JPRS ID: 9548 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080031-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/9548
13 February 1981
Near East (~orth Africa Re ort
p
(FOUO 6/81)
~B~$ FOREICN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9548 _
- 13 February 1981
,
~ NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 6/81)
- CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
5addam Husayn Compared to N~sir, Extolled ~
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 26 ilec 80-1 Jan 81) 1 -
~ ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
Muhammad Haykal Discusses At-Ta'If Summit _
(Muhammad Haykal; THE SUNDAY TIMES, 1 Feb 81) 10
IRAN
Bani-Sadr Attacks Opponents
_ (James Dalgleish; RE'UTER, 1 Feb 8I)........... 12
Country Reportedly Obtaining Arms Secretly '
(Peter Deeley, Peter Ilurisch; THE OBSER4'ER, 25 Jan 81)......... 14
Oil Contracts With USSR, Spain, India Sigtied
(Terry Povey; FINANCIAL TIMES, 13 Jan 81) 16
Briefs
~teza Sends Message to Women 17
MAURITANIA
Economy Minister Discusses Economic Policy Decision
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 Nov 80).......o....... 18
IDA Grants Loan for Gorgol Irrigation Project
(M~~RCHES TROPICAV~ ET MEDITERR.ANEENS, 21 Nov 80) 19 -
Briefs
Irrigation Loans 20
- Customs Tariffs 20
Hodh Echargui Economic Development 20
Application of Islamic Law 2a
- a- r III - NE & A - 12I. ~'OUO]
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Sonimex Price Incr~ases 20
MOROCCO
Article Analyzes Pluralism Tolerated Under Monarchy
(Hamid Baxrada; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 31 Dec 80)..~ 22 R
WESTERN SAHARA
Paris Magazine Interviews PULISARIO Chief
(Mohamed Abdelaziz Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81). 28
L~.bya Possibly Behin~ P~LISARIO Ship Boarding
(Abdela~ziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Dec SO) 31
Briefs
Diplomatic Relations W::.th Costa Rica 33
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� IrTI'F,It
AFtAB ~'~'F'AIRS
SADDAM HUS~YN OON~ARID TO N11SIR, F'X~(C~T.T~
' Paris AL-V~,TAN AIr'ARA3I in Arabic 26 Dec 80-1 Jan 81 pp 16-1�
/Article: "With the Fall ot ~he 'Arab Solic7arity' Slogan, the Dilamia of the
~ eighti.es: The Arabs Need Ar~thPx Nasir'~
/'r~xt~ There is a phex~n in I~rab politica.l life which inspires amazement.
In the midst cf the ~ension rhe Arab nation is going thr~ugh, in the depths of
the disputes fragmenting the Arabs, ar~d in view ~i the narY'c~ariess of the popular
base nn which imst regimes starr3, w~e ought to I~av~e aFraken0d day after day tA
Crnmuniqwe No One declaring a militan~ ooup in one capital aftex arr~ther.
This has not happened. In fact, it has not happened for s re].ativPly long time.
The Arabs today are venturing onto the eighties m~stiy with regimes which began
' life by the sevpnties and mana.ged to exist 10 years or more, an spite of all the �
disturbances wizich have characterized t3zis period in Arab relati.ons an3 in the
context of relations betwgen the regimes and their citizens.
, Perhaps the iniarobability of chanc~e in Arab capitals may be ascribed to a group
o� psychological and political reasons.
Tatay there is an alm~~t ge*~xal a~~?-sion bo m~imting an adv~nt~e t,~ reach pawer.
The spirit of blooc~y violen~ advent~e v~ich maz'ked o~ political life in the
fifties arxl sixties has quieted c~a?m or disap~eared. Mnre precisely, it has
fled behind the fear of even thinkir~g about adventure or ~3rking on it,
on the one hand; on the other, a deep feeling has grown a~an9 apP~sition foroes, _
be they civilian or military, that rule in this ooanplicated, distwcbed world is rn _
]Anger a matter of pann or circ:~m~tar~ce but is a burden, a lieavy burden by which
the people sitting in the seats of power today are op~essed, and c3oes mt mPxit
an adventure which will not ass~ attairanent c~f it.
This psychological reason which impedes the spirit of adventure is si~ori-~ed
Yyy ~e dani~r~e of a state of relative aontentment amor~g foraes, groups or
_ classes which possess the capabiLity t~o itake char.ge. _
For example, the militaiy class has been encased in privilec~es of salary, rank
and benefits and has been dr'awned i.n the ~omfart of civilian life, with eveYy-
thinq which psychological ar~d social stability requixes in the v~ray of early
m~riages, cars, ccmfortable Y~cames, ar~fi sane aoquisition cf luxuries which
the broad public of th~e citizenry c,anrnt qet its hands on. ~
~
This is as far as the psychological oor~ditions which helped regimes in th~
seventies ryeutralize the foroes ocx?~etent tA consti-ttibe a real danger to
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t~n are oor~rned. As for the political reasons, the ~liscussion of those is ~
- a l~err~`u~ly one.
' r
~ All the regimes born on the ~:hreshold of the sev~enties, ~.~xcept for a few - most
pranir~entl~ th~se of Iraq ar~d Sauth Yemeni were military in origin. Th~y
transferred their intense infatua~an with discipline, their e~ceptional oonoern
for their security and their ze~al. to surrourr3 thenselv~es with all means of pre-
vention ar~d early and distant ~rarning fran the barrac,ks tA the palaoe of govps'r.-
ment.
Col al-Qadhdhafi disnantled ev~erything in his jamahiriyah exoept for his security
ager~ies. Field Marshal Ja' far Nit~d Nunayri sheltered a s~porting military
strike far~oe ~ich was able t~o save his regime arr3 rid him personally of bondage
tA the hatchexs of coups who or~ce thax~ht that they had beoare part and parcel .
of the regime, if not closer.
4~fiat happened in Syria was sanething exi~eding all imagining. A change oocurred
= i.n the organic f~undation of the arn~ed foroes through reliance on a specific
factional fahric whose canoerous oells extem~ed to all service an;~s, in ti~e
form of officers described as offioers who be.lon~}ed t~o a religiaus sect that har-
~ bared feELings of persecutian vis-~a-vis ather sects ar~d went back to dark periods
in the histoiy of the religiws quarrels of Islam.
In or3er to negate t~e possibilities of any change in the regime, and out of a
c~cern to maintain the do~nir~ance of religious factionalism, even if changes
occurred in persoru~el, a religious militia by na~ne of the Defense Cc~anies was
established within the arnied forces. These ca~anies have their ber~efits, powers,
_ security agencies and independent leaders and have trained the scions of the
sect in urb~an oanbat, not just to strike aut at ariy military plot but also t~o
deter any civilian muti.ny ar pc~pular mavenent. -
This organic change in the stn~cture of th~e army explains why the religious regime
has ranained in pawer, supported by militazy p~w~x. This armed religious organ-
ization, s~rour~ding the capital ar~d main tc~n~s like an arniband under the
~ ~nnand of the brother of the head of the regime, explains ~y President Hafiz
, al-Asad has ranained at the head of his regi.me for 10 years although he "enjays
the support of only 2 or 3 pera:nt of the citizens, " in the wr~rds of Presic~ent
al-Sadat - quatirag a statcsnent President al~sad made in a v~rann m.~rn~?t of frank
talk between the tw~ in the past.
Lilcewise, tllese regimes ~ept for those of Iraq and South Yanen share
ariother characteristic: they are the property of a military offioer or leader
who holds all authority and power in his har~ds and on whose faoe are focused all
the lights of inedia propaganda. He is the "leadex of the cavalcade" in Syria,
~ the "devout president" in Egypt, and "our larother the colonel u~-io set off this
great revolution" in Li.bya.
� A Personal I,eadership with Limited Aspirations
These personal loaders, by virtue of their scant papular support, have res-
tricted their ambitions ~ mornpolizing power within the limii,s of the country
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they rule and aontrol; as a conseq~enoe, the~, axe ].ocal regional leac7~xs w~~o
do not have national aspirations goir~g b~yr~d ttae barders, ar~d refiy~ ~ l,~t any
winds b]Aw across the barders bringir~g in nationalist or unificationist in-
rluenoes.
PresiciErit Nim~ayri, at the funeral pY~ocession for Jaanal 'Abd-al-Nasir, cried as
n~ grief-stricken man ever cried. Nonetheless, the Suclane,s~ leader rejected
all Nasir's unificationist ideas when h,e was offered manbership in the federa-
tion of the republics of F.gypt, Syria arr3 Libya, in spite of his delight.
~resident al-Sadat relinquished a broad mass legacy which Nasir had bequeathed
to him throughout the ler~gth and breadth of the Arab nation and foroed himself
into Egyptian irYtroversion, ~gnor~ng the fact that Egypt, even befare its Arabi-
zation ar Islamlization, reached the peak of its power and the apex of its
brilliance by extending its influence andeffectiveness to the envirornnent around
it and that it lost even its national indeper~dex~ce when it drew back and iso-
lated itself in its shell.
