JPRS ID: 9474 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICI.aL USE ONLY JPRS L/9474 - 7 January 1981 ' Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort p FOUO No. 704 ' - Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 NOTE .7PRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also ~rom news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retair.ed. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text~ or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. ~dhere no processing indicator is given, the infor- - mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar name~ rendered phonetically or translite-rated are _ enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the _ - original but have i~een supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as _ given by source. ~ The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- c ies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. - CQDYRIGHT LAWS A~~TD REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 ~ FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY , JPRS L/9474 7 January 1981 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT FOUO No. ?04 . CONTENTS INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS More Than Money Seen As Necessary To Solve Sahel Probiems (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 26 Nov 80) 1 Details of Senegalese-Gambian Cooperation (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 iVov 8Q) 3 ANG~LA Briefs Support for Savimbi 5 BURUNDI Briefs National Sugar Office 6 CAMEROON Fourth, Fifth Development Plans Discussed (MARCHES TROPICAUX ~:T t~DITERRANEENS, various dates)......... 7 Realization o� Fourth Plan 'I'he Fifth Plan Brief s Aid for Natural Gas 14 CHAD Deteriorating Situatir~n in South (MARCHES TROPCCAUX E~ ;~1EDITIItRANEENS, 21 Nov 80)...,..~...... 15 -a- ~?:~:[-~tV~~A-120FOU0] ~'~::.i :'~~^.?,al~ 31.~s~ 4i 1~,~' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 I Briefs WFP Emergency Aid 16 EQUATORIAL GUINEA - Details of Expanding Cooperation With France Set Forth (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 Nov 80) 17 GABON ' Briefs French Protection 19 _ GUINEA-BISSAU , Coup Reportedly Aimed at Destroying PAIGC Unity (Editorial, Simon Malley; AFRIQUE-ASIF, 8 Dec 80)............ 20 IVORY COAST Heavy Competition in National Elections _ (Sennen Andrimirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 Nov 80) 22 B*:iefs Election Results Disputed 25 Municipal Electiuns Anger Manufacturers 25 MALI Briefs Dissidents' Leadership 26 SENEGAL _ Briefs Electronic Training Center 27 _ SIERRA LEONE Briefs BADEA ~,gricultural L~an 28 SOUTH AFR~CA DetaiJ.s of Railway Ex~ansion Plans Given " (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Dec 80)..........~... 29 - , -b- FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLjf APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICII~L USE ONLY INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS . MORE THAN MONEY SEEN AS NEI:ESSARY TO SOLVE SAHEL PROBLIIriS Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Nov 80 p 45 [Article by S.Bs.: "At the Meeting of the Sah~l Club Held in Kuwait, the - Experts Pul.l the Alarm~ Money Alone Is Not Enough"] [Text] Contrary to what one would think, it is not so much about money that is discussed in Kuwait on 16 and 17 November. On these 2 days the capital of the emirate hosts the fourth conference of the Sahel Club which gathers the CILSS (Inter-State Com~ittee To ~ight the Drought in the SaheJ.: Maixritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Gambia, Cape Verde, Upper F.olta, Senegal), the main West- ern and .Arab donor countries, and the African and international. development - agencies. The Mali president Moussa Traore made a special trip to give the opening address. . Awareness - Qf course, even before the discussions, the representatives of the S8he1 countries and the Club leaders did not hide the fact that they hop~d to see a"gesture" from tt~eir rich in~erlocutors. Bnt that was not the es- _ sential thing. For if none of the countries of the region has ~ruly , "taken off" for the moment it was not because of m~oaey shortage: from 1975 to 1979 the 8 CILSS couatries received nearly $7 billion wort~ ~f firm commitment for financing purposes on the part of the ba~.lers, of which some 4 billion have actually been transferred over by the end of 1979, in the ~ost part in the form of outright grants. Per capita, that is by far the most important amount of aid in Africa and one of the most important in the Third World since each Sahelian receives in theory $38 per year from abroad. Then why do we have stagnation, food deficits, and increasingly frequent calls for help coming from the political leaders? It was the actuai causes of the stagnation that the Sahelian and international e~tperts undertook to explain to the Rural Development ministers present in Kuwait. They have told them in effect, even if through allusions, that most of the - impediments to devel~pment are of a political nature and that the clearing of these obatacles can be made only through governmental choices. Much 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY mentioned, for instance, is the development strategy drawn up at the Ottawa meet:ing in 1977 which it is incumbent to improve upon in response to the evolution of the situation in the last 4 years. According to - _ the Club leaders, the "politicians" must be forced to envision longterm _ actions instead of quarantining themselves as they do at present in the short term. From now to the year 2000 the food demands of the Sahel will almost triple and especially will change in nature. But whereas the experts suggest profound structural reforms in order to prevent the degradation of the situation the states have the tendency to consider the CILSS as an agen~y for fund-raising meant to take care of the most hard pressed issues. Ir. drawin~ the balance of the aid which the conference partici- pants have ~nade, they have noticed that at the present time the financing has been directed to the tune of 25 percent towards the infrastructures, as against 4 percent towards the rain cultures and 1 percent only towards reforestation. "If this con~inues," one of the participants comments, "one of these days people will see highways crisscrossing deserted lands." That is why many of them have stressed the necessity of changing the present order of priorities. _ Which Decisions? The 5ahe1 Club has thus contributed to better define the responsibilities of the states without for that matter ceasing to encourage the rich coun- _ tries to be even mor.e generous. A certain slowdown in the Western aid which constitutes 78 percent of the total aid has in fact been noticed. The Arabs provide anothe~ 18 gercent but three-fourth of their grants - go to Mauritania. The ministers have left Kuwait with voluminous studies of their regions in the-lr suitcases. Will these studies ?i~lp them to take some painful _ de.cisions? Or will they paraphrase Louis XV and say: "After me... the d.esert"? In the meantime, the desert is gaining rapidly. COPYRIGHT: .Teune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 - 1;51 CSO: 4400 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR GFFICIAL USE ONLY : INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS DETAILS OF SENEGALESE-GAMBIAN COOPERATION ~ Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3089 ~ [Article: "The Point of Cooperation Between Senegal and Gambia"] , (Text] At the beginning of November, the Senegalese-Gambian interstate ministerial committee has held its 15th session in Banjul, the Gambian capital. The i.wo delegations expressed their satisfaction at