JPRS ID: 9439 TRANSLATION THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE BY S.G. GORSHKOV

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JPRS L/9439
12 December 1980
Translation
THE SEA POWER OF THE STAT'E
By
S.G. Gorshkov
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JPRS L/9439
12 December 1980
THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE
Moscow MORSKAYA MOSHCH' GOSUDARSTVA in Russian 1979 siqned to press .
6 Aug 79 (2d ed, supplemented) _
[Book by S.G. Gorshkov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union,
Military Publishing House, 60,000 copies, 416 pages]
CONTENTS
Foreword

iii
Chapter I.
The Oceans and the Sea Power of the State
1
1
Various Views Concerning the Sea Power of the State
1 =
The Ocean and its Importance
9
The Transport and Fishing Fleets - Components of
_
.
the Sea PoNer of the State
35
Pt�oblems of InLernational Maritime l.aw
63
~ Chapter II.
Pages from the History of Navies
87 =
ivavies of the Western hations from the 16th through
~
the 19th Centuries
90 _
-
The Russian havy in the 17th-19th Centuries
97
'
N;3v.ies in ttie Wars of the Late 19t.h and Early 20th �
Cent.uries
119
Navies in World War I
132
Navies in World War II
147
=
The Suilding of the Soviet. Navy
171
The Soviet Navy in Warld War II
193
Chapter III.
Ihe Deve]opment of Navies After World War II
220 ~
The Military Doctrines of the United States and NATO..
223
The Deve]opment of the Navies of the Imperialist.
States
239
The Development of the Soviet Navy
253
The Improvement in Naval Forces and Equipment
269 -
i [II - USSR
- FOUO]
[III - USSR
- 4 FOUO]]
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Chaptier IV. Modern Problems of the Art of Naval Warfare 305
mhe Strate4ic EbrnZoyment of a Navu 306
Fleet Against Fleet and Fleet Against the Shore 315
Some Theoretical Questions of the Art of Naval
, Warfare 326
Navies in Local Wars of Imperialism 342
_ Navies in Time of Peace 356
~ .
Problems of Balancing Navies 366
Conclusion ...........i 403
- ABSTRACT -
The monograph studies the concept of the sea power of the
state and its importance in the policies and defense of a
nation. It examines the basic components of sea power
among which the main attention is focused on the navy,
- particularly a modern navy capable of conducting operations
-,nd prosecuting strategic missiuns in various areas of the
World Ocean in concert with nther branches ot the armed
forces or independently. The monograph is intended
[[primarily for the military reader]] for admiraZs, gen-
eraZs, and officers of the Soviet Army and Navy.
Translator's Note
New material in the 2d Edition is in italics. First Edi-
tion material deleted from the 2d Edition is in double
brackets: Data deleted from tables of the lst
Edition are not given.. Material xn single slantlines
indicates there was a chanqe in the Russian wordirig which
may he of intere ,t to the analyst, but which does not alter
t.he trrinslation. Paragraphinq was altered somewhat from
the ls:t Fdition, with some combined and some split. These
- ctianqc::: are not flagged. The posilion of paragraphs was
rearrenged in the secti.on on maritime law.
ii
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FOREWORD
- The author received a Zarge number of Zetters from readers
and several reviews appeared in the press arter the first edi--
tion of the book Morskaya mosnch' qosudarstva. These Zetters
ane reuiews ccn+lained valuabte w2shes and cr2tica2 remarks on
subjects raiaed ir t%-e book, associated by the overaZZ theme of
the make-up o;" the cor.cept "sea power" and its importance for
a state rahose ecer.omic deveZopment anci defense are Zinked
cZosely witn our planet's sea expanses both by uzrtue of a Zong
stretch of maritime borders and the maritime geography, which is
contpZex for our countru, ard by virtue of ar, increase in 1RZZZ-
- tary threai frcm, mari.-time axes. Significar.t?y cor.tributing to
the latter is the adherer.ce of a number of western poraers to
navaZ vrdnar:ce ar.d its unusuaZZy rapid deveZopment in the
nuclea�r missiZe era.
The readers' Zetters and the reviews cZearty attest to an
ever-growing inierest shown by the pun?ic at Zarge in our coun-
try and abroad in proDl2ms invoZving the deveZopment and use of
oceans for economic ard military purposes. Bui it was not onty '
c. desire to take account of the readers' critical remarks which
forced us to turr ~o a second ed~tion o; the book. ln the time
since the rirst EdZtZOY?, :mporiar.t ever.ts have occurred in our
country and abroad with rahicr: the problems examined in the work
are Ziniced. Tnis relates anove aZZ to the extensive discussion
1:eZd ur.der the aeg-1s of tne United Natior.s; a discussion which
assumed tne rorm o; an unprecedented"y representative and very
ler.athy in.ternation.al conference on Zaw of the sea and which
- Gttempted to 1'in.d a so7lution to the prob?em o:" use or the
oceans. ir: additi.;n, explcitatzon of the seabeds for extraction
' of vaZuanZe resourcad--und pe~roleu~n above aZl--from the bottom
3^czsasswr,ed a ccmpla4taly unh2ara o` scaZe in recent years. This
is ?inked with nu.^rerous attempts bu 3ome atates to appropriate
' large sea an-A ocear ewwanses, with the simultanaous threat of a
considerabt'a and dan.gerous 'imitation :o freedom of navigation.
FinaZZu, man~ s:a.Za�2C3 c:;tad in the book have ckanged signifi-
cantlyvus a res4,s of LRe, rarici deve%opmer:t cf atazes' economies,
w'rcicn also generated a number of criticuZ remarks from readers.
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Very important events which occurred in our country--the
EOth Anniversary of the Creat October SociaZist Revolution and
adoption of the new Constitution--forced u new Zook at some
_ issues raised i-~ the mork.
AZZ this Zed the author to the idea of the advisability of
returning to a favorite topic of his about the sea power af the
_ state as an impo�tant factor for ensuring frsedom of.navigation
= on the icigh seas ar.d for protecting sovereignty over the area
contiguous with a coa8t.
Marxism considers the qeographical medium, of which the
V;orld Ocean is a most important element, to be among the many
factors influencin, the development of human society. It occu-
pies almost three-fourths of the surface of our planet and
Fossesses colossal biological, energy, and mineral resources.
As man's understanding and the devetopment of technology
- rosa, his use of the World Ocean for many centuries gave rise
to transport and fishing fleets which engendered the expansion
- cf trade and the building of numerous bases and ports. With
the development of the ocean sciences the research fleet is
becoming ever larger. The maritime status of many countries
has fostered the appearance in them of specific bran,~hes of
industry that exert a favorable influenr:e on the economic
= developmPnt of these countries. Moreover, the seas and oceans
= have long been a specific arena of rivalry and armed combat
which has entailed the development of special weapon systems
and types of forces incorporated into the concept of "the Navy."
- There is a basis for regarding the totality of the physicaZ
means for scienti fic and econonric mastery of the World Ocean ar.d
~ [[tl:e mE:ans ) ] for defending the interests of a State, when ration-
ally combined, as repr3senting the sea power of the State, which
determines the capability of one country or another to utilize
the military-economic resources of the ocean for its own pur-
roses.
The sea power of the State is rightly regarded as a system
which is characterized not only by relationships between its
components (naval, transport, fishing, scientific-research
fleets, and so forth), but also by an indivisible unity with
the environment, the ocean, in an interrelationship throuqh
which the systen [[expresses] J funetions and raanifests its own unity.
_ The i.mportance of the individual components comprising the
sea power is not constant. It is determined by specific histor-
ical conditions; however, with the existenee of antagonistie
social systems, /the importance of the Navy remains dominating./
� iv
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In view of tnis, an examination of the military aspect of
sea power is very important, /if one considers/ the signifi-
cance which is attached to navies hy the major imperialist
states in their expansionistic poZitics, rahich gives rise to a
need for reinforcing attention to our country's defense from
ocean axes.
At the present time, i.n the era of grandiose scientific
discoveries and thei.r utilization for military needs, the tech-
nical capabilities of conducting military operations in the
ocean medium and their roZe in armed conflict have increased
considerably. Despite the statement by CPSU CentraZ Committee
' GeneraZ ..~ecretary, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, from the roszrum of
the 25th Congresa of th2 Communist Party.of the Soviet Union
that "tke Soviet Union is not planning to attack anyone. The
Soviet Unior, does not need a war. Our country is waging
a consistent an.d unfl-inchixg struggle for peace..."1; the
imperiatist states are not ceasing the arms race, are not
rejecting plans for preparing for a new worZd war, and are con-
tinuously unleashing locaZ wars, rahich have become an inalien-
abZe part of t'rceir poZitics.
[[Both in the preparation by international monopolistic
capital for world war and in the Zocal wars which have become
an integral part of the policy of imperialist states in the
last quarter of a century,]j J."n these wars an important role
is being assi5ned to navies which have been thrust to the fore-
fraiit of the diverse modern meana of combat. For example,
Pentagon leaders cor.sider U.S. r..aval forces to be not only a
primary means of n tv.Q J- ~ ~~~1' 'y lI't~:, c~ .'p:'. ~ ~ 7
t� i~ . �;,~~i- ~(10NNA
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ac~pHNa
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6
. Figure,l. International tilarine Shipments of dil
Keyl
1. U5J1 S. TAe tiear and Nidd?e =ast
2, ':erezvela 6. Aus:nl:a �
j. .':cr:h %�'r!ea 7. *a;,ira
4, 'aes:e:n _.;rop� '
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44
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Figure 2. Intern3tional N!:.rine ShipiT,ents of Iron Ore
12
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Figure 3. dnternational Mirine Shipments of Coal
R�rs
1. iTSSx S: South 4Nriea 2. Australla d Englxr,d
CaniLds 7. Sout! Afriea
� QSA A. ioland
, ' ~r~�~:'i i ~
111!~~y' .i~.:~ !~i~il~ 9i., i t~"~ . t``.~ 2 3~uw?T Nraop~uroww oSOaMawY~
t ^,'`~I�';~~�,: a~i ~:I,~~~~ 'a,.tiH~�..�� 3 . ~/{0 60orw.r
�i.:'i~~i,i:r~!~~'`' t=�i~" 7er by the end of tne war) brought about
great changes in tne balancing of the forces. At the same time,
the relative weignt of the total displacement of battieshipsand
cruisers decreased considerably although at the end of the war
' they accounted `or about half the tonnage of the British Navy.
