JPRS ID: 9502 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070037-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 37
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/9502
23 January 1981
~Jear East i~l~rth Afr~~~ R~ ort
~
CFOUO 3/81)
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JPF,S L/9502
23 January, 1981
- ,
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 3/81)
CON7ENTS ~
~ 2N~ER-ARAB AFFAIRS
America Encourages Egypt To Bear pown Hard on ILi.bya
(AL-WATAN AIr-'ARABI, 21-27 N~v 80) ......o.........o.......... l
Possibilities, Obstacles to Deaaocracy Txplored
(AZ-WATAN.AL-'ARABI, 28 Nov-Lt Dec 80) ...........o..ooo.oooa.. 6
Tunisian Foreign Minister Revi.ews Various Arab, I?umestic Proble~ms
(Nabil Mughrabi; AI,-ih'ATAN AL- ~ARABI, 21~-30 Oct 80) o. a..... 21~
LEBANON .
~ Role Played by Iran in South Ihscussed.
(AI~T~IATAN AL-'ARABI, 22-28 Aug 80) .......o.......oo....o...... 33
- Financial Posture of Phalanges I}iscussed
(AL-i~iATAN AI,-tARABI, 22-28 Aug 80) ..........o......o.......:.~ 39
. Bank Deposits in Lebanese Pounds~Declining Ihxe to Deteriorating
Security
(AZ-WATAN AI,-~ARABI, 22-28 Aug 80) ............e..........ooo. !~2
MAURITANIA
~ial of Mokhtar Ould Daddah Viewed as Paroc~r
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEIIN$ AFRIQIIE, 3 Dec 80) .......e.o...oo.. 1a1.~
TUNISIA
Tunisian Cabinet Reshuffled
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEUr1E AFRIQUE, 17 Dec 80) !~6
Brief s
Socialist Interazrican in ~inis 1t8
1500 Tunisians Fighting Ix~an 1~8
- a- ~III - NE & A- 121 FOUO~
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` rva~ V~Ca tvtcau vva~ va~u.
TdESTERN ~AHAftA
Official ~lfredoUFernandez;hPRELA,~2 Jand8t~j Mo:oo:o.
~ ............o.o0 49
-b-
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I[~TI'ER-ARAB P,~'FAIRS
,
A"�~R.ICt'~ ENOOURAGES F,GYPT TO ~t DUW@i HARD ON LIBY1~ -
Paris AL V~TAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 21-27 No~v 80 pp 22,23
~ %Article: "Egypt: al-QacIlzcZhafi's Isolation Enoourages al-~.~ada~ Zb Irn~ade
Libya~~] .
/~.'ext~ President al-Sadat is krnwn tA rely on inspirata.on frcqn his genius for
~eadership and ~annand in his politicaZ calculations, on many occasi.ons disclain-
ing the advioe and apinions of his advisors and objectiv+e e]aments and ciarc~nrn
stances which might not co~respond with the spaitaneous inspiration which cle-
- scends upon him in his rural retreats.
Howevpx, this time President al-Sadat rn~y firyd that the fa,ctors and circum-
stances which surrrnuid his t~reqni.tting advers~y Px'esic3~ent al-Qac~af i encaourag.,~ -
ham to launch a lightnir~g w-~Gr agair~st Libya across the }~orders .
- E~ypti.an press circles are circulating news, ori.ginating in the narraw source ~f
advi,;~rs around t.,t~e F,gyptian president, t~o the effect that m~re than one
~rL~ n n~,~n and ~~lll~'.L'173't10T1c1.1" circunstarbce is encauraging Egypt to conduc~ _
a mi.J,itary o~peration against al-~afi's rc~ime, at thi.s time in particul.ar� -
The "Libyan fac~bo~s" enoouragirag the wrr~uct of s~ch an operation, in the calcu- _
l.ations of the consultants to the presid~.ncy, are:
The deteriorating inte.rnal situation in Libya and tY~e ir~cr~easirig op~:=QSSivex~ss w
of the tri~Ls of daily life an Libyan citizens as a resul.t of al-~adhc'~a.fi's
- ecorxm~~~ and social policy.
The breakc7r,~m - ar~d fragmentati~ of the Lib~yan ac3~ninistrative authoriti.es and the _
s~ll of corr~tion whidz causes nasal aorigestion and extez~s to the big ar~c1 the -
sm~11..