the diver- , sificati~n and strengthening of their bilateral cooperation and reaffirmed their desire to develop it Purther. - Witn respect to the postal service and the telecommunications, the. minis- : terial committee noted with pleasure the positive turn taken by the - - projected agreement on the direct exchange of postal money-orders, and the recommendaticns aimed at improving telephone communications between ~ the two countries, Both parties agreed to have the bilateral cooperation ; agreements concerning civil aviation and meteorology signed within a reasonable period of time. As for ~lanning, both parties have committed themselves to coordinate and : - harmonize their plans to the largest possible extent. With respect to communications, the two parties have noted the favorable developmeni ~f the Dakar-Banjul-Bissau road construction project, the - technical study of which was started last June. With respect to borders, the committee noted that the demarcation of the _ border in the Kantora area will start in the near future, and it gave = instructions concerning the deli.mitation of the Baria border. As far as _ fishing cooperation is concerned, it has asked its executive secretary to take as soon as possible all the measures required to finalize the draft _ agreement. The two delegations have also examined the matter of cultur?1 - cooperation and have noted with pleasure that the cultural programs which _ had been agreed on by the two parties had been completed on schedule L;~ the _ departments involved. Concerning primary and secondary education, the cot~ittee congratulated itself on the progress of the Senegalese school_ extension projects and _ 3 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 on the conscruction of the Banjul secondary school. Concerning higher _ education, it was decided to facilitate the admission af Gambian students at the Dakar Uni�-ersity. The committee has also noted with pleasure the progress of the cooperation in the fields of information and radio-broadcasting. - As far as health is concerned, the co~ittee has aqreed to harmonize its efforts against serious endemic diseases and social ills such as the lack of control on sales of drugs, alcoholism, "Xessal" and excessive smoking. In the field of tourism, the committee has advised its executive secretary to take the necessary steps to prepare a bilingual Senegalese-Gambian guide as soon as possible. Finally, the committee has adopted the budget prepared by its permanent secretariat for the fiscal year 1980-1981; it has aiso decided to hold an extraordinary session in 1981 to deal with administrative and financial - matters. - COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1980 9299 - = CS0:4400 - 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ANGOLA BItIEFS SUPPORT FOR S~VIMBI--European diplomats foresee important support for Jonas Savimbi, _ leader of UNITA, following Ronald Reagan's installation in the White House. They add tha~ the Soviet Union would not fail to react in Zaire by supporting destabili- _ zation operations. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFLLIQUE in French 10 Dec 80 p Si] t CSO: 4400 ~ , 5 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY BURUND I BRIEFS ~~A'fIONAL SUGAR OFFICE--A presidential decree, dated 16 September 1980 created a National Sugar Office (ONASU) in Burundi; it is a public institution of an agricul- tural, industrial and commercial nature endowed with legal status and organic and financial autonomy. The Office's mission is defined in l~rt 2 of the above-mentioned decree, which states that "the purpose of the Office is to create and administer sugar cane plantations. For that purpose it may participate in creating sugar com- paiiies; it will carry out all the development work, including putting in place the economic and social infrastructures necessitated by the existence of a concentration of persons attracted by the Office's activities. It will take all appropriate mea- s~~res to improve promotion of the industrial production of sugar." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET h~DITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2687] 8946 CSO: 4400 6 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CAMEROON _ FOURTH, FIFTH DEVELOPMENT PLANS DISCUSSF.D Realization of. Fourth Plan Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 pp 2680-2681 [Text] The report on the first 3 years of the Fourth,Cameroonian Plan, which was prepared by the ~conomy and Planning Ministry and published at the end of the first half of 1980, is concerned with the period of July 1976 to June 1979. One is struck by its tone of truthfulness: roughly, realization of the Fourth Plan has been falling beh~od since the very beginning, and there is no hope o� catching up. Dwindling Agriculture = Cameroon's principal export products (chiefly cocoa and coffee) are declining be- cause the plantations are aging and renovation is taking Flace too slowly. More- over, the cperations upon which the country depends to diversify its production and limit certain imports are costing the taxpayer dearly and are not yielding the hoped-for results. Wheat (SODEBLE [Wheat Development Company] in Ngaoundere) yielded a mere 104 tons in 1978-1979 out of several thousand hectares planted, com- pared to 800 tons the year before. Cameroonian rice costs twice as much as i~- ported rice, and is poorly marketed. Three costly studies in succession on the subject of the rice fields in the Mbandjock region have prodv~~d no results. ' Nevertheless there are some successes in oil palms and hevea. But there is no - lack of difficu~ties: village plantations of oil palm trees are unsuccessful be- cause they are not being maintained. The rotation rate among SOCAPALM [expansion unknown] workers is high (although this is not mentioned in the report); they are dissa~isfied with their living conditions and the possibilities for promotion in the company--�which, by the way, is saekircg to remedy these problems, even though - they are not strictly company problems. Cotton is becoming more and more an in- dustrial and intensive crop and less and less a peasant crop. Production increased from 49,000 tons in 1975-1976 to 59,000 tons in 1978-1979. _ In the animal industries, a delay in the construction of modern slaughterhouses at Uouala and Yaounde is observed (the firm responsible for building them went bank- rupt). Some limited progress may be seen in livestock raising: diseases have been eliminated (rinderpest) or reduced (bovine contagious pleuro-pnewnonia and tset-se). 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 Artificial ponds have been built (43 of the 300 provided for) in the north. But _ many prospects are still in the planning stage: milk, pharmaceutical products, pcultry farmizg at Yaounde. On the other hand, the Mbandjock Fattening Mission is i~ place. Industrial fishi;~g is making no progress; it is satisfying only 70 percent of the domestic demand, in contrast to 85 percent at the beginning of the Third Plan. - The forest e.xploitation capacitiy has been increased, thanks chiefly to the Deng-Deng forest clurr.p, but reforestation operations are inadequate: 1,300 hectaxes per year. In tlie integrated develo~ment projects, such as the Ombessa operation (in the Bafia region) or the SOD�NKAM [Nkam Development Company] (Yabassi-Bafang) , the number of ~armers affected is diminishing or increasing only very slowly: "The enthusiasm aroused in rural young people by the Yabassi-Bafang operation seems to be dilmning little by little." These projects continue to be expensiv~ for the community, and produce disappointing results. On the other hand, the CDC (Cameroon Development Corporation) has a different, more clearly capitalistic style, and it is to double ~ its acreage in ten years, to reach 60,000 hectares of diverse plantations. Support for rural mechanization is not yet out of the experimental stage, for lack of financing. The result of this slow progress is that agricultural production has declined as part of t}ie PIB [gross domestic product] (32 percent, or 300,700,000,000 CFA francs in 1977-1978, as against 34 percent, or 223,400,000,000 in 1975-1976, this increase - in absolute value beirig due to the fact that prices held up well for s~metimes lesser quantities). Cameroon is experiencing the same difficulty as many developing countries in knowing what to do to rPally advance agriculture, because workers on the land are urged to become familiar with new crops, with new techniques, and th.