An analysis cf the changes in the relationship of forces of the
British Navy makes it possible to conclude that the Admiralty
~ was cnly able to balance the I3avy with respect to goals, mis-
- sions, and areas of operation by the end of the war with the aid
of its alll, the United States, and only owing to the fact that
the main missions of the Second World War were carried out on
� the Soviet-German Front.
The Navy of Fascist Germany differed considerably from the
British Navy with respect to the balancing of its forces
according to these same characteristics. In preparing for the
attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler's command devoted prior.ity
attention to developing the Army and Air Force. The extent of
the ef.Port whicn Germany expended on preparations for conduct-
i^g navaJ. warfare against the Western powers was extremely
small. Preparations for war with England and, consequently,
expand.ed naval construction, were scheduled for a later time
after the completion of the war in the East. The general plan
_ for naval construction (Plan Z), developed with this considera-
tion in mind and adopted in February 1939, called for the
buildir,g of six battleships (including three "packet battle-
ships"), five heavy cruisers, two aircraft carriers, and 190
_ submarines by the time of the possible outbreak of war against
England. After the ccmpletion of Plan Z it was intended to
have 13 battlesY:ips, 33 cruisers, four aircraft carriers, and
257 submarines in service.
Accordinq to Plan Z, the main goal oF naval oDeratians was -
to interdict the British sea and ocean communications. All
- naval forces we re intended to be used for this purpose, with
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the main stress being placed on surface ships. To carry out
this mission long-range forces were established, consisting =
primarily of high-speed battleships and cruisers with a long
cruising range and high endurance, capable of attacking enemy _
combatants and merchantmen in distant a-reas or the high seas.
Submarines were also includEd in the long-range forces. On the
eve of the Second World War, the German Navy had a total of 57
_ submarines. The total submarine displacement was only 9% of
the total tonnage of the Navy, while at that time battleships
made up 46$ of the tonnage; cruisers, 31.5%; and destroyers,
13.5$,zl
The German command underestimated the role of aircraft in
operations at sea. Goering's resistance to the establishment
of naval aviation greatly contributed to it. He believed that
all aircrafr of the armed forces should be concentrated in the
Luftwaffe which, deoending on the situation, should be employed
either to aid the Navy or to [[carry out independent missi.ons,
i.e., for strategic bombing] ] deli>e� s:ri;~es agair.st grour.,-_-7
taccets.
- The German command [(also]) devoted a great deal of atten-
tion to the development of coastal forces intended to defend
its basing areas, to combat the mine threat, to support the
deployment of the main forces of the Navy at sea, and to main-
Lain a favorable operational regime in its own coastal watErs.
Thus, on the eve of the war the Navy of Fascist Germany was
already oriented toward interdicting the ocean communicatiUns
of the enemy. Its construction and traininq was proceeding in
accordance with that end. -
The 2ac'r, of foresight and the adventurism of Hitier'snaval
command, which affected the selection of the direction of naval
construction, and also the vi.ews on its employcnent, were the
main reason that the German raiders were destroyed by Allied
naval forces in the very first year of the war. The subsequent
- redirectian of attack aircraft operations to the Soviet-German
Front in the summer of 1941 left only the Germar submarines to
= conduct the battle against Allied communications. The Hit?.er
command regarded the reassuring result's of their cnmbat opera-
tions at the outset of the war to be a stimulus for the expan-
sion of intensive cor.struction of submarines ar.d for accelerated
training af their crews. The successes of the submarines were
*_o a great degree due to the passiveness of the British and
American armed forces on land and in the air and also to the -
ir.decisiveness of British naval operations at sea.
On 30 December 1939 a new shipbuilding program was approved
in Germany under which the construction of 392 submarines was -
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envisioned by the end of 1991. In the summer of 1943 one more
program was adopted for the accelerated construction and intro-
duction into service of 288 XXZ-series submarines by February
1945 and of 140 XXIIZ-series submarines by October 1944.
The employment of large contingents of labor forces (l:ired
foreign workers, workers from the German-occupied countries,
prisoners of war, and women) ar.d other [(emergency]J measures
permitted German ir.dustry to considerably [[increase]J acceZer-
ate submarine construction. Whereas in 1939 six of them were
built, in 1940 this figure rose to 40, in 1941 to 219, and in
1942 it reached 222. The largest number of submarines was built
in 1943 and 1944 (292 and 283 respectively). The Germans
succeeded in puttinq 1,131 submarines into service in the course
of the war.22 However, the increased construction of submarines
did not improve the situation of Fascist Germany at sea, since
no forces were built capable of supporting the operatior,s of
those submarines, of ooposing the fleets of England and her
allies, and of cooperatinq from the sea with her own ground
forces.
The development of primarily one arm, tne submarir.e force,
should have led and,in the final analysis, did lead to a dras-
tic limitation on the range of missions of the German Navy in
combating the enemy fleets, and predetermined its passiveness in
every other sphere of warfare at sea. Thus, the Fascist German
command put itself in an unfavorable position at sea, making the
operations of the enemy fleets to a certain degree easier, and
contributing to the purposeful development of their antisubma-
rine forces.
Germany was still unable to exploit the fruits of such a
raoid, yet to a certain degree warped, development of her Navy,
. because she had lost a great deal of time, having allowed the
enemy to undertake appropriate countermeasures. Moreover,
havi.zg built an armada of submarines, the Hitler command did not
concern itself with the battle against the antisubmarine
defenses of the Allies. Finally, what was most important was
that the tremendous intensity af the struggle on the Eastern
- Front deprived Germany of her ability to allocate greater
material resources Lo the Navy. The scope of the struggle and
a se.ries of major defeats on the decisive Eastern Front pre-
vented the German Fascist cor,unand from assigning aircraft for
- use against British, and later also against. American, shipping,
for reconnaissance support of submarine operations, for the
- laying of mines, and for combating the antisubmarine forces at
sea. Moreover, the [(very]] powerful shipbuilding industry of
_ Great Britain and the United States remained unaffected, as a
result of which, beginning in 1944, the replacement and building
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_ of the transport fleet exceeded i-ts losses in the war, and the
increase in the construction rate of antisubmarine forces in the
final analysis led to the failure of the German plans for unre-
stricted submarine warfare.
([All of]] The above factors aggravated the prewar miscal-
culations of the Hitler command still further, which had an
immediate effect on the combat operations of the German Navy as
a whole.
[[The balancing of the Navy of Fascist Germany in the
course of the war was also constantly influenced by]] The opera-
tions of the Soviet Northern, Baltic, and Black sea fleets,
which the Hitler command was forced to combat by dispatching a
considerable part of the fnrces from the sea and ocean communi-
= cations, in addition to inshore forces[[. This]] increased the
disproportion in the Fascist German Navy and limited its capa-
bilities to combat the navies of our allies.
One of the contributions of the Soviet Armed Forces was
that, by displaying steadfastness on the defensive and by
delivering attacks on the offensive, they prevented the Hitler
command from eliminatinq this lack of proportion in the devel-
opment of the Navy or creating balanced forces to carry out
their main missions at sea in the caurse of the war.
Taking advantage of the fact that the Soviet Union was
wagir.g a bl4ody war single-handedly against Fascist Germany by
engaging almost all of the German forces, the Anglo-American
- command, while avoiding the direct conduct of active combat
operations in the decisive ground theater for almost three
years, built up without hindrance and finally employed vast
naval forces and aircraft to combat the German U-boats.
Accordinq to very rough figures, more than 1,500 land-based
aircraft, more than 30 aircraft carriers, and about 3,500
escort ships of various classes carried out this mission.
British and Canadian aircraft alone flew 44,000 sorties from
airiields te escort convoys and ((755,000] ] 75,500 sorti-es to patrol mari-
time areas in the hunt for hostile submarines. We should add
to this that the German shipbuilding enterprises, especially
the factories and yards building suhmarines and turning out .
equipment for them, were subjected to frequent mass attacks by
Anglo-American aircraft beginninq in 1943.
Even by this time, as a result of the sharply declining
level of crew training ancl the drop in their morale, German
diesel submarines, which had remained essentially at the 1939
technicallevel, proved incapable of successfully overcoming
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Tabk 23 Muchant Marine Losses of England and Her Allies to
i;eemah Submacines.in WW II?'3 . . .
Merchant ship tosses
No. of
No. of
Gross
G
s
shi
Register
erman
p
No. of
Subs sunk
sunk per
tons of
Yeu
ships
GRT
wtr
ship
muine
losses
los:
per sub-
marine
lost
- 1939
114
421156
9
12.6
4679s
1940
471
2186158
22
21.4
99375
1941
432
2171754
35
12.3
62050
1942
1160
6266215
85
13.6
73720
1943
463
2586905
237
1.5
10915
1944
132
773327
248
4.5 .
3118
1945
56
281716
145
0.4
1949
Total
2828
114687231
. 781
3.6
18806
counteractions by the thoroughly trained forces of the enemy's
antisubmarine defense, which were more advanced technically.