The tntal isolation of the Li.byan regime from the silent majority and its re-
1a.ance on mervenary militias and security ac~cies.
A ger~ral feeling acrong ?~ibyar~s that oil resource rc~nues az'e bPang wasted on
foreign adv~eritures which bring haxm and anmyanoe upon Libya. _
The escalati.r~g politi.r,al ~ition t~ President al-Qac~c~afi. It is rx~ secret
fihat a 3.azge number of Libyan vp~position �igures are living in Egypt, ~ncluding
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MUK UNFI(,'lAL UJ~ tIIVLY
~
same pe~aple who w~ere close t~o the Libyan p.resident in the past. They are all
exertir~g r~Gssure on Cairo t~o carry out some aperatior. agai.nst the regime.
� The p~essence of a massive Soviet arms arsenal in LiY~a, and the fact that
al-QadY~afi has built a~werful defense line along `he borders with Fgypt,
- a].ang witt, a sex~ies of ai.r, missle and radar basses -
T'he Arab f act~ors are:
The regica~al isolation of the Libyan regime. With the e~cePtion of Algeria,
I,ibya's dipl.cenatic and paliticaZ relations with nei~hborir~g ootmtries, starting
- wi.th Egypt, ending with N~omcoo anr3 passing through T~u~.i.si.a and the Sudan, are
almast frozen, or tense.
The escalating official and po~ular opposition in the Arab world to the regime of
aI-Qac~c3hafi, except in S~iri.a; ~:ch is in agreeqnent with Libya for well ~der-
st-.ood reasons. al-~adhdhafi firr3s himself scrappin~g with Irar~ arbd ~audi Arabia
in a prapaganda war, not to speak ot relations with the main currPnt in the
Palestinian resist.ar~ce? which ras a deep loathing far him.
The, great tr~nsfa~nation in the Arab public apinion of al-Qac~cIl~af i as a person
and a ruler. His vie~ws and theories meet with a soorn mi~oed with ridicule in
view of their haphazardr~ss and naivety. His nerwus actions and his gambles
have cause~d many people to have doul7ts about the health of his mental faculties.
a1.-QacThdhafi's open support far Rhaneyni's re13~m~e and ~i.s Pr~ision of moral and
, material support tA it are scarething which has hurt Arab feelings, espe~ially in
Iraq arxi the (~lf . ~
The internatioral factors are:
2'he ancreased grunblir~J on the part of European coimtries which have basic in-
- texests in west and central africa over Presi~nt al-QacIllc~a�i's pravocative
policy in th~e region, reaching the poir,t where that has oone t~o e~eed ~ere,
Soviet or Cuban zle~.nt in shaking the stabili-tY of the African regimes
a11 of which are in one way or arnther connected to w~st~rn int~rests .
Western fear that al-4~~i's activity in Africa will be a channel in which
Savie~t activities wi.ll f 1aw~ as a result of the presenoe of a Iarge nunber of
Saviet and Eastern ~irope3n advisors on Lil7yan territary.
The exister~ of mr~re than one it~em of proof on the part of Western intelligennce
~ agencies that Presic7ent al-~~i is finarrcing and ts'ainirx~ I~olitically vio-
lent Euro~ean o~ganizations, p:u~ticularly in Ireland., Ita].y and West Germany.
~ A Divez'sionary Alternative t~U DC[nest~.C Cx'ises
In addition to that, there are "Egypti.an~~ elenents which mi.ght enoourage Presi-
dent a1-Sada.t to con,~uct his adventures.
The Egyptian regime ~rants a cliversionary alternativ~e t~ the oa~lex ~mestic
~ and foreign political se'tba~c'-ks . T'he star~dard of living is growing worse as
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a result of the oonstar?t increa.Se in' prioes and food bottler~ec3cs, in spite of the
re]ative i~~rovenent in the balar~ce of trade.
The autAr~omy tallss have carie to a d~d er~d and the Pr~speritY which ~Yne re~gi.m~
pmmi.sed the people as a result of pea+ce with Israel has not vcxne about.
Then there is the growir~g politic~.l o~osit~on to the re~gim~e, which is er~oour-
aqed in its o~pposition by the failise of eoornnric policy arx3 the fail~e of
- the Camp Da~rid ~reanents to p~av~ic~e a ccmprehensive solution to ~he Mi.ddle East
crisis.
