JPRS ID: 9564 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9
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U
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50
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November 1, 2016
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47
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REPORTS
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APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9564 23 February 1981 ~ West E u ro e Re ort p p (FOUO 10/81) FBIS FOREICN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000304080047-9 NOTE JPRS publications contair. informaticn primarily from foreign news~apers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those irom English-language ~ources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Prccessing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing inciicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetAcally or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes ;aithin the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The cor_tents of this publication in no way represent the poli- : cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION 'JF THIS PUBLiCATI~N BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/9564 23 February 1981 - WEST EUROPE REPORT (F,OUO. 10 % 81) CONTENTS COUNTRY ,SECTZON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS UK-FRG Relations Strained Over EEC Fishing Policy (Michael Horneby; THE TIMES, 13 Feb 81) 1 _ BELGIUM Poll Shows Eyekens's Popularity on Incre~~e (POURQUOI PAS?, 11 Dec 80) 3 FRANCE ~ Airborne Rapid Deploymeirt Force Tested (Pierre Mace; ARMEES P'AUJOURD'HUT, Dec 80) 8 Several Limit~ on Befenae Eetabliehment Viewed , (Roger Che~alier~ Pierre Dabeziee; PARADOXFS, Apr-Niay 80). 13 Defenee Policy Guidelines Formulated After Colloquium (PA~ADOXES, Apr-May 80) 31 Briefa Trane~pcsrt Aircraft Readied 35 - ITALY Figures on Labor Merket Situation for 1980 - (IL SOLE-24 ORE, 7 Jan 81) 36 - SPAIN Suarez' Fall, Socialiat Takeover Predicted (Jose Manuel Arija; CAMBIO 16, 5 Jan 81) 43 UNITED KINGDOM 'TI1~S' Journalist Discuases Weat's View of Detente (Arrigo Levi; THE TIMES, 12 Feb 81) 47 - a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO] APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C 0 U N T R Y S E C T I 0 N INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS UK-FRG RELATIONS STRAINED OVER EEC FISHING POLICY LD131433 Landon THE TIMES in Engl.ish 13 Feb 81 p 7 ' [Dispatch by Michael Hornsby: "Germans Infuriated by British Stance on EEC Fishing Policy"] [Text] Brussels, 12 Fe~--The collapse in the early hours of this morning of the umpteenth attempt by EEC minister of agriculture to agree on a common fisheries policy has seriously strained Britain's ?-~lations with West f~ermany. Mr Peter Walker, infuriate3 his Wegt German counterpart, Herr Josef Ertl, by i refusing to approve an agreement with Canada that would allow EEC boats to fish ~ off Labrador in return for tariff reductions on Canadian sea food exports to the j community. I ~ The agreement poses problems in that most of the Canadian iish would be sold on ~ I the already depressed British market, but Mr W31ker's main reason for withholding approval was to retain a bargaining counter in the dispute over the EEC's internal fisheries regime. Under the agreement some 14,500 tonnes of fish, mainly cod, could be caught by i EEC boats in Canadian waters, West German trawlermen, wha get the bulk of this ~ catch, are angry and frustrated at being denied such a valuable haul. I ~ The Germans say that unless their fishermen can get into Canadian waters by the ~ beginning of March at the lat_;t the agreement's value will be much reduced ~ecause after that date icebergs make fishing dangerous. Herr Ertl is convinced that the British are now maintaining their veto on the C~nadian agreement out of sheer malice. He accused Mr Walker of "ungentlemanly conduct" and said he was an "even more unpleasant" negotiator than Mr John Silkin, the previous agriculture minister and noted anti-market~er. The Germans were not the on~.y ones to be irritated by Mr Walker's performan~~. When talks broke down last December, most of the blame was aimed at France--but there was a lc?t more sympathy for the French point of view last night. In the ~yes of the Germans and the French at least, there was a clear link between last May's agreement on Britain's EEC budget refund and an ~arly solution to the fisheries dispute and it was being op~nly su~gested yesterday that Britain had reneged on its part of the bargain. , 1 Fnu n~TrTer. Tt~~. nt~rr.v APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 L'VL\ Vl'1'iVLLILJ V~1L v11u~. The atmosphere is bound to be much more difficult wlien agriculture ministers meet again on March 9 and 10. There is a danger that the whole dispute will become caught up in the annual negotiations on farm prices. With the French presidential elections only a month away, Mr Daniel Hoeffel, ~he FrPnch fisheries minister, will find it even harder to offer r_oncessions. The one glimmer of lignt is that the minister of agriculture, for the first time this week, started to look at ways of satisfying Mr Walker's most contentioiis demand--that access of continental fishing vessels to British coastal waters should be physically controlled. The gap between Britain and Frar.ce, the two main protagon~sts, on the rules that _ should govern fishing within 12 miles of the British coast has narrowed. The French can probably accept that this zone should be reserved essentially for British boats provided the French can maintai_n a reasonable level of traditional fishing there. But much more difficult is the British demand for a ban on boats more than 80 feet ~ lo- ? in areas beyond 12 miles off the north of Scotland and in the Irish Sea. The French say that beyo~ld 12 miles the rules of free access must be guaranteed. The Dutch-sponsored compromise--a system of licensing--misfired mainly through lack of detailed preparation. COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981 CSO: 3120 . 