JPRS ID: 9550 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPR~ L/9~5Q
17 February 198 ~
1Ne~~ ~ u ro e Re ort
p p
(FOU~ 8/$1)
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JPRS L/9550 ~
17 February 1981
~ WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 8/81) `
a
CONT~NTS ~
COUNTRY SECTION
FRANCE
~ French Foreign Policy; S~atus, Directions, Goals, Problems r
� (PARADOXES, Autumn 1980; EUROPA ARCHIV, No 23, 198U~....... 1
Prob~ems To Address
_ Power Balance Analysis -
Bordea~.ix Composite Materials Industry Called ~i,eader'
(Pierre Langereux; AIlt & COSMOS, 20 Dec 80) J.8 `
ITALY
r
" Problems Confronting 55na11, Medium Businesses Described -
(Marco Borsa; LA STAMPA, 31 Dec 80, 3, ~t Jan 81) 22 ,
Union Leaders ~arniti, Benvenuto In~erviewed -
(LA ST.9MPA, 3 Jan 81y, IL-SOT,S 2f~ ORE, Jaz~ 81)............ 29
_ Carniti on New Labor Role: Pierre Ca:niti 3ntervi.ew
Benvenuto on I,abor I}isunity, G�a,orgio Benvenuto Interview
~
:
- a - [ III - WE - 15Q .FOUO]
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
FRENCH FOft~IGN POLICi~ STA~US, DIRECTIONS, GOAIS, PROBLEMS
Problems ~o Address
Paris PARADOXES in French Autumn 1980 pp 50-65
[Article by ~ernard Adrien, diplomat and direc~or of stt~dies at the Ynstitnte of ~
- Political Studies]
[Excerpts~ For several years the international co~munity has been undergoing
~ without cioubt the most acute pawer stru~gle it has known'~.since ]945. The post
war order and the complex equilibrfum which ensured its (iur2'~ility colla~psed dur-
~ ing the 1960's and the beg3nning of the 1970's und~r the combined effect of many
factors. However it may have be~n criticized and attacked, the resulting dis-
order seemed tolerable and even contxollable so long as wealth increased and the
appearances respected of existiug situations. flowever since 1974 the interna- _
tional situation as a whoZe, after having ~altered in several d{rectiona, today _
seems to be going from disorder to a growing dir~equilibrium which more and more -
el*ides all control. The major explanation of this phenomenon is surely to be
sought in the impQrtance, the novelty, and the rapidity of changes that have oc- ~
curred. But above all it shou].d be found in the odd and dangerous attitude -
adopted by certain large industrialized countries, particularly France, in Lheir
forei~;n policies.
Basically, it is that too much attention is pai.d ~o appearances in foreign policy.
The implementing diplomacy thus acqu�res an ~~real aspect. Since 1974 its pra~~-
� tices have consisted in minimizing or denying the erosion and cracks heard ~Ln i:he
' domain of capital as well as of energy, money, commerce, and atrategic relations.
Since then control has progressively escaped into the hands of the sorcerer's
apprentices. There could have been a reaction. But instead the foreign policies
of numerous industrialized countries preferred to continue to ignore the dangerous -
and difficult ~-eality. The spectacle provided by the "sumfluits" or bq the "Globe
Trotters diplamats has lang occupied the center of a stage where everything end-
ed in smiles. But what. great international problem received even the beginning
- o� a settlement? A deeply dangerous situation since it baffled its protagonists.
A situation scarcely changed by the recent increase in international tension,
marked by a genuine danger of slipping out of cont~ol, and people's becoming
- extraordinarily excited. Indeed how could people not become provoked when it was
clear to everqone that the situation was completely out of r_ontrol.
No doubt after the current crisis we will end in a brutal awakening. France, par-
ticularly vulnerable, is likely then to be taken aback by the mediocritp of its
new deal.
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Let us note today the principal areas of cor.frontation.
� The energy question remains at the c~nter of the stakes. WEiat is it if no't a
merciless struggle over purchasing power? The industrialized countries paq the -
producers for the petroleum in paper mon~ey and those among them that dispose of
hydrocarbons prefer to conserve them an3 buy abroad the quantities needed for
their consumption. These same countries increase the price of their industrial-
ized products, seJ:_i.ng them in terms of the very same inflation prices that they
continue to fue1.
In 1974 the industrialized countries withstood the increase; some wavered over a
solution involving use of force. The majority hoped to find a response in the -
form of a"Western" cartel of rich countries against thp OPEC. France then clear-
ly stated the problem, asking the united States if it were ready to carrq out its
responsibilities as producer, and suggested that an international agenc~ monitor-
, ing prices and purchasing power be e~ta~lished at the United Nations. These
proposals were r~jected. Refuge raas then taken in appearances, and its first
example was the idea of "dialog." Such has been the line ~f French proposals ~
since 1975. This approach was and remains a failure since there is no time to
dialogue, but only to negotiate over the purchasing power of energy materials.
Wliat of the Third Worlcl? Here today= despite certain appeF?rances and forecasts ~
to the contrary, a solidarity is ma3ntained among developing countries ~hat is
simply astonishing, considering all the cleavages and the increasing diversity of
these countries' situations.
The realities of the developing world in fact today seem very far from the for-
eign policies of our principal partners and of France. Of course, the extraordi-
~ nary general assemblies, CNi1CED [IIN Conference on Trade and Dev~l~pment], plenary
committees and specialized conferences all note some limited progress, but most
importantly they avoid mentioning, or reiterating before public opinion, that if
the five richest countries cr' the globe devoted 0.7 percent perhaps 1.0 percent,
of their GNP to developmer.t aid, the financing of the growth of these countries,
above all the most deprived of them, would finally have a chance of being assured
However, it would be advisable for thie aid to be financed not by paper money but
by effective savings. Alas, to state this simple truth is to risk passing today
for being out of touch with the new realities. Yet, what more timely ob~ective
is there than the increase of Foreign Assistance~ and the organi~ation of the raw
materials markets as France suggested more than a decade ago? What a gult ~till
- separates us from satisfactory solutions these domains! France's effort for
Foreign Assistance is diminishing to the ,.:int of being nearly caught up with by
_ the most backward industrial country. Car~~ronting 4he dominant religion of
liberalism, our diplomacy urges the organiz~tion of markets with increasing ti-
midity lest our unwilling partners be offended, and we hope that treating them `
tactfully will bring them around sooner to our way of thinking.
Let us consider the monetary field. There we have been witnessing for almost 20
years the certain and continuing decline in the situation.
A certain line was followed beginning in 1974. After the Rambouillet agreements
during which France came close to the American positions concerning gold and
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floating exchanges, all that the international conferences on the subject did
~ was to align law with the facts, that is, legalize the existing disorder. Revi-
sion of the statutes of the M~netary Fund so diluted the powers ~f that institu-
- tion that now everything is allowed. The emission of international liquidity is
less than ever contr.olled and its division is extremely un~ust. In a period of
hyperinflation the IMF iound it necessary to issue DTA [special drawing righta].
- Pro~ecta for the stabilization or consolidation of dollar balances sre of absurdly
limited extent, and at all events were re~ected. Finally the timid discussions
- concerning control of the international capital market took place outside the IMF
and achieved nothing, which only goes to shaw that it is merely desired to deal
w3.th this question in terms of special interests, that is the rivalry between
New York and London as international financial capitals. Today the IME is cer-
tainly one of the institutic~ns that has sacrificed the most to the policy of ap-
pearances, even if during its ann~al meetings international officials continue
the ritual of venera+ting the ar_tributes of a pawer which has, in part, abandoned
it.
In the commercial area, the present situation is marked by a considerable increase
in competition coming from all categories of countries.
The realities of the question of commercial confrontation remain badly understood,
especiall}r by France. At the opening of multil.ateral commercial negotiations a
prerequisite was advanced, according to which any tariff or nontariff reduction
must r.ot be put into question by monetary manipulations. Quite symptomatic of
current bad practices, this prerequisite was immediately abandoned. And so since
~ 1974 tariff and nontariff obstacles have been negotiated while the value of cur-
rencies has been fluctuating to an uaparalleled extent, and unemployment has been
increasing regularly. An exceptional attachment to appearances. Here, too, in
a period of great economic difficultie~, thF European Commimity, whose protection
level is the lowest in the wor~d, follows the sole policy of reducing it still
further. Without lapsing into protectinnism, are there not other completely dif-
ferent and naturally dynamic ways?
� Let us come to security questions. In this area the reign of appearances ended
~ in bitter disappointments. First, in Afghanistan it was discovered that in let-
ting things "go" during a coup d'etat perpetrated 2 years ago, the door was open-
ed to such interpretations khat a Russian military invasion became possible. And
- since appearances were clung to in the analysis of the situation, suddenly a11
international relations revolved around Afghanistan, which for awhile became the
"navel of the world" to ~uch an extent that South Vietnamese imperialism and the
changes in South America or the Middle East became unimporta~t. No government
was not ready to "die for Kabul." And we have seen the r~ality of these fool-
- hardy resolutions.
As another example of the reign of appearances, one can cite what could be called _
the "European Illusion." It consists of thinking that faced with the American
eclipse and the growing incomprehension between the superpowers Eurone shoul3 take
over and assume the qualities of the third great power. Europe's emergence, it
is said, would be one of the outstanding characteristics of the present time. And
indeed responsible Europeans of the highest rank saw fit to intervene i.n Warsaw -
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or in Moscow in order to renew a contact which in their eyes was irremediably
eroding. T~is ambition reflects a dou5le paradox. An interventioz~ in a strate-
gic domain where, except France, all E~iropean countxies are singularly lacking in ~
means. An intervention taking place precisely when the only realities existing r.
in Europe, that of the Co~unity, are crumblin~ or are struck with weaknesses. -
Is this not a rather irresponsible evasion of the difficulties caused by the fail-
ure of a certain way of constructing Europe? The results of this ~ffort ahowed
how illusory is a policy lacking in means.
The important element in the last fe~w mont~is~ developments is ult3.mately that
never has the highest level of relations bztween the great powers ever been af-
flicted and that detente has basically not been challer~ged. More than rhe grave
danger of confrontations, one must recogn.ize the lack of staml.na in the armaments
r~ce. Each one, small ~r large, suddenl~ became concerned about its real situa-
tion before resuming with a special frenzy this costly race. But during tha~
period of concern each ~ne suddenly felt the precariousness of the current bal-
ance. Let us wager that in view of the c~sts brought about by this race, there
will soon be felt pressures to r~turn to modera~e gractices.