In the rec~ent per. iod, a currexrt which holds t1~at war with Libya might break
Ec~ypt's Arab isolation and that the fall of al-~2ac~c~afi as a result of Fyyntian
~ mi.litary inf.ervention might meet with a warn? reo~ptioai in the Arab w~rl.d has
gai.ned praminence in the narnaw circle Presic7e~t al-S~,dat.
The fact is that al-~Qa~fi has naw mr~ved the ball into E.gypt's goal through
his direct miLitaYy interve~tkion in Ct~ac1 in the past fEw weeks. A7~gho~'~ C~ad
is not of exceptional strategic importanc~ tA E9Y~t, PresidPnt al-Sadat cbes mt
want ~n African ooimtry c]ASe to Egypt to fall into the harx3s o� a hostile r~iit~
like that in Li.bya.
_ Thus Libya's iit,vasian of Ch~d constitutes "A lAgical e~e and ~egitim~te jus-
tification" for Egyptian i.riten~ention, eit~s' in Ch~ or in ~ya, in the wn~ds
of a jot~nalist close tr Presid~t al-Sadat. Here it is r~ecessaxy t~o refer t~o
a reoen~ stat~a~ent by Lt Gen Kaaaal Hasan 'ALi, the foreign mi.ni.ster, who said
~?Libya now occupies part of ar~d w~e are observi.r~g develr~nents there with
the ut~most attention,"
~1 g~ ~p,l,i ~ s st~tarerrt is r~ot,eworthy. He is or~e of the pillars of ,the re-
- g9m~e and reflects al-Sadat's views. He is also a tnilitaxy man who ~as previously
_ minis ~.es of defense, oommarbder ger~'al of the (arn~) toroes, chief of staff and
1~-~,d. of Nlilitaxy Intellic~ryce.
- Although al-Sadat has stressed mo~'e than oru,e that he does not have "aggressive
u~tentions" taaard Libya, he is always Warni?x1 the ma~man of Libya," as he says.
of gravo]ciixJ E9YPt and states that he wi11 p~mish him as he puni.shed him an 1977.
EvidPnce of Increasing Likelihood of a Clash
A qroup of Egyptian maves oonstitutes evic~er~oe that F~t is mt nil.ing out a
- skirmish with Li.bya. The ~gypti.an foroes alalg with the LiYyyan borders hav~ been
strerx~thened and the desert area extiendir~g frrm the sea t~o the svuth ~ has been
subj ected to a state of arnargex~cy and mi-LitaYY rule .
The Egyptian forces reoP~tly held militaxy maneuvers in which a~viati.on played a
pranir~nt part in bat~Uing "hostile~ra,dar~ andmissile systems bases." I-Ielioapt~rs
aLso held trai ni m i:n banUi~g military v~rrvoys and s~ply assistar:oe a.n tly de~-
sert. It is we].1 lax~m that heLic~ers in desert war oonditio~.s play an e~c~p~-
ti.oz~al. reoom~aissa~ce and aomb~at role.
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Egypti.an milit:~y figures say that th~e Egyptian arnzed farces are nvw much better -
than they were in the si~r of 1977 when the Egyptian-Li-byan slcirnnishes occur- _
red. The a,ir force i.s receiving modern American and Fren~~1'~ aircraft in instal-
ments and the Iand farces Yiav~e been ~nsolidated with American tanks and ant~-
tank miss:~].es. EgyptiJar? farces can g�r..rate on the west~ern front withou~ taki.r~g "
much stock of serious c]ar~ger on the eastern front. _
- Ii~wever, i,n ti~e event w~r wi.th L.ibya breaks aut, will it be a border war Limited -
tA the destruction of military bases along tY~e borders, or will the Egypti.an ~
forces invade the ha3rtland, aiminc~ directl.y at bri.nging the re~ime down? _
Here military calculations and po3itical forecasts in Cairo differ. Militazy
_ figures say that Egyptian forces are able ~o penetrate into the Liby~n heart- _
land easily, but that wrnild r~ire spe~d in pen~etration and the dispersal of
the Libyan forces on which al-Qx~c~afi basically c~epends ta protect his re- _
gime, before international or Soviet p~ressure is o~nsolidated against F~t in
order to stop its operatians befare bringing the regime d,own.
PoLitica.l prodictions revolve 3bout tw~ points. The fisst i.s the question ~
- whether the Middle East coul.d ncaw e~dure the circunstanc: