JPRS ID: 9418 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300050038-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 38
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/94.18
28 Novemb~r 1 ~80
- USSR Re ort
= p
MIIITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 1~6/8Q) -
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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NOTE
JPRS publications contain in`ormation primarily from foreign
newsFapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the c~riginal phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
_ are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was sunmarized nr extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendc~red phonetically ot transliterated are
enclosed in parer.theses. Words or names pre~eded by a ques- -
~ tion mark and enclosFd in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have be~n supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as -
given by source. _
- The contents of this; publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
F
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGUI.ATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE O~TI.Y.
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JPRS L/9418
28 November 1980
~ USSR REPORT
_ MILITARY ~iFFAIRS
_ (FOUO 16/80)
_ CONTENTS
= USA: Intelligence and Foreign Policy
(Radomir Georgiyevich Bogdanov, Andrey Afanas'yevich
Rokoshin; SSHA: INFORMATSIYA Z VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA, 1979) 1
Soviet View of U.S. National Security Doctri~e
- (V. F. Petrovskiy; DORTRINA 'NATSIONAIa'NOY BEZOPASNOSTI'
V GLOBAL`NOY STRATEGII SShA, 1980) 9
Book Excerpta: Yepiahev on Ideological Work
(A. A. Yepishev; IDEOLOGICHESRAYA RABOTA V SOVETSRIKH
VOORUZHENNYRH SILAKH, 1979) 17
Book Excerpts: Dialectics of Military Hiatory Research
(V. T. Login; DIALERTIRA VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKOGO
ISSLEDOVANIYA, 1979) 35
Book Excerpta: Warsaw Pact Tasks and Organization
(V. G. Kulikov; VARSAAVSRIY DOGOVOR-SOYUZ VO IMYA MIRA
I SOTSIALIZMA, 1980) 45
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO]
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USAi INTELLI:GENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY
Moscow SSHAs INFORMATSIYA I YNESHNYAYA PO~,I~IKA (USA: Intelli~ence and Foreign
, Policy) in Russian 1979 signed to press 7~ 79 PP 213-~4
[Annotation and excerpt from book by Ra,domir Georgiyevich Bogdanov and Andrey
Afanas'yevich Kokoshin, Nauka, 45~0 copies, pag~es]
[Text] The present monograph examines the role of intelligence in the elaboration
and making of foreign policy decisions in the United Sta.tes. A critical analysis
is giv+en of the featurea of intelli~ence practice in the State Department and other
U.S. foreign policy departments, the types and forms of intelligence circuZ.~ting in
the sta~te machinery and its role in foreign policy activities.
2. Types and Forms of Information Products Circulating
In the U.S. Foreign Policy Sys~em
" [~cerpt] Analysis of the forms of intellig+ence products for the needs of foreign
policy prepa.red within the "intelligence comtnunity" is of definite interest.
In American practice two ba,sic types of foreign policy in.te3ligence are distin-
guished: "finished" and "raw." Informatian xhich has undargone analysis and
been compared with other intelligence is placed in the "flnished" category. "Raw"
intelligence has not been evalua.ted or compaxed tirith other information. ~om this
viewpoint � intelligence f~om U.S . foreign representativ~es is "raw,' but most of it
is of value in prep~ring "finished" intel7.igence.
The "intellig~ence commu~ dty" prepares three categories of "finished" : intelligencse :
synopses of current events, ba,sic or encyclopedic digest~ and forecasts. Some
_ American specialists feel that one of the basic shortcomings of ".finished" inte~l-
ligence is the excessiv~ely long list of documents of this type circulating in the
administration. For the departments of ~he administz'ation ~here foreign policy
deciaions aYe made~ the "Report on the Results of Observation of Conditlons"7 is
issued. This report is prepa.red by the Council's tnterdepart,rnental committee,
the functions of which include observation of the possibility of a.rmed conflict
ariaing in ar~y part of the globe, especially conflict threatening the security of
the United States or its allies. There a~ne also no few~er tha,n 10 official
7. Sees Marchetti, V.~ and Marks, D., "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,"
New York, 1974~ PP 97-100.
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synopaes of evPnts. The CIA Department ~f Current Intelligence issues three
separate documents of this type. The most importa.nt of them is I~nown as the
President's Intelligence Checklist. This document conta.ins approximately 10 pa,ges
and simply lists the ev~ents uf the past day, dealing in greater deta.il with the
questions which are of interest to the president at present. The document is
delivered to the White House in the early morning~ and during the president's trips
it is txansmitted to him via equipment. ^he content of the document is not
submitted to the members of the "intelligence community" for approval, but usua,lly
it presonts their general vlewpoint.$
The CIA also prepares the: "Central Intelligence Bulletin," which is delivered to _
the White House and a11 Cabinet members ev~ery morning. Lower level officials who
need foreign policy intelligence because of the nature of their work receive
copies of the bulletin. It usually conta.ins from 15 to 'GO pa.ges and is supplied
- with the necessary graphs and maps. This bulletin only includes major topics,but
the material is consi~ierably more extensive tha.n in the President's Intelligence _
Chec;tlist. Tne content of the bulletin is submitted in its entirety to a
special. "intelligence communit~" committee for approval. Members of it who do not
agree with the interpre~tation of particu~ar events may ad,d their personal opinion
to the bulletin. The bulletin is also sent to American representa,t~v~es abroad
in order to familiarize them with the of.ficial viewpoint on different internatior.al
events.
