JPRS ID: 9572 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9572
25 February 1981
Near East North Africa Re ort
p
CFOUO 8/81)
F~~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9572
25 February 1981
,
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 8/81)
_ CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
- Briefa
Algerian-Moroccan Contact 1
AFGHANISTAN
Afghan Robberies, Banditry, Fighting Reported
- (PeCer Niesewand; THE GUARDIAN, 6 Feb 81) 2
_ LIBYA
Briefs
'Italian Terrorists' in Deaert Camps 4
PERSIAN GULF AREA
_ Saudis Propose Link-Up With Other Gulf States
(Patrick Seale; THE OBSERVER, 1 Feb 81) 5
~ SUDAN
Sadiq al-Mahdi Explai~ns Position Among Ansar
~SUDANOW, Jaa 81) 8
Reconcilxation irn SSU Shows Progress
~SUDANOW, Feb 81) 9
Inlormation Minister Addresses Current Issues
(Iamail Haj Musa Interview; SUDANOW, Feb 81) 12
, Head of Southern Industr~ r!inistry InCerviewed
(Bona Malwal Interview; SUDANOW, Jan 81) 15
Japaneae Make Large Contribution to Economy
~SUDANOW, Jan 81) 18
Oil Sector Development Reass~esaed
(SUDANOW, Jan 8a) 20
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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Labor Shortage Plaguea Oil Induatry Development
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 2-8 Jan 81) 23
Concentzated Efforts Attack Cat~tle Diseases
(SUDANOW, Jan 81) 26
SULTANATE OF OMAN
Strait of Hormuz Could Be First Spark o� World War III
(Ahmad Hafiz; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 2 Jan 81) 28
TUNISIA ~
'JEUNE AFRIQUE' Article Analyzes Status of Army
(Souhayr Belhassen; .TEUNE AFRIQUE, 31 Dec 80) 34
Gradual Liberalization Program Analyzed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITF.RRl~NEENS, 26 Dec 80) 42
UNITED AR.AB EMIRATES
Details of Establishment of Central Bank
('Abd al-Malik al-Mahar Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
13 Jan 81) 45
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN CONTACT--The wnrld press reported that Morocco's King Hassan II
and AlgQria's president Chadli Bend3edid met briefly with one another insid~ the
sanctuary at Mecca. Such a high level contact between Algeria and Morocco, un-
' precedented since 1975, led some papers to infer a likely apgroximation of views
vi~s-a-vis the Saharan issue. Large numbers of the pvhlic in Algeria and Morocco
feel certain that there were corridor talks between Algeria and Morocco on the
Saharan issue. Significance was readilp attached to th.e handshake and embrace ex-
changed b etween monarch and president. Over the course of several months semi-
, official information and propaganda whisperings in Morocco have actua.lly kept
alive a feeling that relations between Rabat and Algiers would soon normalize and
that the Saharan issue would soon be resolved in line with Moroccan views. In -
Algeria the situation was just the apposite. ~'oreign minister Mohammed Benyahia
said it was regrettable that there were "all those rumors tending to denigrate ~
the SDAR's brilliant dinlomatic gains and the increasinglq strong solidarity of
world opinion on t~e side of the Polisario Front." Consequently, Algiers has
quickly disavowed that the polit~ gesture made by the two heads of state as re-
quired by Islamic tradition had a~c.~.y political significance. The fact is that,
whether on pilgrimage or otherwise, when visiting the Kaaba all Muslims are
obliged to free their minds of all earthly concerns and direct them solely to-
wards God. There is no way the sanctuary precinct could be the site of a suutmit
dialog. All the same, many North African Muslims will be uf the opinion that
it could be the site of a gesture of reconciliation between ~ao believers. In -
the process of banishing such "~peculations," EL MOUDJAHID (28 January) contrib- '
utes one of its own: "It must be borne in mind that Algeria and Morocco have no
quarrel except for the issue of the decolonialization of Western Sahara, a topic
about which each country has a different view." [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES
~'ROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Feb 81 p 288]
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AFGHANISTAN
AFGHAN ROBBERIES, BANDITRY, FIGHTING REPORTED
LD061235 Lond~n THE GUARDIAN iz English 6 Feb 81 p 8
' [Dispatch by Peter Niesewand: "Bandits Boost Toll of Afghan Fighting"]
[Text] New Delhi--There has been a marked increase in the number of f unerals
in th e Af ghan capital, Kabul, as the toll in continuing fighting again~t
Islamic guerrillas vies with fatalities from a dramatic increase in armed
robberies, diplomats said here yesterday.
Une diploma.t said he had been told that in some areas of the city, ~
Mojahadin (Islamic rebels) had formed n3.ght patrol units which extorted
- money from shopkeepers, while at the same time Soviet troops looted houses,
stores and businesses.
. Ano~her diplomat said that intruders also included "thugs" from th e ruling
~ communist party, and common criminals. Althnugh curfew does no t begin until
10 p.m. few Afghans were now seen on the streets after 7 p.m.
, The sources said: "The intruders are always armed, and a major factor in
the deterioration seems to be the wide and indiscriminate issue of submachine-
guns and automatic rifles. If resistance is encountered--and many Afghan
householders are armed--shots are fired and people are killed."
Banditry and robbery in the countryside was also widespread now, the source
added, with the main dif�erence being that outside the city there were more
cases of extortion by Mojahadin.
"Resistance forces send demand notes to businessmen and other householders,
and set fire to premises if they get no response," he said.
The closest the small foreign community has come recently to the latest
troub les was on Thursday of last week, when five Afghans, dressed in Western
clothes and armed with machine-guns and pistols, raided the iJnited Nations
club in Kab ul. Th ey held five UN officers and several Afghans at gunpoint
before locking them in a room. The robUers stole electronic equipment,
a television set, a film projector, and cash from the club till, and loaded
them into three taxis waiting outside. They made their escape unchallenged.
Although there were no casuaifiies in th is incident, there frequently are
! woundings and fatalities when people attempt to resist.
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Political assa~sainations are reportedly continuing in Kab ul, particularly of
thase believed to be members of the Parcham (flag) faction of the Afghan
Communist Party led by Babrak Karmal, the man installed as president by
the Russians after their invasion more than a year ago.
Despite the heaviest snows of winter in many parts of the country, there are
also persistent reports of continued fighting in many areas.
One diplomat, quoting a"good source," said that the Afghan 4th and 15th
armoured divis~ons--which for months have been confined to their cantonments ~
and guarded by the Soviet army because of their "unreliab ility"--have now
been ordered into the field. Separate reports pin-pointed the 4th and 15th
armoured divisions as being sent to Gt~orband and Parwan provinces, along the
road to Bamian, and to Taqab in the newly-formed Kapise Province.
Taqab is understood to be an area of particular unrest at the moment.
Diplomats said they had been told that 47 wounded Afghan soldiers from the
444th Commando Brigade had been brought to the military hospital in the
capital after fighting in Taqab and its surrounding valley.
Afghan officers in Kabul are also reported to h ave been talking about "a
serious defeat" for the 444th Commando Brigade, and saying that an armoured
- division had been sent to help thPm.
Funer~ls of dozens of military and civil officers in the capital--many
announced by the off icial Afghan ~nedia--h~ve been noted by diplomats.
Joint Afghan-Sovie~~ for=es have been reported fighting Mojahadin, or being
seen on manoeuvres in the provinces of Loghar, Wardak and Zabul, over the
- pas t week .
A diplomatic source reported that clashes took place around Istalif, about
- 30 m:iles north of Kabul, with Soviet helicopters and jets brought in to
- relieve pressure on Afghan �orces theie. Military vehicles have been ambushed
along the main supply road north through the Salang Pass to the Soviet Union,
and some of these attacks have taken place less than 12 miles from the capital.
Diplomats said that Kab ul itself has recently been shaken by several heavy
explosions. "We have not been ab le to determine the cau~c of these," a source
said, but the timing--for inst3nce on Friday (the Muslim holiday) after dark--
- fits oddly with the official explanation of rock b lasting for road construc-
tion."
COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers Limited [1981J
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LIBYA
BRIEFS
'ITALIAN TERRORISTS' IN DESERT CANiPS--Algiars--The chorus of rumors, suspicions and
pointers circulating in Italy on terrorism and its international connections is aug-
mented dramatically today with information gathered in Algiers. Very authoritative
Algerian circles have apparently discovered that Italian terrorists are being trained
in three paramilitary camps in the Libyan desert. Basques from Basque Homeland
and Freedom and West Germans are apparently keeping our fellow countrymen company
there. Ac~ording to the Algerians, the discovery was made by the bedouins who, as
we know, know no frontiers in their wandaring across the Sahara. A much more
_ realistic hypothesis, however, is that the efficient Algerian security services,
which have eyes and ears even in the vastness of the Sahara, are involved. A mes-
sage has apparently already been sent to Rome, as a sign of friendship and solidar-
ity. Relations between Algeria and Italy are good and Pertini's visit last year
helped a great deal. [Excerpt] [LD041423 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SEARA in Italian
2 Feb $1 p 1 ]
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PERSIAN GULF AREA
SAUDIS PROPOSE LINK-UP WITH OTHER GULF STATES
LD021255 London THE OBSERVER in English 1 Feb 81 p 7
[Report by Patrick Seale~
[Text] At-Ta'if, Saudi Arabia--In a ma~or development which could change the
political map of Arabia, the Saudi Kingdom and five lesser neighbours are con-
_ siderir~g joining together in a confederation of Gulf states, according to senior
Arab delegates at last week's Islamic au~it.
Under cover of the summit, leader~c from Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab
E~irates , Oman and Saudi Ar~bia held an unpublicised meeting here to discuss their
plans. Their foreign ministers are to meet in Riyadh on 4 February to study con-
stitutional proposals which have already been circulated in great secret.
~ These proposals are understood to go considerably beyond the shared security con-
; cerns which first drew these countries together in the wake of the Iranian revolu-
~ tion and the Gulf war.
What is under discussion is nothing less than a sort of political marriage on the
model of the Malaysian Federation, where the federal head of state is elected in
rotation for a five-year term from among the members.
If iC comes off, such a Gulf confederation, which Saudi Arabia would be bound to
dominate, would greatly boost Saudi power and prestige and be a major blow to the
ambitions of Iraq in the Gulf.
Iraq has been informed of the plan and, in a diplomatic trade-off, is believed to
have reluctantly acquiesced in it in exchange for Saudi and Gulf backing for its
; war agains t I ran .
; This war is a prime reason prompting the Gulf states to move closer together.
; They fear that, even if a ceasefire is arranged soon, the antagonisms aroused
~ between Arab and Persian, and between Sunni and Shia, could take a generaCion to
appease with a constant threat of renewed flare-up. Their greatest desire is not
to be sucked in--a desire ardently shared by their Western fri~nds and oil clients.
But if the Iraq-Iran war. is the spur to the Gulf get-together, it has also pro-
vided Saudi Arabia with the opportunity to make a bid for regional leadership. In
the private words of a senior Saudi prince: 'The war has won us 10 years.'
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By this he meant that Iraq and Iran, the kingdom's two principal rivals, had each
sui'fer~ed such a setback as to give the kingdom its chance.
df all the cou~ lex inter-Arab relations, the Saudi-Iraqi one is now among the
most interesting and ambiguous. Saudi Arabia needed--and still needs--the muscle
of Iraq to roll back the subversive tide of Shia revolution emanating from
Ayatollah Khomeyni in Iran. In other words, Iraq is a necessary buffer between
Saudi Arabia, with its s mall population, and Iran's much larger 36 million whose
revanchiste nationalism has now been so alarmingly aroused.
But, although the Saudis have supported Iraq's war effort, the two countries are
really adversary partners. Ideologically and geopoliticaliy they are at odds,
and, beneath the surface cordiality of relations between Crown Prince Fahd and
President Saddam runs a current of caution and competition.
Last week's summit showed that, for the moment at any rate, Saudi Arabia can have
its cake and eat it. Iraq is doing the dirty work in the muddy plains of Khuzestan,
while Saudi Arabia reaps the political glory of hosting the greatest gathering of
Islamic leaders the modern wor.ld has ev~r seen.
Undoubtedly, the at-Ta' if summtt has done the Saudi image nothing but good.
Brother Arabs were highly impressed uirh the Western efficiency of the arrange-
- ments, the meticul.ous staff work, the fastidious finish of the buildings and
- highways, the smart, alert bearing of the Saudi security forces. But there was
no loss of Bedouin hospitality or Islamic piety. It was as if the kingdom had
- managed that most difficult of exercises--squaring the circie between the best of
East and West.
The picture the Saudis were trying, not unsuccessfully, to puC over was of a
strong, stable regime which had fully recovered from the security hiccup of -
November 1979 when insurgents stormed th e Great Mosque in Mecca.
In hard political xerms, the significant aspect of this summ.it, assembling a
quarter of the world's nations, was that it signalled Saudi determination to play _
a more assertive role in the world. The instrument for this new role is the
- Islamic Conference Organization, founded in 1969 but now for the first time
under Saudi chairmanship.
The aim of Saudi diplomacy is to demonstrate that this M1s1im forum can be the most
effective of all Third World bodies--better. able to shape events than the now
dormant Arab League, the gravely sp13L- non-allgn~nent movement, or the powerless
Organisation for African Unity, Saddam of Zraq, whc is iooking fozward to hosting
the non-aligned conference in Baghdad next year, finds himself upstaged.
United in Is1am and exceedingly we11 funded, the Islami.c Conference is being pushed
by the Saudis as the place where Third World disputes can best be resolved; where
Khomeyni's Shia mischief can best be countered; where the cause of an independent
~ Palestine can best be promoted, and where the encroaching superpowers can best be
kept at arm's length.
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With these ambitions and backed by G~lf money, conference must be judged an
important new player in internatinnal affairs.
Can Saudi Arabia pull it off? It is easentially a cheque-book state, it has an
anachronistic social system, remains heavily dependent on foreigners, and is
unused to pro~ecting its power abroad.
Now it has manoeuvred itself to the centre of two new power groupings--the pro-
p~osed Gulf confederation and the Islamic Conference Organization, whose multiple
agencies range from high finance to sport, from Islamic education to the promo-
tion of trade, and half a dozen other activities besides.
Saudi skills and nerves are going to be stretched iri the years ahead.
COPYRIGHT: The Observer Ltd 1981
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SUDAN
SADIQ AL-MAHDI EXPLAINS POSITION AMONG ANSAR
Khartoum SUDANOW in English Jan 81 p 5
[TextJ In discussing the history of the Ansar since the May Revolution, Sadig
el-Niahdi referred in a recent interview, to tfie close identification between
the Mah di family, th e Da'irat el Mahdi--the Mahdi company--the Ansar and the
Umma Party as reflecting an 'historic phase.' In this light, he asserted that
'the role of the fonner Unmma Party will be inherited by the political organi-
sation that all of us want to form for the nation."
'The Ansar,' he said 'will evolve along lines that will contribute to the -
mode~�z social and religious culture of the country.' He said, too, that
the Da'irat el Mahdi, once restored to its owners, would exist 'in smaller
units for people for their livelihood; and not in the previous form as a kind
of patronising company.'
E1 Mahdi referred to the Mahdi family as a'grouping tied by blood relations--
simple relatives.' In this context, he said, Ahmed el Mahdi, as the eldest
living son of Abdel Rahman el Mahdi, would be viewed as the head of the
Mahdi family.
When asked in a recent interview how political differences between himself
and his uncle had affected the Ansar movement, E1 Mahdi answered: 'Throughout -
the period of this regime, Ahmed has played a different role from mine.' But,
he asserted, their political differences had not impeded the development of
the Ansar.
'There isn't any explicit organisation to say this or that is the leadership,'
co~nented Sadig el Mahdi. 'But, I think,' he continued, 'that it is quite
clear in the minds of the b ulk of the Ansar where they get their political
direction; although there are people among the Ansar who may have a different
attitude,
'I am saying,' he stressed, 'that throughout the whole period, there has
been no confusion about where decisions were made and who made them.'
COPYRIGHT: All righ ts reserved, Sudanow 1981
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SUDAN
RECONCILIATION IN SSU ~HOWS PROGRESS
Khartoum S UDANOW in &iglish Feb 81 pp 15-16
[Text]
The National �Reconciliation was ugreed strongest opposition forces, has bcen
upon in 1977. Since that time, jvrmer busy building an organisational hierarchy
vpposition groups have slo~oly begun to into the Ansar since his return to Sudan
merge with the SSU, ajte~ al! a~reed thot in 1977. Such organisation had previously
it w~ould remain the aole polrtical instr- boen absent, and has ~ven the Msar the
tution. chance to tackle the ongoing dispute re-
Observers have bee?i uw~riting hot ~rding the leadership of the movement.
dcl~ates, heated conflict or, in tire Iri a recent inierview, Sadig el Mahdi
extreme, ths collapse of the recon- made it quite clear that the dispute had
ci(iafion p~ocess Jt seems, hvwever, that been ::ettled, and settled in his favour
tirey will be sorely di,sappoin~ed, as with tPrintout,Jan $1).
the arrival of the nex+ ycu~ the oppo.ring President Nimeiri's recent book, .'Why -
polrtical jactions continie lo ~econcrle the Islamic Metirod ; in praising Sadig,
their drjferences Azhari Abdel ~ahman seems a]so to have Iocked the door on
repvrts: Sadig's opponent and uncle, Ahmed el
Mahdi, who, thrnughout the days of
~LTHOUG~4 observers expected Sadig's opposition to the rc~ime, played
major conflici in the late s~;venties, the card of allia~?ce with the regime.
it would appear that the political climate Notable is that although Sadig agreed
in Sudan has cooled considerably since that the SSU would be the sole political
ihe National Reconciliation in ] 9~7. o~gani;ation, he has kept himself and his
_ The cssential point to which all parties ibllowers well outside the boundaries of
to the reconciliation agreed, according to any political activity. He has also staied
Dr Ismail Haj Musa, Minister of Culturc that he rnm~~n~ i~:,i;tent upon the
and lnformation and member uf the Poli- originel nilie points that he submitted to _
ticaJ Bureau, was that the SSU should the government upo:: reconciliation, =
remain the sale political organisation in points that will, in his opinion, serve to
the country. Haj Tdusa considers the re- mak� the SSU more effective, voluntary,
conciliation as a step towards national self�financing and rrnnpetitive and a
unity but not as attempt to change the generally more a~..ountab'e institution.
political line of the SSU. The Musiim Brotherhood has also
The question stilf remains as to whether succeeded in maintaining a following, as -
or noi the leaders of the various opposi- ~ evidenced by its participation in
tion groups are finding it casy to dissolve university pditics, vihere it dominates
iheir organisations and merge their the students' unions. A well�known
elements with the SSU. lt also remains to leader of the 141Bs and editor ofAlAyam,
be seen whether or not this can be done yassin Omer c] Imam,told Srulanow that
without compromising the terms of the he considered a single political organisa- ~
opposition groups or contradicting the tion the best system for Sudan because it
principles of the SSU. negates conflict and enhances partici-
Sadig el Mahdi, leader of one of the pation and dialogue without ideological
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' commit.nent. Ht went on to add that $rothers were able to increase their
there are no Muslim Brothers in the SSU, numbers in the Assembly, and those ~
and that any participation on their part is sympathising with the Mlis hope that
of an Islamic rather than political nature. they wiIl use their strengfh to press for
The Pinal outcome of the National Re� the passage of tha I~lamic laws prepared -
conciliation is one that will be deter- by the Iaws Rovision Committee.
mined by history. What is now evident is Sadig el Mahdi, however, boycotted the
that secondary conflicts are being tackled elections because he contended that the
in ~ngoing debates on the efficiency and National Assembly is without the powers
democratisation within the SSU. that it needs to make ii capable of
7'he ineff iciency of the SSU has lotig properly handling iis furction as the legis-
been the object of criticism by opposition lative body of the country. Many obser-
_ groups, who have claimed that the SSU vers have concluded that Sadig's expected
has failed to reach the masses. Dr Ismail mOVe towards the re ' e and the
Haj Musa, however claims that there is ~
no criterion by which efficiency or in� appointmeut of Abdel Ma~d as Secntary
efficiency can be determined, and General of the SSU are indications that
pledged that efficiency will be gained the Assembly will eventually be dissolved.
through ex~+eriance. Sadig ei Mahdi This view seems further corroborated by
believes that the democratisation of the tlie institution of regional assemblies.
SSU must be achieved from bottom to Observers have also been awaiting a hot
top, and that the bases of the organisa- debate when the Islamic Laws are tabled
tiun should elect the leadership, to which in the Assembly. However, the work of
fiaj Musa agrees. The Muslim Brothers do the Laws Revision Committee has been
not seem to concern themselves with the frozen due to some dispute over the tech-
issue of elections, but tend to criticise the ' nical aspects of some of the laws.
popular organisations of the SSU as the 7~e rhyth-n of Islamisatian has in fact
cause for inefficiency. According to the been sJowed. I~ws already drafted have
MBs, anti-Muslim Brother elements and not yet been tabled. 'Ihe presidency of
old cadres of the regime are dominating the committee has been taken from the
the Sudan Youth Union and the Sudan Mu~1im Brothers and ~hei.r sympathisers.
Women's Union, and have effectively '1'here have been other obstacles to the
quashed the influence in decision-making reconciliation, which Dr lsmail Haj Musa
of the parties to the reconciliation, vie~vs as a process ~f a large number of
Indeed, the social base of the SSU has p~op~e working together under the um-
widened since ihe National Reconcilia- brella of natio~?al unity. Yassin Omer el
tion and a degree of political stability has Imam argues that the idea of national
been achieved. The return of two unity lacks the Islamic depth essential
oppos~ng elements from abroad, Abdel to lending unity, and hence reconcilia-
Magid Abu Hasabu and Hussein Osman tion, its true meaning.
Mansour, indicates that the older powers ~e current plan of regionalisation,
in Sudanese politics are slowly coming to adoptei] late last year, has also proven a
realise that not so many differences exist bone oi contention among former
between the regime and the former opposition e]ements. One MP to]d
opposition, and that dialogue may help ~danow that the regional government
in achieving the incorporation of the legjslation could have been passed under
opposition into the regime and the SSU. Article 6 of the Permanent Constitution,
Sadig el Mahdi, in a recent interview, which provides for Sudan~ administra-
assessed General Abdel Magid Hamid tion within a decentralised system.
Khalil's potential in the latters recent pthers, the M& among them, insisted
' appoir.tment as S~cretary General of the that regulations for regional government
SSU: `(1 see his role as) one ot objectively be embodied in the constitution, and this
assessing the perfonnance of thc SSU, is what eventually transpired.
and that should help to narrow the gep The process of regional governmeni
between those of us who, we believe, creates its own ~problems not the least
have made such an ass~ssment and those because its opens to criticism and com-
who, we believe, have refused to do so.' petition positions and polices which have `
T't~e role of the People's Assembly has hitherto been closed off. Following
- been a subject of minor debate compared demonstrations last month in EI Fasher,
to the role of the SSU, In elections at the the capital of Darfur region, the Regional
begjnning of last year, the Muslim Governor, E1 Tayeb el Mardi, resigned
1Q
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arid was replaced by Ahmed Ibrahim
Dreig.
Meanwhile, each of the opposition
groups is struggling to promote their own
mode of Isla~n as the proper one for the
angoing 'Islamisation' of Sudan, The
President's book is without conclusion to
the debate of which method of Islam is
to be followed and how.
Dr lsmail Haj Musa is of the opinion
that we should Islamise the society before ,
the state. Sadig el Mahdi, in a recent un-
published interview, stated that he is
currently seelcing to create a national .
Islamic platform comprising all Lslamic
- movements, regardtess of political line or
religious sect, Under the present
conditions, however, it seems doubtful
- that such a platform will emerge in the _
nearfuture.
Although the issues at stake are major,
and the debatas continue, none of the
parties to the reconc~7iation has ban
forced to rstreat or to make major
concessions. Slowly, ii seerns, a political ~
- alliana may, in fact, emerge.
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981
CSO: 4820
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SUDAN
INFORMATION MINISTER ADDRESSES CURRENT ISSUES
Khartoum SUDANOW in English Feb 81 pp 18-19
[Interview with Dr Ismail Haj Musa, minisCer of culture and information; date and
place not given]
[Text]
Dr /smvi! Haj Musa, Minister of Culture /t /ooks, however, as if rhe conirary
and lnjormation, recently sat down is the case.
with members of Sudanow's stujf to A: No, We should see with whom the
discuss severvl topies of contenrporory reconc~7iation was made; it was made
concern: the resulrs of the P~esident's with various groups, some of whose
reconciliation initiative; relations wit~ disagreements with the regime had
~ the Muslim Brothers; the President's reached the level of armed conflict. So
recently published book, which high- we shouldn't expecf the reconciliation
lights the Islamic method; and the to end these differences overnight, and
s~a~e of progress of the Islamisation of we canK expect the returnees to remain
Laws Committee. Exnacts from this dis- silent. On the contrary we feel that they
cussion appear below should contrbute their opinion; so it is
~ natural that at the beginning there were
SUDANOW: Whai were ihe effects of some different views expressed and this
reconci/iaiion on the genera/ po/i[ica/ ]ed people to wonder about a change in
line of ~he SSU7 political direction, Those who worked
DR ISI4IAI L: Of course, political change inside through the last ten years
was not the aim of the reconc~7iation. disagreed a lot with each other, but
On the contrary, the reconc~7iati4n was through dialogue they reached a similar
- rrudc in keroina. with the line of the tune; so it is to be expected that the
SSU policy, which calls for and concen- views of the newcomers should be
' trates on national unity. The Addis different. I think that with the process
Ababa Agreement in 1972, which gave -
the South its regional autonomy, was a of the reconcfliation and time the
, step towards national unity and in tum opinions of people wiD be unifted, and
' it gave a forward push to national they will reach the best through
politics by fostering stability in the dialogue and debate,
South and increasing Southem partici- p; Do you think rhat rhe SSU was more
- I pation in the political system. Similarly e~lecrive befor+e or after the reconci/ia-
I think reconciliation was anoth~r step tionl
' towards national unity, which wui ~r� q; ~e~ is an essential fact when we
' another push and achieve more stability .
Hopefully this will contr~ute to a speak about the efficiency ot' the
political orpanisation: this is the topic
, better atmosphere for economic of discussion now instead of the rulin
development, which is our essential + S
role of the SSU. With experience and
~ priority, daily efforts and with the admission of
12
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new elements to leading or base declaration on 25th af MaY, 1969,
positions we have a new efi~ciency. which rejected the parties, sects, and
However, I think it is certain that the trbalism, because they are d~fferentiat-
SSU is not on the 1eve1 which we hape ing factors against national unity. A
for, and this }ia5 its objective and his� look at the SSU will show that it now
torical reasons. comprises those elements which had .
been against each other fae a long
S~,~ch asT period, They sit together now and
p: I think that any political organisa- discuss with each other. It is the result
tion which through its struggle has of the rejection of parties and it is
created a revolution will be a very effec- evidence that every day national unity
tive organisation,because the struggle to will be consolidated. I ctonK think that
change conditions which hamper the there will come a day when we can say
- revolution will strengthen it and its that we have achieved national unity,
cadres will be really strong. To the because national unity is the largest
contrary, any organisation which is ntunber of inen working together and _
created by a regime will be ineffective, ~e ~~gest number of efforts made to-
simply because as the organisation of gether, and this can't ever be achieved
the regime the recruitment of its completely. The broad line on which we
members will not be without all a(~ree now are that: (a) the first
opportunist aims. I say frankly that priority should be given to develop-
there are SSU membsrs who came not ment (b) that this development should
to give but to take, and this is a cause of be along a non-capitalist path (c) the
complaint on different levels. We give importance of the Islamic method in
all people the chance of inembership, our poliiical cultural life. (d) foreign
and throup~ exp~erience we will dis- policy should not be tied to any ally,
cover the opporturust elements. There is and should evaluate the problems
one important new and useful step in objectively for our national benefit and
the SSU, which will lead it to more for the benefit of the Afro-Arab world,
- e.{f9ciency whether before or after the Q; yyhai happened so far in the l~ami-
reconc~7.iation: the S5~ is moving
towards more elections, which is an sation of Laws CommitteeT looks es if
important part of the efficiency of the it has slowed down.