It is strange that the Albanian policeman Muha~nnad 'Ali ~eal.~.zec1 the value of
Egypt' s opening to the Arabs; one day he alir~ost brought c3~yran the Ottan~n
Empire and di.srupted the international balanoe. The Upper Egyptian Nasir of
- the Bani Murr also absorbe~i this, and he gcyv~e.rned Arab emtians and gnbodied
their aspirations for J 8 years . This fact has been lost on al-Sac]at; during
his ternzre, Egypt has lost its Arab influenoe ar~d effectiveryess, handing its
independent national will over to the American-Israeli a~lianoe and its
thought and culture over to old peaple, thinkers frcm the thirties and farties
like TawFiq al-Hakim, Louis 'Awad and al-Fiusayn F~wzi, in order to strike out
at the Arab sp~rit within itself and to glorify the "civilized relationship� ~
between Egyptian ;~nan and Zionist man.
The strar~gest thi~ is that after all this al-S~-uiat was anxious to n~)ce Egypt
the leader of the Arabs by virtue ~~f nunerical majority, out of his belief
and many F,gyptians are the prisoners of this illusary belief as well-- that Nasir's
Arab leadership was based on the law of quantity Fyypt's ntm~erical quai~tity,
Yes, quantity was an effective elerent in the Arabs' acoeptRr~ce of Nasir's
leadership. Haaevpx, this accounting majority became ~~mlus margir~al and zero
when al-Sadat severed Ec~ypt's loadership from the a�nbitions, interests and t~es �
of the Arabs; al-Sadat today feels the cold shivers of isolatian, althaugh he
puts a total of 40 million Egyptians in his poGket. -
Perhaps on~e might say that our brather Mu-~r's military affiLiation and the
- indi.vidual nat~e of his rule have mt prevented him fran havir,g unificationist
ambitions which he has in practice P rressed through t~e atte~ts he made with
al-Sadat's Egypt, Bourguiba's Tiu~isia, Nu~nayri's Sudan and al-Asad's S~ria.
That might be tr~~e tA a]~rge ex`~ent. The man c~Oes have his unificationist
ambitions. F'awever, these ambitions are intensely inteswaren with his cloudy '
or obscure systen of thinking, have becrn~ lost in his intense fluctuating -
psycl~l.ogical moods, and have been uprooted tl~raugh the pxoliferation of h:i.s
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objectives, which sanetim~es swim rnrth with the current of the sea anr3 at other
times drift south with the sands of the Sahara.
That has all hastened the oollapse of the ruler5' and reqime's trust for the
Libyan presiderit . There then oc~red "the third theoxy" which he formulated,
with the d~vious ideas of a p~il in pru?~y school, to entioe Arab puUlic
apinion, to reviw the sc�~mdness of his political, idological and intellec~ual
- dechictions and to offer himself as a moc3el off the shallo~wness of thinking and _
vision at the apex of Arab political leac~ership.
al-Qadl~fi's unificationist ex~ximents have 1~cane m~re of a threat t~o .
the ].c~fty national goal of unity than the seoessionism, regionalisn and dares~i.c
orientation of the r~on-unificationist, anti Arabtx~od leaders. Unity i.s a holy
national ho~e, franwhose content ~che revential quality of sanctity which sur-
rourids it may rbt be abs+~-nt, by subjecting it tx~ capricious exFeriments which
are based on personal interests and poli.tical a~oes that bring ~sezy on the
Arab masses after a few weeks or months.
The repetition of the misfortur~e of the expe.riment and the meloc~'am-~ of the
wretched spectacle of secession which follc~rs the heat of the entree arxl the
beqinninq abn~tly and withaut prel�?naries tisn the serious unif.icationist
scenario into a ca~dy enticinJ the ma.sses looking on fran the C~.ilf to the
Atlantic to jeer whenever they wat~ch a unificationi,t soene. Haa oould that be
if the writer of. the soenario is President al~hafi himself?
The masses of the union in 1958 carried Nasir's aut~rabile froa?1 Shu}~i
al-4uwwati' s house to ~Y~e g�,est mansion where he stayed when he came to DaQnascus
to inaugurate the union state. Nowaclays the c7~oar's of Daanascus are flung wic3~e
open to al-Q~a,dhdhafi to visit wher~ever he likes. But where is tl~e P:~1thusiasn
of the masses? Where is the passionate desire to bear the leaders' retinues
on heads and shoulders?
Affiliation with Arabhood is rx~t just a symt~olic quality contain~ed in the body
of the name of a regional state, a senantic r~petition in press and radio oc~r- ~
ments and statarients by leaders and ministers, an applicatioa~ to join the Arab
Leagwe or an official acknowledgement which is entered da~nz like the p'resen-
tation of a re~primznd in the h~rt of ]:edgers.
Affiliation with .Arabhc~od is an absolute faith in the existence of a single
nation, not nurero~ peaples. This faith plainly and of neaessity ne~gates
affiliation t~o a countzy, state or entity whose borders were drawn up in the
past by oolonial fingers and irYterests.
This deep faith in affiliation with the greatPx nation and the broaden c~meland -
is what organically and spontarieotuly gra~ted half the Lebanese t~o ally them-
selves with their Palestinian h~others in the Leb~ar~ese war. While this war cost
the Lebanese and the Palestinians more than 100, 000 victi.ms, it baptised
the Arabhood of I~ebanon by blood. -
This deep belief in Arak~hood is what has preverited a single Le~ianese natiorial
leader fran standing up and rebukirg the Az'abs for the fact that liLtle L~n,
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wh,ase popul.ation cbes mt e~aceed 3 miJ.lion, paid this high grioe in blood and
lives wer 3 yea~s, while al-Sadat does rbt let an opportunity pass before the
micraphone with~ut reI~uking the Aza."~s for the fact that F~t, which nut~be,rs
40 r.u.llion, has paid 100, 000 victims ~ver 30 years in oo~froriting the Zionist
~nY �
_ Rsasons far tt~e Weak Feeling of Natio~al. Affiliation in Egynt
The weak f~ling of national affiliation is what pmnpts al-Sadat to boast un-
abashedl.y to the Arabs and ci~astise then ov~er w~at Egypt has dor~e for their
sake, as if the Egyptian azmy o~nsist~ed of ineroenaty troaps who fought by proxy
and deputization for the Arabs, nat for the defense of the AraUhood of Egypt
and Palestir~e .
Out of fairness to al-Sadat, he c~oes not bear the whole responsibility for the
weak feeling of national affiliation amr.~a~g the Egy~tians. The Lorr~ withdraQaal,
by virtue of the circunstances of bac~;:wardness arr3 declir~e, during 'cne era of
the Mamelukes, the Ottanans and Western oclonialisn, kept Ec~rt estranged fran
its consciousness of its affiliation with its motherlarr3 ur~til Nasir came and
awal;en~ed this consciousr~ess, though he was mt given the oppartunity ti deepen
it, implant it and validate it by education. Sharing in this responsibiLity
uras a broad ger~ration of nationalist intellectuals and thinkers ~o did rx~t
take the apportunity of Nasir's rule to irnrade the Egyptian universities arid
oenters of thought with their nationalist thinking.
Thus it was very sim~le for al-Sadat to h~ing F.gypt out of the front line trench
under the slogan of holding the Arabs to bl~ae far damagirg it. It was easy
for him to make a reoor~iliation with Israel and naYtnalize relations with it
withazt fearing a savacJe damestic wrath. In fact, this all t~oak place within
t'rie framE.'work of alienating F~ypt fran the Arabs, setting it apart fran them
and raising it above thesn.
In any event al-Sadat's regime is not the only regime inti~e seventies whic~ was
overwhelmed by narraw r~ional local spirit and was ultimately brought to
striking out at the man most entrusted with the strategy of "Arab solidarity"
on which the Arab T~eague was famc3ed in 1945 as a feeble, pale ~.xpression of
the unity of national interests.
There are regures which have been forced i.nto vacillation by circ~unstances on
the right and the left, making it inq~ossible for them to adhere ev+en t~o this
frail thread of Arab solidarity. President IVtmiayri, who began as a Nasirit~e
leftist in 1969, and ended up, as a result of ooup att,at~ts against him, as a
regional rightist, could n,~t put the Sudan in a position of solidarity, if c~nly
of a surface nat~e, with the Arabs against the Cai~ David pea~e with Israel
because he was prey to di f f icult dcmestic circumstar~es which made him the
prisioner of his Western relations.
The rejection of the principle of "Arab solidarity" by the regime in South Yaren
is founded on the fact that it has gone bc-y~xi the Arab pranises on which the
national front, firm].y linked tA the Arab nationalist~' mavement, was based
to its aoquired Marxist k~liefs.
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The success th,e Marxist regizne there has obtai~ed in gnphasizing th+e centralisn
of the state has rrt broadened into a wide pc~pular base on which the regime
could move. The blatant failure t~o establish such a base has oanpelled it
to agree to rally under thP LanbreZla of Soviet p~ot~ectio~, with all i ts ex~r-
bitant ta:;es fran the acoeptance of its influenoe, its experts, and it5
naval and air bases, to acceptance of its sch~nes to strenght~en its hegem~ny
wpx the autlets and entranoes to Arab water arx3 Arab shipping and oil routes .
Perhaps British policy makers naw realize the extent of their sttzpidity and ~ '
- shortsightedn~ss in handing the keys t~o pawer in South Y~ren o~v~ex t~o the National
Front taaard the erxi of the sixties, in order ~ offerx3 Ja~l. 'Abd al-Nasix,
whose forces c7~cminated North Yanen. They handed South Yemen out the winc~ow of
Nasirisn so that it would fall through the wir~daw of an enany who was greater
and more ciangerous to the West.