Along with the top secret bulletin the CIA publishes a secret bulletin intended
- for offtcia.ls without clearance for top secret inaterials. It is also distributed
to U.S. fore~gn representatives, and it basically duplicates the top secret
bulletin with certa.in deletions.
- Current intelligence originating from the military department is provided by the
Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]. It issues three daily reports. O~e of them
- is the Intelligence Bulletin. The top secret v+ersion of the ~entral Intelligence
Bulletin differs from it chiefly in its more detailed covpxage of events. The
DIA Intelligence Bulletin is issued on 30-40 pages as a rule, and it touches on
a much wider range of ev~ents tha.n the CIA top secret bulletins; i t is intended for
the information of the secretary of defense and his closest assoc iates and for
the Joint C:iiefs of Sta..ff. It includes military intelligence which touches on
the foreign policy interests of the Unit~ed Sta.tes. The bulletins axe also dis-
txibuted to a11 American military staffs and militaxy attaches abroad as an
official daily briefing from Washington.
The intellig~ence a.gency also issues a secret version of the daily top secret
bulletin. It is known as the Iritelligence Bulletin, which is cireulated in Wash-
ington and distributed to the ;~ajor U'.S. armed forces abroad and to all American
8. Here and inf`ra, sae: "The Intelligence Community~" New York, 1977; Morrison, _
- J., "Kissingers Uncertain Greatness," New York, 19'17; McGarney, P., "CIA.
T~,~ P4yth and the Madness," New York~ 1972; Marketty, V., and Nlarks, D.,
"C:iAs The Cult of Intelligence," New York, 1974.
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militaxy attaches and which, like the CIA secret report, is in content an adapted
version of top secret ir.f~rmation.
T.he third type of daily report issued by the DIA is the so-called OP~INT ( operativ~e
intell.igence) . Nlaterial of an opeia.tiv~e and intelligence na.ture intended
for the ~ecretary of defense, his closest associates and tha Joint Chiefs of 5taff
is presented in generalized form on 10 or more p~ges. A document of this type was
first issued a~ the v~ery beginning of the war in Vietnam and since then has come
to cov~er conditions throl:ghout the world. The necessity of this type of report is
dstermined by the following considerationss American military operations often
provoke retallatory action by the other country without receiving a complete inter-
pr3ta.tion f~om the "intelligence community." Thus certain representatives of the
administration do not alwa,ys know about the n,ature and purpose of American military
oparations.
In addition to num~rous da.ily deta,i.led rey~rts issued by ~the National Security
- Agency for the informa.tion of inembers of the "intelligence community" the agency
prepa,res a Da.ily Intelligence Bulletin which cov~ers Uasic information received
the day before via equipment and which dra.ws conclusions which are not formulated
- in profeasional language in order to be understood in foreign policy circles not
associated with the "intelligence community." In ad,dition~ the agency issues daily
regional bulletins which cover tiie course of ev+ents in specific regions of the
- globe. The bulletins axe intended for uae in the regic,nal offices of the State
Depar�tment and in the International Security Agency of the Defense Department. 5uch
questions as, for example, the training of the Soviet Ara~y~ Nav,y and troops in
anti-aircraft defense receive detailed coverage in the biilletin.
The Penta~gon's National Indications Center, which hea.ds a broa,d network of different
notification and indication centers~ also issues da.ily reports for the"intelligence
community" and gov~rnment circles which ma.ke decisions ~oncerning foreign policy
q�ued:f,ions. The center processes a11 "raw" ma.teri~.ls incoming in 24 hours and
selects t`rom 80 to 100 of the most important communications. E~ccerpts or complete
- texts are distributed in Washington in the form of a 35-50 page d,aily report which
is called the Report of the IVIC Ot~fic,er on Duty.
The Sta,te Department issues da,ily top secret material--the Diplomatic Bulletin~
which contains information with a direct relationship to foreign policy. This
bulletin is distributc~d by tele~raph to diplomatic representa.tiv~es abroad and to
the departments in Washington.
Ths Foreign Broadcast Information Service issues da.ily summaxies of full texts of
the moat importxtnt broadcasts in the last 24 hours. They are widely used in
government and academic circles.
