JPRS ID: 9256 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080028-0
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 75
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 28
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9545 .
12 February 1981
West E uro e Repor~t
~
- (F4U0 7/81)
~BIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMA~'ION SIERVICE
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JPRS L/9545
12 February 1981
WEST EllROPE REFORT
(FOUO 7/81) -
. CONTENTS
ENERGY ECONOMICS
FRAN(~
Chalandan's Views on E~nergy Matters Presented
(Albin (halandon In terview; PA~IS MAT(H, 26 Dec 80)...a~....... 1
COt~TTRY SECTION
FRAN CE
Trade Un~ons Experience Financial, MembeYUhip Ivsses ,
(Mdnchel Jacques; L'EXPRESS, 29 Nov 80) 6
(haban-De3mas Notes 'Ways To Improve Our Position'
(AIR & (70SMOS, 13 Dec 80) .........................o............ 10
Dissidents Speak in New Book on PCF, Eurocommtmism, Goals
(LES HERETIQUES DU PCF, 1980) ..........................oo...... 12
Introduction to Daix Book, by Pierre Daix
- Excerpts From Book
Further Details Concerning 1981 Defense Budget
(ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HiJI, Dec 80) 25
Matra-Hachette: ~nformation Contml, ULssemination Problems
(LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 15 Dec 80; LE POINT, 15 Dec 80)........ 29
Matra's Possible Intentions,~ by Josette�~Alia
Implications of Actions, by Jean-Pierre Adine
Netd for Wide-Radius-of-Action, Piloted Weapons System Discussed
. (AIR & COSt+~ S, 20 Dec 8U) ..............................o.oo... 38
Background of ~Y~ra African Affairs DiTector Viewed
(Francois Soudan; JEi~1E AFRIQUE, 24 Dec 80) 43
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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'L~EXPRESS' Notes Garaud~s Criticism of Giscard
(Editorial, Olivier Todd; L'EXPRESS, 20 Dec 8t!).........oo..... 45
Small Business Credit Bank Viewed as Too Closely Tied to
Gove rnment
(Alain Margaron; VALEURS AC~UELLES, 15 Dec 80) 47
ITALY
, Trade Minister Has Cooperation Talks in Libya
- (Franco Mi~i; LA STAt~A, 20, 21 Ja3 8f) 51
~ Hope for Share of Trade
' Crucial Period� Pend3.ng
Italy, Bulgaria D~ Set Up Jo~t Stock Compang
(LA STAMPA, 22 Jan 81)~. 53 '
PORTUGAL
Prospects for Dem~cratic AlliancP Programs Under Eanes
(Francisca Sa Carneiro Interview; CAI~IO 16, 1 Dec 80~......... 54
SPAIN
Hopelessness, Canfusion Said To Mark Latest ETA Offensive
(CAMBIO 16, 1 Dec 80) 59
, SWITZERLAND
Publication of Gold Figures To Cease
(David Marsh; FINANCIAL TIMES, 27 Jan 81)......o 63
LIDIITED I~INGDOM
- Gibraltar Issue Debated in House of Lords
(TtiE TIMES, 29 Jan 81) 65
Fall in Gold Pxices Attributed to Far East Sales
(David Marsh; FINANQAL TII~S, 26 Jan 81) 67
- Arms B;~ying Scandal Revealad
(Peter Durisch, Peter Deely; ~iE OBSERVER, 1.8 Jan 81) . 68
Briefs
Submarine Scrapped ~1
- b -
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ENERGY ECONOMICS FRANCE _
CHALANDON`S VIEWS ON ~NERGY MATTERS PRESENTED
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 26 Dec 80 pp 62-63, 81
[interview ~~rith Albin Chalandon, president and general manager of Elf-
Aquitaine, by Liliane GalZifpt; date and place not given] ,
[Text] PARIS MATCH: Following the latest price increases by OPEC at Bali
do you think that petroleum 4ri11 continue to go up in 1981? ~
- Albin Chalandon: If there is no new political crisis, if neighboring coun-
tries continue to make up for the short-fall of Iraq and Iran, and if the
recession continues in the industrialized countries, we can believe that there
will be a surplus of crude petroleum next year and in consequence moderate
increases, if r?ot stabilization, of prices. That indeed poses many "ifs."
PM: And beyond 1981?
A.C.: All the hypothetical sftuations are possible. If there is economic
recovery, and hence increasad consumption of petroleum, price rises will be
imposed; but if, at the same time, the Iraq-Iran conflict ends, there will
be a surplus that will be gradually absorbed by deliberately decreased
production.
PM: You seem to be counting upon "reasonable" behavior of the oil producing
countries. You do not therefore fear an abrupt price increase decided upon
unilaterally?
A.C.: Such things are possible only in periods of great shortages. That is
why the year 1979 was very bad for consuming countries. As there was a large
imbalance in the market place OPEC took advantage of it to proceed with large
increases. It might have been feared that the same thing would accur when the
Iraq-Iran conflict stopped the production in those two countries. But the
wisdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirates, which increased their produc-
tion, even though they had no need at all to do so as far as their own econo-
mies were concerned, made it possible to avoid a new crisis. What was very
disturbing was, that at the very moment when those producirg countries were
~ showing signs of sensing a highly manifest international solidarity, some con-
suming countries sought to increase their already laxge stocks. If these
~ matters are viewed objectively it must indeed be said that their behavior is
' often quite as unreasonable as that of certain produCing countries.
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~
ro erl have recent2 decided to draw from their ~
PM: The Western countries, p p y, Y
stocks and to induce 3omestic production in order to reduce their requirements.
Are they, in the end, going to be in a position of strength?
A.C.: The decision of the International Energy Agency is good and presumably
will be observed, at least over the short term. First, because the physical
facilities for stocking are limited and then because, in this period of rela- -
tive abundance, the consuming countries have greater interest in stabilizing
prices than in accumulating reserves. But to have a new policy based upon
solidarity of consuming countries seems to me to be indeed hazardous. Alas, it
must be feared that at the first indication of shortage it will again be every-
one for himself" as in the past. Nevertheless it is in the interest of the
consuming countries to act jointly, with solidarity, particularly in attempt-
ing to restore the conditions of a petroleum market which, today, is compart-
mented. The recent decisions at Bali, in opening the bracket of official
prices, are reinforcing this compart~entation and, indeed, anarchy in the
market placef which are factors in the price rises.
PM: Do the consuming countries have the means of applying pressure upon the /
r~ producing countries?
A.C.: The consuming countries will regain a position of strength when the rule =
of the market place will a~ain w~ork toward lowering prices. Today it is work-
~ ing only toward increasing prices. There are in fact two prices: the price
, fixed by the OPEC countries which is a price in some ways political, and the
free market price which involves transactions upon separate cargoes. As soon
as a lack of offers causes rising prices on the Rotterdam market OPEC follows
s:~tit. On the other hand, when the opposite occurs, that is, a surplus of _
oifers, as was the case this summer, the official prices do not go down because
the p-~oducing countries contrive to make the excess of petroleum disappear by
reducin; the production by some or others of them. But deliberate reductions
in proc~uction cannot be continued indefinitely. It encounters a limit which
is, f~r each of those countries, satisfaction.of the needs of its economy,
If ~aorldwide consumptiion of petroleum is one day successfully lowered to below
that limit there will be a lowering of prices. This presupposes, on the part
of consuming countries, of will, money, and time.
PM: And what is your opinion of industrializQd petroleum producing countries
like Great Britain and the United States, which are pushing toward high~er
prices?
A.C.: Great Britain has very great production capability but only f'or a few
years. The British certainly are seeking to take advantage of it ar~d because
of that are not at all pushing for stabilization of petroleum prices.
PM: Do you not find that shocking?
A.C.: We must be realists and not look for ethics there where there aze none.
It is the same with the United States as with Great Britain. The Americans
have reserves which are relatively short lived and will certainly not acquiese
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in being dependent upon foreign countries. Con3equently they are going to seek '
to obtain replacement production which will have ~ higher cost price than the
present price of their petroleum. It is therefore in their interest that
~ petroleum attain a price level at which it is profi~able to produce those
~ forms of energy which go by the names of coal liquefaction, heavy oil, tar
sands, and so forth. The USSR, the world's leading producer, is also always
' in the first ranks to increase prices. There is, therefore, even in some con-
suming countries, a push to higher prices because they are at the same time
producers of petroleum or replacement products. France, unfortunately, from
this point of view is one of the most poorly situated countries. For it, price -
increases have only disadvantages.
PM: Is it in the interest of the large companies that the ri.se in petroleum
costs cease since, when there is a relaxation of petroleum prices the market
prices of their stocks decline?
A.C.: Obviously the higher petroleum goes, the more money a company makes. We
must differ.entiate~ 5etween producers of petroleum and gas and refiners, who pur-
chase petroleum in order to transfer it into products such as gasoline and domes- _
tic heating oil. Refining results in no profits in France, but in very heavy
losses which are impairing the future of that industry and particularly the
investments it must make to adapt its facilities. The petroleum production
which results from exploration generates profits which, depending upon the tax
structure, varies considerably from one country to another. Such projects are
mainly, if not totally, reinvested in e~tploratian and exploitation of deposits
, which are discovered. Besides, they are realized in foreign countries which
_ prevent their exportation. We must be aware that a petroleum group may make
large profits worldwide without, for all that, making any in its home country.
But we must also be aware that functioning in this way, that is, by reemploying
the money made where it is made, it contributes to the discovery of new
petroleum and gas resources which the ~~orld needs, particularly the country to
which it belongs. The costs of product~~n in the Arctic Ocean, for example,
may be 100 times as great as in the Middle East. Someone must indeed pay for
it.
PM: You are returning to Libya. What were you going to do in a country
which, at this time, is on very bad terms with France?
A.C.: The general rule which we apply is to pursue our activitiee: abroad--
we are w~orking in 43.countries--without being concerned with the polittcal re- _
lations between those countries and our own. When we set up in a country it
is for 20 or 30 years. We need stability. We must there�ore avoid the hazards
of politics. This concept is generally accepted on both sides. However, when
those relations give rise to special problems, which is the case today with Libya,
it is obvious that we undertake no initiative without advance consultation with
the appropriate government authorities.
PM: Is that to say that, contrary to the rumors which circulated, you had a _
green light from the French government?
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A.C.: Yes. I must :'emind you that our firm has,been installed in Libya .for
many years, that is producing a little petroleum there, and above all that it
has discovered therE a lar~e off-shore deposit whose development is at present
- blocked because it is a region whi.ch is in dispute by Tunisia. The differences
are going to be settled by the Ha.gue Court. Last, upon the request of the Lib-
yans, we are going to widen our ~xploration effort in the country's interior;
we have been negotiating to this end with the Libyan authorities for many
months. We are awaiting the grant of a large mining concession.
PM: It is said that petroleum prospecting in Fxance is being carried out too
slowly. In particular, in the Sea of Iroise, where there are only two drill-
ings per year?
a A.C.: As for Elf-Aquitaine, we can hardly do more than we are doing. Our
exploration expenditures which are very high--n~arly 5 billion [francs] in
1981--and which are financed by our profits must produce results, that is,
petroleum or oil, in order that they in the?r turn generate prof its which will
make new explorations possible, and so on. If exploration is unfruitful the
enterprise must sooner or later shut its doors. Our exploration objectives
must therefore be selected so as to obtain a minjmum l~vel of success. In
France the chances of finding anything are small. If we devoted our entire
~ exploration budget to France and we found nothing it would in the end meui~ the
death of our firm. We are thus obliged to go where we have the greatest chances
of success. As for the Sea of Iroise where the eight borings already effected
were dry holes, the effort we are devoting ta it is a considerable one; we are
providing half of the financing for the exploration. This vast region has now
been assigned to a unique group of five petroleum exploration firms operating
in France. In order to go ahead faster must we do otherwise and divirle it up
among a greater number of companies? That is a decision for the pub].ic author-
ities. Furthermore, this supposes that there are petroleum firms wttich are
interested, of which there is no evidence. Today this exploration is no longer
paying off.
PM: Have you any information on the discovery attributed to the Soviets in
~ Siberia?
~ A.C.: Within the scope of conversa ttAns we have regularly with the Soviets our
geol~gists had info rmation on the region in question. Our opinion is that
there exists an immense reserve of oil and gas very difficult to produce; it
involves tar bearing silicified clay and it seems that there will have to be
several million borings to extract this petroleum at very high cost. At the
present rate of drilling in the USSR this would require several thousand years.
' PM: 3ome experts now put at 100 years the time that pe�:roleum will last be-
fore the problem of shortage arises. Do you share their optimism?
' A.C.: Given the various sources of petroleum, heavy oil, tar shales and sands,
and so forth, there will be enough petroleum for many more than 100 years.
However, there will be a shortage becaise production cannot be increased at a
sufficiently rapid rate. As new petroleum will be much more difficult to
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extract we may consider that present production of 3 billion tons annually can-
not be increased. If consumption increases, there will therefore be a shortage
pure and simple. It is purely a probl~ of spigots. The only producers who,
technically, would easily be able to obtain greater output are not doing so for
political reasons. Those are the countries of the Middle East which want to
make their petroleum last as long as possible. Put yourself in their place!
We must be prepared to live through a number of very difficult years. The
~ replacement sources will not be ready in adequate quantities before 1990, per-
haps even 1995. Until then the price of gasoline will climb. Exxon, the
world's leading company, proposes devoting 800 billion dollars to production
of 400 million t~ns of petroleum (50 percent of American consumption) from tar
_ shales. Well, despite the effort devoted, there will not be any results in
less than 15 years. We are in a tunnel....
PM: Is it not in large part because the money earned by the OPEC producing
countries is not reinvested in exploration?
~A,C.: This is an element which weighs very heavily. Traditionally the petro -
le~nnprofits are divided between the government and the firm. In times when the :
return to the government was small, the major portion going to the firm which ~
reinvested the money in exploration, discoveries proceeded at a good pace. To-
day the profit from minerals is almosr totally confiscated by the producing
countries which are not reinvest:ng in exploration. The cost of prospecting
has become very high and resources are not keeping pace. I have al�aays said
that the principal bottlen2ck in the years ahead will not be petroleum but
money to produce it.
PM: Where does France's petroleum future lie? Is it in signing very large
contracts li~e the one just concluded with the USSR for supplying us with gas?
A.C.; The large contracts--that with the USSR will represent 30 percent of
' our annual consumption--puts us at tne mercy of political pressures. Although
it was not possible to do otherwise--agreed. But, in the case of gas the North .
Sea and Africa offer an alternative in a considerable gas potential. Prudenc~
requires us to depend neither upon a single country nor a single region of the
world.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 par Cogedipresse S.A.
11706
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
TRADE UNIONS EXPERIENCE FINANCIAL, r~lBERSHIP LOSSES
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 29 Nov 80 pp 112-113
[Article by Michel Jacques: "The Trade Uaions' Diecreet Bank Accounts'']
[Text] "We are broke": this is what Georges Seguy, secretary general of the -
- GCT implied during a recent meeting of h ie trade uaion. The treasurer,
Ernest Deiss, confirmed: "We need oxygen, iu~ediately."
Rapid loss of inembership, increase in expenditures, massive debts: the largest
group of affiliated French trade unions is having difficulties makixtg enda
meet. It is not alone: "All the trade unions presently have financial
problems," acknowledges Jean Doriac, a financial official of tt?e Workers =
Force [FO].
Poor Payers?
With respect to finances, the trade unions have chosen a cam~uf laged position.
The CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] has an "open-book" policy,
but does not publish its budget. The GC~ recognizes that "there existe no
structure capable of seizing its finances in a global sense...": how does
one explain that its budget amounts to 22 million francs and that of the
FO to 30 million, which does no t correspond to the respective situations of
theSe organizations? Their bidgets do not include the same items. The CFDT
presents only a working budget which does not include the prese, the fund for
strikes and the training of militants. The F0, on the contrary, groups
everything together.
Moreover, it only involves the confedera 1 budget. The trade union organiza-
tions, in fact, handle many more important simms of money. But the fees are
split up between the central trade union, the local and regional unions,
the federation and the confederation. Thus, for the CFDT, the confederal
budget represents only 10 percent of the total fees, and for the GCT, out
of a 20-franc fee, the confederation sees only Fr1.28. ~
At least one thing is certain: French trade unionism is not rolling in money.
_ Especially ~hen one conrpares it with the German or Ameriean trade unions,
which are f inancial pow�ers . In Federal Germany, the DGB nimmbers 7 million
members and receives fees equal to 1 percent of the $ross salary. In France,
tY~e GCT officially claims to have 2.35 million membexs, the CFDT and the FO
approximately 1 mi1 lion each, and they barely receive 0.7 percent of the salary.
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A maximum. The fees are in fact paid m~nthly, in exchange for a stamp on
one's card. However, the annual average of stamps sold is 8 for the FO and
4.5-10.5 for the GCT,
Poor payers? Those in construction: it is hard to follow those membexs that
constantly move from oae building eite to another. Even m~re "thrifty": the
temporaries or the free-lance persons, 'b ut one cannot asd these people to
pay for 12 stamps when they only work 6 mouths out of the year." On the
- other hand, th e trade unions for officials have a more cushioned treasury. '
A distinct advantage for the F0, well i.mplanted in the public office sector., ,
or for the FEN [National Education Federation], the teachers' organization,
protected by a system of annual fees.
The FEN Bank
The FIId, which is said, rightly or wrongly, to be reasonably well-off, is very
much envizd. It is surroun~ed by a network of some 50 organizations which
allaws its members to liv~ in almost a closed circuit: the MGEN, mutual
health insurance (1 million members); Maif, mutual insurance companies
(600,000 memb ers); Camif, one of the most important cooperatives in the
country, etc. Unique case in French trade uniouism, the FEN has even opened -
a private bank: Casden-B.P. Of course, the leaders deny that these organiza-
tions have anything to do with the finances of the FEN. Except for the bank, -
wh ich, they say, allows them to get over the difficult humps.
The trade unions, it is true, receive outside help. First, through the state, ~
which pays them annual subsi.dies: either~ for the training of militants or
for the productivity of enterprises. A total package of approximately _
7 million francs for each of the three large workers organizations, a sum
judged inadequate by the leaders. "The training subsidy does not cover half
of our actiual training activities," says Pierre flureau, CFGT treasurer. The
, departments and co~unes also offer their contribution, by making available
to the trade unions buildings or subsidies for those thst cannot be accomanodated.
However, left up to the discretion of the elected, this type of aid is a source
of inequality: "In 1974, the FO points Qut, the GCT received 180,000 francs
from Seine-Sa int-Denis Department, while we only received 18,000 francs. We
had 1 permanent representative, and the GCT had 22, put at its disQosal by
the locals." One CFDT militant noted: "Sometimes, right-wing municipalities
fork it out, j ust to avoid making trouble." Final he~ping hand: the personnel
from the public and nationali2ed sector assigned to the representative organiza-
Cions--and their n~bers are increasing--continue to be paid.
A Guide for ]Enterprises
There is, f inally, resourcefulness . At the time of tax declarations, the
- unified tax trade union (autonomous) sells 100,000 copies of a taxpayers ~
practical guide, written voluntarily by members. The GCT tax trade union
publishes a guide for enterprises
However, the fuel for the trade unions is the fees. They represent 83.28 per-
cent of the CFDT confedenal budget, 87 percent of the GCT and 94 percent of
the F0, which explains the present difficulties. _
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"The fees basically follow inflation, we just receive them one year later," -
explains one treasurer. Meanwhile, the expenses increase. Personnel expenses,
first of all, are by far the most important: they represent more than half
of the budget for the GCT (220 permanent employees) and for the CDFT (160 _
permanent employees). But all the other expenses cannot be overlooked: -
"The FO brochure itself costs 500,000 francs per issue," grumbles Jean Doriac.