SSU democracy. Let us take the ~olit� A: No. It is not an easy task, because to
bureau. The first two politbureaus after review we have to study all existing laws
the establishment of the SSU were and decide which of them don't
absolutety nominated by the President; conform to the sh~ia. The committee,
the next one was half nominated, half since its inc~ption, was directed by the
elected; in the next the President President to work with conscientious
brought a list of more than thirty from care. I think the committee is going as
which he rieeded more than twenty. The planned. We know that the fourth
existing 20 member politbureau was People's Assembly has to debate laws in
elected by about 100 people. So a day the coming days. Sorne of these
will come where the politbureau will be revisions have already been discussed
elected d'uecdy from the central com� in the newspapers, for example the Bi11
mittee, and this is definitely a step ofPublic?.!�~~s.
towards more efficiency.
0; There have been days when [here
Q: You said that naiional ~econciliation was con~mniation between ihe old SSU
is a step towards narinna! unity, can we cadres and the Muslim Broihers. Whai
conclude that you view nationa/ unity was the MBs aim ar~d whai do [hey hope
as a po/itical unityl t.~r /iom ihe Presideni's book7
A� No, what I said about the efficiency A: In fact I have not been confronting
of ihe SSU can be said about national the MBs. I understand the reconcilia-
unity. National unity is not an aim for tion: that this country can`t develop
- which we can set. It is a tune w}uch we unless the means of political activity is
will continue te. play - reconciliation, unified and this means a unified
the Addis Agreement and the efforts pulitical or~nisation. Sadig El Mahdi,
we made an transportation and commu� for example, when he returned agreed
nication ace aU steps towards national upon a unified political org~n, indeed
unity. 1 have said that the first step t?e has been calling For such a thing since
towards national unity was the first the days of the multi-party system. Dr
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liassan E! Turabi in aii intervie~~ w~ith I:T initiativc he put it openly to all who
Ayvm also agreed with us. All those upposed ihe regime - not necessarily to
who came with the reconciliati~~n agreed ~hose who are abroad, there are some
on this point. So whoever works with people inside who didn~t oppose the
the regime, I don't deal with him as regime to the extent of anned conflict
representing a certain faction, because or even speakingagainst it, but who just
all of them are within the sole political kcpl tl~emselves in the sltadow - and
org~nisation, and if they have different tlie invitation still stends. So 1 can
opinions they express them within the see that the responses will likely
organisation, continue.
Concerning the Islamic method Q~ Do you think thai therP is an over-
referred to in the Presidert's book and P~aying of the tune ihat all things
the Constitutional Laws Revision staried wiih the SSU and it will end ,
CommiUee, it may be shown that 1 with ii - a tune which was higihly
disagreed with somc people on this P~ayed aft~r the aborted communist
subject. Indeed in my speech at the end coup d etat.
of the Third Cultural Festival 1 said that A: Yau seem to be saying that after the
th~ lslamic; society v~hich we are coup a concentration was made on the
looking for should be built throu~l~ SSU. lt is true that the CSU was estab-
preaching and not enfor,:ement. Wfien lished after the cuup d'etat, but the
we say that we want to apply (slam, planning for it began earlier. Indeed one
that means to get it back to its glory of tlie reasons for the divorce between
and great days. This can't be done the regime and the cummunists was.
except by a method waich preaches prccisely the SSU because the
� communists had been calling for the
. and doesn't enforce. This is a hurden to establislunent of front, so as to keep
be carried by the mass media, educati~in their oart~. Tl~ey went back to the
institutes, and the family. There ~re experienre in Egypt - from their own
some people who are dogmatic in their point of view - where the communists
opinicin of Islam. I remember thal at the decided to dissolve their party and fuse
dialogiie in /~7 ~ vam, attended by Saelig in the ESU. T7iey thou~,ht that was a
E1 (vlahdi and Yassin Omer el lmam, we mistake; so to preserve their party with .
ccmcentrated on 1'i~htinR the all its or~tnisational and ideological
dognatism, becauseit may bring neg,~tive foundations they called for a front as an
results. This may be the difference umbrella under wluch all parties will
between me and some ~co~le which work. '1'he regime had been thinking thc
:nay be su.nmarised as foll~ws: opposite: that the essential priority is
That it is not a dialoguc between ~iic or developinent, which can't be achieved
any group and another group, but it is a within a front because the conflict
dialogue within tlie unified organisation will continue, After the October revo-
on c>ne of the controversial issues. lution in ]9C4, two fronts were
cxperienced. ih~ Front of Professional
Abdel Magid Abu Hassabu and ~)rgenisations - wiiich e:omprised the
Hussein Osman Mansur returned to the Nrofcssional and trade uni~~ist organisa-
country lasr December. Do you think tions - and the 1Jational Front, which
it was just a reacrron to /amily pressure, con:prised the political parties. Both
or are there poliiical reasons? proved a failure. I think that those wlio
A: I have no idea, I didn't meet them, I played this tune were the communists.
ltave just read about it on one of the 1969 may be a turn in a long road, and
newspapers. But 1 can imagine that tl~ey 1 tliink thal not only in politics but also
disagreed with the opposition with in the cultural and scx;iological fields,
which they l~ad been working, People May benefited what c:ame before.
tend to say that there is an initiative Before the revolution there were good
, from Sherif E1 fiindi, and forget that and e~;ii things, end tl~e revolution
when the Presidcnt decided to take this benefited from the good.
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981
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SUDAN
HEAD OF SOUTHERN INDUSTRY MINISTRY INTERVTEWED
Khartoum SUDANOW in English Jan 81 pp 18-19
[Interview with Bona Malwal, head of S~~uthern Region's Ministry of Industry,
by Jacob Akol--date and place not given]
[Text]
Fvrmer Minister of Culture and lnfor Q; The siting of the refinery af Kosii is
matron, and a longstanding member ~f thoughr by many Southerners to be
the ~�olitical Bureau, Bona M~:wal is unfai~ ro the Region. ~l:yai do you
now head of the South~;n Region's~ think?
newly-independent Ministry oj A: Since most of the oil which will
Industry. Jacvb Ako! was first to i~rter- eventually reach Kosti will most pro-
view him rn this new post: bably come from the South, one can
understand why Southerners complain. -
SUDANOW: 'Too soon ro say' has Other regions would also complain.
a/ways been the phrase emp/oyed by yowever, there are certain sound
Souihern poliricians who wish ro avoid economic reasons for placing the
speaking publicly about oi/ dis~coveries refinery at Kosti: railway and river tranj ~
in the South - a matter c%se to the sport does not pose a problem there, for
hearts of many Southerners. But is it example. And there are other reasons:
really too soon to say? oil by-products can be better utilised
and manufactured at Kosti than at
BONA MALWAL: tt all depends what Mugiad or Bentiu, the suggested more
we mean when wE talk about oil. If we Southern-placed alte~natives.
are talking about the fact that we have a Perhaps people feel the way they do
natural resource which will hopefully be because there ha~ h^en ~ery little in-
found in enough quantities to give some formation coming out of those state
optimism and hope for the future of institutions responsible for oil industry
Sudan, then there should be no reason decisions. I think it would have been a
to shy away from it. good idea if these bodies had enligh-
tened the public on the rAasons behind
Q: Have you any information as ro how the choice of Kosti, before the Pre-
much oi/ rhere rea!/y isl sident's announcement.
A: I think there are enough reasonable
findings to encourage us to start Bui how informed is the Regiona/
building a refinery; thP refinery which Government on rhese matters?
the President has announced will be
built at Kosti. Figures quoted by people A: The Regional Government has access
perhaps more informed than myself to at least the same information I am
range from anything between 40,000 sharing with you. But if they are not
and 50,000 barrels a day. sufficiently informed they only have
themseives to blame... if they want
information they should go out and get
it.
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Q: What role does the Regional Govern- A: We have ~o revive stagnant agro-
meni play in dec,'sions such as ihe industries such as the one in Nzara,
/ocation of the refinery, administration canning and brewing factories like those
and so on? in Wau, Kenaf and Tonj, the Melut
sugar refinery, Mongala textile and sugar
A: As regards the location of the factories.
refinery, that decision was taken by the We have already achieved some
Head of State; and so, as a Regional measure of success. We now have funds
Government, there was no room for for both the canning factory and the
us to make our own decision. r1s far as I brewery in Wau. A team from the Arab
see it, as regards admir~istration, there Fund have promised, during their visit
is simply nuthing to administ~r at the to the 5outh in September, to assist us
momrnt. In January last year, the with the development projects planned
President de:,reed that administrative for Melut and Tonj.
problems arising between prospecting Hydru-electric power is an irnportant _
factor in any industrial development of
companies and the government will be ~e ~uth, and we have commissioned
_ dealt with in future by the Energy ~ Italian company to wriie a study on
Department of the region concerned, in potential sources of electric power
co-ocdination with central government. throughout the Region. The repe~rt -
But really, we are still at a formative should appear in the next few munths.
stage and i feel that it is part of my re- We are still pressing ahead wi'h the
sponsibility at the moment to try and Kapoeta cement project.
create this kind of co-ordination with
the central government. , Q: Did you bring back any money ~-rith
you from your last tour of Arab staiP~T
Q: The wells in the South'em Region A: I came back very optimistic re�
are named 'Unity One, Unity Two' and sponses from the Gulf were very r:o-
so on, while ihose nonh of ihe Region mising. We have just formalised a pro-
are given the names of rheh /ocality, gramme of health, educational and
This obvious/y has po/iiica/ overtones, social services aid, costing some $l60
Sourherners camplain. So, who is re- million, to be completed over the next
sponsrble for naming the w+e//s, and why two to three years. The United Arab
were they so namedl Emirates and Kuwait were particularly
A: The first `Unity' well was so-named, generous. Our social services should
I believe, by Abel Aliei himself; start to feel the effect of the agreement
naturally enough, I think, given our over the next few months.
attachment to unity throughout the
country. It then followed that `Unity' Q: How important do you think it is
became a catch-word... 1 think that thar rhe South is now able to go and
`Unity' is just as good a name as p/~ad its case to the ourside world?
`Bentiu'; if you like, take it that 'Unity' A: After nine years of peace in ihe
is in the South, and che others are in South, all of ~~s in the Regional Govern-
the north. ment thought it was about time to go
Q: Now for someihing rarher diffe~ent: out and do something about social
what is rhe srate of industry in ihe services and industrial development pro-
South at the moment? jects in the Region. We realised we
A: There are no industries in the South. could nut accomplish much simply with
Before independence there was no the resources of Sudan, so we are grate-
_ industry there, and then [oUowed the fut that the President of the Republic
civil war... some industria] development was able to allow us to seek out our
has taken place in the north. brothers and friends in the Arab world,
But we hope to move from a situa- whose means are far greater thar. our -
tion of stagnation to one of activity. own, and present our case to taem. : ~
' Q: As mrnister of an industry thai does think this is an important turning-point
nor exisr, where do you begin? in the history of development in the
South.
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Q: /r is now eighi years srnce rhe Addis Q: ln rhe recenr debate on the Re-
Ababa Agreemenr, yei parts of rhe gionalisarion BiII in rhe Nationa! As-
�South are stil! administered from rhe embly, a map which the Souihem
North. Why is it taking so long ro bring Region members of ihe Assembly claim
ihese areas under ihe Southern Region's was incorrectly marked and wirich, they
AdministraiionT clarm, took land away from the Souih
A: I would like to hope that the de)ay end gave to the Norih, was attached to a
in bringing those areas under the bil/ with the intention of legali~ing the
- South's administrative umbrella is r~ot boundaries without ihe backing of ihe
caused by any one person being c.if- Southern Region members. Whar is your
ficult. It would be un~ierstandable if the reacrron to rhis?
- reason for this detay was caused by the A: I think all this should not have
Regianal Governmen!'s being bogged happened. It was indeed untortunate
down with administrative ~roblems - that this took place at a[ime when the
indeed, if you had witnessed the pro� emphasis was on the Regional Guvern-
blems the Southern Administration has ment Act, which came before the As-
had to tackle over the last eight years, I sembly as a unifying factor rather than
am sure you would feel you had enough a dividing one.
problems on your hands without adding It must be said honestly that the
a few more square miles to them. [ leadership of the Assembly was insensi-
believe the delay is jusi another admini- tive to the issue of the borders on the '
strative bottleneck, for the law is very map, and I think that particularly the
clear on this issue of administrative Attorney General, the Speaker, the
jurisdiction. Chairman of the Legal Ai'fairs Com-
mittee - and indeed the whole As-
Q: Bur ;s not the land under dispute sembly - should have been much more
more than jusf a few square miles' - sensitive to the issue.
indeed, does it nor conrarn the copper- 1 do not think rhis matter should be
ricl~ Kafia-Kingi disrricr.? settled by sheer weight of numbers
A: Agairi, l feel it is very easy to over� W?thin the Assembly. However, this is
play this business ut minerals. Tf~e a11 behind us now es the President -
who keeps watch over these sensitive
matter of the minerals is not relevant to areas - followed the dehate and was
the question; we do not claim admini- very concerned by the w~y in which the
strative rights to a place simpiy because issue divided the Assembly, on an issue
it contains minerals. By law, the central where no division had been expected.
government has the right to develop any ~ party to the legislature in the
mineral deposits it discovers jointly wi[h country, the President will make sure
the region concerned. The rest uf the that this matter is corrected, and I have
country }~as to benefit From those no doubt in my mind that he will solve
_ minerals if they are found in any exploi- the problem.
table quantity.
No, the borders were there before we
knew there was any copper in Katia-
Kingi, just as Bentiu was in the Suuth
before we knew tliere was any oil
beneath it. We will administer those
areas on basic political, not economic
- considerations. 1 think it would be
wrong of us to su~gest that economic
benefits shuuld come to us in the South
ro the exclusion of any other part of the
country.