~he abov~e mentioned documents comprise the ba,sis for the "intelli~ence community's"
work in providing the government with foreign ,policy intelli.gence but do not
completely cov+er the entire range of ti~e "community's" information activities.
For example, so-called "coaching"--official briefings conducted by the secretary of
defense for different gov~ernment circles--is widespread in Washington. Every
morning for 15-30 minutes sev~eral officials of the department orally hrief
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congressional coma?ittees and subcommittees, the work groups of the National
Security Council and the Defense Department leadership.
Second in activity in this field is the State Department's Intelligence and Re-
Bearch Agency, which ev~ery morning tariefs the secretary of state at a meeting and
his colleagues on the National Security Council. The State Dep~.rtment and
Defense Department briefings ars accompanied by demonstrations of visual aids~
slides and in some insta.nces, films. Ir~ terms of the effect they produce,
they ma,y be compared with the e~rening news of the American broadca.sting compe.nies
NBC, CBS and ABC.
- Every day official Washington is swa.mped with versions of daily intelligence
bulletins sent by telegraph and prepared by the numerous arm~d forces aoroad.
Current intelligence ma.terials are not limited to daily reports. The CIA issues
a top secret version of TYME Maga.zine weekly. The events which took place in
ev+ery region of the world during the pas t week axe described in great deta.il in
35-4o Pages. The publication is supplied with photographs, maps, diagrams, etc.
A secret v~eraion of the weekly is published for persons without cleaxa,nce for
top secret material. This publication is circulated in Washington and distributed
abroa,d to all CIA services and American embassies and to a11 American military
staffs abroad.
The National Security Agency prepares a weekly report which .:ov+ere in~orma,~tion
received ~om around the world through intelligence channels by means of communi-
_ cation in a wider context than in the da.ily reports. Weekly reports on specific
regions are also issues; they axe distributed to a11 institutions in Washington
- which deal with intelligence matsrials by means of communication. Copies of these
documents axe trazlsmitted by telegraph to the I~SA, a11 embassies and the American
- armed forces.
The Foreign Broa.dca,st Informa.tion Service issues a weekly digest of the content
and nature of socialist country broadcasts. It is circula~ed in government
circles and distributed to the libraries of individual colleges.
The Air Force intelligence service ma.kes a film ava.ilable weekly to all interested
officials . As a rule it run.s abottt 4~5 minutes . Such films for official use
depict the activities of the American air force in different part~ of the globe.
F~zrthermore, informa.tion of government circles is achiev~ed using so-called "facts
- for consideration." They axe issued occasionally by departments which are part
of the "in~elli.gence community." As a rule once a week one or two such reports
appeax from each department. Devoted to detailed analysis of current problems,
they present an in-depth stuc~y of the qusstion in its historical aspect. The
topics of the reports are vaxied. There are several ways of distributing these
special materials. By order of the Sta.te Depaxtment this :aaterial can be sent
only the secretary of sta.te and White House of~icials; through the Defense
Department, to all U.S. armed forces; through the CIA this material can go to the
members ~f the NSA. There is no established channel for distribut~ng these materi-
a1is, but they play a subs~ta.ntial role in tAs pr~~~ss of foreign ~o11cy decision ma.king,
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as they are a depa.rture from ev~eryday routine and an attempt to present current
ev+ents in broad context.
The Foreign Broadcast Information Servlce issues a widely used surrunary called
the "Summa,ry of Intc~rnational Responses." The United States' every step
in the field o~ foreign policy is evalua.terl from the viewpoint of the reaction
which it produces in the px~esa and ra.dio of the entire world.
The need fur so-called "bas ic "intelligence information was most acutely realized
at the time of the invasion of Tarawa, during the ~econd W~rld Wax. Because of
incorrect inforina,tion on tides the troops were landed on coral reefs 1500 yards
u offshore, an error which resulted in the deaths of ma.ny American soldiers. So
that such a thing would nev~er happen again, the CIA was entrusted with the task
of ensuring the collection of "ba,~Lc" infortnation. One of the depa:rtments
entrusted with this flinction was the Department for Cont.a.cts which initially
engaged in the collection of ob jects, such as tourist road nie.ps, wYiicr~ are
trivial at first glance. The acti-~rity of the de,partment received f'ur�iher develop-
ment when the Sta.te Department selected special ~officials for ~h~ p~~s t of
g,eographical coordinators whose ~ob included photogra.phing of raad.s, bridges,
coastal zonea, telegraph poles, power plants, urban a.nd riira.l house,s :~nd
~samples of police arid militaxy unifor.ms throughout the world. All thir~ infor-
mation ia collected at the CIA, whers a dossier of photographs for E~ach country
of the world is kept in the Central Refersnce Department.
