JPRS ID: 9458 CHINA REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060039-0
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• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 39
• Content Type: REPORTS

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_ JPRS L/9458
29 December 1980
China Re ort
p
POLITICAL, SOCIOLO~ICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
CFOUO 4/80)
FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST' INFORMATION SERVICE
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i ~ JPR.~; L/9458
29 December 1980
CHINA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAI,RS
(FOUO 4/80)
CONTENTS
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECIJRITY
- Chinese Nuclear Strategy Discussed
(Georges Tan Eng Bok; STRATEGIQUE, No 3, 1980) 1
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~ - a - [III - CC - 80 F~UO]
~ ~~o n~~*~-r s s r rcF ~nri v
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, MILITARY AND PiJBLIC SECURITY
CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY DISCUSSED
_ Paris STRATEGIQUE in French No 3,1980 pp 26-62
~Article by Georges Tan Eng Bok*~
- ~Text~ This article does not deal with China's positio.ns in
regard to nuclear proliferation or to arms control, thPse two
topics being themselves the subject of another article.
~ Sources:
We have worked solely with documentation drawn from the public
d~main such as press dispatches and radio broadcasts.
To not burden the text needlessly with too many bibliographical
references, we indicate below the pri.ncipal source materials for
- this article:
1) The Fei-ch'ing Nien-pao (Taipei) 1967 and 1968 Yearbooks, and
those of their successors, Chung-kung Nien-pao from.1969 onward;
2) 29 issues of the GONGZUO TONGXUN ~Bulletin of Activities~
covering the first half of 1961. These are internal documents
intended only for officers of the PLA ~Peoples Liberation ~rmy~
from regimental commanders up. Released in August 1963 by the
State Department of the United States, these documents are a
treasure house of information and, above all, of details that
appear not to have suffered the erosions of time. They moreover
provide an insight into the state of mind and preoccupations of
the PLA cadres before the Cultural Revolution;
3) The magazine CHUNG-KUNG YEN-CHIU (Taipei) published a major
study by Xiang Zh~~,nshu on the Chinese potential and nuclear
" strategy, serialized in seven issues beginning in April 1979.
~ We extracted from it a substantial compilation of raw data.
* Georges Tan Eng Bok (1951) has already published one article: "Military System
and Poli�tical. 5ystem in Communist China" in STRATEGIQUE No 2.
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Abbreviations: !
DN ~DEFENSE NATIONALE~
FEER ~FAR EASTERN ECOIJOMIC REVIEW~
IS ~ISSUES AND STUDIES~ !
JFJB CJIEFANGJUN BAO~ � ~
i
i
NCNA ~NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY' I
RMRB ~RENMUN RIBAO~ ,
SCMP ~SURVEY OF MAINLAND CHINA PRESS~
CY CCHUNG-KUNG YEN-CHIU~
i
- In China, the development of nuclear weapons responds to polstical ends. China's
leaders are bent on equipping the nation with the indispensable material means for
ensuring its national independence and territorial integrity. They are also
making clear their reje~tion of the nuclear duopoly that enables the United States
and the USSR to impose a bipolar international system. In the context of recent -
years--the end of the 1950's and beginning of the 1960's--this bipolar system
signified the impossibility of a national reunification, since the American zone '
of influence included Taiwan. By becoming a"nuclear power," China delivered
it~elf from Soviet guardianship and protected itself from an American aggression '
that its leaders deemed probable at the time.l .
China's currently inverted perception of these threats does not change the under- -
lying principles of its nuclear power. But the qualitative evolution of nuclear
weapons technology is eroding its "accession-emancipation"2 charactez. We have in
mind, of course, the advent of accurate ballistic weapons systems tt~at, by ,
enabling selective attacks, tend to alter the absolutist nature of nucl.ear deter-
rence.
Without going so far as to consider it from the standpoint of a counterforces
capability, and even assuming it remains in the nature of a deterren~ by a weaker
power against the stronger, it appears evident to us nevertheless that China's
nuclear deterrent capability cannot hope to maintain its credibility in the
absence of certain material improvements. But will evolution of its equipment -
= alone be sufficient? Will it not also be necessary to reconsider certain aspects
of its use which, in our opinion, still includes some obscure points? '
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Its Means
Basic Research
Personnel
China's personnel withstands comparison at the international level. :Sost of its
experts are graduatQS of Western universities, among which Caltech and MIT pre-
dominate. Some of them have taught in those universities and carried on research
in them.
In accordance with the objectives of the Chinese nuclear program, these experts '
pertain to three disciplines: nuclear physics, of course, but also aeronautics and
automation. Well known figures such as Qian Sanqiang, Qian Weichang, Qian Xeusen, ~
Wang Gangchang and Zhou Peiyuan need no introduction from us; the many studies
dealing with the Chinese nuclear potential citP them frequently.3 We would like
to point out, however, two reports that appeared recently in the :.hinese p::ess:
--In its July 1978 issue, LA CHiNE EN CONSTRUCTION published a highly laudatory
article on Wou Tchong-houa, director of the Institute of Idechanics of the Academy
of Sciences. In 1950, Wou Tchong-houa presented a theory on three-dimensional
' subsonic and supersonic flows in turbojet engines a} an annual meeting of the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers. This theory makes it possible to design
high-pexformance jet engines. It was the basis for the design of the Rolls Royce
Spey engine mounted on the Trident airliner and the Phantom F-4K; the T-69 engine
_ on American radio-controlled aircraft; and the Boeing 747 engine;4
--In November 1978, the NCNA reported the admission of Wang Daheng, director of
the Institute of Precision Optical Apparatus in Changchun, into the Chinese
Communist Party. During the 1960's, he developed the first Chinese laser.5
Research
Ftesearch i.s carried aut throuah the Gombined efforts of three major sectors:
the Army, the Academy of Sciences, and certain ministries for the mechanical
industries. Within tr~e PLA, three centers are involved in the nuclear.pro-
grain: the Academy of ,ilitary Sciences, the National Defense Commission on
Science and Technology, and certain sections of the Zone of Interior Services
~epartment. Within the Academy of Sciences, at least five instituces participate
in the research effort: the Institute of High-Atmospheric Physics, the Electronics
- institute, the Institute of Automation, the Institute of Nuclear Energy, and the
Institute of Mec.hanics.
Aside from these institutes, the contributions of certain highly scientific com-
panies, such as the Chinese Aeronautics Company, the Chinese Electronics Company, ~
the Chinese Mechanics Company, and the Chinese Automation Company, should not be
~ overtooked, as also the role played by the University of Science and Teahnology.
Three ministries for mechanical industries contcibute their know-hows a;id poten-
tials: the Second, for nuclear energy; the Fourth for electronics; and the Seventh
" for ballistic missiles. ~
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Locations of Cer~ters
In this reyard, we note a concentration in the Northwest:6
--at Lanahou, a complex of three centerr to which power is supplied by two hydto- _
electric dams: one producing 600,000 kti' and the othex 1,225,000 kW; one gaseotis- ~
diffusion isotoge separation center that went into aperation in 1963 and is
producing l0U kg of uranium-235 a year, with a peak production of 500 kg in 1967;
an adjoining plant, the Helan Shan one: using the centrifuge process and proaucing
400 kg of uranium-235 annually.