_ Search for an Alternative
The narraw dcmestic popular k~ase of the regi.mP.s of the seventies has caused then
to seek a foreign alternative on which to rely ar~d t,hraigh which t~o e~ercise their
Arab role, instead of choosing the alternative of their Arab affiliati.on and
extendi.ng bridges t~ tsansform the fragile forniat of "Arab solidarity" to an
advanced fonn of practical coo~ination or unity.
Syria's alliance with the Saviet Union, exPressed by the treaty of friendship
and ooo~peration which al-Asad signed with Brezhr~ev last October, may increase
Syria's defense capability, but it in fact and reality is an alte.rnative foreign
outlet and a safety valve far th~ danestic isolatioaz the regiure is e~erier~cing.
The lack of parity in the circunst~nces of the trao cont.racting garties makes tY~e
independenoe of S~ria which was always the crux of the delicate Arab political
balance a gawn to the calculations and interests of a major ootmtry like the
Soviet Union in its stru,~gle with the United States ar~d the West in the Middle
East and the Arab region, just as al-Sadat's alliance with Washingtpn has made
F,yypt the pawn of the calcv.~ations arx3 int~erests of a major cauntYy like the
United Sta~es in it~ st~g:~le with the Soviet Union to preserve its doani.nance
over the Rrab re~ion .
The Amnan su~nit conference oonsecrated, or a].m~st consecrated, the collapse
of the slogan of "Arab solidarity" which has been the basis of official deaLings
arcbng Arab countries up to naw. This relationship of solidarity did mt satisfy
- Arab nati~naLsts yearning for former relationships of unity, but the ooll.apse
of the slogan in this paor stage of modern Arab history has signalled the degree
of deterioration in urxlerstanding tn which Arab relations have declined ancl has
c~ened the way for Arab aotmtries to ciiserigage t~elves fran a mirLUman of
national relations in order that they may be distributed between the t~ao inter-
national camps oanpeting in the region.
?hus al-Sadat's aligTarent with the American ca~, and the rallying of S~ria, South
Yem~n and perhaps Libya urrler Saviet hegerr~ny, has far the first time in their
modern history faced tl~:e Arab countsies with the danger of a Yr~t or arnied oon-
frontation with one another.
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This statement is not a fonn of exaggeration, or prvwcation of panic in Arat,
gublic opinion. Rather, it is an actual fact, enhodied in the mobilization of
50,000 Syrian troops and 1,200 tanks alo~ Jordan's borders d~ing the Arab
sumnit confereryce with DaQrtiascus boy~cotted aryd embodied in the return of tsension
- to the Egyptian-Libyan borders, the autbreak of skismishes and m~bilizatiai
on the Libyan-Tunisi.an barders, Libya's intervention in Chad, the Iraqi-
Iranian war, a~d the continued I~ebanese dilsmtia, as forms of heated indirect
confrontations amor~q Arabs.
Thus the o~partunity renains fully present for the sheclding of Arab blood in an
- Arab-Arab war at any n~nt. If the calculations of Syria or Jordanian field
oo~rnandQxs who stand facing one ar~x on both sides of the b~rder go wror~g,
they may perhaps open another bleeding woau-~d in the Arab heart.
The Arab region is rapidly turning into a map of the international gartitions
which the oorxiitons of the Swiet-~nerican struggle br~aght t~ the fore after
World War Two. Just as there are tzao Koreas, tca~ Chinas, two Gesm-~nys and two
Eurc~s, we are rx~w e~riericing the first signs of th+e energenace of American
Arab countires and Swiet Arab countries .
Perhaps there r~o longer is any urgency prce~tirig the Uriited States t~o unleash the
Israeli rrr~nster to snap at th~ Arab body or discipLine one reg~me ar another -
fran time to time. Fiot or cold Arab stn~ggles will guarantee that the Arabs
are diverted fram their direct eneny. Li.kewise, there is no urgerycy prampting
the Sovie ~.s to e.ngage in the risk of setting of f the f ire of a third w~orld war
of uncertain results by directly approa~hi~ the Hrater and oil of the (~ilf; it
is emugh for Nbsaow to move its Arab pawris t~ fiexy a~cts wher~evex it wants
a local war or disturbar~ces in the area.
- It is the Arab reg~me.s of the seventies who bear the responsibility for this
unfartunate situation before histary they who by virtue of theis d~anestic
circ~unstances agreed to internationalize Arab di.sputes, dissension and struggles
on a broad scale . We are now preparing to enter a stage of tbtal Arab rif t
which it will n~t be possible t~o mend by the traditional methods of reoon--
ciliatian and laxity which for exar~le Saudi diplomacy has pursued.
Nasir arr.i the Arab Sunnit Form~i:
In the light of the tragic ciscimstanoes which the Arab nation is g~ing through,
the Arabs have lost Ja~nal 'Abd-al-Nasir and the distinctive national role he
played. Nasir ~s not abave the level of Arab disput~es - rather, he became en-
mored in them, ar~ perhaps tried tA ir~crease their intensity. In addition, he
. was defeated in three wars. Hawever, in view of what he represented as the
presider.t of F~t, the biggest Arab country, the direct influenoe and effect
- he had on the Arab state as a result of his papl.lar magic and his mass relations,
and the penetrating pawer of personality he possessed, ?~e was always able ~
get the Arabs united during the times of da~er.
Nasir ovem~re his personal anc~ political price and h~rorrhaging wounds in
Yemen and Syria t~o call for the first Arab sL~trmit meeting in 1965. This high-
level format for joint Arab acti~n prwed its great suocess in eLiminating many
disputes and lessening many difficulties and obstacles. Indeed, it managed t~o
establish, after his departure, a minimum Arab politiGal ar~d military solidarity
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and mutual agreenent on the Y,asic cause, the cause of Palestine and the con-
frontation with Israel.
It is enough, for 'Abd-al-Nasir to be held in estean in the eyes of the Arabs,
that he breathed his last at the peak of the s~erb effort he e~aerted at the _
Arab sLmnit level t~ stop the Jordaniar~Palestinian war in 1970.
V~IlZere, however, is the regime and the political leadership that may be qualified
to perf~m Nasir's role?
A review of c~rent Arab circ~anst~arzces does not inspire aptimisn abaut the possi-
bi.lity of producing a rapid alternative to Nasir.
~ President al-Sadat, by squanc7es'ing Nasir's mass legacy, by relirx~uishir~g his
~~i~na~ path and I~, maki.ng peace with Israel withwt autharization or agree-
ment fran the Arabs, has permanerztly forfeited his credP_ntials to perfornn this
role, and has snatched F,yypt away frcm the possibility of bringing a leader~._hip _
- to the fore which is able to bear this national burden.
Saudi leadership, by virtue of its traditional political status and its alternating
Arab position and Islamic position, does rr~t ~,~rant t~ transcend the frai~rk of
the role it had drawn up far itself as an imrediate, practical intern~cliary for
r~olvirx~ sudden Arab ca~lic;atAns without getting cban7 into their roots or ,
getting lost in their labyr'inths. -
President al-QadhcIl~afi has renaved himself, by force, determination and design,
fran the framework of the Arab cor~eption of a pe.rsonality which is able to play
Nasir's role. This cabsexvation also applies tA his "i.mificationist" partner,
President Hafic al~sad, who made an enao~'aging start with the seventies,
reached his peak in the October war, then gradually dr~a back and regressed, t~o
beccme the prisoryer of his regime with all its oonQlexes, weight, burdens and
ttm~ors . -
This rapid review also makes it neoessary that we pause before the Iraqi regime,
not because AL-Tn~T~1N AL-'~1RABI syrnpathizes with it but by virtve of the potential
it actually possesses for playing Egypt's Nasirit,e role.
This statenent may r~ot please those perr~ons who are tangli.ng with this regime on
tltie p,rab stage and who, out of jealc~usy or vexation with it, hasten t~o reject
its w~tY~iness and fitr~ess t~o perfonn this role.
Hvwever, this immediate object-ion does rnt corioeal the deductions of an unbiased
observer who has been follaaing the curr'ent Iraqi reg~me sir~e it caQC~e tA pawer
in 1968.
Perhaps the first and most cor~spicuaus of these 8edu~ctions is that the Iraqi
regime has in practice prwed its national oatmitrrent by affirmi.ng the irr3epenr~ent
nature of its political path and its an~.ety not to fall int~o the pits of align-
ment wi`.h international c~, at a turie w~~en p~apl~e makinq Political decisions
in other regimes are surrendering their wi.ll, one after the other, to the major
_ interna`.ional powers and are mortgaging their independe.nt ic3er?tities t~o Washingt~on
or Nbscx~w.
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~
= Whatever may be tY~e objections of those apposed to and making mischi.ef rnrer the
Iraqi regime's style of dealinq with events, they canmt deny its achievements,
~arting with the liberation of its oil and the rescue of the S~ra.an fmnt fzom
real catastrophe in the October war. ar~d ~r~ding with the raassertion of a mini-
mun ALrab will to resist the Camp David glatfarm.
For the first time in the modern histozy of ~raq, a yr~ur~g man has made his ~ray
to pa~r~r through the ranks of his p~arty in ord~er to give his snall cz~untxy a
strong fism leadership, political stability, and eoor~nic and c7~veJ_c~mental
prosperity, to c~ualify it to stand on the east~esn wing of the grea.t nation and
= defend the Arabhood of the G~.ilf which is being threatened by th~e T_~ersian peo~les
who are once agaan clressec3 in the garb of religion.