German submarine losses during the forcing of antisubmarine
barriers and in the course of the attacks on British and Amer-
- ican convoys began to increase substantially, while Merchant _
Marine losses of Great Britain and her allies dropped notice- -
. ably. This is clearly seen in Table 23.
Foreign historians have often employed these statistical _
data to prove the far-fetched idea that submarines, Zike battle-
ships, were defeated in the last war. But the reduction in the
effectiveness of submarine combat operations against sea -
- communications in the course of the war was nothing other than
[(an expression)] the res.c?t of the process of the contest
between offensive weapons and clefensive weapons, whose develoo-
ment proceeded under unequal conditions: The former were
i.mproved slowly, without alterinq their technical level, while _
- the latter were developed on a new technical base. While
the Sritish and Americans achieved certain successes in combat- -
ing submarines, owing to the massive employment of ASW forces
and equipment, there is no doubt that the appearance of funda-
= mentally new classes of submarines with improved armament would
have inevitably altered the situation in the U-boats' favor. In _
other words, if the Hitler command proved to be unable to widely
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employ new submarines and new combat equipment bzfore Germany
was defeated on land by the Soviet forces, then this certainly
- does not mean that submar.ines were at all discredited as a means
of waging war against sea communications.
The success of the Ailies in armed combat at sea is ].argely
explained by the lack of balance of a German Navy which was
employed only to carry out one mission. The adventuri.stic
- nature of the German naval strategy, which transformed the Navy
from a versatile branch of the Armed Forces inco a narrowly
specialized instruinent and limzted its sphere of employmPnt only
to operations against enemy commun:cations, was one of the mai.n
reasons for the defeat of the German Navy "in the battle for the
Atlantic." The lack of balance of the Navy prevented the Hitler
command from effectively employing it against strike forces,
against the shore, or to combat Allied landings, which
encountered practically no firm resistance at sea.
At the same time, the employment of various for_ces and
equipment by the German Navy in the sea theaters adjacent to the
territory af the Soviet tlnion and the periodic reinforcement of
them with submarines, with anLisubmarine forces drawn from the
ocean sectors, and also by aircraft from the front, greatly com-
plicated the struggle for our Navy. [[However, the operations
of the Suviet Navy were to a certain degree favored by the
absence in the German naval inventory of major amphibious ships
and equipment to provide support from the sea for the graund
troops in the littoral sectors.]]
Active combat operations by our Navy prevented the Hitler-
ites from comppnsating for the lack of balance in their forces
at sea through various [[types of impravisation J] redep Zoyments.
Tlzerefare, throughout the course of the war, the German Navy was
unable to render decisive support to their troops in the
littoral sectors even when they had suffered serious defeats.
Tt cannot be said that the US Navy entered tre war balanced
with respect to its goals and missions. On the eve of the
Second World War, this oceanic Navy, the largest numerically,
was also oriented toward waging war with battleship forces on
the high seas. All major ships, including aircraft carriers and
crtiisers included in the composition of the squadrons, were
supposed to support the entry into battle af the battleship
forces.
A rather large number of US submarines were earmarked
- mainly for combat with the enemy's surface combatants, although
this did not exclude the possiblity of employing them to destroy
transports on the sea and ocean communications routes.
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The apportionment of naval forces with respect to mission
did not go any further than this, if we exclude the fact that it
was proposed to employ part of the surface ships comprising the
squadrons in the battle for communications. Therefore, the
American comman3 was forced to resolve the problem of balanciny
right in the middle of the armed struqgle.
After the Jaoanese attack on Pearl Harbor "Like Adam and
Eve, the Americans saw they were naked, ..."24 [[A large]]
The greater part of the "foundation" of its Navy lay on the
bottom in the form of a useless mass of scrap. The loss of
- eight battleships, three cruisers, three destroyers, and other
warships shocked the [[hierarchy of the]] American Navy. Six
months were needed to orient the Navy toward the accomplishment
of their main missions in the war on the sea with carrier
forces. The Eattle of the Coral Sea and zhe BattZe of Midway
were needed.to convince them that battleships had finally lost
their leading role and had irrevocably given it up to aircraft
carriegs, the platform for naval attack aircraft.
The vital need for aircraft carriers forced the US naval
command to push construction of them in every possible way. At
the same time, construction of battleships, cruisers, and
destroyers was accelerated. Durin3 the war nine battleships,
45 cruisers, and 379 destroyers were built.
The Second World War introduced considerable changes in the
relative strength of the American naval forces. Whereas at the
outbreak of war the ratio of the displacement of the battle-
ships to the displacement of the entire fleet was 45.6$, and
this ratio was 22% for cruisers, 19.1$ for destroyers, 9.3% for
aircraft carriers, and 4$ for submarines, at the end of the war
it was 24% for battleships, 23$ for carriers, 23% for crtri.sers,
19% for destroyers, and 9$ for submarines.
- These figures ([confirm]J reaffirm the conclusion that in
the course of the Second World 'tlar, battleships had already lost
their former siqnificance and had fielded their main role in
armed combat at sea to the carriers and submarines, which even
today are the main combat strength of the US Navy.
- The American Navy entered the war completely unprepared to
protect merchant ships from submarine attack. The enormous
losses of the Merchant riarine and the continuing acceleration of
German submarine operations in the Atlantic Ocean confronted the
US Navy with the primary problem nf building patrol-escort
ships. Through extr,.me measures and at great financial expense,
the Americans succeeded relatively rapidly in expanding major
series construction of ships. [[whereas]] At the end of
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- July 1941, 280 patrol and escort ships were enqaged in antisub-
marine warfare; within a year 527 were participating, and two
years 'Later there were 1,260.
Thus, in the years of the Second World War the United
_ States created powerful antisubmarine surface forces practically
_ from scratch. Taking into account the insignificant losses
suffer_ed in the course of combat operations, by the end of the
war they numbered 73 escort carriers, 358 escort ships, 77
_ frigates, eight corvettes, and 659 submarine chasers.
At the outbreak of the war with Japan, the United States
was faced with the need to make up the deficiency in landing
ships. At that time there were only several experimental ships
of this type in the US naval inventory. The United States began
accelerated series construction of landing craft of various -
classes and of large ships to transport troops across thP ocean
and to deiiver a landing force to landi.ng areas in the course of
the war. By the end of the war the US Navy had 17 amphibious -
command sh i ps , 1,090 1 ar ge LST' s, 554 L.: m's , 454 amphibious transports and ,
_ 23 dock landing ships. In additYOn, thousands of various small
landing ships and craft were constructed.
Mass construction of mine warfare ships was undertaken. -
Whereas at the outbreak of war there were almost no mine warfare
ships in the American Navy, by the end of the war there were
a].ready 223 fleet minesweepers, 74 inshore minesweepers, and 450
minesweeoing craft.
Thus, anly in the course of the war was the American Navy
balanced with respect to missions, qualitative and numerical
composition, and areas of operation. The operational-strategic
goals of employing its forces in warfare were redefined,
_ requiring the building of new types of ships, incZuding antisub-
- marine and landing ships.
The US Navy, which previously had been oriented toward
waging war with the enemy's surface fleet, was transformed into
a general-purpose branch of the Armed Forces, which was charged
with such major *nissions as conducting large-scale amphibious
operations, the defense of Allied ocean communications, and the
interdiction of enemy communicatio_r.s. .
The successful resolution of the problem of balancing the
forces of the American Navy wNs aided in the course of the war
- by the, fact (which favored the United States) that the strategic
missions of the war were accomplished by the Soviet Armed Forces
on the main, Soviet-German ground front, and therefore the Navy
of Fascist Germany, particularly beginning in 1943, was not able
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to waqe warfare against communicarions lines and the US Navy in the
- Atlantic. As a result of this, US industry was not subjected to
enemy action and operated under the most favorable canditions
dui-inq the war.
However, even under tl:ese conditions American industry
required years to build naval forces from the }ceel up which
were capable of battling the German submarines in the Atlantic,
- as well as to build major amphibious forces for the Allied inva-
sion of Europe.
The lack of balance of the Japanese naval forces with
- respect to goals and missions was detected from the very outset
of military hostilities in the Pacific Ocean, and served as one
= of the reasons for their defeat in the Second World War. The
- trend in the development of the Japanese Navy in the pzewar
period was determ.ined proceeding from those same original theses
- which underlay the military doctrines of the Western powers.
The differences consisted only in the fact that the Japanese
providedfor t.he construction of combatants and auxiliaries to
- land amphibious forces. However, no modern forces for the anti-
submarine defense of ocean communications lines were built,
althouqh the insular position of Japan and her dependence on the
importation by sea of strategic raw materials has always been
her weak point.
The rapid advance of the Japanese in a southerly direction
and the seizure of vast island areas in the southwestern part of
the Pacific Ocean at the outbreak of war led to the dispersion of
naval forces employed to protect merchant shipping and to
extreme pressure on the inshore antisubmarine forces, whose
position and combat qualities did not permit them to conduct
combat operations over the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean.
In preparing for the war against the USSR, the Japanese
miiitary leadership proceeded from the premise that if even
limited ASW forces prevented the Soviet submarines from egress
from the Sea of Japan, every mission respacting the protection
of Japanese communications in the Pacific Ocean would be accom-
plished. The mass employment of mines and networks of antisub-
marine barriers covered by ships and coastal artillery in the
straits were considered sufficient for th:.s purpose.
The losses inflicted on the Japanese Merchant Marine in the
very first year of the war considerably exceeded every predic-
tion of the Japanese commanc3. However, the limited capabilities
of the production and of the raw material base of the country,
which was not prepared to bui?d the necessary number of antisub-
marine ships in a short period of time, prevented the taking of
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- decisive measures tu support and protect sea shipping. The
- overall inventory of escort forces of the Navy continued to
remain insufficient. In 1943, the Japanese naval inventory
- included only 50 antisubmarine screening ships (of these 14 were
specially-built antisubmarine ships) including severaldestroy-
- ers constructed in the period 1920-1925, but they were also
emp'toyed mainly to screen major surface combatants.
