JPRS ID: 9454 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060035-4
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• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 35
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9454
19 December 1980
West Euro e Re ort
p p
(FOUO 53/80) ~
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9454
19 December 1980
WEST EUR~PE REPORT
~ (FOUO 53/80)
CONTENTS
THEATER NUCI~EAR FORCES
FRAN CE
~ Briefs
M-4 Miss ile Tes t 1
ENERGY ECONOMICS
ITALY
Objectives of National Energy Plan Summarized ~
(ATOMO E INDUSTRIA, 15 Oct 80) ..............................o... 2
_ COi~ITRY SECTION
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
PCF, Marchais Become More Isolated in Furocommunist World
(Guy Konopnicki; PARIS MAT(H, 24 Oct 80) .................oo..... 4
Ten-Year Program, Budget for EAS Outlined
(Pie~re Langereux; AIR & C~SrDS, 1 Nov 80).....:...........oo...... 8
Fr".DERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Terrorists May Plan Attack Against Bundeswehr', Qiancellor
(Michapl Wesener; 5~~~ 5 Nov ~~~~~~~~~~~c~~~~a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~� 1.~1
FRAN CE
Poll: Giscard Ahead of Mitterrand, RPR Divided, PC~-PS Close
(Albert du Roy; L'EXPRESS, 8-14 Nov 80) 17
PS Adherents Increase Greatly To Form 'Axis' of Society
(Roland Cayrol; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 1Q-16 Nov 80)............ 25
-a- IIII-WE-150.FOU0]
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Manufrance II Liquidated: Fate Linked With 1981 Election
(LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 27 Oct~2 ~Nov ~BU; ~~?ALEURS
~
ACTUELL,ES, 27 Oct-2 Nov 80) 2
Tapie's Role, by Anne Gaillard ;
Those Responsible, by Jean-Francois Gautier ,
Use of 'Canasta' Light Amplification Apparatus Discussed ~
(Javier Taibo :.rias; DEF~ENSA, Aug-Sep 80).....���������������� 3' ;
Briefs .,5 ,
Civil Defense Exerc~ses ;
ITALY
7nterview With Spadolini on PSI-PCI Dispute
(Gian Paol~ Vitale; IL I~DNDO, 3 Oct 80) 36
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SPAIN '
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UDC's 'Young Turks' React to Party's Ideological Problems ~
(J. Luis Gutierrez; CAN~IO 16, 29 Jun 80) 3~ I~
;
SWE DF~i '
Social Democrats' Strategy in Oppositian Discussed ~
(Stefan Mehr; VECKANS AFFARER, 23 Oct 80) 42
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- ' THEATER NUQEAk FORCES ~ FRANCE
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i BRIEFS
i M-4 MISSILE TEST--The first test of the M-4 missile (10,000 kilometsr rangej which
~ is to replace the M-3 (6,000 kilometer range) has been effected at Biscarosse
[test center?]. The results show it to have received a rating of 20/20
I [presumably, perfect], [Text] (Paris PARIS MATCH in French 5 Dec 80 p 74]
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~ CSO: 3100
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ENERGY ECONOMICS ITALY
OBJECTIVES OF NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN SUMMP?RIZED
Rome ATOMO E INDUSTRIA in English 15 Oct 80 pp 8, 9
[Text]
Among the various measures thet sior? oi primary sowcea ea ~well es iFie !mplementatlon of t~e � rene-
the audden fail of the Rome Ga that of the supplying countrlea, and wsble Sources� pro~ect;
vermnent has Qaralysed, the offl- the creatJon of adequete atrateglc the productlan of naturu~ gas
cfal ~resentation of the definitive reserves; wlll drop sllghtly from the present
version of the neri Nation~l Energy - cholcea of iechnology and ol 12.5 6!lllon cuBlc metres to 8 6Il-
Pian (FfN) was of vital importan- p~ocurement ~pollcy whlch wlll la- 1lon cublc metrea !n 1990, In sp/te _
- ce for the energy future of t~he vour the itolian lndustrlal syatem of. Intenslfled prospecting eNorta
- country. This documertt +nras being !n qualiiying and markefing Its lor new deposlta, partJcularly to -
com~pleted at the Ministry� af in- own producta end syatema on the meke !t posslble to create a atra-
dustr~, which was makfng the ~ast lnternatlonal market. feglc reaerve;
modifications resulting from the Sk?ce t~he energy consumption fo. - the {~roductlon of oll wlll go
recent )ourneys ofi the Mirtfster reseen ~For 1990 without the adoQ- up from the present f.8 Mtoe to
#rimself, Sen. ,Antanio 8isagl~la, to tion aF contalrxnerrt meaaures, cor- 2.5 Mtoe In f990;
Algeria and to the lh~ited States, responds to ebout 220 MMa, tfie the productlon of solid (uels,
where fie had negotiated the sup~ maln aim of 4he Plan ts to seve malnly .Sulcis coal and Ilgnlte, wlll
ply of impartant quantities af Qr(- 20 Mtoe/year to that date. This reach 2 Mtoe
mary energy sources for italy. T#?e goal ~a conaMered r anything but T#te cantributian of the sources
proc~ram o~` the ne~w government easy: In fsct lts attalnment calls just ~fsted tneticmal in the stNct
in the energy fie{d avlFl not be able, for determineHon and the con� sense, wlth the exclualon, that is,
hawever, to depart rnuch from aent of social partles af nuclear energy) corresponds to
what has already bee~ laid down T~e development rate of the 24�7 Mtoe. To cover the remainir?g
by this new verslan of QEN, which, Grqss Fntemsl Product on whicfi requi~ements to reach the goal of
in ats main Fines, has already been tfie Pdsn hea been canstructed, is ! 200 Ju~toe; ~~t MiNl~be necessery to
made known, even ~f not officialdy. estk?teted at between 3.0�io and 'have recou~se to the intportstlon F�
The eims of the new QEN {~h~h 3.5 ~er cent. `of foreign sources amounting to a -
also in~ludes projections to the The contr~bution o~f nsNo~el sour- total of 175.3 MMe. The documont
year 2000~ are summed uQ for 1990 ces to satisfy the energy requtre� , then analyses the {>osgibiFltles aF-
in five main poi+rts: ments, ~s foreseen as fioNows: fered by each of ~the latter, begfn- -
. - adoptlon of a vlgorous energy natuiel hydroelect~ls produc� ~ning with coal.
- saving pollcy and af !ts more ra� tion, In an average hydrologlca/ The maxJmum contrlbutlon that ~
tlonal use In al! co?~sumer sectors, year, wlll go up lrom the present can be envlsaged altogether for Im-
so as to, contaln the' energy de- 44,3 TWh/yesr to 50 TWh/yeer !n ported coal may reach, !n f990, 55
mand w/thin the limlt of 200 Mtoe; l990. For thls purpose a lerge part m1111on ions, cor~esponding to 34
- reductlon of the present de- o/ the plants that can stlll be rea� Mtoe. Thls wlll Imply a consldera-
_ pendency on oll (SB% !n 19T9) to llzed wlll be bullt and dlamantled ble extenalon oi the uae of cosl loi
50% of the total energy requlre- power statlons wil be reaotlvated non-electNc uses, the lmplemente-
_ ments, by Ilmlt~ng Imports of cru� completaly; tlon ot en expar?ded progrem of
de oll to about f00 milllon tons, - geothermaelectric productlon new coal power statlons, acco?ding
and developing the use o~ e/terna ry~p po up from the present 2.5 to CIPE's dlrectlves ol i1 January
tlve end competit/va se~urces, partl� TWh/year to 4.0 TWh/year. This 1980. The reallzatlon of this alm
culerly coal, nuclear, gas and re- estlmate la besed on a hf~ly de- lnvolves a serles of lmportant ec�
newable aources; gree ol success o/ the researches tions, speclfied ln the proJect !n
- maxJmum recourse poaslble to In progiess and planned; questlon, for thq constructlon of
netlona/ energy sourcea; - the contrlbutlo.~ o/ � new � !nlrastructures and the prompt sIt-
reducTlon ol tha rlaks o/ ener� aources, ma/nly solar energy, rd1U !ng and Ilcensing oi the new powei
py procurement through the expen- reach 2 Mtoe/year, as a reFUlt of statipns.
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' The mexlmLm coptrlbutlon that to ~AAontalto di Castro, and the si- more than f2 Mtoe/ear, whlle the
can 6e envlsaged, still /or 1990, ior multaneous stsrt on the other eight contributl4n of natlonal naturel gas
lmported gas, !s 31.4 Mtoe (equal plertts ~Foreseen. Also as regards wlll remaln In tne order of 6.5
to abou~ 38 bl!llon cu61c metres), sites, the choi~ces of Piedmont, Mtoe/year, ihat o/ oll about 2.5
of whJch about 24 Mtoe have al- ~~be~Y. frluli snd Aputia are Mtoe/year end that of natlonel so-
resdy been ecqulred on the basls confirmed. As far es we know, 1~ fuels (Sulcis coal) 3 Mtoe/year.
of contracts; the gas pro~act Indlce- there are no indications ~n tfie 7he remelnMg requlrements,
tes ~he necessary acdons to permit Plan about the most recent hypo- which !n tlie year 2000 wlll lnevita-
thls strong lncrease In the con- thesis nnrhich ~dentifled a ske in bly htnre to 6e covered wTth hydra _
sumptlon of natural gas, in partl- the island af Aianosa. carbon and cor! Imports and wlth -
cular as regards the Infrasturctu- To carry out the coal plan, a recourse to nuclear energy, can ba
res of transportatlon end dlsirlbu- start wil~l be made on t~he construa eveluated, as a more hypothesls,
tion, tion of 6 pa+ver stations with two around 185-205 Mtoe. ln the n?ne-
The contrlbut~on ol nuclear ener- 9~Pg of 640 ,MWe. The first two tles, therefore, a quota of these re-
gy should reach a value ot at least will be constructed in Taranto and qulrements (a6out 72 Mtoe) seems
10 Mtoe by 1990 through rapid sIt- BaSN~ ~~~rana on the ~o, bet- destMed to be covered by ene.
ing lor the lnstallat(on of at least ween Pavie and Voghera, two power sources for the use oi which the
4.000 Mw, as well as the 2,000 Mw~ station wiN be oonstructed Fn Gioia r aent ~plan elready foresees the
of the Monralto dl Castro stat/on. Tauro, while the altes fieve ~ot yet P~
!n the meantlme It wTll 6e necessa� besn chosen for ifie Tuscan one construcilon o/ the plants and In-
ry to start /nvestlgatlons for the and the Abruzrl one. irastructures necessary; It refers,
sltln,q of the slx other p/ants ~or This is the new PEN ~n Its ekna ~n Partlcular, to coel anr! nuclear
whlch provlslon Is mede In the up to 1990. The authors, hawever, statlons (the letter eveluated on
Enel plan, To cover energy requlre- fek tfie necessty af attemptMg en the hypothesla that the whole com-
ments, oll would contrlbute only approach also to the ~ntermediate plex of i2 tbousand Mw wlll 6e
i03 Mtoe, of whlch 101 imporred, periad, as the one that aeparates ;.anstructed) end to the lnfiastruc-
correspondlny to Juat over 509'. oi us from 2000 1s now to be const- turea lor the trantportetlon end d!-
the country'a enerpy demand. dered. In thls perspect}ve the Plan ~trlbutlon of netural gas. As re-
Tiie remaining 103 ~Atoe would iderrtifies ~n greater recourse to yards the remelning quate of re- I
~be covered by oll wh~h would nuclear energy, also ~rith the corr~ qulrementa (114134 Mtoe), the i
thu~ pess from 68�k an ~1979 to 50 plete uti~ization of the urartium~ cholces ramaln_open ea to the ener-
per cent ~n covering italian tota~ plutonium cy~le, the only solutlon gy sourcea to be sdopted: In ti?la !
requirements. to the energy Qroblems of 2hat framework, taklnp Into account the
for aFl the inftiatives to be taken, t;me. ~ect that oll aupplles, In the nln9-
the ~Plan Indicates In detall the ~ It seems problematlcal to fo~- tlqa, wlil hava become scarcer and ' _
operators avho are made responst- mulate hypotheses a6out energy ?e- procurement more, expenalve, the
ble for the attainment of the aims. qulrements !n the year 2000 - Jt neceaslty o( greeter recourae to '
For each energy sour~e, as well as 1s sald In the pari ol the new PEN nuclear energy !s env/saged, ior ~
for all the ~horizontal actions (sav- that has been made known 1t which preparatlon must be made
ing, research, Mformation, environ- Js extremely pro6able, howeve~, Immedletely.