--the H~~angyuan plant in Qinghai: completed in 1962, it has included, since 1965,
an underground section at a depth of 30 meters, where thermonuclear weap~ns are
- being manufactured;
--the Yumen plant in Gansu: since the end of 1966, it has been producing 200 kg _
of plutonium 239 a year;
- --the Baotou plant in Shanxi: In service since 196 it is equipped with two
large n~clear reactors and its production is estimateci at 40 kg of plutonium-239
a year.
Nuclcac Testing
Since 1969, China has carried out 25 tests.a From the outs~t of each test, foreign
observers have not failed to express, on each occasion, their surprise at the
level of technical expertise the Chinese had attained in the short in~ervening
times. The first explnsion was characterized by two major features: the use of
enriched ur.aniunr235, which ha~ necessitated a gaseous-diffusion proce~ss starting
from uranium-238, marking an advance over the methods that had been ch-osen by the
French and the English~ and detonation by implosion. The second tes+_, 7 months . .
later, consisted of a bomb of some 30 kilotons dropped from a TU-e. The following
year, the Chinese exploded a 200-kiloton bomb dop~d with lithium-6 and dropped _
from a TU-16. The fcurth test, 5 months later, also failed to pass unnoticed:
"The experiment was unprecedented, since it was the first timf~ that a rocket and
the warhead it is desigz~ed to deliver have been tested simult~ineously."9 Finally,
in 1967, a 3-megaton thermonuclear bomb was exploded using the 3 F principle
(fission-fusion-fission). On this occasion, China expitessed its welljearned pride:
"China has taken only 2 years and 8 months between the expl~~sion of its first -
atomic bomb in October 1964 and the successful test of its l~ydrogen bomb. To
accomplish the same thing th2 United States 7 years and 4 mr.nths, the Soviet Union
4 years, and Great Britain 4 years and 7 months. Chin,3's *ime was therefore~the
world's fastest."10 This experiment, however, appears to have marked an apogee,
following which China's advances began to slow down, particularly as regards the
development of missiles. Economic xmperatives intervened at that point, and
China's political climate over the last decade has not tended to produce great
economic strides. But let us beware of hasty conclusions, for, since 19?E, China's
economy and its sciences have followed new and very encouraqing directions in
this regard.
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Current Nuclear Weapons Systems Development
, Development is proceeding in thre~ directians: ICBM's ~Intercontinental Ballistic
' Missiles~, StdLE's ~Missile-Launching Nuclear Submarines~ and SLBM's ~Submarine-
. Launched Ballistic ~lissilesa, and At~T's ~Tactical Nuclear Weapans~. Since 1972,
these proyrams have stagnated. Among the possible clifferent reasons, the diffi-
culties encountered by the Chinese in the development of solid fuels may have
~ played an essential role.
I.CBM
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; IT~ an interesting article on Chinese space activities, published in DEFENSE
j NATIO'~ALF,11 P, i3erpaix has pointed out the close kinship that exists between
ba:listic missiles and satellite launchers, and neither the United States nor the
~ USSR, nor China now, can ascape that common kinship. In September 1973, it was
~ learned that China had tested a missile with a 5,600-km range. Subsequently
identified as the CSS-3, it sQrved also as the satellite launcher for China's
: thir~, fourth and fifth spac:e trials. F3ecause of its range, the CSS-3 represents
~ a first stage in C:hina's ICF3M development program. 1975-1976 saw the start of -
; experimentation on a longer-range missile: the CSS-X-4. F.ccording to indications
� by Ren Xinmin, director of the Chinese Space Institute, while visitinq Japan in
1978,12 this missile, this 200-ton, iiquid-fuel prorpl.led missile consists of
1 three stages and would appear to res~:mble the Tit~an-2 or the SS-9. Its range
~ appears to be 10,0U0-11,000 km. A Japanese source attributes to it an explosive
; force of 1 megaton,l3
~
~ Two experimental launchings of the CSS-X-4 took place in 1979.14 Two others were
~ recently carriec3 out between 18 and 21 May 1980. But not until the Chinese suc-
ceed in developing adequate ~o~.id propellants,15 will their program experience a
substantial advance. Sound financial considerations evidently keep them from
; devoting major resources to the development of first-generation ballistic missiles.
Reversal of threats serves their pur~se equally well: Their ICBM's were aimec]
~ specifically at the United States while the USSR is witliin range of their TRBM's
~Intermediate-Range Ballistic rlissiles~. _
I
, In our opinion, the Spr:ing 1980 tests are to be interpreted in four ~vays. Frum
; a general standpoint, the Chinese musti maintain their research potential. Con-
' sidering the presence of observation ships in the planned ~impact zone, the launch-
ings probably had to do wiL�h the system of guidance and the accuracy of the
missile. Similarly, we cannot exclude the development of solid propellants. And
~ lastly, these tests preceded by only a few days the visit of Geng Biao, chairman
of the Central Committee's Commission on Military Affairs, to the iJnited States,
; responding to Harold Brown's visiC to China. It was important for the Chinese
~ delegation not to arrive empty--handed for their talks on military matters with
their hosts.
SNLE and SLBM
The plan to build a nuclear submarine goes back to 1965. Initial experiments
b~gan in June 1968 in the Red Flag Shipbuilding establishment in Dalian. Jane's
1975-1976 Xearbook reported that this submarine would be called the "Han." An
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_ ,
in-depth study by Ti Chung-heng, which appeared in the April 1977 issue of
MING-PAO YACH-K'AN, indicated that tests of the "Han," beginning in 1974, had I
revealed a number of defects such that, currently, it is ~ften berthed: The
nuclear boiler is not yet fully~tried and tested, and tl~e "Han" cannot be taken
to its i�ntended cruising range. ~
Thus, China has encountered at least four obstacles: the propulsion problems aust _
mentioned in the case of the "Han"; the advanced technology of underwater tele-
communications; the development of solid fuels or, strictly speaking, stockable ~
liquid fuels; and mastery of the techniques of cold launches. If China seeks to
develop an SNLE to patrol in tr~: vicinity of its coasts, it will also have to have
- an SLBM of a range equivalent to that of the American Trident. The technical
difficulties and the financial cost of such a project place it out of China's
reach, for the time being at least. If China set~les for an SNLE ~o patrol the
Arctic or the Indian Ocean, it can limit the range o� its SLBM to that of an IRBM.
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But in the latter case, the operational distance away from the Chinese coasts ~
raises additional problems. To keep two submarines on continuous patrol would ~
require, according to a study by E. Luttwak presented at the 7th Chinese-Amer~.can
Conference on the Chinese Continent, organized at Taipeh under the auspices of I
- the IIR ~expansion unknown~,l~ at least six SLNE's of this class; hence, a far i
from negligik,le financial burden. Telecommunications kith submarines raises other
problems as well. In principle, the intensity of the received field deereases
exponentially with depth and varies inversely with distance from the transmitter
and with frequency ;~-8 hence, the advantages of very long wavelengths (VLF? ~very
low fr~quencies~, subject, however, to resolving the problem of adequately high-
powered transmitters, and miniaturization and protection of antennas. Multi- ~
_ plicity of stations is perhaps a solution if we disregard the dissuasive aspect
of financial cost: The United States has 10 stations it can use for its submarines,
and the USSR 9(4 in Siberia, 3 in European ~Russia and 2 on the Nor~h Sea}.
