conclusion of an agreement, it nevertheless opened the way by
: bringing negotiations out of the impasse and by laying the groundwork for new
~ energy cooperation.
; A delegation from the French Gas Company (GDF) once again went to the Algerian capi-
tal at the beginning of December for a work session. Today, a new and important
step has been taken with France's acceptance of the principle of alining gas prices
! with oil prices, a principle on which Algeria is intransigent.
;
For its part, Algiers proposes to spread out this measure in time. "We have never
said that we wanted parity overnight," said the Ministry of Energy's planning
director Boussena. "We are for a gradual alinement of the price of gas with that
of oil in order to spare consumers very abrupt increases." The two sides have now
but to agree on the indexing formula, the choice of reference crudes and the length
' of the period of transition.
, The Americans also went to Algiers and Paris several times to meet with their A1-
gerian counterparts. Here, discussions seem tighCer. It is known that the Ameri-
, cans suspended taking GNL deliveries at the Arzew plant, now shut down, in April.
Washington is keeping the price of $4.47 per million BTU, paid for Canadian gas
at the border, as its reference price.
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Gas Battle
It is obvious that the new increase in the crude oil reference prices deEided upon
_ in Bali (Indonesia) by the OPEC ministers of energy strengthens Algeria's position. _
Af ter what will soon be a year of discussions, it is possible that negotiations
will conclude with new contracts in the early months of 1981.
The signing of such contracts would come at a decisive time for Algeria, which con-
siders the energy question sufficiently important to include it on the agenda of
the current session of the Central Committee of the FLN. Presented by Belkacem
Nabi, minister of energy and the petrochemical industries, to the various rank-and-
file organizations of that country, the dossier defines the main lines of action on _
which Algeria's long-term energy policy will be based. They include the f ollowing,
as outlined by Abdelhamid Brahimi, minister of planning and national development:
conserving oil and oil derivatives through a gradual reduction in consumption; en-
suring the reliability of the national supply through a program of management and
conservation of existing deposits; continuing research efforts and the working of _
new deposits; and mobilizing new alternative sources of energy.
We know the essential place occupied by hydrocarbons as a source of financing for
national development. The minister of energy emphasized recently that in 1981,
99 percent of all f oreign exchange will come from the sale of oil and gas. In the
1981 Budget, royalties from oil r.epresent 68 percent of all anticipated receipts,
or 46 billion dinars .
- Furthermore, in the face of. the rapi~ evolution in internal energy needs, both
domestic and industrial, Algeria is beginning to ask questions about means of avoid-
ing imports for future energy supplies. Following independence, the country con-
sumed a milliun tons of oil a year. In 1979, consumption amounted to the equivalent _
of 16 million tons. Estimated needs total the equivalent of 40 million tons of oil
in the 1980's and 75 million by the year 2000. Since resources have been computed,
priority wi11 quite rightly be given to national supplies. While internal consump-
tion now represents only 21 percent of production (equivalent tons of oil), this
share should rise to 30 percent by 1990 and 77 percent by the year 2000.
Oil exports (47 million tons of oil yearly) have already begun to drop in volume.
And yet, with 980 million tons of known reserves, the reign of oil should come to
an end within 20 years.
On the other hand, gas reserves estimated to datE au~ou:.t ta 3 trillion cubic meters
and put Algeria in fourth place in the world, enough to assure the country of sub-
stantial income for many years provided that a fair price is paid, the Algerians
say.
New Sources
This is why gas is being called upon to gradually take the place of oil, both with
_ regard to export r eceipts and internal consumption. It is in fact estimated that
by 1990, the respe ctive portions of consumption of gas and oil will be 60 and 33 per-
cent, compared with 44 and 48 percent at present.
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However, there can no longer be any question of undertaking costly gas processing
facilities. The GNL 3 liquefaction plant that was to be built near its sisters at
Arzew will not see the light of day. Furthermore, Algiers has just told German
(Ruhrgas, Salzitter Ferngas) and Dutch (Gasunie) com~panies that contracts already
conCluded for the delivery of liquefied gas from GNL 3 will not be honored.
Algeria, which is moving toward the delivery of gas to Europe by means of gas pipe-
lines being built toward Italy and perhaps Spain, is already seeking alternative
sources of energy that wi.ll require the estab lishment of training programs.
~ "We must resolutely embark upon the mobilization of solar and nuclear energy re-
sources," says Brahimi. Here again, the country has been richly endowed by nature.
The Hoggar Mountain Range (in the far south) contains uranium deposits whose re-
serves total over 30,000 tons, according to es timates. Furthermore, the country's
potential in solar, hydroelectric and even geotherma.l and wind energy is well known.
The Hoggar uranium deposits could begin to be worked by 1984-1985. There is also
talk of an initial nuclear powerplant around 1990. At any rate, it will be recalled
that a framework agreement was signed in April between the Algerian National Office
of Scientific and Technical Research (ONAREST) and the French Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, according to which Algeria could order two research reactors from France.