2 - FOR OrFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION BELGIUM - POLL SHOWS EYSKENS'S POPULARITY ON INCREASE Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 11 Dec 80 pp 11-12 _ [Article: "The Political Barometer: Mark Eyskens's Irresistible Rise: The Belgians Have Confidence in their Prime Minist,er"] (Text] The "PP?[POURQUOIS PAS?J-Marketing Unit Political Barometer" this time re- � veals an interesting rise in temperature: the popularity rating of Mark Eyskens, who has been finance minister for a short time, suddenly becomes feverish in Novem- ber. And not by a little! Rated seventh in September with 27 points, he is now second, propelled forward by a jump of some 12 points! In short, this is the irre- sistible ri~e of Gaston's offspring, who has indisputably become a national person- ality. For the "Eyskens effect" is seen not only in Flanders (+12), but also in Brussels (+14) and even in Wallonia (+10). And this while a Karel Van Miert, for example, remains above all a very Flemish pers.onality, his score being low in Brus- sels and almost nothing in Wallonia. Other increases are also pointed out by this new "PP?-Marketing Unit" barometer: the PSC [Christian Social Party] Charles- Ferdinand N~thomb and the Socialist Guy Spitaels, both men receiving 4 points na- tionally. Among the new heads put to the test, only Herman de Croo, on the liberal side, clearly breaks through, thus becoming the Number Two man in the PW [Party of Freedom and Progress], ahead of Herman Vanderpoorten. The new justice minister, Philippe Moureaux (10 points), is of course rising, but , is still not pulling into first place among the "20" in our national ranking. The same is true for Freddy Willockx (secretary of State (SP [for Public Service] in the PTT [expansion unknown]), also with 10 points, and Jean-Pierre Grafe, chairman of the CEPIC [Political Center of Christian Independents and CadresJ-PSC, who only gets 9 points. This month "PP?" and "Marketing Unit" also tested the confidence the Belgians have in their prime minister. To the question, "Do ~ou have confidence in Wilfried Martens to solve the problems currently being raised in Belgium?", the 1,087 persons questioned responded as follows: --have every confidence .............................12 percent --have some confidence ..............................36 percent --have not very much confidence .....................16 percent --have no confidence ................................20 percent ' --have no opinion ...................................16 percent - 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 Thc proportion of ttic positive (48 percent) and the negative (36 percer~t) ratings is assuredly a good result for Wilfried Martens, since one Belgian in Lwo has at least - some confidence in him. On the other hand, it will be noted that one Belgian in five has no confidence at all in him. �A_y ~ WALLONIA September November Difference 1. Andre Coo1s ...............................39........39..........SQ [status c{uoj 2. Paul Vanden Boeynants .....................38........39..........+ 1 3. Wilfried Martens ..........................37........38..........+ 1 4. Antoinette Spaak ..........................38........38..........SQ S. Willy Claes ...............................36......,..35..........- 1 6. Edmond Leburton ...........................36........35..........- 1 7. Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb .................32.......,35..........�} 3 ' i 8. Jean Go1 ..................................32........32..........SQ ~ 9. Guy Spitaels ..............................27........30..........+ z : 10. Mark Eyskens ..............................20........30..........+ 10 - 11. Leo Tindemans .............................30........28..........- 2 - 12. Guy Mathot ................................28........28..........SQ 13. Henri Mordant .............................28........28..........SQ 14. Henri Simonet .............................27........28..........+ 1 15. Jean-Pierre Grafe - .......20.......... - As always, no personality really stands out from the crowd in Wallonia. Out- side of the obvious jump. by Mark Eyskens, who w as recently advanced by his statements on the "necessary sacrifices," the increase for C.-F. Nothomb and Guy Spitasls 3 for both) will be noted. Also noteworthy is Edmond Leburton's decline nationally 2) as well as in Wallonia 1). 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084447-9 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY BRUSSELS September November Difference 1. Paul Vanden Boeynants ..................44.........47........+ 3 2;. Antoinette Spaak .......................47.........47........SQ 3. Wilfried Martens .......................43.........47........+ 4 4. Mark Eyskens ...........................32.........46........+14 . 5. Henri Simonet ..........................38.........41........f 3 6. Willy D~clercq .........................41.........41........SQ 7. Willy C1aes ............................41.........40........- 1 8. Guy Spitaels ...........................28.........34........+ 6 9. Jean Go1 ...............................32.........~2........SQ 10. Leo iindemans ..........................34.........32........- 2 11. Edmond Leburton.. .......................30.........27........- 3 12. Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb .21.........27........+ 6 13. Andre Cools ............................24.........27........+ 3 14. Karel Van Miert ........................21.........23........+ 2 15. Henri Mordant ..........................18.........21........