Lastly, in the inverse direction, namely, transmissians from submarine.to~surface,
the Chinese must also overcome the ri.sks of goniometric location of emissions and
consequently that of the transmitting submarine. By way of information, we point
out that, in 1967 and 1977, China sent some oceanographic research ships into the
Pacific to carry out various tests, including experiments on communications to
land,l9
ANT
We use the term ANT here to designate a type of weapon based on the energy it I
releases, disregarding its possible employments. Within the terms of this defini- ~
tion, certain scientific works published in communist China .are indicative of t
that country's interest in enhanced-radiation weapons. ~
In 1978, W. Rupert translated, in a specialized Viennese magazine,20 an article '
published in the December 1977 issue of KEXUE SHIJIAN ~Scientific Experimentation~: ;
This article, signed by Zhang Mengjun and titled "The Neutron Bomb," deals with
the principles and applications of this weapon. According to the reference nates,
this study was based mainly on an article by Fred M. Kaplan: "Enhanced-Radiation
Weapons appearing in the May 1977 issue of SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN. Among these
notes, we think it desirable to point ouk an important passage concerning the .
Lance.
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- More recently, in the August 1979 issue of a magazine published in Shanghai,
HEJISHU ~Nuclear Technigues~, an article dealt with "measurement of the explosive
force of shel~s based on detonation by fast neutrons."2~ This ar.ticle, a purely
tect~nical one in nature, discusses the detarmination of the r~atio b?tween fast and
slow neutrons. It dea:s also with the initiatic~n of the fusion reaction. Can we _
deduce from this that China is in the process af developing neutron artillery -
shells?
~ If this is so, the slowdown perceived in the development of nuclear weapons would
only be masking a lony-ter.m program dealing with the design and production of
I weapons of ano ther technologii;al level. This ~ossxbility has also been addressed,
! by Thomas W. E tzold, prof.essor of strategy at the United States Naval Callege,
during a confez2nce held in Taipei in June 1978.22 In this case, it could be a
matter of a cho.i.ce between prESent needs arising from the soZe Soviet threat and
; the future needs of a nation bent on surpassing it-s merely regional influence.
To the extent the latter needs prevail, the Chinese leadership could sAt~le for
, a minimai security accompani.ed by a more flexible policy tow~xrc3 the USSR. This
approach seems to us the m~,re logical, for, in the present state of its eeonomic
and scientific capabil.ities, China oould not producs other th~n equipment of a
~ past generation. This is equally true of its ICBM's and SLBM's.
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~ The Second Artillery
~ The Second Artillery g.roups the Chinese nuclear forces. It has been known by
~ several successive desiynations.
~
~ Hlstozical
I Upon coming in to power, the communists immediately showed an interest in the
i applications of nuclear physics. True, they were already endowed with scientists
! of renown. But research for rnilitary ends did not start until after 1957.
~
In 1957, a high-ranking Chinese military delegation arrived in Moscow to take part
in the f.estivities ot the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. Headed by
Peng Dehuai, Ye Jianying and Su Yu, this 20-member delegation was invited to visit
the Red Army Academy and the principal military applied sc~ientific research
centers. St was suhseauEntly learned that China and the USSR had just signed an ~ _
- "agreement on new national defense techniques" covering 122 categories of coopera-
tion.
From that poin t on, the pace of events quickened. In February 1958, the Second
Ministry for Mechanical Industry, which since its creation in 1952 had been res-
ponsible for weapons production, took charge of nuclear weapons. The following
month, an Academy of Military Sciences was opened in Peking. It was intended to
familiarize the higher-�level cadres of.the PLA with the problems~of nuclear
strategy. And surely in accordance with the 1957 agreement, the Soviets began -
delivering missiles to the PLA. The;~ were no doubt short-range missiles,2~
probably Frog- 1's. Tt~e first launch trials took place beginning in 1959 at
Qilianshan in Qinghai and at Shuang-nhengzi in Gansu.
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GONGZUU TONGXUN mentioned, in 1961, the existence of "Special Techniques Units" ~
(tezhong budui) recommending that youths with college degrees in the scisnces I
be assigned to it. The qualifications being sought indicated the role oE the&e !
- units in the missiles field. The Special Techniques Units were thus the precuf- '
sors of thz Second Artillery. Then, between 1962 and 1964, "Units 83" (Basan I
budui) were displayEd in P~king, Luoyanq (Henan), 2hangzi (Shanxi), Datong at !
8 kilometers south of Tianjin, and in the district of Conghua (Guangdong). I~i I
1965, a 4-digit number was assigned to the units of the PLA. Units 8.i must have ~
been included in this change, because no further mention was made of this designa-
tion. This did not halt the con tinuation of experimentation: On 24 October 19f6,
the fourth Chinese nuclear test was carried o~�t using a Soviet Sandal SS-4 mis9fle.
- On the occasion of the 46th anniversary of the .founding of the CCP (20 June 1967), ~
mention was made, for the first time, of a"Second Artillery" (di'er paobing~,
sparkiny intensive interest. Military analysts were quick to identify the _
Second Artillery with the Chinese nuclear forces. But to date, .to �the best of � I-
our knowledge, no Chinese source has ever confirmed or denied this assertion. On
the other hand, a recent RADIO-PEKING broadcast indicated that the National
Defense Commission on Science and Technology also has missile units. These,
however, probably serve only.an experimental purpose.
Organization
s The aent 1 I
The organization of the Second Artillery consists of two echelon . xa
ech~lon includes the general staff, the Policy Department and the Department p~
Zone of Interior Services. At the regional level there is a Major Military
Regional Command.
- Tactically, the battalion is the basic unit. The internal structure of the ~
- battal~on varies zccording to the nature of the equipment in service. According I
to estimates by Taiwanese services, there are 4 types of surface-surface misslle
battalions: i
--SRBM of 30-100 km range: 1 battalion of 3 batteries, each batter e i ed with !
Y 4~ PP
around 6 missiles;
~ --SRBM of up to 300 km range: 1 battalion of 3 batteries, 1 launching ramp ger
. battery;
htRDM of 1,000-1,500 km range: 1 battalion of 3 batteries at most, 2 of which -
equipped with 1 launching ramp per battery;
--IRBM of over 1,500 km range: 1 battalion equipped with 1 launching ramp.
The Second Artillery also includes surface-air missile units. The surface-ait
missile units are organized as follows: 1 communications section, 1 headqua~r~ers
and headquarters company, 1 engineer section, 1 transportation section, 1 Fan
Song B or Gin Sling radar section, and 3 surface-air missile batteries. Each
battery is equipped with from 4 to 6 type CSA-1 missiles (SA-2 Guideline) .
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Patential
Its strategic nuclear forces consist of;
a) Ballistic missiles
--MRBM: 30 to 40 type CSS-1 (1,100 km range);
--IRBM: 50 to 70 type CSS-2/Sandal SS-4 (1,.300-1,8t~0 km range dependnni~ on warhead);.