ment), Investment estimates have that the fundsmental outlMe, d~awn Even !f ihe year 2000 may appear ,
- besn Qrepared, amounting to 45-50 /or the efghtles, wlll malntaln che- e horizan that Is stl11 very dfsiant,
thousand bllllon lire at prese~nt va- racterlstlcs thet are slmllar quaUts- it must be conaldered, In fect, thet
lue, For supplies o~F coal end the tlvely also for ihe tollowing deca- ener~y cholces preaent very lonp
necessary irr6rastruetures, between de. The energy strategles ior those tlmes of lmplementatlon (up to
15 and 18 thousand billion wlll be rears wIl! have, that !s, the seme ~p.~2 years). It Is understendable,
= invested, while }ust to carry out characterlstlc as the ones deNned therefore, that ihe checks to 6e
the savings est(mated, an experr so far. By and large, for !he yea~ carr! out and t e ie etlve eci-
diture of 5-6 thousar~d bidlian will 2000 the maxJmum conirlbutlon alons can be postponed turther ,
be necessary. that can be foreseen for natla?al only for e very few yeara: thla,
. In partlcular for the ~mplemen- primary sources !s estlmated at 34 em~g othar thlnpa, ~uatlflea the
tation af the nuclear program, an Mtoe, broken down as lollows: geo- d~~slon to make thls energy plan
expenditure of 10-12 thousand b(i- thermal and solar energy wlll con- e� sllding ~ one, an updating being -
Iian 1s foreseen. TMs program ma- trlbute w?th about 10 Mtoe/year p/anned In the next three years
kes provlsian for tfie coming into pppp; hydroelect?Ic energy, even
- operation, by �1990, af 4 plants uf )n ihe hypothesfs o/ a complete :
1.000 M'We, ~n edditlon, of rnurac?, exploltatlon of resourcea, cannot 6e -
CODYRIC~iT: 1980 by Edizioni Atomo e Ind�stria
CSO : 3120
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INTERI~'ATIONAL AFFAIRS
COUNTRY SECTION
PCF, MARCHAIS BECOME MORE ISOLATED IN EUROCOMirfUNIST WORLD
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 24 Oct 80 pp 42-43
[Article by Guy Konopnicki:"All the European Communist Parties Against Marchais"]
[Text] Under the thunder of applause of the delegates at the National Conference
of the French Communist Party, one man appeared tiriumphant. Tk:at man was obvi-
ously Georges Marchais. The leaders of his party are unanimously with him after
two years of crises, exclusions and resignatinns. Nevertheless, something is not
quite right in this triumph. The assurance of the Secretary General seems to hide
a persistent malaise. 3omethin~ which worries people at the Place du Colonel
Fabien [PCF headquarters]. Marchais '~cnows,that some men around him are keeping
quiet and waiting for his fall and that they have two discreet and efficient al-
lies, Santiago C3rrillo and Enxico Berlinguer. Conmaunism is, after all, an inter-
nai`ional movement, and although the French Communist Party is constantly putting a
new layer of tricolor paint on its politics, nothing can be done against this _
reality. It is all the more impossible to think of it strictly at the national
level that Europe no�~a exists politically, and tha.t outside of some very peculiar
groups such as the French Gaull.ists or Basque and Catalonian regionalists, only
- European currents seem to exist. Whether ecologists, neo-Nazis, socialists,
liberals or communists, all the political currents are now continental currents.
Within European communism, the French Communisrs are in a more than delicate sit-
_ uation. The Conference o.f European Parties, which convened in Brussels last week,
consecrated the differences, or rather the lack of agreemsnt, between the French
Communist Party and all the other Communist parties. Naturally L'HUMANITE a~-
tempted to minimize the impact of a meeting whose three main actors: the
Spaniard Carrillo, the Italian Berlinguer, and our very own Marchais were absent.
But nobody can deny the concrete result of the conference: whereas the lin~ of ~
the French Communist Party is backed by Moscow, the European Communist Parties,
including the French speaking ones, show their preference for the Italians and
the Spanish.
French Delegation Hu~uiliated
At the conclusion of the Brus~els meeting, Manuel ti.zcarate, a member of the
. leadership of the Spanish Communist Party, could hide neither his satisfaction
with nor his complaints against the French ~raitor. And how sizable were hi~
complaints! The French delegation had to submit to hum~liation for two whole
days. From the very be~inning, the Italians and Spanisl~ were imposing an
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- unusual style to the discussions. Breaking wi.th the traditional droning of the ,
woo~en tongue type of speeches peculiar to coimnunist meetings, they started a
frank, dir.ect, and cor~trov~rsy-oriented dialogue. This style breaks not only -
with the past of the Communist movement, but also with the present of the French
Party which, this past week~nd at NanCerre, preferred to keep with the old tra-
ditions of the triumphant type of speech. People argued in Brussels; in Nanterre,
they slept whfle waiting for applause to awaken th~ from time to time. Naturally
these problems ot form are related to political problems, and not just a~.y politi- '
cal problem: for Georges Marchais, the European framework is responsible for the
economic crisis, the Federal Repul~lic of Germany is the principal enemy of the _
- w~rkers, and Socialists are traitors throughout Europe. No other European Com- .
_ munist Party follows this kind of reasoning, not everi the very pro-Soviet German -
Communist Party which breathed easier when they saw Hel~ut Schmidt defeat
F. J. Strauss in ti7e last elections. The Italian courmunists, for instance, are
making the search for a union with the German socialists the axis of their ,
European policy. The Spaniards are backing their country's demand for integration
within the Common riarket. And Manuel Azcarat~e does not appreciate the opposition
of the French Communist Party: "It is the Portuguese Communist Party's right to
oppose its country's entrance into the Common Mar~~et", ?1e says, "but it is intol- -
erable for the Fiench Co~nunist Party to oppose the acceptance of the Spanish. i
They defend ttie privileges of the rich against the poorer countries of Southern ~
Europe ~
And he adds: "The attitude of the French is incoherent". There is no chance for
European communists to be reassured by reading Charles Fiterman's repor~ from
- Candidate Marchais' coronation ceremony. Whi~e the participants in the Brussels .
meeting agree in considering that the crisis is neither French or European, and
not even Western since it involves the Socialist countries themselves, Charles
Fiterman proclai.ms "The crisis comes from nowhere else". And the whole orienta- '
tion of the electcral campaign of the French Communist Party rests on this illu-
sion of a French solution, on the ~,rill to slow the pace of European construction.
For the French Communist Party, Europe is still America's pri~;ate hunting preserve
while on the other hand, Manuel Azcarate states "Europe is ~asing up its subordi-
nation to the Americans. The French and German governments and the European ~
capitalists are tryir.g to build their own power. Should we fight against this?" '
i
The differences are certainly not new. Enrico Berlinguer did not hesitate to
establisn contacts with Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and even the French
Socialists. His representative in Brussels Gianni Cervetti told me frankly "we
- see the continuation of a leftist majority in the Bundestag as a posi~tive ele- ~
- ment in the European situation". If such a statement were made by a French '
lef tist politician, he would draw upon himself the fire of L'HUMANITE. ~
French Communist Party Prefers Husayn and Qadhadhafi to Israel
Statements such as these are indeed made by communists. It is certainly passible ~ I
to believe that there are several communist lines in Europe but, once again, we i
no 1Qnger live in the days of nations and Georges Marchais' actions disturb his i
"brothers" because they occur on the same continent. The brothers in question
are all the more worried that they fear a renewal of fasCism after the terrorist
incidents in Bologna, Munich, and Paris and that they ar~ hoping for a large ,
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scale anti-fascist European mobilization which would include the forces of the
Democrats, Christian Democrats and Social~sCs. But there again, the French
Communist Party stands alor~e. Everywhere in Europe, Communists have suggested
~ unitarian demonstrations to their sociali~t friends whereas in Paris, Georges
Marchais was refusing to appear at the head of a parade together with the
_ Socialist Party leaders. On the day of the opening of the Brussels meeting, the
tiny Belgian Co~unist Party was proposing a unitarian demonstration with the
socsalists. Two days later at Nanterre, Charles Fiterman minimized the fascist
danger by saying: "In countries such as ours, the bourgeo3.sie and imperialism
- can no longer resort, or try to resort, to fascism in the same conditions as half
a century ago as a means of government". And Fiterman managed to co~ent on the
terrorist bombing at Rue Copernic without ever referring to its antisemitic as-
pect, being content to use the vague Cerm racism. The National Conference of
the French Communist Party which took place in such a troubled atmosphere never
bothered to address a few words to the representatives of the Jewish community
which, after the Rue Copernic bombing, woul.d have been the least they could have
done. But it is true that the French Communist Party considers Jewish institu-
tions as contaminated because of their natural ties to Israel and prefers to _
ente�rtain relations with Saddam Husayn and Qadhadhfi. The contradictions be-
tween communist parties on the question of fascism are certainly more important
that it seems. They underscore the fundamental differences between the Eurocom-
munists and the French Co~unist Party. The former, having learned from their
own history, are more deeply attached to democrat~c liberties than Georges
March~is' party. They believe that, in the world where we live, Eur~pe is an
incomparable democratic area, even if social inj ustice, attacks upon liberty,
and insecurity are still significant. One can appreciate this position of the
_ Eurocommunists as one wishes, but it is impossible to deny it.
- They Retain the Presumptiveness of the French Spirit -
The Spanish Communists, for instance, have had to bear with Franco's totalitari-
anism for too long not to be able to make a difference between their new regime
and the previous one, even if capitalism governs Spain under Juan Carlos as it
did under Frdnco. Italians, who have withstood the first fascist regime in his-
- tory, have remained deeply scarred. It rollows that the break with Stalinism
was mnre obvious in communists who knew better than anyone the price of democracy. _
The French, or at least the present leaders of the Party are less sensitive to
these problems. They are carrying out a short-sighted policy whose only preoc-
cupation is to retain their own power and their score at the voting booth. It is
remarkable to see the difference with leaders such as the Spanish Ma.nuel Azcarate.
= One can say that our coBnnunists are French in the worst sense of the word. Of
French philosophy, they have only retained Descartes' mathematical reasoning and
of the French spirit they have only retained the presumtiveness. The other two
Latin communist parties deal in politics with an attractive brilliance and _
finesse. On the European scene, the French Communist Party is not up to fighting
the influence of Carrillo and Berlinguer. The Western Communists have stopped
Caking Georges Marchais seriously. Even the small Belgian Communist Pa~rty is "
tired of this too powerful neighbor and its domineering ways. Brussels is closer
to Rome than to Paris and Georges Marchais irritates militants from French-
- speaking Belgium by his presence everywhere in the media and by the image of
~ communism he present~ to Belgians. Because in Belgium, French and surrounding
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radio and television stations have such an influence that the Walloon audience
- knows Marchais better than their own communists, and as seen from Belgium,
Marchais does not look well: the chauvinism he shows is badly f elt by people
who are the constant target ot the French lack of humor. An anecdote will
serve to illustrate the stat, af mind of the Belgian Communists: a militant
whom I was asking his opinion of Marchais replied: "when I see him on TV, I
always think he is going to tell a Belgian joke" [an ethnically derogatory
~okeJ. Marchais' international posture has been badly battered during the
l.ast few months, and even if our boxer can take punches, it looks bad on the eve
of an electoral campaign. At longer range, the maintaining of the Eurocomr~unist
line in the rest of Europe may become a factor in the evolution of the French
Communist Party. At the present time, Marchais remains on his positions.
But if he cannot lead his party to success, the foreign communist parties model
will assume new strength in France. Some signs may lead one to believe that
there is no obvious consensus behind the Secretary General. Logically, Maxime
Gremetz, the :,ecretary General's most trusted friend should have been represent-
ing the pari:y at the Brussels meeting. But within a few mon*_hs, the man respon-
sible for the French Communist Party's foreign policy discredited himself with
the international co~unist movement by the unbelievable emptiness of his think-
ing.
Georges Surrounded by Traitors i
It is therefore Rene Piquet who went to Brussels. More flexible and more open
to discussions, he was the man of the situation. But he preferred to return
to Paris at the very start of the discussions and leave it to two lower ranking
colleagues to defend the party's theses. Traitors are really surrounding the
unhappy Georges . . _
COPYRIQiT: 1980 par Cogedipresse S.A.
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QOUNTRk SECTION
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
TEN-YEAR PROGRAM, BUDGET FOR EAS OUTLINED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 1 Nov 80 pp 48-SO -
[Article by Pierre Langeceux: "Annual Ceiling of 2.5 Billion Francs To Be Set
on ESA Budget"]
[Text] The European Space Agency's new director general, Erik Quistgaard, briefed
the ESA Council, at i:.s 22-23 October 1980 meeting, for the first time on the pro-
posed European space plan for the 10-year period 1981-1990. -
This is the first 10-year plan established by ESA since the agency's formation in
1975. The plan sets forth principles, establishes budgets, and defines those
. programs ESA wi11 "reasonably" be able to initiate over the next 10 years in a
climate of relative austerity, indeed even of declining f inancial resources.
~ Hence the plan calls for reducing ESA's annual budget to 450 million accounting
units (MUC) at 1979 prices, i.e. about 2.5 billion francs, beginning in 1983 and
continuing to the end of the present decade. It may be recalled for purposes of
comparison that the current 1980 budget is 670 MUC. 1'his new 450 MUC-ceiling
would permit implementation of a"basic program" consisting, as is currently the
case, of mandatory programs--general budget, sci~ence--and optional programs--
application, technology, launchers--in which partieipation by member countries _
is voluntary and according to their means. In r~utlining the plan, the director
general told the ESA Council that this ceiling of 450,MUC per year "will not
permit Europe to be competitive in all fields." This reduced budget will merely
allow ESA to maintain Europe's space effort at its present level "in certain
fields," namely those f or wh ich Europe is best prepa red. _
Quistgaard also said that tl~is plan "cannot be implemente~ with the ESA's present
organizational structure." In fact, he is now reorganizing the agency's top
~ management staff in an effort to increase the agency's efficiency by reducing
administrative tasks. Henceforth, all directors will have full and complete
responsibility for their programs.