One result of the work in collecting "basid' information is the I~atic~nal Intelli--
gence 3urvey--a six-part encyclopedia about a11 countries of the woz~ld~ The infor-
mation collected in this publication gives basic facts about the cotuztry, beginning
~ with the topograpY~y of the region with emphasis on analysis of geogz~aphical objects
of militaxy significance: shores and beachYieads, macadam roacls and ~ ~
railroa.ds, ports and haxbors, clima.tic conditions, and ending with basic infor-
mation on the economic system of the country, the demographic compo~~ition of the
population, politics and gov+ernment, urban and rural ways o~ life, ~~rmed ~orces~
the public health and medicine orga.ns and the security service.
An increasingly important field of information activity is the fYelci of economics .
Practica.lly each of the memter depa.rtments of the "intelligence community"
p~:epares a quarterly, semi-annual and annual report on such subject~a as foreign aid
to other countries and trade, industry~ agziculture, transport and communications
in a epecific country. ' During the fiercest bombing of North Vietnam ~he DIA
prepe,red a monthly report called "Estimate of Damage Inflicted by Bombing,"
in which data on the number of i.rucks, briciges, basges and trains d.estroyed or
damaged were correlated with data on the resouroes remaining at the; country's
command and an attempt wa.s ma,de to evaluate the res ult of the prev~.ous 30 days'
bombing.
Under the influence of the events of the energy crisis and the gen,eral economic
= crisis of 197~-1975 which struck the capitalist economic system~ Fsuch quesiions
as the provision of fuel and energy rgsources and the sta.tus of e~.iergetics
as a whole in different countries of the world, analysis of possi'ble ways to
expand American exports and foreign inv~s tments, the sta.tus and c~utlook for
the dev+elopment of the international exchange and financQ system, etc.~ have
_ played a much more important role in the preparation of information and
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analyti~al docwnents of the iz~te119.gence service a.nd other subdivisions of the
U.S . forei~n po _icy r~echa.nism. Tn ~onnection with this the CIA, for example, has
for the past tw~ yeaxs i~su~d among its special materials and reports a weekly
- summary of events in the field of oil extractioz~~ tran~porting and tra,da on a
- global scale. The given topic is arso ~he subject of continuing studies by a
r~umber of aubd.i.visions of the State Depaxtment, the inf'oi7nation and analysis
servic:e of trle Departmen~: of Energy created in 1977 and. by the appropriate offices
of the Z~easury Departmant.
Despite the growing attention of the informatian and analysis subdivisions of
the foreign policy departments to political economic problems~ it is
- appaxently still la~ging behind the traditional7y predominant atteiltion to mili-
~ tary ~,nd political problems. A t the same time it is clear to specialists
tha-t prabl~ms exist in the ~ieZd of econqmic intelligence tha.t must be surmounted
- in order t~ ensure the political Ieaders of adequa.te information appropriate to
u the presen~ 1eve1 oi foreign poliey significance of new and old economic problems.
Today military intelZigence requiras enormous outlays on a system for obtaining
and 'i.nitiu.lly ~rocessin~ information while r~ost of the economic data, necessary for
making pol~.tical decisions is not secret. In the opinion of the Murpt~y Comtn3.ssion
~ experts the problem is, ~ ra'tl~~r, ~competent scientific ~~analytical treatment of lar~-~~
files of dconomic information. And in order to solve this problem it is not
enough to strer~gthen only the CIA's capabilities in this field~ This comtpission
feels tha,t this is p~ecisely where i~ ia acceptable and even necessary to have
duplication in the analysis of comple3e economic problems, which will be justified
even witn rdgard to the cost of this analysis. Consequently it ia suggested that
r.ot only sho~.ild +.:Ze analytical reso~.~rcea of the intelligence service for processing
ecoriomic informati~n be s~rengthened but the rPsults of the appropriate intelli-
gence and ana.lytic work of the subdivisions of the State Depaxtment~ Trea.sury
Department, thc Depar.tments of Commerce and Agriculture and the President's Council
of Economic A~visers should also be used more actively.
The field. of scier,ce is still another important field of research in which the
CIA, DIA, NSA and, recen+,1~ to an increasingly greater degree, the State Depastment
take an active par t, in the process duplicating each other to a significant extent.
They regularly publish technical descriptions and evaluations of a11 weapnn
systems, ma.jor and minor, and issue monthly, semi-annual and annua.l reports on the
S oviet and Chinese programs for development of rocket and space technology,
on the production of airplanes in Israel, the electronics industry in Japan and
its space reseas�ch and on other questi~ns of srientific and technical development.
These basic materials are dis tributed ~rithin the "intelligence community" as
"ba.sic" informa.tion for analysts. i~;~reover, and this is very important, they go to
the military planning orga.ns which must be well informed on ev~ents ta.king place
in the sociallst countries.
5tuc~y of the personalities of the top.-level leaders of other countries is a
traditionally important aspect of the activity of the intelligence Eervice.