�ir traditions do not ~ lead them in those directions. On the other hand, the governmental organisms are ~ ~oo cumbersome and have a spirit that is much more bureaucratic than business-like. In the face of such slow progress industry, especially service and administration, are making much better progress. Wise Industrial Progress and the Oil BQOm In 3 years 50 percent of the investments provided for for industries, mines and ~ energy have been realized, or 181,000,000,000 CFA francs. The level is pretty good for industries and mi~~les (60 per~ent); less good for the Pl~s [small and medium- sized businesses] and handcrafts, which are not very greedy (53 percent); and even less good for energy (44. S percent) . What industries are erierging? The lumber industry with three firms, Ecam-placages, SINTRABOIS [expansioii unknownJ and SOFIBEI, [expansion unknown] ; the shoe and leather industries with the C~uneroon Tanning and Leatherware Company in Ngaoundere; build- ing materials with the completion of CERICAM [expansion unknown] (ceramics, etc.) u at Bonaberi, and the CI1~N~AM [Cameroon Cement Plant] extensions at Bonaberi and Figuil. It is notewort}:y that cement consumption tripled between 1971 and 1978, and that the obstacle in the way of importing foreign cement is its high cost in CFA francs. Another significant increase in progress is ALUCAM's [Cameroon Alwninum]. - 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FGR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ln textiles, a newcomer in the CICAM [expansion unknown] is SOLICAhI [expansion un~ knownJ (household linens), at a cost of 2,700,000,000. In chemistry, a huge de- ~ velopment, CELLUCAM [Cameroon Cellulose] for paper pulp, and the extension of SOCAVER [expansion unknown] (glass factory). After an interruption of several years, the SOCAME [expansion unknown] fertilizer plant is resuming production in 1980. 5everal projects that would have given Cameruon a certain autonomy never saw the ~ light of day: in particular, the electrified steel mill and cast-iron foundry at Douala. But it is likely that in this field the future improvements at Kribi (a port, an iron mine, gas) will overturn the data. I?i energy there is the building of the Song-Loulou Dam on the Sanaga, which is in progress, and the slower though less important building of the Lagdo Dam on the - ~enoue (by technicians from the People's Republic of China). Little has been done toward transporting eRergy. However, 70 urban centers are now being supplied by _ SONEL [National Electricity Company] . The electricity �airy is nearly eclipsed by black gold: oil production was 295,942 tons ir? 1977-1978 and 960,549 tons in 1978-1979; it could go to 2,800,000 tons in 1980-1981. The first 3 years of the Fourth Plan saw the startup of work on the _ Cape Limboh refin~ery (beyond Victoria), which will begin operating in February 1981. - Mining is still in the exploration and survey stage (except for oil prospecting, which is swallowing up significant sums) . A Heavy Tertiary to Move, but it is Moving Tiie actions undertaken to diversify Cameroon's partners, to make zt less dependent on the EEC, iiave not yet produced results. In this area they count on the role of - the National Foreign Trade Center, which was created in February 1978. Exchange is still very much in deficit: 191,000,000,000 CFA francs in goods exports in 1977- 1973 (over 51,600,000,000 in services), as against 272,800,000,000 in imports. Re~ults for domestic exchange are also very timid, at least as regards actions under- taken by the state. The Grain Office, created especially for the north, controls ~ just 1 percent of production in that area and is therefore not powerful enough to prevent speculation and stock ruptures. As for MIDEVIV [expansion unknown] (which supplies cities with food products], it has made progress in Yaounde, but in the area of ineans of transport and rapidity of intervention, it lacks the flexibility ~ of its competitors. - In commercial equipment Yaounde and Douala are being endowed with new markets (see MARC}1ES TROPICAUX ~T N~llITERRRNEENS for 11 July 1980) . The most noteworthy novel- ties are: the acquisition of new units by Camshiplines; rejuvenation of Regifercam equipmen~t; Cameroon Airlines' order for a Boeing 747 heavy transport aircraft (de- - livery in March 1981); a certain slowness in expanding thP .fleet of SOTUC [expan- sion unknown] cars, because of funding difficulti~s, but tll,~total number of units is to increase from 89 to 210 units for pouala and Yaoundt, Fortunately, at the same time announcement is made--but this is a. sign of a delay--of repair work to be done on the streets of those two cities. The hotel program went forward when the Douala Novotel went into service, but the touri.st projects are experiencing "a long delay in execution." 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 It is perhaps in the area of infrastructures that the most important changes took place in ttiis peri.od: enlarging the Douala port, Douala and Garoua international airports (the latt~~r in progress), realignment of the Douala=Yaounde railroad and - modernization of tlie Regifercam installations, new sections of the Transafrican - Road at the Bamenda-Bafoussam-Foumban level and later at Tibati-Meidougou; repair and repaving roads in the north, new bridges, new telephone exchanges. But these last accomplishments cannot hide how much need there is for ~ heavy axis between Douala and Yaounde, how badly the telephone and telex function in the country's two principal cities--and this has gone on for years. - Aii Abandoned Social Sector T he Fourth Plan's realization rates are among the slowest in the social sector, where the needs can only increase. 'fhis is true for education: the report says "the situation continues to deteriorate...Pupil/teacher rat_os nave gone from 49 in 1971 to 52 in 1978," whereas the objective of the Third Plan was "to attain the optimum of 45 pupils per teacher and per class." This erosion is continuing at the end of the Fourth Plan, witli the freezing of funds for priuate schools, a free2e that is _ forcing them to recruit more pupils per class in order to meet increased salary loads. i This is ti~e realization rate for the Plan in three years, at dirferent levels: - nursery-school education, 38.6 percent of the investment provided for; primary, 12.4 percent; general secondary, 15.3 percent; technical secondary, 28 percent; higher education, 23.5 percent; teachers' colleges, 9.4 percen.t; rural handcraft and _ domestic science sections, 9 percent. The realization rate is higher for civil service, the CUSS (University Center for - E~ealth Sciences) and the training of young farmers in the north. - - Other realization rates: Youth and sport, 16 percent (chiefly stadiums); health, - 27.4 percent. The report comments: this rate "makes us very pessimistic about realization, even at just 50 percent, of everything included in the Plan for this subsector." Prevention of contagious diseases was barely engaged in (1 percent realized). "I'he delays are explained by the lack "of resources for financing these projects, 3ltd, on the other hand, bad management of the resources already av ailable." . 