A study has also been undertaken for the construction of a nuclear study center at
Ain Oussera (200 kilometers south of Algiers).
The planning minister has described nuclear power as a"concrete prospect" and
envisages the use of solar power as a well-adapted source of energy for small
areas.
How will Algeria manage to reduce its dependency on hydrocarbons as nearly the
sole suppliers of foreign exchange? The question remains posed. Aside from a few
agricultural products (wine, citrus fruits) and some raw materials, the country,
which at the present time cannot meet its own needs in many sectors (grain, capital
goads), would have a difficult time f inding exportable surpluses other than oil and
gas. According to Minister Brahimi, the Algerian economy will therefore have to
reduce its degree of openness to foreign countries in the coming decade. The share
of imports of goods and services at 1979 prices must gradually be reduced until
it amounts to 27 percent of total resources in 1990, compared with 50 percent at
the present time, the minister says.
This is a difficult challenge at a time when the country aspires to a higher
standard of living. And yet, the national solidarity reflex that developed spon-�
taneously at the time of the E1-Asnam earthquake is an encouraging sign for Alger-
ian leaders and planners, whose constant concern is both to ensure economic inde-
pendence and meet the needs of their people. .
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
11,464
CSO: 4400
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ALGERIA
1~RANCE ACCUSED OF NOT HONORING AGREEMENT
~ Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 5 Jan 81 p 25
[Text] On 18 September 1980, an exchange of letters between the Algerian and
French governments was to put an end to the period of uncertainty concerning the
regulation of the stay of Algerian residents in France.
The text signed by Lionel Stoleru, secretary of state in charge of immigrant
workers, contained the following commitments: "Our two governments have agreed
to cooperate closely, for a period of 3 years and 3 months beginning on 1 October
1980 and ending on 31 December 1983, in taking all measures aimed at permitting
the voluntary (our emphasis) return and reintegration in Algeria of Algerian
workers and their families under good conditions and respecting the free choice
of those inuolved...." '
What is now happening? Has the French Government applied the decisions it agreed
~ to make? It would appear that it has not. In a letter to French deputies, SOS-
Refoulement (46 Rue de Montreuil, 75011 Paris) outlines the difficulties and
threats particularly affecting: "Algerian workers, w~ether or not they are em-
ployed, holding a residence certificate for 5 or 10 years and currently in posses-
sion of visiting receipts for 3 months and 1 year; handicapped or disabled Alger-
ian workers; young Algerian men and women residing in France who wish to continue
their studies or work after the age of 16; and merchants."
Regarding families, there.is a manifest determination to deny Algerian workers the
right to live with their wives and children.
Is there any need to cite the example of Malika, whose husband has been in France
for 25 years and whose three children are French, turned dawn because the apart- -
ment is 17 square meters too sma11? Then there is Nouara, whose husband has been
in France for 20 years, whose two children are French and who is carrying a third.
They have been turned down because of "improper housing"!
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
. ~
11,464
- CSO : 4400
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IRAQ
R~VAL IRANIAN FACTIONS SAID TO HAVE CAUSED WAR AETWEEN IRAQ, IRAN
Paris AL-41ATAN AL-'ARAI3i in Arabic 23-29 Jan 81 pp 12-13
[Article by Ta riq 'Aziz, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister: "Who Was Behind
the Glar?"]
[Text] The other question that is being asked is this: who was behind
this war? Who encou raged it, and in whose interests did it break out?
Some Arab and inte rnational circles are accusing Iraq of waging this
_ war on behalf of IJ.S. imperialism for the purpose of putting an ~nd to
the Iranian Revolution and making it subject to the American plan.
We will not discuss this accusation at length because it is too insig-
nificant [to dese rve] discussion. Coun tries on *_he globe are like people
- in villages: each one of them is known for his conduct, his demeanor
and his affiliation. The shameless among them is known; the one who sells
his honor is known; the rational is known; and the honest is known. When
one of them is accused of something, the honorable and the wise residents
of the village can treat him with justice and refute the false accusation.
Bu[ there is a statement that is being repeated in international circles
and that states only half the truth and not all of it. It may be that a
discussion of this statement will constitute a proper avenue that would
help us find out the facts about who was behind this war; who has been
benefiting from it; why did it not end quickly; and [give us answers to]
other well-known questions.
_ This is the statement: "This war broke out with the encouragement of il.S.
imperialism so that ci.rcumstances would be opportune for U.S. imperialism
to re~ain its control over Iran and to extend its hegemony over the oil-
rich Gulf area." This is a very fine statement, and it is very true. But
those who are makin~ that statement are not saying how and where this
took place.