The escorting of transport ships at sea was carried out
mainly by inshore escort ships with weak antisubmarine armament.
The four escort carriers in the inventory of the ASW forces were
ahle to participate ir the convoys only in 1944.
In the quest of inethods to eliminate the effects of mis-
takes in balancing its naval for.ces, the Japanese naval command,
employed a large number of motoriZed and sailing fishing ships
unsuited for antisubmarine work to combat the American subma-
rines. Such ships were not equipped with sonar and rudar and
were unable to have any sort of effect on combating the subma-
rines.
Seeing the gap in their strategic plans, the Japanese mili-
tary lgadership intended to build 233 escort ships in the period
1942 to 1945 to add to the 14 special antisubmarine ships in
service. However, this intention, which was not backed by
industrial capabilities, was not realized.
The weakness in the material-technical base and lack of
preparedness of the Japanese Navy for antisubmarine defense
created very favorable conditions for American submarine opera-
tions against the sea and ocean communications of Japan. With-
out meeting any serious counteraction, they sank 1,150 Japanese
ships totalinq about 4,860,000 register tons, about 62$ of the
total losses of the Japanese Merchant Marine.25
- The Japanese lost more thar 80 combatants, including one
battleship, eight aircraft carriers, 12 cruisers, 37 destroyers,
and 24 submarines to submarine weapons.26
The Japanese Navy turned out to b
to repel attacks from the air. During
ships totalinq 2,467,000 register tons
losses in merchant tonnage) as well as
including six battleships, 13 aircraft
51 destroyers, and 22 submarines, were
craft."27
e insufficiently prepared
the war, 750 merchant
(which was 31.5% of the
112 major combatants,
carriers, 20 cruisers,
sunk by American air-
Thus, an analysis of the conditi.on of the navies of the
Socialist states in the period of the Second Wor1d War, the
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dynamics of their development, andchanges in the structure and
relative str:tngth of forces in the course of military opera-
tions produced by unforeseen circumstances, makes it possible to
conclude that on the eve of the Second World War the problem of
balancing naval forces had not been solved by a single one of
the imperialist belligerent seapowers.
What were the basic re asons for underestimating this impor-
tant problem in the prewar period?
- It seems that it was not at all that the economies of such
- imperialist states as Great Britain, Germany and Japan were
- unable under peacetime conditions to build naval forces with the
needed combat qualities and numerical compositions. One can
hardly agree that the military thought of.these countries proved
i.ncapable of defining the goals and missions of naval forces in
- a future war stemming from the foreign policy of the states or
of developing a scientifically-based program for naval construc-
- tion . '
The true reasons for this situation are: 1) major irrepa-
rable miscalculations in foreign policy by the ruling circles
= and military leadership of the United States and Great Britain,
which were unable to recognize Hitler Germany as a potential
enemy in time and to determine the nature of the Second World
War and the role and position of their navies in it; 2) the
adventurism of the policy and strategy of Fascist Germany and
- militarist Japan, [[which doomed to failure the aspirations of
the military] ] and the cspiratiores (doomed to faiZure) of,
having begun the wcr, to achieve world supremacy in a short
time; and 3) the ignoring of the wealth of experience in the
- First world War by the military leaders of the countries in both
coalitions; the overestimation of the combat capabiliities of
major gunnery ships; and the underestimation of the striking
power and prospects fox the development of submarines and air-
craft, which actually bec ame the main naval forces in warfare
- at sea.
- The lack of balance of naval forces with respect to their
= missions was revealed in the course of the expanding warfare at
- sea, which confronted all of the belligerents with the need to
rapidly correct the mistakes which had been made at the cost of
enarmous effort and maximum stress on their economies. Yet only
- by the time the war ended did the navies of the United States
and Great Britain become balanced to a considerable degree with
~ respect to the missions which had arisen.
The limited economic capabilities of Fascist Germany and
- militarist Japan in comparison with those of the United States
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and Great Britain were utilizsd only to develop those naval
forces on which the main burden of warfare at sea fell in the
various period5 of the war. This considerably narrowed the
range of missions of the Navy, and deprived it of that impor-
tant quality of versatility. Favorable conditions were
naturally created for the enemy, permitting him tu concentrate
his own naval forces only in limited sectors, to support their
operations precisely in this narrow sphere, and to achieve
success at the cost of relatively small effort and material
expenditure.
By utilizing mainly submar=nes in the war at sea, the
- Gerrians forced the enemy to survive many bitter di.sappointments
in their desire to protect their own ocean communications. How-
ever, due to its one-sided developznent, the German Navy Lurned
out ta be pawezless in battle with the Anglo-American fleet.
The navy is among the branches o� the armed forces most
difficult to rebuild; the replacement of its losses and the
resto.ration of its ships and weapons entail great expenditures
in time and material resources. S tates which were strong
economically coped with this task in the course of the war in a
short time only when there were extremely favorable military-
' political conditions. In the absence of these conditions the
replacement of naval forces, much less the balancing of them in
the course of the war, was a practically unsolvable problem. A
good example of this was Japan, wh ich did not have the necessary
raw material base and whose industrial targEts were constantly
- subjected to American atir attack.
The industrial enterprises of Fascist Germany also found
themselves under attack by Allied aircraft; however, as a rule
these attacks were not sufficient to fully deprive Germany of
her capability to replace the naval losses which she suffered.
At the outbreak of the Second World War British industry
was replacing ship losses with gre at difficulty, because its
entGrprises were subjected to savage attacks by German aircraft.
Only a�ter Hitler's Air Force ceased its massive attacks on
England, concentrating all of its efforts on the Soviet-German
Front, and only after enormous US aid, was the constructian of
antisubmarine ships, landing ships and minesweepers as well as
ships for the transport fleet increased.
The Second world War showed that not a single belligerent
capitalist country whose industry suffered enemy attack was able
without Allied aid to eliminate the disproportion in the balan-
cing of its navy and to organize and implement the replacement
of naval f.orces and equipment in the course of the war. Only
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US industry was in a position to independently resolve this
problem. The i:ivulnerability of the American Continent to the
weapon s existing at that time, and also the great strength and
= high level of the economy and of the US milit ary industry aided
in this.
The absence of unity of operational-strategic thinking
hindered the correct determination of the direction in develop-
ing various types of weapons and branches of the armed forces,
which was particularly expressed in the underestimation of naval
operations aqainst the shore. Only experience in the war some-
what altered the situation and forced the Anglo-American command
~ in a number of cases to form a joint Army-Navy leadership group
to conduct operations against the shore, mainly in the Pacific
theater.
Nuclear-missile warfare, if unleashed by the imperialists,
. will create new conditions for'the economies of all countries
ruling out the possibility of elilninating mistakes in prewar
naval construction.
Today the fact that not a single ocean protects the aggressor
country from att-acks from strategic nuclear missiles launched from
~ any area of the ocean or from another continent has become an
immutable truth for all of the apologists of imperialism.
Questions of Balancing the Soviet N avy in the Prewar and Wartime
Periods (1921-1945). The initial stage in the development of the
Soviet Navy as a branch of the Armed Forces coincided with the
period of devastation [(of the nat ional economyJ], when the
country was able to allocate very Iimited resources to the
development of Armed Forces. These resources were clearly
insufficient for the construction of new warships. Thezefore,
the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolshe-
viks) made the decision to put into service those warships which
remained from the old Russian Navy. In this connection, the pri-
mary attention was given to those ships which could be restored
and utiliaed to protect the coast from enemy attacks from the
sea. At that time there was no thought of balancing the Navy.
At the same time development of
the Soviet art of naval warfare was
culties in that it was impossible to
legacies of the old Russian Navy and
theories, because they were based on
logical and political positions, not
different economic capabilities.
the the oretical bases of
:)egun. There were diffi-
utilize the theoretical
of the bourgeois naval
completely different ideo-
to mention completely
Soviet naval ((theoryJ] art followed an independent path.
Theoretical theses on the so-calle d small war oriented toward
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_ defEnsive naval operations in own coastal waters were adopted as
- the bas i.s .
Various points of view were expressed in numerous public
debates and discussions. However, naturally only those progo-
sals whose realization did riot extend beyond the limits of the
= economic capabilities of the country made practical sense. The
development oF the 1Vavy was directed toward establishing forces
capable of fully repelling an enemy attack an our coast :Erom the
- sea with the leas t material expsnditure. For manl years this
concept determined the main purpose of the Navy to cooperate
with our own farces in the accomplishment of missions in the
ground theaters of military operation: which, as the Armcd
- k'orces developed, assumed variaus forms, fzom direct naval
support of the Army from the sea to conducting independent naval
operations, but with the same operational goal.
The foundation of the fieet dt that time was the coastal
forces, torpedo boats, land-based aircraft, coastal artillery,
and mine weapons. Their combtned employment, parti.cularly in
= previously prepared positions with the support of submarines,
major gunnery shi ps, and coastal artillery batteYi.es, of which
the Navy had a very small number, permitted a morE or less
effective opposition to the enemy f1Eet if his intentions were
to del.iver an attack on our shore ox to land amphibious forces.
Thus, in developing the Navy at that time, we proceeded
f.rom the need to accomplish the main mission with its aid to
support the defense of our shore primariZy by supporting the
flanks caf th? Army with fire support. However, in accomplishing
this mission, we were unable to avoid mistakes. Like the navies
of the capitalist countries, our Navy di.d not have and did not
build special, landing shi.ps. In rare instances, sq-called
improvised means and unsuitabie transports were utilized in com-
bat training. Th ese erroneous views in the development of our
Navy wpre held right up to the Great Patriotic War and in the
caurse of the war. When the problem arose of landing amphibious
f_orcES, which was a very wi.despread form of combat operati.ons
carried out on the coastal flaizks of the Soviet-German ground
frunt jointly with the Army, unfor.tunately we had to pay for
ignori.ng this kind of combat training for the Navy and the P.rmy.
= As industry was rebuilt and the economic capabilities of
the country grew, new prospects opened up for the development of
- the Navy. In 1926, the Councii for Labor and Defense approved
the first six-year program o� naval construc:tion, which called
f_or the building of surface ships and suhmarines intended basa.-
calJ.y for operations in oUr own coastal waters.
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P,s noted above, ir. 1928 the Rewlutionazy Military Council of the Republic -
confirmed that the main purpose of the Navy was to cooperate -
with ground forces, which thus continued to be the main start-
- ing point for determining the requirements for naval construc-
tion in the new stage. In the years of the first two five-year
plans, the Navy began to receive new cruisers, destroyers, sub-
marines, escort ships, and torpedo boats.
The program for building a large oceangoing Navy, adopted
in 1938, called for the building of major gunnery ships capable
of engaging in singZe combat with a strong enemy on the high
seas. The questinns of balancing the naval forces as applied to
the new conditions were not properly resolved either in theory
or in naval construction practice.
In the last 'prewar years Saviet military thinking was
oriented toward the establislzment and employment of squadrons of
major surface ships headed by powerful battleships and cruisers.
In this connection, the high combat capabilities of aircraft as
attack forCes in naval warfare were not given sufficient con-
sideration. At the same time, Soviet military theory, being
oriented toward surface ships, was unable to justify the need
to have in its oceangoing naval inventory aircraft carriers
capable of providing cover for ships with their weak antiair-
craft armament beyond the range of the shore-based fiqhter air-
craft. As a result, one could not count on success in ship -
operations in trie relatively distant areas of the sea, much less
in zones cnntrolled by enemy aircraft.
Thus, the oceangoing Navy which was being built actually _
could operate only in its own coastal areas, and cooperation ~
with troops in the ground theaters and support of the Army, as
before, remained its main missions. It was cor.sidered that the
N3vy could also carry out such a mission as interdicting the sea communications of the enemy, but the establishment of special
forces for this purpose was not envisioned.
Even the performance requirements for the new submarines _
under construction were not scientifically based. Tr.. this con-
nection, they proceeded from retrospective needs which had arisen
in the years of Horld war I, anC did not take account of possible
chanqes in conditions of armed warfare in the very near future.
The bulk of the submarines being built had a short cruising
range and short endurance. ?t was intended to huild small num- _
bers of submaTines capable of operating on the ocean.
As is well known, we did not succeed in realizing the naval
construction program adopted in 1938, owing to the outbreak of
= the Great Patriotic War. Therefore, although our Navy had been
considerably strengthened with surface ships, submarines, and -
aircraft, it actually did not prove to be balanced with respect
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to the missions which it had to accomplish. Yet in the course
of the war the Navy actualty had to accomplish completely new
missions which were not foreseen when the decisions werE being
made for its development. Znstead of cooperating with deep
offensive operations by the ground forces, the Navy was forced
- t4 provide defense from the sea and land for naval bases
besieged by the enemy, to evacuate those bases and coastal
cities, and to quickly form numerous flotillas in order to con-
duct defensive operations on the Sea of Azov, and on rivers and
lakes aeep in our terrifiory. The Baltic and Slack sea fleets
had to rapidly establish a new base system in areas under enemy
- attack.
In this situation, the absence of special landing ships, of
the necessary number of minesweepers, antisubmarine ships and
patrol boats, as well as of transport means, had a particularly
acute effect. Moreover, there was an insufficient number of
sweeps to combat influence mines and mines with influence
_ exploders.
The absence in the naval inventory of the necessary number
o� mine-warfare ships led to the fact that, in the period of the
Great Pai:riotic War, 24% of the total losses of our warships in
the Black Sea, 49$ in the Baltic, and 22$ in the North Sea were
due to mines. Fifty-two percent of all the destroyers ].ost by
us during the war were sunk by mines. In this connection, one
cannot fail to note that losses of combatants of the capitalist
states due to mines in leIorld War II -were 7.7% of their total losses, and of
destroyers, 10.7�', i.e., five times less than the losses of our P1avy.
The extremely insufficient number of auxiliary and military
transport ships produced serious di.fficulties in providing mili-
tary shipments; we had to employ combatants and patrol boats for
this, diverting them from accomplishing other missions. In the
Red 3anner Baltic Fleet, for exampLe, in the first months of the
war more than 70% of the torpedo boat sorties were made to
transport various military cargoes.
Prior to the Great Patriotic War, the zir forces of our
Navy iricluded a large numlier of aircraft. However, special
naval aircraft were represented only by inshore, reconnaissance
seaplanes. We had no antisubmarine aircraft. Tnitially the
MER-2 seaplane was equipped for antisubmarine defense, and later
also the D-3, Pe-2, I1-4, and DOUGLAS wheeled aircraft were also
employed. These aircraft had no special suhmari.ne search equip-
ment, but were actually armed reconnaissance aircraft. In order
- ta cover combatants and auxiliaries from attack at sea, we had
- to [(limit ourselves to]] use conventional front-line aircraft
with a short operating radius, wh ich made the employment of
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surface ships difficult and in a number of ca5es led to great
losses.
In the course of the Great Patriotic War our combatants and
auxiliaries operated with a severe and constant lack of air
cover. For this reason, their losses from enemy aircraft action
amounted to 47% of the total number of combatants and auxilia-
ries lost in the Black Sea Fieet, 26$ in the Red Banner Baltic
Fleet, and 48$ in the Northern Fleet.
The change in the nature of balancing our Navy in the
course of the Great Patriotic War was frequently a result of the
entry of ships into the naval inventory through mobilization
Prom the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs, from the
Merchant Marine and the river fleet, from the construction of
new combatants and aircraft in domestic yards, and also f�rom the
receipt of a certain number of ships from the Allies.
More than 1,600 different ships and boats were mobilized
from civilian organiaations. Weapons were installed on many of
these and a number of thern were converted. However, all of them
had p4or performance characteristics and could carry out only
secondary combat mrssions or perform the functions of auxiliary
ships. Therefore, the receint of such combatants, boats and
ships did not make any essential charges in the nature of the
balancing of naval forces.
Prior to the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War the ship-
building industry of the USSR built warships of all types. The
basic trend in its work was the construction of large a.nd*nedium
surface ships and also submarines. The organization of produc-
tion, technology, and the nature of the industrial collabora-
tion were subordinated to that end.
With the outbreak of war, the trend in naval construction
was sharply altered. By the decisions of the State Committee
for Defense, adopted in July 1941, construction of major ships
requiring large expenditures of labor, long periods of time and
materials, equipment, and weapons which were in short supply,
was suspended. Emphasis was placed on the delivery of light
surface combatants and the buildinq of various combat patrol
boats.
As a result of the evacuation of the southern shipyards ~
(about 30% of the gross output) and the expansion of construc-
tion of tanks in several of the major shipbuilding yards, naval -
construct�ion was substantially curtailed. The productive
capacity of the shipbuilding industry and the number of workers
engaged in it was reduced by 50$. Therefore, the domestic
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- shipbuilding industry was unable to fulfi:ll the needs of thP
Navy for ships under the unusually diffa.cult conditions which
it faced. To a certain degree this need was satisfied by ships
received through lend-lease (22 minesweepers, 108 submarine
chasers, 86 torpedo boats, and several frigates). However,
these measures had no practical effect on the balancing of our
Navy, and by the end of the war it was only partially balanced.
Questions of Balancing the Soviet Navy in the Postwar Period. I n the
first postwar decade the main missions determining the construc-
tion and development of the Navy remained as before, coopera-
tion with ground forces when they are conducting operations in,
the coastal sectors, and interdicting nearby sea communications
routes of the enemy. In order to accomplish these missions,the
Navy was supposed to have a considerable number of surface ships
of various type5, submarines, a strong naval arm, naval infan-
try, and coastal artillery. However, the severe wounds
infli.cted on our country by the war did not perm:_t the immediate
building of such a Navy after Fascist Germany's capitulation.
For a long time it continued to be unbalanced with respect to
its missions.
The naval inventory did not have the necessary number of
oceangoing submarines, of antisubmarine and mine-warfare ships.
The Navy had no landing ships. The naval aircra'Lt had a ahort
operating radi.us, and there were no antisubmarine aircraft.
Fighters were able to cover ships at sea only in a narrow area
adjacent to the shore, and shipboard antiaircraft armament
remained weak. The auxiliary fleet consisted primarily of slow
harbur craft.
Therefore, che Navy continued to be a coastal Navy, and,
consequently, on the operational-strategic plane it was a defen-
sive factor in a war aqainst a strong naval adversary.
Only in the second postcvar decadP was it possible to
clearl.y define the basic requirements for balanci.ng the Navy,
i.e., aftez industry had recovered and wi'th the onset of the
technical revolution in military affai-rs.
The tecnnical revolution in military affairs, the growing
economic capabilities and outstanding achievements of domestic
science and technology, the introduction into the Navy of
r.uclear--missile weapons, nuclear propulsion, and electronic
systems, permitted the Central Committee of the CPSU and the
- Soviet government to define the course for the construction of
a nuclear-missile oceangoing Navy fully meeting the require-
ments of Soviet military doctrine. A qualitatively new Navy,
capable of carrying out missions of a strategic nature and of
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waging a successful struggle against a strong naval adversary,
was built in the shortest possible timt--.
On the basis of profound scientific studies of the combat
capabilities of the new naval forces and hardware, an analysis
of the postwar development of the naval forces of the leading
imperialist states, and of the experience in operational train-
ing of our own and foreign navies, [[all the trends in naval
science were determined,]l operational-tactical requirements for
the new naval forces were developed, and a harmonious theory of
the art of naval warfare which revealed paths for planning the
development of ttiese forces and their employment in warfare was
created. These operational-tactical requirements were based on
the thesis that a modern navy, in view of the broad range of
missions confronting it, must have diverse special-purpose
forces in its inventory. In this connection, the optimal
numerical relationship between the submarines, surface ships,
aviation units, naval infantry, coastal missile-artillery troops,
as well as auxiliary ships and other support units must permit
forces and tactical groups which are established ta defeat
enemy opposition and successfully carry out the missions with
which the Navy is charged independently or in concert with
forces of other branches of the Armed Forces.
Scientific research has confirmed that only a balanced navy
can meet sucn requirements, and we already have the foundation
for one.
As note above, a modern navy is a very complex and multi-
faceted organization. The inventory of a modern navy has
diverse combat forces, which include various types of surface
combatants, naval aircraft, coastal missile-artillery troops
with naval infantry, and various support units in addition to
the submarines which are the main striking force. The quanti-
tative composition of these forces and their combat cap�abil-
ities are determined by the need to establish groupings to
accomplish any mission which arises even in the case of the
most unfavorable combination of these missions, i.e., in those
instances when these missions have to be accomplished not in
sequence, but simultaneously.
In the current stage, the operating conditions of the Navy
have changed, and the service forces for the supply and repair
of ships have begun to operate in a new capacity. In order to
accomplish these missions, a balanced Navy must have floating
service forces based on oceangoing supply ships, repair ships,
and tenders. The quantitative co.nposition of these forces and
their equipment must ensure the employment of the oceangoing
forces at a high operating intensity which will meet the situa-
tion emerging in the ocean and sea theaters.
* * *
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Having briefly examined the basic problems of employing the
seapower of the state, and above all, nf employing navies in war
and in peace, we can draw the following conclusions.
1. One of the basic qualities of modern naval forces is
their versatility, [(this is]] expressed in the ability of these
forces to accompl.ish multi�acetPd missions.
The development of naval material has not simply inczeased
the effectiveness of naval operations and has not onl.y expanded
thei.r sphere of possible employment, but has also had a direct
effect on those missions assigned to the navy.
For example, at a certain stage in the development of
navies, the prevalent type of operation related to battling the
enemy's fleet, in the course of which missions were accom-
plished which involved gaining control of the sea, which was
particularly necessary in the era of the sailing fleets.
Today, naval operations against the shore have assumed a
- dominant role. Whereas naval operations against the shore were
previously brought to bear through the accomplishment of mis-
sions in warfare against the enemy's fleet, under present-day
conditions operations directly against the shore are a factor
determining the development of navies and of their art of naval
- war f are .
In examining the change in missions being prosecuted by
navies from an historical point of view, we cannot fail to note
that the "oldest" of them,,which retains it5 impartance even
under present-day conditions, is the battle on the sea lines of
communication and amphibious landings. 2. Local wars, which have been waged by the imperialist
states practically without interruotion since the end of the
5econd World War, are a specific variety of military operation
under present-day conditions. Experience in these wars shows
that the Navy plays a major role in them and�can be utilized
(within the framework of the employment of conventional
weapons) in the prosecution of any possible mission known tio the
modern art of naval warfare and military doctrine.
Naval operations in 1oca1 wars gravitate toward the accom-
plishment of missions in the "fleet-against-shore" area.
Existing experience in emoloyircg navies in local wars is
[[characterized] J d~a:ZY:gL123i22c,~. by a well-known unilateralism
resulting from the nature of these wars, which are as a rule
conducted by major imperialist powers aqainst small countries
which are free or have just been freed from the yoke of colo-
nialism. Nevertheless, a study of this experience makes it
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possible to see changes in the means and methods of employing
large navies in the evolstionary development of individual func-
~ tional areas of the art of naval warfare. [[In general, experi-
ence in employing naval forces in local wars is having a defi-
nite influence on the development of na.vies and the art of naval
wazfare with the empioyment of nuclear weapons or in a contest
between equal naval forces.]] -
3. The navy, as a branch of the armed forces and the most
important component of seapower, possessing specific character-
istics, has often emerged as one of the [[most important]]
instruments of state policy under various historical conditions.
The imperialist states actively utilize this special property of
a navy in relations with weak states. At.tempts have been made
to employ this form of seapower even against the Soviet Union,
although they have been fruitless.
In the policy of our Farty and our state, the Soviet Navy
is emerging as a factor for stabilizing the situation in various
areas of the world, contributing to the strengthening of peace
and friendship between peoples and acting as a deterrent to the
aggressive aspirations of the imperialist states.
4. The multifaceted activity of the Navy in war and in
peace and the broad range of missions accomplished by it, each
of which demands the participation of various f.orces and equip-
ment, have generated the need to balance naval forces with
respect to various criteria and characteristics. An analysis
of the combat experience of navies in past wars shows that lack
of balance in their forces is manifested not only in the limita-
tions on their capability to carry out that mission for which
the given forces were established, but also to accomplish a
series of related, attendant missions. [[For er.ample, the
absence of minesweepers had an effect not only on the contain-
ment of enemy mining operations, but also on the conduct of the
battle against surface ships and submarines on the high seas and
on the execution of all missions by the Navy in coastal areas.]]
In this connection, balanced naval forces can be regarded as a
certain specific form of actual material capabilities.
Tn light of this thesis, in general, a stronger (in total
displacement and number), but less balanced, fleet can be
inferior in overall operational Gapabilities to a numerically
smaller, but correctly balanced, fleet[[, because in employing
this fleet a favorable effect will result from the cooperation
of its mixed forces which is brought about not simply by the
aggregate of the capabilities of groupings of forces, but by
the generation of a new quality, representing a higher degree of
- unity of offensive and defensive capabilities]]. The problem of
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the complete balancinq of a'navy depends to a decisive degree.on
that complex process known as the scientific management of
building it. [(The solution of the problem of balancing a navy
requires great material expenditures, because actually thiG
amounts to building a aavy which meets the needs of a given
state.J]
([On the whole, we can consider it indisputable that the
victories of a navy and the art of employing its forces in the
war for which it is established depend to a considerable degree
on the correct resoluticn of the problem of balancing it.]]
1, Mahan, A. T. Vliyaniye morskoy siZy_na istoriyu (The Inftu-
ence of Seapower on History). Moscow-Lenzngrad, Voyenmoriz-
dat, 1940, p. 25.
2. As a r2suZt oJ this sv-ca?'ed Spanish-Arneriean aar, the USA
acquired Cuba ar.d the isZards olc Puer+,o Rico, Guam, and the
PhiZippines. The popuZations of Cuba and the Pkitippines,
which fought to ;ree themseZves from the Spanisn yoke, not
only did not receive the promiaed freedom, but turned outto
be in an even more serious position, having falten under the
power o f the new co Zonialists.
3. Lenin. V. I. PoZnoye sobrar.iye sochineni,y (CompZete
Collected ,Jorks), 'oZ. 9, p. 155.
4. KZado, N. hlorskaraa si la (Sea Power). St. Petersburg, 1907,
p. 21.
5. Ibid., p. 22.
6. The Americans lost 18 major combatants, including four
battleships which were destroyed, and four battleships which
were put out of action for a long time.
7. Citation from the book: Zherve, B. B. Morskava Strategiya
Napoleona (Napoleon's Naval Strategy). Petrograd, 1922,
- p. 34.
Among the strategic landings of the Second World War we may
cite: the landing of the Fascist Gerr+an troops in Norway in
1940; by Japanese troops in the Philipoine Islands in 1941
and 1942; by the Anglo-American troops in North Africa in
1942, in Italy in 1943, and in Normandy in 1944; and by the
American troops in the Philippines in 1944.
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9. Engels, F. Izbrann e Vo enn e Proizvedeni a(Selected
Milit4ry Works . Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1956, pp. 666-667.
- 10. Frunze, M. V. Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya (SeZected Works),
Vol. II, [[Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1957]] p. 12.
((6. Lenin, V. I. Polnoye sabraniye sochineniY (Complete
Collected Works), Vol. 9, p. 154.]] 11. Cf: Matsulenko, V. Lokal'nyye Voyny Imperializma (1946-
1968). VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No. 9, 1968, p. 39.
12. LA REVUE MARITIME, No. 1, 1959.
13. See: Cagle, M. and Manson, F. Morskaya Voyna v Koree (The
Naval War in Korea), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1962.
. 14. Citation from the book: Solontsov, Z. M. Diplomaticheskaya
Bor'ba SShA Za Gospodstvo Na More (The US Diplomatic
C.ampaign for Control of the Sea). IMO Publishing House,
- Moscow, 1962,,p. 385.
15. Yearbook of World Affairs, Washington, 1958, p. 5.
16. Citation from the book: Voyennaya Strategiya (Military
Strategy). Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1963, p. 79.
17. Ibid.
- 18. PRAVDA, 11 June, 1969.
19. Engels, F. Izbrannyye Voyennyye Proizvedeniya (Selected 'Rilitary
- Works). pp. 17-18.
Istoriya Voyenno-Morskogo Iskusstva (The History of the
Art of Naval Warfare), p. 333.]]
20. Cf: Yeremeyev, L. M. and A. P. Shergin. Podvodnyye Lodki
Inostrann.ykh ?Zotov Vo ltoroy Mirovoy Voyne (Submarines of
Fore gr Navies in the Second World War), p. 67.
a 21. Cf: Yeremeyev and 5hergin, p. 11.
_ 22. Cf: Yeremeyev and Shergin, p. 27.
�23. Cf: Yeremeyev and Shergin.
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24. Fuller, G. Vtoraya Mirovava Voyna 1939-1945 gg. (The
Second World War 1939-19451. Foreign Literature Publishing
House, Moscow, 1956, p. 179.
25. Cf: Belli, V. A. et al., Blokada i Kontrablokada (Blockade
and Counterblockade), p. 706.
26, Cf; Morskoy Atlas (Naval Atlas), Vol. IIi, Part II, sheet
48.
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CONCLUSION
Among the many factors characterizing the economic and
military might of [[our]) a country, an ever [[greater]] more
increasing role is being played by [[itsl]sea power, which
expressesthe real capability of the state to effectively utilize
the Warld Ocean in the interest of building Communism. The
higher the level of econAmic development of our country becomes,
the greater the importance of the World Ocean is to us as an
inexhaustible source of energy, raw materials, and food, and as
a sphere for further developing our political, economic,
scientific-technical, and military ties with countries and
peoples [(of all the continents]] on Earth.
Scientific-technical proqress is bringing about the need to
develop all components-of seapower in an integral relationship,
and is revealing new opportunities for employing them in various
sectors of the national economy. From the point of view of
economics and international relations, the transport and fishing
fleets are coming to the forefront, ensuring the exploitation of
the resources of the World Ocean and the further expansion of
economic, scientific, and cultural ties with peoples of many
countries of the world.
At the same time, the study of the
ever greater importance as an important
status of the sea power of the state and
resources of the Earth's hydrosphere
growinq needs of our country for energy
foodJ].
World Ocean is assuming
factor affecting the
the discovery of new
to satisfy the rapidly
and fuel, minerals, and
But a special ro?e belongs to the military side of the sea
power of the country, which characterizes the real capabilities
of the Soviet Navy to maintain the inviolability of the sea fron-
tiers of the Mctherland and to protect her state interests at sea.
T he important position held by the Navy among the other com,ponents
of tl^.e sea pacaer of our state under present-day conditions is detezmi.ned
by ttie attesnpts of ircperialis* pcwers to turn the course of world development
to their awn advantage with the aid of armed forces in general, and with
navies in particilar. Wars of aggression are alien to the Soviet Union.
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Yet the socialist gains of the Soviet people will be decisively
protected using all our country's power, including the sea powex
represented by the Navy component.
The building in our country of an oceangoing nuclear-
missile Navy has brought about profound changes in the views of
its role within the system of Armed Forces of our country and of
the methods of employing it. In this connection, the acute need
has arisen to draw general inferences from historical experi-
ence in naval warfare in that area relating to present-day
problems of building and employing the Navy. The author set
this goal for himself, but at the same time believes that the
present work is far from an exhaustive attempt to produce this
kind of generalization.
In the course of studying the path of development of
navies, and of the forms and methods of employing them in wars
and in peacetime, consideration was constantly giveri to the fact
that they have always been an integral part of a si;igle whole
the Armed Forces of the state and also to the fact that the
interrelationship between all branches of the Armed Forces and
their penetration into each other's sphere of operations are
constantly being intensified. However, the relative importance
of each branch of the Armed Forces has varied, depending on the
composition of the enemy coalition, the political. goals of the
war, and the weaponry and its combat characteristics.
[[In many wars, particularly those in which the principal
adversaries were separated by seas, navies have had the deci-
sive role in gaining the victory. This was basically character-
istic of the wars of the pre-imperialist stage of develApment of
capitalism and of the initial wars of the epoch of imperialism,
. including the Russo-Japanese War.]]
[[Despite the increase in the scale of military operations
at sea, navies became relatively less significant in the course
o-f the First World War. We might also note the similar situa-
- tion in the Second World War, despite the further increasing
scale of naval warfare. As is well known, the struggle on the
Soviet-German land front played the decisive role in the course
of that war.]]
Scientific-technical progress in the military domain has
introduced new criteria for defining the real combat strength
of each branch of the Armed Forces, the main criterion being the
capability to more rationally utilize such decisive military
material as nuclear-missile weapons. Therefore, forces
possessing strategic, nuclear-missile weapons with an intercon-
tinental range have come to the forefront.
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[(Scientific-technical progress has introduced)] Subma-
rines [[as]] have become the more advanced platform for modern
weaponry: They have practically the entire World Qcean for
launching sites. The Navy has amassed numerous mobile str:::.te-
. gic weapons platforms. Each of [[which]] them can carry a very
' large number of long-range missiles and is capable of deploying
its launch positions over an area many times greater than the
area which land-based missile troops could utilize. Seaborne
strategic weapons platforms also lend themselves to deployment
in depth, seeking shelter in the water and utilizing it not only
for cover, but also for concealment, which to a great degree
_ improves the viability of seaborne strategic weapons systems.
Thus, the objective conditions of armed combat in a nuclear war
are thrusting forward the nuclear-missile fleet, which
- rationally combines the /latest/ achi.evements in science and
technology, enormous striking power and mobility, viability of
the strategic systems, and a high deqree of readiness to employ
them immediately, as the nuclear-missile strike forces.
In the [[courseJ] era of [(the)] scientific-technical revo-
lution, naval forces have been assuming significance as one of
the most important strategic factors capable of having a
[[very]] great, and at times decisive, influence on the outcome
of the war through direct action aqainst enemy troop concentra-
tions and vitally important targets in his territory.
[[The effect of naval warfare on the course of the war as
a whole will be manifested primarily by the degree to which the
Navy's capability to destroy land targets and to undermine the
strategic nuclear potential o� the enemy at sea is realized.]]
The growing importance of navies in armed combat has been
ref lECted in the military doctrines of the imperialist states,
with the main ones being oriented toward an oceani.c strategy.
The strategy reflects not only the military, but also the funda-
mental economic and political interests of the leading powers
of the capitalist world at sea. Thus, an analysis of the
current alignment of forces in the international arena and the
frenzied development of navies in the postwar period provides
the basis for the assertion that the importance of naval warfare
= has grown and will increase in the future.
There is no doubt that, when the main political poles of the
world are separated by oceans, the success of political measures
and the accomplishmer.t of strategic missions will in the future
also depend to a considerable degree on the power of the Navy and
its real contribution to armed warfare.
The postwar period is the most important period in the
history oE the development of navies and in the 3rt of employina them.
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The most significant and profound qualitative chanqes in the
materi.al base of naval warfare ar.d also in the operational art
and tactics of the Navy have oGCUrred precisely in this period.
The cYiu.:-acteristic feature o� the postwar period is the
general recognition of the growing role of naval warfare and
also, consequently, of the oceanic sectors and theaters of mili-
tary operations in modern warfare. This is confirnted by the f act
that today, in contrast to trie Great Patriotic War, we are
- opposed by a coalition o� seapowers having at their disposal
powerful modern fleets capable of prosecuting strategic missions
_ in a war. The imperialists are converting the World Ocean into
a vast base of launching sites for ballistic-missile submarines
and carrier-borne aircraft ai.med ai: the Soviet Union and the
countries of the Socialist Community. In their apinion, these
~ bases are less dangerous for their countries than land bases.
And our Navy must be capable of countering thxs real threat.
Yet the military aspects examined by us L[are]J not [[the]]
only ([aspects which]]exert an effect on the role of navies.
_ Navies, while remaining [(a highly)] an effective and indispen-
sable means of armed combat, also are canstantly bei.ng utilized
- as an instrument of state policy in peacetime. The sea is a
no-man's land, and therefare navies do not encounter in their
activities many of the limitatior.s which prevent utilization of
other branches of the armed forces in peacetime for political
purposes.
[(In this regard, navies have assumed particular importance
urider present-day conditions in connection with the growth of
their striking power. The mobility of the fleet and its flexi-
bility in the event limited military conflicts are brewing per-
mit it to have an influence on coastal countries, to employ and
. extend a military threat to any ].evel, begi.nninq with a show of
military stxength and ending with the disembarkation of a land-
ing force.]]
�
_ [[The activity of the American Sixth Fleet in the
- Mediterranean Sea can serve as confirmation of this. It has
= exerted pressure on elections in Italy and Greece, openly acted
a.s the vanguard of a group of the aggressors in 1956, landed
Marines in Lebanon, and has repeatedly been used for various
- mi.litary demonstrations.]j
[CHowever., even this does not exhaust the reasons why a
greater role is being assiqned to the navies.J] At the present
zime, a new stage in the contest for the division and exploita-
tion oF the oceans themselves for economic and mi ].itary purposes
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- ~ being observed. The World Ocean is becoming
the extraordinary expansion of the imperialist
clear that navies, as an instrument of policy,
important place in the struggle.
the target of
states. It is
will occupy an
The interest in the explo itation of the World Ocean is
explained by its truly inexhaustible =esources. All of these
- resources can be more fully ut ilized in the interest af mankind
only if the seas, oceans, and the seabed remain a sphere of
peaceful cooperation[(, if they are not seized and transformed
b the im erialists into bases for the deployment of new forms
of weaponry. And many facts attest to the far-reaching plans of
the extremists of various persuasicns with regard to seizing and
= appropriating whole areas of the World Ocean) J.
- It is clear that our seapower can withstand the new expan-
sionist aspirations of the imperialists on the oceans, which are
directed aqainst the Sacialist countries, and that it is c.apable
of having a sobering effect on them.
Our Navy is an inteqral part of the Armed Forces of the
= country which are guarding the security of [(our] ] the Mother-
land. The Party, government, and the entire Soviet people are
devoting a qreat deal of attention to its development. [[The
direction of the development of our Navy was determined by the
CPSU Central Committee. As e arly as the mid-1950's, the estab-
lishment first and foremost of powerful submarine forces and
naval aviation, the equipping of the Navy with nuclear-missile
weaponry, and the employment of nuclear power in submarine
construction were envisioned. A definite role also was assigned
to construction of surface ships, withaut wfiich the accomplish-
ment of a series of tasks levied on the '~avy is impossible.