Of course, the intermediary levels of the trade unions "retain" the money
before sending it to the top. The federations have investment problems,
explains one of the FO leaders.'... An investment of 7 or 8 monthe could
= pay for one or two long-term investments. But this also means a delay in _
revenue.
' The CFDT deposits the money directly in the central trade union, and then
redistributes iL. ~
- A more serious matter is, of course, the decrease in membership. All trade
unions, except the F0, recognize that they are losing members: a 6-percent
loss for the CFDT in 1978-1979, 5 or 6 percent for the CGC [General Conf edera- ~
tion of Managerial Personnel, 8 percent for the FEN. As for the GCT, fro~i -
1975 to 1978, it lost approximately 7 percent of its membershig. The heavy
_ drain started up again in 1979, with a loss estimated by some at 10 percent,
and it continued into 1980. A result of unemployment, which is eating away
at the trade union base, but also a result of the disaffection f rom a trade
unionism which pays very little nawadays, and in the case of the GCT is more
and more alined with the positions of the Co~unist Party.
To top things off, the GCT is offering itself a b uilding complex presently
under construction in Montreuil, right outside Pari.s. Covering 24,000 square
meters, it includes four mo dern buildings: several dozen meetings rooms, ~
one of which seats 400, a restaurant which can serve 1,500 meals, a forum,
parking, central air conditioning and computerized telephones....
The only problem is that it is all very expensive: 240 million francs, it
- is said. "The Montreuil project was conceived at a time when the GCT leader- _
ship could hope for some credit opportunities from a possible left-wing
government, " the CFDT trea.surer remarks . Today, this samz leadership has
been able to obtain a 1~~~ of 45 million francs from the "Caisse des depots." -
But it must also borrow at a high rate from other organizations. "Conditions
that are, however, normal," it is emphasized within government circles, where
it is noted that there was no obstacle to the loan from the "Caisse des depots".
nor to the guarantee given by Val-de-Marne Department, without which th e _
oth er loans would not have been possible.
All at once, on La Fayette Street, at the GCT headquarters, one is "exerting
the grey matter. On 20 September, the national confederal co~ittee, in a
special meeting,11drew up several emergency measures. To finance Montreuil,
the GCT leadership had decided in June to sell 2 million vignettes priced
at 10 francs each: it wants to sell 500,000 by th e end of the y ear.
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But the GCT has other ideas, including the automatic deduction of feet from
the bank or postal account. This solution, reportedly "suggested" by loan
organization anxious to obtain ~uarantees, does not seem, however, after
several tries, to delight many of the trade unions. It has not been forgotten,
though. The CFDT is also studying it, and the FO has tried, unsuccesefully _
- up to now, to rally its troops around this solution.
When it comes to bringing in money, the trade unions are united.
COPYRI~HT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
9592
CSO: 3100
~
~
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_ ~
9
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
CHABAN-DELMAS NOTES 'WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR POSITION' -
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 13 Dec 80 p 11 -
- [Text] Focusing on the theme "Bordeaux as an aeron~turic and space center," thQ
Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce and Industry successfully organized December 12 as
a day of information to demonstrate that in 10 years Bordeaux and the Aquitaine
region have become an important center in the f ield of aeronautics and space.
Jacques Chaban-Delmas, president of the National Assembly, demonstrated how
France, as a world competitor, should accelerate its efforts in the advanced
technology sector and especially in the aeronautic and space sectors, an area in
which Bordeaux-Aquitaine occupies a central place with the activities of
Dassault-Breguet, of Aerospatiale, of SEP, SNPE, of SOGERMA and Thomson-CSF.
Four of the ways and means necessary to strengthen uur positi.on in that tough _
battle are as follows:
--technical competence must be employed on a multinational level;
--knowledge of the civilian and military markeCs, which requires that enter-
prises should be under the direction of qualified professionals;
--search for investments that create employment on a regional, national, _
and multinational level;
--maintenance of productivity using modern methodology, which can only be
obtained by mobilizing all participants. We should not stint on investments of
productivity. In addition, the aerospace industry could t~e a model for a new
approach to the social relations of an enterprise. -
President Chaban-Delmas asked us not to stint on the indispensable means for
assuring the success of the Ariane rocket, to accelerate the production rate of
Airbus, and to recruit more labor to that effect. He ~mphasized that Airbus will
only be truly successful if it is matched with a wide range of new products
including the short-range aircraft with 130 t~ 180 seats in the narrow body, which
requires new and substantial additions, and the 200- to 250-seat, four-engine,
long-range aircraft (TA I1) which, in addition to civilian uses, could f ind multiple
military application (by replacing the 707 and the DC-8). Europe must bui.ld
military transport planes. A decision on the launching of the four-reactor,
long-range Airbus must be taken as soon as possible.
Chaban-Delmas concluded that Bordeaux offer:~ all that is needed for the
indispensable development of the French aerospacial aCtivities.
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His speech was followed by a statement by Senator Valade, who described the
development of research on composite material at Bordeaux, organized through an
exemplary cooperation between the university and industry. Then the following
participants spoke:
--Huges, director of the ~quitaine f actory of Aerospatiale, on the production of
missiles;
--Betin, technical director of SEP in Bordeaux, on propulsion; ~
--BasquP, director of Dassault-Breguet in Bordeaux, on the construction of combat
_ and business aircraft;
--Bougault, director of the avionics division of Thomson-CSF, on avionics;
--Bisone, president-general director of SOGERMA, on aeronautical maintenance in
Bordeaux. , _
Af ter these presentations a luncheon was held at the Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce
and Industry during which President Roger Chevalier, speaking for GIRAS, thanked
CCI af Bordeaux for its initiative. He also emphasized the i.mportance of keeping
up the competition in our industry and the reduction of costs to assure the
industry's future. -
That afternoon participants visited the factories of Dassault-Breguet, Aerospatiale,
SEP, and Thomson-CSF.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. , 1980
9128
CSO: 3100
_ ~
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~
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
DISSIDENTS SPEAK IN NEW BOOK ON PCF, EUROCOMMUNISM, GOALS
- Introduction to Daix Book
Paris LES HERETIQUES DU PCF in French 1980
[Introduction to "Les Heretiques du PCF" by Pierre Daix published by Editions
Robert Laffont, S.A.--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]
~ ~Excerpts] This investigation, which I am turning over to the public, concerns
a game in France that has trifled with a tragedy--probably the pre-eminent tragedy
of our 20th century. This French pastime, albeit not the bloodiest, has nonetheless
accounted for an impress ive number of assassinations, when one adds to the list
of those dispatched by b ullet and knife the effects of calumny and moral and
intellectual destruction. At first blush it may seem to be simply an internal
affair of the coumiunists, but the conseqLSnces, over the last 60 years, have been
of the most extreme gravity not only for the French worker's movement but for
_ the entire left and our entire national life. The rupture represented by the
birth and development of the PCF, along with the recoil this produced, appears
as a rupture in the labor tradition and experience of a country from which Marx
_ drew many lessons.
= The remodelings of Bolshevization, and later Stalinization, have resulted--beyond
= the too little knawn human ravages--in cutting off generations of militants from
the patient, painful, but often fruitful explorations of their French precursors.
Not merely, as one might think, from their non-Marxist, noncommunist precursors.
The PCF has been built by s uccessive levelings of inemory, exactly like the Soviet
Communist Party: each generation of new adherents arising through the replacement
and oblivion of the old a~ilitants, whom they are taught to consider as "left
~ behind" by the impetuous changes of the party.
This tragedy is also uniquely French. The PCF was born in a France which thought
itself victorious in 1918 and which Soviet leaders had long held to be the
principal military threat to their young state. There resulted from this the
Communist International's pro-German policy, to be painfully laid aside after
Hitler definitively consolidated his power, only subsequently to resurface with
the German-Soviet pact of 1939. The consequences of this policy for the PCF
over time, as extracted from an ocean of lies, static, and omissions, appear more
and more grave and disastrous. Not only, alas, it resulted in courageous inter-
nationalists demanding peace with Hitler in October 1939 over the cadavers of
Czechoslovakia and Poland; then, after the defeat of 1940, in fervent anti-fascists
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cooperating with the Nazi occupation authorities in Paris. No, we must now look
at the consequences over time up to the current crisis--without forgetting to take
into account France's slowdown between the two wars, the French blood spilled in
the disaster of the phony ~:ar, or in too ill-prepared an armed resistance. .
In reality, if a policy is to be more than improvisational it must be a national `
~ policy, embracing the convergences to be sought between economic transformation,
social change, and defense in its military and diplomatic aspects. Vow it will
be seen how the French section's dependence on the Communist International has
been of such a nature as to deprive that section, the PCF, both of the intellectual
tools that would have been necessary to grapple with France's future, and, which -
is still more serious, of the means of acquiring them.
This alone would justify an effort to discover not only what the PCF has kept, and
sanctioned, but what it has rejected, lost, or condemned. At the same time we
depart from the kingdom of intentions and words, which cost nothing, to seize
upon the hard decisions, the involuntary decisions, in short, the xealities of
the party, Merely to listen--not to the execrations, but to the deviants, the
heretics themselves--presents us with a sLU~ary history, thus a condensed version
of the tragedy, for to listen to them is to give them a voice. And also something
more: it is to give them their honor. To give them life. �
Renegades, traitors to the working class, sell-outs to the City (later one will
say to the CIA), Hitler-Trotskyites, provocateurs in the pay of the interior
ministry; even death itself could not disarm the hatred, and it will take 40 years
for the denunciations of Nizan to cease, let alone for one to dare to rehabilitate
him by repudiating the accusation. But a writer does not have to rest on the
verdict of militants hopelessly swallowed up in the sewers of exclusion; he ~
rests ultimately on the verdict of his readers--and, despite the opprobrium, they
have come back to Nizan, puttin g his books on the library shelves, demanding that
television adapt his novels. How many others have been destroyed from within,
often dead well ahead of their time.
These outcasts have spoken, and sometimes their words have survived; it happened
that they wrote, and these buried texts, condemned and misrepresented, are simply
breathtaking, once exhumed, in their force, their undiminished topicality. They
at once overturn the conventional history of the PCF and that of the workers -
movement and the France of today as well.
- These reconstructions have forced me to abanddn, from time to time, the discourse
of the historian for the /I/ of the witness who has observed the tragedy from the
wings, and more rarely for the /I/ of the participant. Having had an uncle in
the majority at the Congress of Tours excluded in 1928, a"woodpecker" cousin,
I lived in the PCF throughout the wa~, the cold war, destalinization and its
abortion. My deportation, my work for LETTRES FRANCAISES won me friends in all
the socialist countries. So I was anything but naive in approaching this work.
I finished it overwhelmed by the extent of the debris. The fantastic political
and intellectual wealth of the workers movement has purely and si.mply been thrown
into the dust-bin of the century, the most extraordinary facet being the de~ree
to which the PCF excommuncations have been respected by its adversaries, as by
the major news media. One of the most remarkable succe~s stori~es of co~unist _
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propaganda is unquestionably having imposed the myth of a party ceaselessly _
disfigured by the "bourgeois" press. In reality, this press, when one observes
it over time, doubtless exaggerates the real influence of the PCF. It raises
it up on a pedestal as a foil, to be sure, but thereby disseminating its watch-
words, its opinions, its ideology. Quite to the contrary, it takes nothing from
the heretics but their rupture, revels i~n the insults lavished on them, only to
draw the party's veil over them as soon as they blur the ordinary image. Everyone
to his own trade: the PCF wi1Z be well protected, and if it is horrified by any
"revisionism," so are its enemies.
At the worst possi~le moment, for exarlple after the German-Sovxet pact, the
invasion of Poland, when the dissolurion of the PCF only hastens the advance of
repression, those who believe the hour has struck to settle accounts in the
party set out relentlessly, to try to force abjurations from those communists _
who had the courage to say that Soviet policy was contrary to the interests of
the French workers movement.
What we have here is not ~ust the resurrection of an occulted history, but the
restitution of a"cursed" history, which comes to us from brochures saved from
the pulping mill, confidential reports of which only incomplete sets are extant,
private letters, secrets more jealously guarded than the gold of the Bank of France;
yes, a veritable discipline of secrecy, about which only developments in Soviet
history after the death of Stalin, the general crisis of the co~nunist movement,
and the PCF's own crisis have made it possible for a few survivors to speak. -
What springs first into view are the stammerings, the repetitions. A loop.of
magnetic tape eternally playing back the same deb~te. The gestation and the birth
of the PCF in 1920 already present, in the essential points, the totality of
problems about which there has been ever since unceasing discussion, both within
it~~ own ranks and beyond: what is the nature of the Bolshevik party and the
~ mzaning of the PCF's relationship to that party? What to make of the permanent
contradiction between the doctrinal, structural, and material dependence on the
Conununist International, and the authenticity of the popular movements identified
with the PCr and with the syndicates it controls?
In the eyes of the French workers movement, after the disaster of the Com~une,
this march toward Revolution is inexplicably blocked in France. It gains new
life in the early 20th Century which the holy union of 1914 annihilates. And
the closer the war leads toward victory, the more clear it becomes that it will
be the victory of the bourgeois. Thus, Lenin is the true, the only son of the _
_ Commune. When the PCF is born in Tours, Mathiez is tel.ling his students in the
Sorbonne that October is fulfilling the hopes of 1793. The USSR is our daughter.
It is the depositary of our future. Let us learn the lessons we need from what -
- it has to teach us. If only our pride of authorship can help us do as much!
= This marriage between Bolshevism and neo-Jacobinism has indelibly marked the PCF:
- /"It lay:. a Marxist blueprint, handed over by the Soviet Union, over an overly
powerful politico-affective investment, which is its interpretation of the French
revolutio~ as both founder of the 'great nation' and liberator of the universal
society." /
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The extraordinary force of this 3ffective investment will be measured by the fact
that it will take so many proofs of the end of destalinization, and all of the
impact of the Soviet dissidents, to make people entertain the idea that there
was a divorce between the USSR and human rights; to make them understand, finally,
the message of the Prague reformists fighting for a socialism /with a human
face./ And, at the same time, we understand that ehe heretics in French communism
are the heretics of a religion which embraces the whole of the French left. That
is to say, they are dissidents with respect to that left, they overturn its
entir~ history, they hold out a mirror to it in which it does not recognize its
own face.
The value of the history of this dissidence is thus not at all that the heretics
could point us back to a socialist and revolutionary orthodoxy from which the PCF -
has strayed, still less to an ideal party that has never been realized. This
history confronts us with the continually throttled stammerings of a true history,
buried by the massive deposits of more or less sanctimonious ].ies, legends, and
myths. A hidden history which is not only that of the emergence of L~hat Leninist-
Stalinist bureaucratic order which we know is one of the most im~ortant social and
political phenomena of the 20th century, but in turn that of the French transforma-
tion during this same century which in like manner confounds the doctrinal
expectations of socialism ~n general and of Marxism in particular. The revisions
implied by this history are on every scale, and by no means the least is the
meaning of the messages left by deserters from the coimnunist order: from Victor
Serge, Trotsky, and Istratt Silone, to Ciliga, Koestler, Kravtchenko, Margarete
Buber-Neumann, Manes Sperber, and Alexander Wei~sberg. There can be no purely
French rehabilitation, if only because many of these deserters took refuge among
us, spoke among us, dealt here with the attacks of the Communist International
or the PCF. But also because France, because of its revolutionary tradition, is
as seen from Moscow both an ideological and strategic prize. This confers on ~
the PCF an experimental role and deprives it of the same degree of freedom held
by the more marginal co~nunist parties such as the Italian or Spanish. Now the
uniqueness of the PCF cannot be understood solely in the context of the politic~
of our hexagon, but rather from the point of view of the pasition of our hexagon
on the world scene, and, in the first instance, on the European scenn. All the
heretics at one moment or another understood that one must not take a few squares
to be the whole chess-board, much less for the player himself, who has tirelessly
- been playing the same game since October 1917. _
Certainly I have not exhausted the subject. To give voice to the heretics of
communism would take more thsn one book, and more than one man. My hope is simply
to have made possible the o~~ening of_the case, and the posing of the question.
= Excerpts From Book
- Paris LES HERETIQUES DU PCF in French 1980 pp 287-301
[Excerpts from Chapter 26: "The Historical Deception and the End of Heresy"--
passages between slantlines originally published in italics]
(Excerpts] As everyone knows, the "exmember" party has become, probably storting
in the 50's, the biggest party in France. Most of the militants disappointed in
the PCF left on tiptoes, but an unbelievable number of the expelled passed the
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rest of their adult life proving they really were communists� The heretics which
concern us here are those who understood that what they were searching for in the
party was not to be found there, could not be there, and who set out to spell
out the deception at the risk of being treated as renegades. But their depart~~re
from the PCF, their rupt ure with the system, constrained them to examine them-
selves and their own participation in the deception of others and of themselves.
To examine their complicity.
One chose to be a coffinunist: one does not choose to be a heretic. This is a
moral transformation. For one Suvarin, who molded his entire life around it, how
many heretics have sought refLge in other structures, in the haven of another
religion--Garaudy for e~mple--or more simply have withdrawn into the inanity of
private life. 'I'EZe open rule of bureaucrar_y and its cold administrative methods
in the PCF of today has favored the blossoming of a new type of critical militant
who refuses to be "excluded," which is easy since exclusion is no longer practiced,
and who flirts with heresy without suffering the attendant lacerations. They
suffer from no pangs of conscience, but what are they serving? the poses of the
leadership, or the political truth? We shall see how the respunses and situations
have become ambivalent.
Never were so many books published on the PCF as be tween 1976 and 1979.
It is clear that one must plumb this subterranean level to understand what happened
inside the leadership, how the obstructions and prohibitions of democratic
centralism lead to the creation of an oma~ipotent and hidden apparatus within the
official apparatus, and thus to the adoption of those junta proceedings which
~ Fiszbin will describe in detail in 1980 whenever change is contemplated. Here
our view is diametrically opposed to the description given us by two well-informed
journalists who necessarily adhere to the public visage of PCF policy, and also
to the carefully prepared and calculated indiscretions of the party: "1'~e New
Communists at the Gates of Power," by Andre Laurens and Thierry Pfister. This
is how the authors attack their subject:
_ "It is no longer a question of whether the com~unists have changed. They have
changed, and, according to the PCF leaders, they wi11 change further. This is
true in France and elsewhere. In western Europe, this is called 'Eurocomununism.'
In France it is accepted, out of convenience, to speak of the 'new co~nunists.
Naturally, the two authors immediately afterwards posed the question whether
French communists were not, at the end of 1977, ab out to change in the other
direction, "by coming back to what they were before. By closing the parenthesis."
Which was in fact becoming patently obvious. But Jean Elleinstein answered them
seriously in a preface:
"The window is open, and open wide. Nothing and n o one can close it again."
Which obviously does not argue for the lucidity of our historian, unless he judged
it expedient to assert a Euroco~w-~ist optimism he already knew to be diavowed.
- Never has the divorce between the apparent policy of the PCF and its deeper
intentions been so clearly, so forcefully evident as in the period of the rupture
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\
of the Union of the Left. And it was this "shattered left" which provoked an
unprecedented f_lood of personal accounts, of articles by communists published
cutside tne PGF, to an extent that ~ustified the existence of two specialized
collections: "CommunisC Debates," under the editorial guic:ance of G. Molina and
Y. V~rgas at Maspero; and "I Spell Thy Name...Freedom," urider Antoi~ae-Spire at~
Seuil.