_ Those who made that statement are not flattering Iraq because there is
_ some relationship between those who ma de the first accusation and those
~ who made that statement. If those who made that statement--and they hold
positions that are more responsible than those who made the first accusa-
tion--were, firs[, convinced and, second, capable of proving that it
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was l~.S. imperial ism t~hat encouraged Iraq to launch [his war, the, would
have made that statement without hesitation. But those who made that
statement know the truth. They know that the United States and its plans

- a re worlds apart from iraq and its goals. Nevertheless, they say half the
truth because they want to arouse the anger of the Iranians because they
are entertainin~; certain designs in Iran and hurting Iraq in the' process
[of realizing those designs] is of no importance.
The story that U.S. imperialism encouraged the war between Iraq and Iran
will cer[ainly become evident. Did this encouragement take place in
Ba~hdad, i.n Tehran or in both cities?
Let us discuss the possibility that it took pla.ce ir Raghdad, as some
circles would like to suggest directly or indirec[1,� _
~ahen a country like the t(nited States succeeds in encouraging another
- country like Iraq to embark upon a dan~erous operation such as war, it
must rely on old and anciene ties as well as on objective rules that
would enable it to make that possibility a reality. It is known that Iraq
and the United States liave not even had diplomatic relations for a long
time. Relations between the two parties have been poor and tense during .
the past years. Even 5 years a~o the United States was publicly
encouraging in[ernal rebelli.on a~ainst the regime in Iraq. Iraq was
called in the i1.S. press the leader of the rejection front, and it was
accused of encouraging international terrorism. It was Iraq that
initiated [the idea of] convening the Ba~hdad Summit, confronting the
Camp David plan and isolating al-Sadat. The most unlikely occurrence in
relations between Iraq and the lJnited States is that Iraq, within the
framework of i.ts broad development plan, did not forbid American cor-
porations from participatin~ in some development projects. There are
no ll.S. taeapons in Iraq, and Iraq has no deposits or property in the
llnited States. Iraq does not have in the ilnited States networks of rela-
tions with people or with economic, cultural or other institutions that
would make it oossihle for the two countries to have an exchan~e about
serious questions such as war.
The leadership in Iraq is not so stupid as to engage in a war with
another state whose area and population are three tim~s as large as its
own, a state which is located on the borders of a major country such as
the Soviet ilnion arid which carries the banner of revolution it claims is
Islamic simply because it allegedly had access to the reports of the U.S.
Central Intelligence A~ency that made war with Iran appear in a favorable
light; because one of the politicians or officers who oppose Khomeyni's
regime of.fered erroneous information; or because a state in the area that
is friendly to the IJnited States offered Iraq such information. Such a
possibility may be true if there were no state, no leader and no capable
instituti.ons in Iraq. But if all these are available and if this fact is
known to those who are far and near, the simplest statement that can be
made about such a possibility is that it is idiotic. Why should Iraq
accept America's encoura~ement to enga~e in a war with Iran i.f Iraq is
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fi~hting [to regain] its occupied lands and Shatt al-'Arab? Iraq does
not need "encouragement." This is a national objective that any national
leadership must strive to achieve at the appropriate time and in the
appropriate manner. However, if this fight is for 'Arabistan, America's
, position on this matter is obvious, as we have already mentioned.
If we were to set aside the principles and the trends that are proclaimed
in Iraq and if we were to consider only the objective facts in addition
~ to a major fact about war, which is that most of the weapons in Iraq are
~ Soviet weapons, would it then be possible for Iraq to accept [1.5.
encouragement to engage in a war it would fight with Soviet weapons
- a~ainst another country whose weapons were American?
The proponents of this mysterious "analysis" of the war were imaginin~
that under the cover oE dust clouds raised by the random accusations that
were being made in the area, they could gain acceptance for such an inter-
pretation without havin~ anybody oppose it wi[h lo~ic and concrete evi-
dence. Rut this was impossible! People cannot be fooled on major issues,
Eor despite the fact that deception, for~ery and falsehood are widespread
throughout [he area, there are those who can point out the facts and
who can dot the i's and cross the t's. But what is the other half of
the truth that the proponents of this "analysis" are hiding to flatter
the Tehran re~ime in the hope that something may happen in Tehran?
The other half of the truth is the fact that this "encouragement" took
place in Tehran and not in Baghdad. In Tehran there is more than one
objective justific2tion and more than one suitable condition for such
an "encouragement" to take place; in Baghdad, however, there is not a -
si.ngle objective justification nor a single suitable condition.
- How can that be?
The reality of conditions in Iran and the nature of the existing factions
there explain how such an encouragement could have taken place.
It is known that there are three principal feuding factions in Iran's
power structure, th~t relations between them are complex and that none of
these factions, even up to the outbreak of war with Iraq, had been able
to settle matters in its own favor.
_ The three principal factions are:
[1] The clergy and their followers.
~2] The civilian politicians who are influenced by western culture.
[3] The ~roups that have ties in one way or another with the United
States; circles in the Iranian army are among them.
it is known that today there are no integrative institutions in Iran wor-
1