--reduced-range ICBM: 3 type CSS-3 (5,600 km range).
b) Aircraft-deliverable missiles
--80 ta 90 Badger TU-16 subsonic (cruising range 2,500 km).
According to tests carried out,25 the missi.les can carry 2Q-kt warheads, and the
Badger TU-16 one 10- to 200-ton atomic bomb or a 3-MT thermonuclear bomb. In its
"Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces" published in 1976, the AIA (Defense Inte1- �
ligence Agency) of the United States estimates that the CSS-2 uses stockable
_ liquid propellant and can deliver a 2- to 3-MT yield.
The composition of its tactical nuclear weapons is less known, but they probably
include:
a) Nuclear artillery shells .
According ta Jane's,26 China has received type S-23 180-mm shells from the USSR.
This type of weapon is knecvn for its ability to deliver nuclear yie~ds of 1 to 5
kt. .
b) SRBM
Under the 1957 Sino-Soviet agreement, the US512 is committed to furnish SRBM's to
China. The type of missile actually furnished is unknown, but the Soviet SRBM's
in service at that time were the Frog-1 and Scud-A. CHUNG-KUO YEN-CHIU has
mentioned a Chinese SRBM with a range of around 100 km, the T-5.27
c) Aircraft-deliverable missiles: the Qiang-5, derived from the Mig-19, is capable
of delivering a tactical nuclear bomb.
Operational Capabilities
We refer here to the theoretical capability. The CSS-1 could reach the Soviet
West; the CSS-2, eastern Asia and central Asia; the CSS-3, all of Asia, part of
ruropean Russia, Australia and part of the Middle East. The CSS-9, under experi-
~ mentation, could reach the United States. However, all of these missiles have ~the
disadvantage of being liquid-propelled, which means a delay of several hours bet-
ween the decision to detonate it and the actual firing. During this rather long
- interval exposed to the open air, these missiles offer a target for an enemy
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counter forces strike, against which they are able to guzrd until then owing to
- their semimobility or by remaining sheltered in natural �cavities iittec] out fpx -
the purpose. Si.los would reduce this vulnerability,28 but does China have them?
In sum, Chinese missiles represent only an anticity capability.
Uses
Comparing Chinese public statements on the use of nuclear weapons with certain
passages in GONGZUO TONGXUN, �n internal bulletin restricted tc~ the rather high--
level r.a~res of the APL, Jonathan D. Pollac suggests the idea of a sharp disparity
between these two points of view.29 The reference materials he has used actually
bear him out. However, in our opinion, he has compared sources of a different
nature and, above all, of different hierarchic levels. The public statements . -
issue from the supreme policy body charged with defining the overall policy guide-
lines, whereas those to whome GONGZUO TONGXUN is addressed must concern thems~lves
with military operations based on the~ce guideline:. A similar distinction, .gener-
~ ally speaking, is found in the Soviet Union as well, between doctrine and the art
of war: Doctrine sums up the directives of the Central Committee which the Army
must apply within the terms of reference of the military arts. Under ..these
conditions, a distinction should be drawn betwee~n the principle and its ~modes of
- use.
- Tt~e Principle
The principle emerges fram an overall strategy that is at one and the same time _
political, diplomatic, economic and military in the service of a single aim: to
preserve national independence. In accordance with this aim, Chinese military
doctrine is essentially defensive: Our preparations in anticipation of an eventual
?f we�are not attacked we will not attack� but if
war are entirely defens'ive. r ~
we are attacked, we will counterattack. This is our con~istent, reasonable and
solemn position."30 This statement, dating back to 1971, has not taken on any
wrinkles: It was reaffirmed during China's conflict with Vietnam in February 1979.
It defines the principle of China's eventual use of nuclear weapons. On 16 `
October 1964, the day of its first nuclear test, the Chinese government issuea the -
fallowing statement: .
"The development of nuclear weapons in China ensures its defense and the protection
of the Chinese people... On the question of nuclear weapons, China will never -
commit the error 3i irresponsibility, nor that of irresolution. The Chinese people -
can be believed."
It adds to this its total refusal to be the first to use the weapon: The Chinese
government solemnly declares that. at no time and under no circumstances will China
be the first to use nuclear weapons."
The princ~.ple governing the use of nuclear weapons by China could thus be summar-
ized as follows: For the needs of its aefense, China will not hesitate, in case
of a nuclear aggression, to respond using weapons of the same nature.
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The Modes �
= Before addressing the modes, xt seems to us well to recall some general nelevant
conce~pts defined by Mao Zedong.
1) war takes on a class character: "War, which began with the advent of private
property pertaining to classes, is the supreme f~rm of struggle to resolve, at a
given point in their deveZopment, the cont~adictions between classes. If one does
_ not understand the conditions of war, i~s cliaracter, its relationship to other ~
phenomena, one does not know32he laws of war, daes not know how to conduct it, and
- is incapable of winning it." -
2)It is not only a matter of winning the battle, but also of annihilating the
aggressor: "The blows dealt to the enemy must aim to annihilate him; otherwise,
they make no sense.33 In case of an attack on the enemy and to the extent that _
conditions enable us to beat him, our party will automatically take the position _
of legitimate defense to annihilate him resolutely, radically, integrally and
totally."34 Since the Peking leadership bases itself on Marxism-I~eninism, we must
_ 4 complete the first of these statements concerning the class character of war with
this analysis, by Lenin, of international relations: "The period of modern
capitalism shows us that among capitalist groups there become_ establyshed _
certain relationships based on an economic division of the world, and .
- that concurrently and consequently, among political groups, among sta~es, there
become established relationships based on a territorial division of the world, on
a struggle for colonies, on a struggleforeconomic territories."35 In sum, only
imperialism yesterclay and socioimperialism today nurture warlike intentions in . -
regard to China, not to control a territory, but to add to~their.economic
potential.
Under the~e conditions, the Chinese J.eadersh~ip does not shrink back from the
principle of a strategic bombardm~nt, fully aware though it is of its destructive
effects. The ultimate aim of war being the acquisition of an economic potential,
the reason for being of such bombardment is, in their view, dim. Thus, the
development of an aggression against China would necessarily end up in conventional
_ type confrontations: "Although atomic bombs are very powerful, they serve onY~ to
- destroy the centers and economic reserves of the enemy during the strategic bom-
bardment phase. Thereafter, they serve mainly as supporting fire in preparation
- for the assault. In any case, armies and conventional weapons are necessary to
finish a war, destroy the enemy, occupy territories,.and win victory. To count
on armies and conventional weapons means according primacy to the human factor.~~36 -
Furthermore, the sparse cancentration of Chinese economic objectives would lessen
their vulnerability in case of strategic bombardment: Nuclear weapons are
more of a threat to imperialist and socioimperialist countries,~whexe industry and
populations are more~concentrated. Our national economy has agriculture as its
' base and industry as a dominant factor. A policy combining industry and agricul-
ture, cities with the countryside, large enterprises with small and medium ones,
and peacetime.work~.with.preparedness for,war fears neither modern weapons nor
bombardments."37 _
In addition, a sustained policy of civil. defense was put into operation beginning
~ in 1973. That year, the joint editorial of the RENMIN RIBAO, the HONGQI and the -
LIEFANGJUN BAO for the feast of the New Yea~ used Mao Zedong's directive: "Dig
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dcep underground shelters, store vast reserves of grain everywhere, and net~er act
like a superpower. Very recently, the NCNA revealed the existence of an uxbaniza-
t.ion and civil defense plan for Pekiny covering the period 1979-1985.~5 From a
m~re general standpoint, Marshal Ye Jianying advocated, during the 3rd National
Conference for Antiaircraft Defense of the People, the adaptation of urban and
- infrastructural constr~ctions to the imperatives of civil defense.39 ~
On the other hand, the Chinese leadership devotes a great deal of interest to ~he
~>ossible uses of the tactical nuclear weapon. "Although the atomic bomb is a
paper tiger, it is no less true that atomic weapons are a real danger. Their
c3estructive capability is relatively substantial, and while we may disregard them
from a strategic standpoint, we must take them very seriously into account �rom
the tackical standpoint. If we wish to overcome the nuclear forces of impe[ialism
; and socsoi4perialism, we too must develop our own nuclear and conventional
arsenal . D
This statement is of recent date: 1977. h]oreover, the officers of the PLA have _
been schooled for a long time on the battlefield uses of chemical and bactezio-
l.ogical weapons:
"When launching an attack, we must be able to concentrate rapidly our manpoWer
and firepower on the lines of advance of our offensive and exploit the effeCt~ of
a nuclear strike. When the situation demands it, we must also be capable o~ _
dispersing and camouflaging ourselves rapidly. In a defensive situation, we must
have the capability of concentrating our manpower and firepower at essentia~.
poir~ts, and of organizing41nd protecting ourselves against nuclear, chemical and
bacterioloqical weapons.
This text dates back to 1961, a Feriod in which China did not yet have nuclear -
weapons. In this regard, it should be noted that in 1958 there appeared in China
a collection of studies on nucleaz weapons: "Yuanzi Wuqi Lunwen Ji."42 It was the
tranGlation of a Soviet treatise published in 1955, dealing with the followi~ng
points: bases of nuclear physics, causes of the destructive effects of an atomic
war, aerial bombardments and civil defense.
In 1961, the units of the PLA on a regimental level and above received instxuction
not only in NBC ~nuclear, bacteriological, chemical~ def ~nse but also in the
principles of the use of these weapons. But although the le~c3ers of the P.L~
sustain the principle of a nuclear strike, such an eventuality would not supeXVene
cxcept within the terms of a battle to defend China against an aggression. I~ is -
- nUt a.matter, therefore, as J. D. Pollack would have it, of a concept of use that _
departs from the official viewpoints. Moreover, since the military engagement . -
aims at the annihilation of invasion forces, a recourse to.nuclear weapons.in no
way implies their use without the use of conventional weapons. The recourse to
nuclear weapons must be interpreted within a combination of all the means nqces- -
sary to destroy "resolutely, radically, integrally and totally" the aqgressor~3.
mhis proposition could cast light on the designation "Second Artillery" giv~n to
the Chinese nuclear forces. However, from a semantic viewpoint, a Second Artil--
lec,y would imply the existence of a First Artillery. If this were the case, Would
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not the Second.Artillery comprise all those weapons in their entirety which,
though being comparable with those of the First Artillery, or the traditional
artillery, as regards their mode of use, nevertheless differed from the latter
in their technical characteristics? The Second Artillery c3oes in fact include
also the surface-air missile units. Furthermore, it could include Styx SRBM
battalions ~ssigned to coastal defense. We advance this hypothesis for. two
= reasons: certain photographs published bv the NCNA show Styx batteries on the sea-
coast, but the tactical organization of the coast artillery divisions, under the
Navy,43 do not, to our knowledge, include Styx units. ~ '
Critical Analysis
These prin~iples and moc7es of application call, in our opinion, for some comments:
- 1) The Chinese arguments in scappc~rt of the scarce probability of strategic bom-
bardments appears to us soundly based. In this regard, one cannot avoid linking
them with the slowdown noted in the ICBM, SNLE.and.SLHM programs, since,.under _
these conditions, the latter weapons would lose their priority status, at least
- for the time being. These arguments also recall those developed by Samuel T. _
Cohen and by Colonel Geneste in favor of a nuclear barrage. In particul.ar, tT~e
latter writes:
. Bombardment alone does not conquer; it only enables the conquest that -
must be effected by the army and the maintaining of infantrymen and tanks on the
objective."44
However, in the event of a Soviet-Chinese conflict, there is nothing to indicate
that the USSR would follow this reasoning. As Alain Besancon has so wisely
remarked: purely strategic reasoning is sterile if it~~45 not subjected to
political reasoning. This is the way the Soviets proceed. .
Under these conditions, although the USSR may be interested in the economic
potential of Western Europe, it need not be sparing of China for the same reasons: _
"China is neither controllable--too vast--nor exploitable--too poor--nor decisive
in the overriding socialism-versus -nonsocialism conflict."46
Besides, the concept of Soviet strategic bombardments with coercive aims cannot be
' disregarded as long as the credibility of a Chinese nuclear deterrent remains in
doubt.
During one of the conferences mentioned above, Edward N. Luttwak @eveloped a
scenario in the following sense. According to him, 140 ss-20's would be amply
sufficient for a counterforces strike on 200 Chinese objectives that would include
China's missile sites, its warhead depots, and its principal industrial and
scientific centers. This hypothesis assumes the widest dispersion possible of the
, Chinese TU-16's. The Soviet attack could be carried out in two waves of 70
J SS-20's, each delivering 210 independently targeted, high-accuracy warheads.
E. Luttwak also remarks that the Soviets would have no need to resort to their
. ICBM's. According to these figures, 28 objectives could survive the i:irst attack
and 8 could survive the second. In the event Chinese missiles were among the
survivors, no rational attitude would counsel their use: On the one hand, no
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majc~r Chinese urban center would have been destroyed during the two attacks; on
the other hand', the Soviets would have maintained such an overk=ll capability that
the few surviving Chinese missiles would inevitably lose their significance. Thxs -
is obviously only a theoretical scenario: It describes a technical possibility ~ut
does not integrate the political motivations that could inc7uce the Soviet leader-
ship to arrive at such a decision.
2) `Phc~ tactical use of Chinese nuclear weapons, for example to stop the advance
o� irivasion forces, would tend to underestimate the consequences of certain tech- ~
n~~lagical advances such as the increased accuracy of theater ballistic missiles.
Soviet advances in this domain put ~hem in a position to disarm at a distance the
forces that would oppose their offensive: The circular error of the SS-20 probably
does not exceed 300 meters. This capability moreover falls under the "preemptive"
type of attacks in the Soviet "art of war" and entails another consequence: The
Chin~se troops could no longer hope to contact the enemy troops to protect them-
- selves from an enemy nuclear sLrike,47 the enemy having used its nuclear fire at
the start of the conflict and limited its conventional forces to occupation o~
the terrain thus neutralized. Thus, an eventual Soviet-Chinese duel would subStan- -
tiate the situation described by General~Galois: The gap is widening between
. the countries equipped with mobile nuclear weapons--such as missile-launching
= submarines and very long-range bombers--and those that rely on traditional fozces.