The director general pointed out that while total outlays for research and devel- `
- opment--calculated on a per capita and percentage of GNP basis--are approximately
the same in Europe and the United States, 1.8 and 2.2 percent respectively, the
same is not true in the space sector. The United States actually allocates 0.2
percent of GNP to space programs, whereas Europe limits itself to 0.04 percent, _
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or five times less. Annual space expenditures--civilian and military--total -
about 8 billion accounting units (UC) in the United States--and the USSR--but
- on1.y 1 billion UC in I:urope f'or national and European Community programs com- ,
- bined. Furt.hennore, Europe'S chief space powers--France and Germany--are
largely outdistanced by J~~an which has been steadily expanding its space ~
Pffart these past few years.
Quistgaard said he believed it was "unrealistic" to expect European financial -
resources for space programs to rise appreciably above 1 billion ac~ounting units !
per year in the 1980's. As a result, he has concluded that Europe cannot hope `
- to become "fully competitive" and must rather seek to become competitive "in a ,
limited numher of fields" while continuing, however, "to remain active" in all ~
of its present activities! ~
Placing a 450-MUC ceiling on the ESA annual budget from 1983 to the end of the
decade would thus make it possible to implement that basic program whicn is con- ~
sidered "the minimum critical prog ram" re~uired to enable Europe to retain a
_ high standing among space Fowers. ~
Yet the ESA director general did foresee an inevitable "decline" in activities I
during 1982-1983 owing to the absence of duly-approved new programs, particu- I
larly in the telecommunications an d e~rth observation fields. But the situat3.on
is expected to return to "normal" by the end of Che decade. i_
Quistgaard also felt it might be possible to augment the basic program with '
optional (a la carte) "supplemental programs" in which certain member states
, could participate. Such initiatives would enable the annual budget to be ;
raised to about 680 MUC by the end of the decade; in other words regain its ;
1980 level (in constant prices). But under present circumstances, it is by
no means clear that such a prospect is feasible, or at the very least, it is
still difficult to perceive what level the supplemental program cuuld really
attain. Consequently it would be risky to count too much on these resources.
On the assumption that a consensus of the ESA members will approve a budget
restricted to 450 MUC per year, the plan calls for the following efforts in the ;
4 main areas of ESA activity: science, earth observation, telecomm?unications, aid ~
i
launch venicles. 1 ;
Scientific Program ~
- This program involves a community of some 2,000 researchers and technicians
working in about 100 European laborator ies. I ts bu dg e t i s e x p e c t e d t o r i s e
from its current (1980) level of 90 MUC to 130 MUC per yEar by 1990. But its !
first appreciable increment will not occur until 1984. This budget would, how-
ever, permit implementation of only two major scientific satellite projects plus
three or four other smaller-scale pro~ects during the 1980's. The number of i
projects is also affected by the noticeable trend toward some sophisticated ,
missions these past few years: Exosat [X-ray research satellite], ISPM [Inter- ~
national Solar-Polar Mission], Hipparcos [astronomy satellite], and Giotto '
~
[Halley's Comet flyby] . Such projects also reflect European ambitions and ,
competence in this field. ~ -
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- Contr3stingly, it would be possible to initiate an average of one new project
per year in the 1990's. These would include three or four major projects--
large optical telescope, high-energy telescope, magnetospheric and planetary `
_ probes, etc--as well as six or seven small pro~ects involving more specialized
satellites. There would also be continued cooperation with NASA.
A new microgravity research program is to be initiated by ESA in the early 1980's.
This field of research has generated mounting in~erest among specialists in the
life sciences and materials sciences. It will be a minor program, however,
_ with a budget of only some 5 MUC per year in the final years of the decade.
ESA's role in this program will consist mainly in furnishing technical assistance
to new experimenters, coordinating the use of co~on space resources, and conduct-
ing certain basic research experiments. The program essentially involves contin-
uing--after the first Spacelab mission (FSLP [First Spacelab Payload])--to use
the manned orbital laboratory for a few experiments in space biomedicine (with
such devices as the space sled and the Biorack) and space metallurgy (wit~1 fur- _
_ naces, etc).
Earth Observation Program
- This program encompasses both climatology and the remote sensing of earth resources.
It will be a major activity which the ESA's director general descri.bed as likely
to lead to "considerable economic benefits." Quistgaard did, however, deplore
the program's belated start. He also noted "the important national initiative"--
France's SPOT [Earth Resources Observation Satellite]--already taken outside the
agency, a project ESA rejected a few years ago. In Quistgaard's opinion, the ~
_ European earth observation program must be :.onsidered "complementary" to national
programs. It must, therefore, concern itself with disciplines not being exploi~ed
elsewhere, by giving priority, for example, to cli.matology, including observati.on
of the oceans. ESA's objective is to participate ix~ the world climatology program.
To this end, the earth observation program's budget is to be doubled i.n the 1980's,
increasing from its current 43 MUC per year to 86 MUC per year in 1990, with a
- "peak" of 99 MUC in 1985.
The earth observation program for the 1980's thus calls for the use of the Euro- ,
pean Sirio 2--for 2 years--and Meteosat 2--for 3 years--satellites to the exclu-
- sion of future operational weather satellites not included in the basic program.
It also calls for extension of the remote sensing program. All of this still
has to be approved, however. There are also plans to launch two new satellites
in the 1980's: a climatic research satellite called Climatsat and an ocean and
ice observation satellite designated ERS-1, and perhaps a third earth observa-
tion satellite known as ERS-2. It is also planned to begin preparation in the
late 1980's for the launch of a small Earth Kinematics satellite in the 1980's. �
This satellite would monitor rotation of the earth and movement of the poles as
a possible aid to navigation and earthquake prediction.
- Telecommunications Program
Unlike the two aforementioned programs, this program will decline drastically--
_ from 133 MUC per year in 198Q to 45 MUC per year. by 1990--despite mushrooming _
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~ v~? V1 a iVl[1~J UJii Vl\L1 '
requirements and the prospects of developing new geostationaryysatellites. The
ESA program calls first for launching the L-SAT [large communications satellite]
in rhe 1980's. Yroduction of this satel].ite has not yet been approved. L-SAT
i s designed to test and demonstrate new items of equipment. The program then
c alls for development of ~ new experimental satellite, the AOTS (Advanced Orbi-
tal Test Satellite) for expinring, inter alia, intersatellite communications
links. Also included in the program is preparation of a giant communications
satellite, Che OAS (Orbital Assembly System), consisting of a large orbital
- station assembled in orbit, or of a"cluster" of small satellites positioned in
the same geostationary location and interconnected by radio.
L aunch Vehicle Program
This program is also likely to undergo important changes in the 1980's. The
- actual direction this program should take is still not clearly discernible, and
w ill not be as long as the Ariane launcher has not proved itself and Spacelab
:ias not demonstrated its usefulness. ESA has wisely decided, therefore, to
keep its two major options open, without firmly choosing, for the moment, between
conventional launch vehicles--Ariane and follow-ons--and manned spacecraft such ,
~ as the Space Shuttle, Spacelab, and follow-ons. Funds for the launcher develop- i
ment program are to drop sharply from the current 344 MUC per year to only 93
MUC per year by 1990, This reduction can be ascribed, however, to completion
oE the two major development programs approved in 1973, namely Ariane and Space- ;
lab . ~
' Continued upgrading of the independent European Ariane launcher family through ,
the Ariane 4 version is called for in the ESA plan, and even approved for the
larger launchers designated Ariane 2 and Ariane 3. The requirement--by early '
1985--for a second launch pad, ELA-2, in Kourou, French Guiana, is also recog- _
nized. ESA has not earmarked funds for this project in its basic program because
it considers construction of this launch pad to be the responsibility of Ariane-
space, the commercial launcher organization that is to handle the European launch
vehicle's operational flights. Funds for the European launcher program also drop
sharply from 212 MUC in 1980 to merely 18 MUC per year by 1990. ;
Hence long-term options beyond Ariane 4 remain open with respect to what ESA
ca11s the Future European Launcher (FEL). Europe will have to decide whether it
chooses automatic or manned systems, expendable or recoverable launch vehicles, ~
and whether it wants to retain its independent launch capability or, on the con-
trary, prefers cooperation (with the United States). ESA will, however, assume
responsibility in 1986 for the Ariane S project whose HM-60 high-thrust cryogenic
motor is now in the predevelopment phase in France. ESA is also planning to
develop for future missions an independent power system that is reignitable in
flight and called the "propulsion module."
In discussing Spacelab, the ESA's director general said he "understood the reluc- _
tance" of potential users to invest in that project until the first Spacelab ,
- flight fully demonstrates the new space laboratory's�usefulness. Yet in the
present draft of the basic program, ESA has no funds with which to include full
use of Spacelab or finance the launching of payloads prepared by experimenters
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(as ESA does for satellites). ESA plans only a"limite~ effort" on the study
of future Spacelab developments, with due consideration of the possibilities
of cooperation with NASA, possibilities ~rhich still have to be defined, however.
Funds for the Spacelab program are drastically slashed from 132 MUC per year in
19f10 to 15 MUC per year in 1990.
Implementation of these future scientific and applications programs also rests -
upon an "important technological research program" which ESA hopes to develop
in the 1980's. Funds earmarked for the ESA technology program will climb,
therefore, from 32 MUC per year in 1980 to 50 MUC per year by 1990.
The proposed European space plan for 1981-1990 has been "well received" by
~ member states. So we were told by the director general who views the discus-
sions in both the ESA Executive Board and Council as having been "positive."
The plan does actually seem to have been favorably received by a certain number
of inember countries, France included, but it has also been highly criticized by
others, such as Great Britain, for example, which believes the telecommunications
program is noC sufficiently expanded. Several small member states are also very
sensitive to any changes in the science and technology programs because they
constitute a large part of their space activity.
- Consequently the problem is now one of ref ining the proposed plan by taking into
account each member's resources and interests. A revised version of the 10-year
space plan is scheduled, in principle, to be submitted to the ESA Executive Board
at its next meeting on 25 November. It seems most unlikely, however, that all
viewpoints can be reconciled in so li~tle tima. Ins~ead it will necessarily
take another several months to obtain a f inal consensus on a document which, -
given its importance to the future of the European space effort, obviously
ought to receive the approval of inember states at the highest level. In fact,
the ESA's director general has recommended convening a ministerial conference
- to confirm the commitment of Europeans to this 10-year space plan.
Reorganization of ESA Directorate
_ In preparation for ESA's future activities and particularly its 10-year plan for
1981-1990, the agency's director general, Erik Quistgaard, has reorganized its
directorate.
- Michael Bignier has been named director of space transport programs. This is a
new office consolidating the Spacelab and Ariane programs. Bignier retains di-
rect responsibility for the former and Raymond Orye for the latter.
Mr Mallet of Great Britain was appointed director of the communications satellite
program replacing Mr Luksch effective 31 January 1981.
An ESA programs planning and control group attached to the director general will
- replace the former office of future programs.
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^^v~ ~ (liPROjET DE REPARTITION DES ENVELOPPES BUDGETAIRES
700 DES PROGRAMMES ESA DANS LE PLAN DECENNAL 1981-1990 ~ -
600 ~3~ ~4~
; ~ APP~ouve Nouveou
, '
. � ,
500 ' �
� ARIANE ~ � BASELINE � 450 MUC/an 5
.
' , (6) LANCEURS ~nouveou)~, FUTUAS SYSTEMES. ;
~SPACELAB (nouveau) _._.bE TRANSPAA? SPATIAL ;
400 r. SPACELA , ,
E _ .
.
_ (9)TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Nouvecu)
_ . . . . r, ^j , ~~w' ~.~~~t~
~ ~.j ~
3~~ ' : ~!'r?�~ i
'Tel~comniunicatio~s�
. (10)TELEDETECTION (nouveau) '
~
r. .�.,.,..1 ^ U.21 SCIENCE (nouveau) ~
240 -Teledetection~_1---_._ - - _..;....~..-.....r.~--- _ . ~
- ~ . . . ~ . 5CIENCE . � . .
. 100 �`~.'~.~.~:~...~-3-=--=_" ~ 'ICROGRAVITE (nouveau)~.
- - - _ ~f 1~.~TECHNOLOGIE (nouveau) .-H ~ . �
Technologie ..~r::~:.~:.:..~:-.;-:.. : !
- ~ . � � � . ~ BUDGET. GENERAL,~15~, ~ ~ . . i
- 0 ~ � i
'1980 81 82 83 84 SS 86 87 88 89 1990
- Key: (1) Proposed Breakdown of Budget Allocations fox ESA Programs in the '
ZO-year Program 1981-1990
(2) MUC: million accounting units (9) Telecommunications (new)
(3) Approved (10) Remote sensing (new) '
(4) New (17_) Remote sensing !
(5) Baseline 450 MUC per year (12) Science (new) ~
(6) Launchers (new) (13) Technology (new) ;
(7) Spacelab (new) . (14) Microgravity (new) ~
(8) Future space transportation systems (15) General budget ,
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1980 ' ~
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~ .
COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL ItEPUBLIC OF GEIt~iANY
T~RRORISTS MAY PLAN ATTACK AGAINST BUNDESWEHR, CHANCELLOR
Hamburg STERN in German 5 Nov 80 pp 306-309
[Article by Michael Wesener: "RAF Man Inside Chancellor~s Office"]
[Text] A strategy paper found in Heidelbert discloses
_ new plans of underground fighters. New targets are the
SPD and the Bundeswehr.