+ 3 Here too, the same increases are to be found for Eyskens, Spitaels and Nothomb. At a more specifically Brussels level, Vanden Boeynants and Simonet (both + 3) cons~lidate their positions as regional leaders, Antoinette Spaak being stable. - 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 FLANDERS September November Difference 1. ~Vilfried Martens .......................47.........49.........+ 2 2. Karel Van Miert ........................46.........49.........+ 3 3. Leo TindeMans ..........................48.........45.........- 3 4. Mark Eyskens..... ....................31.........43.........+ 12 - 5. Willy Claes ............................42.........41.........- 1 6. Willy Declercq .........................38.........41.........+ 3 7. Hugo Schiltz ...........................25.........29.........+ 4 ! ~ 8. Paul Vanden Boeynants ..................25.........27.........+ 2 9. Jos Chabert ............................22.........26.........+ 4 _ 10. Henri Simonet ..........................22.........24.........+ 2 11. Guy Spitaels ...........................20.........24.........+ 4 12. Herman De Croo - ........23......... - 13. Henri Vanderpoorten ....................18.........18.........SQ 14. Gaston Geens ...........................14.........18.........+ 4 15. Freddy Willockx - ........1~......... - Noteworthy here is the settling down of Leo Tindemans, who loses three points in his own region and two points nationally. Enough to make the great man of Edegem make a face, this maniac for pop- ularity polls. This is because in Mark Eyskens Leo Tindemans ob- viously finds himself with one more rival on his hands. A danger- ous rival: might not Mark Eyskens be that "third man" who tomor- ~ row, within the CVP (Social Christian Party], might separate the "enemy brothers," Wilfried Martens and Leo Tind~mans? - 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE OIv`LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 ~ . ~ - The goal of the "PP?-Marketing U;iit" political barometer is to determine the popu- larity of those who are leading us. T'he question asked of the persons who were in- terrogated being, "For each of the following political personalities, please tell me whether you wish to see him play an important role in the next few months?". - The inquiry was carrie3 out from 24 to 28 November 1980 by Marketing Unit, a company specializing in market studies and opinion polls, with a sampling of 1,087 Belgians age 18 a~d over, according to quotas as to sex, age, habitat and socio-professional class. The results were weighed in terms of the importance of the three regions of the country. COPYRIGHT: 1980 POURQUOI PAS? 8946 ~ CSO: 3100 _ 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300084447-9 FOR OFFICIAL iTSE ONLY COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE AIRBDRNE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE TESTED Paris ARNEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Dec 80 pp 30-32 [Article by Commander Pierre Mace] [Text] Corrnnander Pierre Mace graduated in 1965 from Ecole de 1'Air and volunteered for Transport. Assinged to the 2/63 Bigorre, he acquired all his N 2501 qualifica- tions there, before becaming a CIET instructor, then a brigade leader in 5alon. He lat er commanded the Transall-equipped 3/61 Poitou squadron. He has logged 4500 flight hours and is presently head of the General Studies Division at the COTAM General Steff. The code word Fregate designates the latest airborne operation (OAP) which, as part of the FAE (Foreign Action Force) trafning, made it possible to test reaction - capabilities for the 11th Parar.hute Division (DP) and for certain units which can be act iva~ed along with this force, particularly the TAM tactical squadrons. Cancept Monday Morning The Army General Staff, responsible for defining the general lines of the maneuver, set its theme: tactical situation, goals and terms of the action contemplated. _ The decision was made, in this case, to carry out an airborne operation in order to take control of an airport on which, in a second phase, combat materiel would be unloaded. Personnel and materiel means (ground and air) were defined. the COTAM component included Transalls ond N 2501's. Trans~ort squadrons were alerted through:TAM operations center. The designated tactical squadrons formed ~he crews. Technicians busied themselves around the aircraft to solve last-minute problems. The g athering of units began with little delay and it was possible before 1500 - hours to line up the entire operation in Toulouse which was selected as the operation's starting base. - 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080047-9 Monday Noon A liaison plane brought to Toulouse the Transport Group Commander (CGT) named for t~e occasian, who would provide technical support to the OAP commander within an inter-army genEral staff established for the purpose and in charge of mounting the operation. , Adapted to the scope of the maneuver, this general staff included among others: The OAP commander Cgenerally, a superior officer of the 11th DP); Tt~e CGT (chosen by COTAM for his aeronautics and milita-ry experience); An r~fficer of BOMAP (Airborne Mcbile ~perational Base), a unit of the 11th DP in charge of ter.hnical problem; in air delivery; An officer of PC AM (Mobile Air Command Post), permanent arm uf the Tactical Air Force for the 11th DP, responsible for fire support; ~ he cor~nander of ~t~e airborne troops. The first problems to be settled were of a tactical nature: i Choice of intervention mode: mass drop of troops and materiel or scattered ' drops? Assault 1 anding? - Rel~ted ~spects of this choice were also important: In ei.t~her of the scenarios chosen, pursuit flights would probably come into play (neutralization of intervention zone, protectian of transport planes especially during critical jump stage); Preparation of above ci~nd zone (beacons, radio contact); - Use of a PC (Corr~and Post) plane. Next came technical matters: _ Number of aircraf t available, and intent to maximize their capability, made it mandatory to strictly apportion loads