Of the regures born on the threshh~olr3 of the seventies, the Iraqi regime today
se~ns the mQSt stable, the most self oonfident, and the most qt~alifie~ t~o play
a unifying national role. The pe.rsonaLity of its gresident be~ars mach resan-
blance tio and oongruence with Nasir's personality; nonetheless, it is r~eoessary
to ackrr~wledge that the challeryges facing this regime are greater and taugher
than tYx~se facing the other Arab r~imes because it has pla~~ed itself in the
position of full national responsibility.
_ Perhaps this is Saddam Husayn's fate. His suocess in facing these challenges
s will in the practical sense pre~re him in the eyes r~f his nation to assune a role
similar to that of Nasir in the fifties and sixt.ies.
= The rcmantic rr>stalgia which will drive the Arabs in the eighties bo seek an
alternative leader in the form of the d~3rted oa~mnander shows the extent of the
- error on which are based the oonvictior~s as~d ar~alyses of "re~wlutionaries"
and "progressives" who considered Nasir an intern~ciiate, tentative stage bet3aeen
retention af the old and revolution against it, which must be foll~wed by a more
progressive, revolutionary stage.
4~fiat has actually happeryed is that the stage which follc7wed Nasir was "more
tentative ancl black," contr-~sy tx~ every "scientific int~erpretation" which says
that history is proceeding along a political line progrnssing t~oward the better.
There is rw dou'r~t that the "revolutionaries" wh~ see ~at al-Sadat and others
are dr~ing on the Arab stage have oane to regret their vexation with Nasir aryd
their constant expression that he vTa.s a transitional or internoediatiy stage
which would inevitably be follaaed by the sta.ge of total revolution.
The hoped-for radical revolution has rr~t happened, 3rr1 it is p~obable that it
will not happen at all in the b]~ody scenario which was sketch~d out by theories
whic~ give histAry a"scientific" int~spretation. Today, 10 years after Nasir's
departure, the Arabs are yearing far lsaders in his image artid not in the image
of L,enin, Castro or Guevara.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11887
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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
MUHAI~fAD HAYiCAL DISCUSSES AT-TA'IF SUI~IIT
LD021431 London THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 1 Feb 81 p 10
[Article by Muhammad Haykal: "Finesse and Forcefulness Stamp Saudi Simmmit"]
[Text] The most expensive s~it meeting in history came to its glittering
_ end last week in At-Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, with the leaders of 42 Islamic
countries reaching some agreement on how best they might face the future.
Among the decisions taken was the one to put the question of Arab Jerusalem
at th e top of the Middle East agenda. It was also decided that nothing
could be done about the Gulf War betwee;~ Iraq and Iran, and that requests
for cash from various groups of Afghan rebels should be scrutinised with
care if not scepticism.
The very sacredness of At-Ta'if--it is close to Mecca--was of enormous
importance to Saudi Arabia, whose considerable prestige and resources were
thrown into the affair. The Saudis were at pains to demonstrate to all
Muslims that the holy places, especially Mecca, wilich had been attacked
and occupied 18 months ago, were safe in its custody. And they wanted to
~ prove to others, particularly the Reagan administration, Saudi Arabia's
~ importance as Islam's representative.
1
~ Saudi Arabia was also seeking to reassure itself ab out its friendships
= throughout the world and its influence, not because it was a nation of rich
j resources and rich men but because of its capacity to inspire.
~ Such a role carries problems, however. Once you inspire clear-cut decision5
. on, say, Palestine and Jerusalem, it means you cannot accept even the
. semblance of a compr~mise. (It is no coincidence that the summit was named
"Conference on Jerusalem and Palestine"). And that, in turn, means running
the risk of difficulties with some traditional friends: that is, the
Ilnited States.
The nightmarish aspect of the summit was most apparent in its security
- arrange~?ents. After all, some of the 42 delegations were under vows to
_ liquidate each other.
Another task was to prevent the accidental confronta~ion of enemies without
causing offence. The Saudis achieved this with an i~ppressive mixture of
~ finesse and forcefulness.
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The summit security system, including equipment, cost $150 million. This
concentration on the hardware of law and order was in marked contrast with
- S audi Arabia's attempt to redefine "jihad"--an important word and issue in
Is1am. Jihad, or holy war, means total mobilisation against the enemy to
th e extent that, during jihad, no man is allowed to sleep. Many people
f eel that, in atte~mpting to give the word a more symbolic meaning, the
Saudis may simply be compensating for lack of action.
Whether this is valid criticism or not, the Saudis' interpretation has a
direct bearing on the future of Arab Jerus alem.
Efforts to negotiate an end to the Gulf War stumbled badly. The Iraqi leader,
Saddam Husayn, rejected the idea that Algeria should play a role in this.
In his view, no Arab could be neutral.
He was somewhat more sympathetic to the notion of the Palestine Liberation
Organisations' taking a hand in the mediation process.
Some of the poorer Islamic nations' hopes for financial assistance were not met.
Before the summit opened, there had been talk about a total sum which was put
as high as $20,000 million. The sum actually approved was $3,000 million,
An indication of this new mood of caution emerged from the discussion of
Afghanistan. Pakistan's General Ziaul Haq spoke frequently on what should be
done about the Afghan xesistance movements. He felt th e resistance fighters
talked more than they fought and he contended that if help were to be given to
Afghan refugees, it should be channelled through the Pakistan Government.
The summit leaders agreed, though the Gulf states are setting up a special fund
for anti-communist movements.
_ There were other important developments at the summit. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab ~irates and Oman formed a new block i~ which
- action on such matters as internal security, purchase of armaments, border
disputes and differences arising from the nationality of different tribes will
be co-ordinated.
= To avoid the war-imperilled Hormuz Straits, the Gulf states are now thinking of
constructing an additional oil outlet through Oman to the Indian Ocean.
As for the Arab League, it has gone into limbo. Now that the emphasis has moved
to the Islamic arena, where inter-Arab conflicts can be handled on a different
level, league members are una~~le to agree even on a date for their next meeting.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981
CSO: 4820
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_ IRAN
BANI-SADR ATTACKS OPPONENTS
~ JN011230 London REUTER in English 1212 GMT 1 Feb 81
_ [Report by James Dalgleish]
[Text] Tehran, 1 Feb (REUTER)--President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr has launched what
seems to be a thinly-veiled attac:k on his political opponents in a speech reported
today by the official PARS News Agency.
In an apparent reference to his hardline fundamentalist opponents, who are led
by members of the Islamic Republican Party, Mr Bani-Sadr has quoted as calling
, on Iranians to resist "bullies and tyrants" with all their power and unity.
"If you want to have an independent and free country, if you do not want to be
ruled by those who want to bring back the dark days of the past through lies,
trickery, calumny, 1?.bel, prison and torture, then do not fear anything," the
- president told his audience in the southeastern town of Jiroft yesterday.
Speaking on the eve of the second anniversary of the return from exile of Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeyni, Mr Bani-Sadr also said: "I will resist tendencies towards
oppression, towards [words indistinct) towards prison and towards [words indistinct].
Last November he alleged that torture was being used in Iran but he did not specify
by whom. His charge led to the appointment of a commission of investigation but
no report has yet been published.
PARS issued its account of Mr Bani-Sadr's speech in English and it was reported
in the English-language TEHRAN TIMES. But, except for a brief story in one moderate
paper, the address was not quoted in any Persian-language daily.
State radio last night quoted President Bani-Sadr as saying at Jiroft that Iran
knew, when it opposed Iraq in the Gulf war, that it would not get U.S. arms which
it had already paid for. T'his was a reference to recent remarks by U.S. Secretary
of State Alexander Haig on the subject.
But the radio did not make any mention of the president's speech as reported by
PARS.
The agency quoted him as saying: "Iran is not the former country which could
_ be kept in an atmosphere of suspicion."
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Ae said most Iranians opposed oppression and the soluti~n of problems by force.
"What could frighten people who did not fear the shah's regime?" he asked.
PARS also reported Mr Bani-Sadr as saying he woul~ not submit to "internal enemies
of the revolution."
"If we give the oppressors any more chances, they will intensify their pressure
and cruelties and we will be involved in greater problems before the war ende,"
_ the president said.
- COPYRIGHT: REUTER, 1981
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IRAN
COUNTRY REPORTEDLY OBTAINING ARMS SECRETLY
LD261647 London THE OBSERVER in English 25 Jan 81 p 5
(Pe ter Deeley and Peter Durisch "exclusive" report: "Iran Spends Millions In
Secret Arms Deals" ]
(Excerpt] Iran, desperate for arms in its war with Iraq, is trying to obtain
sup plies secretly by using friendly countries as a conduit.
'Itao weeks ago, a North African country approached Sam C~mings, the world's
largest private arms dealer, with a request to L~uy spares for British and American
military equipment.
Mr Cummings said last week at his Manchester warehouse: "They told us that the
spares were for Iran but we told them we could not supply them. The North Africans
offered to provide the paperwork to make it appear the hardware was going to them."
Sou rces in the arms industry tell us that Iran has agreed deals for $100 million
(41.5 million pounds) worth of arms in the past fortnight.
- Taiwan is said to be a big supplier. The same informant told us that the Iranians
had already obtained American made spares manufactured under licence in Italy. -
Hamburg, he said, was being used as a trans-shipment point. Other sources in the
industry indicate that Iran has also got military supplies from North Korea,
Algeria and Austria. Iraq, it is being said, is obtaining its equipment through
middlemen in Berne, Switzerland. .
We saw a telex message last week asking for one million rounds of 20mm ammunition
for Iran's F4 Phantom jets and a similar quantity for its FS Tiger aircraft.