~ Gerard Molina (in the PCF since 1966) and Yves Vargas (in the PCF since 1962)
opened discussi~n (not fire) just before the elections, by publishing "Dialogue
Within the PCF" --paradoxically, these two philosophy pr~fessors had to publish
their dialogue "on the ourside," but wrote in fact as if, acting thus, they
remained among communists, without departing from their stance as disciplined
militants, p2rsuaded that the contradictions they discerned in their party were -
even a part of the struggle, that they were /its engine of change./
I am far from forgetting, in this nrocession of confessions of impotence, two
books which try to force the issue by means of humor: "Long Live the Centennial
of the PCF--1920-2020" by Guy Konopickiiland "Free the Communists" (from stalinism,
not from the party) by Helene Parmelin. They, at least, are cheerfu3.
All of these authors pinned their hopes on rhe 23d Congress of the PCF, and
undoubtedly never has a party congress been awaited so feverishly, sometimes with
- pathetic entreaties For reassurance, at least for a sign that the dream is not
dead. Never have so many militants flagellated themselves in public to keep
their own disap~ointment from turning back or. their party. In reading them one
confirms the religious, the mythical value of the Union of the Left, conceived
as a veritable reversal of the Leninist pyramid of democratic centralism, wherein
it would be all the currents issuing from below which would illuminate and
fructify ultimately the political imderstanding of the center, all the initiatives
fraternally shouldered bringing with them, after so mam defeats, the real popular _
revolution.
- One also confirms that none of these militants ever doubts--and in most cases
did not even dream of doubting before March 1978--that their party would neces-
sarily serve to realize this transfo~ation of French society expected of it.
Is this ignorance on the part of the militants in the ranks, or of the younger
generations, or is it not rather erasur~ from memory, repression, refusal to
consider the history of the party, the experiences of the heretics, the message
of the dissidents? And therefore the self-preservative function of the party
has remained unaffected, undisturbed, throughout the formidable concussions
provoked by the restoration of Soviet history, by the unearthing of the buried _
history of the PCF? The key word is /change./ Belief in the ineluctability
and irreversability of change in the party is the antidote to the lessons of the
history of the PCF. Let us stipulate that the dialectic by terms of cahich the
Union of the Left wou~d ultimately constrain the PCF to change has handily :
survived the demise of the said Union. There is no worse obstinacy than that of
the left in France. As Peguy realized, it coul3 even go so far as intellectual
ccnaardice .
To be a militant: is this not to be a believer, is it not to put the aim one has
attached to one's life, the meaning one gives it, ahead of the infatuatton of
facts? If we move on from these witnesses to examine a collection of analyses
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- that strive for more objectivity, "Chan~e the PCF?"12, we find nevertheless among
~ the sponsors, two noncommunist leftist universities, the traces of a simi.lar
idealism. Olivier Duhamel and Henri Weber ask, in their introduction, how to
/democratize democratic centralism,/ and are tempted by the idea of a right to
gri organized faction, which they think they see at work under Lenin. It i~.
symptomatic that, in this book finishe~l in early 1979, they prefer to ignore
Suvarin. The systematic ar,alysis is elsewhere rather than in their p ~eface, in
the work of a specialist like Georges Lavau; to the question what use is the PCF
machinery, the lat.*.er responds:
"The ruling group pursues two objectives. First ob~ective: the survival and
growth of the PCF /incorporated./ Second objective: if political circimmstanees
permit, under conditions impo~sible to predict today, the coming into power, to
place as many of the levers of power as possible under the control of the /PC~ ,
incorporated./ In case this second objective is realized, whatever may be the
intentions of tha commimist leaders, either today or on the day when power is
seized, the best assumption is that success will result in a Gierek, Kadar, or
Brezhnev. It is in the logic of this concept of taking power through progressive
seizure of all the apparatus af power thaC it should lead to a papular democracy
which the leaders may not perhaps }~~ve wanted (this I cannot say, and~ their
intentions have /no/ importance)."
Between this analysis and that of Althusser on the meaning of the CME [expansion
unknown] is there any difference other than the difference between conclusions
drawn from the facts and those drawn from theory? But while Lavau's conclusion
, takes into account Marx as a historian, Althusser must brai~ch off toward the
scholastic. The great discovery of Marx, in reality, is f.o have brought to light
despite all the confusion and disurder of actuality, the unknowingness, the
unthinkingness, the unawareness of history's players. /It is men who make history,
but they do not know they are making it,/ meant that it was neither God nor Ceasar
(nor tribune, Pottier will say in L'INTERNATIONALE), but him?an socie ties. Now
this observation of Marx the economist, the historian, the discoverer of the
economic and social unconscious, of imperceptible changes over the long run,
is contradicted by the other Marx, the prophet of the /Commur.ist Manifesto/
- who reestablishes awareness of the aims of history, proposes it as the destiny
of the party of the communists, capable of
"asserting the interests common to all the proletariat regardless of nationality.
_ (...)They still represent the interests ~f the movement in its total ity.
They have the advantage, over the rest of the proletariat, of a clear understanding
of the conditions of advance and the general results of the proletarian movement."
More than 130 years afterward, the irony of history (which Marx understood) has
stamped every word of this prediction. And it is not enough to cons tate that the
French communists, in 1978, do not have the party they deserve: one must really
come to ask oneself why, except in rare and usually ephermeral circimnstances,
communists have never had this party that was Marx's dream for them? The /trans-
formation of Bolshevism into its practical opposite/ as Suvarin says can no
longer be held to be accidental, a result of Russian historical circinnstances
or the personality of Stalin. Nowhere has there emerged, since its s uccess ire
1917, a communist policy capable of "asserting the intarests co~on to all the
proletariat regardless of nationality, the interests of the movement in
its totality." '
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But what is striking is that the leadership of the PCF succeeds so well in
isolating its militants, and even almost all its intellectuals, from innovations
of the two fraternal Eurocommunist parties. That it still pursues Thorez`s dream
of acting as eldest daughter of the Church of Moscow, that it continues to share
the Leninist and Stalinist concept of the Revolution, all this might seem to be
mere doctrinal nostalgia. That Spanish and Italian Euroco~nunism are less
~ infectious in Paris in 1980 than the Stalinian flexibility of Togliatti, indeed
his clever and restrained, albeit controversial, destalinization, between 1948
and 1.964, this poses a real problem. A first response is that the ovezwhelming
- majority of intellectuals sensitive to the centrifugal currents with respect to -
Moscow that are incarnated today in the PCI and the PCE, as they were in 1956
by the Polish Party and in 1968 by the Zech communist party, are today no longer
in the PCF. But one must go even further. And dare to face head-on the two
contradictory po~itical traditions of our modem history--that of centralism
taking the place of Jacobinism, and that of support sought abroad in hopes of
gaining control over the government--complementary traditions which pitted Spain
against Richelieu or Mazarine, England against Napoleon, Hitler against the
Popular Front; but also, let us dare to admit a.t, Lenin against Clemensceau or
Millerand. Stalin was able to make use of this, as I hope this book makes clear,
and Brezhnev is here, as in so many other areas, his heir.
Is this to say that French cotmnunisis are indifferent to the temptation of the
"foreign party?" If we look back in this light on the essays of the dissidents,
a fracture-line can be discerned, precisely over the essential problem of Euro- ~ E
communism: whether to opt for inciting transfo~ation of civic society, or to -
monopolize government and powers by means of the party-state. This choice between
the two methods is implicit with the dissidents, though the PCF leadership
excommunicates it, labelling "class collaboXation" anything that seems to tend
[oward it, and all the more intemperately a~ it realizes that it could lead to the
birth--oh diabolical horror!-at last of an effective political alternative in
France.
This unformulated contradiction sheds light on the behavior of both Althusser and
Elleinstein. Althusser best demonstrates to what degree the PCF's Brezhnevian _
obedience mortgages any possible future and more frightfully still any Marxist
nourishmen* to the French workers movement. History can no longer be swept out _
of sight, nor can Soviet degeneracy, nor the crimes of the Maoi:st cultural
revolution, when~the genocide in Cambodia reveals, behind the long war for the
independence of North Vietnam, a miTita~~zed and dictatorial hegemony, totali-
tarian in the image of its Soviet ally.
What has been called Althusser's Marxist structuralism, his /theoretical anti-
hinnanism/, was aimed really at freeing the doctrine from its prophetic sheathing,
at discrediting in advance those "humanistic standard~," in order to get beyond
"existing socialism," but above all in order to construct a theory, out of native
French soil, elaborating an "Italian" way leading toward the conquest o:F civic
society. This is the meaning of~the slogan: "Emerge from the fortress." This
shines forth in the conclusion of the essay "What Can No Longer Endure in the PCF":
"We must have (...)at all costs: 1. A Marxist theory co~anj.tted to life,
capable not only of confronting contradictions, but of confronting /its own/
contradictions. A Marxist theory' delivered, from the bpwels of its present crisis
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in the o unist movement, by the practi ce of concrete analysis aaid by the practice
of popular struggles. A theory which does not dodge the initiatives of the masses
and social transformations, but on the contrary confronts them, is penetrated -
by them, and nourished by them."
If Althusser must lay bare the thread of his ~ritical reasoning--his role as
theoreti cian demands it--Elleinstein on the other hand comports himself as a
representative of the Coue method. Six months of the year he is an incurable
optimist, 3 months he is a moderate optimist, and he spends the remaining 3 months
accusing the leadership of not implement ing the intentions of its congresses.
He is a good commissar to all appearance s, and moreover was for a long time a
semi-of f icial supervisor, a"head-huaiter" for the apparatus in organizing the
transicion from the mythical history of the USSR to a history suitable to "net
- positive impact." Now, Elleinstein is taking into accowit the work of Helene
Carrere d'Encaussg~and the success of "La Rue des Proletaires Rouges" by Kehayan
husband and wife. In fact, he too is militating to try to gradually bend the
policy of the PCF toward an Italian-styl e Eurocom~unist path.
But the illusory aspect of these initiatives lies in the fact that, unlike Italy
and Spain, France cannot hope to enclose its future within a sort of protected
political province. Its responsibilities born of the victory of 1945, its veto
- right as a permanent member of the Security Council, its nuclear striking force
constrain i~t to look at Europe in its global aspects. "Eurocono~unism" thus cannot -
be for France a sort of regional cocoon which would protect a unique experiment
against Soviet and American aims. France must thus ask itself first of all
whether "Eurocommunism" corresponds to i ts future, that is, to the dynamics of
growth that.would permit it to develop an autonomous future. Now this would -
require before anything else that a pre- destalinized, pre-desovietized communism
could be in its future.
Does one require an overall proof that communism belo*_~gs to the past? There may
still be heretics and revisionists, but there is no more heresy, no mor~ revi-
sionism as a living, fecund quest, as an enterprise looking to the future. Only -
as nostalgia, a doomed ideal. Soviet historians at the turn of the 60's, Czech
economists such as Sik or Richta, Hungarian sociologists like Hegedus, Polish
' Marxists, the Yugoslav review PRAXIS, have all been silenced. It was not only `
repression, the implacable normalization, which brought things to an end, but
discouragement. It was life itselt which finally taught the communist reformers
that they were not struggling in socialist societies which had dev~.ated from
their true ends, but in the eradication, the deculturization, the denationaliza-
tion, of societies produced by that very aim which Soviet co~nunism makes a
reality under the name of socialism. / The.communist world is unrefqrmable./
The impossibility of achieving implementation of the H~lsi.nki Accords has shown
that even the lawfulness of the party-states was a myth. It is in the face of
' this absolute absence of rights Chat resistance takes the form of the moral and =
cultural survival of peoples. The "Charter of 77," the VONS [expansion unknown]
in Prague, the Polish KOR [expansion unknown] Sal~charov in the USSR, all are
witness to the fact that the preservation of the peoples there is now a pre-
condition for any political scheme.
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_c'
Leszek Kolakowski best incarnated the hopes of Polish revisionism in 1956. 'It,ienty -
; years later, it is he who best delineates the errors and illusions o� those days:
' "We celebrate today the 20th anniversary of gre.at and short-lived illusions. To -
say they were illusions is in no sense to diminish the importance of tha ideas
and events of whicil we sFeak; one knows of few historical agitations to which
illus ions did not add their weight, often decisively. In th.e case at hand they
cons isted of ths hope, to which many of us fell victim for some time, that , ~
communism worthy of the name was reformable, that it could assimilate democratic ~
values, lose its oppressive and totalitarian character, without striking at the
foundations. These dre ams of a re-enlivened o r regenerated coummunism,
or even of a Leninism that was not Stalinism, these dreams, as miserable as they
may h ave seemed intellectually, nonethpless contributed to the disintegration of
a system incapable of doing without an ideological facade giving the government
a principle of legitimacy.
"But the ideological defeat of co~unism has also cut the ground from underneath
internal criticism. So-called revisionism only made sense so long as the idea
of cofmnunism itself was taken seriously, which is no longer the case in the
- com~nunist countries, as2~either the rulers, nor the ruled any longer believe in
- the official ideology."
However loudly or endlessly Georges Marchais may repeat the archaisms which
cons ole the old ones in Moscow in the conviction that the world is theirs, the
path on which he has committed his party is even more pernicious for the future
of th e workers movement than for a national future which is only moderately
cont aminated by it. The situation now at the end of the 20th century no longer
has a place for the ambiguities about French autonomy which served Thorez so
well. To bank Paris's future on Moscow in 1980, is to take the role of a Doriot
who would succeed with sovietism, while fergetting that Hitler too believed
his regime would last 1,000 years.
But now we see, as always when there is a serious crisis, that the invasion of
Kabul is giving new life to th e old Communist International phantasmagoria about
the culpability of the socialists, their conspiring with the right. If capitalism
- does not flounder, ~f it recovers and adapts, the fault lies with social democracy.
The spring of 1980 gave proof with unprecedented cynicism, in the course of the
- debate provoked by the publication of a pexmit for foreign workers in Naxi Germany
made out to Georges Marchais, by L'EXPRESS. At that time, the secretary general
of the PCF not only failed to express the least regret for having worked for the
Hitlerian military aeronautic:al industry between October 1940 and the spring of
1943, that is during the period when most people thought Hitler could win the war,
but he even had Claude Mazauric, the historian elected to the Central Comanittee
, at th e 23d Congress, write in L'HUMANITE of 19 March that it was untrue to say
that Georges Marchais had "chosen" to "work in the aviation factories producing
for Nazi Germany, /as if a French worker in 1940 had any choice in the aeronautical
industry between working for the Germans or for a]French industry. (My emphasis)
Whi ch amounts to say ing that in a capitalist regime the working class has no way
to make an autonomous political decision, and above all to its repudiation of any
national responsibility. Moreover, Georges Marchais has stressed this political
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.
p rofile by indicating that he did not join the PCF until 1947, /after/ the
communist ministers had left the government. In other words only after the party
was back in the opposition and h ad abandoned the "national front" line which it
had held since the spring of 194~.
In parallel fashian, Henri Fiszbin, the irremovable head of the Federation of
Paris, has broken silence, revealing in his book "Les Bouches S'Ouvrent" the
reasons for his resignation of 11 January 1979, the political reasons for which
were hidden under "health reasons." This is the testimony of a man who without
any nualms implemented PCF policy since Marchais had taken over its leadership,
but who ended up believing that the Union of the Left was a real pol3tical alliance
and, for that reason, took seriously the criticistas that came out of the 22d
Congress of the PCF of the /lack of democracy in the USSB./ The story of the
confrontation of 11 January 1979 between the Federal Bureau of Paris and Political
B ureau is the best possible dociunentation of the impossiblity, under the conditions
of democratic centralism, of hold ing a political discussion with the ruling
authority. In the case at hand, to "be advised whether the line followed in
Paris was or was not that of the party, that of the 22d Congress."
This basic question will be conjured away under vague formulas conceived to
intimidate: lack of ideological fir~ess on class positions, laxity, slippag~.
- Fiszbin, daring after Georges Marchais has finished to demand the floor again,
in order to say:
"There is a mistake; I was told that the issue was our work in the context of the
regional examination of the activiCy of the party, not an indictment of our
o rientation. I do not agree. I do not accept this proceeding against the Federa-
tion of Paris."
w ill tear from Etienne Fajon this anguished cry:
"I have b~e~n on the Political Bureau for 33 years, and I have never seen anything
like it!"
Fiszbin will come to understand that it is because his federation "symbolized
in a certain way the openness policy of the 22d Congress" that in light of the
mediocre electoral results achievPd in the 1978 elections, one wanted to obtain
f rom it a self-criticism indispensable to preparations for the 23d Congress.
With all appropriate tact, Fiszb in thus reveals what participation in the political
manipulation of the miltants was demanded of him that day. In effect, the self-
criticism would bring the "democratic" openness of the 22d Congress into harmony
with the camouflaged closedness of the 23d Congress.
W ithout a self-criticism, Fixzbin will be constrained to silence. There are no
divergencies. At ':he end of i979, before the Central Co~ittee, he tries in vain
to defend the truth before his peers. He goes away with the impression of having
participated in a surrealistic game of football where, the only member of his
team, he was striving "to score goals with the posts being watched by 140 guards."
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He resigns from the Central Committee. Re will be obliged to submit his letter
_ of resignation in conformity with the ~ooked-up su~?ary the leadership hands out.
Henri Fiszbin states:
"The party took seriously the irreversibre decisions of the 22d Congress and the
requirement for strictness, for truth, which results from it The time f~r
meek submission is definitely gone. No party intez~eI'st can comma..nd one to say
that white is black, because the leadership has dec~ded. The entire federal
secretariat refused."
_ What party? His book shows on the contrary that political lies pr~vailed, that
the line of the 22d Congress was bent and turned around in approbation of th~ -
/"net positive impact"/ of the socialist countries and the aggression against
- Af ghanistan. The recalcitrant militants resigned. They were replaced, and the
only PCF in exiskence is that of the secretary general, as before. Fiszbin,
against his own will, provides the proof.
~Three months later, at the end of Jwte 1980, Fiszbin's last friends will be removed
f rom the Seine Federation Bureau. As for Elleinstein, who also was guilty of
continuing to believe in a union of the left, L'HUMANITE will publish a l.etter
by Lucien Seven announcing the breaking of the contract he had with Editions
Sociales for the publication of a"History of Contemporary France" and disclosing
the amounts of money he had received, in such a way as to cast doubt on his
disinterestedness. This is what is called not missing a trick.
FOOTI30TES -
1. Published by Fayard.
2. Published by Le Sagittaire. In this relief operation for the cadres of the .
Resistance, one must also see the effect of Soviet party directives, not
transmitted forcibly as such, but under the guise of vigilance against the
Titoist danger. Cf. "J'ai Cru au Matin." Marchais, though born in 1920,
is by virtue of his aon-resistance a member of the generation of 1925.
~
3. Stock, end of 1977. Thierry Pfister was born in 1945. The first publication
of NOUVEAUX COMMUNISTES dates from 1973, or the beginnings of the su~cess
of the Common Program. ~
- 4. Maspero.
11. Respectively: Editions Libres, and Hallier and Stock.
12. French University Press, January 1979.
13. Olivier Duhamel, born in 1950, associate professor of pubZic law, Henri
Weber, born in I944, master associate in political scierice, the former close -
to the PSF, the second close to the Trotskyites. Georges Lavau, born in 1918,
director of REWE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCES POLITIQUES, has among other things
published "Communism in France," Armand Colin, 1969, particip3ted in "Communism
in Italy and in France" under the editorial supervision of Donald Blackmer
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and Sidney Tarrow (1971). I would be inclined to think that a French people's
democracy wauld end up with a Husak or worse, the normalization of French
society posing infinitely greater problems than those of *re Czech, Moravian,
or Slovak societies.