This kind of foreign policy has a p~ivileged diplomatic form characterized by
dramatic entertainmen~t and per~onal relat:Lo~.3. F
For some years this method, used particularly b~etween the principal Western coun-
tries, has also been spre~:ding to the "Europe of the Nine" level. The institu-
tion of European coun.cils is no doubt one of the 'i~est indications of European
solidarity. But it remains true that an institution is �valued only ~by what it
accomplishes. What a great surprise ~co find that despite the manq conflicts in
interest among the Nine, almost no European c~:nci1 sY.n~e 1974 ras rsvealed any
real crisis or serious con?~ron~atic:as. While all tY~e subjects siav~ inc.rea5ed ~n
seriousness and existing European achievements have been borne i.n pain, one
- starts to wonder about the spirit of compromise that suddenly has taken possession
~ of our partners. One dares not suggest that this is because nobody wished to
take up difficult problems with the fir~ intention of solving them. R~sult~ of r
the different European councils would tend to confirm this since ~n~ would seek _
in vain for new com~n policies or new developments added te the European struc-
- ture. There is an exception, and it moreover is the only subject where any an-
tagonism, quickly dissipated, could be detected. That is the European ~Ionetary
System. Finally, there has been for a year a calling into guestion to an unprece-
dented degree of the Community's common agricultural policy and Great Britain`s _
contribution. Beca.use of having let the CAP erode, and closed on.es eyes to tl~e
inadmissible criticisms Great Britain levelled against the EE, it is natural that
~ the crumbling away of the Edifice should now appear ~.n broad daylight. But today
the process has taken such a turn that one can doubt the abilities of t~ne persAns
in chsrge to control it. And n2w the Germans, after the English, start tA have
doubts about the Common Market.
~~.t
In real life l~t is in the nature of t:~ngs not to develop as statesmen would wish
them to. In a human uui.on difficulties and a rupture generally come as a conse-
quence of mutual indifferences, of weakness too often accepted, in short, from a -
growing inability to solve problems to~ether. To ignore t:~e fact that life is
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made up of confrontations and diff:Iculti.es writh which one must live and try to ~
resolve is to risk veYy painful awakenings. For Europe, we are at that point.
The erosion is out of control.
But another way is open to French foreign policy. Experience shows that since
1945, under cextain conditions our couatry can alwaye influence in an essential
way the international scene, certainly as a result of F~ance's own weight and own ~
work, but dlso because of it s clear and orig~nal concept of interaational rela-
ticns. Three directions are today opea to ttais resumption of control of our for-
~ eign policy:
--Stop the uncontrolled slippage in the principal sectors of international activ~-
- ittes.
- In the monetary field it means tha'� it is urgent ta stop the la~mess and disiute-
gration of the system or at least avoid encouraging this.
- In the c~mmercial field it means it is rQCessary to return to a stricter concept
of reciprocity in Europe. In the securicy domain it is well to criticize the
extraordinary armaments race taking place before our eyes and which constitute
~ a permanent thxeat to detente or what remains of it.
--Get to the heart of tlne problems af our time. _
Energy ought to have priority. Today a real negotiation is needed with producers _
on the purchasing power of hydrocarbons. The establishment of periodic contacts
permitting examination of this question and taking it into account within the
framework of, if not contractual, at least foreseeable and more or less regular,
_ price increases, would permit attentuation of one of the more serious elemeats of
insecurity of this time.4 ~Ionetary questions ought to be dealt with in concert
inasmuch as they determine in lazge measure the current problems Qf oi.l producing '
countries. A radical reordering is required: organization of the international
capital market, consolidation of dollar balances, retara to mure stable exchange
rates with a direct or indirect reference to gold, effective uaiversal~zation of
the IMF and institution of machinery ab"~.e to discourage a dangerous multiplication
of reserve currencies. The current structure of international credit totally in
private hands has become extremely fragile as a result of the second petroleum
shock. Only the institution of ineans of public control and mechanisms c~f guarantee
is capable of avoiding a possible crisis of confidence turning into a catastrophe. _
In the commercial field it would be preferable to have a real European market
policy. It would encourage the adaptation of agricultural and industrial produc-
tive capacities, and of services, to harsh international competition. With its ~
various instruments, tariffs would help certain leading "infant" industries to get
a foothold in the market; rights which would have to disappear in a few years could
be applied in areas wnere there is a strict reconversion policy.
Vis a vis the Third World the question of foreign aid is essential and in this -
domain France ought to undertake to increase considerably its current efforts. In
- the case of commerce, the op ening up of industrialized markets i~c already broadYy
, accomplished and w311 be mor e so. Finally there remains the organization and
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discipline of markets which are still starting out and could contribute impor-
- tantly tc~ the development of poor countries.
Iri the security fi~ld, it is appropriate to abandon the soothiug concept of
detente for an extremely wigilant attitude. In sp~.te of talk, the only thing
that really counts is defense capability. It is thus essential to translate our _
determination first into our militar~ plans. In this domain these past few years
France has fallen into uncertain attitudes. .
Since 1974 one has only spoken of nonproliferation and disarmament plans in
- Europe and elsewhere, without planning to increase the too small number of our
nuclear vectors and especially of submarines. The question of whether the coua-
try is satisfied with maintaining its established situation in the defense field,
or was it preparing for the future, has long remained without clear response. A
new resolve does seem to have developed under th~ pressure of events. But it is
strangely coupled with an uncertainty regarding ~he strategies to adopt and the
e~:tent of our forces' field of action. in that regard the need cannot be over- _
emphasized for France to dispose of an effect~ve peace keeping force, a~le to de-
fend its vital interests where its adversaries seek to destabilize, in addition
to its strategic capacities. The inhibitions which colonial con~lict~ or post
colonial conflicts have created in all Weatern countries ought nut make us submit
to threats ro our deepest interests.
~ But there is another domain where a couatry like France can exercise considerable
influence in the security field. That i_s the assertion of basic truths con;ern-
ing the frightful accumulation of stocks of arms or the use of intolerable meth-
ods. In brief it consists, for example, in defining the Afghan resistance guer-
~ rillas as legitimate and possibly recognizing them and not treating them as
" rebels. It consists, for example in calling the Vietnamese expansionist policy
what it is, or indeed not to tolerate the sufferable inconsistencies of the Iran-
ian leaders, received in Paris the very same time they tried to assassinate our
political refugees, after having themselves benefitted from that status. It
means finally that the whole truth be told as w3s th~ case in the past about the
extraordinary will zo power of the Soviet Union now arming itsel.f and oppressing
people beyond all measure.
Renew our relations with our allies and our neighbors.
~ France surely has fundamental intereste ia comanon with the United States of Amer-
ica. But its principal interest is that this grea.t country should conduct a good
policy. Never will France or any other couatry have interest in America's flood-
in~ the world with its dollars, sudden~y change its security policy by 180 degrees,
help increase oil prices, or shaw a retrograde egotism vis-a-vis the Third World.
The voice of reason is to wai-n its friends when thep err, it is not to let them
go t~ their ruin without saying a word. For that it is necessary to consult to-
gether in ways other than insipid aummits or sterile procedural confrontations.
New formulas must be found as soon as possible.
The same is true for the field of Europe. It ~s henceforth up to us to present
our partners with the choice of energy, financial, agricultural, commercial, and
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technological solidarity by going to the root of things. It is up to us to pro-
pose in each of the iields policies for the future and for example a ha.rdnosed _
exporting agricultural policq.
But let us not through emugness, conservatism, and lack of imagination allow a
structure to collapss that is import~nt for the country and could be even more _
so. In this new context the attitude of our English ~nd German partners will be
much cZearer. Each one will then be obliged to take positions on constructive
measures and not on destructive measures or of hasty improvisation. Since when
all is said and done the great experience of these past years is that the facts -
have clearly shown that Europe was not the obligatory passage point or the inevit-
able future necessity for France. If i.t is true that we gain in all areas from
the European construction, we lose in every way with a me~3iocre and unsound
Europe. Many have said this but not always convincingly. T'ne recent movements
- of the Community or of the parliaffientary assembly amply demonstrate there is
neither a Europe-at-any-price or a Europe of miracles, and from seeking to be
too European, France came to forget what today it po$sesses ~ore than any of its _
partners--the independence of its defense.
- Moreover this siruation places it in a quite special position vis-a-vis its
neighbors. Here one should recall that England must rema3.n a privileged partner
of France in the security field despite the fac.t that it recently decided to re-
= new its strategic rockets in the United States.
Despite the very close links uaiting us with Germany, and which it is of ma~or ~
importance to develop, one might wonder about France's interest today in con-
ti:zually assisting this country imto the world's saddle, without any kind of r�e-
turn. In acting this way, flying in the face of German realities, which a.re and
will remain those of a country having a"special statute," it is doing no one a
favor to take it for something it is not. That is starting a change in the Euro-
pean status quo which could be dangerous in the long run.
But to take proper advantage of this turning point in our foreign relationa our
diplomacy should be inspired by several principles:
--the choice of a"Renault type strategy," the kind the Renault administration ,
carried out in making "breakthroughs" in the social field, and particularly in
adopting the Sth week of paid vacations. Once isolated, this great enterprise's
policy soon gained ground. In the energy field, in that of aid to the Third `
World, France has great possibilities for action.. In an "interdependent" world
that is indeed the way to res~e our freedom of action and to mark certain sec-
tors of international relations with a positive dynamism. ,
--a better use of international public opinion. Without interfering in the in-
ternal politics of our partners it is our absolute right to try to make their
public opinion comprehend what our positions are and w~at our ~udgment is on
matters. But until naw we have never seen that "diplomati~ news" which would
concentrate all our means in a yreat exercise ~f clarification in the more~varied
places. Mazarin and Richelieu flooded Europe with ra~ording of formidable effec-
tiveness. At a time of audi~-visual media, we cannot yet conceive of a"diplo-
ma t ic news" wh~_^_L~ is not merely an intemal political maneuver. In the monetarp
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field France once undertook a partial effort in this direction. Despite the iso-
lation of its pos3tions the results w~ere not negligible. Henry Kissinger's
' memoires are verp instructive in that regard. T'he former secretary of atate
describes the respect the American authorities had for France's monetary posi-
tions under the presidency ~f General de Gaulle and of George Pompidou. 1'hat
did not prevent the American government from devaluing the dallar. flenry Ris-
singer nevertheless recognized that Pompidou alone avoided a devalua.tion of
the stru~gle.
- --the �return to less diplomatic "frenzy." Na summit that has ~ot been appropri-
ately prepared and sure of getting to the bottom of one great ~ub3ect. No visit
without a relatively limited aim. No policy conducted simultaneously by three
government departments inspired by divergent a.mbitions and concerns. ~hus se~a-
' rated from the sound and fury, our authorities could have a greater chance of
dominating a complex situation where success is determined by the correctness
of the analysis. Thus, surely, with clarity of ob3ectives, unity in implementa-
tion, the coimtry's support-a condition of success--wou].d be obtained without
difficulty.
Clearly, France should leave the domain of appearances for the field of action.
Before present difficulties the alternative should not be to change a given posi-
tion in reaction to the two Greats and thus have the logic o~ their interests
a prevail in the real problems with which we are confronted. French foreign policv
should be determined first and foremost in relation to our own national interests.