- At the present time, the FR~ terror scene lacks persannel, shelter and informa-
tion. Furthermore, the activists of the "Red Army Faction" (RAF) are undecided
- when it comes to the means with which to continue their undergrouad struggle.
The agents of the Federal Criminal Police Buresu received the latest information
from the terror scene free of charge. In October, when a conspiratorial apart-
ment was discovered in Heide~.berg, the officials found among other things a
strategy paper. When comparing handwritings, it was established that it had been
_ written by Adelheid Schulz. The author, however, was identified by experts as
RAF chief Brigitte Mohnhaupt because of the language that had been employed.
The self-assessment by the RAF fighters was nothing less than resignation:
"...any occupation would end in a massacre. There could be no question of a'
- kidnapping."
The main problem of the terrorists consiets of difficulties in communication be-
tween the hard core of the "illegal people" and the "legal ones," between the
"guer" (for guerillas) and the "rear."
Those supporters (perhaps fram "antifascist groups") who are not yet on the wanted
list and who are therefore "legal," "clean" or "cool" are strictly admonished to
_ remain that way and to avoid risking their legality thoughtlessly: "You must be
_ in control of the moment of going underground...I am stronglq opposed to see you
getting involved in operations like barn, baby or bre. ;(provided that this was
- the case)." Apparently, "bre." is a reference to the disturbances during the
swearing-in ceremonies of the Bundeswehr in Bremen.
Instead, the "legal members" are to restrict themselves to political propaganda
and services of practical assistaace: "Supplying residences, something which
seems to be more necessary than ever."
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Already in June 1980, BKA (Federal Criminal Police Bureau) agents had uncovered
the new tactic of the RAF people. Classical "conspiratorial apartments," which
are rented by RAF people themselves under false names, now axist primarily only
in foreign European countries. In the FRG the illegal people are more or less -
"living with the legal ones who are not subject Co police surveillance, staying -
- for short periods of time." Or they "make use of apartments the owners of which
are on trips and who, appax�ntly in good faith, place their apartments at the
, disposal of Qthers. It was such an apartment in Iieidelberg where the RAF paper
_ was found. As a specialty of Christian Klar's, "occasional visits to students' ,
- quarters south of the Main line" were established.
The second major task for the "legal ones" is ta gather information: "Collecting
irnowledge about types and institutions in all areas. An example is given, the
information that FRG Minister of the Interior Baum has a small garden plot in ~
Cologne. If it is not handled professionally from th~ very beginning, it will
always remain patchwork." And the "perseverance that is needed will not be
available." -
The authors of the RAF paper hope that they will be able to enlist new members
- by utilizing propagandistically "the role pla;~ad by the RFG and Social Democrats"
in the exploitation of the Third World. "The dropping out and the refusal" by i
disappointed young people must be remolded "into support for the guerillas." The
goal is "liquidation af the existing exploitative conditions." Means to be em-
ployed for this purpose are "military actions" against the U.S. Army and Bundeswehr i
bases and attacks on SPD "types": "Dwarf "--national security agents suspect that
they mean Chancellor Schmidt whom the RAF wants to downgrade by calling him a
paper tiger--"Wischnewski, Apel, Ehmke etc. etc., not forgotten should be the
second line, for instance, Boelling."
As much as 5 months ago, the BKA and the protectors of the constitution received
"reliable tips" to the effect that RAF members "are planning and preparing in '
countries outside of Europe attacks on leading politicians and economic leaders
in the FRG." They are using as a model the assassination attempt on NATO General
Haig, who only barely escaped a time bomb. Following numerous mishaps, such an
action and the death of a leading politician could again demonstrate the power of
- the RAF. The conclusion by the Fedexal Cri~inal Police Bureau: "After all, an
attack on NATO establishments, particularly the Bundeswehr--even if it were only i
symbolic--would represent an act that would serve as a signal for the terrorist
environment and would...motivate further actions." The authors of the RAF peper
~ are quite concretely planning the "destruction of the computer" of the Federal
Criminal Police Bureau. ,
"Considering the current strength, the measure m~.st be kept as uncomplicated as ~
possible." The FRG chancellery is cited as a location that would permit an "uncom-
plicated" but "technically refined action"; apparently an RAF confidant with the
code name of "Kei" is to sneak into the building: "Kei (the latter one, for
instance, seems to fit very well into the barn of the dwarf)."
At the present time, the terror scene does not feel strong enough for l~arge actions ,
such as the 1975 occupation of the German Embassy in Stockholm or the September '
1977 kidnapping of industrialist Hanns Martin Schleyer: "The rear guard must ;
first create the right political conditions."
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, Considered a task for a later date in the future is the liberation of RAF prisoners.
Here is a quote from the RAF paper: "Within the framework of an off(ensive), T
feel that it might be the right thing to do to get them out. You will finally
have to comment on that." Plans for such an action are apparently ready--"Place
and time can be added." If something is to be done yet this year, "get the uncer-
- tain things taken care of right away so that it can be forgotten as long as it is
still warm."
As self-criticism the author remarks: "My head tel.ls me that other things need
to be done; still, everything is rebelling against it." Nevertheless, if such a
- ~ liberat ion action is nat feasible at the present time, "put an end to the dreams."
8991
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COUNTRY SECTION FI~ANCE
POLL: GISCARD AHEAD OF MITTERRAND, RPR DIVIDED, PCF-PS CLOSE
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 8-14 Nov 80 pp 137-140
[Article by Albert du Roy: "Rocard-Mitterrand: The Gap Is Widening"]
[Text) Second "presidential straw poll": The French are more
decisive--and concerned. They are most concerned about inter-
national problems. As for the eandidates: Ror_ard is up,
Mitterrand and Giscard are down. Marchais stays the same at -
17-18 percent.
There~s enough here to stir the passions, challenge~some of the conventional wis-
dom, and keep the lights burning all night in French political circles.
Mitterrand or Rocard? The same day (Saturday 8 November) that the committee
leader of the PS is confronting this choice, the second "presidential straw poll"
taken by L'EXPRESS and the Louis Harris Institute confirms that, more than ever,
Michel Rocard is the best socialist candidate.
But the two fraternal adversaries of the PS are not the only ones concerned:
Georges Marchais, once again, on 4 November, on TF-1, is launching obviously
extremist attacks against his old ally of the left ("It was on orders from the -
Socialist International that the PS renounced the strategy of the Union of the
Left. As for us, we do not belong to an International..."). Now these excesses
are paying off: our survey indicates that Marchais should be close at the heels
of Mitterrand on the first round.
A Climate of General Campaigning ~
Jacques Chirac has decided to keep quiet f or 2 more months, gambling that the
delay will be to his benefit. But his Gaullist challenger, Michel Debre, who
chose the opposite tactic, is chalking up points, and the RPR [Rally for the
Republic Party] is disoriented.
At the Elysee as well as at the party headquarters, the president is seen coming
out unbeatable. No doubt, he is still winning. But his score is down. "The
nation expects its president to hold himself apart from the agitation of the
moment," said Valery Giscard d`Estaing on 31 October at Autun. Our "straw poll"
shows that it might be in the president's interest to be a bit more of a candidate.
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_ I
And in any case, isn't he himself yielding to the generalized climate of general
, campaigning when on 4 November, to go from Clermont-Ferrand to Paris, he takes
the scheduled Air Inter flight rather than his personal aircraft?
Let's look at the figures 'see, on the following pages, the charts prepared by
Tanguy de Remur) and the lessons that can be drawn.
--Interest is slightly up: 15 percent of the French describe themselves as very
interested in preparations for the election (up 1 percent from the '~straw poll"
_ of 6 September) and 38 percent describe themselves as somewhat interested (up
8 percent).
--Expectations remain stable: only 23 percent of the French continue to believ~
that the election will have a great deal of influence on their living conditions.
And 35 percent (up 1 percent) think that it will have much influence on the inde-
pendence and the international security of France. ,
So there seems more at stake, and the tendency is growing, with respect to the
international situation.
--More voters have definitely decided: 55 percent of the voters (up 4 percent I
from September) say that they are certain that on 26 April 1981 they are going to
vote for the candidate they prefer today. But this degree of decisiveness varies i
strongly from one candidate to another. It remains very high among Marchais ~
voters: 76 percent. It is clearly growing among supporters of the two majority ,
leaders: 62 percenC of Giscard's voters are "sure of their vote" (up 5 percent
from September), as are 48 percent of Chirac's voters (up 13 percent). This
degree of decisiveness, by contrast, is declining among those supporting the
possible socialist candidates: 61 percent for Mitterrand voters (down 5 percent)
and 58 percent for Rocard's voters (down 5 percent). The PS is paying for its
- delays.
For purposes of voting intentions, we are assuming only two possible scenarios: ;
with Mitterrand or with Rocard. Six lessons can be drawn from the answers.
- 1. Freezing of the Marchais vote at around 17-18 percent is confirmed. The un-
folding of the struggle within the Parisian communist apparatus (with the sanc-
t~-ons against Henri Fiszbin), the repression against insubordinate intellectuals
~ (notably the expelling of Jean Kehayan) are not encroaching on the communist
electoral bloc, which has been about 20 percent for the last 22 years. But only
because of the candidate's frantic campaigning, scouring France and monopolizing ~
the television screens. A hard pace to keep up without respite for 6 more months. ~
This hard-line approach, which pays off with communist voters, has disastrous ,
effects on the socialist vote, where one observes a rapid deterioration in
Marchais' image . ~
2. The Mitterrand-Rocard contest continues to drift toward Rocard. Our survey
was half-completed when the f irst secretary of the PS made his speech at
Marseilles. But the results are sufficiently clear to remain convincing:
Rocard is 6 points ahead of Mitterrand on the first round, compared to only 4 ~
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in September. A special chart, which we are presenting on this decisive "match"
shows that, on the first round, Rocard gets more support from communists, social-
ists, UDF [French Democratic Union], RPR, and Ecologists than his rival. The
difference, a bitter pill for the first secretary to swallow, is especially clear-
cut among socialist sympathizers: 62 percent vote Mitterrand, and 72 percent
Rocard [sic].
3. The leftist primary could be closer than anticipated. This is the conse- _
- quence of the first 2 points: if Rocard cleanly outstrips Marchais (25 percent
to 17 percent) [in the "straw poll"], nevertheless the communist leader is right
on Mitterrand's heels (18 percent against 19 percent). In the second scenario,
the oft-repeated ambition of the PCF secretary general to outpoll the socialists
would no longer seem to be mere rhetorical posturing.
4. The Gaullists are more and more divided. Our survey came too soon to take
into account the effect of the quite freshly-hatched candidacy of Marie-France
Garaud. But one can observe, in the first round, that the RPR sympathizers are
split: one-third right off are for Giscard, 43 percent find themselves backing
Chirac, and 18 percent are with Debre, whose campaign, begun early, is beginr~ing -
to see results.
- S. The first round looks ticklish for Giscard. It is generally considered that
- it will be a psychological defeat for the president if he does not receive a first-
round total higher than he did in 1974, when he polled 32.9 percent. Now he is
just barely over that mark (34 percent) in a race against Mitterrand, and he
misses the mark (30 percent) against Rocard. In both scenarios, Giscard is
- lower in our "straw poll" than in September.
6. No "little candidate" can break in. We have not factored them into our poll. _
Altogether, Arlette Laguiller (Workers Struggle), Alain Krivine (Revoluticnary
Communist League), Huguette Bouchardeau (Unified Socialist Party), Roger
Garaudy, Michel Crepeau (Left Radical), Jean-Marie Le Pen (National Front),
Pascal Gauchon (New Forces Party), and Michel Jobert get 6 pexcent of the intended
votes. None of them gets more than 1 percent.
It is in the second round that the two scenarios diverge more clearly: a~ainst
Rocard, Giscard runs neck and neck (51 percent); against Mitterrand, he is very
comfortably reelected (59 percent). Rocard (see chart) benefits, as in the -
first round, from wider appeal in the electorates of all the parties.
Hand icaps and AsseCs
_ Comparing the tallies in the two rounds against each other also illustrates the
advantage he has over Mitterrand. The first secretary still benefits from the
image of "symbol of the united left" acquired in 1965 and in 1974, when he was
the only candidate. The 60 percent of those who voted for Marchais in the first _
round would give him their vote on the second, compared to only 52 percent who
would vote for Rocard, most of the others being undecided. In the expectation,
. probably of getting voting orders from the PCF. But Rocard, in the second round,
- clearly attracts rnore of the vote than Mitterrand from the electorates whose can-
didates were eliminated: 56 percent of the supporters of Ecologis~ Brice Laconde,
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21 percent of those who had voted for the Gaullists Chirac and Debre. While
MitCerrand attracts only 38 percent of Lalonde's voters, 14 percent of Chirac's,
and 11 percent of Debre's.
Similarly, Giscard can cou:~, in the s econd round, on the support of one out of
every eight who voted for Marchais, But a full one-fourth of those voting for
Chira~ and Debre would defect.
~ The handicaps from which Giscard, relatively speaking, suffers, and the assets
that he still has stand out clearly wh en one asks the French what are their top
priorities.
The struggle against unemployment, still more than in September, is the be-all
and end-all. Rarely has such unanimity (89 percent) appeared in a surv~ey. Now,
in contrast to our September survey it is Rocard, and no longer the present chief _
of state, who appears best qualified to deal with it. On this point, on a basic
sub~ ect , his credibility is eroding.