The DIA and CIA keep extensive dossiers on political, public and military figures.
These d.oss'ers contain not only biographical infortna.tion but also all possible
- infox�r.; ;ion on the views and positiona of a particular leader reflected in his
- written. or oral statements or other sources. The DIA regularly issues a
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Collection of Biographies of the Officers of Foreign Armies, and the CIA prepares
materials on the political and publfc figures. This type of informat�ion becomes
_ necessary when a sudden change of government occurs and it is necessary to
determine the possible directions of the new leadership's activities.
The distribution of the armed forces of countries which are potential enemies
is a part of "basic" intelligence material. The mili.tary speciallsts who work
on planning are constantly upda.ting their plans and thus require daily and
weekly reports on changes in the di.stribution of the forces of possible enemies
of the United Sta,tes . The CIA, DIA and NSA and a.lso the staff of the four branches
of the service prepare c~,a.i.ly~ weekly~ monthly and quarterly reports intended for
the military planning organs of the United Sta,tes.
An important aspect of most of the analytical materials p-roduced by the "intelli-
gence community" is analytical forecasting of events. As a rule the res~asch
begins with an inquiry from the president or one of his cloaest assista.nts to
the "intelligence community." For example~ the qLestion may be one like this:
~ "In wha.t direction will the foreign policy of Communist China develop after
certain ev~ants?" The inquiry initially goes to th~ Board of National Estimates--
a group of the 12 higheat officials in the intelligence apparatus, former amba.ssa-
_ dors and military. The Council defines the wording of the problem more exactly,
di`rides it into feasible components and then sends them to the appropriate
intelligence departtnents. During the first stage of work the basic points of the
future material are outlined. Then~each department prepares its part and sends
it to a CIA department, the Office of Nat.ional Estimates~ for preparation of the
first version. When the rough draft is reac~y it is distribut~ed to a11 members of
the "community~" the experts of which get together at work sessions to eliminate
a11 discrepancies from the rough draft. As a rule three or four sessions are
- required to achieve preliminary ag~reement on the working level.
When a member of the Council who is not directly responsable for this problem
" verifies that a11 departments have had an opportunity to express an opinion on
- the rough draft~ he presents a new v+ersion for examination by the U.S. Intelligence
_ Board. This board~ which consists of representa.tives of a11 the intelligence
departments of Washing~on is like a boasd mf "community" directors. As a rule~
the report presented for their scrutiny still contains a number of discrepancies
and ob~ections by diff~rent departments. The board members attempt to resolve
.~.1.1 contradictions in order to preaent a collectiv+e report to the president and the
NSA, but they are by no means obliged to achiev+e complete agreement on a11 aspects
- of the question under discussion. As a rule, however, during the final sta.ge they
succeed in achieving a certain compromise in the analysis.
- An estimate produced on special inquiry is known as a"S pecial National Intelligence
- Estima.te." It is a vgrsion of the "Nationa].Intelligence Estimate," which is
prepared regularly. Comprehensive analysis of the military st-rength and intentions
- of. the Soviet Union is performed annually. Continuous observation of specific
countries is conducted with the aim of pres~nting the military circles which
dev+elop strategic plans with a complete description of the basic trends in the
country's domestic and fo~reign policy, the atability of its government and ?the
possibili ty of changres .
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In reference tc the events of the period of the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli
conflict in i973, R. Cline, former deputy director of the CIA and the State
~epartment Intelligence and Research Office, names a number of basic components
of the "National Intelligence Estimate, " intended for~ use at ~the NSA~~ level :
analysis and forecasting of the possible actions by the USSR under conditions of
intenslfication of the conflict, the proba.bility of different v~ersions of the
development of this conflict directly between Israel and the Arab countries
and the consequences of specific actions 'oy the United States as applied to the
two abov~e mentioned components of the protLl.em.10
In this case one of the principal results of analysis of the informa.tion is
_ forecasting, which is not p~riormed solely in the highest circles of the "intelli-
,~ence community." For example, the Defense Department, which continuously
_ strives to ha.v~e information on the capabilities and intentions of prospective
enemies~ ha.s developed its own system which differs from th8 above described
procedure and ~rhich makes it poasib~.e to perform studies in the field of arma-
ments in the usual way. The units of the Joint Staff ~rhich handle planning
problems have reached agrsement with the DIA on regulaxly issuing the so-called
"Joint Intelligence Planni:zg Estimate."
The DIA ~,nd the inte lligence services of the branches of the service jointly
de~relop forecasts of the ene~}r's capabilities in the field of armaments without
enlisting other members of the "intelligence communi ty" in thii,s work~, Th~.is
results in a significant savings of time, eliminates discrepancies and makes it
possible to circulate forecasts on different types of armamenta . This h~,s
serious consequences~ since such a procedure enables the Defense Department to
continue to improve arms without needing analysis of the DIA forecasts by the
invelligence depaxtments w].tho~~t a direct interest in the given question.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1979
938 ~
CSO: 1807
10. Cline, R., "Policy Without Intelligence," FOREIGN POLICY~ No 17~ Winter 197~-
1975, p 129.