5ociai Affairs: 2.5 percent realization! "The investment situation /i.s turning out to be alarrnitig/ [in italicsJ and there is no reason to believe that the projects will be started up in the near future," the report says. ~s for urbanism, ttie state and the communities have conducted several renewal and improvernent actions, the most spectacular of which is the Yaounde trade center; as well as actions to re}iabilitate and "curette" overpopulated neighborhoods. New urban centers are receiving water and electricity. Industrial zones are being de- veloped in Douala (Bonaberi and Bassa), Yaounde and elsewhere. The SIC (Cameroon _ Real Estate Company) is building housing (1,536), but /it is chiefly individuals who are investing/ [in boldface]; the gross fixed capital formation (FBCF) per household - in the housing "represents 40 percent of the total FBCF in 1976-1977." Information and culture: 8 percent realization. An enormous amount remains to be done in the field of radio broadcasting, television, museums, art in~titute, etc. - ~ - 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY On the other hand, the realization rate for administrative equipment is 47 percent, _ and undoubtedly higher, for just five ministerial departments answered that part of the inquiry. _ With regard to research, it is nearly paralyzed, because "ONAREST [National Office of Scientific and Technical Research] has an organization that is not always function- - al, and its staff is not favorable to research activity; it lacks the means to sup- ' port potential research programs." The report expresses the hope that a general plan for computerizing the Cameroonian administration will be established. _ - What Growth is There in Cameroon? In conclusion, the report studies the origin of the financing of the investments al- = ready realized, and then speculates about growth in Cameroon. It has been placed in financial difficulties by an unfavorable business cycle, marked by slow growth in the Western countries and a slowdown in demand there, by a decline in the demand in _ the oil-producing countries and by difficulties in the developing countries (drought = ~ in the Sahel, etc.). Nevertheless, Camexoon had a real growth rate of 8 percent in ` constant terms, which coincides with the estimates of the Plan (7.1 percent). In the PI~, which increased to 939,800,000,000 CFA francs, each sector is situated as fol- lows: primary, 32 percent; secondary, 16 percent; tertiary, 37 percent; administra- tion, 8 percent; miscellaneous, 7 percent. Imports represent 22 percent of the overall supply, and their structure has evolved only slightly. Supply does not completely satisfy deman~, hence the inflationistic tendencies. However, the st ate h.as done everything to minimize those tensions, al- thuugh its effort has produced no rzsults on the production level; after the first year, when credit was supported, it became more hemmed in, and a deceleration in the growth of the monetary mass was seen. At the same time, the state's expenditures stagnated in 1977-1978. The report puts forward the following recommendations: it is desirable that expendi- tures to create and support agricultural training structures be limited, and that the management of these structures be improved. There should also be more consis- tency in the actions undertaken; along the same line, the lifespan of the existing iiifrastructures could be prolonged by maintaining them. '1'he report, therefore, has the merit of being frank and objective. It leaves room for skepticism on the effectiveness of the planning and the quality of the predic- tions. The state's role appears to be necessary and indispensable as concerns in- frastructures for communication in particular, but although Cameroon is producing and being built, this is in large part due to the initiative of business firms and individuals. The Fifth Plan Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 7 Nov 80 p 2968 [TextJ The Cameroonian Government is known to be preparing the Fifth Development _ Plan for Carneroon. It has not yet undertaken to draw up the docwnent, but those in charge of the preparation have just arrived at the preparatory phase of the proced- ure. A diagnostic report of the 1960-1980 period has been drawn up and has given - 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 rise to a report established by the planning office of the Economy and Planning Ministry. A series o� meetings whose purpose was the release of prospects for de- velopment as far a?i~ead as the year 2p00 were held in the last few weeks and resulted in the writing of a syn:.hesizing report. 'I'he minister of Economy and Planning asked the French consulting engineers company, Norbert Berard, for a study, supported by a mathematical model, on the hypotheses for Cameroon's development over the next 20 years. Its results were submitted at the end of the first quarter of 1980, in the fozm of sheaves of computer listings ~ which are not easily extrapolated by the uninitiated. The local authorities there- fore asked the Norbext Berard office to send specialists to decipher these computer documents and translate them into economic language suitable for use in preparing a development plan. Several meetings on that subject have been held since early October. At the present time the objectives of the Fifth Plan have not yet been released, it - seems, nor, a11 the more reason, quantified. The next stage of the drawing-up pro- - cess will c~nsist of setting up ~reparatory documents for the use of the provincial J authorities, who will have to make credible objectives appear within a geographic framework. Then, in Yaounde, the work of synthesizing will be undertaken, to trans- pose and regroup the documents into a sectoral framework. At that stage consistency of data will be sought, to end up with a permanent draft document. The key ideas which in the words of the president of the Republic are to ,uide the preparation of the Fifth Plan are as follows: ~ffective realization of food self-sufficiency. Making dynamic once more the production structures in the sectors of agricul- ture, forests, livestock raising and fishing. Intensification of exploration and exploitation of natural resources--mining _ and energy. Reorienting the country's industrialization by means of a policy of revalorizing raw materials of local origin. A number of �avorable conditions will have to be produced to enable these objectives to be easily realized. They are, notably: improvement of the rural standard of living to slow down the rural exodus; better deployment of the transportation and distribution infrastructures and activities; judicious recycling into the local eco- nomy of the national savings and foreign contributions. T}ie following schedule has been set up for the various phases of the preparation: Meeting of provincial commissions for the first half of January 1981. Meeting of national commissions working within a sectoral framework, from 15 January to the end of February 1981. Meeting of multidiscipline study groups in charge of the overall consistency of tlie draft plan, for March and April 1981. 