In this connection, the need for balanced naval forces was considered.
The building of a modern Navy became pc;ssible thanks to the
powerful military-economic potential of our country, the major
achievements of Soviet science and technclogy, and also the
introduction of scientific methods in the process of managing
the construction of the Navy. The building of [[our]] the Soviet
oceangoinq nuclear-missile Navy, capable of prosecuting strategic
missions on the oceans, has been the outstanding event which has
shattered the illusions of the imperialist aggressors that they
had no strong opponent in the sphere of naval warfare. We may
include ([the building of the Soviet blue-water Navy]J this event
in a series of most important events of the recent past which
have had decisive influence on world policy, including such
events as the development of nuclear weaponry, which meant tre
end of the American imperialist monopoly on the most important
means for armed combat, and the deve lopment of intercontinental
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ballistic missiles, which ended the inaccessi,. _:Lty of the
American Continent. The Soviet Navy is not only a
- Mothe.rland, but is also one of the
serves as an important instrument
tecting the interests of [[our cou
supporting friendly countries. It
of solving many technical problems
and naval weaponry of our Navy are
specific nature. The ships of the
weapanry comprise a new, original
navies of the world.
means for defending our
factors deterring war. It
or" policX in peacetime, pro- .
ntry)] the Soviet Union and
must be noted that the methods
in the building of the ships
of a clearly expressed
Soviet Navy and their
trend in the development of the
- In the quest fox ways of developing our Navy, we avoided
simply copying the fleet of the most powerful seapower of the
world. The composition of the Navy, its weapons, ship designs
and organization of forces were determined primarily by the
- missions which the political leadership of the country assigned
to the Armed Forces, and consequently also to the Navy, by the
country's economic resources, and also by the conditions under
which the Navy had to accomplish these missions.
The revolution in military affairs has led to considerable
_ advanres in all areas of military theory and practice. It has
- also brought about changes in 'the organization of the Navy,
invaded the domain [[of naval theory, and affected the content]j
of the art of naval warfare from tactics to the strategic employ-
ment of the Navy. This has given rise to the development of a
- modern art of naval warfare, which is characterized by new func-
- tional areas and a unique interpretation of earliPr concepts and
principles. However, at a certain staqe this art coexisted with
- elements of the "old" art. E:samples of this are the operational
- art and tactics of the Navy which [[held sway]] existed at the
outset of the process of introducing nuclear weaponry and
missiles into the fleet. At that time the traditional tactics
- of surface strike fozces, based on the combat employment of ship
guris and conventional torpedoes, had to be modi�ied to utilize
the platforms of the fundamentally new weaponry which possessed
considerably greater combat capabilites. The operational art
had to develop rational methods of planning and conducting opera-
tions under conditions where nuclear-missile weaponry is employed
alongside conventional weaponry. This determined the special
characteristics of the combat disposition and operational organi-
zation of forces and ensured maximum effectiveness in the
emplayment of mixed strike groups or echelons of forces.
At the present time, the general trend in naval construc-
tion is tQward the building of a[[well-rounded, well-developed
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fleet, i.e., a]J balanced fleet. [[Our)] The Soviet Navy has a
theory on the employment of forces under present-day conditions
and a system of [[training cadres]] organizational deveZopment of
a material base of navat rvarfare. Backed by this firm foundation
and the experience already gained, our country will in the future
continue to establish the [[conditions and]] prerequisites for
further strengthening our sea power.
The development of military material has made ever greater
demands on the discipline and morale of personnel. Only armed
forces composed of fighting men in�initely devoted to the Party
and to the Soviet people, who are disciplined, who possess a
high level of general and special training, and who have
physical toughness and stamina, Gan gain the victory in modern
warfare. Even stricter demands are being placed on naval
personnel, especially the commanding officErs of ships. There-
fore, together with the growth of the Navy's material base and
the development of the art of naval warfare, it is essential to
objeptively develop new methods and forms of training and educa-
tion, making it possible to form real masters of their trade,
skillful mariners, and specialists in military af�airs.
In the course of.the struggle to build a Communist society,
our Motherland has had to undergo many difficult tests. Since
the day of the birth of the Soviet.state, the imperialists have
never ceased to nurture plans for its military destruction. They
have already attempted more than once to destroy it through
military force.
During the years of the Civil War, the ground forces of the
interventionists and the domestic counterrevolutionaries were
the main force on which imperialism relied. The fleets of the
imperialist powers played only an auxiliary role in this
struggle. They did not succeed in suppressing our Revolution.
Forged in the fires of war, the Red Army, with the support of
the Navy, routed the enemy forces, drove them beyond the barders
of [[our]] the Soviet state, and consolidated the gains of the
October Revolution. But imperialism did not change its aggres-
sive nature. It fostered Fascism its most frightful
handiwork and in 1941 moved this force against our Motherland.
A battle unprecedented in its scale and savagery developed
between the strike forces of imperialism and the first Socialist
power. And once again the imperialists thrust forward the land
armies of Hitler's Germany as the main farce in this struggle.
The navies once more continued to play a role which, while
important, was still a secondary role. The brilliant ground
forces of the Soviet Army, with all pos5ible support from the
other branches of the Armed Forces, defeated the most powerful
reactionary armed force in the history of mankind. The Soviet
Army showed itself to be an unbeatahle force in this struggle.
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Yet after the victory of Lhe forces of Socialism and
progress i.n the Second World War, imperialism did not lay down
its arms. Tt continued to nurture plans for the military defeat
of the countries of the Socialist Community. The imperia].ists
not only did not abandon their hopes of revising the results of
the historical battles of the 20th century and of establishing
worl.d supremacy, but intensified their aggressiveness even more
in all areas, i.e., in the economic, political, ideological, and
militaxy spheres. The face of modern imperialism is shown above
a11 in the militarization of the ecanomy, the establishment of
the military-industrial complex, and in the frenzied arms race.
3'he main purpose of its armed forces is to prepare for war
against the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries and to
suppress national freedom movenents.
In contrast to the past when the main armed forces of
imperialism were the land armies, under present-day conditions
naval forces have been assigried one of the main roles in the
arms struggle against the Socialist countries. However, taking
into account the experience of history, which has proven the
complete bankruptcy of military doctrines oriented toward the
employment of one branch of armed forces or one type of weapon,
the imperialists aZao are providing for the development af land,
air; and [(also]J missile troops[[, while at the same time
p].aci.ng the main emphasis on naval forces]
One of the reasons for the shift in emphasis to naval forces
is the f act that today the aggressive forces of imperialism are
represe ntEd by a bloc of sea powers h aving at their disposal
powerful naval forces [(backEd by]] having numerous bases and
occupying favarable strategic positions. Moreover, the intro-
ductian of the achievements of [jthe)J scientific-technical
([revolutiori]] progress has fundamentally chanqed the missions
of navies. Attacks from seaward against objectives in enemy
territory have become their basic /mi.ssion/. They have become
capable of directly affecting the course of the armed struggle
quickly and decisively in practically all theaters of military
operations. Naval forces are gradually becoming the main
carrier of nuclear we aponry which is capable of hitting the enemy
on all continents and seas. In this connection, the imperialists
are giving ever greater preference to an oceanic strategy and
war�are from the sea against the shore. The historical experi-
ence of unsuccessful campaigns against the USSR by the most
powerful land armies of imperialism has also played an important
rale in the shift in emphasis to naval forces.
As a result of the consistent implementation of the Program
o� Peace adopted at the 24th CPSU Congress and continued and
deveZope d in a cZoselu related manner in documents of the 25th
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Party Congress, the process of relaxation of international ten-
sions continues, the most important stages of which were the
successful completion of the Helsinki Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe and also the [[series of recent fruitful
meetings between the leaders of the Soviet Union and a number of
leading capitalist statesJ] signing of the second Treaty between
the USSR and United States on a Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (SALT-II) in June of 1979 by CPSU C�ntraZ Committee GeneraZ
Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet,
Comrade Leonid IZ'ich Brezhnev, and US President J. Carter, which
marked a concrete atep on the path to normaZizing the entire
internationaZ poZitieat etimate.
Fundamental changes in the alignment of ecunomic and mili-
tary forces to Socialism's advantage preceded the current
achievements on the path to peace. This became possible thanks
to the wise leadership of the Communist Party, [[decades of]]
selfless labor by the Soviet people, mass heroism of the Soviet
fighting men during the years of the severe military tests, and
the enormous worker and political enthusi.asm with which the
entire country is continuing to carry our the grand plans out-
lined by the Party. However, the forces of imperialist reaction
and aggression, who have not given up their attempts to under-
mine the process of strengthening peace and normalizing the
- international situation, still [[exist and]] are actively
operating on our planet. These forces have not been neutralized,
and the danger of war has still not been eliminated. The Party
teaches that as long as imperialism, whose aggressive nature has
not been altered [[remains]] existsr the real danger of an out-
. break of a new world war continues to exist. In the leading
- capitaliGt -z*_at=z, preparatior of t!+e material base for warfare
� has not eased, military budgets are growing, and new armament
- systems, above all the latest nuclear-missile submarine system,
are [[actively]] being developed.
All of this determines the ((need and]J appropriateness of
the efforts which are being undertaken in our country to develop
a Navy the basic component of the sea power of the state.
capable of opposing the oceanic strategy of imperialism. The
sea power of [(our country]] the USSR is intended to ensure favor-
able conditions for the building of Communism, the intensive
growth of the economic strength of the country, and the tireless
strengthening of its defense capability. [[Therefore, unwavering
attention is being devoted to the development of the cc;mponents
of sea power which are to an ever greater degree being backed by
the achievements of scientific-techriical progress.]]
COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1979
CSO: 1812
- E:1D -
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