Few countries would presently grant an export licence for arms to go to either
side in the conflict. Consequently, current deals being done in the West will
probably involve a bogus destination for the arms in order to obtain an export
licence.
South Africa is also getting large supplies of military hardware from politically
"hostile" countries where governments are prepared to turn a blind eye to inter-
national sanctions. For commercial expediency, these nations are using third _
countries--sometimes without their knowledge or agreemeqt--as fronts for the trade.
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Portugal carries on a flourishing trade with South Africa, selling huge amounts of -
ammunition to the military, although these deals do not show up in any government-
produced statistics.
The Portuguese Government's figures of arms exports for 1979, for instance, shosa
_ sales worth 2,300,$00 pounds to Gabon; but the African government has denied it
received anything. In the first half of 1980, Portugal claimed it had sold 900
tonnes of ammunition to Thailand, but Thailand, too, has denied all knowledge of
s uch purchases .
Over the same period, the Portuguese Government's statistics show that more than
1,250,000 pounds worth of arms went to Pakistan. The Pakistan Embassy in Lisbon
says no arms were p ur~hased, pointing out that the Pakistan armaments industry
produces every type of weapon Portugal could offer.
It has come to light that the aiQnunition allegedly destined for Thailand was
loa3ed onto ships of a Danish line. The same shipping line has been linked in
Copenhagen with the shipr~ent of 12,600 unarmed grenades from Montreal to Durban.
A shipbroker who chartered the vessel has been con~icted in Denmark of violating
the United Nations embargo on arms exports to South Africa. He is appealing
against the court findings.
Danish police have complet~d an investigation into thE movements of vessels
belonging to four shipowners suspected of carryfng arms or ammunition to South
- Africa in the past 3 years.
In two cases, ships have been identified where a bogus dE~stination was used in
port, but en route the ship changed course. ~
Where South Africa has been the true recipient, the Danish national flag has b een
taken down and South African military ships have come out to escort them into
- harbour.
During our investigations into misuse of documents essential to the arms export
trade, a Portuguese arms dealer told us of an instance where his government ha d
issued an end-user certificate--which details who the arms are going to--for
military supplies. The hardware was delivered to a Portuguese airfield. "One
night, planes came in and took away everything to South Africa," the dealer sa id.
In Spain, at least two cases are known where prominent arms manufacturers were
used as intermediaries in deals when tanks from India and Howitzer shells from
Canada were sent to South Africa.
In West Germany an armaments manufacturer is under investigation for having
allegedly supplied war materials to Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Argentina, all
banned by Bonn from receiving arms exports because they are "areas of tension."
The company claims all exports were carried out with government approval. The
arms found their way to their real destinations by circuitous routes: 1,000 machine
guns for Saudi Arabia went via ltaly; arms for South Africa went through Paraguay;
and Argentina got its supplies through Spain.
COPYRIGHT: The Observer Ltd [1981]
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.
IRAN
OIL CONTRACTS WITH USSR, SPAIN, INDIA SIGNED
LD131315 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 13 Jan 81 p 4
[Terry Povey dispatch: '�Iran Signs Several Ma~or Oil Contracts"]
[Text] Tehran--Iran has signed a number of major new oil contracts--including
one with the Scviet Union--in the clearest indication yet that the country is
returning to the world oil market.
The contract with the Soviet Union is for. 40,OQ0 barrels a day. It represents
payments for hard currency debts built up since Iran stopped gas supplies to the
Soviet Union early last year after a disagreement over prices.
_ The other ma~or contracts include 150,000 b/d with Petronor of Spain and the
renewal of India's 100,000 b/d contract for thie year.
Since the start of the Gulf war 15 weeks ago no official figures for Iran's oil
_ exports have been available, alt?~ough oil industry specialists in Tehran yesterday.
estimated current exports of crude to be 700,000 b/d.
They are sceptical of reports from Washington that exports had already surpassed
the Iranian target of 900,000 b/d for the first quarter of this year.
Iran has yet to announce its contract price for Uhe current quarter, although this
is expected to be made public later this week. A rise of 10 percent is expected,
taking Iranian light crude up to $38.91 and heavy to $37.81.
Iran is selling oil on the spot market at these prices at the Lavan Island terminal -
in the lower end of the Gulf. A surcharge of 86 cents per barrel to cover trans-
port costs from Kharg Island to Lavan is added to this.
Iran is using its small tankers to ferry oil to the safety of Lavan. However,
as VLCCs can only load at Kharg, a number of coumtries have taken the decision
that a single VLCC road is less of a risk than several trips using smaller tankers,
and are therefore loading at I~arg.
Iran could have sold more oil but several customers did not seek to renew 9 month
contracts due to renewal just before the war. Brazil and Sweden are two examples
of this. -
COPYRIGHT: The Observer Ltd [1981]
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IRAN
BRI EF'S
REZA SENDS MESSAGE TO WOMEN--Cairo, 7 Jan (REUTER)--The 20-year-old self-proclaimed
9hah Reza of Iran today sought the aid of Iranian women in overthrowing the Islamic
government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni. In a message to Iran, his first since
coming of age last October, the son of the late Shah Mohammed Pahlavi contrasted
"the chains of slavery imposed on women by fanatical reactionaries with the
equality guaranteed by his father's constitution. The shah's secretariat in
Cairo's al-Qubbah Palace re~eased the message on the anniversary ~f Iranian
Women's Emancipat'.on Day. The message urged the women of Iran to "shake off their
yo~es, unmask the diabolical plots (of the reactionaries) and set an example
of resistance to those people." The shah's family has been living in seclusion
here since March last year. President Anwar al-Sadat has offered them permanent
sanctuary. [Tex~] (JN080925 London REUTER in English 0918 GMT 8 Jan 81]
C~PYRIGHT: REUTER; 1981
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MAURITANIA
ECONOM': MINISTEit DISCUSSES ECON~MIC POLICY DECISION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANE~NS in French 21 Nov $0 p 3088
[Text] Mauritanian Minister of Economy and Finance Ahmed Ould Zein recently indi-
cated that "the economic policy decided upon by the CMSN [Militarp Co~ittee for
National Salvation] and the government will follo~r two main lines: a line of
austerity and a line of revival by index.
"This new revival is underway for we currently have an investment volume, either
- in the execution stage or on the point of it, of nearly 2 billion ouguiya. Here
I am speaking of foreign resources allocated to the atate. Thus I am not apeak-
ing of the investments made by tbe national companies, of which the most impor-
tant (Guelb pro~ect, Gorgol proj ect) are lanawa and which will begin in the verq
near future. But as regards investment by the state or from accounts assigned
to the state, the amount is on the order of these 2 billion ouguiya. These in-
vestments are at the takeoff po int. You will certainly learn of it, but for us
' it is a particularly important takeoff in the revival of econc~mic activity.
"I will add that the year 1981 will see the effect2ve start of oil and sugar _
refineries for which start-up conditions are linked. As concerns the other
pro~ects, the perspective is reassuring and in fishing the current si~aation will
soon be profoundly modified in a direction allowing much more activity in the
coming months.
"Thus," the minister said in conclusion, '~e have here steps allowing greater `
economic activity but also on a more soli~i basis, as it will not entail monetary
financing or an increase in the public debt."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
8860
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MAIIRITANIA
IDA GRANTS LOAN FOR GORGOL IRRIGATION PROJECT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3088
[Text] The International Development Association (IDA), a World Bank affiliate
which grants funds on liberal terms, on 8 November announced a grant of 11.4 mil-
lion SDR credit ($15 million, about 660 million ouguiya) to the Islamic E~epublic
of Mauritania for financing an irrigation pro~ect at Gorgol.
This pro~ect, cosCing about $93.2 million, is aimed at creating a focus of devel-
opment in southeast Mauritania. Included are construction of a concrete dam at
Foum E1 Gleita, a canal to carry water to the irrigation and r~rainage network., -
access roade, buildings, as well as technical assistance service, creation of pro- `
duction factors and agricultural equipment, and the building of 15 villages.
Project financing will also come from the Abu Dhabi Fund, the Sa~adi Fund, the _
Islamic Development Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development
(FIDA), and the Redevelopment Bank (R.~J) [Rreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau]. In
addition, it will benefit from gifts from Libya, the European Developmen.t Fund
(FED) and the Fund �or Aid and Cooperation (FAC).
Production from the pro~ect is expected to reach 26,800 tons of cereals, which
will permit the estiablishment of 4,640 families (28,000 persons) there aad the
creation of some 14,000 jobs. -
The IDA credit is repayable in 50 years, with a 10-year deferment.
During the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 7 November, the Mauritanian
minister of rural development presented a communication relative to the prepara-
tion and initialization of the Black Gorgol pro~ect. The council noted with
satisfaction that project financing arrangements have been totally completed and
took the measures necessary to initiate the pro~ect with the least delay.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
8860 =
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MAURITANIA =
BRIEFS
- IRRIGATION LOANS--The World Bank on 6 November approved an AID credit of 11.4
million SDR ($15 million) in order to finance an irrigation pro~ ect in the south-
east. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (FIDA) has ~ust grant-
- ed Mauritania a loan of $10 million for the first irrigation network in the co+.uz-
try. This pro~ect will allow close to 5,000 families to return to their homes
in the Gorgol valley. These pro~ ects are part of an overall agricultural devel-
opment plan that will decrease the country's dependence on importa. The author-
ities hope to reach an annual cereal yield of 26,000 tons. [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Nov 80 p 2960] 8860
CUSTOMS TARIFFS--On 16 October the Council of Ministers of Mauritania a~proved
a proposed statute to modify the schedule of duties and import and export taxes
now in effect at customs. The statute aims at establishing a simpler fiscal
policy and will be a first step toward harmonizing customs tariffs among CEAO
[West African Economic Community~ members. [Paris MARC~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
RANEENS in French 7 Nov 80 p 296d] 8860 .