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (The above indications arrived in our offices when the special part of this issue that is devoted to Cameroon had already been printed. We were therefore unable to give this information in the study itself. - On the other hand, we remind the reader that last week--MARCHES TROPICAUX ET N~DI- TERRANEENS of 31 October, page 268G--we published a very complete article on the - realization of the Fourth P13n.) - _ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980. 8946 CSO: 4400 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 _ CAI~ROOi1 BRIEFS AID FOR NATURAL GAS--A technical assistance contract for developing natural gas in Cameroon was signed on 29 October in Yaounde between the CFP/Total-Mobil partnership and the Cameroonian study company SEG~++ZCAM [expansion unknown], which was created = last 9 July by agreement between the government and four oil companies (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET NI~DITERRAN~ENS, 18 July, page 1802). The CFP/Total-Mobil partnership, which is providing technical assistance for SEGAZCAM, is to comp~ete by 1982 at the latest the studies relative to construction of a gas liquefaction plant at Kribi (150 km south of the port of Douala, on the Atlantic). SEGAZCAM's partners-- CFP/Total, Elf Aquitaine, Mobil Exploration Equatorial Africa Inc., Pecten Cameroon - LNG [liqu~fied natural gas] Ltd (Shell) and the Cameroonian National Hydrocarbons Company, are participating equally in financing the studies, which are evaluated at 7,000,000,~00 CFA francs. We recall that significant deposits of natural gas have been found in Cameroon, north of Douala in the offshore oil production zone, as well - as off Kribi. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Nov 1980 p 2968] 8946 CSO: 4400 - 14 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFT.CIAL USE ONLY ~ ' CHAI7 - DETERIORATING SITUATION IN SOUTH Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in F~ench 21 Nov 80 p 3104 (Article: "The Situation in the South Reported To Be Deteriorating"] [Text] An AFP wire dated 12 November states that, according to refugees from Southern Chad who recently arrived in Yaounde, the people of Southern Chad lack food, civil servants have not been paid on time for months, and many cadres are leaving the country. These refugees, cadres fram the southern part of the country, report that the inhabitants are destitute, that famine is threatening because the cereal _ shortage this year is near 85,000 tons, and that the Chad Armed Forces of Col Abdelkader Kamoughe "ransom people in the villages and in the ~cities." These refugees from the south mention that the region they come from is not in the combat zone, and that 90,000 tons of cotton have been harvested; but they wonder where the money has gone. Finally, in its last issue to reach Yaounde, the newspaper LE BOUCLIER of Moundou writes th~t "financial and political officials are blithely spending - money. Yet, a mini-budget of 5 billion CE'A francs had been adopted to ensure - the proper operation of the south, independently from Ndjamena, until peace is restored." . According to the newspaper, the cadres are fleeing to the neighboring coun- - - tries: "The intellectuals are panicking, they are running away from Calvary." - Criticizing the head of the Chad Armed Forces without naming him, LE BOUCLIER is of the opinion that "in the south, the power is becom.ing more military and this point of view is unable to overcome certain social and political obstacles." COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1980 9294 CS0:4400 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 CHAD - BRIEFS WFP EMERGENCY AID--Food assistance amounting to 157,000 dollars has been sent by the World Food Program to the Central African Republic where it will be distributed to Ch~dian refugees, a FAO press release stated. This aid (330 tons of corn flour, 33 tons of powder milk and.22 tons of vegetal oil) will help feed 6,100 refugees during 6 months. [Text] - [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3104] 92 94 CSO: 4400 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY EQUATORIAL ~UINEA - DETAILS OF EXPANDING COOPERATION kITH FRANCE SET FORTH Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 pp 3102-3103 [Article: "Strengthening of Cooperation With France") [Text] On his official working visit to France (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS dated 14 November 1980, p 3039), President Teodoro Obiang Nguema t~asogo called "fruitful" the private conversation he had on 14 November with President Valery Giscard d'Estaing at the Elysees Palace. He added that he was "very pleased with" the answers o� the French Govern- ment concerning bilateral cooperation projects. A joint communique, published on 15 November after a meeting between the two heads of state, mentioned the "great cordiali~y" of their conversations - on bilateral cooperation and economic relations. France has decided to provide iinancing for a hydroelectric power plant in F.quatorial Guinea. In addition, it will help in the national reconstruc- ~ tion undertaken by Equatorial Guinea following the coup of August 1979 against dictator Macias Nguema. - According to the joint communique, the two heads of s~ate also affirmed = - "their reliance on dialogue and negotiation to settle disputes and _ differences between states, and have recognized that it is important to establish a more just international economic order." Finally, they hope - that the three-way European-Arab-African dialogue will progressively become a part of international reality. During his visit, PrFSident Obiang repeatedly expressed the wish that ~ France would play an active part i.n the development of Africa so as to bring the latter out of the state of "instability" which is plaguing it today . An economic, technical and cultural cooperation agreement was signed on 29 November 1979 by the two countries; it provides Equatorial Guinea with subsiciies from the Aid and Cooperation ~nd (FAC), amounting to 11 million French francs. This aid is to pramote the development of traditional ' _ fisheries, mining prospection and the repairinq of the Malabo port. 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 - Several Frer.ch expert missions will soon be sent to Equatorial Guinea. A projected cooperation in the field of oil production is also under study, In this connection, one is reminded of. the state of "economic collapse" in which this country found itself when Macias N'Guema was overthrown: cocoa production was 10 times less than in 1968, the year of the independence (4,000 tons against 40,000), and gaboon lumber production, too, had collapsed during the same period (50,000 tons against 300,000 tons). - The revival of these productions, che modernization of the economic infra- structure and the return of exiled cadres have been as many priorities for the Malabo authorities. ' Answering questions concerning specific branches of the economy, upon leaving the Elysees Palace, the head of the Equatorial Guinean state men- _ tioned the prospects for cooperation in the field of oil production, while underlining that the agreements signed with France still had to be applied. On 15 November, he was to meet in Paris with the president of Elf-Aquitaine and, the next day, to visit the Orleans laboratories of the Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration (BRGM). During the p~.st few months, _ this organization has undertaken an inventory of Equatorial Guinea's under- ground in order to identify the mineral resources of the country, to con- _ tribute to the training of local personnel and to provide French technical assistance in the field of mineral prospection. During a press conference held on 17 October in Paris, the head of the Equatorial Guinea called "ex^ellent" the results of his official four-day - working visit to France. "Before coming to Paris, we had some doubts because there had been some delay in the application of the cooperation agreements signed in November 1979," he underlined, "but our concern was soon dissipated." - After denying that, in its cooperation with Equatorial GUinea, France was - taking the place af Spain with whom, he said, "we have language and cultural ti~s," President Obiang stated that his country would accept cooperation ` in ti~e field of oil production from all other countries. - "We have signed prospection agreements with France and Spain, and we have _ received offers from the United States. As for the exploitation, we shall not sign any agreement until the Equatorial Guinean law on oil production has been prepared; this law is now under study in France and in Spain, and _ EEC experts are also working on it." The head of the Equatorial Guinean state, who stayed one more day in France on private business, left Paris on 18 November for Cologne. _ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1980 . 