Conversely, one notes that the great p roblems of international policy--"assuring ;
oil supplies," "assuring France's def ense," "strengthening ties with the Western
allies," "conducting re lations with th e East --are mounting in importance. A
- quite unusually large number of Frenchmen are worrying about the first two of
these. Now these are the priorities on which Giscard buries his rivals. ~
The other changes which have occurred between September and November in the chart ~
of priorities seem more tied to circumstances. If the objective of "maintaining ,
law and order in the co untry" appears currently in third place, it is probably as
a result of the antisem itic terrorist actions and of a recent wave of bloody ~
hold-ups. Similarly, the large increase in the desire to see "morality in poli-
tical life assured" seems linked to the controversy stirred up about the police
following the Copernicus Street affair. Since our last "straw poll," in fact,
the great affairs of "morality"--diamonds, de Broglie, Delpey...--have not gone
anywhere. '
Examination of all the results of our "straw poll" leads to a grave conclusion. ~
On the one hand, when it is a question of choosing the man who will be responsi- ;
ble for governing Fran ce for 7 years, the French appear hesitant, even turned
off. Now under the Fifth Republic, the choice of this man is the essential act
in which the citizens are invited ro participate.
On the other hand, a quite large cons ensus is evident on the most worrisome of
the great problems. T'heir keenness is recognized. The urgency of finding solu- ,
tions to them is emphas ized.
Under these conditions, the fact that no one man appears clearly, if not a mira- -
cle worker, then at least to be a symbol of hope, raises again the disjuncture
between traditional political pronoun cements and the anxieties of the citizenry.
Are the candidates, and the parties that support them, mired in their campaign
maneuvers, takin g this into account? ,
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The Priorities of the French _
For Each of the Following Objectives:
Say which of these you consider Comparison with ~
to be the very top priority: September 1980 Trend
Rank Percent
(in percent) .
1. Struggle against unemployment 89 1 84 ~
2. Struggle against inflation and
increased prices 71 2 76 y
3. Maintaining order and security
in the country 65 4 60
4. Struggle against social inequalities 60 3 62 ~y
5. Assure France's oil supplies 57 6 49
6. Improve social infrastructure
_ (hospitals, schools, public ~
transport, etc) 51 ~ 48 -
7. Defend the interests of the social ~
class to which you belong 49 5 50 ""1
8. Modernize the French economy, ~ _
make it more competitive 48 8 45
~ 9. Assure France an adequate ~
national defense 44 9 4~
~
10. Assure the morality of political lif~ ~
(scandals, corruption, etc) 39 11 31 _
11. Ecolo reserve the environment 36 10 33 ~
gY~ P
12. Strengthen France's ties ~
with the Western allies 28 12 26
13. Conducting relations with the
USSR and the Eastern countries ~
to our advantage 23 15 18 _
14. Helping the under-developed ~
countries 22 14 22 =
15. Building Europe 20 13 23 ti _
Survey conducted for L'EXPRESS by the Louis Harris Institute (France), between _
23 and 29 October 1980, with a sample of 966 individuals representative of the
.French population age 18 and over.
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TABLEAU DE BORD DE L'~L~^,TION PRESIUE~~TIELLE 1981
CNOVEMBRE 1980~
.
~~ES ~N i ERESS~S PAR L'EIE~T/
40~'~ 60'k p ESTIMENT QUE L~LECTION
,-pN 20 ~ 80 ~ ~ AURA BEAUCOUP D'INFLUENCE
SUR LEUR VIE SUR L'IND~PENDANCE ~ _
_ 5 0~0 ' QUOTIDIENNE DE LA FRANCE
_ ~ 11 100 % iu0 % ,~s~ ;
~ _
� ~
� Fp,1T SURS
J,~ P 50 ~ ~F 80 % 80 %
;O 40 % 60 96 G,p _ -
~ L
60 % 60 %
_ - 5S o~a 70 ~
4/
_ 40 96 40 96 0~ -
- , l+ ~l ~
20% 80% ~
23 % '
= 20 % 20 % ' -
10% 90`~0
- 0 100 ~ 0 0
~ -
Presidential Straw Poll 1981
Key:
_ 1, ~o~~ember 1980
I,evel of Interest
E:cpectations
Are ver.y interested in the election
I3elieve ttie election will greatly influence
, 'fheir daily life -
' . France' s indepencience
Decisiveness ~
Are completely sure of their vore
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~ ~ o �
� � �
MITTERRANO GfSCARO GEBR~ ROCARO GISCARD DEBRE
M1AARCHAIS iALONDE CHIRAC MARCHAIS LALONDE CFtIRAC
50 ~~6 50 �6
ao ~ ao %
~ 34 �~6
30 '6 2 ) 30 ~ 30 %
25 % 4~
20 % i)
20% 19%
18 % 1 17 �/a
1+ l- 1 1) 12 %
10~ 12�k ~ 10�6 +11 6,5% '
5 % 6 4 % + 1,5
p i+ 11' 11 p 1) :
~ 20% i-3) ~ ~ 20% (-1)
' . ~ ~ ~ � ' ' ~
~ MITTERRAND ~'i GISCARD ROCARD GISCARD
41 % 59 % 49 % 51 %
41 f+ 4~ '
19 NE SE `~NE SE
' ~ PRONONCENT PRONONCENT
.
- PAS PAS ~
,
i
. � � � ~ � c � '10 -
, ~~t V: ~ COTI I: lllUt_'d ~
1.0. Votirg :inttntions 16. Scenario l~l
1]_. Scenario 1,E1 17. In the second round
12. On tlle first ruund 18. Scenario ~~2
13. Scenario 1,f2 19. No op_inion
14. No opini.on 2~. No opinion
15. Opinion 21, In parenchesis, the change
fr.om September 1980
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The Socialist Party Contest
On the first round: ,
Our of 100 persons who sym~:~thize with the have the intention to vote for...
Mitterrand Rocard .
~ in percent i
Communists 5 10 ;
_ 62 72 ~
Socialists :
- 9 ,
UDF
1 4
RPR ,
Ecologists ~ 18 ~
In the second round: ~
Out of 100 persons who sympathize with the have the intention to vote for... '
Mitterand Rocard
in percent
Communists . 55 54 I
Socialists 66 i
_ 6
UDF
15 '
RPR 5
i
Ecologists 36 56 '
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
,
9516 !
CSO: 3100 ~
~
~
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FRANCE
PS ADHERENTS INCREASE GREATLY TO FORM 'AXIS' OF SOCIETY
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 10-16 Nov 80 pp 54-55
[Article by Roland Cayrol: "P.S.: A Party Which Mirrors the Country"]
[Text] Like it or not, the ~ocialist electorate today is the axis of French society.
- Socialist France seems henceforth in fact to be the central motive force of a pos-
' sible political consensus in this country. Geography, sociology, the political
attitudes.of this Socialist France prove it--it being understood tha~ the presence
of Francois Mitterrand or Michel Rocard at the head of the Socialist struggle would
change ~hings somewhat.
First, geography. What a change between today's Socialist vote and its character-
istics not only 20 or 30 years ago, but even ~ust before the 1971 Epinay Congress!
One recalls the structure of the SFIO (former name of French Socialist Party)
elector.ate, reduced to the constituencies of the great figures of nord-Pas-de-
Calais, of the Bouches du Rhone, and west Massif Central. Rarely in French political
life tias the socialist situation--without i.gnoring completely its strongholds--
been so quickly and so deeply changed as in the elections between 1973 and 1978.. -
- Today the distribution of Socialist Party votes is infinitely better divided: One
can really say that ocialist influence has been nationalized, the result of a
double development. Moving into zones that had become practically deserted for _
it (as in the Paris region), conquering what hac~ by 5ocialist tradition been mission-
ary territory in Catholic France in tY~e East and above all in the West, taking ad-
vantage of the trend toward urbanization, the Socialist Party now is strongly rep-
resented in Lorraine (26 percent of the votes in the 1978 le~islative elections) in
Brittany (24 percent) in Poitou-Charente (27.9 percent), in lower Normandy (23.3
Fercent), or in the Paris region (20.7 percent).
In some of the departments the progress was spectacular, even amazing:*
(see table on following page) _
These figures and a few others are extracted from the study recently published
in the United States by R. Cayrol and J. Jaffre, in the book edited by Kay Lawson,
"Political Parties and Linkage" ,(Yale University Press).
. -
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~
Department 1967 1965 1973 1978
- Mayenne 6.6 13.9 22.8 28.2
Meuse 12.9 17.7 26.7 29.9
- 4.4 5.8 16 23.9 I -
Moselle ~ _
Savoie 10 10.$ 23.3 32,2
6.6 11.7 22.1 29~1 '
Vienne
Another aspect of this display of socialist influence: Losses in the old con-
stituencies. Beginning in 1973 it could be seen that the new PS (Socialist Party)
was far from regaining all the votes from the traditional socialist clientele in ~
the Nord, Centre, Limousin, and Auvergne regions. Compared to 1967 the loss was
for example 14 points in Correze, 6 points in Aude, 9 points in Tarn-et-Garonne. ~
This drop obviously was for political reasons: The most centrist voters of the i
SFIO did not follow the policy of union with the PC (Communist Party) and slipped
toward the reformists, then toward the ma~ority. At the same time another fringe
of the Socialist electorate went off toward the PC--as in the Nord, Bouches du Rhone~ .
or Haufe Vienne, thus showing its disaffection from local ~ocialist notables failing
to conform to the left positions of the party.
White Collars
The 1978 legislative elections and the 1979 European elections confirmed this ten-
dency. Although the loss was braked in Pas-de-Calais, it t~nded to accelerate '
and become disquieting in the south-east (Bouches-du-Rhone, Var, Alpea-de-Haute ;
Provence, Vaucluse).
All t~ld, this double movement of conquest of new places and erosion of old strong- �
holds brought the PS to a remarkable geographic homogeneity, much greater than in ;
any of the ~ther French political parties, especially the PC. The Socialist Party ~
no longer has any really vacant areas--it has succeeded in entering the communiat
strongholds as well as the zones of rightist strength. ;
In this privileged situation one can note a favorable element and an element of ;
uncertainty, concerning the presidential election. Favorable: In a presidential
election each vote counts. While the astonishing socialist gains nevertheless did
- not win the party elected representatives in certain districts (as in A].sace, or, ;
often, in the Paris region), the presidential candidate himself can count up all
these locally useless votes on the national scale.
Problem: Unlike the presidential election, in municipal elections and legislative
elections local personalities play a more important role than national party affil- ;
iation. This was seen last year in the European elections: The PS does not gain ~
- everywhere in a national election the votes of some of its regional stars. From
this point of view it is not absurd to think that Rocard has a slight advantage over :
Francois Mitterrand. Apt to reflect the new PS image--all polls show that the new _
socialist voters prefer Rocard to Mitterrand--he can also count on the mobilization ;
of a network of elected representatives wishing to add 'to their personal sources of
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strength the party image at the national level of conquering dynamism. The sociol-
ogy of Socialist France also puts the PS in a median rank in French society. While
the SFIO was rooted in the areas of the common people, at first among employees
of the public sector, the PS began to resemble the whole of France, as if a cross
section had been cut in each social category, of about one-fourth the members of
that category. That is the PS electorate today--the only real inter-class French
party, a real catch-all party as the Americans say. `
Judge for yourself. According to the IFOP (French Public Opinion Instituta) in the
1978 elections the PS received 8 percent of the farmers' vote (farmers count for
9 percent of the total French population), 7 percent of the commercial workers and
artisans ( 6.5 percent o.f the total population), 24 percent of the middle level -
technical administrai.t~e and clerical workers (21 percent of the total population),
31 percent of the workers (27 percent of the total population). Gone is the day
when the miner of the Houilleres and the public school teacher could symbolize
Socialist France.
Today the Grenoble engineer, the upper level administrator in a Parisian bank, an
employee of the Textiles du Centre, all equally represent the new PS image.
Its social dynamics made the PS become the reflection of France at least as well
as General de Gaulle succeeded in doing formerly. And what has been said for the
social field holds true in the groups based on sex, age, size of housing area and, -
- henceforth, even for religion. Sometimes there are, slight differences, a little
over-representation of inen, of those 25-34, and under-representation of strict
Catholics. Socialist France is the France of the individual, ttee France of every- -
one. One can easily gauge the success this implies, in relation to other great
parties in the world, and how difficult it is to govern a society for long without
the support of this vast group, this cross section of the French population.
But there too this judgment must be tempered by two considerations. First, is there
not some risk in simultaneously representing such diverse interests as all the French
population? Certain socialist parliamentary candidates are well aware of this and
their platform looks like a catalog of demands from each and every group. Tomorrow
if the Socialist candidate were elected would b~ not be forced to make choices which
might displease this or that component of Socialist France?
The other question concerns, once again, the Mitterand-Rocard rivalry in the race
for nomination. On the social level t4ichel Rocard holds an undeniable advantage -
for the period now beginning: the act~ve sympathy of the mid-level managers and �
technicians. Leaving aside the aspect of inere popularity, so often analyzed, for -
the aspect of voting intentions, the polls show us (Tableau Louis Haris-France)
that according to whether Mitterrand or Rocard is the nominee in the first turn the
_ PS candidate would get the same percentage af votes, within about 1 point, among
farmers, commercial workers, workers, and among those not in the labor force. But
Rocard brings to his name 22 percent of the upper level managers and technicians
(against 18 percent for Mitterrand) and 35 of the middle level managers and clerical
employees (against only 25 percent for Mitterrand). This advar.tage gives one pause
if this time as in 1978 the white collar workers and managers and technicians play
the determining role. It is understood that one will never know if this advantage
will hold throughout, since in the last analysis only one of the two will be nom-
- inated.