' "The former retain the advantage of invulnerability to direct str.ikes or, at least, -
the privilege they enjoy of not being subject to being invaded unless the aggres-
sor is willing to take considerable risks in doing so. The ~atter countzies, on
the otiier hand can only submit their defense arsenals to being destroyed with n48
means for demanding a high pri~e in return. In reality, they are defenseless.
within the terms of this definition anc~ considering ~he means currently at it~
dis~osal, China falls into the second category of nations. It does not yet
possess the necessary nuclear deterrent capability--a second strike capability--
to shelter ittself from possible nuclear attacks by its big northern neighbar.
Facing Realities
A mer.e camparison of arsenals suffices to dispel all doubt: A difference of levels
exi::ts for the moment between China's nuclear ballistic weapor~s and those of the
major E.>~wers. China has remainec? at the first-generation, verv vulnerable ~
weapor~s level, wh;.le the weapons of the other powers have evolved considerably.
True, the notions of balance or equivalence--of nuclear parity--play no part in
nuclear deterrence by a weaker power against a stronger one. However, the weaker
power. cannot maintain the credibility of its threat of nuclear response unless
its weapons systems continue to convince the stronger power of the prohibitive
level of risk their destructive capability represents. General Poirier reminds us
in this regard that: "The art of deterrence is not to constrain--as in war--bur to
convince. Belief is not a static condition: One who takes a threat
_ seriously at a given moment may no longer believe it under other circumstanc~s."4g
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In the Chinese view, nuclear forces alone will not suffice to win a war. Their
use together will the other forces must also be considered. ~Generally speaking,
Chinese mi~itary doctrine takes as star~ing hypotheses the two following constants:
recognition of China's material inferiority by comparison with their potential
aggressors; but primacy of the human factor over the material one. As a corollary,
it advocates exploitatior, of the enemy's possible weaknesses. The advent of
_ nuclear weapons has not upset these hypotheses.
Initially, the atomic bomb was consider~d by China a paper tiger.,50 But the ~
puerility of this representation masked an incisive analysis of the limits being
imposed by the United States, the leading aLomic power at the time, on the use
of nuclear weapons. Without entering into detazl, we believe the Chinese leaders
had, unlike their Soviet counterparts, foreseen the passage of American nuclear
strategy from the principle of "massive retaliation" to that of the "graduated
response": The Korean war revealed that, despite their nuclear superiority, the
United States w3s unable either to prevent a conflict from erupt~.ng or to even
resolve it in its own favor.51 From China's vi.ewpoint, that American superiority
concealed an exploitable weakness.
On the international level, Peking's leaders decided to depart from the prudence
_ of the Kremlin's masters and posit its~lf as the champion of Third world revolu-
tionary movements. ~rom another standpoint, in thP~r obsession with the notion
_ of an American invasion, which.seemed a possibility as the situation evolved in
Indochina, the top leaders of the PLA drew up, near the end of 1960, a new two-
point strategy: abandon the concept of a stopping blow at its borders anc] allow
the invasion forces to penetrate deeply into Chinese territory until ~they bogged
1 down; press contact with enemy troops so that their command would not be tempted
to resort to nuclear weapons.
When China joined the atomic club, its military doctrine unde.rwent no concurrent
~ change. Although they represented two extremes, the principles of a~"peoples'
war" and eventual rec~urse to nuclear weapons appeared complementary. A peaples'
war is aimed at deterring any attempt to occupy China by resorting to prolonged
guerrilla warfare, relying, in principle, on the support of the popul~tion as a
whole. For their part, nuclear weapons would safeguard China from an attack by
weapons of the sam~ nature.
But what would happen if a potential aggressor were to discard this preconceived
scheme? If, for example, instead of seeking to occupy China, he were to limit
himself to creating an accomplished fact in the form of a military incursion of
brief duration, limited in space, but decisive by way of the means utilized. The
fact is that the conquest of China would entail more disadvantages than any
benefits it might produce: vast and ~ensely populated as it is, its occupation
would immobilize such immense resources as to divert the power undertaking this~
initiative from its other objective. By contrast, limited actions, like a"surgical
strike" or a"political lesson," would be more of a threat to China. A"surgical
. strike" would seek the destruction of its military-industrial complex, which is
concentrated in a geoqraphically very vulnerable region: natural obstacles that
are easily overcome, a vast plain made to order for maneuvers by large armored
and mechanized units, sparsely populated. A"political lesson" would serve
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essentially to demonstrate to the Peking leadership the futility of certain of its
r.urrent foreign orien~cations. Under these conditions, and once the potential
aggressor has been identified, what becomes of the preparations called for by,the _
Chinese doctrine?
The F'otential Enemy
= The material possibility of a Soviet attack does not necessarily indicate its
probability. This eventuality, however, is not to be neglected. .Soviet military~
dc>ctrine lends itself to such initiatives, especially when they are mandated by
"objectiv~ reasons."
Provisians of Soviet Doctrine
As far as can be gleaned from Soviet writings on the subject, two themes dominate
Soviet military doctrine. The first is none other than a paraphrase of Clausewitz
by Lenin: "War is the extension of policy by another means. Every war is indis-
solubly linked to the political regime from which it ensues." Thus, for the
Soviets, war results only from the bellicose actions of imperialism. In "Marxism- -
Leninism on War and the Army," p~blished in 1976, a group of Soviet officers
affirms: "It is with the utmost secrecy, but in a deliberate manner and in
accordance with a plan that has matured over a period of many years, indeed
dr_cades, t~~at the exploiting classes prepare their wars of aggression, and it is
with equal conscientiousness that their governments and their parties unleash
those wars when they judge the moment timely and most advantageous."53
The fted Army therefore cannot be other than defensive. But this conception of
defense goes beyond the national territorial boundaries, as Marshal Gretchko's
writings perceive it: "The historic function of the Soviet Armer3 Forces is not
limited solely to the defense of the motherland and the other socialist countries.
In its foreign policy activities, the Soviet state actively and intentionally
opposes the exportation of counterrevolution and political oppression�; it aids
the struggle for national liberation and resolutely opposes imperialist aggression -
in whatever distant region of the planet it may manifest itself."54
Thus, we could one day see the Soviet Armed Forces aiding "FUSNK" ~Kitaii National
Salvation FrontJ to "liberate" the Chinese people from the "Maoist dictatorship" ~
being sustained. by "world imperialism and reaction."
_ 'Objective Reasons' for an Attack
We see three: the "defense of the gains achieved by socialism," the new trend of
Chinese-American relations, and the time factor.
The Soviets identify their interests with those of socialism. Every time it has
become necessary, they have taken the required measures to "safeguard the qains
of socialism." The inhabitants of East Berlin, Budapest and Pragu~e have learned
this at c~st to them. The vigor of the Soviet reaction is explained by their
refusal to retreat from socialism. This attitude provides an understanding of
the moderation Moscow has shown until now in its behavior toward the Chinese. In
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'effect, without overlooking in the background some of its national aspects, the
~ Chinese-Soviet~eonflict has mainly taken the form of divergences over determina-
tion of the international communist movement line. And it is our opinion that
as long as the disagreement between the two countries remains on an essentially
doctrinal level the Soviets will adjust as if to the:lesser of possible evils.