16. Just as I could not dream of attem~ting the history of French Trotskyism,
the Maoisms also merit a separate study. Nevertheless, the post-Mao era has
provoked us to some reflection which has come to be integrated into the
revisions of communism. In particular those of Claudie and Jacques Broyelle,
~ with the:ir "Deuxieme Retour de Chine," Le Seuil, 1977, and especially "Le
Bonheur cies Pierres, Carnets REtrospectifs," Ze Seuil, 1978, which leads to
a reassessment of Camus. On Vxetnam, I refer ~t;-~ the special edition of
30 April 1979 of the review QUL ME, and to my ~:ticle: "Combatting New Forms
ot Servitude." See also Joan Baez's message.
~ 17. Cf. Elleinstein: "A Certain Idea of Cammunism," Julliard, 1979. "La Rue des
Proletaires Rouges," Le Seuil, end of 1978, was a best-seller. One read there
an unvarnished description of real life in Moscow, seen by two young function-
aries of the French mission there. Cf. my account in L'EXPANSION, January 1979.
21. "1956: Warsaw-Budap~st: The Second October Revolutinn," Le Seuil, ~.978,
an anthology ~ut together by Pierr2 Kende and Krzysztof Pomian. This remarkable
collection shows both the delayed success of revisionism in France, since the
colloquium it reconstructs, ror the first ti_me in the p~esence of co~nunists,
treated the Hungarian uprising of 1956 as a revolution, and not once again
as a cou~nterrevolution, and also its theorezical death-knell, with the expose
af Kolakowski, which moreover, did not g~ down qnietly.
23. Grasset, 1980.
COpYRIGHT: Editions Robert Laffont, S.A. Paris 1980
9516 -
CSO: 3100
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_ COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
FURTHER DETAIIS CONCERNING 1981 DEFENSE BUDGET
Paris AR[~EES D'ATJJOURD'HUI in French Dec 80 pp 6-7
[For related material see JPRS 77366 11 February 1980 No 1700 of this series
pp 76-83, article titled DEFENSE BUD(~T FOR 1981 DISCOSSED IN DETAII.]
~Text~ A Growing Budget
- The 1981 Defense budget, submitted to the National Assembly 23 October and to the
Senate 2 D~cember, totals 104.443 billion francs after deducting pensians--18.767
billion--which formerly came out of the general expenses budget.
- Compared to the 1980 budget, which totaled 88.601 billion francs, it represents
an increase of 17.9 percent. This increase is substantially higher than that of
funds allocated to the civil ministries, which on average have increased only 14.5
= percent.
' A Budget Conforming to the Military Programing Law
The 19 June 1976 Law on Military Expenditures and Equipping of the Armed Forces
from 1977 to,1982 had set the total 1981 Defense budget at 99.990 billion francs.
This therefore represents an increase of almost 4.5 billion francs (4.453 billion,
to be exact) being allocated to the Armed Forces by the 1981 budget over the
amount provided by the Law.
Thus, for the fifth consecutive year, the decision taken in 1976 to intensify the
nation's financial commitment to Defense has been carried out.
In 1981, the Defense budget will represent 3.85 percent of the marketable gross
domestic product, as compared with only 3.39 percent in 1976, 3.55 percent in
1977, and 3.65 percent in 1980.
Priority Accorded to Equipping of Forces
Since 1977, priority has been accorded to the equipping of the Armed Forces, as
provided in the Programming Law.
In 4 years, expenditures for equipment went from 40,7 percent of the Defense
bu~get to 45 percent. In 1981, they were further increased to 45.7 percent.
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The 1981 budget calls for equipment expenditures totaling 47.685 billion francs,
an increase of 19.68 percent in funds .for outpayments cortpared with 1980. -
Even more significant is the growth in program authorizations: 22.64 percent over
1980 (totaling 64.39u billion francs). These are actually the authorizations that
enable the financing of orders for the materiel required to equip and modernize
our- forces.
Operational Expenditures (Title III)
Operational expenditures under Title III annount to 56.758 billion francs, or 54.3
percent of the Defense budget.
This represents an increase of 16.4 percent over 1980. If we exclude fuels
expenditures, the Defense budget increase undPr Title III is I3.9 percent, which
- is less than the increase in operational expenses under the civil budgets (+16.3
percent).
This average percentage increase covers some very diverse evolutions:
--Allocations for pay and allowances, representing 66.77 percent of total Title
III expenses, show an increase of 16.26 percent.
In addition to normal pay increases, they will enable the Einancing of certain
measures in aid of civilian and military personnel, particularly:
a} anincrease in base pay for draftees to 1(3.50 francs per day beginning 1 April
1981, and in the special scale for volunteer personnel; _
b} anincrease in foreign duty allowance for draftees serving in the French forces
in Gexmany (from 24 to 55 francs per month) ;
c) anincrease in certain bonuses;
~j status changes affecting theIETA ~Weapons Studies and Technologies Engineers~,
personnel of the SDECE ~Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service~,
and Armed Forces hospital nurses and technicians.
The creation of new jobs concerns esseni.ially the National Gendarmerie (725 addi-
tional jobs) and will enable the strengthening of its units throughout the
' country.
--Fuel expenditures allocations have increased almost 70 perc2nt, made necessary
by past and expected future oil price rises. This increase should enabie the
Armed Forces to maintain their activities at planned;,1980 levels, namely:
a) 15 flying hours per month per Air Force combat pilot;
b) ].00 days of field exercises, 47 of which to be with org~nic equipment, for the
Ground Forces;
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- c) an average of 86 days at sea for Navy units, with c~tnbat vessel averages
being closer to 100 days.
--Lastly, allocations for general administrat ion and for Armed Fotces day-to-day
- livir;g expenses, representing increases within the limits imposed on the civil ~
- administrations, that will enable an improvement in living ~onditions of the
units.
Equipment Expenditures (Title IV)
These total 47.685 billion �rancs in funds tor outpayments, an inctease of 19.68
percent over 1980.
Funding is being centered on three basic effor ts, as fcl2o~sa _
--Continued development of our nuclear deter rent force ~nd planning of future
generations of weapon systems.
The portion of funds being allocated to the s trategic and tactical nuclear forces
remains around one fourth (25.92 percent) of the program authorizations and
around one third (30.01 percent) of outpaymen ts under Title V.
--An increase in allocations for studies and research.
--Implementation of the principal materiel programs authorized for the equipping
of our conventional forces, as follows:
~ a) The Ground Forces, the equipping of which in antitank weapons (Milan, Hot) and
= anti-aircraft weapons (Roland) will continue, will also order in 1981:
--60 AMX 30 tanks
- --50 AMX 10 RC tanks =
--37 AU F7. 155-mm canon
--115 ANIX lOP and PC tanks. -
The above are in accordance with the priority being given to the modernization of
the armored divisions.
Lastly, a special effort is to be deployed on the new FAMAS 5.56-mm rifle: Indus-
trial investments will be undertaken to acce lerate the production rate. In 1981,
54,000 rifles will be ordered (10,000 more than originally planned).
_ b) The Navy, whose allocations for the build i ng of new ships are being increased
almost 50 percent, will be able to order a s i xth ASW corvetter a fourth nuclear
attack submarine, a fourth refueling oil tank er, one anti-~mine ship, and two
patrol boats. -
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The year 1981 will also mark the start of implementation of the program to
strengthen its resources for the undertaking of public service missions, with
the ordering of the first 2 of the Il planned ships.
c) The Air Force, in 1981, will order 21 Mirage F 1's and 22 Mirage 2000's. It
will continue the renewal of its transport Eleet (5 additional Transalls) as well -
as the equipping of its traininq facilities with modern trainer planes: It will -
order 9 additional Alpha-Jets and its first 30 Epsilons.
Lastly, the strengthening of its air base defenses will continue at the same pace:
The budget provides for 56 new 20-mm batteries.
- d) The Gendarmerie will be able to meet its current materiel renewal requirements
(vehicular equipment, office equipment and furniture).
Overseas units will be provided with modern radio and vehicular equipment (VHF
networks, TP 3 tactical vehicles).
The following equipment will be ordered: 10 armored vehicles, I~Q road.vehicles for
the mobile gendarmerie, 1 light helicopter, 1,225 portable transceivers, and 175
BLU's ~expansion unknown~. ~
For detailed discussion of the 1981 defense budget, see JPRS CSO: 3100/391,
COPYRIGHT: 1980 - Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
- 9399
= CSO: 3100
~
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_ COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
- MATRA-HACHETTE: INFORMATION CONTROL, DISSEMINATION PROBLEMS
Matra's Possible Intentions
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 15 Dec 80 pp 34-35
[Article by Josette Alia: "What Matra Wants To Do With Hachette: From Hard-
ware tfl Sof tware" ]
[Text] What makes Jean-Luc Lagardere run?
He already has everything anyone could possibly desire: money, youth, power,
and fame. His peers have just named him France's most dynamic business leader.
He plays tennis, lunches with cabinet ministers, and d.ines with the president.
He is a rabid soccer fan, dabbler in Europe-1 [radio station], and the Club de
la Presse is his "dancing partner. He is building an ultramodern subway sys-
tem in Lille and planning to build,ta similar one in Los Angeles, the city of
_ French fries encompassing Hollywood and Beverly Hills, and that is an exciting,
amusing, and profitable project. In fact, Lagardere makes money on almost
everything. In short, he is a driver and a winner. In that case, what more
does he want? Why has he set about gaining control of Hachette, that old sepia-
colored firm rooted in the France of Jules Ferry and attached like century-old
ivy to the oldest branches of the great French bourgeois dynasties? What con-
~ nection is there between Matra's missiles and Hachette's textbooks? Why does
this apparently sated young wolf still now want to eat a grandmother?
Because in Jean-Luc Lagardere's opinion, power is still up for grabs. Because
he believes power is no longer entirely political--it's the Elysee Palace or
nothing, the rest is obsolete--, and almost no longer economic--money, always
money, how sad!--and because he is convinced that Comorrow pow~er will be in the
hands of those who possess, create, and disseminate that new means of action,
namely information. But not just any kind of information!~ It is not hand-
written or typewritten information or information printed from metal type. It
is that information which is transmitted by satellite, stored in data banks and
in the small heads of microprocessors, and which culminates in soundg, images,
and colors on television screens or other display screens. Tomorrow's new real
power will be audiovisual and "telematic" [merger of computer and cammunications
techr.ology for information processing]. Such, in any case, is the way the new
prophets of the telematic age picture the future.
War has already begun between the large firms. Television is the first stake
involved and the press is second.
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Fourth Channel
I� everything runs smoothly, French television is supposed to assume its
fourth dimension about 1983-1984. By that time, the Ariane rocket will have
placed the first French direct broadcast television satellite, TDF-1, in -
orbit. TDF-1 wi.ll cover the entire national territory and will no longer =
depend on ground-based transmitters. It will have three video channels, one
for TF-1 and another for Antenne-2 [existing French TV cha~els]. There is
no problem with this allocation, but what about the satellite's third channel?
It cannot be alloc~ated to FR-3 [third existing French TV channel] because the
latter must remain a regional service as required by its charter. Who then
will use the satellite's third channel? The answer is important because this
may at long last be the way France obtains, altogether legally, that fourth
television channel that has been either feared or awaited for such a long time.
- There is no doubt that direct broadcast televi.sion cannot be expected until
1984 at best. But now that everything is being put into place, this is the
time to prepare for the fourth channel. At the present time, there are still
three possible solutions for that channel: allocate it to the government, lease
it to a consortium, or lease it to a private corporation.
Far the time being, the govern~ent does, of course, hold a monopoly of televi- ~
sion, and has not said it will give it up. But many of those who support a
policy of leasing the fourth channel to a private firm sanctimoniously argue that
three state-run channels are already excessive. And furthermore, pointing to the
experience of the peripheral radio stations, they contend that a more independent
fourth channel would somewhat spur our three national television channels. .
The fourth channel consortium would consist of Europe-1, RTL [Luxembourg Radio
and Television System], Radio-Monte Carlo, and Tele-France International. The
government would hold an interest in the consortium through its agency SOFIRAD
(Radio Broadcasting Financial Company). SOFIRAD would furnish part of the
capital and each partner in the consortium would be given a slice of the tele-
vision "cake." But it will be difficult to determine each partner's exact
slice. Who would have the prime vie~,ring time? The best time for commercials?
How would the profits be shared? (The latter has already been decided, the bulk
of the profits would go to SOFIRAD.)
The most active advocates of a private television:channel are vigorously push-
ing for the second solution, name~!y leasing the channel to a single private
corporation. In this latter case, there are only two remaining rivals: RTL
- and Europe 1. Each rival has its good points. RTL has few technical resources
but does have practical experience in that its transmitter in Luxembourg already
_ provides television coverage of Luxembourg naturally, Belgium, part of Germany,
and France'g eastern departments. Conversely, Matra has fully mastered tele-
- vision's new techniques, including networks, satellites, antennas, etc. But it
lacks practical experience and esp~cially programs. In short, it lacks what is
known as software in co~r., ater tercminology.
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_ By acquiring Hach~tte, however, Lagardere now assures himself of having this
intellectual raw material. For contrary to what is too often believed,
Hachette is not involved solely with paper. It also has such audiovisual
activities as Hachette Audiovisual, Tele-Hachette, and Channel 80. These thfee
subsidiaries already produce, inter alia, full-length films, many television
commercials and, as subcontractors, they furnish occasional major programs to
TF-1 and Antenne 2.
Hence with Hachett e, Lagardere also acquires a certain experience in the pro-
duction of televis i on programs. By adding Tele-Monte Carlo's capabilities to
this experience, i t can be said that the amount o.f television program hours
produced by Matra and Hachette combined would be about the same amount of such ~
hours RTL can produce.
- But Hachette's act ivities include much more. For instance there is TELE-7-JOURS
[weekly TV guide], France's best-selling magazine and the daily "bible" of
nearly 3 million t e levision viewers. It will be a magnificent medium for
Europe-1 if the la tter snatches the biggest piece of the fourth channel cake.
A last benefit would be the fact that journalists of the Hachette group's `
magazines and newspapers could be recruited for a future television channel.
Not to mention all of Europe-1's newsmen who are no longer merely dreaming about
the fourth channel but are already actively preparing themselves for it.
Lagardere has thus gained a very clear advantage in the war between Europe-1
and RTL .
The second stake involved is the press. Here also, Matra has mastered the new
technologies. Telematics, videotex systems, and telecopiers hold no secrets
for Matra. Yet he re again, the company needed some subject matter to "tele-
matize." It, the refore, bought LES DERNIERES NOIJVELLES D'ALSACE. Why did it
choose a regional newspaper? For two reasons. First, because Lagardere wants
to use it to test his equipment. 'These tests are already under way. Secondly
because it is being whispered in the PTT [Postal and TelecoaQnunications Admin-.
istration) that the Teletel system* scheduled to be tested in Velizy next spring,
will afterward be extended to the entire eastern region, with the agreement--so
it is said--of the regional press hard hit by the competition from videotex
systems (especially for classified advertisements and local weather forecasts).
Will LES DERNIERES NOUVELLES D'ALSACE, equipped in timely fashion with telema-
tic systems by Mat ra, be able to win out over its neighbor, L'EST REPUBLICAIN,
in this new elect ronic information processing race?
*
A telematic system that combines a television receiver, telephone, and com-
- puter, and thus enables the user to request [by telephone] and receive on his
home TV screeYi a huge amount of practical information he is currently obliged
to seek elsewhere, particularly from his newspaper. .
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If Ariane Is Willing
The "Alsatian" operation was obviously of relatively minor importance in the
Matra empire's scheme of things. It was viewed by some as a fluke, as one of
Jean-Luc's whims. Those who believed this were wrong. It was a serious
undertaking: when Lagardere said in Los Angeles recently that Matra was going
_ to "expand its media-information department," he was looking far beyond the
blue line of Che Rhine. He was thinking of the fourth channel, but also,
apparently, of the major printed news media.
Hachette owns the weekly magazine LE POINT and controls the NMPP (New Dis~ribu-
tion Service of the Parisian Press). Without the latter, no newspaper in France
would be distributed. Thus Hachette will constitute a tremendous asset for
Lagardere in his tussle with the press. Exactly how far wfil this "telemati-
zation" process go? In the future will we be typing our articles on a computer
k.eyboard as is already the case in the AFP [French News Agency] for example?
Lagardere quite obviously believes in telematics. He views it as the communi-
cations mediimm of the future, and one that will, little by little, alter or com-
pletely replace all of the traditional means, such as newspapers, bulletins, or
even books, incluciing textbooks. As regards the latter, Hachette has a wonder-
ful market ready to be tapped, namely the market for textbooks that will, in
the future, be published on small disks to be inserted in computers.
Why, therefore, should anyone be surprised at this partnership between Matra
and Hachette, between microprocessor and books, between missiles and diction-
aries? All of this is based on simple, flawless logic, on an algorithm as
information specialists would say, or in a word, on Lagardere's logic. First
of all, he wants to manufacture the machines and cables, secure a firm posi-
_ tion in the satellites, worm his way into the channels, and dominate the hard-
ware field. Then he wants to supply the subject matter, the directly consumable
image-sound raw material, in short, the sofCware. All of these aspects unques-
tionably go together. But there is still one obstacle to be overcome, and it is
a formidable obstacle placed at the very beginning of the entire process. The
Ariane rocket must ultimately be launched because that rocket not only carries
the TDF-1 satellite but all of Matra's hopes as well. The fact, however, is
that the Ariane launch vehicle is now experiencing inexplicable difficulties.
After one successful launch, it no longer wants to function and nobody knows
why. Its next launch is being further and further delayed. Jean-Luc Lagardere
has perhaps been too hasty.
Impli'da~i~cros of Actions
Paris LE POINT in French 15 Dec 80 pp 48-51
[Article by Jean-Pierre Adine: "Hachette's Transformation"]
[Excerpts] Much remains to be said about this unexpected "marriage" of Matra
and Hachette. The fact is that though the initial shock has passed, it still
appears difficult to unravel the tangled threads of a transaction that is extra-
ordinary in every:respect and unique in France, at l~ast in scope and development.
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Today, however, attitudes toward Matra's action are hardening. After Laurent _
Fabius, the PS [Socialist Party] member of the National Assembly from Seine
Meritime, Louis Salle, the RPR [Rally for the Republic] member from Loiret and
the National Assembly's rapporteur for the Information budget, has put the
following written question to the prime minister: "Does not the formation of ~
such a powerful business group substantially involve certain risks for the
plurality of the press and more generally for information in France?"
Jean-Luc Lagardere, Matra's president and general manager, has told friends
that he decided to seek control of Iiachette only recently. He did so because
an "opportunity"--as the British or Americans would say--was offered him. But
the comment heard in Parfsian busin~ss circles is that "he is either a remark-
ably clever liar, or else he is quite simply right." ~
Today, however, people view with less condescension and much greater respect
this sporting president and general manager who, while continuing to produce
the most sophisticated missiles, has ventured into automobiles, mass transpor-
tation systems, telematics, space projects, and then into clocks and watches,
electronic components, and communication via Europe-1. In a France that is be-
coming sluggish, business executives are not mistaken about him and have listed
him--in L'EXPANSION--among the country's best businessmen. In 1979, LE NOWEL
- ECONOMISTE had already named him best manager of the year.