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- SOVIET VIEW OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE
� Moacow DOKTRINA 'NATSIONAL'PiOY BEZOPASNOSTI' V GLOBAL`NOY STRATEGII SShA
(The National Securitq Doctrine in U.S. Global Strategq) in Russian 1980
signed to press 20 Dec 79 pp 1-10, 355
[Annotation, table of contents, and introduction from the book by V.F. Petr.ovskiy,
Moscow,Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 9000 copies, 335 pages] _
LExcerpt~ .
?'his book reveals the e~ser~tial features of the "national security" -
doctrine as the ideological-theoretical platform of the monopolistic
ruling clique of the United States and traces the adaptation of this
doctrine to the new strategic aituation in the world resulting from
the growing strength of the forces of peace, socialiem, and progrese.
The program goals of U.S. "national security" and means of achieving
them (material potential, ideology, and diplomacy) are reviewed and
the struggle in U.S. political circles concerning the iesues of
detente, primarily military detente, are discussed.
The book is intended for sgecial.ists in int~raational affairs and teachera at higher
educational institutions.
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Table of ~ontents:
I~troductton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter 1. The arigin and E`volution of the U. S. National Security
Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Chapter 2. Foreign Policy Goals . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . 46
- The Priorities of the "G1obal Conflic't" Gf the Z~a~o Systems 52
T~e Directorate of the Capitalist World Instead of Interdependence . 74 -
Opposition to Progresaive Changes Under the GuisP of Creating a
"New World Order" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 -
Chapter 3. Military Force - the Principal Instrument ot U. S. National -
_ S ecur ity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 _
The Foundation of "S*_rength" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
The Parameters of th~ Application of Military Force 128
_ Forms of iJse of Military Force in Foreign Policy 144
Ideological-propaganda Cover for the Military Force Approach 168
Chapter 4. NationEl Sec.urity kesources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Material Potential , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
The Moral Factor . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
~ Oiplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . 237
- Chapter 5. The National Security Mechanis;m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 -
The president and the National Security Counci7. . . . . . . . . . . . 258
Tne Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
The Military and Intelligence Departments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
The "Administrative Strategy" in the National Security Field 295
Chapter 6. Disarmament - trie Path to True National Security 301
' Notes . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
Appendices: Chart 1. The M~litary-Political Obligationa of the
United States (Foldout No 1)
Chart 2. The Organizational Structure of the U. S.
National Security Council (Foldout No 2)
Introduction:
The 'etermining feature of the contemporary world situation is the turn toward
alle-viation of international tensione or detente.
Evaluar ing detente from the standpoint of the late 1970's, ir. ia impossible
- not to see that detente has already gone through a certain teating in practice ~
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and hae confirmed that it has profound roots in reali.t~?, that it is not based
on factors of the moment, but rather on the true interests of states with
different orders in cooperation. The principal area of such interest is re-
ducing, and ultimately eliminating, the threat of thermcnuclear disaster.
Solving this problem requires unceasing joint efforts by all countries to nor-
- malize the internatianal situation, restrict the arms race, and eliminate
centers of tension. Another area of common interest ia development of broad
mutually advantageous cooperation in economic and scientific-technical af-
faire.
It is also apparent that detente has already brought about a certain beneficial
change in the entire system of intemational relatione on the basis of the
principles of peaceful coexisteace. Not only has there been a general improve-
ment in the world political climate, but also a change has occurred in the
nature of relations among states with different social orders, a change from
cold war and confrontation to negotiations on a broad range of issues of mu-
tual interest. The common interests of different states with respect to
various lmportant problems and areas of world politics have acquired a solid
foundation in treaty law. Political consultation and long-term programs of
economic and scientj.fic-technical cooperation are being introduced more and
mnre broadly in international relations. The resulLs of detente are espe-
cially felt in Europe, which was the principal focus of bloody conflict during
the w~orld wars an d endured a high degree of tension during the cold war period.
The moat important result of theae changea is that the danger of nuc?ear mie-
_ eile warfare has been mit~gated.
While it arose from the objective needs of world development, detente at the
aeme tlme became possible o~aing to sub~ective factora. The path to detente
was literally "op~ned" by the purposeful peace-loving policy of the Soviet
Union. The peace programa forrlulated at the highest forums o~ the CPSU, the
" 24th and 25th congresse.s, outlined concrete ways and meana to use objective
_ opportunities to modify international relations. A turn toward rea.lism by
Western political leaders also played a definite part.