18 - 9294 - CS0:4400 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GABON BRIEFS FRF,NCH PROTECTION--According to U.S. diplomatic reports, the stationing of four French Jaguar airplanes in Libreville is not only due to events in Chad. These supersonic attack planes, each equipped with two cannons, bombs and rockets were reportedly dispatched to Libreville at the personal request of President Bongo. Indeed, the Libreville dictator, whose regime maintains itself in power.only thanks to the French military presence, fears a military coup d'etat or a serious popular revolt which could result in his downfall, Does Bongo actually believe that the Jaguar planes could protect him from his oppressed and over-exploited people's wrath? [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 8-21 Dec 80 p 47] CSO: 4400 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - GUINEA-BISSAU COUP R~PORTEDLY AIMED AT DESTROYING PAIGC UNITY Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 8 Dec 80 pp 18-19 [Editorial by Simon Malley: "Amilcar Cabral's Second Death?"] [Excerpts] Who was actually supposed to be done away with in Bissau on 14 November? = Luis Cabral, the president, or Amilcar Cabral, the founder of the PAIGC, assassi- nated in 1973? This is the question asked this week by the Mozamb ican magazine TEMPO about the serious events which shook Guinea-Bissau and whose repercussions reach well beyond the borders of this young republic numbering less than a million ~ inhabitants. How can one remain indifferent to the events in Bissau? Is it possible that the illegal and arbitrary overthrow of a government established by one of the best- - structured political parties on the African continent can only be a"banal" episode in Africa, as the most simplistic Western commentators like to repeat? If the pronouncements attsmpting to "legitimize" Luis Cabral's overthrow by his prime minister with automatic weapons and tanks did not emanate from statesmen who, in the past, gave us repeated proof of their patriotism and their dogged struggle against colonialism and its puppets, they would be reminiscent of the aberrant proclamations of the imperialist and colonialist governments of Paris, London, _ Lisbon dnd Washington. Regardless of the mistakes and the faults which could be imputed to Luis Cabral, the PAIGC was sufficiently mature and offered enough instances allowing for - criticism and even dismissal not to have recourse to the brutal use of guns. Had he not been appointed in the same manner as his own prime minister, Joao Bernardo Vieira, "Commandant Nino"? Don't both have the right and the obligation to accept the collegial decisions of the competent organs of the party, whose principal leaders they are? This is why the coup perpetrated against the chief of state of Guinea-Bissau is inadmissible and intolerable to African public opinion, especially that of the democratic and progressive forces of our continent. If doubts are appearing everywhere on the motivations, the schemes and the real reasons of the 14 November coup, this is because, f irst of all, the fundamental principles, the doctrine, the concepts and ~ the views which presided over the creation of the PAIGC and also throughout its - existence were coldly ignored, disregarded, violated. It is also because a number of troubling facts cropping up right now create serious suspicion involving the - elements who seem to have played a decisive role in th~ organization and implementa- tion of the coup d'etat. _ 20 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 L Vl\ VL'1' l~llLL~ V VL Vl\LL I have known the principal leaders of the PAIGC for a long time, and especially Amilcar Cabral, Aristides Pereira, "Commandant Nino," Luis Cabral and many others. I have admired some, appreciated the loyalty and discipline of others, as well as the courage, abnegation and the sacrifices of the frontline fighters. But I also have had occasion to meet--especially after independence--a number of elements whose ties with Western business circles, notably Portuguese, were notorious. Elements who were in regular contact with corrupt and shady intermediaries, who were spending week-ends iz the Canary Islands as guests of an agent of Lebanese origin who owns a huge t~~use where everything was at the disposal of his eminent visitors. Among those were certain influential members of the Cabral government whose implication in the organization, financing and carrying out of the 14 Navember putsch is well known and unambiguous. Who is not aware that one of the most _ influential members of the Council of the Revolution chaired by Joao Bernardo Vieira never arrived at a dinner in Bissau without being accompanied by a secre- _ tary carrying a case of champagne? Who does not know that a certain person main- tained close ties with an important fascist industrialist in northern Portugal and that he played a nefarious role in many international fi.nancial organizations in order to discredit President Pereira's government and his "ambitious and impossible" prog,rams? Who has not met that evil spirit of the new Council of the Revolution who received hundreds of thousands of dollars from two important U.S, oil companies in order to obstruct his country's plans for off-shore prospecting? Who is unaware of the false reports established by agents who have infiltrated Vieira's entourage thanks to the complicity of certain foreign powers, both European and African, repor.ts which have been trumped up in the sole aim of provoking and exacerbating _ suspicion and mistrust between the chief of state and his prime minister? More examples? More illustrations? They are legion. Personally, I do not believe that "Nino," one of the legendary heroes of the war of national liberation, is a corrupt leader or the agent of a given power. Equally, I do not think he could be in league with those who would hawk Guinea-Bissau's vital interests to any other country, near or far. His prestige within the PAIGC armed forces is too great to let him consciously sacrifice it on the altar of narrowly self ish interests or that of colonialist and imperialist powers. - But ttiose who are attempting to sidetrack him from the trail blazed by the father of the nation, to destroy one of the most beautiful inheritances on the African continent, these hereditary enemies of African dignity, these very elements are - constituting a force around Joao Bernardo Vieira--who could well become their next victim--which is doggedly trying to create a chasm between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau by reviving old demons used by the Portuguese in order to destroy all prospects of solidarity, cohesion and unity