Ond day, Lagardere told LE POINT: "I shali not make Melba toast or manufacture
saucepans. But if it can reassure you, neither shall I go to the moon to lose
my shirt there." What then does he really want to do? As he himself says, he
mainly wants "to avoid having Matra become tomorrow's steel or textile indus-
try." Easier said than done! But behind this statement there is a simple and
powerful idea, namely that the only advances that count in this unstable world
are technological advances and methodological advances.
Matra is, in fact, striving to maintain such advances in both the civil and
military fields. Especially in the military field, because, no matter what some
may say, Matra still depends on missiles for its financial well-being. The
Super 530 [long-range air-to-air missile], mounted under the wing of a Mirage
aircraft, can hit an enemy aircraft flying at any speed and at several thou-
sand meters higher altitude! This small diabolical rocket, like its sister
the Magic air-to-air dogfight missile, makes the air forces of the world
"salivate." The arms trade is definitely Matra's goose that lays the golden
eggs .
It is because of its arms business that Matra can now afford to buy Hachette.
Hachette and Matra offer a strange contrast. The venerable publishing firm's--
it is more than 150 years old--main fieZd of activity is the written word. It
is in no way involved in advanced technologi~s or big ultraprofitable markets
~ and contracts. Nor does it have the government as a"sugar daddy" customer.
Hachette is a sort of federation of 135 subsidiaries, all of a very specific
type. Some are related to arts and crafts. It even has bookstores and news- _
stands in railroad stations, small retail outlets that cannot be big money-
' makers no matter what is done.
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An empire, a colossus, a giant: such are the superlatives used to glorify
Hachette. And all are also generally accepted as true. Yet the colossus in
question actually weighs 12 times less than Peugeot, 11 times less than
Renault, 5 times les~ than Saint-Gobain, and 2 times less than Carrefour. In
1919, it ranked SSth among French fiYms in volume of business--Matra ranked
76th--, 66th in working capital, and 84th in profits.
Admittedly ir does own 49 percent of the New Distribution Service of the
Parisian Press (NMPP), 25 percent of all printing (photoengraving), 25 per-
cent of all publishing, and 13 percent of all periodicals. But the splendor of
its fo~er monopolies has long since faded. It now has to fight on all sides,
and without any privileged ties with the state. It is a constant and difficult
struggle for this 150-year old business. Jacques Marchandise, a former member
of the Council of State who came to Hachette from Pechiney, and Gerard Worms,
the general manager formerly wfth the Service of Mines, have been trying for
several years to remove the dust from the old dull woodwork.
In 1980, all key positions in the firm are held by new men. They are credited
with two major achievements. First the firm's press activities were believed
to be stricken with a sort of sempiternal asthenia, but after a lengthy effort
begun in 1972 these activities are now regenerated, brilliant, and profitable.
Secondly, it was also thaught that Neogravure's (photoengraving company) crash
would prove to be Hachette's via dolorosa, and yet the firm emerged therefrom
with all the honors of war. Conversely, the book publishing business, Hachette's
traditional nucleus of prosperity, has been hard hit by declining sales, as in-
deed have all European publishers. Such additional grievous difficulties as the
losses incurred by the JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE combined with the losses of the
Spanish subsidiary have weighed heavily o~l the firm's overall performance.
- Hachette is, in short, a business weakened by many mishaps, but it has entered
a period of convalescence which some people exper.*_ to be successful. It has
even begun preparing for future activities. For instance, in 1981 it will open
the most modern of the French legal-data banks.
, What is Matra going to do in and with Hachette? Tha.t is the question many con-
tinue to ask. Gerard Worms' answer is that "a synergism is possible. The audio-
visual business requires a pool of inen and skills. We have them. With Hachette,
Matra enters the world of the written word through the front door."
There is no doubt that communications actually fascinates Jean-Luc Lagardere.
Some 2 years ago, he became a member of Europe-1's board of directors. Never-
theless, space is one of his main activities. And space brings wit:~ it that
famous satellite zahich in 1984 will broadcast, on a third channel, programs
and commercials from the sky above. Various firms are vigorously preparing
themselves to supply that third channel. The large-scale audiovisual maneuvers
are actually under way. But tQ obtain a favorable positian in these maneuvers
was it really aecessary to first acquire control of a business firm with 23,000
employees?
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Hachette Group's Activities
Book Publishing
- 1.9 billion francs
a. Eight departments in-
cluding: Hachette Clas-
siques, Hachette Jeunesse
Hachette Encqclopedies, Press
Guides Bleus, and
Hachette Literature. 1.7 billion francs
Foreign Activities b. Fourteen subsidiaries a. Edi 7� ELLE, FRANCE-
2 billion francs ~r firms in which it owns D~NCHE, PARENTS,
stock, including: Grasset, ~LE-7-JOURS, and VITAL
Some 40 affiliates Gayard, Stock, Librsrie b, SOGIDE� LE JOURNAL -
throughout the world Generale Francaise DU DIMANCHE.
Livre de Poche [paper- gook and Press Shop:
backs]), Librarie des 50 percent of TELE-7-
Champs-Elysees (Le JOURS, 50 percent of
Masque), Editions du LIVRE DE PARIS, and
Chaine, Marabout, and encyclopedia install-
Distribution Tallandier. ments.
c. Wholesale trade: d. Edi-Monde: LE
930 million francs ~urepas Distribution
JOURNAL DE MICKEY,
Retail sales in Fra~uce Center and regional dis- pI~SOU MAGAZINE, LE
bookstores and news- tribution centers (the JOUgNp,L DE BABAR, atid
standa in railroad provinces). CONFIDENCES.
stations, subway sta- d. Direct sale of books: e, SEBDO� LE POINT,
tions, and airports; by mail-order or broker- ~IE PUBLIQUE, large -
other retail outlets. age� holdings in Telecon-
sulte (data bank) and
L'ECHO REPUBLICAIN DE
CHARTRES (daily news-
Hachette Group paper.
Hachette has 23,100 em- f. Radio Publications
Printing ployees and had revenues Company: HI-FI MAGAZINE
_ S00 million francs of 7 billion francs in DUdS N,NOWELLE REWE
1980.
Subsidiaries include: g, Modern Specialized
Brodard and Taupin, Publications Company:
New Corbeil Photoen- 50 percent of MOTO-
graving Company, New Audiovisual and New JOURNAL and TENNIS
Printing Inks Co, Techniques MAGAZINE.
Iota, and Kappa
35 million francs
Channel 80, Tele-Hachette,
Hachette Audiovisuel, and
Teleconsulte (data bank)
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Matra Group's Activities
Military Transportation Electronic Components
2.1 bil~.ion francs 0.3 billion francs 0.1 billion francs
Matra, Manurhin Matra, CIMT [Transporta- Comelim, Matra, and
tion Equipment Indus~~ - Harris Semiconductors
trial Co] , Inter-Elec.
Teleco~nunications Space
0.6 billion francs 14atra Group 0.3 billion francs
. Matra, Peritel, Matra has 32,000 em- Matra
Depaepe, Picart-Lebas ployees and in 1979 had
an estimated consolidated
volume of business of
5.2 billion francs.*
Automobile Electronics Automo~ile
0.8 billion francs 0.5 billion francs
Jaegar, Sc~lex Matra .
Watches and Clocks Services Electronic Data
0.1 bil.lion francs 0.3 billion francs ~ Processing
0.1 billion francs
Jaz and 'Yema Europe-I, Quillet, and ~tra Electronic Data
DERNIERES NOWELLES processing
D'ALSACE
* In view of the group's new acquisitions in 1980, its overall--nonconsolidated--
volume of business in 1980 is estimated at 8.3 billion francs. -
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Many other questions are being asked about this marriage of Gutenberg and
Edison. Last Tuesday, in LE MONDE, Jacques Sauvageot likened this merger to
"xh~ kingpin of a sy stem for controlling information." On Thursday, the
National Union of Journalists' Trade Unions reiterated and amplified this same
theme.
- In more simple terms, observers here and there are wondering whether Hachette
~ will safeguard the necessary political neutrality of the press. Another risk
~ is that after the human "strata" deposited by the Hachette family, and then
those by Pechiney, Matra's "atrata" are liable to turn Hachette into a verit-
able mille-feuille. Moreover, how will Jean-Luc Lagardere get along with
Hachette's small subsidiaries, small retail outlets and newsstands whose
necessarily sma11-shop sty~e of management is something entirely new for this
electronic mana ger? There is no certainty that we shall receive quick answers
to these various questions. One thing is certain, however. If this Matra-'-~h
Hachette mix does jell, France will have a European-scale conglomerate prepared
to compete in the next big international comrsunications contests. Contests in
~ahich only "major" firms will be allowed to compete.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
8041
CSO: 3100
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. -
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
NEED FOR WIDE-RADIUS-OF-ACTION, PILOTED WEAPONS SYSTEM DISCUSSED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 20 Dec 80 pp 36-37
[Article by J. G.]
[Text] In the information report on the status and modernization of French nuclear _
forces, submitted last spring by Deputy Raymond Tourrain on behalf cf the National
Assembly's National Defense and Armed Forces Co~ission, the issue of maintaining
or eliminating the "air" component was discussed at length.
The author of the report noted that opponents and supporters expressed themselves
with unambiguous conviction.
Among the arguments raised by the former, the author cited three: 1) The ground
vulnerability of aircraft would be much greater than that of SSBS [surface-to-surface
strategic ballistic missiles], since the bases are weakly protected against a nuclear
attack; 2) The reinforcement of enemy defenses (more sensitive radar, interception ~
aircraft, density of short- and medium-range surface-to-air missiles) would doom -
the strategic air force; 3) This weapons system is fragile, sophisticated and ex-
pensive (F 100 to 150 million per aircraft).
_ _ . . _
_
On the other hand, the supporters of maintaining this weapons system, the author
notes, point out five major advantages of the airborne component: 1) It is an in-
dispensable part of diversification; 2) The piloted aircraft has two advantages:
on one hand, nothing can replace human intelligence in thwarting reinforced enemy -
defenses and, on the other hand, low-altitude penetration assisted by very effective .
_ countermeasure systems makes it possible to reach targets with an absolutely satis-
factory percentage of success; 3) The airborne force is technically bival~nt; 4) It is _
a political tool for manipulating crises; 5) It is the only one which can be recalled
in extremis by the political power.
- The author finally concludes that the'"advanCages outweight the drawbacks and that
France has every interest not only in modernizing, but also in developing this weapons
system in the r~ext two decades."
- In support of this ~iew, but also because it involves much more than a Mirage IV
successor, AIR & COSMOS considered it appropriate to publish below the opinion and
argtnnents of a French military expert, to whom the future of the strategic aircraft
appears obvious, he emphasizes, by virtue of its threefold importanc~: to guarantee
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diversification of the French nuclear deterrent force; as a polyvalent means of re-
taliation suited to deterring the strong f rom attacking the weak and particularly
_ to deterring nuclear powers from attacking nonnuclear powers; as a means of ground
preparation� ground neutralization of enemy defenses with the prospect of increasing
our overseas intervention capacity (and in particular our air-transport capacity '
_ at greater. distances); only combat aircraft with a wide rad.ius af action has such
preparative ability.
This is a warning against possible final abandonment of the strategic aircraft.
- Strategic Aircraft, Preferred Tool for Handling Crises
The term "strategic aircraft" first calls to mind bombers, which constitute one of
the components of the various nuclear deterrent forces. The term "handling crises" -
_ invariably calls to mind the Cuban crisis, in which these very bombers, on the American
side, played a decisive role by merely being put on flight alert.
This article is not intended to be just a defense of pilotzd aircraft within our
Strategic Nuclear Force (FNS). It is intended to specifically stress such aircraft's
demonstrative possibilities of manipulation without being limited to major crises
involving large and intermediate powers with their nuclear arsenals.
= From Ma~or Crises to Minor Crises
The development of the political and military context, particularly in the Mediter-
ranean Basin, ca~ich concerns us greatly, is increasing the risks of crises in which
We could find ourselves involved opposite nonnuclear powers, whether or not assisted _
by the Soviet Union but in any case possessing the most modern weapons, right now
in most cases and more and more in the future.
Today the threat comes not only from neighboring territories. Our view, long fixed
_ _ _
t~?~- '=blue- -~-~ne of -the V~sgES"- _m~.~st now _ tals.~ in. _tbe..."blue.._line" of the Mediterranean
and the Near East and Africa beyond in addition to our land borders in central Europe. _
- A confrontation in Europe remains our greatest risk, of caurse, bur in view of the
risks incurred by the power willing to take the first step, it is not the most likely.
It is therefore important not to neglect the other threats, direct or indirect, whose
probability anrl seriousness are increasing at the same time as the instability and
weaponry, with more and more sophisticated materiel, of Third World countries. The
resulting situation, already very disturbing in the Near East, may teach the western
Mediterranean tomorrow and concern us even more directly.
_ Adapted Means of Action
_ It is not our so-called "strategic " resources, with the meaning usually given to
- this term, which has become inseparable from the idea of nuclear deterrence, which
= will make it possible to prevent or to resolve such crises. The threat of retalia-
= tion with our strategic, or even tactical, nuclear weapons ~rould under.no ci.rctnnstances
= be eredible for obvious reasons (reduction of our deterrent potential� condemnation
- bY international public opinion
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The hypothetical case of armed intervention with temporary ground occupation cannot
be ruled out. But it is rather unlikely in a crisis context alone in view of the
risks which it represents.
A more restricted action, as discreet as possible, such as a strike after infiltx'a-
tion of forces, as by parachute or even airborn~ (Entebbe style), is the only one
that would make it possible to free hostages, to cause limited destruction, etc. _
But between these extremes, it is appropriate to be able to neutralize military tar- ~
gets on land or at sea, either to respond to a violent attack or to guard against
a specific and imminent threat. This requires suitable conventional weapons which
are powerful enough to guarantee destruction and at the same time are very accurate
to prevent any widespread destruction.
In all cases, whether they involve tension or acts of force, it is important to have
as much information as possible. Militarily, it is necessary to precisely keep
abreast of the status of forces which are present or likely to intervene in ~rder
to report accordingly to the political authority, which must decide on the possible
response.
It is essential to be ready to react at the f irst signs of crisis and in a continuous
manne~. It is actually easier to gain control of a critical situation when there
is a quicker reaction.
Handling these crises thus requires an antiforce capacity which gives us the means
to observe and to strike hard, quickly, far and at all times, and thus enables us
to deal with any situation.
A Wide Radius of Action
Most of our air and ground forces are stationed in Europe. Apart from several possi-
bilities still offered to us by certain Af~rican natians but without assurance for
the future, we no longer have any foreign base which would make it possible to inter-
_ _ _ _ _
- vene effectively in the Med'iterranean Basin and beyond.
Only naval aviation resources that would be in the vicinity and possi~le air resources
_ with a sufficient radi.us of action would make it possible to react without delay.
Aircraft carriers in particular can f.unction as bases close to foreign theaters of -
operation. But :rith our two aircraft carriers, it is impossible to assure a per-
- manent and simultan~eous presence at sea and, a fortiori, in the area of an unfore-
seeable ;,risis. Dels~~s in routing, and possibly in obtaining equipment, run the
risk of being excessive most of the time. It would require several aircraft carriers
patrolling potential critical areas, like the U.S. Navy, but that is obviously beyond
our means. Moreover, aircraft carried on low-tonriage aircraft carriers, which we
have available, have limited possibilities because of their size and cannot reach
very distant inland targets.
These same restrictions characterize the Air Force's tactical aircraft. It is true
that Jaguars have performed excellently during operations conducted in Africa, but
those operations still did not involve enemies as powerful and as remote from our
bases as those which we risk having to face tomorrow. Nor does the penetration
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version of the Mirage 2000, which performs much better and is perfectly suited for
] tactical use in the European theater and its surrounding area, satisfy the criteria,
specifically with regard to radius of action, of atrategic aircraft.
Polyvalent Weapons System
The strategic aircraft, in the traditional sense of the term: capable of carrying
out a decisive operation in the midst of enemy forces, i.e., at great distance, fully
meets all these requirements.
Capable of reacting without delay, like all combat aircraft, it is characterized
by a wide radius of action, not only as a result of in-flight refueling but also
due to a very large fuel capacity. It must also be capable of carrying a sizable
quantity of equipment and arms, which may vary according to the nature of the as-
signed mission: ele~~tunic countermeasures assuring the best chances for penetrating
a stron6ly defended area, reconnaissance equigment, air-to-surface missiles with
conventional or nuclear warheads, possibZy so-cailed "cruise missiles" if it should
be decide3 that they will constitute a FNS component, conventional weapons suited
to targets and characterized by power and high accuracy.
, This is therefore a relatively large aircraft in terms of weight and vol~mme, thus
it would be expensive and consequently only a limited number would be built. A two-
seater f or the best handling of complex missions, this aircraft woula necessarily
have twin jets. In addition to a high degree of security, this system would permit
the greatest optimization (the best suited shapes and vol~es for equipment and fuel)
and the greatest possibilities of development for the entire life of the weapons
system. This ability is particularly attractive in the case of electronics;,
whose importance can only increase, whereas the development of airframes ar~d engines
has become much less signifieant and thus less urgent.
Ground vulnerability, already reduced by the gradual "toughening" of our bases, may
� be greatly reduced by scattering. Currently in France, there are more than 80 air-
fields from which combat aircraft can take off. From this standpoint, emphasis should
be placed on the necess~ry autonomy of putting aircraft and their weaponry into use
again, making deployment possible in any area.
In brief, the strategic aircraft which we need must be polyvalent, ~.e., capable
of carr~ying out any type of reconnaissance and attack mission over a great distance:
more than 1,300 l~ in a strongly defended hostile area at very low altitude and high
speed, and several thousand kilometers in a neutral or weakly defended area at high
altitude.
Mo~e than a Mirage IV Successor
The performance of our current Mirage IV is not far removed from these figures, but
originally designed exclusively as a FNS component, it does not have conventional
weaponry. It does not f ully meet the criteria which we have established, even if
it has since been provided with a remarkable strategic reconnaissance capacity. And
although a certain nimmber of aircraft have been expanded and further improved beyond
1985, in particular by the adaptation of a mediimm-range air-to-surface missile system
(ASMP), the operational life of this weapons system vi.ll not far exceed the nine~ies.
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This is why a new aircraft must be designed and built. The Mirage 4000, as well
as the studies on ~quipment �or the Mirage 2000 and Mirage IV ASMP, may serve as
a starting point for this aircraft. Considering its unit cost, only a limited nwn-
ber could be built, about 40 for example (or actually about 30 on line), which still
represents a formidable force.
Such a pro3ect ma,y seem ambitious and beyond our financial possibilities.
It should be pointed out that because of its polyvalence, however, the recommended
strategic weapons system represents an incomparable asset to our national defense
inasmuch as it makes it possible to guarantee, on one hand, deterrenCe: --at all
� levels: strategic naclear, tactical nuclear, recon~ilaissance, conventional attack; -
--with respect to any enemy: a nuclear enemy, comp'lementing other FNS comp~nents
as part of "strong-against-weak" deterrence, whether carrying a"cruise" missile
or medium-range missile with a very powerful nuclear warhead; a nonnuclear but -
strongZy armed enemy: "weak-against-strong" deterrence; --all-directional: in Europe,
outside Europe, on land and at sea; --against all types of threats: land, sea, air
_ (by neutralization of land or sea departure bases), wheCher extended or restricted;
and on the other hand, immediate and appropriate reaction if necessary. _
Thus the strategic aircraft simultaneously constitutes a FNS component providing
for true diversification (ballistic systems actually represent only a singl~ nibde
of delivery) and an essential part of conventional forces in Europe and abroad.