And France's interest today is not in a policy of appearances. It is in the
restoration of an international economic order, it is in the respect of the cur-
rent territorial status quo, and against all the military adventures which seek
to change it, it is in the struggle against pnverty in the world.
FOOTNOTES
1. First sub~ect mentioned by the Brandt Com~ission.
r 2. Mr Ertl recently declared the CAP cost too much and the GFR could get along
with a national poli.cy.
4. The oil producing countries have almost themselves c~me to propose such a
solution, considered until recently as totally unrealistic.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Compagnie Europeene d'Editions et Publications Periodiques
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Power Balancs ~nalgsis
Bonn SUROPA ARC~iI~' in t~erman No 23, 198o pp 701-709
~rticle by Walter Schue+ze, aecretary of' atudy comrdiss.ion on
Franco-German relations at French inatitnte ~f internation~al re-
lations, Paris: 'New Directions in Frsnch Foreign Policy - Ba.sic
Factors: External Dictatee and Domesti~ Constraints_7 =
~ext7 The dramatic change in the climate ot East-ia'-est relatione
since the Soviet invasion of A~ghan~stan a year ago, the intensi-
fication oY conflicts i~~ ~he Third Worl~ and, last but not least,
the possibility that II.S. ~oreign policy i.~av change under Ronald ~
Reagan are forcing French political 3er~ders to reassess their
diplomatic aseumptions a.nd goal$. Ever since the founding of the
Fifth Republic, French p4licy has been one c~P ~.ational independence
and concomitant autonomy in defense and se~urity mattera. This
policy stancb and falls with the preservation of approximate mili- '
~ary balan~e between East and West and ~vith the continuation o~
the detente process in Europe. these two elements ar~ callesi _
into question, French diplomacy's optiona are narrowed a,~d as for
the domestic consensus to which President Giscard d~Tstaing has
often, if eomewhat euphemistically, r~ferxed as supporting fore~gn
policy ventures, it would become fragile. How difficult it bAs
become to protect the Gaullia~ heritage in a wholly new inter-
national arena is evidenced by Giacardts tactical maneuvers both
vis-a-vis the Weatern alliance a.nd the Soviet IInion.
With respect to the NATO decigion af 12 December 197g on t~p
modernization of inedium-rang~ nvelear wea~ons, France adoptea an
equivocal position. OP~icially, France a~nouneed i+, wculd not
participate in potential negotiations iimiting medium-range arse-
nals in Europe, since thie touched on the independence of its ow�ri ~
nuclear s~rike force and --most decisively-- since sucn a~ove _
would not ~ain the sugport c~ parliament or the public under any
circumstances. But beh~nd the ~eenee the allies wer~ t~c~ld that `
France welcomed moderni~ation in that it contribute3 to re-estab-
liehing the "euro-strategic" balance. Giscard d~Estaing's in'tial
reaction to the Soviet army marching into Kabul was sQarcely
different from General de Gaulle's at the time of the invasion of
Czechaslova.kia in 1968. But th~ the$is that this mer~ly wss one
more minor mishap along the way to detente eoon proved unsupport-
able with the Gaulliste in particular eharply critici~ing thi9
type of "appeasement."
Both of these inst~.nces rai~e the question Qf what Giscard~s real
options ar~. To be sure, since his election in Ma.g 1974 it has be-
come even more customary than under his predecessors for the Pre- ~
- sident not only to assume responsibility for general policy guide- �
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lines but alao to exerciae executive power which haa frequentl~
led to ministry experts turnin~ to Preeidential advisera for guid-
~ ance even An minor matters. This pereonal leaderehip atyle does
allow for lightning decisions ~uch as in the case of the Shaba
intervention or the one in Bangui and the Warsaw meeting with
Bre zhnev in May 1 y80 or the d iapatoh of aaval units to the Per~ian
Gulf; but it does have its very definite limitationa where ma~or _
new fcreign policy directiona a.re concerned, which is to say, the
big picture.
- The party alignments, which remaineci largely unaltered by the pax-
liamentary elections of Ma.rch 1978, do not permit ~oining forces
with the Weatern alliance --which three-quarters of the parliamen-
tary spectrum consisting of Gaulliste, 8ocialists and communists
- refer to ~.s returning to one of the "blvcs"-- nor ~io they permit
a revision of eastern policie$ such as is advocated by these three
ma~or parties, albeit for different reasona and atressing dif~erent
" goals. The re8ult is a blockage in domestic policy~ an impaase and
an absence of genuine, which is to say attainable options. 'ihere
: was significant evidence of thia when even the members of paslia-
ment made no move to raise basic questions concerning tne foreign
policy and the defense budget during this year's deliberations.
Similarly, in looking ahead to the Preaidential elections in April �
or Ma.y 1981 , Giscard will hardly want to add to already existing
- straixls between himself and Jacques Chirac's RFR by starting a
debate on the "essential options" of Gaullism. It i~ not so much
a question of taking time out to think things over as chancellor
Schmidt suggests in view of developmenta in the Unite3 Statea, but
a question of looking for additional options in the field of West _
- Eurapean cooperation where some movement may be possible.
~ A Specifically French Answer to Aew Ch~,llenges - EC Europe as New
_ Factor in World Politics
- It is quite evident that Giacard d'Estaing has been casting the
Eur~pe of the Nine in a new role aince early 1980 and has been
trying to enlist the support of his partners for it. In the ~oint
- Franco-German communique on AYghanista.n in early February there
was talk of apecial (West} European responeibilitie8 in view of the
new tensions and conflicts in the world. During his state visit to
- the FRG last summer, the President once again called for a unified,
strong Europe to act as a stabilizin~ factor in international af-
- faire. He raised the point again in his statement at the close of
his meeting with the crancellor in Paris last November. This "pro-
nunciamento" does not seem to be based on any clear ideas about
- creating an autonomous West Luropean power center. Is it merely
rhetcric or doea Giscard really beliepe in pursuing a"third way"
in a zone o~ lessened tension in expectation of changes in the
Eaet-West picture.? His political adversariea on the right and
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left are ir.~.clined to view it as a"gimmick; " the experts are trying
to figure out the "whys and wheretors" of a West European power
ba$e or rather the political impotence c~f the European Community _
which is said to be etronger today than the United States-- an im- ~
po.tsnce which Giscard considers an "anomaly," aa he told Helmut
S~hmidt. One thing is certain: ~y takin~ this position, the Presi-
dent has correctly gauged the mood o~ all democratic parties a.nd
large aections of the public and has outmaneuvered hio Gaullist
critics by pointin~ out t~iat the "Buropean Eurcpe" co~.cept was
conceived by the grand old man himself.
Ever since he took office, ~ieeard has been working hard to =
atrengthen the foreign policy ~omponent of the European Community _
both. in the Porm of the European council of heads of state and
overnment and the cooperation of the aine foreign ministries
~the so-called European political cooperation). Furthermore, the _
nead ~o retain the community ~s a sphere of operations made hlm
adopt a conciliatory attitude in times of seri.oua crisis (ae in
the ca$e of the British budget contributior~ and to reaort to tac~
tical maneuvering whenever there wav a conflict o~ interesta (as
in the case of Spain and Portugal becoming members or the problem
of basia reforms of EC agriaultural policiea.)
Seen in thia light, the c~~unit~r ia not merely a criaie manage-
ment tool in the negative sense, that is to say the management of
internal crises such aa result ~rom the differencea in the eaono-
mic structures and aims of the individual countries (the most re- _
cent eaample being the I,uzembourg compromise which settled the
institutional conflict centering on the application of the steel
crisi$ regulations by the community authoritiea.) The positive
aspect is exempli~iea by the proapects in the ~ielda of economic
policy and development policy as well as by diploma.tic activities
outaide Europe, as stipulated in the Zome II agreement. ~'aris has
- come out strongly in favor of appropriate initiativea bq European
political cooperation as a result of Gisc:ard d~Bataing~s appar~nt
realization based on his unhappy experiencea in the budget contro-
versy with Great Britain that the Council of Europe's summit meet-
ing~ had been taxed beyond their decision-making capabilities.
French Near East Policy Dilemma: To Act Unilaterally or in Concert ?
Officially, Paris i~ saying that it was not until President Carter
reacted unilaterally and ezaggeratedly to the Soviet invasion o.P
- Afghanis~an that the European partners, Great Britain and the
smaller countries in particular, eould be moved to act in cancert.
The offer to mediate put forward by the community forei~n ministers
in Rome last Februarp may thus be viewed as a significant atep on
the way toward more independence in Poreign policy matters in that
the Europeans did adopt a poaition of their own for the first time,
even if based on discreet consultations with Washington.
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The Near East declaration, prepared on the basis of European pol a.-
tical cooperation and made public by the heada of gove:~n.ment in
Ver~ice, was viewed b9 Paris as fur ~her prc~of of the elesire --on tre
~ part of the other partners as well-- to play the role of bystanders
in world af~aira no longer a.nd the ~inding was that the eight other
countrie s had come signif icantly closer to the Brench view of how
the Arab-Israeli contlict should ~ie solved. To be sure, the nine
forei~ minietera had already adopted a guardedly positive position
regarding Camp David, but the i~enice dEClaration labt June allowed
of two di~ferent in~terpretations: the ~+rench interpre ~~tion~Qc+ord-
ing to which the Camp David p~ocess had ended in failure, ~~-p ~~ug
the ne~d ~or entirely new solutions which would include all the
Arab cou.ntries involved pl~:s tD~e PLO! and the interpretation to
which most other partners held according to which the Tuxopean
initiative was viewed as a supplement to the ~amp David procesa
which these countriea were ready to continue supporting.