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The Soft Underbelly
So far as profound political attitudes, opinions on events, hopes and aspirations
are concerned, Socialist France is decidedly average France. Make the test. When- _
eve.r the polling results of some polit3.ca1 subject are published, look at what the
overall responses of French persons are. Then look at the distribution of responses
according to political preference and note the response of Socialist sympathizers.
You will see: It is the same--give or take a few points. Clearly, Socialists
constitute not only the sociological axis but also the political axis of this coun-
try. And that holds true regardless of the subject--domestic po'.itics, foreign
policy, economic and social questions. `
Even on problems involving changing mores, or sexuality, abortion, family author~ty,
where it is easy to imagine that Socialist sympathizers would be among the most
progressive. But no, in those matters as in the others the distribution is ident. -
cal. PSU and extreme left sympathizers occupy the most advanced positions; the ,
most libertarian, the PS is set in the middle, between the most progressive communist
sympathizers and the UDF and RPR who are clearly more to the right. How can one
really think seriously of enacting reforms in this country without the assent of
that Socialist France? Again, what a strong position for French socialists!
But this being said, one should not stop midway in the analysis. Although Socialist
France is so average, that average nevertheless contains many opposing realities.
A close study of the polls shows that 3.n general at the level of political attitudes
Socialist France is divided into three parts. The first is very close to the atti- j
tudes and hopes of communist sympathizers. The second is much like the UDF sup- %
porters and tt?e third--kind of a soft underbelly of the Socialist electorate--oscil- ,
lates between the first two. It is this third part which, according to tthe ecanomic _
situation and the balance of political forces will swing either toward a more or
less reluctant union with the left, or will lend an ear to the sirens of the Third
Force. It is really difF;~+~~.t f~r a party to manage all three parts of this heri-
tage at the same time! In fact what is the strength of the PS--its ideological and ~
r political diversity--also constitutes its weakness, its lack of consistency regarding
a c~herent plan. One gets the impression of a co-existence of these several tradi-
tions, rather than a real synthesis of them.
At the table of honor among those optimist views of the Sofres barometer the PS
prances unfailingly at the top of the curves. That is because in a way everyone
feels close to the PS. NEarly everyone has voted or might vote socialist, if only -
the second time around. Communist or leftists sympathizers, Giscardians or Gaullists
have all, for quite different reasons, a certain sympathy for the PS, naturally after
their own party, because the PS is at once democratic, antitotalitarian, worker,
leftist, etc. ;
But sympathy is not always translated into a vote. And the center left voter dis-
tinguishes between his active sympathy for the PS which he will go so far as to
- vote for in the cantonal elections (1976 and 1979) or municipal elections (1977). ~
But until now he has always drawn back (at the last moment in 1978) from the prospect
~f Socialist France carrying off all the national posts of command, above all if it
is the ally of the co~unists. Once again it is on him, the center left voter, that
the results of next May's election Grill depend: No doubt it is one of the reasons
why Socialist voters see, by a broad majority, in Michel Rocard--who have never really
espoused union with the PC--a better presidential candidate than Francois Mitterrand.
- Will they be right? Or will the Rocardian advantage in the centrist faction dissolve? ;
We will not know unless the Socialist politicians concur with the deeper Socialist
France and nominate the deputy from Yvelines. But that~ we know, is another matter.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"28
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
MANUFRANCE II LIQUIDATED: FATE LINKED WITH 1981 ELECTION
Tapie~s Role
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 27 Oct-2 Nov 80 pp 51-52
[Article by Anne Gaillard]
[Text] Thursday, 23 October, 4 pm, 24 Avenue de Friedland, a stylish setting.
For the second time in 10 days at the headquartere of the "Bernard Tapie Group,'~
I have before me the man who will soon become one of the most detested in all
France. At 7:45 pm, on the P~,'F [French Communist Party] broadcast on channel 2,
against the backdrog of the tricolor flag, a solemn Joseph Sanguedolce, mayor
of Saint-Etienne, will testify before the tribunal of public opinion, along
with another defendant named Giscard.
"So, who are these industrialists whan you promis~d to call in to buy the various
divisions of Manufrance, in order to pay the debt of 500 million?"
"I can't give you their names for reasons of their personal safety. But Marius
Boutrand, president of the commercial tribunal, has the list."
"No, I just ph oned him. He didn't mention it."
As Bernard Tapie watches, I phone Boutrand again, who states that he has no list,
adding, of course, that even if he had one, he wouldn't tell me.
Tapie appears stupefied. He phones Boutrand and switches on the amplifier to allow
me to hear the conversation.
' "You just told Anne Gaillard that you didn't have any list."
"Oh:" answers Boutrand, "I didn't know tha.t you wanted me to let on about the list.
We're going to have to agree on what we~re doing."
Thus, a triumphant, bantering Bernard Tapie is again in the limelight as PDG [chair-
man and managing director] of Manufrance I, which owns the real assets. After
the 7 February 1979 court ruling, Manufrance II was c~eated on 9 May as agent for
the former, to run the factories and shops. But after three PDG's and futilely
awaiting the 300 million Swiss francs promised by Jean-Claude Dumas, the Bordeaux
busineasman, Manufrance II in its turn came to a halt apd Manufrance I is re-
covering it interests, of sorts.
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Now the very name "Tapie" makes Joseph Sanguedolce sick--and thia, perhapa, ie
one of the reasons for the unbelievable confidence which the mayor of Saint-
Etienne displayed toward ,7ean-Claude D~anaa. The latter no doubt "discovered"
40 million Swise francs lasC year; but this brilliant conjuring trick inspirea
laughCer in the ha11s of the ministry of the econany whenever mentioned.
~ "The city of Saint-Etienne guaranteed them: With a public guaranty, any bank
could provide:"
Now that he has his "go-ahead," I ask Tapie if he has made contact with the
miniatry. He answers magnificenCly, "I have no need of the government other than
to find new joba for the workers. In financial matters, I wi11 manage alone."
"Great," says the minister's entourage, recalling the anecdote of the 10 million
franca Bernard Tapie had promised to bring to Manufrar.ce the first time he appear~sd
in Saint-Etienne in July ("If my plan does not work," he said, "~t will be my
fault."). No one ever saw.so much as the color of his money. It is also noted ~
at the ministry that nothing is stopping the industrialista fram dealing directly '
with the preaident of the tribunal without going through Tapie. ~
~
The next legal step is the Manufrance I bankruptcy hearing; that is, the meeting
= of the creditors and prospective buyers of the varioua divisions of Manufrance. ~
The first objective will be to discharge the Manufrance I liability of 500 million.
- It is another story f or Manufrance II. Since Che plan is occupied, it is
impoasible to have acceas to the account books. It is hard to see how the in- ~
vestora could form an opinion on the state of the various divi~ions.
- Bernard Tapie wryly admits that it will be a good 6 months before the bankruptcy
hearing can be held and before the coamiercial court could possibly accept a i
settlement. It is known that the fortune of Manufrance has always been tied ,
to politica. Already, from 1976 (first deficit year) to 1977, nothing was done '
so as not to hurt Durafour in the local election (bad figuring, as everyone knows).
Tapie and the others knaw that they have until the presidential election to
peacefully do their "editing."
Tne opposing camp ie alao preparing for trench warfare. The PC [Communist Party], ~
with ita union and municipal driving belts, is marking out the terrain with
occupation of the factnry and free food stFUnps for the children, and other social '
measures which will allow the licensed wor~:ers to hold out until spring. At thaC ;
time, they will be held up as symbols of the betrayal of power before all of
France--whose name "she" [Manufrance] bears-~much as Sanguedolce and Rrasucki '
appear on televiaion, the first armed with hia flag, the second with the conatitution, i
to gtir up the "petitioners." ;
As for the approximately 1800 licenaed workers who will submit to the 6-month ;
seige and be seen on the posters, who will bother to take them in when the party
is over, when no one will be legally obliged to them? The PC? The government?
What a sad ending France is preparing for the party in Saint-Etienne:
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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Those Responaible
' Paris VAI,EURS ACT[JELLES in French 27 Oct-2 Nov 80 p 31
[Article by Jean-Francois Gautier]
[Text~ Liquidation of assetR, occupation of ahops, political maneuvers, union
recoupment. After s everal months of watchful waiting and exciting developments,
the people of Saint- Etienne have finally been confronted with a problem willfully
hidden by their loca 1 gover~ent--Manufrance is an economically intolerable
enterprise.
After 5 years of crises, 8 directors and 9 rescue plans, Joseph Sanguedolce,
communist mauor of Saint-Etinne, clung to a last Bordeaux "miracle man," Jean-
Claude Dtmnas, , . -
Dumas claimed to be the intermediary of Swiss financiers, then of Libyan in-
vestors, ready to inject 300 million francs into the enterprise. On 22 October,
' Mariua Boutrand, pre siding judge of the Saint-Etienne com~nercial court, ordered
liquidation. He had waited to the last moment for a single franc fram Dumas,
but nothing catne.
"The only one responsible for the Manufrance situation is the goverrnnent," states
Sanguedolce, forgetting that the coaomunista themselves took direct responsibilities _
~ in the affair--Macif, the mutual insurance company directed by Pierre Juvin, com-
munist and major shareholder of the corporation, refused in June to deliver the
15 million treasury francs as promised a few weeks earlier; the town, also a
_ shareholder, guaran teed a loan of 40 million francs while unable to control its
use, nor to atraigh ten out the enterprise; the Dumas project had received the
support of the communista, who were ready to modify the floor occupation plan
to peYtnit the "resc uers" to carry out a property transaction on the factory
grounds.
~ Moreover, behind the Dumas bid was the canvassing of Jean-Baptiste Doumeng, who
; suppoaedly searched in vain for additional fir~ancing in the Middle East.
Added to this political context is the Saint-Etienne union dissension. The
CGT [General Confede ration of Labor] demonstration of 18 October was called
"Operation Speatacle " by the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor].
: All during the demon stration," adds the Maire group, "the communists systematically
initiated unprovoked attacks on management, elected officials, and active
socialists. A 1 1 indications ~re that it was planned to launch Marchaie' -
campaign."
The ccmanunist party could use the social bonfire kept going by its troops in
Saint-Etienne to se t the situation before the presidential election. Raymond
Barre announced at the end of September that Manufrance no longer existed; to
which Marchais resp onded last week, "Manufrance is just beginning."
As for the governme n t, it seems to have finally given uR on the 22 million francs
loaned to the enterprise--aid which calmed a few creditprs and raised aome hopes,
but which is now harshly judged. ~
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"Sabotage and swindle," says the CNPF [National Council of Fret~ch Employer~].
"A business ia not saved with sedatives. Governmental oxygen tents are useless," ,
adds Yvon Gattaz, preaident of Ethic [H~mian-Size Busineases] and bully of .
"industrial milk caws." ;
Such is the social problem c:�~ated in SainC-Etienne. Nearly 2,000 empla~eea, _
exploited by their local government, are still waiting for it to provide a
solution and a future. A paradoxical, buC revealing, aituation--who elae, outside
of Barre and his clear-cut opinion, has spoken understandably to them?
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "Valeurs actuelles"
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
- USE OF 'CANASTA' LIGHT AMPLIFICATION APPARATUS DISCUSSED
Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Aug-Sep 80 p 11
[Art icle ny Javier Taibo Arias]
[Text] Thomson-C5F has developed an innovative night-vision system based on
light amplificat.ton, known as "Canasta," which allows a combat vehicle's crew
_ to detect, recognize and identify any stationary or moving targeC, as well as
take aim, fire upon it and observe the results, both by night and by day,
within its area of responsibility, determined by the mission assigned to the
vehicle, its methods of observation and its weapons' capability. ~
Basically, the Canasta system includes a TMV 562 model night-and--day television
camera with its own control box and one or two television monitors (TMV 563),
which has been fully tested by the French Army and has been integrated into the .
' CONTAC automatic fire-control system mounted on AMX-lORC's and AM7{-30 B2's. .
It offers plenty of flexibility for installation, both external--typical of a
modern device--and internal--more usual in the case of new programs--so that it
is compatible with any kind of turret, without requiring major modifications.
It is set up to allow two modes of operation, manusl and automatic, and the
control box can be programmed to operate on four ballistic tracks. It is there-
fore compatible with all firing,calculators. rhe monitoring screen is flat and
does not have an eyepiece, thus preventing the parallax effect because it is
independent fram the eye's position.
It has a very simple movable electronic reticle that can be adjusted manually or
automztically for setting the firing parameters. Its electronic tube is protected
from glares produced, for example, by a bullet's impact or any other intense
light source, with an automatic shutter.