In this twofold way, it is definitely the preferred tool for handling cYises, whether
ma,jor or not. '
COPYRIGHT: A. & C., 1980
11915
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
BACKGROUND OF NEW AFRICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR VIEWED
Paris JEUNF AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 80 p 39
[Article by Francois Soudan: "Mr Africa Number Six;" passages enclosed in slant~ines
printed in italics]
[Text] At the Quai d'Orsay the silent Jean Herly succeeds the
_ hearty Guy Georgy. It is a change in continuity.
The small, very simple off ice on the fif th floor of the Quai d'Orsay, the French -
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had become unaccustomed to continuity. As the head-
quarters fo~ the director of African and Malagasy affairs, it had a change ~f host
almost 3 months ago and regained the diplomatic silence for i~hich it seems to have
been made. On 15 September Jean Herly, good-natured and uncommunicative, succeeded
Guy Georgy, who was named French ambassador to Iran. Certainly, the new "Mr Africa"
of the Qu~i d'Orsay is an affable man, but this Lorrainer, who celebrated his 60th
birthday on the very day of his appointment-~-/"my finest birthday present,"/ he dis-
closes--is too well aware of the weight of words. Too bad for the ~ournalists...
, A Diff icult Post
The post of African and Malagssy affairs directors, created in 1962 at the time when
the departments of the Quai d'Orsay were divided into areas, has reached its sixth
incumbent. Jean Herly is the latest of a succession of senior "Africanists" who
have provided a certain amount of stability for French policy in Africa--despite
the officially subordinate aspect of their role: since the birth of the Fifth
Republic the various French presidents have, as a matter c~f fac~, surrounded them-
selves with their own "Africans." The mandarin Jacques Foccart was followed by
Rene Journiac and then by Martin Kirsch.
Relations between these president's men and the diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs have not always been wholly untroubled: according to a slightly malicious
murmur in the Quai, /"They make the policy reversals, the special operations...We
ensure stability, make the contacts and mend the damage."/
Consequently, it is a diff icult post for wise diplomats. On this level, at least,
there ~ill be no break in style between Guy Georgy and Jean Herly. They attended
the National School for Overseas France together. Which one was the more gi.fted?
~ /"Neither of us was especially brilliant,"/ Herly smil~s.
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~
I Then their African career begins. It starts very soon for Guy Georgy: at the age
I of 27, in 1945, he directs the information service of Cameroon, in 1955 he becomes
chef de cabinet to the Minister for Overseas France before beginning a long round
! gs ambassador: To the Congo, Bolivia, Dahomey (now Benin), Libya. From this last
episode (he remained in Tripoli from 1969 to 1975), Guy Georgy has retained a
definitive opinion of Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi2 /"He wants to bring together every living
thing, everything nomadic, under one tent. Unfortunately, he is not riding the
caliph's horse. He has only a very small donkey. And gilding his wooden shoes will
not change much."/
Today, at 62, af ter f ive years in the "Quai," Guy Georgy is leaving again /"to visit
, a bit more of this vast world."/ Direction: Khomeyni's Iran. Disgrace? Banish-
ment? Doubtless Georgy was not without enemies. But, admittedly, /"better Tehran
`.than Bern or Stockholm. I prefer passions to boredom."/ Besides, he ha.s various
`passions--especially a passion for drawing: for 30 years he has made a multitude of
aketches, caricatures of politicians and cartoons.
An Inimitable Laugh
As for Jean Herly, with his snow-white hair and his black pipe eternally hanging
from the corner of his mouth, he seems quite the opposite of a passionate man. No
doubt he needed a good dose of sangfroid in order to remain for nine years in Viet-
n~m and Laos at the height of the Indochina war, to occupy the post of consul
general in Algiers and Oran in 1962 and to be, from 1967 to 1969, the French
representative in the Central African Republic. It was then Bokassa's "Edwardian
era." /"I had sametimes difficult relations with him,"/ Jean Herly discloses. /"But
I did not know the man of violence."/ In 1973 he was stationed in Tel Aviv before
being installed, 5 years later, in Morocco, where he remained as ambassador until
mid-~980.
Even though he has visited it less than his predecessor, Jean Herly loves Africa,
somewhat in the manner of Robert Galley: sensually. /"For me, it is nature and
mankind. All the Africas. And then, above all, that inimitable laugh of the
Africans--a laugh which one finds nowhere else."/
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Af rique GRUPJIA 1980
9719
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
'�L' EXPRES S' HOTES GAdi~UD~ S CRITICISM�~ 0~ GiS CARD
~ Paris L'EXPRESS in French 20 Dec 80 p 74
[Editorial by Olivier Todd: "The Insolence of Courage"J
[Text] Marie-France Garaud likes to explain that there are two methods for making
a child take cod liver oil: "Every hour you can repeat: 'Don`t forget, at noon
you'll have to take ~t'. Come naon, you tie him up and pour the oil down. This
is a bad solution. Or, while the ch_ld watches television with his mouth open,
you catch him by surprise. Now that's the way."
In the mournful gaullist family, Debre uses the f irst method. But the mayor of
Amboise got caught in his own contradiction: Between Afghanistan and Poland, his
anti-Americanism, which is as fierce as his anti-Sovietism, makes him an antiquated
gaullist. Jacques Chirac, a silent gaullist these days, has no method. He has
been acting as if a clairvoyant promised him that the future, an accident, revela-
tion, or scandal would get rid of his only competitor, Giscard. Marie-France
Garaud does not claim to be the bearer of authentic pieces of the Cross of Lor-
- raine. She does not plan her strategy by laying out tarot cards. In her use, or
- manipulation, of the media beamed to the electors, she has chosen the second method.
This was evident with the front page publication of a raging letter in the "Monde"
on the afternoon of Monday 15 Decem~er. Addressed to the president of the repub-
lic, it was entitled: "You have deceived us." This epistle has a tinge of Pierre
Juill~t in it: clear to the point of brutality, extremely violent, and written
with ink used in the Cochin appeal of December 1978, it reproaches the president
for his permissiveness, condescension, and off-handed manner. No one from the
majority has thus far publicly given Giscard such a dressing down. The author
assured the president of the respect she held for his "high position." How could
anyone have said with more insolence that the president himself, however, inspired
none?
But, in the spring of 1974, how could Mrs Garaud have forced Chirac to support
Giscard and let Chaban go? It is much more difficult to say I have made a mis-
take" than to say "We have been deceive~~i." Why was the absence of an overall
plan discovered only in 1980? Did Mrs Garaud not see Giscard walk up the Champs
Elysee on foot? Did she not hear the Marseillaise played at a much zippier tempo
and hear Giscard decree, like Goethe at Valmy: "This moment marks the beginning
of a new era"? Had she been so naive a skeptic? -
The case she is quickly making against Giscard concerning interior affairs has no
double meanings. As for Barre, she has such low esteem for him that he goes un-
named, except when she talks about inflation and unemployment, then she denounces
him like in the Cochin appeal as "a mob of technocrats." It's short. She
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seems to believe that in economics wanting to want is enough. She lacks even a
= rudimentary program there, and one very different from the president's. The
' campaign has hardly begun.
The main points: Marie-France Garaud very loudly says all that many only murmur
even within the confines of the Elysee. First, that the president exercises
personal--and solitary--power, and that at the same time he is afraid of power.
The man fears bad news more than anything else. Obsessed by her conviction of
the West's selfabasement before Soviet hegemony, Marie-France Garaud doesn�t mince
words: Giscard's foreign policy appears "ur.real and...vague, such that one doesn't
know whether it lacks substance because it is kept undek cover, or just the
opposite."
Mrs Garaud dares to proclaim that in internal politics the choosing of a society
' is no longer possible. Being for or against the Common Program is not the ques-
tion. The choice occurs in foreign policy: are we for or against the French,
European or Atlantic effort, now that we are faced with a threatening danger? That
woman also dares to state that this danger, today, is Soviet expansionism, directly
or indirectly with its subcontractors: Colonel iQadhdhaf~`s~victory in Qaaa3~ se.rves
- as the last gloomy illustrat~on of Marie-�France Garaud's thesis. Our African
policy is incoherent. According to Marie-France Garaud, it procedes "by unpre-
dictable fits and starts." Recently at the French Foreign Office, they were
carefully explaining that the Libyans are floundering in Chad. No doubt like the
Soviets in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese in Cambodia and in Laos?
The question is not whether Marie-France Garaud is exaggerating but whether she is
right. Is our spirit weakening? Are we preparing an extensive Finlandization?
Marie-France Garaud's indictment surpasses that of Michel Debre and of Jacques
Chirac. Many politicians of all parties, except the co~nunist party, agree with
her privately! But, those on the right do not want to criticize the president
openly. Those on the left could not approve the "primary anticommunism" of Marie-
France Garaud: as if there were, in essence, several types of anticommunisms!
Those on the left would also reproach the candidate for having a slightly populist
tone, calling upon "millions of ~ood people...for whom morals still exist."
Whom is she working for? the analysts are asking. At present not for Giscard,
Chirac, Debre, or Mitterrand. She knows her France too well to hope to reap more
than 4 or 5 percent of the votes, which would be quite a few. What will she do
before the second round? If Giscard clearly refuses t~ ease up on an already
nonexisting detente, if he abandons his acts of appeasement towards the Kremlin,
- she would then no doubt join uF with him. But how, having attacked him with such
severity? The communist voters will not follow the dictates of the French Com-
munist Party if it refuses to shift its vote in favor of the socialist party
candidate, and the same goes for the garaudists who, without a doubt, would not
all follow Mrs Garaud if, at the last minute, she refused to help Giscard.
And if the president does not make the transformation promised by certain people?
And if he is reelected? Marie-France Garaud has courage: in the past, she loved
to repeat that, regicides and parricides, all those who play a joke on the king
eventually have their "hand cut off."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
9128
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FRANCE
COUNTRY SECTION
SMALL B'USINESS CREDIT BANK VIEWED� AS TQO CLOSEi,Y 9.'ISH. ~9 tRDJ~RNk'1EbTT
Paris VALEURS ACTUE3.LES in French 15 Dec 80 pp 61-63
[Article by Alain Margaron: "The PME's Counter"]
[Text] Giscard d'Estaing makes a"national requirement" of
steps on behalf of small and medium enterprises. But he is
creating a new credit bank likely to become a formidable
instrument of interve~tionism.
"More necessary than ever, action on behalf of small and medium enterprises con-
stitutes a national requirement." In Paris 8 December, before 3,000 directors of
PME [Confederation of small and medium enterprises] holding a colloquium, Giscard
d'Estaing made government action on behalf of the amall enterpriae a key ele-
ment of his policy. He announced that all the inheritors of a P'ME would have a
period of 10 years to pay inheritance taxes, and the constitution of a series of
loans funded by the sum of 10 billion francs.
Giscard d'Estaing listed state actions: return to freedom of pricea ("A neces-
sary freedom and henceforth permanent"), the partnership statute, assistance in
forming companies, loans from the market fund and the creation of the Development
Fund for PME which will be put into operation 1 January. The statutes for the
new institution, the CEPME, [Study Center of Confederation of Sma~ovokedMaddis-
Enterprises] were presented 3 days before the colloqui~� TheY p Leon
agreement at the PME directorate level which their founding president,
Gingembre, reflects in these very pages (read his letter elsewhere in this pub-
lication.) The creatioa of this loan fund in fact is likely to contradict the
l:iberal intentions displayed by the chief of state. At all events Mr Gingembre
will not allow his name to be associated with this creation, although the minister
of economy, Rene Monory, cited him in November the day of the general assembly of
the Confederation of PME, after his successor Rene Bernasconi and Aimery d'Oiron,
president of small and medium industries.
--I never wanted to be a servant, or recipient of state aide, Mr Gingembre con-
fided a few months ago, while a file was being drawn up on the Development Fund
for PME.
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_ He confirms it today:
--Heads of companies who know how to meet competition bring some health i~nto a
company where everyone is asking for protection.
The idea of the creation of a bank for the PME is old. Giscard d'Eataing took
it for his own in 1972 w~en he was finance miniater. No one then worried about
the ~iles he then had in his d~sk. In 1976 socialists and communists brougt::: out
in their jo int platform a similar project, but more ambitious: creation of a na-
tional development fund which would function under the Plan. The left lost the
- elections but Giscard d'Estaing did not give up his nlan, which is to institute
- for small and medium enterprises the equivalent of Credit Agricole for the agri-
cultural world: a decentralized body in the form o~ a mutual society and very
powerful financially. And according to well informed sources he is believed to
have had several conversations with Mr Rocard on this matter. Jean-Pierre Prou-
tesu, secretary of state for PMI is now charged with the responsibility of study-
ing the f ile and will soon submit a plan to the Elysee. His proposal: create a
bank author ized to handle all kinds of credits, short, medium, and long term. .
- And for res ources using the tremendous surpluses of Credit Agricole, about 70 bil-
lion francs, which the "green bank" cannot loan out because of credit restrictiona.
Mr Prouteau's intentions are, at first brush, considered excellent. The credit
terms which the large banks accord to the PME are much more expensive than for
the big companies (the difference is three times greater than in Germany), But
his plan has the serious defect of putting the PME completely at the mercy of the
new financial establishment.
It took the energetic intervention of Mr Monory, helged by the treasury director,
Jean-Yves Haverer, to divest the pro~ected bank of the suthority to grant short
term credits.
CEPME will regroup three organizations: GIPME [expansion unknown], created by Mr
Gingembre, and the basic part of Credit Hotelier (until now in the orbit of the
banques populaires), two organizations issuing long term discount loans to com-
panies; the Caisse nationale des marches d'Etat [national state markets fund] in
charge of d iscounting medium term loans guaranteed by mutual guarantee societies
[societes de caution mutuelleJ and granted by co~ercial banks.
In the current system enterprises can choose, competitively, the bank of their
choice. This discourages any interventionist industrial policy. On the other
hand CEPME could place at its mercy the mutual guarantee societies: organizations
managed by the trade associations and since 1971 by regional development companies
(these RDC have taken, outside the building industry and the Paris region, 50 per-
cent of the market). The Caisse nationale des marches d'Etat had no contact with
the clientele. While the new organization can take advantage of the dossiers
given it for marketing and offer the clientele its own loans (long term discount-
ed loans). Thanks to the network inherited from Credit Hotelier, it will have
25 regional delegations.
For the immnediate future care will be taken to prevent informing this network of
the information obtained from investigating these cases. But what will happen
the day the government changes policy? CEPME sellers will have a weighty argu-
ment for the companies:
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--Since your cases pass through us, why not come to see us directlp, everything
will go much fa~ter.
A sword of Damocles thus hangs over the small companiea in the event of a change
of government. While until naw t'hey had been sheltered from all sector-based
po licies.
Current leaders of the PME confederation gave their support to the plan when they
learned they would have half the seats on the overseeing council, with ma~ority
vot~ for their president.
--And then, there was no question of arguing about it: the Elysee wanted it,
said one of their awn.
The ma~ority of CEPME capital (51 percent) is state owned and this new organiza-
tion will have the legal status of a public enterprise, while the Credit Hotelier
had the statute of a cooperative, and the GIPME, that of a private company.
In his letter Mr Gingembre speaks of nationalization. The administration itself
imposed the formula of an ovarseeing council rather than a board of directors,
which will diminish the powers of the PME representatives. If one asks why such
~ an organization was created the minister of economq would reply:
--To simplify and to create a system closer to smaller enterprises. In fact the
number of special credit procedures for PME is such that bankers themselves can-
not find their way. But the creation of CEPME is not accompanied by the elimina-
tion o� any of these procedures. ~nd the fusion of the existing organizations
_ brings no diminution of personnel despite the existence of numerous staff, par-
ticularly in the accounting branches. It is already foreseen that the new or-
ganization will be in deficit for at least 3 years and the deficit will be filled
by subsidies. The deficiencies of the French banking system make it necessary
to help medium and small er.terprises in the financing field. But rather than
create a new organization would it not have been better to confront the causes
of the difficulty: aberrations in French mon~tary policy since 1945?
--The detailed measures taken by the g~vernment do not make up for the negative
effects of its economic policy as a whole, decared Mr de Beaufort, president of
the national association of PMI [confederation of small and medium industries] .
at the 8 December colloquium.
Banks no l..onger wish to distribute long term loans on fixed terms, according to
normal market conditions. They only have means to provide them based on short
term resources whose rates vary (even fixed deposit receipts can be cashed at any
time), which makes them run ehe risk of being caught in a stranglehold if the
cost of short term money incr~:ged.
It thus became necessary to seek to consolidate individual household savings.
That is why the prime minister maintained interest rates in the bond market at a.
very high level in 1980. The volume of issues doubled the first 10 months of the
_ same yea~, but the market seems saturated: it is rather difficult to dispose of
' new bonds. ~
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Many depositors are more interested in the anonymity of deposit receipts and sav-
ings certificates than in interest rates. However anony~ous bonds represent a
very large volume of capital, about 130 b illion francs, and most of their hold-
ers are self-employed independent workers taxed at a fixed rate. To eliminate
anonymity from one day to the next would be dangerous. There w~ould probably be
a flight of savings abroad or toward sterile investments such as gold. But Ray-
mond Barre has had 4 years to prepare such a reform. He has done nothing. The
policy he has followed ends up by having all the disadvantages of high interest
rates (enterprises are no longer making any investments) without other advantages.
As for short term credit, it remains very expensive for small enterprises despite
its reduction for a few months on the moneq market. Banks have much higher over-
head expenses than abroad. Credit restrictions do not incite them to reduce them
and exploit as they could recent developments in computer science (automated of-
fices, [bureaucratique] automated bank tellers], the elimination of competition -
for 8 years allowing them to continue selling credit at a very high price. Not
to large companies able to compete with foreign banks, but rather to the amallest
one's.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "Valeurs Actuelles"
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
TRADF MINISTER HAS COOPERATION TALKS IN LIBYA
' Hope for Share of Trade
- LD231429 Turin LA STAMPA in ItaZian 20 Jan 81 p 5
[Dispatch by Franco Mi~ni: "Minister Manca* s Tripoli Talks"]
[Text] Tripoli--To try to secure some of the 60 trillion lire worth of orders
stemming from the new Libyan five-year plan, Foreign Trade Minister Manca had an
initial round of talks in Tripoli yesterday with Municipalities Minister 'Umar
Durdah. The firs t item dealt with possible guidelines for cooperation. A large
number of openings were created, with many tiopes for securing or sharing in a
number of pro~ects whose total value exceeds 10 trillion lire.
Italian policy, as presented by Manca in close consultation with Foreign Affairs
Minister Colombo (who is due to visit in March), is in fact to "cooperate in
development"--to participate in financing projects, with a willingness to create
joint ventures, supply technical assistance and train personnel. A group of
Italian experts is due to visit in February to examine areas of participation,
following which Libyan experts will come to Italy to choose enterprises, and in
March the joint committee will meet in Rome.
Durdah acknowledged the "specific offer," announcing the greatest openness and
preference to Italians over north Europeans and Japanese, though with a few com-
plaints. For instance, that the Italian press, according to him, always presents -
only Libya's negative aspects. Then he outlined the ma~or projects. The largest
of them all, the Serir aqueduct, is an oriRinal and fascinating project with
wells to extract not oil but water from the Sahara, a sea of fossil water which
two pipelines over 1,000 km long will carry to the coast to permit Libyan agri-
_ culture to be developed enough to make the country self-sufficient.
On Sunday evening shcrtly after his arrival Manca was introduced by Ambassador `
Quaroni to Italian operators, who pr~sented their problems to him. They condemned
the lack of stability in relations between the governments.