HODH ECHARGUI ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT--On 15 October at Nema, the economic develop-
menC program for the Hodh Echargui region was set at 16 million ouguiya, of which
the Mauriranian Government will contribute 13 million to rural development. The
projects set up in the framework of this program ~rtll aim at preserving the live-
stock and at sugmenting food production. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER- ^
RANEENS in French 7 Nov 80 p 2960] 8860
APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC LAW--The application of Sharia (Islamic law) to the Mauri-
tanian judicial system last month was "a first step toward the application of
the precepts of Islam to all areas," Lt Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla declared
recently. Last month, for the f irst time in a considerable period, a man was
executed and three others were f logged and had a hand cut off by virtue of the
Sharia. In a speech broadcast for the Muslim festival of Id al-Kabir, the head
of the Mauritanian state invited "all vital forces of the country to work side by
side with the Military Cou~.ttee for National Welfare to combat the perversions
which have infiltrated our values during these past 2 decades and to return to _
- our original customs and values.�' [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 14 Nov 8a p 3025] 8860
SONIMEX PRICE INCREASES--On 31 October the Coimcil of Ministers authorized the
National Import-Export Company [SONI2~C] to increase prices on some of its prod-
ucts. Thus, loaf sugar has gone from 45 to 50 UM [M~uritanian ouguiya] per kilo,
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lump sugar from 35 to 40 UM per kilo; the price of cracked rice from 12 to 15
UM per kilo, whole rice up to 30 UM per kilo; all varieties of tea increased to
lOG UM per kilo. For the past year, explained Minister of Commerce, Industry and
Mines Cissoko Mamadou, SONIMEX had been forced to sel7. at prices substantially
below cost. Thus rice, which during January cost SONIl~R 18 UM per kilo, con-
tinued to be sold at 12 UM per kilo; loaf sugar sold at 45 UM per kilo, but cosC
74.60 per kilo; lump sugar costing 64.70 per kilo was offered at only 35 UM per
kilo. Only the sale of tea was producing a slight profit margin, but this amount
was far from covering the deficit of hundreds of millions of ouguiya engendered
ar_ SONIMEX by selling other goods at a loss. [Paris MARG'HES TROPICAU% ET MEDITER-
RANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3025] 8860
CSO: 4~n00
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MOROCCO
ARTICLE ANALYZES PLURALISM TOLERATED UNDER MUNARCHY
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 31 Dec 1980 pp 194-199 -
[Article by Hamid Barrada: "The Monarchy, the Left and the Rotation"; passages
enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]
[Text] Morocco--Rare are the countries where the plural
party system resists the rigors of postindependence regimes.
Morocco is one of them. But what does not pluralism lead
to a real change of team?
/"Far from me is the ideu of claiming that the system was perfect. But when une
speaks of Austria, I think one should emphasize the idea of a state in constant
evolution, where nothing was fixed or once and for all defined, Where were w e going?
No one knew. But I who in my youth *~as a passionate adversary ~f the empire, now
know that we destroyed sdmething that could have become a shining example."
Manes Sperber./
In Morocco, why do the political "openings" to the left made by the government~always
come to a sudden end, and f inally lead to nothing? Why do they come to seem like
- false windows and deceptive facadea, if not boobytraps?
According to a broad spectrum cf opinion, at home as well as abroad, the answer is
simple, One word: trickery. Hassan II fools his world; he makes an art of confusing
his opponents and they are wrong in having anything to do w~th it. The problem with =
that explanation is that it presupposes that the Moroccan lef*_ is the stupidest in _
- the world, something which remains to be proved. The repeated failure of the _
"openings" poses a problem that concerns not only Moroccans. Since what is involved
= is in fact the viability and the credibility of democracy in a Third World countr;~.
If inen who challenge the government are hopelessly condemned to stagnate in the
opposition, as in the prisons, and if as a result the political process stands
revealed as a game of deception. Morocco would not r_onstitute an originai experiment ~
worthy of interest, as far as institutions are concerned. The plural party system -
~ would remain "formal", mere colorful folklore, and in the end Morocco has nothing
- to envy, in the tieighboring tyrannies. We would be dealing with a single party, _
- /in fact/, camouflaged and underhanded, And there would even be reasons to credit
the classic single party system with certain virtues--the same virtues a gangster has `
= compared with a swindler: with a gangster at least you know whnre you stand. -
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A Lost Opportunity
A legitim~te suspicion will continue at all events to hover over the Moroccan
experiment as long as the /politi~cal/ motives of the left for not participating
in Che government remain undisclosed, when it can boast of representing forces at least
- as large as those of the governing parties. In other terms, should the failure of
the "openings"--and hence the absence of any rotation--be imputed to the Cherifian
monarchy /or to surmountable historical and political factors?/
Let us examine first the most recent "opening", during the summer of 1980, which
went practically unnaticed. Hassan II announced the rehiring of some 3,000 national
education and health officials who had been dismissed for over a year because of a
strike. The persons concerned belong to the CDT (Democratic Confederation of Labor)
close to the USFP (Socialist Union of Popular Forces). Earlier, it had been suggested
to them that they appeal for the king's c1E.nency. They refused, considering that the
sovereign, guardian of the constitution which recognizes the rfght to strike, has
the grounds to intervene "spontaneously". 'vihich he did.
That is not all. Soon the greater parL* of the prisoners who were USFP members were
pardoned. Then, came 20 August (commemoration of the exile of Mohamed V), when all
political exiles (except two) were authorized to return to the country. In the
speech he gave that day Hassan II announced two measures: rents for persons of
modest means were lowered by one-third. (In parliament the opposition ~xid sought
without success, a rent freeze.)
Informal Talks
Second decision: representatives of the two political factions were invited to
Ifrane to a colloquium on teaching problems. The "selection" system of the Education
Ministry had provoked deep ~iscontent, and the opening of the university session was
likely to be stormy. At Ifrane, Professor Abderahim Bouabid finds he is asked to
chair the committee charged with inquiring into the circumstances of the opening of
the university season. The USFP leader declines: "I can only defend the positions �
of my party, which are contrary to those of the government." TEiat need not matter;
all the ministry's decisions, particul.arly the limitation of registrations in the
faculties, were purely and simply cancelled. "Just imagine," Mr Guedira, king's
counselor, said to us, "Giscard taking over the programs of Marchais or Mitterand."
At the end of the colloquium Hassan II explicitly declared that the same steps
could be taken in other domains. On the fringe of the Ifrane colloquium Mr Driss
Basri, the youn~ minister of interior, and then Mr Guedira opened discussions with
- the leader of the left. These talks were kept "inf ormal, exploratory." They could
~ be taken up again tomorrow. But once again we have probably seen a missed opportunity.
?
* Six persons to be exact, according to the USFP headquarters, were not freed.
- They were soon to be freed, depending on whether their cases were more serious than
the others. Moreover, there remain, according to their comrades, 114 "Marxist-
Leninist" political prisoners in Moroccan prisons.
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In government circles there are men (not all, far from ic), looking especially
for reforms in the fields of health and the ecc~nomy, who would approve the USFP's
entry into the government, and regret that the party did not rQ~~ nd suitably to the
palace gestures. Did not AL MOHARRIR, USFP daily, devote the major part of its
"page one" to...the arrest of its cartoonist, Lemhadi, the very day the clemency
measures were made public? The journalist had been questioned following a cartoon
which seemed to be an offensive illustration of the royal speech. It was a mere
coincidence since the offending material had been produced several days before.
Mareover, the cartoonist was released. The oniy result of the "Lemandi affair" was
that AL MOHARRIR's readers found the artist's talent suddenly dried up.
Rigid Attitude
The Ifrane decisions were also presented by the USEP ~:-.~er with impolitic re~oicing.
According to the left, it has "imposed" its views on the colloqium. That is not quite
true, and at all events would only make the author of the initiative dig in his
heels.
For themselves, the USFP explained that their reaction to the clemency measures had
- to be restrained: had not the government merely announced them in an official news
agency dispatch, giving the list of about 15 exiles "among others"? One still
wonders if the other royal decisions were not "timed to insure a peaceful resumption
_ of trade union and university activities?"
And it can be added that, at all events, the "reopening" quickly turned into a
"closing". The way parliament resolved the question of the entry into effect of a
referendum adopted last May prolonging the legislature by 2 years is illustrative.
Since the text did not say so, no one knew if it applied to the current chamber or
would not be implemented until after the chamber's renewal, which, earlier, was to
take place in 1981. The second possibility should have been accepted, in order to
show consideration for the opposition (USFP and PPS) which had opposed the referendum
and condemned the vote rigging.
However, a propos of the duration of the president of the chamber's mandate (3 years
inst2ad of 1), also provided for by the May constitutional amendment, the parliament
decided on the immediate application of the terms of the referendum. Logically, the
same interpretation should apply for the legislature. It turned out that the deputies
of the majority urged, with the opposition, the later application of the referendum.