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SUDAN
JAPANESE MAKF. LARGF CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMY
Khartoum SUDANOW in En~lish Jan 81 pp 27-28
[Text]
Sudan's relations with the nations of'Asia understanding uf the philosophy behind
are oJ' fairly recent origin. Although still develupment aid and the need for
in their injancy, coope~ative endeavours concrete measures to attack the problem
are becoming more extensive. Since the lying at the very core uf the Nurth�Suuth
Ramadan War of 1973 Japan, in parti� question,' observed ~tr Hidehiro Yoshu,
cular, has played an increasingiy Third Secretary of Japan's embassy here
empvrtant rvle in assisting Sudan's in Khartoum.
development efforts Nagi Saliem Boulis (t is this understanding that underlies
reports be%w: the hisrory of Japanese ,economic
~ assistance [o Sudan. ~Ir Ashaqar Abdalla
T HE JAPANESE government has Matur, an Economic Assistant at the
recently donated a grant-aid of : Japanese embassy in Kl~artoum,
800m Yen (about $4m) to assist Sudan's commenred upon Japan's grant~aids to
efforts to increase domestic food produc~ Sudan: 'The Japanese guvernment realises
tion. Notes to this effect were exchanged that a devetoping country such as Sudan
last November between H.E. Mr Fumio is more in need of ~rant�aids than of loans
Hirano, Japan's ambassador to Sudan, (See Business, December). Japan's grant-
and 4Ir Hashim Osman Ahmed, under- aid to Sudan is in accordance with the
secretary of Sudan's M~nistry of Forei~ United Nations resolution calling upon
Affairs. `The grant will be used for the the developed industrial nations of the
purchase of products and services,' Northern hemisphere to allocate 0.7
Sucianvw was informed. Fertilisers, agri� per cent of their gross national products
cultural chemicals and agricultural as official aid to the Third World.'
machinery will be purchased, as will the lapanese grants to Sudan started in
services required to transport them. September 1976, when 154m Yen (about
This is but the latest in a series of 50.Sm) was donated for purchases of
cooperative efforts between Japan and agriculcural machinPry. In August 1977 a
Sudan, and reflects Japan's deepening SOOm Yen (S 1.9m) grant was given to the
commitment to Third World develop- government for the establishment of an
~ ment. `The prolonged st~gnation of the experimental farm fur rice cultivation in
world economy tnggered by the 1973 the Gasaba area. A year later 300m Yen
oil crisis brought about increasing recog- ~~,lm) was rant~d to the Sudanese
nition in Japan that the world has never ( g
before been so interdependent. This govemment as emergency relief aid for
recognition has been accumpanied, the purchase of food, medicine, tents,
~amongst other things, by the awareness and clothes. In October 1978, under the
that both the North and the South (the Nutrition Improvement Project, 400m
developed and the developing nations) Yen (~?.'lm) was granted to the govern-
should be developed in harmony. [t has ment for the purchase of powdered milk
also become widely accepted that the and canned fish. 'Cwo months later pur-
developed nations should take concerted chases of agricultural machinery, ferti-
actiun tu help eradicate poverty in the lisers, and insecticides were made possible
developinR countries. As a result, the
Japanese public has deepened its '
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by a Japanese grant uf another 400m great natural potential. So ~ieveloping
Yen. in July 197~ I'urtlier Ib Yen the human resources hand in hand with
(S4.6ri) was given to the Gasaba rice the natural resources will enhance the
cultivation project, Then, in December of process of development in Sudan.'
that year, another ;rant of SOOm Yen was psked about the volumc ~~f trade
used for the purchase uf more fertiliser between Sudan and Japan as ~n indicator
and insecticides. A month later the uf their mutual ecunomic relations, titr
Fishery Development Project received Matur replied that he would not consider
a sum of ZOOm Yen, while in September this as a usetul criterion of the coopera-
of last year the Blue Nile Health Pruje~t tion between ~he two countries, `Most of
was ;ranted 400m Yen. the trading between Sudan and Japan is
In addition tu grantaids, the govem- done indirectly. Many Sudanese abroad
ment of Sudan has so far received two transfer their eaming~ home in the form
lung�term Yen loans. The ti:st loan was of Japanese products such as motor
concluded in May 1976, wherein Japan vehicles, television sets, cassette
extended 3b Yen (about S10.1m) for recorders, and radios.' (According to the
road constructiun between Nyala and Bank of Sudan, 7.8% of Sudan's total
Zalingei. T'his loan was tu be repaid over exports for 1978/79 went to Japan wt?ile
30 years with a 10 years grace period 8�'0 of that year's imports came from
and an interest rate of three per cent per Japan. In 1979/80 Sudan exported goods
annum. The second loan was extended in ~+alued at �s16.5m to Japan and imported
December 1977 (Sb Yen, ~?3m) ~or the Japanese goods valued at �s31.1m).
purchase of spare parts and eyuipment WI?at are the obstacles to direct trade
for the Rural Water Corporatiun and between the two countries? According to
bears similar terms of repayment. Mr Matur there are two. `The first has to
'The gos-ernment of Sudar~.' noted Mr do with the congestion at Port Sudan
Y~shii, 'has ~tsked Japan to extend a third harbour. Japanese businessmen are
loan, which is to be used to improve unvrilling to ship their goods to Sudan
Sud~n's telecommunications and because unloading operations there
transportation networks.' Although the usually talce IS-20 days. Secondly,
amount of the loan has not yet been Sudanese merchants are inexperienced in
specified, 1~1r Yoshii predicts that it will dealing with the Japanese market.'
be in the neiehbourhuod of Sb Yen. The future of JapaneseSudanese
In addition to ;rant-aids and Yen loang cooperation, however, lies in a field other
the Japanese gcvernment, tiirough th~ ~~n grants or direct trade, The nature of
Japanese (ntemational Cooperacion JapaneseSudanese cooperation in the
Agency, has extended scholarships to n~r future will take the form of joint-
sume 300 Sudanese for training in various venture projects,' assured Mr Yoshii.
6elds, including agriculture, engineering, `Although Japan has only a few joint-
_ telecummunicatians, medicine, computer venture projects in Sudan at the moment,
- science, electronics, the te~:tIle industry, several Japanese companies have lia.ison
offices in Khartoum searching for such -
construction, tourism, port and harbour opportunities.' Tn date Japan is involved
design and econumic development
s~udies. with thre~ ~oint-venture projects: the
�Japan is paying much at[ention to Sudanese Sheet Metal Producing Mill,
technic~l cuoperation with Sudan', nuted ~artoum Spinning and Weaving Co� and
Mr A, A. Matur. Thanks to this cuupera- Kenana Sugar Eactory. The six companies
tion a group of Sudanese technicians will ~th liaison offices in Khartoum are:
- be available in the near future to assist ~~tsubishi, Mitcui, i,anematsu, Gesho,
the process of econom~c development in Marubeni, Nissho Iwai and Tomen Co.
Sudan.' Mr Yos}~u drew attention to the Mr Matur briefly outlined the major
f~et that the Japanese 'economic miracle' problems identified by ]apanese firms as
could nut have been ~~hieved f~ad not regards the Sudanese market: poor infra-
Japan cunverted its human resources into structure, the shortage of loc;al raw
a highly skilled and disciplined labcwr materials for the construction trade, the
force. `Uniike Japan, which has no outflow of sldlled Sudanese to the Gulf
nutural resources. Sudan is endowed with re~on, difficulties in the transfer of
forei~ eacchange, and, most importantly,
the failure of the People's Assembly to
enact the New Investment Act.
CUPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981
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SUDAN -
OIL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT REASSESSED
Khartoum SUDANOW in English Jan 81 pp 31, 33-34
[Text]
A national conference is to be held in be allowed to bid for all or part of the ~
Khartoum in March to discuss how best project, the total cost of which is
to use Sudan's energy resources. The estimated at $200 miilion.
attenNon currently focused on oil as Chevron's involvement in the financing
' the potentia! salvation of the economy does not mean that they wiil be given any
needs to be reconsidered in the light preference when tender bids are open~d,
of escalating domestic consumption and said Ministry officials last month.
the spread of ~oad-haulage and its att- However, Chevron is one of a number af
endant fuel demands, while opinion companies who `have expressed an
has been divided on the siting of the interest' in ~building the project. Clearly,
country's second oi! refinery. ?effery Chevron, or one of its subsidiaries, must
, Philfips reports: have a good chance of winning the con-
tract.
; ~NERGY MINISTER Dr Sherif el Senior ministry officials are optimistic
Tuhami confirmed last month that that construction might begin within six
' Sudan,s second oil refinery is to be built months and the whole project completed
; at Kosti. In the fust stage, using crude oil after a further two years. Dr Sherif el
from the Unity field in Upper Nile Tuhami said that an effect upon the
province, the refinery wil! have a capacity balance of payments was likely to be felt
of some 10,000 bazrels per day - about raised to 25,000 bpd - the size of the
one-third of the country's current level of refinery at Port Sudan - depending upon
demand. The refinery will be linked to the extent of the oil reserve revealed by -
Unity by a 550-kilometre, ten-inch pipe- further exploration. With the rate of
line. demand for refined products increasing
The Unity wells have been the most by about ten per cent per annum, Sudan
, productive of the `wildcat' wells sunk so will be refining about 30 per cent of its
far by the Chevron Oil Company in its daily requireenents by late 1983. There
500,000 sq. kilometre concession in are no plans at present to build a crude
; southwestern Sudan. Unity Five has been oil pipeline to Port Sudan, which will
i reported as producing 3,200 bpd. Hydro- continue to receive foreign crude.
carbon shows have been found at Unity Consumption patterns are difficult to
i Six, but no public statement as to the forecast accurately. Even s.~, by the end
' flow rate has yet been made. of the 1980s, a refining capacity of even
; Following the feasibility study for the 50,000 bpd - Kosti plus Port Sudan -
proposed refinery and pipeline carried wili be woefully inadequate, providing
out by Chevron, detailed designs are perhaps only two-thirds of demand.
likely to be completed within the next Even this figure may be an overestimate if
' three months, after which tenders will be the expected boom in road haulage,
called for. Although the Ministry of following the opening of the Port Sudan
Energy and Mining regards refinery and to Khartoum highway and the road
pipeline as one project, tenderers will system linked to it, takes off.
20
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The Ministry of National Planning - were opened at Jebel Aulia at the end of
having virtually ~iven up any hopes of iast month. In addition, the River Tran-
unproving the etficiency levei of Sudan sport Corporation has recently taken
Railways in the short term - are en- delivery ~f four oil barges, with a further
couraging the establishment and ex- two expected later this munth.
- pansion of modern road haulage com- Despit~e strong Southern reservations,
- panies. Indeed by the mid-1980s road there are clear advantages to locating the
haulage is likely to carry more than 50 refinery at Kosti. The area is well served
per cent of all goods transported - by cummunications, being the point -
reversing the domination historually en- where the railway to the west and south
joyed by Sudan Railways. But it seems ~rosses the White Nile; it is also the _
- that the energy ~ost of suca a poticy has northern port for north-south river
not been fully worked out, so that the traffic. And, when the current road�build-
demand for petroleum products is likely ing programme has been implemented,
to increase over the next few years by Kosti will be linked by modern ruads to
= considerably more than the ten per cent the tuwns and areas of productive activity
forecast. in the central region, where the demand
The energy options facing the govern- for petroleum products is greatest.
ment in the last twenty years of the 20th Looking further ahead, there are plans
to build an oil-fired power station ad'a
century - ~vhether to increase re~ning ~ "
capacity; to encourage tlie esploitation of cent to the new retinery to provide elec-
other forms of energy, especially hydro- tricity for the proposed agro-industrial
power; to raise the price of petrol at the schemes in the broad sweep of fertile land
pumps, and so on - are to be discussed at between El Dueim in the north and the
a national energy conference at Khar- Nuba Mountains. `A power statiun thrre
toum's Friendship Hall in March. Al- could revolutionise agriculture in that
though the list of participants is yet to be area,' said the Energy Minister last
drawn up, the ministry. expects a number month.
of distinguished Third World authorities Witl~ fast-declining yields in nearly all
on energy to attend the meeting to work Sudan's major agr~cultural schemes,
out the optimal use of Sudan's indigenous up~n which the national economy is
resources. The conference is being totally dependent - fhe importance of
. planned by the IVational Energy Admini- domestic oil's coming on-stream at this
stration (part of the ~linistry ot' ~nergy time can hardly be over-estimated. The
_ and Mining) which is being supported by saving to the balance of payments an~] the
a~ 1 million grant from USAID to releasing for development investment of
develop an energy policy for Sudan to hard currency export earnings is likely to
the year 2000. be the saving of the economy until such
The choice of Kosti as the site for the time as the decline in a~riculture can be
proposea ~efinery has not been without reversed. Certainly, officials at the Bank
its critics. Last month, there were of Sudan and the Ministry of Energy and
~ protests from some members of the Mining believe that oil has been one of
People's Assembly who represent the major factors in the ease with whicti
Southern constituencies about what they the re-s::.....u?,ng of Sudan's external debt
saw as attempts by the north to deprive has been negotiated.
Of course, from ~he point of view of
the South of investment and jobs that propping up the economy, oil is stil] very
were rightly theirs'. Since most of the oil mucli an unproved asset. To date, Sudan
has been found in the Southern Region, is capable of pro~ ~cine something in the
they said, the rei'inery and any ancillary order of 18,U~0 bpd. But by the end of
projects should be built there. lt was also ;j~~ ~~~ade, the country's demand for
pointed out that locating the refinery in petroleum products is lihely to be in
the Suuth would help overcome some of excess of 60,000 bpd. And last month's
the distcibution bottlenecks that the ppEC meeting in Indonesia could not but
region currently suffers. In an attempt to reinforce expecta~ions that oil prices are
overcome some of the distribution pro- likely to continue upwards.
blems in the South and West, two 572- -
tonne refined products' storage tanks
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Tlie building of the refinery and the
pipeline are significant of the optimism
that now characterises those included in
the explorations. But equally, one is
_ entitled to expect that the govern- _
men+ will use the breathing space it is ~
~ now being offered to get its handling of
the economy into shape.
h'rom this point of view. oil is still
an uril:nown quantity. There is still,
for example, no reason to believe that
Sudan will be capable of producing the
amount of oil that the economy will
require by 1990. Certainly, there is no ~
reason to believe the reports in the
Londun magazine 8 Da}~s that Sudan was
capable c~f producing 100,000 bpd fur a
decade. Last montli, Dr Sherif el Tuhami
denied that he had ever given any reason
for believing in such a figure. He alsu
denied a report in the same map,azine that
Cl~evron Oil Company was considering
pulling out of Sudan unless it could prove
365,000 bpd upon which tu establish an
. oil-export industry.
COPYRIGHT: All righ.ts res~erved,Sudanow 1981
I C S0: 4820
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SUDAN
LABOR SHOKTAGE PLAGUfiS OIL INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 2-8 Jan 81 p 44
[Text] The emigration of manual labor is considered to be the greatest ailment to
afflict the Sudanese economy. While Sudan has a population of 18 million, 80 percent
� of them are illiterate. Meanwhile, the number of workers and employees living
abroad has reached a millio:~ and most of these are employed in work in the Gulf states
and Saudi Arabia.