"The political problem" was the co~on criticism which they put to Manca. "When
there are misunderstandings between Rome and Tripoli they have immediate reper- "
cussions on our work. Your arrival here is very timeJ.y, but it is necessary to
establish with the Libyan Government relations that aFe excellent from the formal
viewpoint for the future also."
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'Crucial Period' Pending
LD261107 Turin~LA STAMPA in Italian 21 Jan 81 p 4
[Dispatch by Franco Mimu?i: "Difficult Moment in Italian-Libyan Relations;
Necess ary Clarification Will Come in March"J '
. [Excerpt] Tripoli--"Follo~aing this meeting, relatfons between Libya and Italy
will either take off or regress. And March is the last chance for a decision to
b e taken. What we must at last adopt with respect to Tripoli is a clear stance.
But this does not imply paying any political price, which nobody has imposed on ~
us. This is how Foreign Trade Minister Manca r~ummed up the situation following
an almost 2-hour conversation with al-Qadhdhafi's right-hand man Major Jallud.
According to what Jallud told Manca, the problem is in fact th.?~ relations
b etween the countries, which from the ecnnomic viewpoint are very important, are _
constantly fluctuating in other areas; there are visits and return visits and
many meetings, but many things remain solely on paper. Politely but explicitly,
Jallud expressed his trust in Manca�s words and propc,~als but, he said, it is
indispensable that the problems to be resolved be linked not to the good will
of an individual but to the collective com~itment of the Rome government.
Jallud raised only one political problem with the Italian minister--that of war
damages. But he did let it be understood that Libya is demanding primarily a
moral acknowledgement rather than economic compensation. Apart from that, there
is a complete openness and indeed a basic preference with respect to Italq, as
- long as the econos,i.c relations are of overall cooperation, and not purely com-
mercial~ supplies must be accompanied by technology transfers and an undertaking
with respect to research and development (for instance with the Italian National
Hydrocarbons Agency [ENI] in the oil sphere or with the National Nuclear Energy
Committee in the nuclear energy field). Joint companies can also be formed, -
not only in Libya but also in Italy, for marine transport (90 percent of trans-
port to Africa is by sea), for fishing and for joint initiatives with respect
to other countries, especially in the Third World.
~ In short, from this--obviously the most important--as from his other con-~ersa- _
tions, Manca gained confirmation of Libya`s willingness to give priority to
relations with Italy, starting with oil. It is true, Minister Muhammad
az-Zaq'ar said, that in 1980 supplies fell, but only as a result of decreased
production, and the cut affected all clients. The supplies should soon return
to and even exceed the 13 million tons of 1979 (15 percent of our requirements).
The same applies to liquid gas, supplies of which were interrupted last year only
because of work on the liquefaction plant, the minister.said. It is true, how-
ever, that a price increase must be negotiated. The tendency among gas-producing
countries is to bring its price inta line with oil. The Libyan minister is aim-
ing for the time being at an agreement like that already reached with Spain for ~
a price equivalent to about 82.5 percent of the crude oil price. Ratti of the
ENI, who attended the meeting (ENI is a highly rated company among the Libyans,
who gra.~ted it 50 percent of the Italian-Libyan joint cancern, whereas in other
cases they always keep a ma3ority holding), replied by citing the mpre advan-
tageous agreements for ^~uch larger supplies which Italy has signed w~.th Algeria,
the USSR and the Netherlands, and consequently the need not to break the balance
among suppliers. Be that as it may, Manca said, negotiations will resume right
away .
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
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COL'NTRY SECTION ITALY
_ ITALY, BULGARIA TO ScT UP JOINT STOCK COMPANY
LD231511 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 22 Jan 81 p 9
[Unattributed report: "Volani Estahlishes Joint Company With Bulgaria"]
[Text) Rome--Volani of Rovereto, Trento, will be the first Western concern to
form a joint stock company with Bulgaria. This is one of the results of the
visit by Bulgarian Foreign Trade Minister Rhristov, who yesterday signed a 10-
year cooperation agreement between the General Federation of Italian Industry
and the Bulgarian Industrial and Economic Association.
_ The agreement will be ratified in the next few days by I~iristov and Italian
Foreign Minieter Manca; it envisages the offer of a$` million credit by the
Italian Government to facilitate exports to Bulgaria. _
This initiative should bring maj or orders not only to Volani (which produces
prefabricated construction components) but also to Italimpianti (for enlarging
a steel works) and to the manufacturing industries' participation and finance
board (in the tourist field).
The possibility of new agreements was also discussed with Industrial Reconstruc- -
tion Institute [IRIJ chairman Pietro Sette. The topics discussed included plans
for steei works to be built in Bulgaria, imports and exports, production by
license in the mechanical, electronic aud foodstuffs fields, and professional
training. The meeting was attended by representatives of the IRI holding com-
panies most directly concerned.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A. _
CSO: 3104 -
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.
COUNTYZY SECTION ~ PORTUGAL
PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE PROGRAMS UNDER EANES
Madrid CAI~BIO 16 in Spanish 1 Dec 80 pp 94-96
' [Interview with the late Prime Minister Francisc~o Sa Carneiro of the Democratic
Alliance, by Juan Tomas de Salas in Lisbon on the eve of Portugal's presidential
= elections; date not givenJ
[Excerpt] Juan Tnmas de Salas: The first question from the Spanish viewpoint is why
do you support a military man as candidate for the presidency?
Sa Carneiro: Ocne of the most important tasks of the president of Portugal in the next
few years will be to help the military return to their barracks. This is the end of
the transition period with the revision of our constitution, and calls for a president
who is totally democratic. A military man with the characteristics of culture,
intelligence, and experience of Gen Antonio Soares Carneiro impresses us as one who
can accomplish this task because he has military and civilian features as well. He
was not chosen because he is a military man but because with these characteri~tics
he also happens to be a military man. As you know, the government has no authority
whatever over the armed forces. This situation comes to an end with the amendment
of the constitution. As an entity, as an institution, the armed forces are outside
politics and do not have the intention of fulfilling a political role let us say.
But this is not the case with the political-military group of the Council of the
Revolution. Accordingly, General Soares Carneiro, as a democratic rather than
revolutionary military man and with his great experience, appears to us to be a
better candidate than any civilian at this time.
JTS: We1Z then, why General Soares Carneiro and not Gen Antonio dos Santos Ramalho
Eanes?
SC: Naturally, I am against Ramal'no Eanes' candidacy because he is the adversary
of the Democratic Alliance [AD]. On the day following the formation of the AD he had
already espoused that position. We establi.shed the AD on 25 July 1979 and the next
day, on 26 July 1979, General Ean~s alled me and called the leaders of the [other]
political parties and outlined his political plan, namely, an agreement between the
Socialist Party [PSP] and the Social Democratic Party [PSD] for the support of the
president of Portugal. That would have been the end of the AD--that is, if Eanes
had managed to bring it abour.
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Eanes is a man who has constantly strived to generate crises in the parties. As I
said last year, he provoked a serious crisis in my party [the PSD], in the parliamer.-
tary group, and some of these deputies changed parties in the assembly in 1919 be-
cgu~e thie political project of the Soc~alist Front was a political pro~ect of
Eanes more than of Mario Soares. , ~
Eanes is a revolutionary military man who played a positive role after 25 November
1975 as regards the armed forces. But in politics he constantly tried with his
political-military group which represents the military in politics to retain in
another form the Council of the Revolution and to entertain with the Portuguese
Communist Party [PCP] a relationship which is ambiguous to say the least.
I believe that the PCP supports Eanes for two fundamental reasons: The first is that =
Eanes is the enemy of the AD and the latter is the alternative which helped to reduce
the importance of the PCP. The second is because Eanes has maintained a positi~n
against a conservative revision of the constitution while the socialist economic
model regarding the public sector is what suits the PCP.
Furthermore Eanes, with this impossible plan of bringing about an agreement between
the PSP and PSD, has become an unstable factor. His impossible plan means instabil-
ity and for this reason it is pleasing to the PCP.
During the 3 years of Eanes' term, before the advent of the AD, there were five
governments. Eanes has created political instability in government. He took advan-
tage of this instability to increase his power and intervention in politics.
JTS: But after the elections Eanes took a backward step, declared himse~f to be
almost liberal, and enraged Mario Soares, 3id he not?
SC: Yes, he did this b ecause it is one of Eanes' personality traits and because his
advisers said, "Well then, the AD won the elections with a large majority; let us
seize this opportunity a bit and see whether we can capture the electoral following
of the AD." And Eanes, who before the elections supported Mario Soares, changed in
short order, and it is not a very positive move for a head of state, following an
election, to change so rapidly, so opportunistically.
JTS: Why not Francisco Sa Carneiro for president? Why a military man?
SC: This is one of the other aspects of the matter. I believe that a political
- leader must be actively involved. A political leader is incompatible with the post
of president of Portugal. The presidency involves national representation, a repre-
sentation of state, but it does not include a role of political leadership, it does
~ not call for active intervention by the president. I like politics too much to be
president of the country. I believe that it does not behoove the Portuguese presi-
dent to like politics so much.
JTS: But the public opinion polls concede the victory to General Eanes, don't they?
SC: However, we do not have experience with how trus~worthy public opinion polls are
in presidential elections. It is the first time that polls of this type have been
taken. Let us see what happens. I believe that if Fsanes should win we would re-
turn to a period o~ instability, a period similar to w~at we witnessed in 1975. We
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would have political instability because the leaders of the AD, Freitas do Amaral and
myself, have already stated that we would not be part of the government. Social
instability because the PCP wo~ld feel strengthened, would feel its power increased
and thus there would be tremendous social tensions that could lead to the disaolution
of parliament and the calling of new elections. Economic instability because this
recovery that we are experiencing could not continue with constitutional struggles
between the president, who is a declared enenry of the AD, and our government. Thus,
a situation of great confusion would occur that would destroy in our country all our
chances of economic recovery for the next few ye~.rs.
JTS: And if Eanes should win, what would happen to Soares?
SC: A confused situation would result so that it would not be known what power the
government would have or who would be the opposition.
JTS: But with the victory of General Eanes only the PCP would be ahead. That is
certain.
^ SC: It is sure that with Eanes' victory the PCP would be strengthened.
JTS: Is it possible that between now and the elections Mario Soares may break his _
silence and support Soares Carneiro?
SC: I don't believe so. Mario Soares has h3s tactics, which he has already explained.
He has already declared his position. Then, he kept silent. He did not expect a
significant gart of the socialist elecCorate to vote for Eanes, some perhaps for
Otelo, some for Soares Carneiro, while finally another part might abstain. This is
a conf used situation which seems to me to be very bad for political stability and the
future of the PSP. That is what Eanes has achieved with his candidacy. With the
posture that he adopted after the [general] elections, he provoked a very serious
crisis in the PSP,
- Eanes is a man who provokes crises in parties because he has a vision of politics
which is the politics of personal power of the military group of Melo AnCunes and
- Vitor Alves and of all his friends wh~ rejected the social democrats in 1975.
Question: And if Gen Antonio Soares Carneiro wins, what will be his political pro-
gram?
Answer: The policy that we have pursued these last 10 months in the interest of har- -
mony and understanding between the president of Portuga]. and the government. This
policy that we have followed is not conservative and there will be no conservative
policy in Portugal if Soares Carneiro wins. Rather, it is the most advanced social
_ policy sincP the years of the revolution when it comes to specific results. We
Portuguese have experienced this since the years of the revolution. As for concrete
results, we Portuguese have felt them in this short time span.
We see~: a peaceful revision of the constitution; we would strive to reach an agree- ~
ment with the socialists, and if we fail to do so we would hold a democratic referen-
dum. I believe that the next 4 or 5 years would not only be a period of political
stability and social peace but also of development much greater than that possible
in the developed countries of Europe. This means that the difference between
Portugal and countries such as Spain, Ireland, or Greece would diminish.
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JTS: Would you have to change the constitution, which is programmatic, totally? -
SC: It would have to be changed sufficiently, not as regards individual rights,
which are very well regulated, and not as regards the political system, even though
iC is necessary to guarantee governtnent stability supported by a ma3ority, but with
respect to the economic system.
JTS: Would there be denationalizations? -
SC: There would not be denationalizations. We were the only political force which
outlined a program for amending the constitution before the elections to allow or-
dinary law to determine whether to denationalize or not. Now the prohibition [against _
= denationalizationsJ is included in the constitution but we advocate that ordinary law
approved in parliament should decide whether there should be denationalizations or
no t .
JTS: What is happening with the press? ,
_ /
SC: The p ress would have its freedom guaranteed.
JTS: And what about the nationalization of newspapers?
SC: That is not so much a problem of the constitution, but rather one of political
and legislative dimensions. I believe--and this is also the position of the AD
program--that there should not be any state-owned press. The state must guarantee
what in regards to the press would be an essential public service such as television
provides, for e~mple, and guarantee conditions of independence and high standards '
because it is also a very important cultural medium. But as regards *~ewspapers, .
the state does not need to own proprietary organs of the press. Thi~ rarely happens
in any demacratic country.
JTS: Mr Prime Minister, seen from Spain what has happened here in Portugal starting
on 25 April [1974] is very interesting. From a kind of "Operation Potemkin" the
- country moved into a situation where the electorate voted for the AD according to
- European liberal practice. How do you explaj.n that?
~ SC: I believe that two trends overlapped in the revolution, one a democratic trend
and one an avant-garde and Marxist-Leninist trend. The latter was dominant until
1975. Later, the de.mocratic trend prevailed. The avant-garde and Marxist trend
is focused today in the Council of the Revolution, in Eanes' political-military
group. But in 1915 the people rejected that entire avant-garde tendency. Later they
_ put their faith in a socialist government but the lack of stability and a certain in-
efficiency in government resulted in the fact that the Portuguese became aware that
under socialism they were not eating either, that they were constantly eating less,
and that their standard of living was worse all the time. Thus, when this Platform
Agreement of AD was signed for the first time, people believed in it because it said
that there would be a guarantee of stability and lawful order, as these last 10 ,
months have evidenced. Wages have increased; purchasing power has risen by some
4 percentage points at least. Inflation has been checked in a spectacular manner
and social pensions increased greatly, which was completely fair. And all this
without an electoral policy but rather in a context oi very rigorous economic policy,
of public austerity--a policy which must continue in the next few years. Now, be-
sides enjoying tranquillity, life begins to improve a little and the vote naturally ~
`i
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has followed the trend of the policy which has created better living conditions for
the people. In the last analysis, this is the meaning of politics--that the people
may live better, and since they have started ,to live a little better the revolution
was forsaken and socialism was forsaken and the ma~ority voted for the AD. I believe
that it is as simple as that.
JTS: How is it that there is no terrorism here in Portugal?
SC: It would be very difficult to initiate a terrorist plot in such a small setting,
in an economy and a society which are eminently rural, with very small industrialized
- areas. Terrorism would be totally rejected and I believe that those responsible
would be considered people of the left and that it would have very adverse conse-
quences for the PCP. It is clear that an effort is being made to determine the
connection existing between international terrorism and international communism.
Before the revolutiion, it was known that it was one or another branch of the communist
party that planted bombs, but none of them ever resorted to personal terrorism be-
cause I believe that they knew that any such action would lead to a very difficult
situation for the PCP.
JTS: "ow do you explain the fact that Portugal and Spain have ignored each other
for so long, even now, after so many years when both were under dictatorships which
lived behind closed doors, after discovering democracy practically at the same time,
having similar governments and being prepared to meet each other in the Common Market?
SC: I believe that this is a parado~dcal situation but one which represents a cer-
tain 13tent lack of trust between the two countries. Some very tenuous progress,
very tentative, has already occurred, but I believe that with the new Portuguese
situation, following the election of Soares Carneiro, the conditions for closer
cooperation between Portugal and Spain will be created. There is no reason whatever
on the Portuguese side for the present situation to exist. Perhaps there is some lack
of confidence by Spain, a certain lack of interest in this neighboring country that
- is so small and so little developed.
But we shall outline a joint plan of action to improve highways and communications.
I believe that the principal problem is a problem of physical, political, economic,
cultural, and co~mnercial communications. When w~ develop this type of communications
we shall be face to face rather than back to back, and it will be very easy for us
to have a dialog and act together.
JTS: I believe that there are now many Spanish tourists i.n Portugal, are there not?
SC: Yes, there are many Spanish tourists in Portugal and this is because life in
Portugal is cheaper and because we have a system of subsidized prices which favors
everybody equally, foreign tourists or Portuguese, who all benefit from subsidies.
For this reason Spanish tourists are attracted and they are very well received in
Portugal.
JTS: At least we are getting to know each other.
SC: Of course!
COPYRIGHT: 1979 [as published] INFORMAC~O~i`~ Y REVISTt~S, S.A.
~
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COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
HOPELESSNESS, CONFUSIO~i SAID TO MARK IA3Es;~-ET~ OFFENSIVE
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 1 Dec 80 pp 22, 23, 24, 26, 27
[Excerpt] The three branches of ETA [Basquz Fatherland and Liberty Group] (the
military, politicomilitary and so-called autonomous commandos) have begun a gen-
- eral offensive which, according to police sources, maq become worse in the next
= few weeks.
= After thoroughly studying the situation and evaluating the contents of the latest _
= manifestds from the three ETA branches, these sources seem inclined to beliene
that before the end of the year a new qualitative and quantitative development
may occur in Basque guerrilla terrorism which might even take the form of an at-
tack on military installations with the seizure of a small village for a few hours
and in urban guerrilla activity per se.
According to information at hand, there is every indication that the terrorist
organizatian might force the issue in seeking to negotiate even though the Guern-
ica Statute is quite explicit and, especially, to obtain aamesf~y for its prisoners
and a change in the Navarre situation. In this manner, the ETA cffensive, which�
would be an offensive of desperation and would give rise to a vicious circle of
genuine madness, would pursue two objectives: eithe~ make negotiations mandatory
or produce a situation which would result in the declaration of a state of emer-
gency or some kind of military interventions which is not desired by the military,
nor, in the opinion of all the experts, is it a solution.
Althougr, historically, ETA's strategy, with its intermittent escalations per-
fectlq planned by the organization's staff headquartered in southern France, has
always been accompanied by short periods of truce, the latest offensive of the
Basque terrorists can be qualified as one of ~he most virulent and prolonged of
all those which have occurred in recent years. For 8 weeks there has been no
semblance of truce and all records have been broken up to now: one death every
3 days.
Moreover, in the past 8 weeks the Basque terrorist organization has begua to
resort to its typical style of extreme gangsterism and brigandage common to armed
organizations on the decline.
For instance, a single example is sufficient. ETA (military), which on 23 Sep-
tember 1979 assassinated Lorenzo Gonzalez ~Jalle, mil~.tarq govemor of la Plaza,
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in San Sebastian and boasted in an official com~unique of not having touched a
hair on the head of his wife or of the 2,000 persoas who were on La Concha beach
at the time, 14 months later, on 3 November, machineguaned a Zarauz bar k311ing
4 rural policemen and seriously wouading 6 Basque citizens.
According to the minister of interior, this blind terrorism, typical of an or- _
ganization which is acting in desperation, is due to the lack of popular support
and political influence which the terrorist organization has been increasingly
experiencing.
"Whereas 2 years ago ETA was able to get 3,000 persons to take part in a demonstra-
tion," ministry sources point out, now the organization does not get even 150, as
shown last summer at the amnesty march organized by ETA in Martutene."
- Interior Minister Juan Jose Roson believes that the new ETA offensive is an act
of desperation being carried out by the three branches of this organization which
have gradually lost almost all their political influence during the last few
weeks. Basque party leaders of various ideologies believe in a preestablished
plan aimed at thoroughly destabilizing the democratic and autonomous process in -
the Basque provinces.