On t'+e other hand, they would certainly modify their attitude if the Chinese were
to abandon the doctrinal character of their grievances. Actually, Peking's
current behavior lacks clari.ty, and its references to the "polar bear" are not
- designed to reassure Moscow. , .
Moreover, the new trend af Chinese-American relations is adding to Soviet concerns.
A genuine "Chinese card" psychosis has overtaken the Soviets. In November 1978,
Boris Ponomarev expressed to visiting American senators his concern over certain
impl.ications in the normalization of Chinese-American relations: The fact
that some circles in your country are seeking to strengthen Chinese-American ties
on the basis of anti-Sovietism cannot be other ttian disturbing."55
Far from bringing appeasement into the situation, the.subsequent unfolding of
, events exacerbated the fears of the Soviets, who were already tending toward a
fear-of-the-besieged complex. Sn October 1979, the NEW YORK TIMES revealed the
existence of 'a study ordered by the Pentagon56 on the possibility of aiding China
to defend itself in the event of a large-scale Soviet. attack. In the wake of the
- Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and less than 2 months after requesting it, China _
obtained an agreement with the United States granting i~t most-favored-nation -
status, a status the Soviets have been seeking for years.
- Time is the third reason. Certain circles in the USSR estimate that a mili-
tary incursion into China beyond the latter half of the 1980's would be too cost.ly
in relation to the results that could be obtained. This evaluation takes the
following form: ~
--1976: With the death of Mao Zedong, the "Four" were eliminated. A major hin- .
drance to the modernization of China disappeared.
--1977/1970: Political and economic reorganization~with the return of Deng
Xiaoping to power.
--1978/1979: The "New Long March" commences. As viewed from the outside, the
_ results appear less unsatisfactory than had been predicted.
--1980/1985: If development continues at the same rate, the 1976-1985 10-year plan
- will provide a solid base for the realization of the "four modernizations."
Soviet Concepts
While Soviet doctrine espouses the defensive, the Sovaet art of war, on:the
contrary, teaches the offensive or, more exactly, the preemptive action. Despite
the seeming contradiction, the preemptive action is designed to head off the
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enemy's attack, This being sa, the preemptive action must be decisive to accom-
plish its purpose. Consequently, any preemptive attack must be executed unc3er the
conditions most favorable to the obtaining of decision: superiority anc~ the
combined use of all necessary means.
Based on the three "objective reasons" we have just set forth, a Soviet preemptive
action agains China could take the form of a"lesson" or of a"surgical strik~."
These two types of action could also be brought to a conclusion.
The masters of the Kremlin would have no compunctions about displaying their
pedagogic talents if the evolution of Sino-American relations were to strengthen
their "Chinese card" obsession. The fact is that during the next 5 years--a
- period in which the probabilities of a S~viet attack against China seem high--
the F+merican nuclear commitment to defend Western Europe will be problematicdl~ ,
given the Euro-strategic and conventional superiority of the Soviets and the
balance between the American and Sova.et central systems. Nevertheless, there is
an institutional framewark of Atlantic solidarity, a framework that is absent aS
of now from the relations between the two Pacific powers. A preemptive action
would demonstrate to the Peking leadership f.he illusory nature of seeking a S~.no-
American convergence.
The 5oviet intent to undertake a"surgical strike" against the Chinese military-
industrial potential is not new. It was expressed in 1969, when Soviet military
attaches stationed in Toicyo and Canberra stated it to their American counter-
parts.57 In the context of that period, they could have been seeking to head off
the start of a Chinese-American dialog. The Americans, if advised of the Soviet
threat hanging over China, could conceivably be induced to make such demands
as would discourage the Chinese. Cuzrently, the danger is greater. In April 1978,
Hrezhnev's presence at the Red Army's large-scale~ manauvers in Siberia coincided
with the arrival of Sir Neil Cameron in China. On both sides, these events
assumed a symbolic character of the first order: Sir Neil Cameron was ii.~ fact the
first chief of staff of the army of a member of the integrated NATO command to _
visit China. It turned out, by way of this occasion, that Great Britain was the
only country, among several that had been approached, to agree to supply China
with reactors capable of equipping a new type of fighter plane being developed.
In our opinion, the Soviet warning was crystal clear and unr.~istakable: The US9R ~
will not stand by without reacting toward a China that, even as it draws clos~x
to NATO, strengthens its own rnilitary potential.
Fl.aws in the Chinese Doctrine
Mao zedong developed the principles of the "people's war" as part of the "war of -
anti-Japanese resistance." Subsequently, the Military Affairs Commission, tow~xd
the end of 1950, based its preparations against an American invasion on simildr
principles. Soviet designs would differ from those of the Japanese and from those
asccibed to the Americans. In addition, they would be favored by geography.
Under these conditions, the PLA's margin for maneuver would be small, whether or
not it resorts to nuclear wreapons.
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A Failing Doctrine
In invading Chi.na, Japan sought a colony. The Japanese presence was thus intended
to assume.a durable character. Besides, geographical constraints compelled the
Japanese to effect their penetration from East to West. The Japanese army thus
landed on Chinese territory from the sea. In doing this, it~penetrated.into
- China's overpopulated area, which has always grouped three quarters of China's ~
population in 23.5 percent of its territory. This populati~n density was there-
fore capable of becoming the breeding gYOUnd necessary to the pursuit of a"pro- ,
longed war," But ~his was all in theory. The fact is that the Japanese army _
never lost its full freedom of strategic action throughout the hostilities.
Actually, the zones occupied by the Chinese communists were never considered a
priority by the Japanese.ss In the North, these zones were either contained by
the general line of the Japanese front or were outside the main railway axes
controlled by the Japanese. In central China, the Japanese forces virtually
ignored the hinter.land.
Be that as it may, the Soviets would enter from the North, descending upon the
Manchurian plain. They would thus penetrate a very sparsely populated region, if
one judges from the following densities:
' --43 inhabitants per square kilometer in the Heilong~iang region:
--90 inhabitants per square kilometer in the Jilin region;
--215 inhabitants per square kilometer in the Liaoning region.
- It must be recalled that the mean national density is 297 inhabitants per square
kilometer. Moreover, a"prolonged war" would have no purpose unless the caviets
were to pursue their penetration. This seems very unlikely. On ~he other hand,
the Soviets could maintain themselves in Manchuria if they wanted to.
A Geography Favorable to the Aggressor
Geog~aphy favor~ the Soviet designs. Let us consider the theater of operations.
The Sino-Soviet frontier between Vladivostok and the Pamir plateau compares~in
~ length with the distance between Paris and Bombay, that is, ~,200 kilometers. This
gigantic frent is divided, however, into three sectors of approximately equal '
lengths but sharply different geostrategically, one from the other:
--the western sector, made up of mountainous rock masses, some of them reaching
altitudes of 8,000 meters;
' --the central sector, extending over sparsely populated regions of Mongolia, the '
Gobi desert;
--the eastern sector, comprising the coastal provinces of Siberia and Manchuria,
, which present a terrain that is sometimes flat, sometimes mammilated with groups
of inedium-sized, easily crossed mountains. '
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The latter sector is in northeastern China, that is, the sparsely populated but ~
Yiiqhly industrialized Manchurian plain. This plain lends ~`.self admirably to j
maneuvers by the Soviet large armored and mechanized units. These are curren�ly ~
equipped to advance 75 kilometers a day against NATO units. Against the PLA j
units, their advance would be even more rapid. They have a sustained combat range ~
af thr~e day~. Let us not forget, also, that since 1972, the Soviets have been i
building a gigantic logistical complex consisting of airports, supply dumps, '
hospirals, roads, and pipelines to sustain an eventual military incursion into
China. Aside from the new Soviet air transport capability, ~et us also recall i
that the daubling of the trans-Siberian rail line will be comple ted very soon. ~
Thus, the Soviets could, in a matter of a few days, take over an essential park of ~
China, without even penetrating toward the inte~r�ior of the country. To carry out ~
a"lesson" of a political nature, they would need merely to pursue their advan~e ~
on Peking. ~ ~
To prevent thxs, the PLA would have to be able to stop the invasion forces at the ~
frontier. But, as of now, Chinese military ~octrine exclud~s this type oE preven--
tive strike in favor of drawing the invader into the interior of its territory. ~
Conclusion
There are numerous indications that a change is in progress. The extent of this
evolution can be assessed from the decisions taken by the Military Affairs Com~
mis~ion, and especially its Bureau of Training Manual Revisions, in 1961.59 Sub-
jECC to the usual cautions, the following passage from the article by Marshal -
Xu Xiangqian, published in HONGQI on the occasion of the 51st anniversary of +tbe
founding of the PLA (1 August 1978), appears to us highly significanfie "Marxism ~ -
' will not stagnate, but will develop as practice progresses. The same holds tzu~
for the theory of people's war. It will advance as history evolves; modern war
differs from the ancient in many respects. Our enemy has experienced major -
char,ges, and our own country is very different from what it was. This requires
that we link more closely the theory of people's war enunciated by President Mao
with the new historic conditions, that we study the new characteristics and the .
laws of that war, and that we intensi~y our preparations in all domains
Defending ourselves actively and drawing the the~er,emy deep within our territqcy
are the fundamental strategic principles that will enable us to win.
Drawing the enemy deep within our territory does not mean allowing him to go where
he wishes, but rather constraining him to expose himself to our blows. We must
- concentrate powerful defenses at a few key points to prevent penetration by thP
enemy and to lead him to the battlefield we will have prepared, to annihilate
~ him."60
The Fact is that China's perception of the source c+f its dangers has changed~from
the United States to the USSR, modifying the geographic aspects of its potential
enqagements. The PLA's top leaders therefore have a keen interest in being ab1Q
to halt an invasion from the Northeast before it can cause too much devastation.
Prom the standpoint of nuclear strategyo it appears vain'to us to think in terms
of changes in the absence of a prior technological progress that would raise
China's means to current international levels. This would of course inv~lve the
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development of mobile reprisal weapons capable of escaping a preemptive strike
or, at least, of minimizing its effects. With this technical constraint as a point
of departurP, we could consider a two-phase approach: for the short term, gain time _
by developing a minimal deterrent based on present capabilities; favor the long -
term by preparing, starting now, the design of new generations of weapons.
The first phase hinges on polit'ical action. In recent years, Chinese leaders shown
shown alarm over the inevitability of a new world war, as when, at the 23d session
of the UN General Assembly (28 September 1978), Huang Hua applied.heavy shading to
this view. Huang Hua went even further to stress China's peaceful aspirations:
"Step by step, as the rivalry between the two superpowers intensifies and planetary
strategic deployments of social-imperialism spread, local wars are becoming more
numerous and the danger of worlc3 war is increasing. To delay the start of this
world war and mainkain international peace represents at this very moment an -
important task for the peoples af the different countries The Chinese people
ardently desire peace and oppose all that is leading to a new world war. Besides,
we need an international situation of peace over a long period, to rebuild our
country."bl
These statements were reiterated some days later by Hua Guofeng in his speech for
the 1 October national feast day. Despite their general character, they appear -
to be addressed particularly to the USSR. In the c::rrent evolution of the Sino-
Soviet conflict, the turn being taken by the China-United States-USSR triangular _
relationships is proving dangerous. Although the United States occupies the
privileged position of arbiter, the rigidity of Sino-Soviet relations induces an
escalation in the systematic search for reciprocal checks and balances that could
accidentally result in a war. Also, al.though we have spcken at length of the
Soviet threat perceived by China, let us not forget that the Soviets, for their
part, feel threa'�,ened by the objective rapprochement that has developed amonc~
China, the United States and Japan. Thus, China, by maintaining a certain dialog
with the USSR, is tryino to minimize the dangers of armed confrontations.
The fact is that China's military doctrine is currently inadequate, for�China
does not have the means to back its policy. As regards the long term, the Peking
leadership is counting heavily on the development of ineans to strengthen the
credibility of China's nuclear deterrent capability. Although it is still too
early to judge, we can at least discern its intention in this regard as reflected
in this statement by Su Yu on the occasion of the SOth anniversary of the �ounding
of the PLA: "We have decided to constantly improve our weapons and equipment and, '
through our own efforts, to possess the same weaponry that our enemies have,
indeed to invent new weapons."62
As regards these new weapons, two trends may actually be.taking shape. The first
would be bearing on the development of enhanced-radiation weapons, as we have
already mentioned. in our opinion, because of their nature and possible uses, ~
this type of weapons would be extremely well sui.ted to an essentially defensive _
doctrine as is that of the "people's war." However, we are aware of certain
limitations: the very small area covered by each weapon would necessitate a large
, stock of them so that their action would not result marginal and lack decisive
~ effects on the battle;63 the risk of remote disarmament would also, for that
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matker, not be resolved. To this effect, we must underscore the importance
being accorded to particle physics, which is one of the eight priority sect0=8 of
the National Scientific and Technical Levelopment Program (1978-1985). Is Ghina -
also concentrating on the development of particle-beam weapons designed for ABIK .
~Anti-Ballistic Missile~ defense?
- Annexes: � `
1. Location of Missile Production and Test Genters.
- 2. Second Artillery - Organization Chart.
3. Second Artillery - Top Leaders.
4. Missile Sites By Major Military Regions.
1. Location of Missile Production and Test Centers ~see map next page~:
1) Weapons test centers and launching test centers: Six: Shanghai, Baotou, Jining,
vicinity of Yinchuan, Qilian Shan, Shuang-chengzi (Gansu);
2) Missile manufacturing plants: Five: Zhenxi Plant (Xinjiang), Yinchuan Plaqt
- (Ninqxia), Shibao Plant (Gansu), Gansu Military Plant, Xi'an Weapons Plant; �
3) Experimental production centers: Eight: Peking, Tianji~n, Shenyang, Harbin,
Shanghai, Wuhan, Chongqing, Xining;
4} Missile engine factories: Four: Peking, Taiyuan, Xi'an, Gansu;
5) Missile warhead, body and launching ramp factories: Four: Shenyang, Harbirl.
Taiyuan, Chengdu;
6) Solid propellan ts: Three: Taiyuan, Shenyang, Xiangxiang;
7) Liquid propellants: Three: Xi'an, Lanzhou, Luda; ,
8) Guidance systems factories: One; Peking.
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