The controversy over this issue r3ised two important questions m~re
sharpl,y than ever before: Are West European initiativea ~uatifiable
within the contex~ of individual countries or the alliance, if they
touch direct~y on ~merican. intereats ? Is the "concert of nations"
within the community a kind of re-insurance contract which provides
immunity ~or purely national ventures, a safetp net in other worda
to be used in case isolated activities or d~emaada of one individual
country do not attain the desired results ? The French Near East
initiat ive at leas t does indicate that there wae no attempt tQ
evade a confrontation with Waehington and that Suropean political
cooper~a.tion is viewed as an instrument to be used to bring the
other partners into the Paris line. There is a history to thie; -
a~ter the first oil ahock in the spring of 19?4 it led to the brink
of a serioua cri~is with the Weatern allies. The then ~oreign mini-
ster Michel Jobert conclude 1 bilateral agreements for oil delioe~iiea =
with the Arab oil producer~ thereby weakening the bargaining p
- tion of the multinational ~corporationa. This practice to whieh the
OPEC countri.es adhered more and mora as time went b~ ha~c not under-
gone any~ change under Giscard d'~ataing. In fact, it hae been ex-
pandad in all fielda (commerce, arms s~les, nucle~r technology) up
- to and including the "exemplary" and privileged relationship France
and Iraq have had (at least until the outbreak of the war with Iran. )
In the diplomatic field, Giscard anticipated the Europea.n political
~ooperation initiative by calling for inclusion of the PZO in any
negotiations with Igrael while on his trip through the Gulf statea
last March.A trenchan~ commeutary on thie wa8: "will trade Palestine -
for oil." The Frenc2~ government was no doubt motivated by the desire
to secure oil deliveriea over the long term by making political con-
ceseione and by approaching the posit~on taken 3y the "re~~ction
front." Until the end of 1979, economic considerations weighad moat
heavily, but once the power etructure in the Gulf region shiYted
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and the Soviet occupation of Afghaniatan took place, ~`rench atten-
tion became focused on preven~ing the sp~ead of a new Baet-west
confrontation to this area. Giscard d~Bstaing made an unequivocal
point of this in the ~oint comraunique that was issued at the con-
clusion of his talka with Mme Gandhi in late January 198U in New
Delhi. With regard to the Kabul events, the communique ~tated thst
this "fait accompli" coulii not be tacitly arcepted but should not
at the same time lead to the forination of a new bloe.
French diplomats watched.r+ith great anxiety aa Vlashington made an
attempt to build up a m.'~litary presence on the Arabian peninsula
under cover of the Car'cPr poctrine. Ideally, the Brench felt, the
members of the Luropean Community should guaran.tee the non-aligned
atatus of the countriea in the area-- politically, by reopening the
- EC - Arab League dialogue interrupted by Sgypt's 1978 wifi�hdrawal;
economically, by making large-scale investmente and even militarily,
by increased arms deliveriea and the provision o~ training personnel.
In view of the American inability to contral the revolutionary
eventa in Iran, France went its own way by putting its money on
Ehomeini and, when this proved unauccesaYul, bp atfiempting to sup-
port Saddam Hussein's Iraq ae a new power ~actor in the Arab world
and a counte~weight to the Ielamic regime in Teheran. Aa far ae can
be judged, this strategy Na~ not coordinated rrithin the community
or with the United Statee; beyond that, it underestimated the
aggreasiveness of the Baghdad regime.
- At auy rate, the Iraqi attack on Iran created a new situati4n, fore-
- ing France to do what she had meant to avoid rhich was to play a
~oint military role in the Persian Gulf with the Unified States and
- Great Britain and to try to prevent the closing of the vital Strait
of Hormuz by asse~bling a Western "fleet in being." ~"he eubaequent
call for concerted guropean action --Paris ezperts even diacussed
plans for a"European fleet" and deplored the fact tha', the FRG waa
unwilling to send ships to the Gulf-- seem~ to hold out little pro-
m~.se of success in the abaence of prior coordination within the
community-- the more so, since the Frei.~h commitment to Iraq hardly
appeare likely to facilitate any at~empts ~ointly to help negotiate
_ an end to the Iraqi-Iranian war.
Progress of East-West Detente in Europe
The conclusion reached by the Blysee Palace that the unstable situa-
tion in the Idear and Middle East made it necessary for the EC coun-
triea to compenaate for weakness in American leadership as much as
possible by pureuing an independent courae influenced the reaction
- to y'che deterioration in U.S.-Sovie.t relations followin~ the invasion
oP Afghanistan to an even greater extent. In his New Year's messa,ge,
~ the President dramatized the dangers of war, at the same time pre-
senting himaelf as a cool and level-headed crisi$ manager. InsidE
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the cabinet, the opinion prevailed that the Soviet move cii~l not
signi~y a fundameatal oPfensive shift in Soviet etrategy but that
it resulted fi~~m a groes miacalculation of the eituation in Afgha- ~
nistan itself ae well ae of the reac~ion to be expected in the
United States and even more so among the Third ~orld couatries.
But as yet there was no compelling reason why this should a~fect
Fast-West relations in ~urope, or as the Franco-German communique
o~ early Feb~uary 1980 said-- detente would survive unless a aecond
blow similar to A~ghanistan were struck.
In the American view, such sta~Cements from the Preeident's inner ~
circle seemed to indicate a trend toward neu~ral~sm which was of �
no danger to the Western alliance as long as it remained restricted
to France ana did not spread to the F8G or the other cantinental
' allies. In spite of the fact that the Xest Puropean countries are
in general agreement both on Soviet intenticns and tha risl~s o~
- American overreaction, the gC par~ners certainlp do not ehare the
as sumptions vn which French diplomacy ig based. (~iscard viewa west
$urope'e role as that of a mediatdr between the two world powers.
- Hia coup de main of going ofi to warsaw ~or a face-to-face co~ver- ~
eation with Brezhnev last May (the preparations ~or whieh were kept ~
. ae cret from his own cabinet as well as the partnere) was meant ta
drama.tize the need ior ke~ping the line to Moscow ope~. ~his is not
on~ly or even primarily part of Qi~card'e election e~rategy as the
opposition and even his own coalition viewed it, although he may
want to make it appear ~-it would not be the ~irst time-- that Mos- ~
= c o~v would like France to continue playing the role of its pxivi- ~
leged partner in Euxope and would therefore ezer ~ snough pre~aure
on the PCF to 8ee to it ~hat the President, who would guaxantee
continuity, is re-slecte~. But it would certainly be do~.ng Giacard
d~Sstaing an injustice to accuse him of basi:ig his diplomatic
efforts $olely on election campaiga considerations. In his press -
conference of 26 June 1980, he declared that th~ ~fgha.nista.n crisis
~ must ~e resolved by political means which presupposes that the
Ea.at-Weat lines of comna~unication remain open. Addresaing himself to
President Carter on that same occasion, he said he had explained
to the President the reason8 why "Brance's policy was and would re-
main independent. " Paris had made a point of uxiderlining thie posi~ i
- t i on earlier when the French ambassador to Moscow coatrary to the
ambaesadors of the other western powera took part in the Ma.y Day
- f
e etivities and when offfcial relations with the Soviet Union con-
t inued as before (consultations with foreign minister Gromyko tak-
ing place in Paris in late April 1980.)
Di d this point to the pursuit ot a separate course vis-a-vis the
_ alliance, a.n experiment with "splendid isolation" for which France
hoped to gain ~C sunrort ? Both the preparatory ph~~ae and the actual
c ircumstances of chancellor Schmidt's Moscow trip (close prior con-
aultations within NATO, immediate report on resulta to ~lashington)
c ould only lead to the conclusion that the F8G was not prepared to _
~ ~ollow this path. And since the gremlin gave no real indication as
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time passed of wa.nting to withdraw its troops from Afghaniatan,any
possi~ility of Giscard offering himaelf as au honest broker fell
by the wayside.
' Since last summer, French diplomacy has intensified ita efforts _
toward achieving a consensus among the Western allies. ~'his is
neceesary not only in vie w of events in Poland but also because _
o~ the current CSCE meeting in M~drid. ~ere is a great deal of
skepticism a~ong French experts re~arding the chance~ of the -
French plan for a disarmament conference in Europe ~ecoming the
main element of a grou~, of eaperte to be decided upon by the
Madrid meeting. (The plan had been taken over by Suropean politi-
_ aal cooperation in November 1979 and NATO-integrated, as it were,
on 14 December 1979.) Mindful of what happened at the Belgrade
- CSCE follow-up meeting, Qiscard's adviaers sought to avoid having
discussion.B on concrete measurea with regard to leesening military
tensions become enmeshed in the human rights debat~. They had
therefore propos~d a separation o~ the three Helainki final act
baekete but then agreed as a reaul~ of a protest by the neutrals
to tie the disarmament conference scheme to a mandate to be isaued
by the main Madrid conference. Inao~uch as the Madrid diseuseions
. were more and more likely to be dominated by human rights viola-
tions i.n the Soviet Union, the invasion of Afghanistan and the
border contro~.s in the GDR, Paris even toyed with the idea o~ pro-
posin~ that the CSCE meeting be postponed~ which was not well re-
ceived by many Western partners and not only by the IInited States.
On the surface, this getting-back-inta-line on France'e part ie
evidenced by the fact that her ambassador kept to the NATO agree-
ment and did not attend the military paracie comm~emorating the
= anniversary of the S~viet October revolntion.
The problem of how France ca.n best champzon its own specific goals,
above a11 that of continuing the Eaat-West cooperation process in
~urope, vis-a-vis the Washington government has become even more
acute and urgent as a result of 8onald Reagan's election victory
= than it would have, if Carter had been re-elected. Going it alone
is neither poeaible, nor desirable, a~ Giscard d'Estaing unequivo-
cally emphasized on the occasion of hie Paris meeting wi~h chan-
cellor Se~midt on 10 November. Is ti~e "Franco-German twoeome" to
asaume ~he role of vangua~d ? The genuine satisfaction with which
the Elysee Palace reacted the cha.ncellor Schmidt's re-election
would aeem to point in that direction and it wae notewortk~y to
hear Giscard tell the chancellor that `the F8Q ia France'g "premi.er
partner." How can thie be reconciled with the vaunted independent
atance taken by the community of nine Briti~h ~oreign secretary
Lord Carr~.ngton, at any rate, turned thumbs down pn any idea of a
Fra,nco-Germa.n twosome by reviving the r,oncept of an BC political
secretariat, under discusaion since 19~9, and by simultaneously
announcing that the "special relationship" of the E'rigli$h-speaking
- countries should be reactivated as a,;o':int repr.esentation o~f inter-
ests vi$-a-vis the 8eagan administratioiZ.
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Official circles in Paria see little merit in the ereation of a
per~anent diplomatic w~rlsing group within the framework oY Europe~n
polit3cal cooperation --in the spring o~ 1980, a Britiah proposal
Yor the formation of a Near and Middlp ~ae~ crieis staft had been
turned down-- and are calling ~natead ~or a kind of (in~ormal) di-
rectorate to be sta~fed by the four leading European political
cooperation countries whose effectiveness woul.d not be reatrained
_ b,.y the hesitancy and the ob~ections of the smaller.~uropean part-
ners. Other ideas bein~ discussed are to have th~s worldwide
crisis management mechanism devaloped in joint sumouit meetings
= along the lines of t~uadelolzpe (January 1979) between the tinited
State~ and the three other leading western powsrs.
