JPRS ID: 9436 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060017-4
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 17
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9436
11 December 1980 ~
_ Sub-Sa~aran Af rica Re ort
p
FOUO No. 700
~
FBIS FOREICN BRDADCA~T INFOKn?~ATION SEF~VICE
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JPRS L/9436
- 11 December 1980
S~iB-S~HARAN AFR~CA REPORT
- FOUO No. 700
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRI CAN AFFAIRS
Mobutu, Dacko Claim Soviets PJ.an Aggression I~'x~om Congo
(Maryan Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIA, 13-2b Oct 80) i
West German Aid to Africa Mscussed
(M.anfred Lohmann Interview; JEU1~iE AFRIQUE, 15 Oct 80).......... 4
West African Monetary thiion Finances Examined
(MARQiES TItpPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 17 Oct 80) 6
Briafs
Tanzanian Troops in Uganda 13
AN GOLA~-
Official in London Speaks on Fore~gn Re.lations
(MARC~lES TRpPICAUX ET MEDITERR,ANEENS, 10 Oct 80) 14
Briefs
= A1leged UNITA Operatinns 15
CAME RD ON
CNLAA Adopts Budget for Antilocust Campaign
(MARQiES TRL?'ICAUX ET MEDITERI2ANEENS, 24 Oct 80) 16
GENTRAL AI~RICAN ItEPUBLIC
Nation Described as Power Keg Ready to Explode
(Zilegue; A.FRIQUE-ASIE, 13-26 Oct 80) 17
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Briefs
Recruitment of Nigerian Workers 22
- a- (~II - NE & A~ 120 FOUO]
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GAFiON
Details Provided on 1979 Economic Situation
(MAR(HF.S TRDPICALTX ET MEDITEItRAidEIIVS, 10 Oct 80) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
GAI~ IA
FAD Rr~ad Financing Agreement Signed
- (MARQiES TImPICAUK ET MEDITEBRANEENS, 24 Oct 80) ~26 -
I VO RY COAS T
Election Besults, P~rocess Reviewed
(JEiINE AFRIQUE, 22 Oct 80) 27
Houphouet-Boigny Reelected, Delegate Elections, by
Siradiou Diallo
Speculation on Future, by Sennen Andriaznirado -
Foreigners Disfranchised
- Pree:lectien Situation Described
_ (Siradiou Diallo; JEiA1E AFRIQUE, 29 Oct 80) 32
' Houphouet-Boigny`s Democratiz~tian Drive Seen as 'Real Gamble'
(Mawdo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1 Oct 80) 36
MOZAMBIQUE
Briefs
Finnish Agricultural Aid 39
NIGEI~IA
Briefs
Cacao Development Program 40
Fiahing Developmenr. Program 40
SENEGAL ~
New Peanut Marketing System Established
(MARQiFS TRAPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 24 Oct 80) 41
Briefs
Return to School Calm 43
TANZANIA '
Briefs _
ADB Water Supply Loan 44
UGANDA
Briefs
Diseolution of Proviaional Parliament 43
-b-
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
' MOBUTU, DACKO CLAIM SOVIETS PLAN AGGRESSION FROM CONGO
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in Frer~ch 13-26 Oct 80,pp 44~ 45
[Article by Maryan Sysle: "'The Plot of the Four' Capitals"] _
[Text] Th~ Brazzaville regime must still face new threats linked to a theory of
"African dominoes" made in Paris and relayed by Bangui, Kinshasa and Libreville.
If one is to believe David Dacko, who was brought to power in Bangui a year ago by _
the "barracuda" operatior., the new Central African leader went to Paris from 22 to -
24 September in order to "set up a balance sheet and thank France and its president
for the help which they have brc,ught." It is true that he went away apparently more ~
sure of himself, confirming that he would be a candidate in the presidential elec-
tions which should take place within a year, and bearing away in his luggage
promises of help and supplementary cooperation: 7,000 million CFA francs in credit,
an unspecified amount in budgetary aids, a sum of 2 billion to reimburse the
state's debts to the private sector, plans for the study of several big economic
projects of which France would take charge. Enough to show that everything is for
the best bet~,~een Paris and Bangui and that his advisers are pleased with him.
There are~ however, some strange coincidences. Indeed, it has been noted that dur- -
ing the same period it was not only David Dacko of Centra7 Africa, but also Mobutu
of Zaire and Omar Bongo of Gabon who ~aid a visit to the host of the Elysee. What _
is th;: objective causing these three "heads of friendly states" of Cent~al Africa,
all of whom owe a great deal to the French Government and have problems with their -
own populations, to hurry over to Paris? In Gabon complaints and resentment per-
sist. In Central Africa the game is up for the regime which was imposed on the
country. As for Zairs, after the uprisings in Shaba, Kasai and Kivu and the strikes
and demonstrations of last March, there is now a general expActatiun of outbursts _
of urban guerrilla warfare by the Oppressed Forces of the Congo (FOC).
~ The Scapegoat
Under tho~e circumstances it has become essential to stop the "contamination'.' and
- find a scapegoat; and there is one made to order. The Popular Congo Republic--in
spite of all the hard blows directed against her, such as the assassination of
President Marien Ngouabi, the attempts to stifly economic life, and the dangerous
accession to power of a friend of the Weat, Yhombi Opango--persists in its social-
ist policy against winds and tides. Furthe~ore, the country seems to be reviving:
Significant progress can be observed, aeveral jobs of national construction have
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been undertaken--Brazzaville is a swarming workshop at the moment--and staffs are
- regularly paid. All this is being accomplished without any concessions to imperi-
aliAm. Quite the contrary.
The Brazz~ville leadership is watching more attentiveiy than ever the atruggles
taki~ig place throughout the continent. Indeed it is well known that the former
and new colonialists hold grudges and are stubborn: Beating down the Popular Congo
- Republic remains one of their main o~jectivea in the region, in spite of repeated
, aig~s that its people are attached to the ideals of a socialist revolution. For
~he Congolese example is dangerous.
F~~rthermore, last August, Dr Abel Goumba's Ubangui Patriot~c Front (FPO) held a
2-wee~ meeting somewhere in Africa, attended by delegates from exterior sections
and militants from the interior. In spite of precautions taken, and thanks to the
French general information services, news of the meeting leaked out, with the re-
~ult that Bokassa's successor became frantic. At t`~e same time, this whole affair
generated a series of ideas and dealings which might seem grotesque and ridiculoua
if they did not have much more solid and extended ramifications.
It so happens that Mobutu, ior his part, waQ literally panic-stricken because he
found on his own desk an appeal from the Oppressed Forces of the Congu, and was
unable to understand how this document could have reached his desk--whereas it was
being distributed throughout the capital. Mobutu and Aacko are therefore collab-
orating; and, in order to arouse their friends and protn_ctors, they are forging
documents on alleged Soviet preparations for aggression threatening neighbor~ing
countries. The chiefs of state of Zaire and Central Africa are asking their friend
Omar Bongo to serve as referee at the earliest opportunity in a conflict which, as
they see it, sets them in opposition to the Congo leaders.
Under some pretext or other the Gabonese chief of state got President Sassou-Nguesso
to come to Libreville, where he was presented with false documents. This meeting,
to be sure, did not have the foreseen effects. Consequently, Dacko then sent
post-haste to Brazzaville one of his emissaries, who, after cooling his heels for
several days, was finally received by the Congolese leaders. He not only presented
~ him his forged documents but insisted upon the extradition from the Congu of Cen-
tral African refugees who were claimed to be militancs of the FPO [UbanguiPatriotic
FrontJ, and he threatened to bring the matter up before th~ iJN Security Coun~il if
his request was not taken under consideration. Of couise Congolese leaders had
to unequivocally decline all response to this flagrant blackmail. President
Sassou-Nguesso perforce replied to his interlocutors that the Congo was a sovereign
nation which would accept no blackmail whatsoever. Shortly thereafter, at a meet-
ing of its central committee, the Congolese Labor Party publicly reaffirmed its
solidarity with all stru68iing liberation movements and all African peoples fight-
ing for socialism. At the same time, the Popular Congo Republic took all necessary
measures to stand up against eventual aggression.
This affa~r is too important to be ignored, and it is evident that the pressure
exerted by Dacko, Mobutu and Bongo in September are only the most visible part of
a vaster plot prepared at the instigation of the French secret service--and also,
so it seema, of the CIA. For the moment it appears that the CEntral African Re-
public is the turntable of this destabilization plan aimed against the Popular
Congo Republic.
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A "New" Ambassador
~ It is within this context that MaCsika, former minister of Justic under Fulbert
Youlou and head of an alleged Congolese opposition wirhout any following within
the Popular Congo Republic, spends his time going back and forth between Bangui--
where he is received like a minister and chauffeured around by Dacko--and Paris.
Christian Jayle, former president of the National Aasembl}r under the Fulbert Youlou
regime and responsible for the publication of the weekly LETTER FROM AFRICA, is
supposed to be involved in this affair also. In any case, he is not afraid of re-
peating that, as far as he is concerned, the Congo and the Soviet Union are
responsible f~r the persistent political crises in Central Africa, Zaire and Gabon.
It is, moreover, in the furtherance of this plot that the ne~a Central African
Society for River Transport (Socatraf), managed by Frenchmen, is used as a spying
antenna, thanks to its repr~sentative in Brazzaville. Finally it is certainly not
_ ~ust by chance that Dacko has changed his ambassador in Brazzaville. The new one
who is expected to be appointed very soon is no other than a former "~ournalist" at
Bockassa's imperial court, who has been proved to be a CIA agent. He had, indeed,
been arrested for spying under the Bockassa regime. It is on the advice of the
U.S. ambassador in Brazzavill~, formerly first counsel of the Embassy in Bangui,
that the "journalist" in question is said to have been proposed for the Brazzaville
post.
For imperialism the calculation is simple: Central Africa must be prevented at all
cost from passing to the camp ~f the revolution, for this would inevitably lead,
through a pracess of contamination, to a conflagration throughout the region. And
in order to maintain and reinforce the "status quo" it is necessary to defeat the
Congolese revol~tion which, in spite of some very understandable inadequacies,
remains a contag~ous example for Central Africa. All this depends upon ignoring
the deternination of the peoples to put an end to colonial history and foreign
oppression whether it is direct or imposed through puppet regimes.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
9347
CSO: 4400
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~ INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
4~'EST GERMAN AID TO AFRICA DISCUSSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 15 Oct 80 p 75
[Interview with Dr Manfred Lohmann, preaident director of thp German investment
bank Deutache EntwicklungRgesellschaft, by unidentified JEUNE AFRIQUE correaoon-
dent: "TO Invest in Zimbabwe? Why Not!"; date and place not given]
[Text] Establiahed in 1972, the Deutsche Entwicklungageaellschaft (DEG) is a
bank to promote invQStments in developing countries. It was created by the Federal
Government for the main purpose of helping medium-sized German firms to cooperate
under the method of "shared risks" by opening enterprises in Third World countries.
JEUNE AFRIQUE diecuased this sub~ect with Dr Manfred Lohmann, president director
of the DEG.
[Question] How would you describe the institution which you direct?
[Answer] It is a development bank which can be compared to the Central Bank for
Economic Cooperation in France. Each bank has its special fields of operation.
Our task is to help with the development of Third World countries by various
methods, either chrough the financing of pro~ects or through participation in the
capital stock of the firms; to grant long-term~oans to the firms; to give advice
to German firma; to givc advice to the governmenta of Third World countries telling
them about the coaditions oi investments. The purpoae of all theae activitiea is
- to promote pro;ects. More than 250 companies in the Third World have received
assiatance from our bank.