Mr Ali Yata, leader of t:~e PPS (Party for Progress and Socialism--communist), with good
sense suggested recourse to the Supreme Court. An expeditious solution was preferred,
and this was termed a"brutal act" by the opposition in the height of outrage. The
USFP deputies do not hide the fact that they will leave parliament at the end of
the "normal" term of their mandate (June 1981). Al1 this does not help develop a
compromise between the left and the palace.
To tell the truth, the king could always restore calm to people's minds if he really
cared about collaboration with the left. It is signficant that he did not directly
inte nrene in the parliamentary moves: he always had the option of dissovling the
chamber and bringing about early and relatively fair elections.
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Stopgap Solutions
The fact remains that we are again far from the "opening" attempted in the summer.
Obviously, psychological reasons are invelved in this failure. The wounds of the
sometimes bloodly recent confrontations have not completely healed. Adversaries
~ who become partners have the sensitivities of people flayed alive. Mutual and lasting
suspicion transforms the simplest good will gesture into a doubtful act of trickery,
if not disguised hostility. In our opinion, something more than psychology is involved.
_ If suspicions are not abandoned it is because each side has not completely accepted
the rules of democratic interaction. Everything happens as if democracy were
consider~ed a stopgap, a lesser evil or a necessary evil, at all events not as /the
only form of government/. So much so that rotation, although the cornerstone of
the democratic system, is not considered a normal ob~ective. More precisely, it is
not considered at all. When it is discussed either with the men in the government
or with opposition leaders there is unfailingly a mocking, scoff ing skepticism in
the one group and a sad and resigned skepticism in the other. The multiparty system
has entered into the habits of the kingdom, and happily it is part of the political
panorama, but rotation, which is an inseparable part of the multiparty system,
consubstantial as the philosophers would say, i~ seen as an incongruity, a naive,
in fact unthinkable hypothesis.
The Opposition's Suspicions
It does not help matters that what both the opposition and the government agree on
most is clearly the rejection or discouragement of rotation, TY:~re are precise causes
for this situation, and while taboo, they are nonetheless pertinent and, we hope,
stimulating and progressi~~e. At all events, there is reason to believe that as long
as the causes are not defined, clarified, and discussed, Moroccan democracy will
remain wobbly, fragile, and uncertain,
As far as the opposition is concerned, in this case tne USFP, it obviously is not
completely converted to the idea of rotation. Posif~g as an alternative to the regime,
having tried a little and dreamed a great deal about replacing it, Mehdi Ben Barka's
party very naturally neglected to take the place due it in the monarchy. Wanting to
be everything, it will come to nothing. Too much concerned about being the alternate,
the USFP could not play the rotation role. It is true that it could plead extenuating--
and exhausting--circumstances. The campaigns of repression, if not extermination,
of which it was the victim almost since its birth 20 years ago, were not of the kind
to inspire modestly democratic concerns among its active members. Until 1975 (the
date it became the USFP) a rather large part of the UNFP was convinced that any
political change could not be carried out without violent acts, and some of its
members sometimes acted accordingly. The continued failure of this tendency, the
isolation of its incorrigible inspirer, Mr Mohamed Basri, ended by persuading the
entire movement to give up this simplistic and costly strategy.
Uncompleted Reconversion
- The congress of January 1975 officially marked the turning of Professor Abderrahim
Bouabid's party to legality. But it is noted that although this reconversion is
reflected in the statues, it is not yet anchored in the minds. This is shown by
what happened at the 1978 congress: at the opening of the session on Friday 8 December,
the first secretary made a courageous and clear speech in defense and explanation
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of social democracy in Morocco and at once it silence.d the few young militants
bringing in "revolutionary" slogans. But a little phrase in the political resolution
intended as a condemnation of the "Makhzenian Monarchy," read in a stentorian voice
aC the congress closing, 3 days later was enough suddenly to wildly galvanize the
minds. Members of the congress who had been dozing rose up to bring down the house
with applause, chanting /"Mehdi and Omar; (Ben Barka and Ben Jelloun, the party's two
marryrs) /victory is inevitable!"/ It was Sunday night fever! An intellectual bitterly
noted: /"One step forward, 20 years ~ackward. Here we are back to the political
climate of the 1960's and to the irresponsable and demogogic positions which have
done such harm to the ieft."/
In reality the USFP has not finished its transformation and if it delays its resolute
- and systematic struggle for rotation it is because social democracy is practiced in
_ the party as a strategy to be ashamed of. Perhaps no one dreams any more of a Great
Night but it is difficult to accept the slow, prosaic work of social democracy. The
immense majority of the USFP have learned through harsh experience that reformism is
the only possible revolutionary program, but they submit without response to the
intellectual terrorism of their adversaries.
Because of this attitude, which is the very opposite of political courage, and although
Mohamed Basri's partisans can today be counted on the fingers of one hand, "Basrism"
continues to wreak its havoc. And the result is that the formation of a leftist
government (or a government with the left) seems a compromise bordering on betrayal
more than an encouraging or at the very least normal prospect.
Presidental Regime?
So much for the opposition. But what prevents rotation on the government s~de? It
goes without saying that when what for convenience is ca~led the reign of Oufkir holds
sway, there is no question of it. The left was the enemy to strike d~wn. And if
in such and such an action one was gentle with it or "kept in contact" with it, it
was less to deal fairly with it then to discredit it or even to provide an escape
- hatch in case the effort to liquidate it went wrong and produced the opposite effect.
It was a time of cruelty and deception.
The problem of rotation has only been (potentially) on the agenda since the monarchy,
learning from its suicidal isolation after the putsch attempts in 1971 and 1972, opted
for political liberalism or resigned itself to it. However, the obstacles that can
- be more or less easily identified (the ways of the Lord are inscrutable...) are such
that the obvious democratization policy stops midway, and does not follow the dema-
cratic logic to its conclusion, which is rotation. There is sometimes the feeling
that Hassan II is mistaken about the regime. Constitutional and parliamentary mon-
- archy above the crowd and parties, sometimes assumes the air of an absolute presidential
regime.
An Unorgan~zed Right
One sees this clearly when the monarch descends into the arena and hi.mself takes the
initiative of having a referendum such as last May, The vote at the base could not
help being distorted. Since, things being what they ar~ it is politically inconceiv-
able that the voting results could be anything other tllan positive, How does one say
no to a question posea by the cocmmander to his believers, when his person, in the
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terms of the constitution, is "inviolable and sacred"? And if it happened that the
barriers were overrun despite everything, how could one make public the results of
such a vote? In fact, people found themselves facing an impossible situation after
the second referendum of May (on the extension of the legislature). According to
numerous, credible witnesses, a large majority apparently boycotted the polls or
voted against the second constitutional revision (this was not the case for the
first, bearing on the organization of the royal succession). And the minister of
interior could not report it "without endangering the regime." Whence the famous
99.94 percent of the votes, serving as a reminder of Morocco's not so glorious member-
ship in the Third World! The presidential aspects of the manarchy distort the
democratic function and practically institutionalize vote rigging.
A second equally grave cause of rigging can be noted. After all, referendums are not
held every day. It seems to us that the fundamental cause of electoral manipulations
is the absence of an organized, independent right, able to depend on its own forces.
The Short-Lived "Parties of the Kiag"
Let us be very clear: there are political parties situated to the right by virtue of
their conservative responses--admitted or not--but their political audience remains
limited and abave all, as shown by all the kingdom's electoral experiments since
independence, they cannot win against the left ~rithout the administration's massive
and decisive assistance. It is no accident if on the eve of the elections one can
see movements come forward, introducing themselves as the "king's party," which last
only as long as roses, and parliaments, last in the kingdom. Such was the case of
the FDIC in 1963, such will probably be the future--judging by the friction it is
now experiencing--of the RNI [National Rally of Independentsj. In Morocco the true
party of the right is the Interior Ministry, regardless of the personality and the
views of the incumbent.
This anomally, if it is to be explained, even ~ustifie~i, by the vague subversive
impulses of the left, has no further excuse. It is a disservice even to the regime.
The monarchy has no interest in identifying itself with retrograde or parasitic social
groups--who moreover, even if profiting shamelessly from the regi.me, are disloyal to
it and are ready to drop it (as they did in 1971 and 1972) at the first alarm.
It remains true that it is the existence of the "king's parties," transitory and
always the same, which constitutes the principal obstacle to rotation. Careful reading
of royal declarations in recent times give us the impression that things could change
in that regard. We had the opportunity in mid-October to interview Mr Ahmed Reda
Guedira, counselor to the king, on the views of Hassan II on rotation. He replied to
us in precise tenns, authorizing us (once does not mean always) to cite him. "His
Ma~esty expects to be kind of all Moroccans, without exception. He does not wish
to be the prisoner of any political party, he does not prefer Mahjoubi Ahardane
(chief of the Popular Movement) to Ali Yata (co~nunist) nor M'Hamed Boucetta (Istiqlal)
to Abderrahim Bouabib (USFP). In order to govern, he is quite free to have recourse
to all."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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WESTERN SAHARA
PARIS MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS POLISARIO CHIEF
L D061027 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81 pp 10-12 �
[InCerview with Polisario Front Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz by Kamel
Dj aider: "We Are Determined..."--date and place not given]
~Excerpt] [Question] What do you thir.k of the pledge by the king of :~Iorocco
to make 1980 the year of peace?
[Answer] The king of Morocco rejects peace. It is rather the year of Ouarkziz,
Akka, Ras al-Khanfra and other operations in which Hassan II sent thousands of
Moroccan soldiers to a.terrible and useless death in a lost war of aggression.