Perspectivea for a New Orientation
In view of the paramou.~t position occupied by the Preaident of the
8epublic, the ou+.�come of the election in late April/early May 198'!
ia oY great impcrtance. If, as is generally asaumed, Valery Giscaxd
dtEstaing tries for a second 7-~'ear term, his chancea of winning
are good. Public opinion polls give him a b~g lead over all his
rivals, including Fra.ncois Mit~erand who is running for President
for the third time. Continuitq of leadership of the Fifth Republic
--which is being referred to aa an "elective monarch~f'theae daya--
is not synonyffious, however, with continuing freedom of action in ~
foreign aff~irs. To be sure, a substantial ma~ority of the French
people consider Giscard to be better qualiiied than Mitterand t~
preaerve national independence, to maintdin a strong position vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union and to take a decisive position vis-a-vis
the United Statee. But many Parie observers eapect the n~w American
governm~nt to press for closer French military coopera,tion not only
outside the NA~O treaty area and to ask all the allies for better
coordination in the entire sphere of relations with the co~?uni~st
- bloc, including the controversial iesues o~ economic cooperation,
the embargo of strategic goods a.nd so on. Chances are it wi11 be
more difficult for French political leaders to assert their claim
to an independent policy beyond the con~ines of inere rhetori~.
Insofar as $eagan!s policies can be predicted at all, atrengthen-
ing NATO defenge capability and concerted action by all partners
in foreign affairs within the NATO framework have already emer~ed
as prioritg goals on the Republica~l agenda. ~hs French military
budget is ezpected to rise by about 4 percent in real terms next
year which far exceeds the increases, ad~uated for inflation, ot'
all European members of the integrated NATO command but which
cannot neceasarily construed as a relevant contribution to inarea-
aed burden sharing, as requested by washington, since Fra.nce ddes
not have a part in NATO defense a.nd deterrent strategy.
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The statement by the French represen~atige at the CSCE follow-up
meeting in Madrid, on the other hand, makes it clear ~ust how
little room there ia for independent action vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union and that coordination of Western po~itions haa priority
statu$. The change o~ government affects French policy most of all -
in the Arab world inasanuch as the Elysee~s persietent ef~orte to
have the community ta.ke concrete steps to reaolve the Israel con-
flict have met with mounting opposition bP Great Britain and the
- Beneluz countries since 4 November who firat wish to ascertain
the II.S. position before commiting themselves to a new Near East
initiative at the December meeting of the Council of Europe in
Lu=embourg. Domestically, Giscard d'Estaing's haads are tied on
this isa~ue, since most of the political p~.rties and the public
continue to ma.ke full PZO participation in anp new negotiations
contin~ent on that organization's recognizing Israel'e right to
statehoad. and security.
- Any new orientation of French will thus be the result of ezt~srnal
' pressures and necessities in the first inata.nce. Faced with a
Gaullist coalition partner, who would hold fast ta the principles
of the past 20 years for campaign purposes if for no other reason,
the President and his aupportera Nill have a di~ficult time in
� pleading their case convincingly in the midst of a totally ehangsd
world eitua~ion.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Verlag tuer Internationale Polit~.k
9478
CSO: 3103
1
~
�
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FRANCE �
COUNTRY SECTIOh
BORDEAUX COI~OSITE MATERIALS INDUSTRY CALLED 'LEADER'
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 20 Dec 80 pp 45-46
- . [Article by Pierre Langereu~c]
[Text] Problems posed by the development of F'rench ballistic missiles have reaulted
in an original applied research process which today makes Bordeau~c industry the
"European leader in high-performance camp6site material~, according to a statement
made bq Jean Touton, pr_esident of the Bordesux Chamber of Camm~erce amd Industry,
during a press conference on 12 December.
The administration (meaning the DGRST [General Delegation for Scientific and Tech-
nical Research]) has also confirmed the pilot role of Aquitaine ia the development
of high-performance camposite materials, paralleling Lyon's role in the wide dis-
tribuCion composit~.Q sector, Senator Valade, dean of the Bordeaux Faculty of
' Sciencea, recalled.
_ The Four Musketeers
Four Bordeaua companies, in 10 years, have acquired experience which places tihem
in the forefront of Europe in the sector of research and manufacture of inechanical
or thermal high-performance composite materials (carbon-carbon, Revlar, boron, etc.).
They are: AER03PATIALE [National Industrial Aeroopace Company] (at Issac), SEP
~European Propellant Company~ (Le Ha~.11an)r SNPE ~Naticmal Powder and Eaplosives
Co~apany] (Saint-Medard) and Dassault (M,erignac and Bia~ritz).
AEROSPATIALE (Acuitaine) has principally developed composites for use in reentry
vehicles, wrapped structures and heat shields for ballistic missiles. ~R03PATIALE
has developed over 650 glass fiber- or Revlar fiber-wrapped components. It also
mass-produces heat ahields for atages (nose cones [fentres] of ~fibers .arid cera~aics),
structures (glass-nida-glacs saadwich) of reentry vehicles equipped with fieat shields
of Orthostrasil (silica-resin), Orthostralon (~ilica~nylon-resin) or three-dimea-
sional carbon-carboa, etc. AEROSPATIALE is associated wfth Carbone Lorraine in the
development of "A~erolor" carbon-carbon composites, for reentry vehicles and mis3le
nozzles, and it has also developed automatic, three-dimensioaal ~aeaving machines
whose (patented) process is at preseat of interest to the United States. AERO-
SPATIALE processes about 50 to 60 tons of composites per year in Aquitaine; howet~er,
its Mureaux plant, near Paris, works "cold" composite materials.
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The SEP employs half of its workf~rce (1,700 persone in Aquitaine) on composite
materials. It now processes about 70 tons of composites per year, which makes it
one of the leading plants in the world, according to Pierre Betins SEP technical
director in the field of powder propulsion. The SEP hac: made a specialty of 11igh-
performance composites, particularly "thermal" composites for applications in
missile motors and nozzles. IC masa-produces iaternal rubber heat shields for metal
motors and "mechanical" rubber piece~ for motor seats, which have given birth to
laminated composites (rubber-metal) for the "flexibl~ stops [butees]" of motor
nazz~.es. It produces thermal composites (pheaolic ~esin and silica, glass, carbon
and gxaphite fibers for the manufacture of nozzle deflectors and collars: the
collars of the 7iking motors of the "Ariane" rocket are manufactured b~ the SEP
in Bordeaux of phenolic silica (SEPHEN 301). The SEP has been associated with the
- CEM [?Electromechanical Company~ for several years in the GIE GEPEM jexpansions
unknown~ in the production of carbon aad graphite fabrics, par~icularly for the
manufacture of multidiraensional (3D, 4D and 6D) carbon-carbon composites, "SEPCARB"
[?SEP carbon] which are used in ballistic missiles (M4) and aeronautics.
Composites sre now being used in the motors of ballistic missiles to replace steel,
titanium, tung~ten and light alloys. The weight percentage of composites ia the
- inert parts of motors has increased from 20 percent to 80 percent in 15 years (the
- reat is metal), wizich has permitted a decrease in inert mass/active mass ratio
- (propergols) from 13-15 percent to only 5-8 percent, according to P. Betin.
This is a veri~able "technological revolution" which has permitted France, with
- the United States and USSR, to be in the forefront of countries dominating the
major part of the powder propellant sector. However, the SEP is also making plans
for the use o,f, composites in the motora of tactical misailes.
The SNPE, with ~ts resea.rch center in Bouchet, near Paris, has the largest re-
search and production potential in Europe, particularly ia the resins for composites
sector, as well as in the development of certain high~performance composites.
The SNPE manufactures polyestar and phenolic resins, epox}? and PSP jexpansion un--
known] for different applications: missiles, airplanes, sports equipment, etc.
PSP 6022 resin., which was developed by the SNPE with the ONERA [National Off ice for
Aernspace Studiea and Research], is in particular to be used for the radomes of
misstles a~d for turboreactor pieces; the qual3ty of this material enabled the
SNPE in 1974 to obtain a NASA contract for the supplying of laminated sheets of
carbon fibers in a PSP matrix.
The SNPE also manufactures epoxy resin compounds for the impregnation of Kevlar 40
f ibers to be used for wrapping the casings of ballistic missile motors~ the tubes
of rocke~t launchers and armor plate castings.
~ Dassault was one of the f irst companies to manufacture structural elements for
airplanes in its Bordeaux and Biarritz plants (wings, empennage, controls, etc.)
from high-performance composite materials. Thus a rudder was made out of carbon
fiber for the Mirage 3 which has been flying since 1975 and a horizontal empennage
from boron f iber with a titanium edging has been tested on Mirage gl.
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Several parts made from carbon fiber comp~site have been flqing in mass-produced
Daseault airplanes. Mirage Fl ailerons, produced with an optimized profile, have
perniitted weight reduction of 26 percent with a manufacturing price equal to that
of ineral ailerons. Aoneqcamb ailerons covered w3th carbon fiber have been maau-
factured for the Falcon 50 and repreaeat a world first in the civil aviation sector.
The Mirage 2000 is the fi:st airplaae, beginning with the planning stage, to use
composite materials in its s~condary and primary structures. Eyery aircraft has
17 parts of composites with carbon or boron fiber bases: fuselage doors, landing _
gear haCches, landing gear bay roof, radio bay door, elenators, vertical stabilizer
casings, directional controls, etc. _
The Super Mirage 4000 also has several parts made of composites. The duck empen-
nage is a honeycomb covered with carbnn fibers witb a titanium fastea.er. The ele-
vators pick up the Mirage 2000 concept; however, the vertical stabilizer with
monolithic paaels and built-in stiffeaers manufactured by Dassault with AEROSPATTAT.F
is a world first.
The application of composites to working parts t~as already permitted important
savings in weight, said Mr Basque, director of the Dassault plant in Merignac;
however, prices are still too uncertain; and large investments are still ~eeded to -
~mprove the cermpetitiveness of composite materials.
Mar.kets Everywhere
The market for composite materials in the next 5 yeara will be characterized by
strong growth--~S to 28 percent--in high-performance composites to the benefit of
the serospace industry bu~ also to other industrial sectors: nuclear, automobile,
oceanographic, offshore oil, energy, medicine, electrotechnology, sports, etc.
From now to 1985, we predict in parti~ular tthat the composites market will be
mult iplied 40-fold in the automobile sector and SO-fold in the medicine spctor.
It is an "open" market iato which we must "resolutely pro3ect ourselves," Mr ~Iugues,
director of AEROSPATIALE (Aquitaine), feels.
Most of the Aquitaine companies have ~.ready oriented their research and manufactur-
ing toward these new civil applications. ~
Thus AEROSPATIALE has studied and developed, with the IFP jFrench Petroleum Insti-
tute~, composite structures of glass or carban fibers for offshore purposes: pipes
(risers, extenders, etc.), hulls of reservoirs or underwater vehicles for great
depths (6,000 meters), helicopter pontoo~s and derrick structures, as well as water _
- in~ection pipes for deep drilliag (1,000 to 3,000 meters) which are to be utilized
in an upcoming drilling program in the M~editerranesa. It is also developing com-
posite structures for AEC jAtomic Energy Commission.~ ultracentrifugation machines.
AEROSPATIALE has also developed a flywhee]. for the storage of kinetic energy in
the 3 kWh ra~nge. 7'his rotor with a metallie core, fiber spokes and carbon fiBer
outer ring, with an 800-�mm diameter, can rotate at 630 m/s. Tt iras showa for tYie
first time to visitors to the Aquitaine plant on 12 Decetnber.
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AEROSPATIALE has decided to collaborate with Bordeaux companies in the manuf~cture
of composites. It has taken a share (one-third, of the capital) in ti-ie new AMC
[expansion unknown] company in Salannes (Medoc) which will manufacture metal
bottles reinforced with composi~e for the storage of gas under pressure for Air
Liquide in particular.
For its part, the SEP is mass-producing laminated rubber-metal composites (flexible
SEPLAM [?SEP laminates] stops) for the rotors of AEROSPATIALE Ecureuil helicopters,
structural composites (Kevlar-epoxy) for CFM-56 turbojet fan casings of GE-SNEQ~IA
[National Company foi Research and Construction of Aircraft Engines] and carbon-
- carbon composites (SEPCARB) for the Messier-Aispan.o brakes of the Mirage 2000.
. Other applications of these materials are under development: laminates for mech-
~ anical joints (kneecaps, joints), offshore sCructures, carbon-carbon compnsites for
' vehicle brakes (automobiles, trucks and high-speed trains). The SEP is also de-
- veloping a new famiI.y of ceramic composites reinforced with carbon in a matris of
silicon carbide, "CERASEP" [expansion unkaown] for future aeronautical turbomachines
and turbocompressors for land vehicles, as well as for metallurgy (crucibles for
the refining of copper and aluminum). The SEP has also made a specialty ~f surgical
applications of carbon-carbon composites.
~ The fallout use of composites in these various sectors eould surpass~~and by fa~~-
production for ballistic missile applications. According to P. Betin, "If the
spirit of enterprise and the desire for conversion animates our future partners in
the other industri.sl branches, if coordination of efforts and the support of the
public authorities are suitable," Aquitaine in.dustry, sided by Bordesux University,
could become "one of the world's ceaters for the rapid development of high-per-
formance composites."
A kind of "composite valley" in Aquitaine!
Despite their present drawbacks,-aging, shock resistance, cost---,composites in fact
now permit an important reductian in weight (energy economq) and a reduction in
manufacturing steps and time involv~~d in manufacture which compensates for the
still high price of raw materials.
However, as ~ustly noted by Mr Deplante, legal adviser to the Dassault Company,
there is still one ma~or hindrance to the massive developmeat of crnnposites in
France as regards civil and co~ercial applicatioas: it is the total uependence
upon foreign countries for fibers, whether they be Kevlar fibers (an Americatc
monopoly of Dupont de Nemours) or ~arbon f ibere (a moaopoly of the British Courtaulds
and Japanese Toray companies).
There is a serious supply problem, said Mr Hugues, who feels that national inde-
' pendence is not assured. I~oreover, even the missilES of the Strike Force are de~
~ pendent on composite fibers and raw materials iuL~.{.~ed exclusively by foreign
countries.
Then,why not launch a"Composites Plan" which would also cover the national manu-
facture of the fibers needed for the large-acale production of composites "Made
in France":
COPYRIGHT: A, ~ C., 1980
8143
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
~
PROBLEMS CONFRONTING SMALL, MEDIUM BUSINESSES DESCRIBED ~
; Tur~n LA STAMPA i:~ Italian 31 Dec 80, 3 Jan 81, 4 Jan 81
~Article by Marco Borsa: "A Report on the Italian Small and Medium Busines~
System�~ -
C31 Dec 80 p 11~
~Text~ Milan--The fir~t to raise a cry of alarm publicly was the president of the
CONFINDUSTRIA ~General Confederation of Italian Industry~, Vittorio Merloni, at
the FEDEREXPORT ~Italian Federation of Exporters~.meeting, citing the disturbing
trade balance results, which show that Italian producta have lost substantial
margins of competitiveness.
"The year 1981," said Merloni, "will be even more difficult." CONFINDUSTRIA's
pessimism was confirmed less than a week later by the ISCO ~Institute far the
Study of Economic Trends~, with a statement that "unless the export downturn can
be halted, the outlook for 1981 is certain to be worse than can be forecast today."
The Italian trade balance will close this year, according to the ISCO forecast,
with a negative gap of close to 19,000 billion lire, the largest deficit ever
registered in our foreign a~courts and virtually equal to the oil deficit, wl~ich
this ye~r rose by nearly 80 percent to around 20,000 billion lire, owing to the
steep rise in crude prices last year.
This is the second "oil shock" to have dealt a powerful unbalancing blow to our
balance of payments, following that of 1973-1974 when our oil bil3 went from 1,500
to 6,000 billion lire. On that occasion, however, Italy surprised all the inter-
national observers, the entire political and financial world, by performing a
genuine miracle: Having become by 1975 one of if not the leading industrial
nations, it succeeded in increasinq its exports sufficiently to cover its oil gap,
increasing its share of the world market during a year in which.there occurred,
for the first time in the postwar era, a downturn in international ~tr.ade~,
The producers of this miracle were the small~and, above all, the medium indus-
trialists (between 5 and 20 billion lire of that year in billings) of the so~-called
"mature" sectors, from textiles to clothing, from ceramics to furniture, fr~n
shoes to machine tools and to mechanical products in general.
~
F
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In Piedmont, where the FIAT colossus was compelled to scale down its production
from 1973 maximums (almost 1,6 million vehicles) to the minimums tor the decade
(just over 1 million in 1975) , a whole region living on induced p~aducstior.i, was
- able to convert to exportinq in an extremely short time, without awaiting lawa and
without relying on government promises.
Can the miracle be auplicated today, to at ~east cover the 8,000-billion-lire
increase in our oil costs? The enterprise world's response to factorsethatn is a
~ categorical no, because, they say, there are at least three key
_ prevent it. Five years of inflation at a higher average rate than that of their
competitors have driven Italian industries and proc7ucts against the ropes.
This year, for the first time in the past 30 years--the ISCO pointed out--Italian
exports have diminished substantially, not Qnly in terms of value but also in
volume. "I+ast June,~f~r the first time," according to a spokesman for the
A880PIASTRELLE ~Italian Tile-Makers Association~--ari association of 300 firms that _
export.s 750 billion lire of proclucts ann~ally, the world's leader in.this sector--
"the prices of Italian tiles were higher than those of German tiT.es."
The loss of competitiveness of our pra3ucts moreover coincides with the intensifi- _
cation of international competition, on the part both.of the indu~oblemsZeand of
countries, all with unemployment and excess-productive-capacity p
the so-called developing countries. Last year, the latter--according to GATT .
~General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade~ statistics---attained a historic high: For
the first time, exports of manufactured pro~ucts from non-oil-producing areas
exceeded in value the expor.ts of raw materials as a whole, having totaZed $78.5
. billion. Many of these products co~mpete with Italian ones, as emerged from the
most recent SNIA ~National Company for Industrial Exploitation~ survey, in the
report by Giovanni Bianchini, professor of industrial and commercial techniques at
- the University of Modena.
And thirdly, tighter international competition nas combined with an exchange
situation that is unfavorable to Italy, unlike the one that followed the 1973
crisis, when tl:e strengthening of the mark and wea~Cening of the dollar enabled us,
by letting the lira fluctuate together with the dollar~ to realize increasingly
higher margins for our exports, paying in dullars for our imports. Today, the
situation is reversed, with a weak mark tti~at penalizes our sales in~markets Chat
are our main outlets, while we pay incr~~asingly higher prices in terms of dollars `
for our raw materialsa
To sum up, the loss of competitiveness of our small and medium industries, as
compared to theix former liveliness, cannot even be offset by in.creased dynamism
on t~.e part of our large enterprises, which are undergoing an even worse crisis,
as is clear from the trade balance in key sectors of our economy, from steel to
- chemicals, from electronics to automobiles, the latter being a eector in which
thousands of billions have been invested over the past 10 years. CONFINDUSTRIA
Vice president Guido Artom said to our newspaper: "Italy is threatened with
industrial decline." The problems of the large enterprises could moreover spill
dangerously over the medium ones, exacerbating the latter's in at least two fun-
damental aspects: energy costs and financing.
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~3 Jan 81 p 9J
~Text~ Milan--"Dozens of f irms, if not entire sectors, even small ones, are going
bankrupt. Marco Vitale, partner in Bersani and Vi~ale, a consulting firm that
does business mainly with medium ~irms, is convinced that the comi~ng months hold
many difficulties in store for those export firm~ that have grown up in the wake
of the initiative shown by small and medium enterprises devoid of adequate struc-
tures aiid ot effective financial backing from the Italian banking system. "What
is lacking at times like these is the ability to find capi:al available for -
permanent investment in the firm, with which to guarantee its growth or defend over
the medium-to-long term the po~itions acquired on the dome~tlc and international
markets."
The drop in exports is worryinq entire sectors, which fe:ar either permanent loss
of their own competitiveness or an insidious erosion of their domestic marketa
by European competitors they had considered defeated. "The German producers,"
says a spokesman for the ASSOPIASTRELLE ~Italian Tile-Makers Association~--300
firms, average biilings of .7-8 billion lire, total exports of 800 billion lire--
"are sellino at lower prices than we,and are managing to.cover.tshe added demand
this is generating in their market, while outside of Europe we are beginning to
feel the effects of competi tion from the Spaniard; who are manufacturing a product ~
of inferior qualaty at a much lower price." The re5ult is that this year our tile
exports are at a standsti.~l, while, for the first time, imports from France ar~d
from Germany have doublec.
In another branch--that of sport clothing--French competition is making itself -
felt even more markedly. "Inflation," says Alfredo Maspes, general manager of
SAMAS ~expansion unknown~--billings of 12 billi~n lire in skis and pa~ckas, sup-
plier of the Italian national team--"is putting us out of busi�.ess." If we keep
our 1981 prices down, our costs will ruin us. If we raise them, we ],ose our
markets." The French are exploiting these difficulties and are reco~~ering ground
they had lost, with a sizeable penetratian into Germany, Austria, a:zd even Italy. -
"They have.quaranteed export financing, incentives, and billions of franes in
subsidies," Maspes points out.
s.a In the ski bc~ots sector, where the ItaLians have heretofore been the undisputed .
~ leaders, witr~ '._arge firms like Nordi~.a, it is now the Austrians who are rearing ,
their heads at the expen~e of several small Italian producers who do not have the
muscle to w~th~atand the first gusts of a financial .crisis.
The cost of mone'~ to one who does not have solid guarantees or very large size can
Ue as ;nuch as 27 percent. This is a powerful deterrent for anyone wanting to
produce for a while to lay in a s�LOCk, or for anyone seeking to resume the offen-
slve with new technical or marketing initiatives. "If I try to sell abroad," a
mcdium-business owner in textiles explains, "the banlcs tell me: 'Do not extend
yourself. Go slowly."' Fir.ancial ties not only do not support enterprises in
difficult moments but ev~n tend to~constrain their growth.
~
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The machine tool producers--billings of 1,400 bilLion lire, a positive trade
balance of 440 billion lire (+22 percent with respect to Iast year)--after
underscoring their concern, at the recent assembly of their category, over the
difficulties that are making themselves felt in international markets, requested
"instruments supportive of small and medium enterprises and favor~ng investment,"
to enable them to maintain and consolidate the strong positions tl~ey have achieved
in the domestic and foreign markets. ~
(1) MAGCHINE UTENSILI IN DISCESA'' ;
2~I inddu tonq~umuraN lkimu dt~ nuovi adini ~n lfrmini rNlit.�.:
b~w'1o t~imectr~ t 972 � 100 1 `
180 - ~ . .
' int~rno _ . . - ~
~stero 4 .:f. ~ ~
~ r~ fotal~ ~ ~ 5;. M , ' i
e , ~
140 ~ i I ~ i ~
~
~i i � ~
120 \ ~ i ' f �
100 ~
~ . ~ ' . f r~'`r .
~ ' x . .i
~ ~ ~ .~i;~w . ...iui
~
197~' .,:.s.- 1978 � ,.19T9��.� . ..~._.19Y0.-.
' font~: Mondu Etoromito i ( . , ~1
Key:
. 1. Decline in Machine Tools
- 2. (UCIMU trend index of new orders in real terms--base: lst quarter 1972=100)
3. Domestic
4. Foreign
5. Total
_ 6. (Source: MONDO ECONOMICO)
f4aurizio Vitale, general manager of the Maglificio Calzaturificio firm in Turin--
- billings of 46 billion lire, "Jesus" brand blue jeans, which, after having estab-
~ lished a beachhead in the Soviet Union, are now invading Libya--is convinced that,
with intelligent and carefully aime.i backing, the Italian knitwear and ready-made
clothinq industry can "corner all of Europe." "We are the Japanese in this
sector."
- The proper f?.nancial backing could also be decisive in sectors that are less
"impoveri:~hed" than that of knitwear. "As suppliers of industrial plants," says
Cecilia Danieli, general manager of the Danieli firm, which specializes in the
building of mini-steelworks and sells them throughout the world after having
prefabricateci them in Brescia, "we are compelled to seek pre-financing of export
contracts by credit institutions at current interest rates, and we are not always
able to pass on these costs to the client."
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The Danieli firm is negotiating with China on the possible modernization of dozens
' of old small steel foundries, but before assuming any Iarge commitments it must
ev~lluate the financial constraints these would involve.
The problems of small and medium enterprises, however, could still be mitiqated by
two favorable circumstances: the ample profits realized in the 1978-1979 2-year
period, which, according to the OECD ~Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development~, should help ameliorate the effects of the dimi:~ished competitiveness
of our prod~acts because they offer an opportunity to lower prices without suffer- _
- ing toa much hardship, and the greater propensity on the part of the banking
system to financing small and medium enterprises after being burned by their
experiences with the EGAM ~Agency for the Manaqement of Mineral and Metallurgical
Concerns~ and with the chemical industry.
"The market until now has been very receptive," says Sergio Cumani, deputy manager
of the San Paolo Bank in Turin, une of the most active and most sensitive banks to
the problems of small industry." :,hort-term credit is available, therefore, even
thouo,h it is costly. What is lacking, Cumani himsPlf admits, is intermediate- and
long-term credit with which firms can finance their longer-term programs.
"For medium firms," says Gi?ncarlo Gloder, ger.eral manager of the Private Finan-
cing.acid Investment Company--the leading cotapany in the intermed~iate-term banking
gool sector, a new credit c~annel tha~t has funneled to enterprises not less than
500-600 billion lire a year over the past several years--"there is not even a
li=a." "The market has stalled because of ~he ceilinq,'� Gloder explains, "just
when we were moving from the large over to the medium borrowerers of money. "The
demand for funds, however, is still s~rong," Glober concluded, "above all, on the
part of those medium and medium-larqe firms needing between 2 and 10 billion lire
to finance the development of their programs."
~4 Jan 81 p 11~
~Text~ Milan--"The need is more pressing than evex to resolve the problems that, _
emanating ~Erom the external structure, are weighing down the enterprises,and that,
in substance, boil down to the lack of an industrial policy based on clear choices
- and adequate instruments." In these words, Bruno Rambaudi, president of the UCIMU
~Union of Machine Tool Manufacturers~, which met in special session in Milan,
expressed the requests issuing from the mr~st efficient productive sectors on the
eve of the very difficult challenge that awaits them in 1981.
Absent a national industrial poli~y that sets the objectives and provides the in- _
� struments needed by businessmen to attain them, the widespread fear among indus-
� trialistis is that the entire enterprise structure will end up seeking cover as -
best it can, each one seeking to avoid rua.n by negotiating his position individu-
ally, or at most by sector, with the government, the banks and the Iabor unions,
with the object of eking out some advantage, some more or less minor privilege,
to help offset his marketplace losses,
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T:~e dang2r is making itself felt so acutely among the top C013FI1~DUSTRIA leaders
that they have been trying to work out, over the past �ew weeks, a platform on
which all Italian industry, large and Emall, can agree. "The problem today,"
Guido Artom, the vice president of CONFINDUSTRIA, stated to our newspaper recently,,
- "is not one �chat calls for distinctions as to large, medium ~r small industry:
The industrial decline threatens all of us."
To obviate "extended order" proceedings, CONFINDUSTRIA has launched two major
debates: one wi~h the banking system on credit and one with the government on
energy. These could give birth to the embryo of an industrial policy that would -
would provide enterprises with a framework in which they could move on a parity
_ footing and with certainty as to their rights and responsibilit~.es over the
coming problemsome years.
To date, however, this initiative has met with a sosaewhat cool reception. The -
banks, fearing they will become involved in the problems of industry, with
financial reconstructiun plans ~ased on transferring losses f.rom the enterprises
to the credit institutions, have beet~ highly circumspect in their respons~ ta the
invitation to discuss the operation of the credit system w~th regard to enter-
- prises. As for the government, it has for the time being flashed a number of
signals pointing in the opposite ditection. _
Probably alarmed over the growing trade balance gap in base sectors of vital
importance to the industrialization of the co~ntry, the government is tending to
react to the crisis by resorting to a massive dose of internal protectioniam, and _
of external protectionism centered on the large public and private enterpri~es,
disregarding the consequences such ~ policy could have in regard to the nation's
fabric of small and medium enterprises. The report on the state of industry just
drawn up by the government experta affirms that "protectionist" measures at the
Community level are indispensable, to give Europe the time it needs to extricate
' itself from the crisis it is currently undergoing and to restore adequate cora-
petitiveness in the marketplace. In Italy, meanwhilP, solid effort will be
deployed under Law 675 on industrial reconversion tc sustain, above all, its key
aectors, such as chemicals, metalworking and machinery, textiles, electronics,
~ and the automobile sector.
The minister of state participation has published a v:hite book requesting 13,000
billion lire, which has been criticized by CONFINDUSTRIA because it does not
provide a precise evaluation of the compatibiiity of this figure with general
commitments under the national economic policy, and because it does not address
the question of whether such a vaet sum should be directed toward large enterprise
" as a whole rather than to the public enterprises ~lone.
Steps have been taken in the area of energy policy that also discriminate between
enterprise and enterprise, and between sector and sector. High-energy-cons~,amer
industries have already obtained ample ENEL ~National Electric Pawer Agency~
billing concessions from the minister of industry, which he wiZl be campelled
_ to make up for elsewhere.
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' The breach opened by the first patrol of the privileged, however, has already
brought forth legitimate new requests for special treatment on the part of steel,
a heavy consumer of electricity. If alsv the eteelmakera are accm~�nodated by ENEL,
they will have no further recoursP byt to penalize small- and medium-induatry
conaum~ti.on--d0,000 aubscribers, approximately, who will pay more for their energy.
Those with lese clout will have higher costs.
' The same phenomenon is takinq lace in rEqard to methane supplies. The SNAM
' ~National Gas Pipeline Company~, an ENI ~N.tional Hydrocarbons Agency~ enterprise,�
is currently engaged in a dispute with CONFINDUS']~RIA, which ras advised its mem-
bers not to pay the most recent rate increases, so that it may negotiate the
energy issue as a whole. Meanwhile, however, talke have been opened at sectoral :
levels, so that if a general agreement is not reached, the prices of inethane will
depend on presaure the ENI can exert on the government and on khat which the
, enterprises can exert on the ENI.
In the finar~cial sector, distinctions, a~lready acute, will be further ~harpened,
widening the moat that now separates the large en~erprise, public and private,
from the small and medium enterprise. The 500 billi,on lire which the minister of
- treasury, Nino Andreatta, has succeeded in furnishing to the Mediocredito -
to finance small- and medium-enterprise proqrams next year have i~een welcomed with -
undoubted relief; but they represent a sum equal to that of a single 3oan
contracted by the ENEL or the ENI on the international market ($500 milYion each). _
"If we go on in this way," said an industrialist in a sector that is stil.l com.=
petitive, "we industri.alists will simply be reduced to requesting from the govern-
. ment one or more of the carrots i~ is offerinq us: financial aid, energy discounts =
, or protection against imports. This is a dangerous road. Have we:.not already
- exnerienced a similar one during the 1930's7"
(Last of three articles. The preceding ones were published on 31 December 1980
and 3 January 1981. ~Editor's note~).
COPYRIGHT: 19_ Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
- 9399
CSO: 3104
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ITALY
COUNTRY SECTION
_ UNION LEADERS CARNITI, BENVENUTO INi'ERVIEWED
Carniti on New Labor Role -
Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 3 Jan 81 pp 1,2
~Report of interview with Pierre Carniti, secretary general of the CISL ~Italian ~
Confederation of I,~bor Unions~ by Mario Pirani: "Carniti: Confiict Now Political--
Unions Should Manage Economy"; date and place of interview not given~
~Text~ Rome--The year 1981 has begun under an unmistakable sign: The production
boom on which the Italian eaonomy has been "floating" for 2 years has come to a
halt. The hopes of recovery in the export sector have long since dimme8: Over the
past 10 months, exports have c3ropped 25 percent and the competitiveness of our
products has declined by another 5 percent. Despite this, Italy was:again in 1980
the.only country in the world where real wages increased, while the ~.abor cost per
unit product rose ].5.4 percent. Can it therefore be impossible, in the face of
these facts, to persuade the un~ons to assume a less "alternative" posture toward
the system? We discussed this issue with Pierre Carniti, secretary general of the
CISL.
"The fact must be recognized," affirms Carniti, who comes across immediatPly as
the spokesman of the most extreme wing of the labor union triad, "that an era has -
come to an end. The democratic compromise that operated between the working
classes and the groups that ruled during the po~twar period, until the 1970's has
been extinguished by the erosion, following the oil crisis, o~ the growth margins
that had made it possible. The social conflict over incoane distribution has now
become political."