Progreae toward detente is not, however, easy. Significant and influential
forces oppoae the transformation of international relations to a basis of the
principles of peaceful coexistence; these f4rces cover a broad spectrum, from
the boases of NATO to the Maoists. Their efforts are directed tn preventing
a further mitigation of international tension and improvement in relations
betw~en the capitalist countriea and the Soviet Union. An jmportant place
among these forces belongg to the moat reactionary circles in the imperialist
countries, above all the United States, which is the principal guardian and
protector of the World capitalist system. The vast array of various inter-
woven interests involved with maintaining a high level of international ten-
aion in order to protect the positicn of imperialism gave rise to the military-
industrial comFlex, which brings together groups of monop~liea that depend en-
tirely on military order3, top military leaders, and a certain number of
- politicians, in particular in the U. S. ~ongress. The mouthpieces of the
complex, varioue committees and asaociations, work by every means to build up
a militaristic state of mind and exacerbate the international situation. The
military-induatria.l complex is the most 3mportant permanently active factor
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_ which stimulates the militant-aggressive tendency in the politics of the capi-
~aliat ~ountriee and "works" stubbornly againet detente.
There is also another circumstance that creates major obstacles to reordering
relatione between the capitalist and the socialist countries. During the
period of its existence, and especially during the cold war years, :,merican
militarism hae created a real glly in its own image a~d likeneas: a large
group of ahilesophera and sociologists who base their viewa on the necessity ~
~f insuring a"poaition of strength" for the conduct of foreign policy. A cer-
tain way of thinking has taken shape in U. S. academic literature which puts
- force above common sense and hinders revision of goals that have been over- -
tiirned by the changed ratio of forces in the world.
The d4ctrine of "national securitiy," wtiich plays a growing role in 'J. S.
global atrategy, is a apecial type of political philosophy in this category. "
Of course, American authors prefer to speak of a"policy" of national security,
not a doctrin.e. But if we begin from the concepts of the doctrine that have -
beccne established in American practices as off icially formulated, universal
guidelines, we cannot fail to see that the ideas of national security off i-
cially set forth in the 1947 national security law have subsequently been
formuiated aa a doctrine in the atatemeats of virtus:,.ly all American adminis-
trationa~ beginning with the Democratic administration of H. Tr~an which
proclaimed i~. n].though they express doubt concerning the advisability of a
doctrinal approach in foreign policy, nonetheless the representatives of the -
J. Carter administration in reality appeal to national security considerations
at different levels so often that these considerationa indeed sound like the
_ workiug d~ctrine of the preaent administration.
At the same time, it must be kept in miad that the national security doctrine
is different from those doctrines, widespread in foreign policy practice,
which establish principles of U. S. behavior (actions) in internatioaal af -
fairs (isolationism, the Monroe Doctrine, the "open dobr" doctrine, "freedom
of the seas," and the "Truman and Nixon doctrines"). The national security
doctrine deals with principles of a different type which determine the choice
of ineans and methods of insuring the interests of U. S. ruling circles in
conditione of war and peace on a global scale. For perfectly understandable
class reaeons, official American documents and political literature do not
` call these real interests and objectives by their true names, but rather
clothe them in the garb of above-class, all-people's slogans. In this way, -
the national security doctrine rationalizes U. S. policy, which is funda- _
mentally imperialistic, and puts it in acceptable terma of the supposed basic
intereste of the country.
In view of its purpose, the national security doctrine comes close to military
~ doctrine, which contains the principles of building up and using armed forces.
_ Overall it acts as the connecting linSC between foreign policy and military
- doctrines. The place and role of the national security doctrine are deter-
minEC. by ~he fact that it serves as an ideological-theoretical platform for
the unique national security system that has beea put together within the
American state and is used to plan and make key governmental decisiona in the
_ fields ~f foreign policy and the use of the armed forces.
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Study of natic~nal security problems now plays a large part in varioua elements
of the poli~ical and academic complex.
_ The conversion of the probleme of national security into an independeat field
of academic research, which occurred soon after the end of World War II, was
linked, in the first place, with the continuing militarization of U. S. foreign
policy and the appearance af a qualitatively new weapon, the nuclesr missile,
which made reinterpretation of milita.ry force and the possibilities of its
application a paramaunt issue, and, in the second place, the growing awareness
that under the new c~nditions military problems could not be viewed in isola-
tion, in a vacuum so to speak, that theq would have tn be coordinated with
both foreign and domestic political and economic considerations.
Growth of the atate national security mechanism led to a strengthening of its
ties with the "academic community" and to its subordination to the interests
of military business and the politics of the ruling class. Representatives
of academic circles (some of whom had already been used for this purpose dur-
- ing World War II) were given the task of presenting studies and worka oa ape-
cific aspecta of national security to various goverrnnental bodies. Academics
are regularl.y enlisted for work in the goverument, and many of them become
full-time civil servanta. At the same time the opposite procesees are also
occurring, where employees of government institutiona go off to academic ~obs.