Among the main advantages enjoyed by the Canasta over other methods employed for ~
the same purpose is the fact that it is passive, obviously because its use does
not expose the vehicle carrying it to detection, in addition to its insensitiv-
ity to interference. The camera supplies the same information simultaneously to
the gunner's and the vehicle cot?miander's monitor, before, during and after the
firing takes place, which increases the efficiency of detection, recognition and
~ identification, because two people are looking, and it helps speed up the exchange
of information amorig the crew, decreasing the reaction time to a minimum. In
- addition, it provides the vehicle commander with permanent control over his
gunner. -
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~ va a avi~~+ ~+v~ ~+~~ur
Within its broad range of use it can also be linked with other optical and
fire-control devices, and the system can be amplified to include a daytime
sight, or a laser telemeter can be added to the sight.
In the important area of m~?ntenance, Thomson-CSF points to the minimal time
requ ired for repairs, the ease with which personnel can be trained, the sim-
ple way in which it can be mounted and dismounted, the possibility of exchang-
ing units and its high degree of availability. Thomson-CSF has defined several
degrees of maintenance, related to various tasersonnelStdocumentation,stoolsnges
and repairs) and to the resources necessary (p ~
spare parts, audiovisual training and technical assistance), in addition to
which it is possible to adapt it to the maintenance techniques of each army,
according t o the organizational structure of its operational units, its tactical
deployment and its policies, resources and development of its maintenance.
In conclusion, we point to the demonstrated fact that the Canasta can be used ~
on any vehicle, having been successfully tested on the M-47, M-48, Centurion,
Leopard, AML-90, TAM, T-55 and T-62, among others.
COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Def ensa, S.A., Madrid 1980
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~
~ BRIE FS
i
i CIVIL DEFENSE EXERCISES--Jean Royer [former government minister and presidential _
i candidate) wants to or ganize some civil defense exercises in Tours [Indre-et-Loire
Department] based on the theme: "What to do in case of a nuclear war alert."
j [Text ] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 5 Dec 80 p 74] -
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COUNTRY SECTION IT~y
INTERVIEW WITH SPADOLINI ON PSI-PCsI DISPUT,F,
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 3 Oct 80 pp 12-13
[Article by Gian Paolo Vitale]
[Text] After Enrico Berlinguer's speech in Bologna and Bettino Craxi's harsh
response, the PCI and the PSI are fighting again. Like 2 year.s ago, after the
appearance of Craxi's article on Proudhon, the dispute is in part ideological
(there is the socialist congress at the doors with a perspective of launching a
labor program), but this time the prevailing difference is over the government
and its relations with the Christian Democrats and the minority lay parties. IL
MONDO asked Giovanni Spadolini, secretary of the PRI, to appraise this new I'CI-PSI -
polemic, its motivations and risks.
Questi~n: Do the divisions within the left add an element of instability to the
political picture and, therefore, present dangers for democracy?
Answer: Ugo La Malfa was convinced of it and struggled a long time to improve re-
lations between the PSI and the PCI with the view of favoring the gradual overcome
of the scission of Legharn in 1921. This is a theme that has dominated non-Marxist
democratic thought for years and not only that: From diverse sides, men like
Giorgio Amendola and Francesco De Martino have followed the same design. A coali-
tion of leftist parties, according to this theory, would bring an advantage through
the mending of this break. La Malfa deemed soctalist ferment essential, which is
always the ferment of liberty, and considered it indispensable that the Communist
Party experience it, with the view of encouraging its orientation toward the West.
This turn, according to La Malfa, is equivalent to the full westernization of Ital-
ian 1ife. At the same time, they thought that the modern and well-articulated struc-
_ ture of the PCI and its strong organization should influence the weaker and more
fragile socialist structure, which was still Jacobin or libertarian, reviving if:. and
infusing it with new life. Of course, the process of reunification, if not of a
bond, between the two parties, experienced a haZting blow after the death of La
Malfa and after a sharpening of a conflict which is no longer only ideological but
also programmatic and sometimes only pragmatic.
, Question: This is what explains the hard line Berlinguer is taking w3th his insis- _
- tence on limiting the growth of the PSI.
~Why isn't communist hegemony in the worker movement discussed?
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Answer: It is a struggle for hegemony, of cocrse, and not only nor. so much over ~
the working class, which would not constitute a suff iciently large social base in
present-day Italy, but the PCI often represents more sacial-democrat3cally tending
groups, that is, ~ore moderate than the socialists. In this the PCI inherited ,
someth ing of the reformist socialism of FilippQ Turat i, with respect to those
factions in the Socialist Party which are still linked to ar~.archist and libertarian ;
unrest originating in the Italian Risorgimento.
~raxi, a follower of Pietro Nenni, belongs to that humanitar3.an and voluntarist ; -
_ faction of the PSI that is inspired with a strong wil 1 for autonomy. Behind the ,
t~arsh action of Craxi, there is the memory of tP.e idea of socialist unification, a -
great opportunity that Italian democracy missed. '
In 1968 when I was editor of IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA and supported socialist unifi- ~
cr.tion, I received two letters from the Honorable Mariano fiumor, secretary of the
Christian Democratic Party, in which he explained the concern of the Christian
Democrats about a pos~ible domination by the Socialist Party, and therefore the
_ fear of an overthrow of the traditional political equ illbrium. Today the story is
repeating itself--with one difference: Crax3 is looking resolutely at an alter-
native; he has never forgotten the exauple of Franceis Mitterrand. His goal is =
~ the ~eappraisal of the power relationshi~ with the PC I.
Question: The PRI has never interrupted the dialogue with the PCI and at the same
time has been able to renew a tie with the socialist s, with whom there have often !
been troubles in the past. ;
Answer: The dialogue between socialists and r.epublicans follows national history
from 1870 up to today and is a dialogue between the two oldest forces ~f the Italian
left. Today union between the PSI and the PRI is indispensable to guarantee the ;
governability of the country, as experience with the tri-party coalition has demon-
strated.
(~uestion: And today, faced with the continui~ng disagreements between the FCI and '
the PSI. . -
Answer: We have never tried to orchestrate in any way dissensions and differences ;
between socialists and communists. With the worsening of the emergency, we should ,
not lose the thread of this minimal national solidari ty which must sub~ist, beyond
- parliamentary combinations; ott~.erwise, the way is open to the worst of adventures. , -
The true center is the emergency today.
Question: Regarding the communist stance today, how much influence does the inter-
national picture have after the crisis in Poland? ~
Answer: The lack of words addressed by Berlinguer to Poland in his Bologna speech
struck me. This shows an increused concern over the unknowns of the international
situation, or, for the pressures that Moscow already exercises and even more, could
exercise in the future. The Soviets fear an ideological-politico encirclement, as ,
the Polish reforms reflect, by Chinese revisionism. Thus the domain of Eurocom- ;
munisn risks being further narrowed; and the role which La Malfa already allotted
to the Socialist Party, as an international guarantor of the evolutionary process
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of the PGI within the European comQnunity, has acquired greater relevance. It is in
Europe that Euroco~nunism and Eurosocialism will be able to find further points of
contact in the future.
Question: Berlinguer even attacked the foreign policy of the three-party coalition.
, Answer: This attack amazed me. Between socialists, republicans and the Christian
' Democrats the agreement on international political options has been total in the
~ last months, linked to Helmut Schmidt's Social Democrat line. What sense is there -
in reproposing negotiations on Euromissiles without conditions on the eve of the
talks announced between Moscow and Washington? This is a trend that seems contra-
, dictory with regard to the dynamism demonstrated by the communist leaders in contact -
i with Willy Brandt, Francois Mitterrand and Olof Palme. To subordinate a distinct
opposition of the PCI to a modified stance on Euromissiles is equivalent to reinforc-
ing the present government; or,.in any case, to outlining a government identical to
; the present one.
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- COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
- UDC'S 'YOUNG TURKS' REACT TO PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 29 Jun 80 p 26
[Article by J. Luis Cutierrez: "The 30 'Virgins for additional inforn~ation on
the political ideology and principal objectives of the UCD's "Young Turks" see
JPRS 76926, 3 December 1980, No 1663 of the WEST EUROPE REPORT, pages 223-225]
[Text] We know that the word "virgenes" is spelled with a"v," but the word
"varones" sometimes is spelled with a"b," as it is in this case. Because the
30 centrist parliamentarians who since the end of last April have been holding
regular dinners, and e.*ho have just formed the group called the "Young Turks," have
done it for one main reason. It is the same one which allows the virgin to pre- _
serve the immaculate and innocent intactness of ~i~er hymen: not having known a
male (varcn). Here the subtle distinction between the "b" and the "v" explains
very substantive differences.
Because the "Young Turks" stick together in reaction against what they consider
the clannish elitism of the so-called "barons" of the UCD [Democratic Center ~
Union], who head up the various ideological currents within the party, and form
part of the Standing Committee, their name does not come, as some have said,
from the wild youths who ove~threw the Ottoman Empire under the orders of Mustafa
Kemal. They take it from the democratically directed teams which gathered around
the then young politician Mendes France in the French Radical Party in the 1930's.
At the end of last April, at the time when violent unrest shook the centrist
parry as a result of the government crisis, the "Turks" met for dinner,at the -
Jai Alai restaurant in Madrid. From the start, certain minimal rules were laid
down. There were to be no more than 30 members--"because with more there is no `
way to be heard, and for everyone to participate --and everyone should take part.
Therefore, they decided to begin the meetinus with everyone present in turn tak- ~
ing 2 min~tes to speak and analyze the situation. `f
Later, a minimal joint and improvised secretariat would be in charge of preparing
an agenda, which would be sent to each of the members of the group before the next
meet ing .
As to its intended program, Jose- Manuel Garcia Margallo, a deputy from Melilla '
and one of its leading figures, told CAMBIO 16: "The UCD springs from the -
� ideological contribution of the three known factians: Ghristian Democrats, -
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liberals and social democrats. In my opinion, it is not correct for certain indi-
viduals to boast that they have a hereditary right to these three labels. Espe-
cially when some of those persons who call themselves liberals or social democrats
do not adopt many of the most important assumptions of those groups. It does not ,
seem very accurate to me to say that Fontan is a liberal, especially if you ob-
serve the positions which this known member of Opus takes on some points such as
divorce--positions very far from the liberal thinking on thi.s problem." ~
UCD, Inc. '
The "Turks" f eel that one of the great failings of the party is that it has not
known how to "sell" to public opinion the monumental work carried out by the UCD
from 1977 to today. ~
For the "30 Turks," positions like the one expressed by some me:mbers of the cen-
tirst leadership about the possible alliance with Fraga--"If Fraga comes into
the government, I go out the other door," said Fernande2 Ordonez once--are not
admirable. "The UCD," states Margallo, "began as a coalition. There is a feel- -
ing that the party is a corporation, originating from the merger of three earlier i
ones, where each one retains its original shares. And we ~thers, who do not be-
long to any of the factions, where do we have our shares?"
On the list of "the 30" there can be noted a complete absence of Christian ;
Democrats, who are perhaps the most homogeneaus and cohesive group of the cen-
trist party. Margallo explains this saying that "normally, at a dinner, if you
sit at one table you cannot sit at another."
The initiative has not been very well received in the par*_y, especially in the ;
groups captained by the "barons." The secretary general, Calvo Ortega, has even ;
~ suggested that they need to be dissolved.
Given the closeness among some of the prime movers of the group, such as between
the Valencian Pin Arboledas and vice president Fernando Abril, the group has been
considered by almost everyone to be a pressure group under the direct orders of
President Suarez. Margallo says: "We think that at this time there is no sub- ,
stitute for President Suarez, and that he is one of the most important activists
in the party. It would not be a solution to change him in the short term, although '
the great failures around him should be corrected." The reference is very clearly
directed at the so-called "Moncloa plumbers," the team of advisors led by Alberto
Aza.
"We think," concludes Margallo, "that there shduld be varying opinions within
the party, but that they must be expressed within the framework of the direct-
ing bodies. There should be permanent tensions within the party because this -
is healthy, but these must be worked out behind closed doors."
Why They Are
Although the group of deputies known as the "Young Turks" appeared very recently,
some of its members have already become well-known. Thus, the Salamancan
Alberto Estella, the father of the well-turned phrase: "Use the pole on the
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ox; use words on man," recently made the headlines in the newspapers by resign-
ing from the presidency of the RTVE [Spanish Directorate General of Radio Broad-
casting and Television] parliamentary investigation committee because of differ-
ences with other members of the party and the government. These are his
companions: Jose Manuel Garcia Margallo (Melilla), Nona Ines Vilarino (La Coruna),
' Juan Quintas (La Coruna), Jose An~onio Trillo (Orense), Jose Sabalete (Jaen),
Antonio Orpez (Huesca), Antonio Diaz Fuentes (Lugo), Ju~io Ulloa (Lugo), Fran-
cisco Olivencia (Ceuta), Jose Luis del Valle (Burgos), Jose Miguel Bravo de Laguna
(Las Palmas), Jose Nasarre de Letosa (Vitoria), Jose Ramon Pin Arboledas (Valencia),
- Jose Manuel Pineiro Amigo (La Coruna), Josefa Lafuente, J.A. de la Casa Ayuso
(Murcia), Juan Sabater (Tarragona), Ricardo Leon (Oveido), Leon Buil (Huesca),
- Jose Maria Martin Oviedo (Avila), Martiniano Martin (Avila), Juana Arce (Alba-
cete), Joaquin Garcia Romanillos (Granada), Francisco Gari (Baleares), Jose Anti
~ Antonio Gago Lorenzo (Pontpvedra), Alberto Estella (Salama~ca), Antonio Faura
(Tarragona), Francisco de la Torre Prados (Malaga) and Ignacio Huelin Vallejo
~ (Malaga).
i .
i COPYRIGHT: 1979 [as published] INFORMACION Y REVISTAS, S.A.
i
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- 8131
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COUNTRY SECTION SWEDEN
~ SOCIAL DEMOCRATS' STRATEGY IN OPPOSITION DISC~JSSED _
Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 23 Oct 80 pp 34-37
[Article by Stefan Mehr: "Social Democrats Prepare Recapture of the
Goverinnent Offices--Invite the Economy"; passages between slantlines
printed in boldface]
[Text] /With 2 years until the next election and almost half of the voters
polled behind them, the Social Democrats are now taking firmer hold--by a
vote of no confidence--against the nonsocialist administration. At the same
time the recapture of the government offices is being prepared. "We have
_ devoted too much time towards parliamentary work," says party secretary
Sten Andersson. "Now we must prepare for what we will do when we capture -
n n
the power of government. One feature of this policy will be to tie the
knots closer to the economy." "We want the old H~rpsund spirit back," says
Anderson./
With almost half of the voters behind them in the last Sifo-pol~ and reliance
in the nonsocialist administration, the Social Democrats ~hould be filled
with the feeling of victory, self-confidence and un3.ty.