[Question] What proportion of this aid has gone to Afr.ica?
[Answer] Over 51 percent of our investments went to Africa.
[Qu~stion] To how many countries and in what fields?
[Answer] To 27 African countries. The DEG is involved with 24 African banks.
They are development banks of obvious importar:e. It is so in the case of the
- BIDI [Tvorian Bank for Industrial Development] in ivory Coast. We have invested
in processing industries but have practically made no investment in agriculture.
Tt?e truth of the matter is that we have few Germans who are tropical agriculture
experts. Then we must turn to the French and the British.
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~Question] Do you favor any countries in Africa on $ccount of their political .
system. fox inatance? _
[Answer] No. Our main criteria are development, naturally, and trade policy. We
take into account the political cl.imate but we are not concerned by the palitical
system. We operate in ivory Coast as wel.l as in benin or in Kenya. We will invest
~ in 7,imbabwe if the climate is favorable. We are satisfied that thia country has
- gone through an evolutian and not through a revolution.
We are an instrument of development and not a political instrument. We never carry
out a pro~ect without a local partner. We prefer a situation where two loc~? part-
ners, a private enterpriae and a development bank, are involved. We also require
that there be a German partner ~rilling to accept the risks. We also cooperate with
~ foreign and international banks suc.'~~ as the French Central Bank for Economic Coopera-
� tion or the World Bank.
[Question] Are the Germans more interested in Latin America than in Africa? _
[AnawerJ Fourteen percent of our investmente in the Third World go to Africa.
[Question] Do you favor countri~e farmerly colonized by Germany?
(Answer] No. The main countries vhere we inveat are Nigeria, Ivory Coast and
ICenya. We were fortunate ii~ thattae had few colonies and lost them very early.
[Question] Ia the aid granted by the bank subject to conditions or not?
[Anewerj The cofinancing of the DEG is not sub~ect to conditions. Our philosophy
is that one must choose the best equipment. And this choice is left to the f irms.
The pro~ect must be prof itable and consistent with the industrialization policy
of the country. An industrial project wiiich goes bankrupt does not help the coun-
try concerned but has the opposite effect. What the DEG seeks is not so much aid
- as a wider cooperatyon which the countries themselves want. -
[Question] What cio you think of the transfer of technology?
[Answer~ It is interesting. One must convince firms from the developed countr~es
to effect the transfer of technology accepting to take the riske which this involves.
There ie no general rule. Every product muat be adapted to a given country. The
product mus[ match a given market, it muat have the necessary quality. We believe
that cooperation betweer~ German enterprises and African enterprises is a very good
thing, particularly when it involves small and medium-sized enterprises,
[Question] Which are the sectors that are best suited for this transfer of tech-
nology?
[Answer) It is hard to say, but in Africa one could mention development banks,
textile in~ustry, manufacture of spare parta, tourism.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPIA 1980
8796
CSO: 4400 _
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INTER-AFRICAPT AFFAIRS
~
WEST AFRICAN MONETARY UNION FINANCES EXAMII1Ell
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Oct 80 pp 2534-36
[Tex*_] The Central Bank of the West African Stgtes (BCEAO) recently published
f.ts analysis prepared at regular in~ervals to review the economic and financial
situation in the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). In page S49 of our lssue No
1796, published on 11 April 1980, we already gave an accvunt un the situation at
the end of 1979.
During the early months of 1980, the econo~mic and finaacial performance of the UMOA
deeply felt the combined effects of a deterioration in the terms of tr~de and of
the drought areas which started appearing in some countries of the Sahel.
The union member states have suffered the effecta of the higher cost of oil sup-
plies and have been directly aff ected by the lower prices of the main agricultural
products which they export: coffee, cocoa. cotton and groundnut products. The
prices of cocoa, for instance, dropped by almost 30 percent between June 1979 and
June 1980. The decline of sale prices has also affected uranium ore in Niger. -
. Agricultural Year
The tentative results of the 1979-19i30 agricultural year, which present great con-
trast depending on the product, fell below the forecasts. The marketing of cocoa
and cottonseed registered strong gains, 13 percent ac?d 11 percent respectively,
while coffee (-15 percent) and groundnuts (-46 percent) registered a serious decline.
Food production was mostly satisfactory except in Senegal where the aize of the
_ grain deficit increased sharply.
The changes in the main export crops since the 1975-1976 agricultural year are
preaented in the following table:
UMOA's Agricultural Production
(In 1,000 tons, by agricultural year)
1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80*
Oil producing peanut
In the at~ell:
Senegal 1,178.0 956.4 441.7 781.7 422.5
*Tentative figures

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Shelled: !
Benin 7.0 7,9 3.9 1.3 4.0
Upper Volta 13.1 4.7 1.8 1.0 1.0
NiEez 3.8 7.2 14.5 8.9 3.2
Cocoa
Benin 1.1 2.3 1.4 4.1 5.0
Ivory Coast 234.6 235.8 30b.0 312.0 350.0
Togo 17.8 14.1 16.7 12.6 12.5
Cof f ee
Benin 0.1 0,8 0.4 0.1 0.3
Ivory Coast 308.1 291.3 195.7 277.0 230.0
Togo 8.5 10.4 4.7 6.2 10.0
Cottonseed
Benin 20.1 17.5 13.9 18.7 26.0
Ivory Coast 75.5 103.0 115.0 125.0
UpUpper Volta 50.7 55.3 38.0 60.0 78.0
Niger 11.1 7.2 3.8 4.4 3.4
Senegal 39.0 45.4 37.0 33.8 25.0
Togo 7.0 4.5 12.6 13.0
The cocoa crop benefited not only from normal climatic conditions but also from _
higher production prices and from the policy of progressive regeneration of the
old plantations.
For coffee, the 1979-1980 agricultural year turned out not to be as good as ini-
ti.ally expected. T!ae old age of the plantationa and the consequences of the 1976
drought are the factors which make production specially susceptible to climatic
changes.
The reaults of the cotton crop would have been even more satisfactory but for the
deterioration of tho clima te conditions in the Sahel zone, particularly in Senegal
where the harveat dropped by 32 percent during the 2 lateat crop years.
A return of drought conditions in the Sahel zone has affected more particularly
groundnut production in the UMOA countries: the 46 percent drop in productior_,
the biggest in a period of over 20 years, is also due to the fact that this crop
is not favored by the farmers who prefer crops which guarantee them more substantial,
and particularly more steady returns.
As regards the fflod crops, the contrasting climate variations (pluviometric deficit
in the Sahel zone, excessive rainfall in some areas of the tropieal zone) have
considerably reduced the production level for recent harvest in the various coun- _
triea. This is particularly true in Senegal where millet and sorghum crops regis-
tered a 38-percent drop in 1979-1980 creating sn estimated 335,000-ton grain deficit
by the end of 1979.
There has been a certain slowing down in forestry, particularly in timber exports,
as a result of ineasures adopted by the authorities to protect the ecological system _
of rhe region already scarred by the continuous desertification which has taken
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place in recent years. Timber exports from the Ivory Coast consisting, in 1979, _
of 2.789 million cubic meters of rough timber and 263,0(~0 cubic meters of sawed
lumber, could therefore decrease in 1980. Qn the other hand, afforestation
programs heve etarted in a11 the UMOA countries.
The Tishing industry continues ita drive to acquire equipment. Already in 1979,
the cannecl tuna industry had proceased 22.OOf? tons in the Ivory Coast and this level .
- of production reached 30,000 tons in 1980. Senegal regYStered a sub~tanti.al
recovery in 1980 after the poor 1979 season when the catches dropped by 39 percent ~
and amounted to 9,110 tons.
in the livestack spherF, efforts undertaken to modernize this sector have resulted
in th~ ~reation of many breeding and fattenin~ centers and in the improv~ment of
the narketing distribui~ion chain. In countries such as the Ivory Cosst~ which did
_ not have a strong pastoral. tradition, the resulte are atill poor and it will take
several years before thP ?ivestock re3chea satisfactory numbers. In the Sa.hel
zone, the recurrence of the drought ia seriously threatening the livestock which
had hardly recovered following the 1972 great drought.
Mines and Industry
So far, the mining activity seems to be the one least affected by the gloomy
. economic situation in 1980. The total amount of exports of calcium phosphates
from the 2 producing countries of the union was 4.567 million tons in 1979 com-
pared to 4.382 million tons in 1978, or an increase of 4 percent. The rates of
production registered during +the early months of Z980 show a slight improvement
compared to the previous year, up by 2 percent in Togo and by 4 percent in Senegal
- by the end of the first 6 months. Wi'h a new production line going into operation
- in Togo, the production for 1980 should be higher than on the pre~:~ous year.
The mining of uranium deposits in Niger produced 3,540 tons of dressed uranium in
1979 compared to 2,109 tons in 1978, an increase of 67 percent as a result o� the
' Akouta Mining Company (COMINAK) going into production. '~he output of the 2 units
now in service should reach the 4,000-ton figure in 1980, up 13 percent compared
to the 1979 output. -
Prospectiag for oil, which has been going on for years with the allocation of impor-
tant resources, has given tangible reaults in the Ivory Coast which will benefit
fr~m the expl~itation of its f irst off-shore deposit.
Also, in 1980 the West Africa Cement (CIMAO) plant fired up its firs~ kiln which -
went into operation last February. Production during this first year should -
3?ield 695,000 tona of clinker, of which 450.000 tons will be exported with equal -
shares goi.ng to the Ivory Coast and to Ghana.
The favorable trends registered in the industrial sector during 1979, were generally
maintained in the first quarter of 1980. This is particularly so in the case of ~
the Ivory Coast where the average level of the industrial activity indicator for -
- the first quarter of 1980 was 325.9 points, up by 24 percent compared to the 263.8 '
= poinrs registered during the same period of 1979. On the other hand, in Senegal, _
the figures for the first quarter of 1980 indicate a.~lowdown in the industrial
activity due to a poor groundnut cr~p since less than 271,000 tons of seed will be
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- delivered to the oil milla compared to 661,464 tons delivered during the 1978-1979
crop year.
Furthern?ore, the pattern remaina sluggish in rhe textile sector which had already
ehuwn nigns of. diffic~~lt~.es in 1979. In Senegal, the index for "leather clothing
= textilee'~ registered a 5.2 percent decline during the las~ quarter of 1979 com-
- pared to rt,w raame period of the previous year. In the Ivory Coast, the firm
_ F.i~ablissemente R. Gonfreville, tt~e largest textile plant in the country, had ended
::`~eir latest bueiness year, on 30 September 1979, with a def icit balance of 700
! million CFA f.rancs, In Togo, the Togolese Textile Induatry (ITT) was forced to
_ cl~~se som~ of its workshops at the beginning of 1980 while waiting for a program
of financial recovery to be implemented. The crisis now affecting thia sector
- seems to be connected with problems of aell.ing in forei~n markets while at a local.

, level the massive and often fraudulent import of foreign goods is a source of
particularly atrong competition. -
- Budget and Monetary Situation
With regard to prices ~nd wages, the firHt 6 months of 1980 were marked by the
presence of inflatiQnary tr.ends resulting from a Xead~ustment of pricea and, some- ~
_ times, from an undersupply of food producta. In January 1980, wages were increased
in Senin, Sen~gal and Togo.