between the two parts of one body. - Despite the seriousness of the events which have just taken place in Bissau, we - refuse to believe that the true patriots and militants of the PAIGC, notably in Bissau, will allow that this crime be consummated. They should know that if the 14th of November figures as an important date in history, it will be only as a _ step, as a first phase of a vastly more sinister plan: the elimination of the PAIGC revolutionaries, including "Commandant Nino," to permit the installation, in Amilcar Cabral's capital, of a regime obeying the orders of the agents of international capitalism, both European and American. COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie CSO: 4400 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR QFFICIAL l1SE ONLY - IVORY COAST HEAVY COMPETITION IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS - Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Nov 80 pp 4, 42 I~?rticle by Sennen Andrimirado] [Text] Dimbokro, right in the center, about 300 kilometers to the north of Abidjan. In thia city. an the border between the forest aad the sav~anna, the battle for the legi8lative elections (on 9 and 23 November 1980) will not have opposed the ins and ouCs. The contest for the single deputy's seat in~olved three retiring deputies and only one new pretender. The second round ~ras to have been decid~ed between two retiring deputies: Rone Samba Ambroise (3,433 votea in the first round), a historical figure in th~ city~ and his youager colleague Amon Leon (3,3L.2 votes)~ The third retiring deputy. Pierre . Chicaya, ~it the dust as of 9 November with...88 votes. Aa for the outsider. - Dr Kouame Kangr~., he ecarcely expected to be elected: "I ~anted to play the part of a balance wheel," he told us, "to avoid the division of Dimbokro into two ca~pa." - _ ThiB neurosurgeon proclaimed to whoever was willing to listen: "The intellectual is deapicable. There are some franed in alumin~ and others in wood." Aluminum shinea but it warpa. Rere in DimbokYO the electorate has been warped taaard the - past. Entrenched Leadership Crushed by greenery, in the heart of the "riag of cacao aad ~~offee," built on the _ banks of the Bandama, Tiassale takes ita name from Tchassa, a aecret rock, the pro- tective genius of the city which is worshiped every qear. A foruer alave market, _ Tiaseale has the peculiarity of being coetiopolitan. Nine new people faced each other araund a aingle vacancy. In the firat turn. the ethnic dispersion profited the candidate who eeened to be the most neutral: Daniele Boni, W1io had S00 votes more than the aecond. "I did not think that it would be so rough or eo law," she confided to ue. She was re- proached for having a white mother aad, furthermore, a White husband. Certain of her adversaries even spread the rnmor that if ehe was elected Daaiele Boni ~rould leave "for her home in F~ance." But there ia more yet. If she is not an "old timer," Daniele Boni has the disad- vantage of beia~g the daughter of the President of the Supreme Court and the niece _ , - 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 rvn vrr~~ i:~i. ~ .~c. .r..?..~ of. the secretary general of the party subsection at Tiasaale. Aka Yao, her un- luckiest opponent, in the firet round (236 votes), a school director, his body naked and a loin cloth over his kidneys, told us: "The Bonis want to keep the - leadership in Tiassale. That is intolerable." The candidate�e reply: "I am _ neither m}? father nor my uncle." The cases of Dimbokro and Tiassale, although absurd and exceptional, will not have deflected the new wind that is blowing over Ivory Coast (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1037). Still a fe~r days before the second vote, a minister--not a candidate--was [elling us: "The change is irreversible. For 20 yeara, political life wae sad, congealed. This time the young people have dared to ~ump into the arena and they are overturning a game Which seemed to be won for- ever. The voters understood that and ase supportiag them." This analysis is shared by a peraon close to Philippe Yace, outgoing president of the National - Assembly (for 20 years) and he adds: "Why do yau want the electorate to change ita orientation for the aecond round?" The first round has slready demonstrated Chat change was possible and that the fortressea were not impregnable. The image of a Philippe Yace~ even reelected, hae been tarnished by the fact that he had a competitor in his fief at Jacqueville. "Direct Contact" It begina ~o be known what change th~ new deputies can bring. A Iienri Konan - Bedie--who has become a young man again for having been eclipsed for three year~-- or an Em~nanuel Diaulo, both of them elected as of the first reund and who paes a~ the atandard-bearera of the new wave, are workaholics. They begin to st~udy t~eir - f.ilea or to write at 4 0' clock in the morning after having apent a good part of the night receiving the faithful. The newcomers in the political arena have fur- ther known~ during the campaign, how to exploit the weakaese of their elders and their opponents: they adopted the "direct contact" style. The journalist Jean ~ambire, after the favorable votes of the firat round~ has, for eaample, the reputa- tion of being a big talker and above all to have been the firat to dare, more than 10 years ago, to publicly take on the most poWerful members of the old Assembly. Because they were marching off to battle, the newcomera methodically analyzed their electorate. As theq were largely made up of cadrea, they knew that cadres...did not vote. Then, they went into the prisons to convince those who were arreated but not yet aentenced and were therefare voters. They saw fire~en and they saw the police. They plunged into the working diatricta of the citiea or into the planta- tions. BetWeen the two rounds of voting they patiently explained to the voters how to vote. A certain candidate would not get angrq with a certain female voter who came to annouce to him that she had voted for him as ahe trfumphantly brought him as proof...the ballot in his name. Another took half an hour to demonstrate the procedure to a certain peasent who, after having imderatood what he should have done with hia ballot, burst out with: "Give me the ballot, I'm going back again." Their elders had lost the habit. Hence this for~ula which is al 1 the rage today in Treichville: "An 80 deputy is not a former deputy." - Voicea of Little People The new wave does not feel reassured on that account. It knows that the "1980-1985 deputy" will be under surveillance, because, according to a newly elected official, 23 FOR OFFICIAL USF. ON1.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICIAI. USF: ONLl' "the voter has become king." In Abobo, a quar~er on the outskirts of Abidjan - where piles of debrie still serve as playgrounds os where a basin of water is still sold for 100 CFA [African Financial CaumunityJ fraaca, people choose to be on their guard: "the little ones have spoken, the big onea have voted." For _ the moment, the new candidates have under~tood that they will have to give a - regular accountiug. The haxdest thiag to do will be to do juat that and not, in their turn, to treat their votera with eaey faailiaritq. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 _ 12,116 CSO: 4400 2 F~OR OFFICIAL USE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 i�uK urr~~i:~~ ~;~r. VIVLY ~ i - IVORY ~'AAST - i _ ' BRIEFS ELECTIOh RESULTS DISPUTED--A real ju~idical headache for the ~agistrates. Accord- ing to the Constitution, only the National Asaembly (the old one ie diaeolned aad the new one will not meet before the ~iddle of January 1981) ahould take cogaizance of it; so that, according to the electoral law promulgated in ~eptember, thase dis- putes wi11 go to the Supreme Court. Naw juridical orthodoay inteads that ttie elec- toral lew cannot be applied to contradict the Constitution. [Teat) [JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1038 26 Nov 80 p 42] 12,116 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS ANGER MANUFACTITRERS--The competitors of Renault, who would have had a preference for certain candidatea for the~~ayoralty of Abid3an, are proposing bueea with more than SO seats, equipped to reduce pollution. In order not to lose a market ~on many yeara ago, the French company would be ready to adapt ita Saviem bu~ea for the same demands--compatible with the needs of a city of one million in- _ habitanta which is undergoing a rapid industrial expansion. [Teact] [JEUNE AFRIQUE 26 Nov 80 p 42] 12,116 CSO: 4400 _ ZS FOR OF'F'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MALI BRIEFS - DISSIDENTS' LEADERSHIP--Malian dissidents residing in Li.bya are looleing for a leader. They have already contacted three former officials of the Sudanese Union, the party of deceased President Modibo KeiCa. Despite a number of solid arguments--including suitcases full of money--none of them has so far accepted the offer. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 10 Dec 80 p 51] CSO: 4400 26 FOR OFFZCIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENEGAL BRIEFS ELECTRONIC TRAINING CENTER--An electronic training center is going to be created in Dakar. A Japanese technical study mission includinq seven people and headed by Mr Sumio Tarui, assistant manaqer of the Technical Cooperation department of the Ministry of Foreiqn Affairs in Tokyo, stayed in Dakar from the 11 until the 22 November. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPZCAUX ET MEDITERRANTENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 30�39] 9294 CSO: 4400 27 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SIERRA LEONE BRIEFS BADEA AGRICULTURAL LOAN--The 8.5 million dollar loan to Sierra Leone authorized last 26 June by BADEA [Arab Bank for the Economic Development of Africa] (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS dated 1 August, p 1920) has been signed at the bank's headquarters in Khartoum on 4 November. This loan, which is intended for an integrated aqricultural development _ project, brings to 17.1 million dollars the total fi.nancial commitments of the bank in Sierra Leone. (Text] [parig MARCHES TROPICAUX ET _ MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3100] 9294 CSO: 4400 28 = FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SOUTH AFRICA DETAILS OF RAILWAY EXPANSION PLANS GIVEN Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX Ex MEDITERRANEENS in French S Dec 80 p 3259 [Text] The volume of railway traffic for South Africa as a whole should not mislead in regard to the nature of the system itself, which is little different in its ~ main features--including gage--from the other old systems on the continent. Also, the geography imposes difficult conditions which limit capacities. The main lines ~oining the ports and the ma~or industrial or mining centers were thus, in 1975, at saturation limit. All possible measures were taken to cope with constantly increasing demand: doubling of lines, improvement of grades and curves, increased . telecommunication and signaling facilities, block system and construction of new lines, including the Sishen-Saldanha Bay. Details of the pro3ects formulated in 1978, all aimed at increasing capacity on lines approaching saturation, are as follows: increase capacity of the Johanneaburg-Durban line (goal: 100,000 tans/day in 1981-1982), increase of capacity of the Pretoria-Komatipoort line toward Mozimbique to 40,000 Cons/day beginning this year; the same for the Cape line on which it is hoped to increase the daily fl~w to 40-45,000 tons (in place of 30,000) solely by installing cen- tralized fJ.ow control equi,pment. A1sA, the first phase of the Bapsfontein mar- shaling yai~ds will soon be yielding full benefit. This new marshaling yard is an ~.mportant element in South African Railways' (SAR) strategy for improving per- fo~mance of `h~ system. This strategy ties in with simultaneous development of port facilities and air transport, which fall under the same authority. The deep water terminals at Capetown, Port Elizabeth and Durban are, or will be, the points of departure for cargo-trains (1,600 container transport cars have been operating since 1978). A train of this type (40 cars) was already in 1978 traveling daily between Durban and City Deep. At the end of that year, five similar trains were put into opera- tion. Also needed was to undertake a major electrification program, and this has been started. On the one hand, 2,300 km of line is to be electrif ied and 250 loco- motives acquired by 1985. On the other hand, measures toward bigger traina (example: the coal shipments from Vryheid to Richards Bay) composed of up to 200 cars (as opposed to 84 currently), trains with grouped locomotives and also SAR has decided, wherever possible, to convert from 3,000 volts dc to 25 kv 50 _ hz ac. When completed, this program will reduce petroleum products consumption ~ by about 15%. Financing necessary to complete it is estimated to be at least 600 29 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2 million rand for equipment work and 300 million for purchase of locomotives. The work schedule ie as follows: Beaufort West-De Ar (completion planned for 1982); De Ar-Port Elizabeth and Springfontein-East London (1985). Rolling stock will come from local railway industry, assembly in fact, whose capacity is sufficient for the demand. For example, the contract is 1977 with the European 50 Hz Group covering 100 locomotives provided for 40-50X local parts, and local assembly by Union Carriage. In respect to new infrastructure, we should point out three pro3ects, but without being able to say how far they have progressed: _ 1. The new line between Grootegeluk (coal mine recently opened for exploitation) � and Vanderbi~lpark (113 km), among other connections, because it is part of the Iscor mining corporation's program to link its production centers by rail. Work on this line could be completed in 3 years and cost was estimated in 1977 at 41 million rand. 2, The double-track line for urban use between the center of Johannesburg (2 km of the route underground) and Soweto township (14 million rand). 3. The short line from Vryheid to Richard's Bay (7 km; 2.4 million rand). Plans ann~unced as of 1979 included: doubling the Mabdpane-Pretoria line (33.5 million rand) to enable increased passenger volume to a peak of 20,000 (suburban service); establishment of a new marshaling yard at Pyramid (7.5 million rand); quadrupling of the Hercules-Pretoria North line (already doubled) (21.1 million rand); construction of a new station at Bel Ombre (47.9 million rand). The investment budget programed for 1980, as always one of the largest equipment budgets among industrialized countries with market economies, is 1.4 billion rand. This breaks down by major categories as follows (in million rand): engine equip- ment, 111 (2 diesel-electric shunting engines, 62 diesel-electric line engines; - 106 electric line engines); hauled equipment, 156.5 9330 carriages and 3,045 wagons; containers, 0.7 (1,200 units). Infrastructure: 86.2 million rand for construction of 167.2 km of new lines, a package of 186.5 million for renovation and line improvement work and equipment, and 26 million for electrification. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980 - CSO: 44d0 END 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070009-2