;
. Still the party leadership, with Olof Palme in the forefront, is o~ errun by
the parliamentary party on tk~e issue of vote of n~-confidence. What is
_ actually going on?
Presently the Social Democratic Party is a national movement in an awkward
position. 1~ao lost elections and 4 years and the opposition has forced the
party to review its positions on important issues; tax policy being a good
~ example.
"It is first now that we have found our role as an opposition party," says
party secretary Andersson. "It took time b~~t now we know what to do."
However, the new signals have not yet reached through the party ranks. There
the demand for more aggressive opposition policy is heard.
In private discussions with top Social Democratic leaders, on the municipal
level,.party leader Palme has rGceived the question: Are we to assume that
there will be new elections and conduct an opposition of even greater
responsibility ann careful statements and promises--or shall we ass ~ne that the
government holds through the period and drive a harder opposition where we
can b e noticed? ~
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The question was placed before the claim of vote of no-confidence. Palme
answered: "We must be prepared for both. We can assume that the government
holds but we cannot exclude the possibility of a new election." -
"Your answer is without rh�~me and reason," says the Social Democrat who placed
the question. "We know just as little now as we did before."
Criticism in the Party ~
There have been different opinions within the party as to how to conduct the
opposition. One line has been to lay dawn, point for point, detailed alterna-
tives in government policy.
Thus, it has been done in the parliamentary group and the motions have been
long like expositions and formulated as proposition~.
But in the party, the party leadership has been criticized for devoting too
much time to parliamentary work. The f oundation work~ campaigning and the
contact with the voters had disappeared.
Anderson acknowledges this: "We have put too much work into parliamentary I
' motions that have landed directly in the waste basket and party members have ~
had no idea about. It is not good to devote too much time to parliamentary !
work-=as it is then impossible to be out among the people. The political
information work and campaigning are essential for the labor movement and
must not disappear in detailed alternatives into the government policy.." ;
The vote of no-confidence declaration is just such a combination of propagandis-
tic weapon and constitutional finesse. ;
Both party members and now even AnderSOn complain that the party discusses the ~
policy far too much on government term~. "We have not had any opposition
practice. We have become a reflex of the government policy which has been
most unfortunate." ~
More Long-Term Policy ;
Now the Social Democrats are rearranging the opposition work.
"The party must take time and vigor from the parliamentary work and instead
formulate a program for what we w311 do when we regain the government power. ,
We must have more long-term perspectives," says Anderson.
The Social Democrats have about 30 work groups operating that are dealing with '
everything from tax policy to children's rights in society. The first mentioned ,
group is led by Gunnar Strang and the latter by Palme himself . i'
The work in the groups in many cases involves reevaluating their own earlier !
policy. The tax policy to be abolished now, for example, bears Strang's
signature.
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"When we have seen that our tax policy does not hold as a means to reach the
goal, we must change," says Anderson. "It has gone surprisingly fast to get
out of prestige liaisons."
_ There is also a new and more tentative attitude in the party leadership.
John-Olof Persson, Stockholm finance comnissioner and deputy on the party's _
executive committee:
"With the great trouble we have in the social economy, it would be strange
if we had ready solutions. We are not faced with a recession--we are facing
economic crises. In that kind of a situation one should not be too cocky.
We must have a searching direction. It would be wrong for the critics to
~ believe that there is irresolution when there is submission."
The Social Democratic group leader, Hans Gustavsson, who is earmarked as
Palme's successor by the mass media, has sent off similar signals: increased
accord policy. -
Seek Contact With Industry
Party secretary Anderson also makes motions regarding the industry:
The Social Democrats want contact with industry. We want to conduct discus-
sions with people from the business world. Even if we do not share the
same opinions, we can exchange experiences. We have already had informal
talks with many company leaders in heavy industry. Now we want to conduct
these talks openly. We want the old Harpsund spirit back."
The mass media puts these signals in opposition to Palme's profile and inter-
pretation, and the parliamentary group's declaration of distrust. Person
says: "The fact that we are Ueing accused of dissatisfactory policy cannot
- scare us into silence. We must be extremely firm and resalute when we see
how the administration specifies the demand for everyone's right to work
and relinquishes the impartial allocation policy."
The pressure on the party leadership was extremely hard from around the -
_ country. People wrote, called and made a fuss for a more aggressive opposition
policy. Once again the party leadership seems to have underestimated the
party opinion. There were that many arguments against a distrust declaration:
one was that constitutional instruments without any practical signif icance;
another was that it was an empty clamoring--and that the split nonsocialist
parliamentary majority should get together again.
But th ere was one argument for a vote of no-confidence that was stronger than
all rational arguments together: the emotional element.
Around the country there was the distrust in th~ administration's economic
policy and the impatience was so great that from all directions within the
party thundered: The leaders~iip must do something!
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The party's executive committee did nat want any distrust--but was overruled.
- The parliamentary members returned to the group with fresh reports on the
sentiment w ithin the party districts, and it was so unequivocal that the party ~
leadership could not withstand the pressure.
But the dis appointment over the administration's industrial policy, for example,
also leads to problems for the Social Democrats. If the party now changes its
course in the industrial policy and accepts that unprofitable companies must ,
be abolished---how will it then be possible to go out to the people who connect
everything with the Social Democrats and talk about this? `
How will th e Social Democrats talk to the workers in the Oresund shipyard; or ;
to the miners from Spanhyttan?
"We will, of course, replace unprofitable jobs with other ~obs, applying it
to social responsibility," says Anderson. '^We must maintain the industrial
investments, concentrate on research and develop the cooperative industry.
We will use both the carrot and the stick. The administration cuts back in ;
expenditure but does not increase the income." _
i
Gr Anderson also admits a flaw in the policy pursued by the Social Democrats ~
earlier: "We got caught in the belief in permanent growth and development I
- optimism. It was not just us, even industry felt there was a lack of I
performance."
Nuclear Power No Explosive Wedge
The nuclear power'voting was never the explosive wedge in the Social Democratic
Party as many believed, even within the party. At that time, before the
nuclear power voting, Palme's position was weaker. '
Now it seems stronger. In a conversation with Social Democratic representa- _
tives, party workers, union officials, local government politicians and even
the most opposed within the party, the answer is always the same: "In the
labor movement we do not blame any one person for a setback." ;
Palme said at one time about Strang: "There is only one parson who can remove ~
Gunnar Strang, and that is Gunnar Strang himself." -
The same may be said about Olof Palme. ;
In order tc understand Palme's position, it must be kept in mind that he is the
fourth and rapidly descending Social Democratic Party leader. The party
le~iders h ave survived party dispersion and faction fighting. They have been
criticized and attacked. But the demand for resignation has never been placed
and never has anyone resigned as a result of fighting.
Jan. 0. Karlsson, editor-in-chief for the debate paper TIDEN, says: ,
"It is only the Left Party Communist, the Liberal Party and the Conservative
_ Party, in that order, that do what is done in industry: fire the director ;
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when the profit decreases. We do not do that i~n the labor movement, nor do
we do it in Che Center Party. They are national movements."
The newly published book about Olof Palme by Dieter Stranfl, journalist with
AFTONBLADET, has become important regarding candor within the party. This
comes clearly forth in the Social Democratic Party paper's review and when one
tries to catch th e mood of the movement.
Strand covered Palme during the election, the nuclear power voting and the
wage negotiations. He got to observe Palme involved in secret tactic al talks
and attending internal meetings. Palme's frankness to Strand has aroused
both astonishment and criticism within the party leadership. Gr Lars Engqvist,
newly appointed editor for ARBETET, says in one section of the book: "Palme
has too few sincere friends. I do not think he gets to hear what is said about
him. Especially up to this spring. In the LO [Swed3sh Federation of Txade
Unions]. At the local party office a t Sveavagen. And in the parliamentary
group, and including the old government circles.
~ "Invite Strang for a drink," says Engqvist, "and you will hear him get going
about Palme. Thage Peterson needs no drink. He believes that he, himself,
should be party leader."
Engqvist has acknowledged these statements and ~xcused them in a big article
in ARBETET that has made party secretary Anderson shake his head. This
article dismisses Engqvist's chattiness, and he dismisses Dieter Strand's
book. Han calls it "keyhole-journalism."
But the book has bro ught candor to th e party in more taboo areas, for examp le,
the party leader's position and the relationship between LO and the party.
The Administration's Clumsiness
- Strand writes in the book how disturbed the trade union movement was because
th e party politicized the wage negoti ations this spring.
"There was no reques t at all to poli ticize the wage negotiations, and the first
time we tried everything we could to keep out. It is out of the question to
negotiate ttie talks with trade union means only, political means are necessary,
too. The tax policy belongs in this category. The administration's clumsiness .
last spring cost the country many bi llions of kroner. We could have obtained
a higher standard of living at lower cost," says Anderson.
Anderson says about the relationship with the trade union movement: "Righ t
now there are issues whe.re we are of differ.ent opinion. We have been out
of step a few times, for example, regarding the employees funds, but that is
- better now."
Stig Malm, assistant union chairman in Metall, confirms this: "The f eeling
betweer, the ~arty and the trade union movement is much better now ~han it
was half a year ago. The north-south dialogue and the Brandt commission are,
of course, important issues, but that is not what the steel workers discus~
on the job. They talk about the pri ce of food and th~ir salary."
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~ v~~ VL ~ ~V1~YJ V~I~J V~~VL
It is more difficult for Palme, personally, to talk to the LO director,
Gunnar Nilsson, who is on the party's executive committee, than it is for
him to talk to Bert Lundin, director of Metall, who is also a member of the
VU. Nilsson prefers not to attend the W meetings, but that is not any new
behavior--the same applies to Arne Geijer.
When one talks to the Sociul Democrats about a successor to Palme--as if '
Palme /himself/ should want to leave--three names are mentioned. They are '
Hans Gustavsson, Stend Anderson--and as a dark horse after the Line 2
victory, LO secretary Rune Molin. Will Palme resign if the Social Democrats
lose the election in 19 81? That is what the nonsocialists papers said he ~
should do in case he lost the elections in 1979.
Nobody but Olof Palme can answer this question, and that confession will not -
~ pass his lips . ' . r
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Will They Close the Circle in 1982? !
~ _
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[Photo caption] These are Che innermost circles of the Social Democrat Party:
In the center of the circle is the party's chairman, /Olof Palme/, and /Sten
Anderson/, party secretary since 1963. The circle around them consists of
; /Tngvar Carlsson (VU, group management. Speciality: unwieldy advisor,
general policy, energy, issues, housing), /K~ell-Olof Feldt/, party manage-
_ ment, but not VU. Specialities: economy), /Thage G. Peterson/ (W, group
management). Speciality: industrial policy), fAnna-Greta Leijon/(party
management, but not VU. Speciality: the ~mployment market, equality rights,
i immigration policy), /Gunnar Nilsson/, LO chairman with a seat in W, and
; /Bert Lundin/, chairman of Metall and is more often at W than Gunnar Nilsson.
' /Gunnar Strang/, the last of the old generation, does not get a circle. His
influence is getting less, but he must not be disregarded yet. He is the
chairman of the tax group and partially responsible for economic issues.
- After this there are some heavy names in the Soc3a1 Demo cratic Parzy and
- different areas of responsibiligiea; /Gertrud Sigurdsen/ of the LO secretariat
specialist in international issues and aid. /Lena Hjelm Wallen/, responsible
- i for the school policy, /Rune Molin/, LO secretary and a successful Line 2
~ general, /Bert Winberg/, chairman of Byggnad, /Kurt Ward/, chairman of the
Provincial Council Federation and VU member, /John-Olof Persson/, d~eputy
~ member of VU and Stockholm's minister of finance, /Anna-Lisa Lewen-Eliasson/,
involved in disarmament and peace issues, /Birgitta Dah 1/, specializes in
equal rights issues and accommodation democracy, /Sven Hulterstrom/, deputy
member in W and the party's Goteborg member, /Nils Yngvesson/,expert in housing
policy and /Ma3britt theorin/, defense policy expert, inf luential revolutionary
whom the party leadership cannot ignore.
~ COPYRIGHT: Ahlen & akerlunds tryckerier, Stockholm 1980
~
9583
CSO: 3109 END
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