The drain comprises trained workers beginning with engineers, teachers, journalists,
and ending with drivers, cooks, and continuing to ordinary manual laborers, as in the
fields of construction and the like.
To put a stop to this drain the regime has relied on restricting the freedom to
travel, but it has been unable to prevent the travels of pilgrims wanting to go to
~ the holy land. The pilgrimage is the pretext that is used by workers and laborers
then to justify their leaving the country, but then they do not return.
In fact there is no solution to this prablem in the foreseeable future, especially
since Sudan is a bankrupt country with few job opi.ortunities and no high paying jobs.
Furthermore the often incapable of paying the salaries of its civil servants and ~
employees in some production sectors.
Sudan's foreign debts are estimated at $4 billion. Four foreign banks have begun
negotiations with the government on behalf of some 200 banks in order to put off the
repayment of some of Sudan's deb ts and to make its repayments spread out in install-
ments over the next 7 years.
- Poor planning by the government has only added to Sudan's economic woes. The deve- -
lopmental plans it wanted have co~t 10 times what the,y we~e initially estimaCed to
be. It is possible to ofPer many examples of poor planning, mismanagement, and the
- flight of skilled labor.
- The costs of the Kinanah sugar project had been estimated to come to $125 million
when projer.ted plans were made in 1973. BuC the project's costs to date have run to
a billion dollars, and as of now it produces only a minimal amount of sugar.
Sudan cansumes sugar ravenously and the government has squandered huge sums of money
in sugar price supports. In spit of this there are six other projects to produce ,
sugar at various stages of completion, and yet despite the pressing demand for sugar,
none of them have gone beyond this stage.
[
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The factory to produce tomato juice is another example of poor planning. It was
built in a.n area that produces dates but not tamatoes. Meanwhile a milk processing
, plant was built in an area where no livestock are raised. The g.,vernment has come
~ to realize too late the extent of its planning and economic blunders, It is now in-
' tent in its at~empts to rectify the problems and make these failing projects work.
It is laying a pipeline to transport oil from the refinery at Port Sudan on the coast
to Khartoum in the interior, but it is not working at full capacity. Workers and
contractors on this project have not gotten their wages on schedule.
Amidst the rise in the price of Sudan's oil bill (put at $450 million in 1980) some
optimistic hopes have spread about the discovery of_ oil inside the country. It is
said that within a few years Sudan could be transformed into an oil-producing country
_ and perhaps even an oil-exporter.
There are currently five wells producing oil at a rate of 18,OOU barrels a day, which
is half of Sudan's daily consumption of oil. Mr Muhammad Sharif al-Tuhami, ministar
of Energy and Mining expects that Sudan will beco:-~ Jelf-sufficient in the next 3
years.
However the American oil company, Chevron, and other oil companies that are prospect-
ing for oi~. in Sudan have advised the government to moderate their enthusiasm and
optimism and to make less extravagant promises.
Chevron, the owner of the principal finds, says that there is oil, but that it is ,
difficult to say if it is in commercially exploitable amounts before Chevron can
complete its tests and technical studies that are meant to estimate if what they
have found is of commercial amounts.
The company announced last May that its studies would be completed after the rainy
season. The rainy season is now over in the south and the time is coming when these
hopes will be either dashed or confirmed.
Up till now this company has already spent in its prospecting for oil along the
coast and in the southwestern part of the country nearly $130 million. It now owns
four producing wells. It is said that the oil is a high-grade oil with a low
sulphur content, and that this facilitates its refining.
Sudan has decided to build a refinery plant in the region of the Upper Nile that
, will produce 5000 barrels daily starting in 1982. Meanwhile preparations are under
way to build another refinery, perhaps in Kosti, which could start production in
1986 with an estimated capacity of 50,000 barrels per day.
Currently the refinery in Port Sudan operates at a capacity of 26,000 barrels daily,
although it relies on imported oil, thus disregarding the pipeline coming to Port
Sudan from the newly di.scovered oi1 wells in the southwest.
Out of the confusion of these dilemmas the government has been unable to deliver
' on its promise to increase wages in two stages by 100 percent; a matter that is
threatened by the outbreak of political and labor disturbances considering that the
rate of inflation (price increases) was also 100 percent last year.
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P resident Numeayri has tied wage increases to the discovery and commercial exploita-
tion of oil. It is obvious from this Chat the results of the technical tests on
- Sudan's newly discovered oil are of crucial {mportance; for these results whether
~ negative or positive, will have material and economic--and perhaps even political--
- repercussi~ns.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "AL-WATAN AL-ARABI"
9587
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SUDAN
COI~CENTRATED EFFORTS ATTACK CATTLE DISEASES
Khartoum SUDANOW in English Jan 81 pp 34-35
[Text] ~
A NEW �s'/. million veterinary labora- At present, the new laboratory has 0
tory was ina4~urated last month in the projected annual output of two millio'n
Soutl~ern Reg~onal capital of Juba by doses of CEPP vaccines, though at periods
Abel Alier. Vice-President of the of peak demand batches of 100,000
Republic and President of the Regional doses can be produced within a fortnight.
_ High Executive Council. The ceremony This level of production will provide
was attended by the Regional Minister 40-50% coverage in the region, compared
for Agriculture and Animal Resources, to the present 15-30�Io. The ultimate
Dr Gama Hassan, the Director�General target, which depends upon improved
of the Ministry, Dr David Bassic>uni, and ~ads and transpurt, is for 80-90`~~
tlie llirectur of Veterinary Services, Dr cc~verage.
Aggrey A~uen. `Southern Sudan is an endcmic area for
The conception uf a veterinary vaccines a number of major cattle diseases, and
production laboratory dates from tt~e with an estimated annual herd mortality
inception of regional self-rule. Following rate of 13.5%, disease problems are more
the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord, priority extensive, serious and intractable than in
in regional development was given to the more temperate climates. In the absence
rehabilitation of the agricultural sactor, of sufficient information about the
with emphasis on the development of incidence and severit of various diseases
small-holder farming a.s tne quickest no effective disease control ro ramme
method of raising the standard of living can be mounted. Hence a disease surve
. of the mass of th~: population. The Y .
_ potential for livest~~ck production Wil~ be conducted from within this
obviously required an effective animal laboratory as a prelude to the present and -
health service so as to reduce the future- disease control programme,'
incidenc~ of endemic disease. Therefora, observed Dr Ayuen.
the regional government, with the In this effor', the May laboratory in
assistance of the Federal Republic nf Juba wil) be aided by branches in Wau
Germany, undertook a large-scale vaccina- and Malakal. Simple diagnostic work will
tion rogramme, rimaril aimed at be done at the Wau and Malakal labora-
~ P P Y tories, with the more advanced work
- rinderpest and contagious bovine pleurop� handled by Juba. The Wau laboratory is
neumonia. already operational, directed by the
This effort was timely, but various German Veterinary Team, and the
factors limited its impact. The vast dis- Malakal laboratory will open shortly.
tances between herds, the ' frequently `The May laboratory in Juba will also
'short shelf-life of vaccines {two to three pro:~ide in-service training for local
; weeks for the ~EPP vaccine, for personnel, an exercise which has not yet
example), the already heavy demands on existed in the Southern Region, and it
- the central laboratory in Khartoum and W~l as well act as a centre for new scien-
' su on made a regional vaccine produ~tion tific techr~ology,' continued Dr Ayuen.
_ centre necessary.
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In addi~~on to rinderpest and
contagious bovine pleuropneumonia
other diseases flourish. New lines in �
vaccine production will include haemorr-
hagic septicaemia, black quarter and
anthrax. Wlth the present scope of the
new laboratory, Sudan will continue to
. se~?d samples to Kenya f~,~lly hose
sophisticated problems, esp
in the field of virology. Although Kenya
has been very cooperative in this _
endeavour, it is felt that we should be
- prepared to h3ndle our own problems.
Most of the road still lies ahead and a
degree of determination is needed so that
the impact of scientific work is felt more
effectively at the grass-roots. It is tlte
wish of the government that in the not
too far future there should be similar
veterinary centres in all cattle-populated
provinces.
- prop Madut
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved, Sudanow 1981
CSO: 5400
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i SULTANATE OF OMAN
STRAIT OF HORMUZ COULD BE FIRST SPARK OF WORLD WAR III
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 2 Jan 81 pp 32-34
[Article by Ahmad Hafiz: "The Game of Nations on the Arab Oil Term3.na1"]
[Text] An Omani helicopter took us to the strait on a warm, sunny morning with the
breezes playing. Near me sat an Omani officer as a companion and guide. Then there
were three members of the Omani armed forces, carrying some provisions, mail and
newspapers to the Omani armed forces stationed at the entrance to the strait on the =
~ island of al-Ghunayim, as well as a photographer from the Omani Ministry of Informa-
tion.
The plane made the trip to the strait in 2.5 hours but it had begun to seem to me as
if it were taking 10. I was overtaken with apprehension about the winds playing with
the small aircraft that was vibrat3.ng above the lofty peaks with pointed, rocky sum-
mits and above the deep, desolate valleys. However, the vista would at times change
and the attractive topography along the On?ani caost would appear, splendid scenery
with a m3xture of sea and desert with green cases covered with date and coconut
trees and all types of tropical plants while there were scattered villages near the
primitive fis~:;~l~ ~~dw and thc ^?rrow deseri: ~.aths.
~ "Here is the island of al-Ghanayim, at Ra's Musandum," said the captain, "We will now
leave you and then pick you up at the same place in 5 hours so as to take you back _
to Muscat with us."
I looked about me. It was absolutely silent everywhere. The 3.sland looked like a
barren, rocky mass with a number of buildings and installations on its forward edge
jutting into the water. I asked my companion about them and he said, "They are
the installations of a small Omani military base comprising a battalion of 130 per-
; sons, seven coast guard patrol boats, a helicopter and a small transport aircraft."
I ask~d whether this small force w�as suff3cient to protect or secure navigation in
the strait. _
He responded, tersely, "It is not enough."
Alone, We Cannot...
I recalled wh.at I had been told by Yusuf al-'Alawi, the undersecretary of the Omani
Fore3.gn Ministry, in his o�fice in Muscat when I was talking with him about the
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responsibilitq of the Sultanate of Oman in the strait as the state within whose
territorial waters the international mariti.me channels were located. I recalled
how he had said that his country could not alone bear the responsibility for pro-
tecting that iriternational strategic corridor where the most important "material"
of modern times passes--oil. Al-'Alaw3 added, explaining his country's policy w~tih
regard to this vital issue, For a long time, we have been drawing the attention of
the world, or to be more precise, Che producing countries whose oil passes through
the strait and the consuming countries, to the issue of protecting navigation there.
Given our responsibility as a country in whose territorial waters the stra3t is
located, we at the beginning proposed to the s3ster Arab countries who have oil ex-
port ports on the Arab Gulf that the strait constituted the only bottleneck for the
passage of ships to and from the Gulf. We suggested creating a fund to pay for
forming a special Omani force, equipped with various necessary air and naval units,
whose main mission would be to protect navigat3on in the strait but the idea got
no responsive audience. In an attempt on our part to implement it, we aga3n raised
it with the western oil importing countries which had fundamental interests in the
safety of navigation but were startled to encounter a vicious attack on us and on
Oman3 policy as a whole and how we were striving to establish western military bases
in our country, and consequently, in the Arab Gulf area. We made repeated attempts,
reexplaining our goals and reaffirming that we did not want foreign armies to pro-
tect the strait, as this was to be rejected out of hand; rather, we wanted financial _
assistance or ma.terial assistance in the form of equipment which the Omani armed
forces could use to protect freedom of navigation and to guard the international
waterways fram any sabotage."
"In any case,"--the undersecreta~q of the Omani Foreign Ministry is still speaking--
"The western oil consuming countries themselves were not enthusiastic over the Omani -
plan. It is now clear that they preferred to bring their fleets, their battleships
and their aircraft carriers, to be stationed in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean,
nea: to the entrance r~f the strait, to be completely ready to intervene were any
interference with navigation to occur. The strange thing is that these countries pre-
ferred ta spend hundreds of millions of dollars a month to guard the strait with
- their military machinery, the sums representing the costs of the fleets near the
strait, rather than pay IO percent of this sum to implement the Omani plan that could
- fulfill the objective."
War and the Strait -
I was recalling what Yusuf al-'A1awi told me about the responsibility of his country
toward this strategic waterway when i visualized a terrifying scenar3o: The strait
is closed and the industrial west is deprived of 19 million b~arrels of oil a day,
90 percent of Japan's needs, half of what Europe consumes and a quarter of America's
imported requirements.
I visualized the international and Arab reactions to this. The strait is the vital
artery linking Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, the UAE, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain with
the sea, although Saudi Arabia could rely on its ports on the Red Sea and the Sul-
tanate of Oman on the Gulf of Oman as is the case with the UAE which recently built
a port on the Gulf .
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Obstructing, Not Halting
However, can navigation in the strait be halted?
This was the question I put to the captain of the Omani naval vessel while we were
touring the waters of the strait near the Ra's Musandum peninsula and ge~ting a
clear view of a huge oil tanker quietly sailing east, that is, out of the Arab Gulf.
The officer said, with his eyes on the distant horizon, "The fact is that you should
consider the closing of the strait to be lacking in scientific accuracy for one sim-
ple reason, that is, that the word "closing" which is bandied about by some infor-
mation media is imprecise with regard to the Strait of Hormus. Scient3fically and
practicallq speaking, it would be difficult to completely close the strait. The
truth is that it would be possible to obstruct the course of navigation there for a
few days or weeks, depending on the s3ze and nature of the obstruction operation.
However, I do not want to minimize the gravity of statements about guaranteeing the
security of navigation in this important waterway; obs~tructing navigation here for
even one or two days would have a direct effect on the world`s oi1 supplies. Suffice
it for me to say that before the Iraqi-Iranian war, the number of ships and oil tankers
transit3ng the Gulf and passing the Stra3.t of Hormuz used to approach 300 a day, an
average of one ship every 3 minutes. Now, with the war still going on between the
two countries, the number has fallen to 220 and, at times, to 180, since the loading
of oil has stopped at the Iraqi and Iranian terminals, the two largest oil exporting
countriss in the area after Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, we can imagine the shortage
in oil supplies to the world were navigat3on in the Strait of Hormuz were to come to
a halt, if only for a single day, to clear some mines which had been planted to ob-
struct the progress of the ships."
' However, I asked, how would it be difficult to close the strait, or what 3s the fallacy
in the common expression, closing the strait?
He replied, "The strait of Hormuz is a waterway that is different from the Suez Canal,
for example, which is also an essential international waterway. The strait varies
in width from 400 kilometers at its widest to 40 kilometers at its narrowest point
at Ra's Musandum, where we are now. Also the water depth reaches 250 feet. If we
assume that the largest tanker of the type transiting the strait has a draft of no
more than 20 feet, in order to close the strait, it w~uld then require the sinking
of no less than 10 huge tankers one on top of the other, not to mention what I said
about the width of the strait at its narrowest point being 40 kilometers; what is
the length of the largest ship in the world?"
Salamah, Queen of the Islands
The man had been speaking excitedly in a loud voice, trying to make himself heard
ov~r the roar of the vessel's engines tak3.ng us through the waters of the Arab
Gulf in this part called the Strait of Hormuz, while on the horizon appeared a huge
rocky mass, growing larger and larger as we drew closer. Our guide pointed to it
and said, "That i~ the island of 5alamah which the English used to call "Queenland,"
that is, the queen of the islands, because of its importance in guiding ships at the
entrance to the islands. It is an Omani island but no ~ne lives there except some
workers who operate the lighthouse." The man then po3.nted to a group of small isl2nds
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around Salamah Island and said that they were named Banat Salamah [the daughters
of Salamah] as an indication of their small size compared with the mother island,
Salamah.
The vessel took us around Salamah Island so that we could see the lighthouse and,
f rom afar, a number of workers who operated the lighthouse were visible.
We returned to the coast to al-Ghanayim Island, the site~ of the small Omani military
base and found the helicopter waiting for us. The plane took us on a tour of the
strait and here began the most impressive part of the trip. No sooner had the plane
risen over the calm, deep blue water than one of the most beautiful veiws we had
ever seen became evident to us, the Strait of Hormuz. We caere flying over the
narrowest part of it and the peaks of a chain of high mountains began to appear
clearly and rock islands emerging from the waters.of the strait. The shipping corri-
dors which wound around the small islands looked like small streams of clear water.
The landmarks of the other side, the Iranian side, appeared distant and the aricraft
captaii~ apologized for not taking us closer; we nodded our heads in understanding.
The oil tankers stood out clearly in �ront of us, sliding along easily and quietly
on the surface of the water. It was a splendid natural panorama.
Suddenly our enjoyment of our view and our absorption in the details of ~hat splendid
panorama was broken by the voice of the captain saying, "Attention. We have approached
a very dangerous and important spy ship stationed in international waters at the en-
trance to the strait, the Soviet spy ship." Quickly I stuck my head out the open wincow
of the helicopter. The deck of the ship looked lilce a jungle of equipment and w3res
running back and forth here and there. The crew in their uniforms stood quietly,
watching us coldly with their naked eyes as if they were seeing a paper airplane with
- which a sma11 boy was playing. They were right since what could be done by a small
helicopter tayed with by the breeze as it wished, a plane whose captain had asked the
passengers to wear life jackets throughout the whole flight in readiness to jump at
any time. The pilot took us around the Soviet spy ship once, then a second time and
then a third to give us more chances to photograph it. I asked the Omani officer,
"isn't this dangerous for us; they are watching while we are taking pictures?"
The professional officer laughed loud].y at my naivete and said, "Do you think that
they are taking any interest in the pictures you ~-~~o taking or even in the fact
that we are now here above their heads? They have been here for months monitoring
all a.ctivity in the Strait of Hormuz and on both the Arab and Iranian sides of the
Arab Gulf_. Everyone knows they are here. Nearby are other American ships and a
British ship and a French ship and they are all watchirig each other so that no
one will break the rules of the 'game'."
Between Iran and Oman
The plane began to move away from the Soviet ship squatting on the water while two
ships followa.ng opposite course~ appeared on the near horizon, one heading toward
the Gulf ports and the ather moving toward the entry to the strait, and from there
to the high seas. I�re~alled what I had been Cold by 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rawwas, the
Minister of Information in the Sultanate of Oman, when I had been sitting with him
in Muscat. He had been talking about the strait and how Oman had concluded an _
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agreement with Iran in 1974 which defined the continental shelf between the two coun-
tries, thereby dividing the strait on the basis of the line at the midpoint in the
waters between the furthest land promontories between the two countries. As a result
of the agreement, the shipping channels in the strait were confined to Omani terri-
torial waters since the Iranian portion did not have sufficient depth of water
for the passage of large ships. Iran had instructed an international company to reg-
ulate shipping through the strait but, after the agreement defining the territorial
waters between Iran and Oman, the Omani Government alone assumed the burdensome duty
- of regulating the new shipping channels since the navigable channels were confined
to Omani territorial waters. Starting in November 1979 the old routes for tankers
were changed to new ones that would achieve greater safety for shipping traffic through
the strait. These rout2s now comprise three channels, one for tankers heading to-
ward the Gulf and the other for those leaving it, with a safety strip in the middle.
These routes are 2 nautical miles wide and the water depth reaches 100 meters, the
width of the old routes for tankers having not been more than 1 mile. The area divid-
ing the routes had been narrow and the huge tankers had been unable to maneuver freely
and this had posed a constant threat to shipping in the strait because of the possi-
bility of collisions between two tankers headed in opposite directions.
Limits of Qmani Resnonsibility
When I asked the Omani Minister of Information about the limits to Omani responsibil-
ity for the Strait of Hormuz, he replied, "The responsibility of the Sultanate of
Oman over the strait, or to be more precise, over the waterways there is total, just
_ as is its responsibility over any part of Oman3 soil."
I asked him, "llo you receive any tolls from the ships and tankers that transit these
waterways as Omani territorial waters?"
He replied, "No, we receive no tol.ls. International practice is that tolls are not
collected from ships transiting international straits on the basis that they are
natural waterways, unlike the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal, fur example, which had
been dug by human efforts."
I queried him, "So what benefit do you derive from this important international strait?"
He replied, "Nothing, except for the problems which we don't need. We have no com-
mercial port in the strait or the Gulf as a11 our ports are located on the Gulf
of Oman. That might explain the invitation, known as the Omani plan to protect the
strait, which we extended more than a year ago and in which we asked the countries
that benefit from the strait (the oil exporting and consuming countries) to help us
provide the needed guarantees for shipping; we, however, have as yet received no
positive reaponse and so we have no choice but to depend on our own abilities to
exercise our sovereignty over an important part of the Omani homeland."
On the way back, while the winds were buffeting the old helicopter and the captain
was reiterating the saf ety instructions and the need to confirm the positioning of
the parachutes on our chests as a precaution against danger, I felt a succession ot
_ misgivings inside and more than one question flashed through my mind.
I wonder how things will develop 3n this sensitive area of the world and whether
World War III will start from this strange, wonderful strait which ~he countries of
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the world are quarreling about protecting while the country within whose internation-
al boundaries it is located has no interests in it, or at least no concern with
whgt goes an around it and over it? Another question: Do not the inhabitants of
the strait and the Gulf have priority over others in protecting it? Then why ~o
others i.mpose themselves as protectors of us and of our territory and our waterways?
I~ it because of "our beautiful dark eyes" or for purely their own interests which,
in this case, 1ie in ensuring their continued supplies of oil through the ~trait of
Hormuz, the one bottleneck through which Arab oil passes to all parts of the world?
It is certain that any slight miscalculation by any of the parties who have their _
fleets stationed around the Strait of Hormuz could light the first spark of World
War III. If there is any doubt about this, closer scrutiny of contemporary history
which moves through the strait each day would be enough to wipe away this doubt and
transform it in~o a certainty.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-�'ARABI
8389
CSO: 4802
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TUNISIA
'JEUNE AFRIQUE' ARTICLE ANAYLZES STATUS OF ARMY
i
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 31 Dec 80 pp 178-184
~
[Article by Souhayr Belhassen: "The Tunisian Army: An Unknown Qua.ntity"]
' [Text] On 24 June 1956, in the course of a parade through the principal streets
' of Tunis, the Tunisian people were meeting the most spectacular attribute of
independence: The army.
In fact, the parade involved the first contingent of the Tunisian Army, composed
of a combined arms regiment of about 1,500 men, among whom were 26 officers (includ-
ing Major Tebib, who was to lead the Tunisian Army for many years) and noncommis-
sioned officers, several of whom had served during World War II.
~ Sergent Bechir recalls how, as a teacher and administrator at Sbeitla at the age
of 20, he found himself wichout a job and volunteered for the Fourth Regiment of
Tunisian light infantry a few months before the Tunisian Army was established.
"A list of inen from the First Combined Arms Regiment was to be sent to us from
i the Ministry of Defense. It was more than taking an examination, more than getting
a diploma. It was a kind of second birth."
That is why the military routine did not stop for 3 days at Forjmol barracks in
~ Bab Sassoun (a residential area west of Tunis), where the First Combined Arms
Regiment was installed. While the various units were being formed, the Tunisian
high command received its armament (MAS rifles, sibmachine guns, 105mm artillery,
half-tracks), its vehicles, and its prime moving equipment.
Even before the parade took place the Tunisian Government decided to open military
schools in Tunisia and to send a certain number of students to France in order to
train the permanent cadre of the army. To be a graduate of a senior school and to
' be 20 years old at the time amounted to seeing all doors open before you. Leaving
~ for somewhere was therefore the key word. To go into dentistry, pharmacy, or to
; attend Saint-Cyr came to about the same th3ng.
The Dream of Being in Uniform
,
However, for many young men the army was perfectly integrated into the general
patriotic movement. Each one wanted to find his place in the nation which was
~
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being born. 'i'hus, the brother of General Abdelhamid Escheickh, today chief of
stafF of the Tunisian Armed Forces, explains that his father and he himself did
everything possible to talk the young Abdelhamid out of going into the army. "He
was brilliant, always first in his class. He was advised to become a doctor or a
lawyer, but he was stubUorn. To us, bec~~ming a member of the military was not a
career!"
- "My ideal," a reserve captain says, "was to wear the Tunisian uniform!"
"It was somethi~.g new, prestigiousy attractive, whir_h responded to my taste for
adventure," recalls another young man of the time who had a choice between going
into the hotel business or goi.ng to Saint-Cyro He adds: "Being a soldier, I said
to myself, was nevertheless better than being a waiter in a cafe, because at the
- time that was the way I loaked at the hotel business
So there were 105 young 'I`usisians who entexed the combined arms school a.t Saint-Cyr.
But there were also others in Brest to attend the naval school; or at Salons-de-
Provence for air force training; at Montpellier for the military administrative
s.chool; at Bordeaux of Lyon for the army medical school. The excellent general -
training and the iron discipline o.f these great schools made the young second
lieutenant into a young wolf in the eyes of the officers who had gone through the
campaigns in Italy or Tndochina. This competition between "older and younger
sol.diers" clearly led to tensi.ons in the relationships between offjcers, but events
would very rapidly lead certain young officers to distinguish themselves. -
A New Pyramid
The first task of the military officers was to delimit the frontiers of the country; ~
but the army had to fight also, beginning in 1958, at Remada, in the southern area
of the country, where sauze noncommissioned officers received their baptism of fire.
However, the real test would take place in Bizerte during the summer of 1961. This
battle would mark once and for all tihe supremacy of the civil power and would under-
l.ine the fact that the army is only an instrument of ~hat civil power. It would
also accentuate P1the quarrel between older and younger soldiers."
The battle of Bizerte shaped the top of the pyramid of the Tunisian Army and gave
birth to a cadxe of rese.rve officers. A certain ~+~m~~-r of officers, in fact,
would choose to leave the active army after the shock provoked by the 600 dead
left on the battlefield. Some of the officers were turn~d into gover.nment delegates
(subprefectsj. Others retired to marry foreign women or quite simply because they
were not well adapted to the military life. Finally, the conspiracy of 1962, orga-
nized against the regime by a d:i.verse group of oppon^ats, some of whom were mili-
tary officers, including two young graduates of Saint-Cyr, broke the morale of the
young officers.
To3ay, only half of the first class of officers are to be found in the higher
command of the armed forces, composed of the three general staffs and the various
directorates (of progra~uning, logistical services, planning, health, etc).
Parallel to these direct~rates is a General Inspec~orate of the Armed Forces, 1ed
by General Molcaddem (the only represeni:ative of the older personnel who came from
the French Army).
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Since the reforms introduced in 1979,the minister of defense holds all power in
the armed forces after President Bourguiba, supreme leader of the armed f orces,
- The chief of staff of the armed forces, Ma~ Gen Iibdelhamid Escheikh, is only an
adviser of the ministsr, contrary to the French conception, which invests this
position with real powers.
Mohamed Salah Mokaddem and Boubaker Balma are the two other major genreals. On
- the same date four colanels were promoted to the rank of brigadier general, includ-
ing Mohamed Gzara, chief of staff of the army. The chief of staff of the navy is
Capt Habib F'Dhila. The only rear admiral of the Tunisian Navy is presently
serving at the Tunisian Embassy in Paris. Finally, Col Touhami Machta is the chief
of staff of the air force.
The Ps eudopeasants
Personnel, intelligence, training, and logistics and operations are the four depart-
ments of each general staff. The first five or six training classes, or about 300
officers, who today are between 40 and 50 years old, had an essentially technical
kind of training at the time of the war in Algeria. An interesting detail is that
in the military training exercises at Saint- Cyr they played the role of dissident
peasants [fellagas]. For 10 years after independence, and unril 1978, the first
officers who received diplomas from the general staff school in Paris --as well as
those from schools in the United States and Belgium--were graduated at the rate of
three or four a year. Like the officers from the countries where they are trained,
they enter the respective schools by means of an examination, as is also the case
with the Higher War School in Paris, where one or two places are offered each
year to Tunisia. Further, the training programs or the refresher courses in France,
the United States, and also in Italy, Greece, and Turkey, operate continuously for
specialized personnel, officers, and noncommissioned officers of the three services.
The "Eggheads"
Courses in management and electronics were added to those involving combat. Today
the armed forces are managed like a company. To judge both the level of the per-
sonnel as well as the quality of their training in terms of military instruction,
technical education, and practical training in posts and units, it is enough to
see the results of the training courses abroad. The results show, in fact, th at
by their standing in the class~:s the Tunisians have no reason to envy their Western
comrades. Aside from the students in postgraduate class es for the army and navy,
who are still trained abroad (a naval institute has just opened in T~nisia), the
entire army training takes place in Tunisia, with the assistance of G3 foreign
advisers, at the military academy of Fondouk Jedid, which accepts only senior
school graduates and which tra:ins each year nearly 500 noncommissioned officers;
at the combined arms postgraduate school of Bou-Ficha, which trains an equal
number each year; and finally at the general staff school at Kassar Said, recently
established, which produces about 20 graduates per year.
Whereas in the civilian sector there is a tendency to think that the level of in-
struction is generally declining, the revexs e is occurring among the Tunisian
military. Thus, at the military academy it is dema.nded that the student also
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- folloor, at the same eime, a course of study leading to a diploma in the area of
his choice. "We were getting eggheads," says a colonel on active service. "From
1974 to 1979 there was a continuous coming and going between the military academy
and the u~niversity, to ttie paint that officers were arrlving at postgraduate school.
w~th the mentality o� civilians. We had to stop the experiment."
A reserve captain, 45 years old, notes that not only are the criteria for admission
higher than Chey were when he attended, but aiso thaL ~he stud,y programs are
following the evolution of the sciences and the technical areas~ "Among the mil-
itary there is something which on~ does not find among Tunisian civilians, that is,
a moti.vatl.on to learn. At 40 years of age a soldier, whatever his grade, does not
feel it beneatti tiim to return to study. Quire the contrary!" This captain also
notes a new educational *_endency founded on cooperation, reflection, and group
work, A leader, although always the only one to decide, consults and listens.
According to whether. an officer has studied in the United StaCes or in France, the
style changes: simple and direct for the first group; reserve and distance are
commonly to be �ound when one encounters a soldier trained in a French military
school.
Concern for Promotion .
The emergence oi a businQSS-~riented baur~eoisie in the 1970�s, which has created
a gap between civili~s and militaxy personnel, has not involved coJ.lective dis-
content among the military but rather i.ndivi.dual frustrations which will be answer-
' ed v$ry quickly by indexation of milita~~~ salaries to the salaries of the civil
service, a policy of housing For military personnel, sports and leisure clubs,
insurance polic:Les--in short ~~11 ~the advantages which equate higher ranking of fi-
cers and ge.nerals te civil ser.vi.ce personnel. The officers quarters have nothing
in common with the sumpt~ious villas in the suburbs of Tunis, but this does not fail
- to arouse a cer.tai.n envy on the part of junior of~icers, whose first problem is
housing.
Pramotion is also a matter of concern to junior officers. One can easily take about
' 8 years to go f.rom second lieutenanL- to Xieutenant and finally receive 'L60 dinars
instead of 120 dinars per month (60,000 CFA francs) . The future appears to be
' blocked for the generation of 30--year-olds ~ Whereas in civilian life business
act~vj.ty has opened up the prospects for tnis gP� ..u~ion, in the armed forces, as
in the government, the best positions are already takeii~
Installed in his home which "loolcs rich"--heavy velvet drapes from Genoa, stucco
_ statues, fancy windotashades, many small possess3.ons arat~nd the house--"the colonel"
wears sporty clothes which malce a:nan in his 50's who is gett;_ng a little thicker
- around the waist, look younger. Only the regulation haircut recalls his function.
Owning his own house, he evidently doss not have the advantages he would have had
~ if he had been the comuiander of a place ? ike Sousse or Bixerte, but with a salary
of 400 dinars per month, "heavens," he says, "I have nothing much to complain about."
Like his opposite ~number in civi? ian "life, a high of ficial or executive in a
_ co~~pany, "the colonel" dreams. He speaks of khe plans of others, of those who have
come upon "the" good business deal, of those who have been able to put something
aside to help make ends meet. Thus, some of his colleagues in the armed forces
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have a share in "big" or "little" Uusiness transac~rions, some with friends, some
_ with relatives (their brothers or ~aives). Th.ese inGlude representing medical firms, -
offices, import~-export concerns, restaurants, mountain resorts, banquet ha11s.
This is done in order to have some money set aside when the time for retirement
comes. If he had wanted to make money like everyone else, "the colonel" would have
taken the path of "promot:ion" already followed by many of his colleagues from his
"class" and would have left the armed forces. Moreover, all those who leave the
armed forces are very much in demand for their efficiency, whether in ba.nks or
private or public companies. But the slogan of "the culonel" is "to serve and obey."
A Closed Caste
The military apparently constitute a separate corps of people. In fact, they are
a caste whi.ch lives in a closed world, a cocoon, but a permeable cocoon. It is
permeable above all in terms of daily problems: the high cost of living, housing,
the future of their children. Thus, in the mess, in the course of a game of cards,
one can have a lively discussion about the latest football game, but not about the
latest change in the government. Does this meaza that the Tunisian Army is not
politicized? Compared to the armies of the Middle East, it is certainly less
politicized and more loyalist.
Rejection of Politics
For President Bourguiba the place for the soldier is :tn his barracks. Excluded from
political relationships, the soldier wi11 not bring politics, and therefore govern-
ment ideology, into the barraclcs. Between government leaders in a given region
and the local military comma.nder there is a kind of madus vlvendi, a type of peace-
fu1 coexistence. "Don't mix things," says a captain, "that`s a good idEa."
This commander thus does not hide the little esteem he has for politicians. "They
are people who only progress by devious neans. At least, in the armed forces you
advance by ranks and by .following a hierarchy, and that's the right way to do itl"~
Another officer says, "The army means: I don't get into politics, but don't play
politics with me." Perhaps this is what explains the fact that today there is no
attempt made to avoid speaking of the way in which the former minister of defense,
Abdallah Farhat, entrusted the organizatton of the last congress of the govern-
ment party to the armed forces. One officer says: "So much the better if President
Bourguiba keeps his hand in things. That keeps us from being involved in problems
which do not concern us. As for us, our job is to defend our territory against
an external enemy." -
What about 26 January 1978, when the army was called out to put down riots which ~
grew out of conflicts between the trade unions and the government party? In
response to all questions the person to whom we spoke became annoyed and aggres-
sive: "Go ask those who gave us the orders. As for us, our duty is to defend
the country when it is in danger!"
- One year later, to the day, the army came out of its barracks once again to en-
- counter, in Gafsa, a commando group which came in from Libya. On this subject the
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.
speaker was more vocal, and the tmpresaion remains Chat Gafsa, for the army, was
not ~ bad thing. It was the alarm ba11 which fina.lly was to draw the attention
of the government to the plan for modernization of the army.
Created with no military development objective, with essentially the aid from
, France, ~ahir.h in ~.956 ~urned over a heterogeneou.s collection of equipment, the
armed forces hav~ had :Eor a long time a skimpy budget o� about 10 million dinars
annually.
When Che Tunisian-LiUyan union of Jerba took place in 1974, the armed forces, long
frustrated, did not look unfavorably on "this extraordinary field of experiment"
which was opening up before it. The union, which did not develop, convinced the
politicians o~ the need for a credible and defensive army. Sweeping aside his
prejudices and suspicions, President Bourguiba let himself be convinced, and the
armed forces set aside its temporary structures, replaced its equipment, and
pleadect for minimal growth in its stock equipment. From 20 million dinars in 1975
the defense budget more than trip'led in Y977.
Faced with tiie expansianism of n.ei~hbori.ng Libya, the Tun3.sian Navy, which up to
- the present has been ff� re of a coast ~uax�d r..omposed of 2,500 men, charged with
' conflicts relatad ~o fishing quLs~tions, has been faced with the need to reconvert.
1K.ode~nization of Armament
In 1976-1977 Tunisia carried out a p~J.icy of diversification in all directions of
its arcuament, of which the weakest point remains the air force. This is not so
much in texms of the nuuiber of inen (nearly 3,OOOj but zn terms of i.ts air defense
capa.bili~y. Also, tb.e lack of troop transport aircraft was cruelly fe:Lt at the
tLme of the I,i.byan connrando attack (Gafsa, January 1980) o
This attack carried away the last hesitations of the old pacifist leader. Caught
between two neigYibors who a~e not always as calm as he is, the chief of state
ordered the general sta.ff to cons~.der again the plan for the renovation of the
arm~d for.cES which will be carried aut cluxing the next 5 years, If the objectives
as def~ned are clear enough, their achievement js a question of ineans. Members
of the ~Crench and American general staffs ~made several visits to Tunisia in 1980
and even before, ir. February and Apri1 1979, in ~ to evaluate the military
potential and ideriti:Ey neQds o
For ttie caming 5-year period thr~e stages are de~~nede The first phase will be
equivalent to 2,5 times the present budget, or 250 mill.~on dinars; the second
phase will prov~de 350 mx].lion dinars; and the Iast pnase, whose budget will reach
700 million dinars, shoul.d assure n.inisia of acqui.ring sophisticated equipment for '
surveillance, detection, and telecommunications. About half of this sum w3.11 go
to tt~e air force (160 million dii~azs) and an equivalenC sum for the acquisition
_ of surfact-to-~.ir missiles. A gaod ~art of it goes to the army, which continues
to be the tip of the lance. The xest goe~ ~o ~he navy, for logistics and for
various auxiliary services. Arab financing~ particu7.arl.y from Saudi Arabia, is
being ac~a.vel.y sough~.
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However, the TunisI.an Army has only played a military role. Outside the cities,
and especially ir~ the south, the prPstige of the uniform does not need to be
demonstrated. Tn godforsaken places the means of development are to be found in
tihe army. Often, local or regional authorities turn out to be incapable of en-
couraging the effort necessary for urgent and vital tasks. These situations will
convince the skeptics of the need to entrust young national servicemen with carry-
ing out projects forming a part of national plans (fight against erosion or floods,
construction of roads and rural housing, etc).
The Other Side of the Picture: Desertions
In the Sahara desert, isolated by sand dunes, situated about 20 km froW the nearest
center provided with electricity, the village of E1-Faouar welcomes the young con-
scripts in battle dress, armed with picks and shovels, with a spontaneous and un-
precedented burst of praise! "Our f riends, you have come to save us.... Finally,
the road promised (for the last 20 years). "Long live the army!" This is one
example among many others. And the positive side of the balancesheet is often to
be found. The professional soldiers are proud of stones dug out of the ridges,
of ineals.shared with a native of the locality, underprivileged and unknown, and,
above all, of an Army prov?ng without fanfare or speeches its effectiveness along-
side a"profit-ma.king" society. The tr.oops, like all troops in the world, iz~arch
in disciplined fashion.
However, conscription, long considered as a misfortune, is far from having acquired
Che title of nobility in the eyes of the people. Nevertheless, since the establish-
ment, following the riots of 26 January 1978, of abligatory wor.kshops for y~ung
- unemployed workers, tYie annual conscription classes present themselves at the
gates of the barracks without even being called. Mahmoud, a black who is 23 years
old, tells how, when he was caught in a security sweep in Tunisa, he had a hard
time showing the papers proving that the Ministry of Defenss had postponed~his
- being called up. It didn't work. He spent 3 days in the hell of the classifica-
tion center and then was sent, together with 200 others picked up in various sweeps,
to the barracks at Sousse. "That was paradise," says Mahmoud, "with meat every
day. I used to think that the army was made up of savages. But I learned more in
3 months than during tha rest of my life. The noncommissioned officers were better
than parents to us. They told us that the army is a big family, and that is not
false. For the first time I had the impression that someone was concerned about
my education. I learned, for example, to give he~p to others, spontaneously, to
carry out my joo on time and the best I could." Very quickly, Ma.hmoud lost inter-
- est. When his training was over, he was as~igned to "S". That could stand as
well for Sfax as for Sousse or Sahara. Now, the Sahara is the worst of calamities
for a conscript. If they are not told their destina~tion, this is to avoid deser-
tions, but there are some cases on each trip. Assigned to Ksar-Ghilane or Dhib at,
in the farthest reaches of the Sahara, like Ali, another s~ldier 20 years old:
"One had the impression," he says, "of being turned into a forced laborer. We
broke up rock all day long, where we were building houses."
Military Service or Civilian Service?
When they left Tunis, Ali and Mahmoud considered that overall the balarce was a
good one. What had they learned? They had learned to know the country, in the
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first place, and the people. "The people of. t~ie south mistrust the people of the
north. They treat us like inferiors." They learned to deal with situations with
courage and a sense of responsibility, to work, to discipline themselves. Would
they vol.unteer for the army? The categorical answer is, no! However, bath of them
are unemployed.
Some people are concerned to see military senrice take another path, first by
tolerating and then by extending its participation more and more in useful work
projects and turning the soldier away from his proper mission: a good defense.
"At the time of danger," Deputy Nouri Boudali told the National Assembly, "the
value of a planted tree becomes insi~ificant, while the value of a well-trained
soldier becomes decisive. It is not a matter of the soldier becoming a citizen
bur rather that the citizen become a soldier."
Search for Homogeneity
B ased on conscription, the Tunisian Army is composed of 1,000 officers, 3,000 non-
counnissioned officers, 1,000 officer and noncommissioned officer candidates, some
5,000 corporals and privates, and fxom 15,000 to 16,000 conscripts. About 27,000
? man in all. Since independence in 1956, nearly 400,000 young men have performed
their military service, to the point that, in 1972, there were not enough officers
for training the conscripts, and a 6--month training program was set up for soldiers
b eing demobilized, in order to train nox~cou~?issioned and commissionec? reserve
of.ficers. According to reserve officexs the reserve army is at a good level and
has kept its ref].exes in good order. ~Iowever, f.or a regiment to be effectice, it
must be compos~d of elements having a minimum of homogeneity. Now, this organiza-
tion presupposes that at its base there exist relationships of confidence b etween
the civilian and military authorities, so that in each area of a city, locality,
or region defense activity can be carried on without a break, without difficulty,
and that it wi11 ber_ome natural, simple, and effective.
Tunisia is hesi.tating. Aruiing itself to have credible forces capable of deterrence
is a legitimate abbition, but can it really be effected in a Tunisia with only
- limited resources? To insure "coverage" of this need involves risks. King Hassan
II of Morocco h~s said quita correcCly, "one is always a little bit the prisoner
of him who helps you."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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TUNISIA
GRADUAL LIBERAL IZATION PROGRAM ANALYZED
Paris MARCHES T ROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 pp 3513-3514
~ [Text] Mohamed Mzali's government, following President Bourguiba's directives, is
_ prudently carrying its work of political liberalization.
In the unions, nearly all of the militants who were condemned after the events of
26 January 1978, on 10 November were pardoned and had their civil rights reinstated;
thus they will b e able, depending on the decisions of the future extraordinary con-
gress of the Tunisian General Federation of Labor (UGTT) , to aspire to union respon-
sibilities again. But seven of the condemned, including Habib Achour, who was re- -
leased and put under house arrest, have not had the benefit of these reprieve mea-
sures. Some exp ect this to be the case before the meeting of the UGTT Congxess; in
fact Mohamed Mz ali clearly stated that the union members who have received the pres-
idential ~grace constitute "a first group," and the new president of the National
Committee of the UGTT, Noureddine Hached, did not fail to take note of this formula.
During an audience he granted on 13 November to Noureddine Hached and the members of
the National Committee of the UGTT, President Bourguiba did not fail to formulate
his directives aimed at the union group. The latter will have "to have in its r~.nks
loyal nationali ~ts who demonstrate a spirit of sincere responsibility." The work-
ers' educationu 1 activity will have to be pursued in such a way as to "inculcate in
them high patri otic values and make them aware of their rights and duties," and by
seeing to it that "any activity likel.~~ to hinder our work of developr~ent is avoided."
- The UGTT will, in particular, have to contribute to the success of the Sixth Plan.
After the audience the members of the Committee themselves in_dicated that they had
assured the pre sident of the Tunisian workers' desire to preserve the dignity and
invulnerabilit y of Tunisia, and to support the development ef.f.ort; they confirmed
their resolve " t o maintain cohesiveness in the ranks and to be imbued with a sense
of responsibility."
' The National Committee of the UGTT is thus giving all the guarantees of good will,
indeed of confo rmity, which are desired on its part. For his part, President
; Bourguiba is ret aining his freedom of action as to the measures for reprieve and re-
- instatement awaited by the seven union members who were excluded from the first
' series of benevolent measures. No doubt he intends in this way to avoid having the
moral authorit y of these militants weigh too heavily on the operations of preparing
~ for the union congress. But detractors of the present Tunisian political line con-
clude that, all things considered, Tunisian unionism has still not really been set
free.
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Be that as it may, Noureddine Hached is pleased with the changed atmosphere in
Tunisian unionism: "The black page has been turned," he declared on 6 December ~t a
public cexemony in memory of his father. "The sectoral committees of the UGTT have
been formed, 365 basic unions have so fax been renewed in all regions of the country,
4,S$5 candidates have been elected; about 43,000 voters, out of the 63,000 UGTT mem-
bers, participated in the voting. We are proud of ~these results."
What Noureddine ~lid not indicate at that time is that most of the election results
favo.r thz partisans of "the old group," despite attempts to obstruct by the employ-
ers or by the local Destourian elements; the reappearance of social conflicts, gen-
eralJ.y }iaving to do with wages, also contributed to hindering the activity of the
sectoral committees and the National Committce of the UGTT. In these circumstances
the UGTT Congress, which should mark the reswnption of normal union actzvity under
a new regularly elected Central, will not take place on 20 January as scheduled.
A Revealing Ministerial Shuf.fle �
On the political level, the ministerial shuffle of 3 December is the first sign,
though ve.ry qualified, o� an opening up toward the opposition. In fact it includes -
assigning to Tahar Belkhodja the In~ormation portfolio, detached for the occasion
from the portfoli.o of Information and Cultuxe, and the appointment of Beji Caid
Essebsi as ministerial delegate to the pri~ne minister.
Tahar Belkhodja, after being a diplomat for a long time, then National Security di-
rectox and a membex of the C~ntral Committee of the party, became minister o� the
Tnte.rior in 1973. It was in that post that he strongly advised against the "policy
of fixmness" adopted the Tunisian c~vexnment during the last montlis of 1977,
coun~er to thc J.eadership of the U+~TT. Believing that he had been too weak with
respect to t}ie movements launched by the railwaymen and the miners, President Bour-
guiba dismissed him on 23 Decembex 1977, which brought about the resignation for
solic~axity reasons of three other ministers and a secretary of state. Among those
ivho resigned, while Habib Chatti became secretary general of the Isla~nic Conference,
the other two ministers, Mongi Kooli and Moncef bel Hadj Amor, found high political
office this year; on the other hand, Tahar Belkhadja had only been xeinstate~. last
March in the diplomatic corps and named ambassador to Bonn. Tlie slowness wi.th which
a ministerial post was given him--a post much ].ess im~ortant than the one he held 3
years ago, are indica~tive of the care with which President Bourguiba is striking a
_ balance between the measures of appeasement and conciliati~n; if the 1977 dif�erence
of opinion has been pardoned, it is plainly not fc.~~otten.
The case of Beji Caid Essebsi, which is very di�ferent, shows similar subtleties.
Mr Essebsi, who as a student was active durine t}ae fight ~or independence, had a
career that was more administxative than political; he w;.~ secretary of state and
then minister of state during just five years; and since 1972, after a brief mission
as ambassador to Paris, he has been back at the Tunis bar. In recent years
Mr Beji Caid Essebsi has been one of the leaders of ~he "liberal" movement of the
Social Democrats, directed by Ahmed Mestiri, but he represented the most moderate
group there. Whereas Mr Mestiri clearly took a position in favor of multipartism,
Mr Essebsi was not articu.lating as clear a doctrinal demand and seemed to be invis-
aging merely a"liberalization" of the regime by granting important offices to per-
sons with independen~ leanings; and several months ago he agreed to be reinstated in
the party, from which he had been excluded in 1974 for criticizing the regime.
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In such circumstances it is permissible to wonder if his accession to a political
post entailing no responsibility in a ministerial department really constitutes a
success for the opposition.
How Much Freedom of Expression for the Opposition?
In fact Beji Caid Essebsi's accession to the government underlines and emphasizes
the divergence that exists between the two groups of the Socialist Democratic Move-
ment (NIDS), since June 1978 when Ahmed Mestiri expressed his intention of formino
a political party and began taking steps to that end, in vain as it happened.
The Essebsi group in the i~S, which is the most modexate--or rather the least immed-
iately ambitious--, had been authorized for three years to put out the weeklies
AR RAI (THE OPINION) and DEMOCRATIE. The Mestiri gxoup has just been authorized to
publish AL MOUSTAQBAL (THE FUTURE), whose first issue went on sale on 1 December,
and a French-language weekly which should follow shortly. In its first issue
AL MOUSTAQBAL publishes an editorial by Anmed Mestiri, recalling the opposition's de-
votion "to the rules for the alternation of power" and reveals rhat is favorable,
though with numerous reservations, to the more open policy practised by
Mohammed Mzali.
On the other hand, neither the Tunisian Communist Party nor Ahmed ben Salah's Move-
ment for Popular Unity have received the publication authorizations they asked for.
And the Muslim publications of fundamentalist leanings, AL MOUFI'AMAA (THE SOCIETY)
and AL MAARIFA (KNOWLEDGE) remain suspended.
This extremely restrictive and frankly arbitrary measuring out of freedom of expres-
sion constitutes, when all is said and done, indirect homage to the critical spirit
of the Tunisians and to the strength of a national opinion that the only Destourian
channels are not enough to convey. This is undoubtedly a weak point in Mr Mazli's
policy; on this subject he is glad to be laconic. "If no other party (than the
Neo-Destourian Party) has been able to impose itself upon the Tunisian political
' scene, this is not our fault. However, there is oppasition on the right, and espec-
' ially on the extreme left, that are expressing themselves in one way or another, and
no one is preventing them from doing so as long as that expression is not accompanied
by anarchy and violence." (Interview in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 1 December
1980). Actually, this "expression" is realized chiefly through the channel of the
foreign press; within the country it takes place only from mouth to ear or through
. clandestine pamphlets.
Mohammed Mzali, as he confides in the gxeat American daily, is counting on the Sixth
Fivp-Year Pian to "assure a more equitable distribution between individuals and re-
gions of the fruits of growth, a condition that is necessary for mobilizing energy
and strengthening the social peace and national unity." He adds, "We are also con-
cerned with all the rebalancing required today by the evolution toward a more just
' society that is better structured and better balances." The reappearance of social
~ movements, which certain symptoms already foreshadow, are in danger of not giving
the government the time needed to properly conduct a policy envisaging such ample
time for its realization. ~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1980
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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
DETAILS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL BANK
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 23 Jan 81 pp 48, 49
- [Interview with Governor of UAE central bank, 'Abd al-Malik al-Hamar, bq Ahmad Hafiz,
date and place not given] ~
[Text] Arab and international political and economic circles are following with deep
interest the establishment of a central bank in the UAE. This interest arises from
the unique pulitical character of this state which was founded on the basis of a fed-
eration among seve.ral emirates each of which had represented a politically, socially
and economically independent entity prior to the formation of the UAE in 1971.
The establishment of the central bank comes as a step along the road of union and com-
plete amalgamation. Prior to issuance of the decree forming the central bank early
in January, there had been no specific body with the powers enjoyed by the central
bank as a governmental institution to monitor and implement th e state's financial
and monetary policy. -
There had been a currency council but its powers were limited and each emirate had
its owu budget besides the general federat3on budget.
'Abd al-Malik al-Hamar, governor of the central bank, says, "Estalilishment of the
bank means that the member emirates have agreed to come to terms with each other about
depositing their funds in foreign currencies in it and that this will lead us to a
very important fact, that is, that for the first time since th e creation of the UAE,
there will be a federal account deposited in a central bank owned by the federation
state." _
A1-Hamar added that the emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai had been the first emirates
to participate by depositing 50 percent of their oil revenues, that is, of their
basic income, in the central bank which, in turn, covers the governmental institu-
, tions and the public sector in the state in their financial requirements.
'Abd al-Malak al-Hamar also says that the huge expansion experienced over the past
10 years in the economic and commercial areas made it essential to create or form
a central bank to legislate, develop and promote commerical and financial activity
, in the state.
To prove this, we merely have to recognize that the number of banks operating in thE =
UAE has jumped from 12 to 54 in the past 10 qears and the numb er of branches of =
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international banks in the country is about 420. This huge banking and economic
leap made it necessary to create a natipnal inst3tution on the scale of the central
bank to go beyond the role of the previous currency council to regulate the prodi-
gious financial and banking traffic in .the country.
[Questionj However, don't you feel as I do that the appearance of this large
number of banks exceeds all anticipated bounds in a small country such as the UAE?
[Answer] That's very true. This perhaps stemmed from the tremendous leap exper-
ienced by the UAE in its first 10 years, the economic and social growth rates having
exceeded all projections, and from the standpoint of the huge construction projects
witnessed by each emirate. This was helped by the large monetary fluidity provided
. by the oil exports, besides the fact that the state at that time was pursuing an open -
door policy with no restrictions on the entry or exit of currency; in fact, it was a
completely free market which made it easy for any bank management which wished to
form banks or establish banking branches in the UAE.
[Question] Up to 1977 which saw a severe financial cxisis as the result of the dis-
appearance of controls over the banking and �inancial system in the country?
[Answer] Yes, tlaat was what happened. The currency council tried at that time to
cope with that crisis, issuing some econ~mic and financial laws defining the condi-
tions under which banks or bank branches would operate in the country. As a result _
o� the application of these laws, some foreign banks closed their doors and the num-
ber of branches was reduced. That, in: my op3.nion, was an essential step in coping
with the financial crisis in one of the wealthiast countries of the world.
- I am in full agreement with the statement that there was a verq high ratio of foreign
banks operating in the country compared with any other country, even pre-1975
Lebanon. Naturally, all the profits of those banks were remitted abroad and the econ-
omy of the country did not benefit in ttie slightest from them. Moreover, those
. banks were totally owned by their owners and the emirates had no share of them.
The major. role commercial banks pl~y 3.n commercial activity is no secret and it would
_ have been better had the number of local banks been greater than the number of foreign
- banks and what happened in 1977 would not have taken place.
So, it is my opinion, which I have e~~pressed on iuore than one occasion, that it is
necessary to ~olster and improve local banks so that they ca.n compete with the huge
international banks.
What has happened up to now is that we have countered t:it increasing activ3ties of
the f oreign banks with laws regu"lating thei.r operation. In 1977, the year of the
crisis, a number of decl.sions were issued of which I might mention the freezing of
licenses for foreign banks and their branches and not granting licenses to open new
banks. In early 1978, we abrogated a number of licenses pending for bank branches ~
that had delayed carrying on full activity, about 70 branches, after a warning
period which they did not abide by.
[Question] How many local banks ara there compared with foreign ones?
[Answer~ lfaelve local banks compared w3.th 54 foreign banks.
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Conditions for Establishing Foreign Banks
[Question] What are the new terms for opening foreign banks in the UAE?
[Answer) National capital must constitute 80 percent of the capitalization of the
bank with the remaining 20 percent being foreign capital.
[Question] Is this condition laid down on the basis that it is in effect in the other
countries of the Arab Gulf?
[Answer] No. Each country has its own circumstances. Saudi Arabia, for example,
- stipulates that therc be 70 percent local capital participating in the bank with the
other 30 percent foreign.
[Question] Are all the local banks in the UAE set up on the bas3.s of p urely local
capital? -
[Answer] Most of the banks are established on the basis of purely local capital,
banks such as the National Bank of Abu Dhabi, the Bank of Dubai, the Bank of Oman,
the Bank of the Middle East, etc. There are some local banks that were set up with
the participation of foreign capital but the proportion of foreign captial in each
~ case 3s not more than 30 percent. Local participation is rare in the other 54 foreign
banks operating in the country.
The Bank and The Future -
[Quest3on] What precisely is the policy laid down for the central bank to pursue
in the future?
[Answer) Essentially it is that it will have priority in the next few years in in-
vestment operations in the state and expenditures on various projects and disburse-
ments in the institutions of the state and its governmental sector in the sense that
those fundamental activities will, to a large extent, be restricted to the central
banle, the operation of which has begun, in coordination with the ministries of plan-
ning, trade and petroleum.
_ In brief, it will be the state's basic bank to take on the burden of organizing and
developing the country's economy, this having been left up to the small local and
large foreign banks. It is an extremely important new political and economic phase
that has begun in the UAE and will have firemendous future effects on the unification
process.
- COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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