This theme is tmashamedly supported by Basque socialist leader Txiqui Benegas,
_ secretary general of the PSE-PSOE [Spanish Socialist Party~-Spanish Socialist Wo~k-
ers Party], who stresses that the sole objective of the terrorist organization is
n
"to attack de~ocracy and bring about a sCate of emergency in the Basque country.
Both postures--that of the minister of interior and that of Basque politicians--
seem to coincide: ETA's action is one of desperation, and the ob~ective is to
provoke the army while aware that the armed forces cannot bring about anq change
in the Euskadi situation.
The long and painful path to the installation df autonomy in Euskadi has always
been accompanied by a continuous string of deaths and assassinations. Aware that
the final autnomous process is the last blow, ETA leaders-through a process of
true madness--are trying to bring about repression, the only thing which can
change the situation in their favor among people who, for the most par~, have re-
~ected them and even begun to take opposite sides.
In the opinion of experts who are closely following the evolution of Basque ter-
rorism, it is obvious that the Basques are becoming politically isolated. The
- condemnation they received from the Socialist International, the declaration of
the European Council in Strasbourg, the rejection by t~ie Basque people, the pos-
sible results which might have been obtained in Paris by Spanish Foreign Affairs
Minister Jose Pedro Perez Llorca and, finally, the formation of the Front for
Peace, have been successive blaws inflicted on the ETA commandos who are finding
themselves increasingly isolated and faced with the need to act to bring about a
change in the situation in their favor. Mo~eover, the progressive action of
political platforms somewhat tied in with those of the ETA branches (Herri _
Batasuna with ETA, military, and Euskadiko Ezquerra with ETA, politicomilitary)
has caused discrepancies and, in some instances, a split between the two nation-
alist complexes.
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- The fact that a man like Mario Onaindia, Euskadiko Ezquerra's secretary general,
has ventured in a lucid analpsis of the situation appearing in the weekly news-
paper, LA CALLE, to asFert incisively that "the a:med conflict in Euskadi is in
a proceas of absolute disorder" is quite revealing in itself.
In the opinion of Onaindia, one of the historic ETA participants in the Burgos
trial, the present situation is intolerable. "It is an intoYerable situation for
everyone, including the ETA, and T~ are at a point where ETA may atte~mpt action
as absurd as that of inciting a milii:ary coup. TEiings cannot go on like this ad
infinitum."
These declarations and observations, which do not appear in neTaspapers but rather
gre made at internal discussions, indicate that ETA (politicomilitary) is con-
cerned about the lack of control of political parties which are part of the sys-
tem and which have begun to escape its influence. This leads inevitably to a
radicalization, which is definitely what has occurred in the case of the organi-
zation's politicomilitary branch.
Until the approval of the Guemica Statute, the strategy of the politicomilitary _
branch was not that of assassination but of fight~ng for the Guernica Statute
which they supported last summer even With hunger strikes in the prisons where
the commandos were confined. -
- The change in the situation, the struggle against the UCD [Democratic Center
Union] and the assassination of its leaders and, recentlq, the madness of attack-
ing certain quarters like the air traffic contro~ headquarters of Guipuzcoa and
the Berga barracks in Cataluna seem to indicate a spectacular qualitative change.
According to the experts, this qualitative change was allegedly due to the with-
. drawal of a group of terrorists from the ranks of the ETA (politicomilitary) to
~oin those of the ETA (military). Forced by desertions, on 28 June 1980 politico-
_ military memb~rs, with the assassination Luis Hergueta Guinea, head of *~Sichelin's
engineering department in Vitoria, began a mad race to see which ETA branch could
kill the most. Fr om that time on, the attacks became more ..ruel, and each of the
two terrorist organizations sought more carnage. The qualifications of the vic-
tims did not matter; it was unrestrained terrorism aimed at causing the gceatest
damage possible and seeing who could kill the most.
" What will happen in the future? Experts consulted by CAMBIO 16 on this sub~ect
, offer two theories:
Either ETA (politicomilitary) will join ETA (military) before the end of the
year and, with the increased number of militants, take another step forward in
terrorist strategy (attacks on barracks, urban guerrilla activity) or the two
ETA organizations will continue to fight for leadership and sub~ect the country
to a b?.oodbath of incalculable proportions.
In the opinion of those who purport to be well-informed on the subject o� ETA
terrorism, attacks on barracks will be carried out with the aim of directly pro-
voking the armed forces and obtaining mare sophisticated long-range weapons.
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Up to now there has been a constant struggle betaTeen the militarp and politico-
militarp factions to show which branch acted more effectivelp and spectacularly.
Whereas the military co~andos have continued to kill rural policemen with a ahat
in the nape of the neck and have gone oa to indiacriminate massacre (like that of
a few weeks ago in the Guipuzcoa village of Zaraus), the politicomilitary members~'
have been more selective in their act3ons, with the desire to be more spectacular:
attempt to kidnap centrist deputy Gabriel Cisneros, kidnaping anotfier centrist
deputy, Javier Ruperez, a bombing campaign on the coast against tourism, an at-
tempt to bomb Moncloa Palace, attacks on armed sites and the like. ~
There has been a constant struggle to shaw that "one action by the politico-
military group is worth 20 of those carried out by the military commandos."
Now, with all sense of moderation and orientation lost and isolated from the peo-
ple, they are undertaking a new offensive.
In turn, the military commandos, guided from the south of France by ETA's key me.n,
Apala and Tchomin, have not substantially changed their strategy.
"ETA (military)," a former director of the organization told CAI~IO 16, "is fol-
lowing tTne same activist plan as in the time of Franco. They have not changed
, qualitatively or quantitatively. They are continuing to kill rural and regular
police and are operating in the same manner as before, for they have not known
. how or been able to mount the steps of every revolutionarp struggle, arming peo-
- ple who are no lon~er listening to them and are beginning to hate them.
"Nor have they been able to increase their war potential with adequate armaments.
_ Now they are engaging in an act of madness and, especially, in genuine 'bluff."'
In the writer's opinion, the activist position has now become a profession, a way
of life for many leaders who have d ifficulty fitting in with normal and civilized
society. They know nothing except to flee, to handle a machinegun, to continue
to flee and ta become intoxicated with action for the sake of action.
_ COPYRIGHT: 1979, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8568
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COUNTRY SECTION SWITZERLAND _
PUBLICATION QF GOLD FIGURES TO CEASE
LD271221 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 27 Jan 81 p 2
~ [Report by David Marsh: "~old for Swiss Market Falls 36 Per Cent"]
[Text] Physical supplies of gold on to the Swiss bullion market last year
' fell by 36 pei� cent--to 629 tonnes--compared with supplies for 1979,
according to ~a valedictory series of gold trade statistics fssued by the
Swiss Customs Office.
The decline, particularly reflected a sharp drop in direct daliveries by
the Soviet Union, the world's second largest p~oducer, which reduced
aupplies to 40 tonnes, fram 214 tonnes in 1979.
The customs office confirmed yesterday that it will stop publishing detailed
figures on gold movements from this month. It claimed that a breakdown of
imports and exports according to countries "can be misleading or endanger
~ general economic interests."
Recent publicity given to the Swiss figures, after years of being thought
secret, are known to have discomfited the Swiss banks and irritated the
Soviet Union, which has used Zurich as its main sales outlet to the West
~ in recent years.
The Swiss National Bank advised the customs office towards the end of 1980
to stop publishing the breakdawns.
The drop in supplies last year also reflected reduced direct deliveries
from the main producer, South Africa. These fell to 95 tonnes from 117 tonnes
- in 1979, with the December inflow--at oril.y 4 to~es--one of the lowest monthly
figures of 1980.
A big drop in indirect South African supplies via London was also indicated by
a decline in imports from the UK to 131 tonnes last year from 313 tonnes in
1979. The import/export figures are only an imprecise indicator of trans-
- actions, as a large number of.sales and purchases of gold are made without
the bullion ever moving.
Some gold imports are also stored in boaded warehouses at Zurich airport,
and thus do not show up in the figures .
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The lower Russian imports figure does not give the full picture of actual '
. sales . As Moscow can move gold both before and after selling the metal,
about 20 tonnes of its deliveries in 1979, for example, are thought not to ,
have been sold until last year.
On the exporta side, the volume of gold taken out of Switzerland dropped
_ by 15 percent last year, to 552 tonnes.
COPYRIGHT: The Fi.nancial Times Ltd, 1981
CSO: 3120
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COUNTRY SECTION UNITED KINGDOM
,
GIBR~?LTAR ISSUE DEBATED IN HOUS;; OF LORDS
LD291327 Londor. THE TIMES in English 29 Jan 81 p 9
[Unattributed report of 28 Janu~.ry House of Lords debate: "Britain's Trade
With Spain Increasing in Spite of Dispute Over Gibraltar"]
' [Text] If the British -Spanish agreements on Gibraltar remainEd unfulf illed -
it could become a ser ious issue in the current negotiations between Spain -
and the EEC Co~ission, Lord Bethell said during a debate on Gibraltar.
He said it could make it even more difficult for Britain to aupport Spain's
application fflr entry to the community. This was at a time when Britain
- was perhaps the most enthusiastic EEC member pressing for Spain's accession.
- The agreement signed in April, 1980, was as much in the interests of Spain
- as the United Kingdom, the Atlantic Alliance and the EEC.
" Since then there had been no progress and restrictions still existed which
prevented people of Gibraltar trom co~micating with their relatives and
- friends across the border with Spain.
Lord Gorornay-Roberts for the opposition, said he did not regard Gibraltar
~ and Spanisn accession to the EEC as being linked. -
~ While we wish to do everything to smooth the entry of Spain into the -
community (he said) we cannot envisage even the po~sibility of o~'r agreeing
' to a constitutional change in the status of Gibraltar without tha full and
free acquescence of the people of that state.
Lord Gladwyn said that if Spain joined the EEC, and there was every reason
to support it would, the whole future of Gibraltar, th3s hot potato between
Eri~ain and the Spanish Government, must be considered from the European
- point of view.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter said no British Government could hand over 25,000 loyal
Gibraltarians to any foreign or other regime which they themselves were
_ not prepared willingly t~ accept.
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Lord Greernaood of Rossendale said Lord Carrington and Sir Ian Gilmour were
tc, some extent the prisoners of policy evolved by previous administrations .
In the circumstances, they did we11 in the Lisbon talks, but they should _
plan no concessions. All they needed to do was to say clearly and repeatedly .
that Britain was there and would stay there until the people of Gibraltar
- asked her to leave.
Lord Selsdon said the greate~t service to Gibraltar would be to help it to
develop and build economic independence. The removal of the blockade and
the opening of the frontier would perhaps be the greatest single thing to
benefit Gibraltar's economy. '
- Lord Carrington, secretary of state for foreign and commQOnwealth affairs,
said *_he growth of the Gibraltar economy, quite apart from developments on
the soeial and political s ides, demonstrated the barrenness of the policiet~
_ of restrictir:.? the country economically and politically.
~
Under the Lisbon agreement anything could be discussed ir. the negotiations,
but the prea~ble stated that the British Government would neyer enter into
negotiatione under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the
sovereignty of another state against freely and democratically expressed
wishes. Nothing could be clearer than that.
The main hold-up in recent months had been over the clarification of the -
agreement. The lord privy seal (Sir Ian Gilmour) visited Madrid earlier
th is month, British trade with Sp ain had been increasing.r$pidly and exports
totalled 1,300 million pounds last year, an inciease of more than 19 per cent
on the previous year. The two countries had much in co~non and many shared
interes ts .
At Madrid the commitment cf both governments to ttre Lisbon agreement was
reaffirmed and Sir Ian Gilmour stressed the hope that it might be implemented
without furth er delay, making the point that this was as much in the interests
of Spain, as Britain and Gibraltar.
Although they had run into difficulties with implementation of the agreement,
it was not dead and there had been no breakdown. Britain ~aas ready to imple-
_ ment it in the terms they signed it. The agreement should be implemented
long before Spanish accession to the EEC.
The debate conciuded.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981
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COUNTRY SECTION UNITED KINGDOM
FALL IN GOLD P:4ICES ATTRIBUTED TO FAR EAST SALES
LD261633 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 26 Jan 81 p 28
[Report by David Marsh: "Far East Beh ind the Fall in Gold Prices"]
- [Text] A big increase in gold flows from the Far East on to Western bullion
markets last year, reversing the wave of buying from the area in 1979, has
emerged as one of the prime factors behind the sharp fall in the gold price
in the last 12 months.
Heavy selling of Far East investment hoards last year coincided with a sharp
fall in demand for jewelry after the new year price surge, which brought
the metal to a peak of $850 per ounce, last January. It has since fallen
to about $550. .
The res ult was that Hong Kong and Singapore became new suppliers to the
London and Zurich bullion markets last year, for the first time in r~t least
a decade.
The swing between the 1979 net gold inflows from Europe and last year's
net outflaws was probably close to 200 tonnes, according to Iiong Kon~ and
Singapore statistics.
This large-scale dishoarding from the Far East, where gold owners are
notoriously sensitive to price changes more than offset the reduced supplies
last year from the two main producers, South Africa and the Soviet Union.
- It was also accompanied by similar heavy selling from private i~estors from
the Middle East.
Figures from the Singapore Department of Statistics shaw that total Singapore
gold exports rose to 59.7 tonnes worth about 510 million pounds in the first
10 moaths of 1980--against imports of 13.8 tonnes (worth about 110 million
pounds) .
' This was a dramatic turnround from exports of 19.1 tonnes and imports of
65.5 tonnes during the gold-buying boom of 1979.
Hong Kong's gold imports in thc first half of 1980 dropped to 20.4 tonnea from
104.6 tonnes during the whole of 1979, according to official Hong Kong statis-
tics. Exports between January and June totalled 6.8 tonnes against 9.2 tonnes
~ in 1979.
COPYRIGHT: The Financial Times Ltd, 1981
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COUNTRY SECTION UNITID KINGDOM
ARMS B~UYING SCANDAL REVEALED
LD1916~5 London THE OBSERVER in English 18 Jan 81 p 1
[Report by Peter Durisch and Peter Deely: "Diplomat Exposed in Arms Deal F
Scandal"]
[Text] Documents can Le bought in London which enable extremist groups to
obtain arms by short-circuiting international controls.
' THE OBSERVER has bought such a docimment. We could have been representing
- the IRA, the Red Brigades or au~ other terroris~t faction. We could have
been suppliers for opposing elements in Lebanon or in Central America. -
The man who sold us the paper did not ask.
Last week THE OBSERVER showed the 'bent' certif icate to senior Scotland Yard
- officers and informed the foreign office.
a
Our certificate was a bogus request for 10 fully automatic NATO rif les, and
50 Browning military pistols. It was sold to us by Mx Mashu Khulila,
military attache at the Zambian High Cou~ission, for 1,000 pounds. We assume ~
that his govertunent knew nothing about the transaction.
The documents, known as end-user certificates, can be bought for cash and
other favours at some Third World embassies in Lonaon. At the illicit end
of the arms industry, London--with its large diplomatic community--is
recognised as a likely place to get such papers. Our aim was to expose this
racket.
That governments are aware of these malpractices is beyond question. We
have learned that British off icials who issue export licences for arms have
refused 'several' applications because intelligence sources indicated that
the weapons were destined for the IRA.
In the past year the British Government has issued two arms export licences
- for guns only to find that the documentation did not indicate the true
identity of the buyer.
Attempts like these to bypass the British controle have occurr~d in spite of
very tough regulations. In some European countries, where vetting of applica-
tions for arms export is much less stringent, possession of an end-user certifi-
cate can make buying arms possible.
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Most arms deals are the result of government-to-government negotiations at a
high level, of ten min'.sterial. The scope for abuse there is limited.
IC is in the field of the smaller transactions that opportunities exist to
~ exploit the syetem. The value of an end-user certificate is that in some
circumstances it is the main document required to obtain an export licence.
That is also a weakness of the system. With a bogus end-user it ie possible
to visit some countries (we were told Belgiimn, Italy, Spain and Portugal
= in particular) and buy and export the weapons.
Once in shipment the goods can be diverted to their intended destination.
With our bogus document we visited both Brussels and Lisbon, convincing
dealers that we were agents for a foreign goverrmoent.
In the Belgian capital we were quoted a price of about 35,000 pounds for the
consignment, supplying the rifles from London and the pistols from Brussels.
In the off ice of this very reputable dealer we were accepted as genuine
buyera and allowed to handle other weapons held in stock.
In Lisbon a dealer started to tell us how 'bent' documents could be used to
get military hardware. We later received a telex message from the Portuguese
company .
The price of a corrupt official varies: we have learned that the going rate
is about 10 percent of the com~ercial value of the order.
For larger shipments th e pay-offs are enormous, reflecting th e venality of ~
some officials and governments. We came across one_case where a head of _
state of a Third World nation asked $1,500,000 to produce paperwork showing
that the weapons were for him and not for the true buyer.
The extent of the racket in bogus papers in London was revealed to us by !
Major Robert Turp, an e:cperienced and reputable British private arms dealer.
- 'I would say that there are several dozen end-users obtained every year in
Lond~n in this way,' he said. 'I believe I could do it now in any one of
about 10 embassies, but I would not jeopardise my business in that way.'
Major Bevan Keen, sales director of Sterling Armaments, which manufactures
sub-machine-guns at Dagenham, told us that in all his years in the trade he
had seen 'a dozen or more end-users which gave me cause for suspicion. But
it is for the gover~ent, not us, to itrvestigate them if they feel it is
necessary.'
We showed him our certificate, with all reference~ to Zambia deleted. He
commented: 'That is a perf ectly accepted end-user. My company would see
no reason not to forward it in support of an export licence application.'
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The scale of this clandestine industry was revealed by our inquiries in _
Washington. United States Government arms control officials told us that
Chey received 40-50 applications to buy arms each year in which the paperwork
turned out to be bogus.
In many of those cases the documents are signed by overseas government
officials, but their govertmments know nothing of the orders.
Until now the misuse of docwnentation such as end-user certificates has
largely been concealed from the public because of its potential for
political embarrasament. _
To many arms deale�rs, as it was emphasised to us, any publicity is anathema.
COPYRIGHT: The Observer Ltd, 1981
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- COUNTRY SECTION UNITID KINGDOM
. BRIEFS
SUBMARINE SC.RAPPID-A fifth submarine for the Trident strategic nuclear
force has become a hidden casualty of pressure on the defence budget.
Though no public announcement will b~ made before 1983; it has become clear
in Whitehall that the "fifth boat optio.n," as it is called, is dead in all
but name. The extra cost it would incur, between 675m and 750m pounds on
top of the 4,500m to S,OOOm pounds earmarked for the procurement of a four-
boat Trident submarine squadron, means that nothing short of an unexpectedly
vigorous uptum in the economy would enable the government to go ahead and
b uild it. The United States Government will not need to be told formally
for another two years that the Thatcher administration has dropped its
, option on a fif th boat and will not therefore be requiring the additional
missiles, launchers, navigation and fire co ntrol systems that would have
been provided by American manufacturers. Abandoinnent of a fifth vessel
for the ~rident force, which is intended to replace the Polaris submarine
squadron in the early 1990s and to carry the British nuclear deterrent into
the 2020s, will have both political and strategic co~sequences. The "fifth
boat lobby" has been quite strong inside the defence community, though it
now seems resigned to losing. [Text] [Peter Hennessy] [LD281229 London
THE TIMES in~. English 28 Jan 81 p 1] ~
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