Confronted with a difficult economic situation, the states of the union have con-
tinued to follow a balat?ced policy to implement the projects included in their
1980 budget which establishes a pxogxeas rate o~ 17.7 percent for the union as a
_ whole. The aggregate budget for the 6 countries (Benin, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta,
I3igPr, Senegal and Togo) th4s wen~ up from 848.6 billion CFA francs to 998,7
- billions. The ahare of tax receipts in the overall current revenues remains
stable, at 94 percent in 1980 campared to 93 percent in 1979, which keepe the fis-
cal burden rate at 15.8 percent compared to 16 percent in the 2 previous years.
With regard to expenditures, there is an ever-increasing trend in favor of invest-
ment activities where allocations have increased from 29.8 percent to 33,7 per_
cent, therefore strengthening etie state's role as top investor. The states which
rave earmarked the largest amount of appropriations for Qquipment expendiCur.es are
the Ivory Coast, at a progression rate of 42.3 percent, Upper Volta (21.9 percent)
- and Niger (18.7 percent). Senegal and Togo, on the other hand, have registered
sharp decllnes of 31.4 percent and 41.3 percent respectively,
Internal cash generation represents ar~ increasingly larger share of the overall
revenues while external contributions only reprESent 36 percent, compared to 48
percent a year ago, as a result of stagnation in public aid for develop~ent. The
treasury of the atates was further tightened up in 1980 and required increased
fi.nancing by banks, mainly by the Central Bs~nk.
_ Therefore, the governments which used to have credit balances with thP u~onetary
institutions, had a debit balance of 36.1 billion CFA francs in April 1980 while
a year ago they had credits amounting to 90.1 billions. This drop of 126,2 bil-
lions, which stands out against the upward itgure of 21.4 billicn regiStered a
year ago, is foun.d in almost every member state of the union and generally
reflects the tightening of the liquid asaeta ~f the states.
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Accurding to the Waz�ld Bank, the tota:. borrowing by the UMOA member atates amounted
~ to 1~480.7 billion CFA francs in 1978, 37.8 percezt ~f which could come from draw-
- ing rights, while in 1975 the borrowing only amounted to 59'9 billion CFA francs,
- amost a third of what it was in 1978, between 1975 and 1978, the 38.4 percent '
_ average annual rate of growth brought the principal c+� the debt of the union member
~tates up from 327.2 billion CFA francs to 921 billions. The increase of the prin-
- cipal of che debt by 593.8 billions campared to the 1975 figures is the result of
' a 37~5.5 billion increase of the debte to private credi.tors and of a 215.3 billion
increase of the debt to the public sector. The developments recorded during the
period ur?der review are explained bq the decline of contrLbutions from governments
funds which had been until then the main source of loans; in 1972 these funds repre-
_ eented 56.5 percent of the comanitments while between 1975 and 1978. this perc:entage
dropped iro~ 53.9 to 35.3 of r.he overall coum~itments.
The facr :t~~t the un3o:~ is dependent on private financir.g eources explains the
" faater grcwth of the debt seiv ici.ng. The eervir_e of the debt amounted to payments
totaling 123.7 billion CFA f.rance in 1978 compared to 42.6 billions in 1975 showing
an average rate of increase of 112.7 percent in contrast with the f igure of 41.2 -
percent for the principal. -
- ~
As regards the 299.4 billion CFA fraT~cs borrowed by the end of 1977 from foreign
banks--with short-term financing and at high rates--whi.ch represent 68.5 percent
of the loan commitments contracted W�th the international private sector, the
eerviciug of this debt to the banks required 99,8 billion CFA francs which is
80.6 percent ~ii th~ tcrA1 burden assumEd by the 6 atates for their entire external
debt. This is why since 1978 the governments have tried to cut down on their bor-
rowing from the private sector. Consequently, the private share in the total loan
commitments dropped from 68.5 percent in 1977 to 64.7 percent in 1978, for a total
contribution of 180.9 billion CFA francs.
The increase of the total amount of t~e debt has had consequential effects on some
of the borrowing indicators: for the states as a group, the service of the debt,
expressed :n t~rms of a percentage of exports of gooda and services, went up
f.roca 4.5 percent in 1972 to 6.1 percent in 2975 and to 7.7 percent in 1977.
Balance of Payments and External Asaets
In the aphere of foreign trade. the transactions carried out by the UMOA~ which -
already in 1978 had resulted in a total negative balance of 16.4 billion CFA
francs, regiatered a deep and serious deterioration in 1979 reflected in a deficit
of 178.7 billion CFA francs. _
In spite of the improvement registered in the aphere of products which results in
the value of exports increasing by 8.5 percent, the UMOA's deficit in trade trans-
actions increased in 197~ reaching 70.3 billion CF~ francs compared to 48.5 bil- -
lions a year earlier. The higher cost of imports (conaumer goods, oil products and _
equipment goods) contributed to this imbalance with importa rising from 931.8
billion CFA fr~ncs iri 1978 to 1,028.4 billions in 1979 (up by 10.4 percent).
- The structural ~eficit of the accounts for services also went up from 314.2
billion CFA francs in 1978 to 356.6 billi~ns in 1979. -
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Transactions and pa�,~ments for ~oods and services from the balance of payments of -
~ the six countries are given in the following table:
Balances of Payment
(Tentative for 1979; projection for 1980; in billions of CFA francs)
1979 1980
Ben in
, Impnrts - 74.6 - 89.0
Exporta + 40.3 + 47.0
Services - 4.6 - 2.9
Deficit - 38.1 - 44.9
- Ivory Coast .
Imports -485.3 -547.0
Exporrs +595.3 +640.0
Services -232.0 -270.0
Def icit -122.0 -177.0
Upper Volta _
Importe - 62.4 - 66.6
Exports + 27.5 + 30.7
Servicea - 22.5 - 24.1
Def icit - 57.4 - 60.0
Niger
; Imports - 90.8 -124.2
- Exporr.s +105.1 +135.2
~ Seroicea - 41.3 - 58.7
Def icit - 27.0 - 47.7
~ Senegal
Imports -220.1 -207.7 -
Exports +129.2 +113.9 -
Services - 26.8 - 23.3
Deficit -117.7 -117.1
Togo
Imports - 95.2 -109.4
Exports + 60.7 +2~~.~
- Services - 29.2 - 35.5 -
- Def icit - 63.7 - 38.9
Between 30 April 1979 and 30 April 1980 the monetary stock rose from 1~022.2 bil-
1 ion CFA francs to 1,102.8 billions, an increase of 80.6 billions or 7.9 percent =
instead of the 15.8 percent a year earlier. The only source of this additional
money supply was an increase of internal credit; it affected the paper money as
well ae the bank depoeite.
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Banke depoeita went up from 727.9 billion CFA francs to 763.8 billiona ehowing an
increaae of 35.9 billio:~s or 4.9 percent ocmpa.red to 14.7 a year earlier. The
slowdown in the rate of growtin of thia aggregate involved depoaits in banka of the
private sector as well as in those of the public or almost public sector.
Credite to the economy rose from 1,170.5 billions by the end of April 1979 to
1,370.9 billions by the end of April 1980, namely, an increase of 200.4 billions
or 17.1 percent instead of the 25.7 percent of a year earlier.
F'urthermore, the worrying trend of the balance of external transactions resulted
' in a sharp deterioration of the net external assets held by the monetary establiah-
ments of the union and between April 1979 and April 1980 the exchange value of these
aesets wenr_ from bei.ng -i-41,9 billion CFA francs to -155.9 billion CFA francs show-
ing a sharp drop of 197.8 billions, more important than the drop recorded a year
earlier (7~s,7 billions). The off icial exchange reserves have followed the same
trends as the net externai assets but their drop was less pror,ounced. For the 6
countriea, these reservea represented an exchange vai~: ~f i9,6 billion CFA
francs at the end of April 1980 compared with an exchange value of 153.4 bill.iona _
a year earlier, which means a decrease of 133.8 billions.
In an address delivered on 19 September 1980, during a meeting of minieters of
economy and finance from the countries which are members of the franc zone, the
cnairman of the West African Monetary Union's Council of Ministers declared that
"In vi~w of the unfavorable prospecte for the economies of the member states,
budget increases in the Union m~mber atates axQ likely to be limited in 1981
while they will continue to follow a careful and strict policy with regard to
externa~ borrowing. In the monetary sphere, the main purpose is etablization and,
if poseible, to improve the net external atsnding of the monetary establishments
reconciling the imperatives of a monetary policy and the requirements of financing `
the economic development. To this end~ the union member states intend to mabilize
all their available external resources to f inance the foreseeable deficit of their
external transactians to avoid putting this burden on the external assets of the
~ monetary institutions. On the other hand, it is essential that fair prices be
offered when their produc[s are sold and that the protectionist barriers facing -
their products be lifted."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
8796
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
B RIEFS
TANZANIAN TROOPS IN UGANDA--President Nyerere and the president of the Military
Commission which is running Uganda, Paulo Muwanga, began talks in Dar-es-Salaam on
8 November principally on the subject of bilateral questions. The Ugandan leader
was accompanied by the minister of regional cooperation, Dr Picho Owiny; the
secretary o� state for supply; Moses Apiliga; and the chief of the Uganda Army
General Staff, David Oyite O~ok. Tanzania feels that it would be unwiae to with-
draw its troops from Uganda before having completed the task undertaken at the
request of the Ugandans, according to an editorial in the government newspaper,
DAILY NEWS of Dar-es-Salaam, co~enting on the appeals issued by Zaire and the Sudan
to Uganda which demanded the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from the country so that
free and honest elections could take place. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in Frer.ch 14 Nov 80 p 3044J 814~
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[
ANGOLA
OFFICTAI. II? ?.~NDON SPEAKS ON FOREIGN RELATIONS `
Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Qct 80 p 2501
[Article: "Pacavira Recalls in London th~ Probleme of Southern Africa"]
[TextJ Manuel Pedro Pacavira, Angolan minister of agriculture, who last week
viaited Londoa, menticned in a press statement on 1 October various problems
in the southern African region. _
In Namibia, he said, Angola will continue to support SWAPO (South-Weat African
People's Organizat~on) and the efforta diaplayed by Rurt Waldheim, secretary
general of the United Nations, to reach a solution to the Namibian question.
- Angola, Pacavira added, harbors many Namibian refugees. Becauae of ite attitude, ~
Angola ia repeatedly attacked by 5outh A,frica. Accor.ding to an Angolan documenC, .
South Africa has laut~ched at least 21 attacka againat Angola from the beginning
ot last August to mid-September.
With respect to South Africa, Luanda'a posftion ia reetricted to "not interfering
in the affaira of a country with which Angola doea not even have a common
border .
Pacavira again denounced the attention given in ~he West to "plantom groups" -
supported by South Africa, such as UNIxA (National Un2on for the Total Independence
of Angola)--a movement that asserts it is leading a guerrilla war against the
Luanda government--whose leader, Jonaa Savimbi, made a private vieit to London -
last July. Pacavira, who notably met with Bir Ian Gilmour, deputy minister
in the Foreign Office, affirmed that Savimbi had not obtained any aid from
Great Britain.
Fic~ally, Pacavira, after having recalled that the United States had never recognized
the goverrunent of Angola, under the pretext, he said, of the presence of Cnban
troope there, atated that Luanda was ready to reapond to "any poaitive change"
in Weehington'8 attitude toward Angola.
CaPYRIG~IT: Rene Moreux et Ci.e Paris 1980
, 9545 ~
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ANGOLA
_ BRIEFS
ALLEGFD UYITA OPERe1~I0NS--The UNITA [NationaZ Union for the Total Independence
of Angola] opp~sition movement, led by Jonas Savimbi, publiahed on 30 September
' tn Pari~ a coaw~unique citfn~ tl:e occupation by LTNITA duxing September of two
settlementa in southeast Angola. On 19 September, the co~nunique specifiea,
guerrillas from Savimbi's movement zook control of Mavinga (250 km north of
the Namibian border), major road center for control of the province of Cuando
- Cubango. On 11 September the guerrillas were already in poeseasion of Chir~bo,
accord~ng to the communique, a settlement located in the region of Menongue
(fox~merly Serpa Pinto), about 300 l~ north of Namibia. During these operations,
UNITA etates having disabled "78 en~ny soldiere, including a Cuban commander"
and seized equipment, especially a dozen SAM 7 miesiles and nearly 600 AK 47
guns. [Textj [Paris MARCI~S TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANSSNS in French 10 Ocr
80 p 2501] 9545
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CAMEROON
CNLAA ADOPTS BUDGET FOR AN'TILOCUST CAMPAIC~f'
Paris MAR(:EiES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Oct SO p 2622
[Article: "Antilocust Struggle: A 272.6 Mj.llion CFA Franc Budget"]
(Text] On 19 Sentember, President Ahmadou Ahidjo created by decree a national
committee for the antilocust and antibird struggle, headed by the prime min ister.
In fact, according to the Cameroonian press, Cameroon is threatened by the largeat
locust invasion that the Sub-Saharan countries have lmown since the years from
1928 to 1941.
On 8 October, the GNLAA [National Antilocust Co~ittee] adopted its initia~. budget
for the campaign in progress, which amounts to 272.6 million CFA francs, 172.6
million furnished by the state, 65 million by the PNUD [UNDP], and 35 million by
the FAO.
The basic tasks for the CNLAA involve the conti~.uous study of the development of
the locust and bird situation in national territory, particularly by the establish-
ment of a system to alert and inform the technical departments of th.e incidence
and the ex~ent of the infestations; the organization of all national campaigns
to cambat Iocusts and crop-destroying, seed-eating birds; coordination and orchestra-
tion of alI antilocust and antibird activitiea. Since the beginning of the year,
search and spraying operations (using lan3 equipment and helicopters) have begun.
- Unfortunately, the swarms multiplied rapidlq due to climatic conditions.
~ On the bilateral level, several months ago Cameroon and Nigeria launched actions
which ahould contribute to the atruggle against the current locust imvaeion. For
- Cameroon this involvea financing a minimum of 100 hours of helicoptar flight time
and atockpiling kerasene products in the Ngaoundere and Tibati area.
To cond~sct the cammon etruggle against the migratory Zocust, the inr.ervention
teams circulate freely between Nigeria and Cameroon. UnfortunatQly, this ia not
the case with Chad, tormented for several months now by fratricidal war. Rpcul_t:
- the swarms of migratory locusts install themselves there and develop, and then
crass Lake Chad to ravage neighbor~ng countries, parCicularly Cameroon a.-~d Ni~eria.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
NATION DESCRIBED AS POiWDER KEG READY TO EXPLODE.
~ Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 13-26 Oct 80 pp y2-G3, 44
[Article by special correspondent Zilegue: "Disastrcus Balance Sheet: Is It for
Reassurance that Bokassa's Successor Has Come To Visit His Opposite Number at the
Elysee?"]
[Text] A year after Bokassa's overthrow and the parachute landing of the Dacko
team at the head of the Central African state, the time has come to try to set up
a balance sheet of the economic, political and social situation of the country.
On the economic plane, as everybody knows, the situation is catastrophic as a
_ consequence of the period between 1969-1970 when Bokassa began to pillage and ex-
ploit to his personal advantage the wealth of Central Africa. The increasingly
desparate need for capital has brought about a steady decrease of production in
all fields. It is that same phenomenon which we are continuing to experience.
This is not astonishing when one knows that it was Dacko--who is now in power
again--who was at the root of the country's first economic and financial recession
in the caurse of the first five years of independence. One cannot see how or why
he might have reformed. Quite the contrary.
Thus, every week, he delves into the coffers of the Treasury and extracts sums of
2 or 3 million francs CFA to "fill the refrigerator, because of the numerous guests"
_ who come to Central Africa, and to face other expenses. Intrigues in the Bokassa
style also continue, with the same paralqsing consequences on the affairs of the
country.
The following is a concrete example. At the head of the Coffee Fund--one of the
organizations that should set up the country's finances--a man has been placed
wl~o is incapable of exercising that function: no other than Faustin Dacko, the
chief of state's own son. And, while we are on the sub~ect of anecdotes, what
should one say about the oetentation displayed on the occasion of the marriage of
another of his eone, Sruno Dacko. taking on the proportione of a national celebra-
tion carried out with great pomp, wnich included a visit to the town in an official
procession, a reception in the palace of the Republic--a11 of this followed by
ridiculous elaborations for the benefit of a people who are nevertheless not cred-
ulous. As can be seen, the nepotism so fatal to the economic and political life
of the country is far from having ceased.
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Whethzr it be in the public or private sector, wherever one ventures to look, one
is struck by the insufficiency--if not the total absence---of Central African upper
or intermediate cadres. 'Today the infrastructurES ar~ totally in the hands of
foreigners, specifically French. The famous moneyle~ders' conference seems to have
been ncthing more than a decoy with which it was hoped to soothe the Central Afri-
cans, and which must particularly made it possible to measure the depths of the
abyss into which the state was floundering. The truth is that Dacko and his team
are going to deliver the death-blow to the counery, and that nobody--not even those
who put him in power--have confidence in them.
The balance sheet is a heavy one. The network of roads--of top priority--is in
such a state ~hat the movement of produce is becom3rig more and more problematical.
To nitigate this ~ituation one might consider the rich Central African waterways,
but this would be to forget that access to the Ubangui ia the preserve of the
~'rench experts anc: business nen to whom the strategic key sections of the nation
have been entrusted.
Thus it is ttiat the Central African Agency for River Transportation was dissolved
and replaced by a new enterprise, the Central African Society for River Transport
(Socatraf), managed by Frenchmen. This aociety started out by laying off two-thirds
of the workers and replacing all the Central African cadres by French "cooperators."
It is rumored that the essent:tal mission of this new enterprise--directed in Bangui
with a representative in Brazzaville--is to spy on the P.~pular Republic of the
Congo. At any rate there has not yet been any opportunity to measure its effective-
ness. The first boat of the Socatraf was not a'uie to sail up the Ubangui toward
Mobaye until two weeks ago (as we write). When it is known that this is the route
through which the essential food supply of the capital has to pass one can measure
- the grave consequences of the delay, which the Dacko government tried to ~ustify on
the grounds that the waters had not risen enough, whereas in fact the rainy season
was at its end.
Agriculture--priority of priorities--registers a continual decrease in production.
This is due to the precariousness of the means of moving produce and to defects
in the system of monetary circulation, but also to the fact that the peasants have
no confidence in the regime and are--like everyone else around here--en~aging in a
- sort of slow-down by increasingly reducing their activities to subsistence farming.
That is to say in other words that to live in town and to try to feed onself there
is a real calvary for the popular masses.
The processing industry, largely tributary of agriculture, is equally paralyzed by
this sir.uation. The result is that workers fron various factories and manufac-
turere either are the victims of technological unemployment or are "compressed"--
that is laid off in great numbers, without having, of course, the slightest hope of
finding other work very soon.
"In Spite of Hiwself"
In this climate of uncertainty and deprivation some people, of course, are profit-
- eering: trafficking in gems or pawn-broking. For everyone here there is no doubt
that the present chaos is the work of three men: Henri Maidou, former vice-
president of the Republic, who backed French intervention before he began to ad�~o-
cate "controled multipartyism;" former prime-minister Ayandho, known for his tribal
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attitude, his blunders, his erratic behavior} and also his thievery, which has
characterized all regimes that have succeeded each other in Bangui; and finally
David Dacko, who never ceases to do evarything that will earn him his reputation
as a puppet subject to manipulation, and wh~ profits from the situation by main- _
taining his lines of communication for his own benefit and that of his minions.
Indeed, opinion is unanimous that the chief of state dces not intend to remain in
power, even though--after his visit to Paris--he confirmed that he too would be a
candidate in the presidential election of 1981. For it is almost against his own
will that he was elevated to the presidency by the French. He is nevertheless _
obsessed b}~ one fear: the eventual return into the country of Abel Goumba, pres-
ident of ti~,e ~bangui People's Patriotic Front, who is now living in Cotonou, and
_ who, if he should return to the country, could reveal the inside story of the plot
(involving, among others, the Bangui Chamber of Co~erce), which made it possible
= for Dacko to succeed Boganda.
This obsession is such that it is said Dacko became ill, a few weeks ago, because
he was sent a bogus telex bearing Goumba's forged signature telling him to resign
and go into exile if he wanted to keep his head. It is, indeed this panic fear--
Dacko keeps repeating: "Goumba must not set foot on Central African soil"--which
explains the astonishing eviction of Maidou. For initially the only departure
anticipated was that of Prime Minister Ayandho, under pressure from the General
Union of Central African Workers (UGTC) and the neighborhood committees of the
Central African Democratic Union (UDC, party founded by the Dacko tean in March
1979) .
Meanwhile Maidou was preparing for a coup with a plan of action initiated, so they
say, in Cairo, and he was hoping to succeed by manipulating the opposition to
achieve his end. Hence the hack-handed declarations by the former vice-president
about the so-called "controled multipartyism." That was precisely what made him
lose credit with Dacko, who, as soon as he discovered the plot, accused Maidou of
being "a man of the Ubangui People's Patriotic Front (FPO)." This accusation, as
everyone here knows, is certainly without foundation--Dr Abel Goumba's movement
having ceaselessly proclaimed that it would not participate in any dialogue which
would not accept the following assumptions: removal of occupation troops, free and
- democratic elections. But he has a lot to say about the chief of state's lack of
~ self-control. �
It has been learned also that, 2 days after the double eviction of Maidou and
Ayandho last August, Dacko had received Ange Patasse (still in prison, with his
case at the investigation stage) and F. Pehoua (an international financial admin-
istrator posted in the Cameroon), doubtless tofind other scapegoats. At the moment,
Maidou and Ayandho are under house arrest, guarded in the daytime by the Central
African Army. At night it is the "barracuda"--the name given to French military
personnel--who are posted on guard in front of the former vice-president's house,
whereas the former vice-president can go about freely.
, Difficult Replacements
It is predicted that Dacko's tantrum--as French circles view his decision as re-
gards Maidou--will cost him dearly. While keeping up appearances (Didn't Dacko
come to Paris recently, and didn't he bring back in his luggage 700 million's
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credit in CFA francs?), the "advisers" are in the process of creating a vacuum
around him. Nevertheless it is assumed that the present "status quo" will be main-
tained at least until the French preaidential ~lections.
In the meantime, however, Paris is increasingly extending its tentacles over the
courtry, through the intermediary of its ambassador and its numerous civil and
military experts. The exploitation of mines and forests, freight tranaport and
- proceasing induatries--such as the ICAT ~Central African Textile Industry)--and
many other sectora are in French h,ands. All this is defended by a veritable in-
vasion army comprising all services, and even a polic force, not to speak of the
French military advisers who are working at the heart of the Central African Army.
In the meantime also the search is on for a future replacement solution. General
:~olingba, c:hief of staff of the Central African Army and former ambassador to
Canada, had been s candidate. But his card was quickly burned as Dacko let out '
the secret, tor the Central African Army was unwilling to follow its chief of staff
because of hi.s kinship ties raith Ayandho. Today the "advisers" seem to have their
eye on the under-chief of staff Sana, former ambassador to Cairo, whom Bokassa had
called i.n for consultation shortly before his fall and had had arrested upon arrival
for per~onal reasons. Replacement plans envisaged by the French include, of course,
prospects of contacts with the opposition.
Meanwhile tY?e Central African People's Liberation Movement (MLPC) has been thriving
from the lawsuit filed agai.nst the chief of its leader Patasse, who had been seek-
ing the lfinelight, spreading his propaganda with abundant distribution of money and
- all sorts of receptions. He seems to be taking root among the new social strata
whose only god is Money. But the great masses have little confidence in him, for
they surmise that the MLPC would indulge in even more flagrant waste if it should
come to power. On the other hand, the "maoists" (whom one can meet at the homes of
some intellectuals coming from France).seem to be losing momentum, as their reprF-
sentative in the government, Blague, has alienated the students through the n~erous
measures that he has taken in their regard.
Simme ring
As for the Ubangui People's Patriotic Front [FPO], which, it must be admitted, is
the only opposition movement which has not compromised itself with the various
puppet regimes, its hold over the people is real. Its militants, whose patriotism
is above reproach (in~ieed, revelations are expected about its role in the insurrec-
tional demonstrations of 1979), are concerned about all classes of society without
exception. It is not surprising that the FPO is the ob~ect of intense surveillance
and that its members are a favorite target of repression. The most recent victim
of this policy--after Mageot Manuel and Bamba Cyriaque, who were deported several
months ago in the interior of the country--is Nditifer Boysembe Marc, arreste:. on
16 August, 1980, in Bangui.
Furthermore, the government is promoting a simplistic propaganda campaign ag~inat
Dr Goumba's movement, brandishing the threat of a"communist FPO" which would
snatch away from the peasants their wives, their children and their property, and
which would not leave them so much as one field to cultivate for themaelves. It is
true that this type of propaganda, belonging to another era, does not taken any
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more nowadays. By the same token, the foreign force of dissuasion--however con-
siderable--which is stationed in the country hardly seems to impress.
A radical change has taken place at the level of political consciousness and
popular aspirations which President Dacko's "advisers" do not seem to have measured
precisely. The thirst for freedom and the determination to fight for t.t are such
that any aolution imposed from the outside--including the Dacko experiment--is
doomed to failure. It has become clear that nobody will ever be able to continue
keeping the lid of restraint on the simQnering pot which is what Cen~ral Africa has -
become. .
Whether in the countryside or in the cities, everyone speaks up and criticizes
openly. The peasants, who are more and more interested in their country's affairs
and who are conscientiously slowing down their production, want to be abreast of
everything and show a realism which many Central African intellectuals might envy.
In the cities the situation is explosive; and, in spite of the posters on the walls
exhorting employees to be punctual, civil servanta sulk against work, arriving at
nine instead of seven, and going home after being there 2 or 3 hours.
The beginning of the academic year promises to be turbulent, as teachers have
addressed an ultimatum to the Uacko government. They are demanding minimum sal-
aries of 60,000 CFA francs. If he fails to. meet the demands, they will call a
strike which has been thoroughly prepared and which can be expected to have popular
support.
While one can observe progress in nationalist sentiment within the Central African
_ Army, humiliated and scorned, policemen and soldiers nc longer inspire fear. "What
do you want? Are we not living in a democracy?" retorts an old bicycle rider, wi~h
a broad smile on his face, to the policeman who is summoning hiw. An anecdote?
Of course, but one that is repeated 10 times daily, and which reveals a lot about
the state of mind of the population. -
The Central Africans are no longer a people bowed down with fear and humiliation.
Central Africa resembles a powder keg which needs nothing more than a spark for it
to explode.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
9347
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
BRIEFS
RECRUITI~TT OF NIGERIAN WOP.I~RS--Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria have ~ust signed
_ an agree~snt whereby several thousand Nigerian workers will be recruited to work
in the cacao plantations of Equatorial Guinea. The mass departure around 1972-1973 _
of some 25,OG0 Nigerians ewployed in the development of the cacao plantations, as
a s~esult of ill treatment by the Macias Nguema regime, had caused cocoa production
to drop fro~i 40,000 tons in 1969 to 4,000 tans. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRIINEENS in F~ench 24 Oct 80 p 262k) 9434
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~
GABON
DE~ILS PROVIDED ON 1979 ECONOMIC SITUATIOiN
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAI~ENS in French 10 Oct 80 pp 2490-2491
[Article: "The Gabonese Economy at the End of 1979"--passages encloeed in
elantlinea printed in boldface and itslica)
- [Excerpts] The raport on the activitiee of the Gaboneae Bank for Development
(GBD) for the financial year I979 (partly analyzed in our issue of 26 September
1980, p 2364) is introduced by an accouat of Gabon~a economic ait'ua~ion at the
end of the year just elapaed.
The /gross national product ((~1'P)/, at market prices, aince ita maximum ievel
in 1976, that ie 719.1 billion CFA (African Financial Caamunity), decreased to
690.2 billi,on in 1977, thea to 600.2 billion in 1978. In 1978 taxes represented
17 percent of the Gt~P, against 16 percent in 1976~
The difficulties of certain public-related fiima brought about an inarease
in budgetary subaidies for balancing operationa: 1.3 billion CFA in 1976, Chen
2.6 billion in 1977 and 2.9 billion in 1978.
' Taking into account the rate of inflation (17 percent in 1977 and 10 percent
in 1978), the /growth of the Gaboneae economy/ ie expreased by a backward
movemenC of 18 percent in 1977 and 2U percent in 1978, while 1976 had shown a ~
rare positive rate of 30.7 percent.
- /The balance of payments~, atrongly adverse in 1977 by k4.8 bfllion CFA, due to
the equipment outlay undertaken at that time, was practically balanced in 1978
with the negative balance returning to 0.9 billion. The componente of the balance
- of payments for these 2 years apportioned in billions of CFA are che follawing:
_
1977 1978
Goods and services +17.1 +28.9
Free allowances - 6.7 - 4.~
Nonmonetary a~aets -84.2 -13.9
Errors and Omissiona -21 -11.8
Deficit -44.8 - 0.9 -
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/The trade balance/ is favorable. In 1978 petroleum, with 207.7 billion CFA re-
preeented 70.4 percent of Ga~one~e exporte; wood, with 28 billion, repreeented
9.4 percent; manganeee ore, wiCh 24.2 billion, represented 8.2 percent, and
:~ranium, with 21.9 billion, repre~ented 7.5 percent.
crence ia Gabon'a chief trade partner. Ite ealee of capital good exceeded its
purcheaea, and the trade balance ahawe r~ poeitive balance of 85.9 billion CFA in
1978 in favor of France. The balance i~ in Gabon'a favor in trade with Great
Aritain (+24,1 billion), the United Statee (+19.4 billion), and FRG (+10.3 billion),
the Benelux countriea (~6.5 billion), etc. The balance was poeitive with Cameroon
5.9 billion) and negative with the Congo (-4 billion).
- !The agricultural campaign/ of 1978-1979 yielded 4,754 tone of cacao (+27,8
percent over the previoua campaign) and 233 tone of coffee (-53 p~rcent).
With 9,205 tons of augar in 1979, the production of the /Sugar Canpany of Upper
Og~oue (Soauho)/ is already covoring the national cons~ption. The ~brella
organization for thie group, the /Sugar Food Campany (SAS)/, atopped operating
in 1979, and manufacturing was reopened by Soauho. Becauae of the difficulties
in exporting aurpluaea in production, the latter will be deliberately limited to
8,000 tona in 1979-1980.
During 1979 the /Agrogabon/ pro~ect entered ite execution stage; the program ie _
baeed on conatruction of a 6,000 hectare oil palm tree plantation and on building
an oil mill. The cost ia estimated at 13 billion CFA.
Fiahing provided 8,000 tons, of which 6,000 tona were for induatrial fieh.
The production of /okoumie/ wood in 1979 wae calculated at 1.06 million cubic
metere, against 1.22 million in 1978. Foreign demand increased a little bit,
and exporta alightly exce~ded l million cubic metera, while uee by local unrolling
c anpaniea decreased by 30 percent. T~?e main buyera of okoiane wood were France
(46.3 percent), Israel (13.3 percent), Greece (13.2 percent), and then Spain,
Morocco and the FRG.
Regarding /ozigo/ exporte were 53,000 tons, and the main buyera were France
(67.5 percent), Lebanon (1~.3 percent), Spain and Morocco. -
_ /~~.production/ in 1979 reached 9.8 million tona (-7.56 percent), with /Elf-
Gabon/ the major producer (6.7 million toc~), follawed by /Elf Aquitaine/,
/Shell Gabon/, etc.
The comnercialized Froduction of /natural gaa/ we,s ca3.culated at 60.8 million
cubic meters (+8.2 percent), and is uaed by 'Gabon Electricity and Water Canpany/
(SEEG) and /Gaboneae Refining Company (Sogara)/.
/The Ogooue Mining Camp$ny (Comilog)/ extracted 2.3 million tone of /manganeee
ore/, which ie an increaee of 34 percent over 1978, dua to the diminiehing of
stocke in ironworking. Regarding ahipmenta, Weetern Europe repreeenta 53 percent, -
North America 21 percent and Eaetern Europe 13 percent. With 1,100 tons of /urani~mm/
24
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held, the /Fran~eville Ur.ani~n Mines Company (Comuf)/ increased its production
7.7 percent. Comilf covera one fifth of Fr.enckti uranium needa. The conatantly
declining /gald/ production of the /Gabonese Mining Reaearch Ccnpaay (Sogarem)/
produced only about 30 kg in 1979.
iv'ith basic treatment capacity for 1 million tcr.ls oF crude a year, the /Gabonese
Refining Company (Sogara)/ and the /Gabon Elf Refining Canpany (Coger)/, both
at Port-Gentil, treated 1.25 million tona in 1979 (-27,g percent). Refining
abeorbed only 12.7 percent of the national petroleum production, against
16 percent in 1978.
The persistence of the decline in public investanente ia affecting the production
of the /Gabon Cement Company/, whose thxee-factory capacity totals 400,000
tons of cement and 350,000 tonr~ of clinker a year. Its 1979 production was
calculated at 96,200 tons (-28.3 percent).
The Draconian reduction in public inveatmenta has especially affected the
, /building-public works/ sector, bringing about the retreat of several foreign
_ c anpaniea, due to lack of projecta.
After the opening of the Libreville-Nd,jole aection, the /Transgabonais/ projecta
= are continu3ng in the direction of Franceville. These projects basically
= conaiat of embanking, deforeating and building art works between Ndole (TLm 185)
and Ayem (Rm 257). The cost of the railroad, put into operation again on
31 December ~979, is 452.5 billion CFA, of which 182.6 billion is for work
$lready completed.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paria 1980
9545
CSO: 4400
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GArBIA
FAD ROAD FINANCING AGREEMENT SIC~IED
Paris MARCEIES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Oct 80 p 2612
[Article: "Roads: Nearly $10 Million from the ADF for the Laminkoto-Passimus
L in k" J
[Text ] A1 Haj i Mohmadu Cadi Cham, f inance and trade minister of the Republic of
= Gambia, and Mr Wila D. Mung'Omba, president of both the African Development Bank
and Fund, on last 17 September in Abid~an, signed an agreement according to which
the African Development Fund (ADF) would grant Gambia a loan of 8 million UCF
(expansion unknown], or about $9.8 million, for financing the Laminkoto-Passimus
road. The loan, approved by the ADF board of directors on last 28 August, will
be repaid in 50 years with payment deferred for 10 years.
The project concerns the improvement aad asphalting of a two-lane road (a 6-
meter roadway) with two shoulders, each 1.5 meters wide, between Laminkoto and
Yassimus (120 km) and two feeder roads, one leading to Bassang (18 km) and the
other to Basse (13 km), or a total length of 151 1~.
_ The total cost of the project is $20.3 million, of which $17 million is in foreign
_ currency and the balance in local costs. The ADF loan is intended to cover 57.4
percent of the component in currency, or 47.9 percent of the costs as a whole.
The Gamhian Government and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), with, respectively,
- $3.4 million and $7.2 million, will jointly finance the remaining 52.1 percent.
The acquisition of goods and services financed by the ADF will be made on inter-
national invitation to tender at the level of the ADB [African Development Bank]
and ADF member countries.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris, 1980
9434
CSO: 4400
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IVORY COAST
ELECTION RESULTS, PROCESS REVIEWID -
Houphouet-3oigny Reelected, Delegate Electiona
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Oct 80 pp 58-60
[Article by Siradiou Qiallo ~
[Text] On 18 October, one week after celebrating hie 75th birthday, Mr Felix
Houphouet-Boigny was reelected president of the republic for tne fourth consecu-
tive term. With 99.9 percent of the deciding votes. Out of 2,795,456 voters,
there were 306 blank or invalid ballots. From Abid3an to Odienne, from Binger-
ville to Katiola, going througli Daloa, Man, Korhogo, Bouake, the Ivorians made for
the polls in great numbers on 12 October, in a fun-fair atmoephere, to bear witness
to their "indes tructible loyalty to the founding candidate," who thus begins his
f if th term.
For theae elections, und~ubtedly the last at which Houphouet will be present, have
taken on the appearance of a plebiscite. In both the working-class districts of
Abid~an and in the inland towns, the crowd was relaxed and good natured.
Strategy
Circumspect, th e police or,ly stepped in to prevent a scuffle. "It's impossible.
You will hace to find a solution to my problem," an old pensioner cried out in
desperation to the pref ect, Leon Koffi, as he stepped out of an imposing black
Mercedes into the middle of a crowd congregated in the court of a school on the
outekirts of Bouake. "I'll be deeply upset if I don't fulfill my duty toward my
friend Houphouet," explained the complainant who had not received his voter iden-
tification card. And he displayed his precedents, with PDC [Ivory Coast Democratic
Party] membership cards and many others proving hi~ loyalty. "Too late," replied
the polite but intractable prefect. "lfiere is nothing I can do. Come back tomor-
- row. I shall s ee what I can do to allow you to vote at the coming elections."
The coming elections? That will be very soon. In fact, the Ivorians are to elect
their 147 delegates on 9 to 23 November and the mayors of the main urban centers on
30 November. Now, for the first t3me since independence there will no longer be
any "president's delegates and mayors"--contrary to what generally takes place in
Africa. Every Ivorian citizen can present a candidacy certif icate. But no one is
entitled io wrap himself up in the folds of the party's flag or claim kinship with
the head of state.
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The delegate candidates, it musL 'oe added, have not waited until 25.October, the
official opening date of the electoral campaign, even though all have not thrown
off all disguise. Since public opinion polls are forbidden, some aet about in
another way to calculate their chancea before committing themselves. Suc� a one
consul~s che Treic:~ville priests, another the village ~uju priest, if not the
clairvoyants brought in at great expense from Mali or Upper Volta.
In the Abid3en well-to-do villas, as in the aimpla thatched cottages in the forest
and on the savannas, the battle is already raging. Any weapon at all is suitable
as long as it serves its purpose: defamation, money, of course, but also tribal
system and descent. The only thing miasing is the discussion of ideas so dear to
th~ Western mind. How could it be otherwise since the candidatea belong to the
same party (in pa~er)? How could they offer different programs since, once elected,
all zhe delegateA will belong td the same parliamentary group? To defend and serve
the same govertuaent .
It does not much matter. Caught unprepared by the storm of renewal, a good many
outgoing delegates preferred to pull out, e~Cther to avoid a h~ilating defeat, or
because of a genuine desire to make room for young people. For instance, some
old campaigners on the Ivorian political acene, such as Jean-Baptiste Mockey, min-
ister of state charged with public health, in Grand Bassam; Antoine Konan Kanga,
deputy mayor nf Abid~an; Kouissou Keletigui in Man; Samba Ambroise in Dimbokro.
However, other "oldsters," unable to give up the dangerous intoxicant of political
combat, were bent on staying on. And they went down once again into the arena;
D3ibou Sounkalo, deputy mayor of Bouake; Gbon Coulibaly in Rorhogo; Amon Daby in
Aboisso.
Groups of determined, self-aseured young people are getting ready to go over the
top of these etzongholds. On the other hand, at Facobly, near Man, it's the other
, way around: Jea�+'~+P4 f~rmer deputy, for~pr Recretaiy of state, is planning to
unseat sameone who ie far younger than he, hia.o,own daughter, Simone Leroux.
"I did all I could to prevent this unseemly fight," this eloquent little lady glow-
iag with vitality told us. "But," saddened she added, "all the village wise men
called to the rescue could not succeed in convincing my Old Father to give up.
Well, what do you expect~ that's democracy." But Facobly was not the only scene
of opposition among members of the saane family. At Korhogo, the outgoing deputy,
Gbon Coulibaly, will encounter a lawyer, his own uncle, Lancine Coulibaly Gbon.
Likewise, at Aboisso, ~ust as at Agou in the Adzoge region, real brothers are expected
to go down into the ring. Although there were il of 12Q outgoing assembly dele-
gates, there are more than 12 women soliciting an electoral mandate; Berthe
Sawadogo, wife of the former minister of agriculture, in Fresco; Achy Brou in
Bassam; Sangare Ansanna in Dabakala; Danielle Boai in~ Tiassale, who besides her
male rival candidates will encounter two other women. The former chairman of the
Foreign Press Association in Paris will not be the only one representing ,journalism:
Ben Soumahouro ie coming forward as a candidate in Abid~an; Marcel Bile in Port-
Bouet; Jean Kambire :Ln Bouma Bouna, in the North.
The Test
- Ardent and all-absorbing battle. Even though the presidential elections went off
- in good humor, the 9 and 30 November polls pramise to be very heated. Whereas in
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July and August, the elections of-the Party's secretaries general were the occasion ~
of only three minor incidente, the delegates' elections promise to be very exciting.
Although all the necessary steps have been taken, the miniater of the interior, Mr
. Alexie Thierry Lebbe has made this verq clear to us. For democracy has noe only
some advantages. it also has ite drawbacks which the democrats should foresee snd
aseume reaponaibility for them.
5pecuidti~on on b'uture
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Oct 80 pp 58-60
[Arricle by Sennen Andriamirado]
[Text] The Ivorians, baffling. Disappointed or skeptical (J.A. No 1032), but
"on the whole contented." At least if we are to believe the results of a poll which
the Ivorian Institute of Public Opinion (IIOP) took in April-May 1980: 55 percent
of the people questioned considered themselves happy with the situation, ae against
_ 34 percent who were dissatisfied.In 1979, however, the "contented ones" repreaented
only 37 percent and the "dissatisfied ones;'40 percent. Based on a eampling of
- 1.800 people dietributed among Abidi~an (66 percent), Bouake (12 percent) and
nine other towns, the sample survey brought out one of the Ivorian facta of lifQ
today: aiixiety due to the high coat of living overrides any yearninga for politi-
cal change.
But this was before the upheaval brought about by Houphouet in the name of democracy. ~
Before the congress was supposed to bring about the renewal (29 September--1 October,
see J.A. No 1031), even before June 1980 which saw the "Old Man suspend the one-
party machinery. At the time, it's true, even the head of state noted that the
Ivorians, thefr minda beclouded by the struggle for individual and daily survival,
could hardly be deeply concerned about public service. Since and shortly before
the congress, JEUNE AFRIQUE also tried to conduct a survey among the Ivorian readers
(see p 83). Democratization was already the burning question of the day. But, to -
our surprise, in the sphere of acknowledged concerns, priority still went to the
- high cost of living (22 percent of the replies received). Democracy only comes
in second (15 percent), closely follo~~~ by another material preoccupation, housing
(12 percent).
D~es this mean to say that Houphouet was wrong to worry and to wieh to democratize
his form of governmentl In fact, material concerns also bring political unrest to
light. In this manner, the IIOP survey brings ou~ very clearly that if the Ivorians
attribute their economic problems to the ir,ternational crisis, they also imputed
the blame to their party in power, which "missed the mark" im matters of salariea,
_ ~ployment and education. Still worse, Ivorian society's diaease was unmercifully
diagnosed: corruption, according to the IIOP aurvey. This is confirmed by the
J.A. mini-survey in which Ivorian readers cite corruption (50 percent) and partisan-
ship (23 percent), and are of the opinion that, during the past 45 years, priority
should have been given to mitigating social inequalities (55 perc:ent) whereas
only 23 percent attribute it to Political reorganization.
The future, nevertheless, leaves a great many readers skeptical: 53 percent of thoae
in the Ivory Coast foresee fewer opportunities.of suceesa for their children than
even they had, as against 37 percent who believe that their offspring will be more .
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fortunate. Since the declaration of intent regarding democratic reorganization,
there is a veiled hope for a change for the better: 51 percent of those who re-
plied to our questionnaire do not believe that the promised reforms will be carried ~
out, but 49 percent think that they will. As for the choice of instiCutional
' ways arsd means to bring about this reorganization. among the rules anCicipated,
43 percent believe that Houphouet-Boigny should remain in power, 39 percent would
like greater freedom of the press, while 32 percent are hoping for multipartisanship
(the total exceeds 100 percent because several replies were given). As for cur-
rent politics which could transform the Ivory Coaet, hopes are divided between so-
- cialism (54 percent) and Houphouetism (43 percent). One thing is certain: Marxism
receives...0 percent.
What are we to conclude from this? For the time being, very little. The Ivorian
Institute has not published the entire results of the public opinion poll and the
JEUNE AFRIQUE survey covered only a limited margin of Ivorians. But one fact is
striking: international experte on public opinion, specialists on Africa, positively
state that today Afr~cana are still skeptical regarding promises of reorganization,
they are less AEraid of their ruling pawers and more willingly express their opinions.
The fact that tf~e immediate conceras are material ones, however, should not deceive
us. They frequently act as a leaven for political upheaval, indeed even for violence.
Houphouet-Boigny underetands this: the dmiocracy he is suggesting to his fellow-
citizens is a safety valve whose purpose is to relieve the congestion of a community a
where the economic crisis emphasizes social inequalities. It is in this respect
that the Ivorian venture at the end of this pear is a mamentous occurrence. If
successful, it would set a precedent in Africa and would be a lessoa to other leaders.
Failure would mean that Africans are no longer satisfied with belated relief. And
that *_he desire for change ie deeper. In the Ivory ~oast as elsewhere, in the months -
to came, we muat therefore expect some violent ground ewells.
Foreigners Ilisfranchised
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Oct 80 p 60
[Text] On the long queues which very esrly had crowded into the polls for the 12 Octo-
ber presidential elections, there were not only Ivorians. Ninnerous Upper Voltans,
Malians, Guineans, Mauritians, Lebanese and others were easily singled out by their
language, their dress or their complexioa. The Ivory Coast is, in fact, one of
the few countries in the world where aliens have the right to vote.
This liberality, however,has met with vigorous opposition among the ruling authori-
ties and young staff inembers. President Houphouet-Boigny consequently had to give
way, ~ust as he did in the dual citizenship matter which in 1965 he wished to grant
to the nationals of countries which were membera of the Mutual Agreement Council
establiahed on the Ivory Coast. The electoral law passed in August apecifies that
thie is the last time non-Ivorians will be votere. This is in accordance with laws
in force in virtually all states.
In regard to the Ivory Coast, a country in which one-third of the population is made
up of aliens, it is obvious that this will present a delegation problem. Consider-
ing their numerical importance and especially the part non-Ivorians are playing~in
the country's economic development, wouldn't it have been wiser to allow them to
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participate in one way or another in political discussions? Whether by keeping
the electoral system in force since independence or by making it easier for these
aliens to become Ivorian citizens. Also, aren't these voting records in which
are entered not only the voter's naCionality (which is understandable) but ~lso
his ethnic group, excessive? This final touch of colonial inapiration seems to be
anachronistic, indeed dangerous, 20 years after independence.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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IVORY COAST
PREET,ECTION SITUATION DESCRIBED
- Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Oct 80 pp 52-54
(Commentary by Siradiou Diallo: "Qrderlies vs Ministers"]
[TextJ In the race for the National Assembly, unknown candidates are pitting
their innocence against the money of the notables.
~ Following the ocean hreeze which, from June to September, softened the sun's heat
and dropped the temperature, Abid~an is once again bathing in alternate wavea of
heat and rain. But, this year, the sudden rise in t~?e number of storms and the
temperature which, beginning in October, threatened to pop the thermometer, will
not only be due to climatic factors. The political situation will also have a
lot to do with it. For the electoral competition throughout the country for the
selection of 147 deputies and dozens of mayors is not exactly peace and quiet. -
With respect to the legislative elections, the campaign which opened officially
on 25 October is to last only 2 weeks. However, the candidates had not waited until
that date to ~ump into the race (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1033). The short period
of time which they were eiven, it is said, is explained by the desire to "avoid
long skirmishes and the deep wo~xnds that threaten to arise out of such skirmishes."
In other words: it is hoped that the battlers will be prevented from inflicting
incurable mutilations. That is something which is not always guaranteed. In this
connection, it so happene that one day of frontal combat is more deadly than months
of ekirmishing.
What is more, the leaders are so conscientious that they are not content with
abridging the campaign. They are resorting to important means of deterrence. In
particular, well before the opening of the campaign, the army and police, generally
inconspicuous, are making themselves increasingly visible. Every evening, men in
combat un�form patrol the various districta of Abid~aa as well as the cities of
the interior. The state in this manner intends "to show its force so as not to
have to make uae of it."
The Springboard
Will this classical means of deterrence be enough to temper the combative spirits
of the participants? That is not certaia. Everyone here is expecting that things _
will be much more difLtcult than theq were during the elections of the secretaries
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general of the PDCI (Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast in power) in July and Au-
~ust. At that time shots were_f ired in Korhogo and Man,'two cities in the interior,
as well as at Ad~ame, a popular district in Abidjan. Not only were there material
losses, but there were also wounded. Some say that there were even deaths. But
that has never been confirmed. What is certain is that of the outgoing 179
secretaries general only 90 were reelected.
The etakes involved in the election of deputies is more important moreover. Not
so much because of the monthly compensation of 400,000 CFA [African Financial -
Community] francs (8,000 French francs) which the deputies receive (although this
gold mine is .~ot something for certain candidates to sneeze at) but principally
because of the influence and fame which attach to the position. As a matter of
fact, a deputy`s seat is an excellent springboard in ivorian political life. Not
only are the representatives of the people known and respected, at times even
beyond the country's borders, but the chief of state has clearly let it be known
that this time a good number of ministers will be chosen fram within the chamber.
This has aroused a resurgence of interest.
Circumventing the Prohibiti.ons
The day after the National Council meeting on 12 June, during which President
Houphouet-Boigny announced his intention of once again startjng up the train of
democracy which was "parked somewhere," some believed that to be a minister is
necessary to have been elected a deputy. This had the effect of arousing very
high tension in certain persons, in addition to veritable pandemonium. Auto-
mobiles and airplanes heading for the cities of the interior were jammed with
aspirants to deputy positions. Each of them was seeking a district.
Fortunately, the chief of state later said that it was not necessary to be a
deputy to enter the government. Nervous tension has abated but has not for all
that diminished the interest in the position of deputy. Be that as it may, in
the Ivory Coast of�icials elected by the people do not limit their activities
strictly to the political field. 'I'hey also play a considerable economic role.
A number of deputies are directors of compar~ies. They may have been appointed to
represent the state in mixed economy companies, or private foreign companies may
have felt they had to give minor positions to nationals in the hope of thus pre- -
serving the future of their interests in the Ivory Coast. Of course, the in-
compatibilities established by the electoral law passed in August limit more than
in the past the possibilities for action of deputies in the ecc~nomic sector. How-
ever, through the interplay of family alliances and many other forms of f igure-
_ head operations, many elected officials are circumventing the prohibitions of the
law to protect their economic interests while occapying a seat in the National
Assembly.
Is not the free enterprise system in this country as elsewhere the favored arena
in which influence peddling, games of chance and corruption flourish? Having
deliberately chosen the capitalist path to development, the Ivory Coast should
not complain about nor ehould it, with greater reason, escape the defects and
weaknesses which characterize this syatem, of which, I might add, it is harvesting
the advantagea.
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The Battle of the `Little Guys'
Still, 5 times the number of candidates for the 147 deputy positions have left the
atarting gate. Among them, the repreaentatives of the new bureaucrat ic or busineas
middle class evidently are carving out the lion's share for themselves: doctors,
attorneys, professors, engineers, directors of companies, merchants, forestry ex-
. ploiters, planters, etc. But, alongside theae aouvesux riches, we f ind several more
modest candidates: farmers, orderlies, teachers, students, prison directors, trade
unionists, minor clerks. -
These "little guys" have thrown themselves without complexes into the fray. We
are told that some of them may cause considerable surprises, for they have been
sought out by their fellow couatrymen of the "village" in preference t o big and
prosperoua cadres. We are also told that certain rich candidates are running the
risk of exhausting their fortunes for noChing. Like the man who, aspiring to the
position of secretary general, in the month of Auguat, gave food snd drink to his
village several days running. And who, the day of the election, was given the
disagreea~le surprise of seeing no one vote for hiat. Although they had enjoyed
his largesse, all the villagers preferred his impoverished opponent over him.
However, that is an exception which, like all exceptions, only.proves the general
rule. This rule states that the wealthiest people make themselves more readily ~
seen and heard than candidates without money. That may be because they have more
means of transportation and m~vement and of necessity create for themselves more !
opportunities to make contact with the electorate. Similarly, dignitaries known
at the national and international levels have more aces in the hole than candidates
who are as unknown as they are nameless. This is the particular case of ministers
and other pereonalities who have occupied the political scene for many years.
Without an Opponent
However, this is the situation: in the final analysis, ministers have not pre-
sented themselves in great numbers. Some of them out of fear of not being elected -
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1033). Others, promoted to first-line positions at the party
level, have ,judged it preferable to not be too greedy. In.stead of concurrently
holding all the positions within the party, governmeat and National Assembly, they
felt it advisable to yield the position of deputy to a fellow villager.
Preferably a grateful fellow villager who, in a period of hard times, would not
take much persuasion to yield the position to his protector of today.
The situation ia all the more delicate because Ivorian deputies do not have al-
ternates. In apite of everything, five ministers did not hesitate to launch
themaelvea into the adventure. They are: Mbahia Ble Kouadio (Armed Forcea) in
Mbahiakro; Dikebie N`Guessan Pascal (Primary Education) in Sikinsi; Theodore
- Koffi Attobre (Water and Forest Resources) in Arrah; Paul Gti i Dibo (Mines) in
Duekoue; Kone Ibrahima (Tourism) in Boundiali.
Former ministers are alsa taking advantage of the confrontation to make their
political comeback. For example, Bouazo Zegbehi Edmond (Information) in Issa and
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Henri Konan Bedie (Finance) in Daoukro. The latter, who by far received the most
applause during the presentation of the list of inember,s of the Politburo to the
recent PDCI congress, is one of the rare eandidates to not have an opponent in his -
district.
Less Flexible
Another first level personality present in the competition: Philippe Yace, out-
going president of the National Assembly. A candidate in his native village of
Jacqueville, former secretary general of the PDCI (who does not seem to have
suff.ered toc auch from his recent political reverses) is aseured, it ie said, of
being elected by an overwhelming ma~otity of the Alladians of whom he is one of
the principal customary chiefe.
Already the National Assembly which will be produced by the balloting on 9 and
23 November promises to be more representative of the Ivorian people. And younger,
too, and surely more dynamic. But will it be as flexibl.e as previous National As-
semblies? The question is already being ask.ed--aad not only in Abid~an. On the
other hand, everyone is in agreement ia believing that out of the 120 outgoing
deputies, only half will be reelected to their seats in the National Assembly.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique 1980
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IVORY COAST
HOIIP'HOUET-BOIQJY' S DEMOCRATIZATION DRIVE SEEN AS ~ REAL GA1~LE'
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Oct 80 pp 34-35
[Article by Mawdo*: "Houphouet-Boigny's Real Gamble";
[Text) The political evolution that Ivory Coast has been undergoing has been
able to 3urpriae some because, for someone who knows its leaders' actual options,
it seems unexpected. Ivory Coast is ranked among the countries that are called ,
"moderate." Its head, President Houphouet-Boigny, who has received the label
"Wise Man of Africa," 3s not a man to risk adventure. Yet this man ia little
understood or misunderstood.
Saved From a War
Although an aristocrat by birth, in addition to his religious training that made
him consider all men as brothers, Houphouet-Boigny has preserved the stamp of his
early years when, as a young doctor, he came into contact with human poverty, which
- further strengthened in him his love for his neighbor.
The colonial regime prevafled then. One of its most contemptible manifestations
was forced labor that required Ivorian peasants to leave their plantations and go
and work on those of Europeans who allocated them poverty wages. Consequently '
_ qoung Houphouet--he was then in his 40's--looked for a way to help his brothers,
beyond the practice of his profession. His ideas led to the creation of the Union
, of African Planters to make it possible to protect the interests o� an everex-
ploited peasant mass.
- Individually the peasants could not make themselves heard. Joined together in the -
union, they could protect themselves. This was the first demonstration of the con-
f idence that Houphouet put in the strength of the people. Everything has already
been said about the effective activity of this iTnion of Planters that led to the
creation of the African Democratic Rally (RDA), of which Houphouet became the
preaident.
From the outaet, this great movement set as its ob~ective the liberation of the
African people. In partnership with France. But life is constant evolution and,
*Pseudonym of an African politician who was one of the original comrades of
Houphouet. Mawdo means "the old man" in Fulah.
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I,
in the heat of action, this ob~ective was soon transcended. The work undertaken
by the RDA to educate the African maases is the ferment that was at the sourcz
of the proceas of African independence. Would it have to be acquired in a blood
bath, as happened in other countries under France�s domfnation, or could the
- leseon be learned from these peoples' struggle, whose combat wae ours, to aehieve
ti2 result?
"The Wise Man of Africa" chose the second way, saving black Africa from a war.
- His tactical positions at the time have often been misunderstood, even among
militants of the RDA, a party that underwent several divisions between 1950 and
1955, follo=�~ing the breakdown of t:~e alliance of its representativea with the
communiat group, ther, the last in 1958, following the constitutional reierendum
- of 28 September 1958 sponsored by France under Geaeral de Gaulle.
Fraternity
T.he administrative t ies between our states having been broken, each looked for
the most appr~~~riate paths for its nation's development. Nevertheless, the .
acronym RDA was preserved all over; whether it had as ita basis one ideology or
another, r.he fraternal ties woven within the movement were maintained. Even when
the various parties no longer acted om the phraseology issuing from a collegiate
leadership, the activities continued to be inapired by the cammon ideology wrought
in the fraternal struggle against the colonial regime and all the retinue of
troubles for which it was the vehicle. -
A New Phase
- Some were able to think that Houphouet was going too far in his policy of coopera-
tion with international capitalism. As a good "f isherman," he saw more clearly and
_ farther than his disparagers, for one cannot catch fish with an unbaited hook.
Whether we liked it or not, we had inherited a country with no resources. Con-
sequently our development could not take place without the collaboration of out- _
- side capital. Can the concessions made to attract this capital have an influence
on the profound convictions that have laid the theory of a man's intentional chaice
of society? It is certain that, while cooperating with other countries, Houphouet
did not permit his political choices, always carried out at the opportune moment,
to be undermined at all. This expl~ins the "revolution" that he has just launched
in hia country under the name "democratization of the regime." No matter how un-
foreseen ar_d ~~nexpected it may appear, it fits into the logical sequence of
Houphouet's polit ical gait anc~ itinerary. For those close to him, there is noth-
ing surprising: he had announced the hue for scveral years by the punctual taking _
of positions including the government reorganization of 1977 and the donation of
~ his personal country properties to the state in 1978. If some of th~ reg:+Ime's
high dignitaries are finding themselves caught unawares now, the reason is that
they did ~ot know how to correctly analyze ths deeds and gestures of President
Houphouet, for whom everything starts from the people in order to return to the
people.
Houphouet is going to allow a new phase to begin in the country's political life.
The generation of leaders who led the country to independence is gradually disap-
peazing. Therefore the country ne~da new gersonnel to continue a campaign t:~at
goes well beyond Ivory Coast's borders. Trueting the sovereign people totally, ~
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Houphouet ie leaving it up tc them to deeignate the nation's children to whom he
intends to entrust the management of ite affaire.
This process, launched in July, wil~. be carried out to the end, via the congress
, of the PDCI [Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast] and RDA, which is meeting at the
end of thie manth of September. It will slso be carried out via the presidential
electfon that will se Houphouet--he himself is ready--in competition with other
lvoria~s, if there are a.ny who feel themselves capable of faciag their fellow
countrymen's approbation through thE~ legislative and mun icipal electiona. The
Ivorian people have the floor. It is up to them to kaow how to use it dispassion-
ately and calmly.
People have talked a lot in Africa about revolutions that do not go beyond words.
'I'he current experiment is really s revolution because, if it is carried out to the
end~ as Houphouet wants it to be, it will make it possible to demythesize the
single party +that rules most of our couatry. It will have been proved that de-
mocrscy can be 3netalled withia euch a party.
- To Be Pondered
The Wise Man of Africa, in the twilight of his lifey will have taught his rivals
_ a leason. They should ponder it because, ae Governor General Van Vollenhoven said
in his doctoral thesis in law (1931) about the French policy of the time in Algeria,
"it has been substantiated since Denis Papin that, ff the pot boils and the lid
is not taken off, the steam ends up makiug it pxplode." What this other viaionary
had seen in 1913 ended up happening in 1954 and, in 1962, the Algerian people, as
a result of the French colonists' mistakes, regained their independence.
Houphouet, after the gamble on economic development that he won, has just launched
another challenge to Africa, this tjme on the political level. Let's hope that
he will win thia one also, thus crowning a career well performed in the service of
Africa.
COPYYiIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
9064
CSO: 4400
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MOZAMBIQUE
BRIEFS
FINNISH AGRICULT[1RAL AID--The Finnish Govermaent decided to grant 37.5 million
marks (10.28 million dollars) for 1981-1983 to Mozaabique to develop the
agriculturalaector. The financial aid ie part of a pregram of the Nordic
ccuntriea to develop agriculture in Mozambique, but the amounts that will be
paid by Denmarky Sweden and Norway are atill not known. (Text] [Paria MARCHES
TROPICAUX $T1~ffiDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2501] 9545 '
CSO: 4400 -
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NIGERIA
BRIEFS
CA.CAO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM--Within the framework of the Fourth Nati.onal Development
Plan, which is to begin 1 January 1981, the federal government intends to carry out
the third phase of the progrsm for the development of cacao plantations worth 259
- million naira. This program provides for the renovation of about 300,000 hectares
~ of old plantations and an expausion of 80,000 hectares :tn new plantations; i.e.,
30,000 hectasPS in Ondo state, 26,000 hectares in Oyo state, 12,000 hectares in Ogun
state and 12,000 hectares in Bendel state. The program also provides for the
building of a processing plant. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 14 Nov 80 p 3036] 8143
FISHING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM--T'he Nigerian Federal Government is planning to launch
a development program in the coastal and ocean fishing sectors which will permit the
country to attain an annual production of 66,000 tons of flsh and 1,600 tons of
shrimp. In a related matter, Cross River etate has been aelected by the FAO as the
aite for a training project in the fishing sector. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3036J 8143
CSO: 4400
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5ENEGAL
NEW PEANUT :fAriKETING SYSTEM ESTe'~�:.ISHED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Oct 80 p 2611
[Article: "Peanuts: A New Marketing System"J
[Text] The working group which, since the abolition of O~iCAD [National Office of
Cooperation and Assistance for Development], hass met on the initiative of the
Miniatry of Rural Development to define a new organizational framework for the
peanut marketing campaign, adopted three measures which concern, in particular,
the setting up of collection equipmeat (scales, sacks), primary transport and the
removal of the seeds from the bulking points to the oil mills, as well as the �i-
nancing of the marketing campaign.
The setting up of the scales, the distribution and the recovery of the sacks, and
all the equipment needed for the normal development of the peanut marketing cam-
paign will be provided for the coming campaign by the now nationalized oil mills.
, The financial means needed for all these operations will be deducted from the
peanut price list. This temporary measure will be in effect only for the coming
campnign. ~ture operations will be taken over by the cooperatives.
Primary transport, from th~e cooperatives to the bulking point warehouses managed
' by the oil mills, will be the responsibility of the cooperatives. But they are
being offered the possibility of calling on th~ oil ~ii?s to put at their disposal
a sufficient numher of vehicles which they could not find locally.
As to the so-called secondary transport, consisting of removing the seeds from
the bulking points to the oil mills, it will be provided in its entirety by the
oil mills themselves. A number of risks encountered as a result of too early
rain will be avoided, because with the eliminatioa of any intermediaries, the
oilmen will be able to watch over their own peanuts.
_ The third and last measure concerns the financing of the ma~keting campaign. This
_ financing will be provided this year by the oil mills. At the beginning of the
marketing campaign, an estimate will be made of the total volume of the tonnage
that each cooperative will have to market during the campaign, and as soon as the
campaign starts, an amount corresponding to the purchase of 20 percent of this
total volume will be paid to the cooperative president at the village level.
This procedure will not, however, bring about a break in f inancing, since the in-
apectors designated by the oilmen will constantly drop in on the cooperatives to
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- superviae the removal rate. These inspectors, who will be two in number at the
basic levels, will be recruited from among Che oil-mill ataff and from former
cooperative workers.
Besidea these general measures, several other epecial measures have also been
taken, in particular, with regard to the price to the peanut producer, the weighers'
wages, Che bonuses to the cooperative presidents and the eatablishment of a market-
_ ing margin.
The price to the peanut producer, which was set at 50 CiA francs per kilo, will
be divided into three sectione: 46 CFA francs (per kilogram marketed) will be _
paicl directly to the peasant immediately after the purchase operation; 3 francs
will be retained on each kilogram marketed to serve as a guarantee far debts -
contracted with the authority of the cooperative entity (it being understood that
this sum will be paid back to the rightful owners as soon as these debts are paid).
Laetly~ 1 franc will be retained as an antifraud rebate on each ki1o, to serve as
a guarantee of the cleanliness and oil content of the seeds (a franc which will
also have to be repaid to the cooperative in the event the seeds marketed are
_ pure.)
Provisionally, the weighers' wages and the cooperative presidents' bonus will be
taken over by the oit mills on the peanut price list until the cooperatives take
over in the near future.
Lastly, a marketing margin amounting to 1,000 CFA francs per ton deducted from
the peanut price list will be granted to each cooperative and will be paid monthly.
This sum will not be paid to the cooperators individually, but will be left at
the dieposal of the board of directors, who wi~l have to use it for the operation
or equipment of the cooperatives or for an~? other purpose in conformity with the
community intereat and the cooperative spirit.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris, 1980
9434
CS~: 4400
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_ SENEGAL
BRIEFS
RETURN TO SCHOOL CALM--After the strikes which marked the lasti school year in
Senegal, the return to classes took place calmly for the 370,000 elementary school
pupils. The teachers from Sudes (Sole Democratic Trade Union of Senegalese Teachers),
which was at the origin of the strikes, resu~aed their duties normally, except for
28 wha were dismiesed and for 1~0 others who were euspended ae a reault of the
movement. The movement, according to the trade-union lee~la~s, had not had the
succees counted on, the government, on several occasions, having called upon
private-ehool teachers, on nonteachers and on technical aseistants to supervise
and correct the tests for competitive and other examinationA, instead of the Sudes
members. For his part, Mr Kader Fall, minister of education, recently stated that
facing Sudes, another teachers' ~rade union favorable to the government is being
formed. Mr Fall f inally brought out that the budget for his ministry, whose pre-
rogatives go from the nuxsery school to the secondary school certificate, was set
at 20,103 million CFA francs as againat 18,530 million in 1979. [Text] (Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Oct 80 p 2611] 9434
CSO: 4400
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- TANZANIA
BRIEFS
ADB WATER SUPPLY LOAN--TEie African Development Bank (ADB) recently granted Tanzania
- a loan of 10 million currency units (about $12 million) for the f inancing of the
Dodoma water supply, sanitation and drainage project. The loan is repayable in
30 years, including a 5-year deferment of payment. The sim of the project is to
provide more water and to increase the new national capital's purif ication and
drainage facilities. The total estimated cost of the pra~ect is about $21 million.
The executing agency for the pro~ect, whose implementation will take 40 months,
is the Capital Development Authority. The acquisition of goods and services re-
lating to the ADB loan will be made by international invitation to t ender in ac- _
cordance with customary ADB procedures. jText] jParis MARCEiES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEF~TS in French 24 Oct 80 p 2627] 9434
CSO: 4400
~
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UGANDA
BRIEFS
DISSOLUTION OF PROVISIONAL PARLIAMENT--Uganda's Provisional Parliament, the Ilational
Consultative Council, was dissolved on 8 November ~y the Military Comnission in
- power, according to an announeement by Uganda Radio in a brief communique. According
to diplomatic eources in Kampala, this measure means that the Military Coumnission
has decided to apply the present election law during the conduct of elections.
This law provides for separate ballot boxes for the different candidates but does
not provide for the presidential election by direct, universal suffrage, as requested -
by the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) of Dr Milton Obote. Parties opposed to the UPC
requested a common ballot box for a11 candidates. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3044] 8143
CSO: 4400 END
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I
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