~Question~ In reality, this means you are refusing to aline Union strategy with
the oil price ~ag, which this year will be 21,000 billion lire. Do you not think
that in this way you will be le~ding Italy to economic ruin?
~Answer~ That is not the case. We, too, recognize the need to;channpl.a certain
quota of income from consumption into investments, but not from;~rages into
profits. It is an approach, however, that implies priorly a new union say in the
management of the economy. ~
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~Question~ Does this line not �:rnear to you at leaet "parallel" to that of the
PCI Italian Crnrmunist Party_?
- CF~ttswer~ No political party, not even the PCI personifies the working class. The
union movement is unquestionably its most representative force. It is not neces-
sary, of course, to be part of the Council of Ministers, h?~t rather to have.a say
in the councils where the procESS of accumulation is decided.
~Question~ What difference is there betweeri this new union presence in the
councils of real government and the PCI's position?
~Answer~ The PCI's so-called politica~ shift appears, for the time being, very
confused. It has made major strides forward internationally, but domesticall.; it
is infring~ng upon the autonomy of the latr~r movement. It is wishful thinking and
inadequate because it ignores the real political relationships. It is outdated
because it is based entirely on the preeminence of the state, disregarding the
nee~ for a changed pluralistic articulati~n of the social forces bn-.which a new,~
concept of �the governability of the natioh can be~based. From this standpoint,
the moralizing, renovating and liberating thrust the labor movement can exert is
important, refusing, as it does, to become the draft horse of any political party,
but demanding a new role of i~.s own in the governing of the nation.
~Question~ It may be as you say it is. To me it appears ~o be a condensation of
the thinicing of Pietro Ingrao mixed with a revival of the pan-unionism advocated
by Sorel or by Corridoni.
~Answer, You are mistaken. We give much impartance, for example, to the neec3~~~or
an underlyinq solidarity capable of brinqing about a change in the power relation-
ships bearing upon investments, giving these a character and a purpose they have
not had heretofore, and making possible an intervention in the 3outh, cooperation,
and direct management by the masses ~uncoordinated by any political or labor
organixation~.
~ ~Question~ And how do you view your intervention as regards the 3-year plan?
~Answer~ We either n~ve a say in the distribution of resources--of the 50,000
billion lire that is being talked about--or we da not. If we do, we are prepared
to channel a quota of labor income into ir~vestments, in the form of.~wage sav~ngs
the determination o~ which can be studied. If, on the other hand, the idea is,
as usual, to increase the tax on labor's wages, depriving them of any sa2~ whatever
- as to the use to be made of those funds, then we oppose it.
~Questionl From everything you have saic;, it would appear that the CISL is ~ ~
attempting a major thrust fbrward. Is this also intended perhaps;to mask the
failure of egalitarianism?
~Answer~ Egalitarianism was meant specifically to combat unfair inequaties, but
not to c~roup all the various occupational categories, individual performances and
other c~nsiderations under a single universal wage leve~--although our current
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concept~ in these regards still require clarification, in that, experience, _
college degrees, a sense of reaponsibility toward the product or the work of
others, leadership, but also willingness to accept necessary though socially down-
graded labor (manual~ onerous, etc) must all be accorded their due worth. The
pltrnmetric wage scale, therefore, cannot have a perennial or sacred character.
CQuestion~ Then, would you agree to a review of the unit value of the cost-of-
living allowance, which is at the bottom of this inequity?
~Answer~ If it were diminished as a result of a review, that would be extremely
unjust. If on the other hand it were incceased, that would be extremely costly.
Each step in the latter case would cos'c 800 billion instead of 400 billion.
February's 12 points would come to S~J00 billion: In two or three such increases
we could absorb the entire multi-year earthquake fund.
CQuestion~ Then, you are not open to any discussion whatever.
~Answer~ Yes, everything can be discussed--Baffi's ideas, those of Monti, or
Benvenuto's calculations. But if in the end the product unit cost dynamic remains
unchanged, then we will have resolved nothing. What needs to be done is to reduce "
the inflation rate, which is not dependent on the sliding wage scale but rather
on the usurioue credit policy, on tax evasion, on the breakdown of sts':e subsidies
and on the collapse of agriculture.
~ ~Question~ You have not mentioned, however, the inflationary effect of the cost-
= of-~iving allowance.
~ ~Answer~ That would mean exchanging the effect for its cause, no matter how one
looks at it. However, Benvenuto is also right when he maintains that wages must
be distributed differently between base pay and automatic mechanisms such as wage-
indexing. Together, they must represent a minimum social wage for all, but the
base wage must become more substantial because it is foolish to think that at
current levels of inflation rates the current levels of base pay increases can
be maintained. This is also the way to approach a full-scale review ot wage and
salary ranges.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
Benvenuto on Labor Disunity
Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Itayian 4 Jan 81 pp 1,2
~Interview with Giorgio Benvenuto, secretary general of the UIL ~Italian Union ~
of Labor~, by Massimo Mascini: "Benvenuto: Agreement on Basics or New Zabor
Splits"; place and date of interview not given~
~Text~ Rome--"I believe 1980 was a never-to-be-forgotten year. It was a signi-
ficant one. For tiie first time, labor began to debate all its problems with
no holds barred. It addressed its own crisis. It was a year of profound debate.
But 1981 must be a year of decisions, because we cannot go on anc7. on with self-
' criticism alone. df course, it will not be easy, because with~n the labor `
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.
le~iderslaip there are widely divergent opinions. But on some basic points, the
, first a,nd foremost of which is that of basic solidarity, an agreement must be
reache~,~. Otherwise, there is no point in going to the Milan meeting in
February."
G~orgio Benvenuto, secretary genera]. o~ the UIL~ makes no effort to gl.oss over the
difficulties the labor union movement faces in the weeks ahead. He well knows
that even tomorrow's meeting of the joint secretariat could be decisive, because ;
the internal polemics within the movement, concerning basir solidarity, are '
growing dangerc,usly and must be eliminated. It is the UIL, in fact, that in
recent months has stresseci the need for a top level meeting among the general
executive councils of the three confederations. Benvenuto, however, is prepared
to forgo the opportunity should it became necessary to call it off. ~
"The fact is," he explained to us, "that within the labor sphere today there is a
conflict between two confederations whose views differ fram each other. On the -
one hand there is a confederation that wants to explore new approaches, that
realizes there is no longer the room for further demands that existed during the -
1970's when--it must hot be forgotten--the buying poaer of wages was de�ended and
increased, a confederation that wants to explore tl~e societal terrain, that is
prepared to assume greater responsibilities, but that wants more power."
~Question~ And on the o~her hand?
~Answer~ On the othez hand there is a confederation that does nct want to ad~7ress ~
these problems. Not that it refuses categorically to do sc--let us be clear abou*
this--but simply that it limits itself to general statements on such issues,
declining, however, to act along those lines. Practically speakin~, Lh~re are
coexistent within the labor movement today those who are willing to shoulder the
burden of problems, and those who camou~glage, beY,ind a seeming consensu~ their �
preference for letting things stand as they are.
~Question~ But is not the real probl~m of the lat~or movement that of its sela- _
tions with the poiitical forces, an~i particularly with the PCI CSta?.ian Communist "
Party~? -
~Answer~ I do not wish to enter into a polemic with the CGIL CItalian General
Confederation of Labor~, but there is no question ix~ my mind that the problem
that needs to be addressed is that of the total divergence between the PCI and
some of the labor movement's basic choices. And it is not sol~ly the issue of the
50 percent, becaus~, alth~ugh not much has been said about it, the PCI's opposi- _
tion to the Western choices ~r,ade by the labor movement, and especially by the ~Ir~i
~Federation of Metalworkers~, in re5ard to the international developments is of
extreme political relevance.
~Question~ Is the labor front no~t united?
rAnswer~ The problem is precisely that of determining whether we will succeed in
sticking together or whether our conflict with the political forces will bring
about a nonc~ecisional phase. But we must also clearl.y understand the issues. The
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withholding of the 50 percent, for example; has been portrayed as being in addi- ,
S~ion to the other sacrificea labor was being asked to make, whereas in fact it is
an alternative. And that is the way it was born--as an alternative to the
Cosaiga government's authoritative maneuvers on wage-indexing.
~Qu~stion~ In what sense is this an alternate maneuver?
~Anawer~ To control inflation, the resources must be found, and the roads open
to us ak thi~ point are two: Either a control must be exercised by the workers
through an insfir~unentality such as the fund, or traditional measures will inevita-
bly have to ~ie resorted to, such as relate to gasolir.e or taxes, which hurt the
salaried worke.rs. The latter road, however, is the one preferred by those who
Of course,
are seeking to confine labor action to mere general protest strikes.
one of the problems is that of the political frame of reference, but I do not
believe we can wait any longer because, among other things, du~ing the period ~
. of national so..lidarity we also had the failure of the EUR policy.
- ~Question~ There are many, however, in the CGIL who are asking that the deci~ion
on the fund be deferred. _
~answer~ We cannot back away fram the fund, as some authoritative voices in the
CGIL would like. This union's policy ahift is at stake--this union that is taking
part in policy plannir.g and wants to make snreathaals~for unity,fwl~ichwlrbelieve
sacrifices will be wasted. Lama is lainchi g ppe
This is why I say lt
are important; However, a clarification is now imperative.
_ I f some-
would be useless to go to Milan for a meeting that would decide nothing.
one proposes a more roundabout route to the fund, he will not meet with a cate-
gorical refusal on our part; but it is necessary that positions be clear and that
each of us assume our proper responsibilities.
~Question~ As in the case of waqe indexing?
~Anawer~ Yes, in regard to wage policy and wage indexing. It is vseless to keep
making agree~ents affecting.oaly_the ca8res._ The entire wage_poI.scy ne~ds_chang-
~ ing. Cognizance must be taken of the fact that the occupational problem is a
aerious one, that percentage increases are not sufficient to maintain parametric
relationships.
~Question~ But Carniti asserts that to touch the sli3ing acale would cost a great
deal or would un2.eash a high level of confliction.
~Answer~ Xes, but i� we do nothing, it will all come down over our heads anyway.
Carniti is right; but it is also true that if we continue as now until the next
round of contract negotiations not even the skilled laborera will feel represent-
ec3 by us. This why I say we must debate the entire matter with no holds barred,
- even including stimulating proposals such as that advanced some time ago by
_
economist Marco_Monti. For,__nationwide or enterprise-wide contract renewa s
no longer adequate to n~aintain the diatances between the various wage-scale
categories while in�lation triggers I.2- or 14-point increases every quarter. The ,
coet-of-living point values must be revised, without any qualms over upsetting
labor union traditions.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editrice I1 Sole-24 Ore s.r.l.
9399 ~
CSO: 310l~ 33
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