The king of Morocco wished to delude his army and his people, who are growing
- impatient and refusing to die in this war, the burdens and sacrifices of which
they bear.
If you remember, each time the Moroccan Army found itself totally unable to
confront our Alps the king of Morocco and his military command tried by all means, ~
including declarations of intention, to make believe that the end of the war was
imminent. In the face of pressure from those of his allies most convinced of
_ his defeat and from chose members of the international community nressing him to
p ut an end to his war of aggression, and also in view of ;,he reverses suffered
by his army on the battlefield and the economic and social disaster into which
his country has been plunged, Hassan II's aim has always been to gain time and -
put off the day of reckoning. For example, soldiers taken prisoner by our forces ~
- who were officers in the Moroccan Army told us that at the end of 1978 the king
and his military commanders spread the information in the army that the year
1979 would be the year of peace, and you know well what happened: the operations
of Bir Enzahan, Smara, Lebouirate, Tan Tan and so forth during which the Moroccan
Army suffered one setback after another and lost thousands of soldiers killed,
wounded or taken prisoner.
At the end of 1978 and at the beginning of 1980, the economic, military, diplomatic
and social situation for Morocco was such that Hassan II felt obliged to make
peace in 1980. Much importance must not therefore be attached to such declarations
when one knows that each opportunity to make peace offered to the king of Morocco
by international or~anizations was simply rejected by him. Who is preventing
h im from starting negotiations as called for by the linited Nations General Assembly?
It is clear that this peace of which he speaks is only a maneuver aimed at _
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obstructing the decisions of international or~anizations and the aspirations of
_ the Moroccan people and the army, who wish to benefit from the mumentum which
resulted from the Mauritanian-Saharan accord.
(Queation] At one time there was talk of secret negotiations between the Polisario
and Morocco? What is the position now?
[Answer] Since our objective is to live in peace with our neighbors, we did not
hesitate for a moment when it came to replying positively to an invitation from
his excellency President Mousa Traore of Mali to meet a Moroccan delegation to
Bamako under his auspices.
[Question] What was the composition of this Moroccan delegation and why did the
meeting not achieve anything?
[Answer] Under the auspices of President Traore, who personally exerted much
effort within the OAU ad hoc coimnittee aimed at the Mauritanian-Saharan negotiations
reaching a successf ul conclusion, our delegations met a Moroccan delegation
composed mainly of advisers to the king of Morocco, Guedira, Bensouda and Dlimi,
and if this meeting failed, it was because Morocco showed itself to be intransigent
and devoid of any political desire to f ind a solution.
(QuestionJ Is the Polisario Front today preparing any particular strategy within _
the perspective of eventual negotiations with Morocco? In other words, is there
a possibility of a settlement which will "save the king?"
[AnswerJ We are ready to negotiate with Morocco to find a peaceful solution to
the conflict between the two countries. We are also ready to negotiate with
Morocco in order that the two peoples, Moroccan and Saharan, might r~obilize their
efforts for the national construction of their respective countries, and not for
war. The defense of the sovereignty of our country and the territorial integrity
of the SDAR remain our basic aims, and if we do not achieve this by negotiation
because of Moroccan intransigence we shall impose it by other means.
As for the second part of your question, I would remind you that our struggle is
one for liberation which we waged for 7 years against the Spanish colonizers.
Its objective is the liberation of our country; it aims neither to topple regimes
nor to save them. If the regime of Ould Daddah fell, it was because he opposed
the interests of the Mauritanian people and the legitimate aspirations of the
Saharan people, who were obliged to defend them themselves, and if the king of
Morocco wished to alienate his army after the attemnted coups in 1971 and 1972
by launching it.on a war of aggression against our country in order to save h~;s -
throne, wl~ich was threatened internally, our people, who are defending themselves
legitimately, are in no way responsible for the situation in which that king
finds himself today. Having said that, the possibility of a settlement does
exist. This involves a return to the legality defined by the internationdl
organizations; I would therefore remind you that the route has been marked out
and requires that Morocco withdraw from our country and that the Polisario Front _
and Morocco begin negotiations.
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The Situation in Morocco Can Only be Saved From Collapse By and End to This War
[QuestionJ What is the meaning of the announcement that Hassan II is to visit
Europe?
[Answer] It is not by traveling abroad, on whatever pretext, that Hassan will
find the means of extricating his country from a disastrous situation at the
military, economic and social levels. He does not nov need arms or money for a
lost war, but peace, for as you know Morocco is on its last legg. All the most
' important development projects have been abandoned because of the war; its foreign
debts continue to increase; numerous firnzs and public concems are bankrupt;
unemployment is rife ard the state cannot even pay the civil servants.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AFRIQUE-ASIE
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I
M'UK UN'hll.tA~, u~~ Viv~.Y
WESTERN SAHARA
LIBYA POSSIBLY BEHIND POLISARIO SHIP BOARDING
Paris J~.'UNE AFRIQDE in Freach 17 Dec 80 p 43 .
[Asticle by Abdelaziz Dahmani] ~
(Text~ Once upon a time in Ms~uritania there Was a retired policeman, Sid At?med duld '
Aida, a scion of the emiral family of Adrar; one fiae day he left his aative Adrar
for Nouadhibou, the Mauritanian fishing port. He bought a boat,"vhich he called
the "Touagad" from the name of a famous pslm grove ia Adrar. He also hired 20-odd ~
sailora. Z~elve of them (six Senegalese, four Mauritaaians aad ts+o Spamiards) were ~
aboard the Toungad in ~,id-~October 1980 when it was attacked at eea by a Zodiac j
Nask V inflated raft armed irith a uaachinegua aad lighter veapona.
- Fuany Story I
The crev Were takesn prieoner and the boat to~ed to a beach where, once it was ~
ashore~ it Was riddled with bullets While the motor was takm out and toeead into
- the water. The guerrill8 Warriore of th~ POLISARIO Froat who have been attacking ~
Watercraft along the Saharaa Coaste since 1976 lzave never attacked with euch anger. ,
_ They have furtherm~re been selective attacka. No Soviet boat or any boat carrying ;
the flag of one of the Bastern Europeaa couat~ries has been bothered aay more than i
Japaaese fiahermen hava been. The principal victiss up to naw havn bem the ~
Yortuguese and the Spaniards. In this hvatiag eceae. only one South ROreaa boat
for which the POLISARIO, in an uaique e:aaple, asks a Luge ramsan. I
Mnet of these incidents have made sone nofse in the preae aad have provoked some
official reactions. Nothing of all of that, at least se far as we kaaW, for the
"Touagad" of Sid Ahmed Ould Aida. It is true that the affair seems to mix polit- ~
ical atrateggr and tribal relations. An old quarrel betwe~n Reguibete of the north ~
and the family of the Ould Aida of Adrar--Sid Ahmed had evea criticized the Algiere (
agreement of 5 Auguet 1979 eo vell that he then spent several days in prison. ~
~
- For the disabling of hie boat in mid-0ctober, our policesnn who became a fisherman j
addressed himeelf to tbe authorities of poua.dhibou, asking for Nouakchott to take I
eteps to free hia cr~. Reply: he was ~+rong to accuse the POLISARIO Front. ~
;
It is true that at that moment no one Was absolutely sure and that the em~ty pack- ~
ages of Algerian cigarettes foimd along the aide of th~ wreck looked more like a
provocatioa than a proof. Aad behold: 20 days later ~he aailors Were eet fsee. ,
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right in Zouerate. They declare and affirm that theq w~re held by the POLISARIO
Front ia the northern part of Ksuritania.
Sid Ahmed Ould Aida has made hia accusation again aad he hae met members of the
government: he vants aa inde~?ity. Once agaia~ without auccese. They evea allow
it ta be understood that hie boat waa fishiag illegally in Saharaa Watere. Which
he givea the lie to with hia last ouace of energy.
- But thie funny etory s~as not finished. Iiaay Mauritaaian cadrea have atated out
loud: "There we were working in our owa country...." There were also some eddies
inside the DMSN [Militarq Co~ittee for National Salvation] where Captain Ahmed
Ould Aida, cousin of Sid Ah~sed and inspector of the National Guard, represmta the
population of Adrar....After many discuesions~ it vsa decided that expenses would
be reimbursed by the SMAR [Nauritanian Compaay for Insurance and Reineurance].
Not Discouraged
Hawev~r, Sid Ahmed Ould Aida was advised not to go back to fishing again off
- No~sadhibou....The affair has not hvwever diacouraged other Mauritaniana from pro-
ceediag to that eector. A Mauritaaiaa-Libyan Compaaq has just been created...in
Las Falmas, dependent on a Hispano-Libysn ~other Compaay.
With this nuaace it has almost received the blessing of the POLISARIO F~ront and it
~?-ill not only engage in fishiag, but also in transport betweea the Canariee aad
Nouadhibou. A new line of resupply independent...of Algeria.
COPYRIGHT: Jeuae Afrique GRIIPJU 1980
12~116
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WESTERN SAAARE~
BRIEFS -
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH COSTA RICA--The governmen~t of Costa Rica has decided
to recognize the Republic of Sa~~ara and to open diplomatic relations. In a docu-
ment signed by the two parties on 30 October, tfle two governmeats agreed to ex-
change ambassadors, it was aanovaced in an official release, which weat on to
say that accreditation of the representatives would be effected after the two
partiea reached a mutual accord. [Paris MARCF'~S TROPICAII% ET I~DITERRANEENS in
French 14 Nov 80 p 3018] 8860
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