The eetablishment of special organizations, lmown as "think tanks," which are
- subordinate to the departmenta of t~e Air Force, Army, Navy, and Defense and
carry on research ia the national security field ie very important. One of
the most important of them is the R.and Corporation. The exchange of psr-
sonnel and iaformation led to a significant int~sification of efforts by the
academic community to develop topics in this field.
N~tional security problems are the core of the research activity of the
"strategic analysie" school, whi~~h engages in compreheasive development of
strategic issues in foreign policy: long-term diplomatic, economic, military,
and ideological actions.
Most of the studies in this subject area view national security through the
prism of either a conflict that determines the policy of the country or the `
interaction of different states.l Studies in the first category usually re-
- flect the point of view that national security is attained by maximum eacertion
of state power in conflict situations, in other words, the development of na-
_ tional security policy should be based on the premise that the state can only
_ be secure if it is superior in power to ~ther states or groups of states.
Counterbalancing this �~iew is the view of researchers in the second group,
who emphasize the development of forms and methods of state interaction more
than building up state power. This approach assumes tnat national security
policy should be guided by the principle that atate aecurity can only be
- strengtheaed if the reliability of the entire system of international relations
is streagthened.
The works of authors who believe that the Qoal of national security is to build
up stren~th can be cla~sified into three types by the sub~ect of investigation:
military, economic, and politieal.
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I
Many studies an national securiry issues focus attention on military probl~,ns,
- which reflects the view, firmly establishad in American writing, that na-
tional security is primarily linked to solving military problems. Despite
the fact that studies in the 1960's and f irst half of the 1970's greatly ex-
panded the ob~ect of investigation, taking it beyond puxely military problems,
issues such as strategy, tactics, w~aponry, and rear planning continue to be
the center of attention in many studies. Many works deal with the questions of
nuclear weapons and the technology of their production (H. Rissinger, R.
McNamara, H. Kahn, and J. Kahan),~ working out an optimal etrategy for future
allout wars (H. Rowen),3 techniques of "deterrence" (B. Brodie, A. George,
and R. Smoke),`~ limited wars (R. Osgood),5 and the like.
Beginning in the 1960's the authors of studies on national security questions
have markedly increased their interest in the material potential of the state.
Attempts have I~een made to define and evaluate all elements that make up the
"national economic potential that is essentiai to wage war" and to formulate
economic criteria for selecting alternative systems of weapons (K. Knorr and
G. Schlessinger).6 It .Ls noteworthy that these approaches have found prac-
tical application at the Defense Department where strategic programs are often
viewed on this plane and economists occupy positions t.hat permit the~ to make
important d~cisions. In a broader sense, both the representatives of academic
circles and economists working in the gover~ent botn in the United States and
in other countries devote considerable attention to the problem of distribu-
_ tion of national resourcea and development of criteria to satisfy the com-
peting demanda of the military and civilian sectors of the economy.
One of the principal areas of reaearch in the national security f ield is
analysis of rhe process of making decisions that are appropriate to a develop-
~ ing situation. On this sub~ect a number o~ works have been written on the
priority of military-strategic interes~a over political interests in working
out the political line and the role of the government and military-
induatrial complex in making national aecurity decisiona l.S. Huntington, A.
Yarmolinsky, and M. Halperin).~
There are only a few studies whic.~:, directly or indirectly, advance the idea
that national security is dependent on strengthening interaction among
states. It is very noteworthy that this interaction is chiefly limited to
the bounds of the capitalist system, and for this reason the issues of inte-
gration and strengthenin...o., ties amo~g allies are made paramount. Among the -
fields where interaction among states is considered desirable and possible,
the studies assign a significant place to arms control in its official con-
_ ception.
The study of national security problems in Americ~n urritings involves broad
use of the latest social science methods such as game theory, simulation
theory, information tneo-ry, input/output analysis, and systems analysis. In
addition, techniques borrowe~ from psychology, sociology, and anthropology
are �::ten used in reviewing national security problems.
The AmErican authors studying problems of national security typically abso-
lutize _he subjects they are investigating. They believe that concentrating
- attention primarily on national security, and not on international relations
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and foreign policy, offers greater opportunities for systematizing the growing
mass of empirical data than are presented by traditional approaches. Obser~-
- ing that the idea of "national security" in fact arose as the result of dis-
satisfaction with the concept of "national interests," tfiey see many sdvan-
_ tages in studying international relations and foreign policy from the stand- _
point of national security. In the opinion of American researchers, this
approach provides a convenient syatem of comparisons which offers a posai-
bility of comparing ev~nts that are not outwardly comparable and promotes
systematization of the vast amount of diverse comgarative data obtained by ~
means of traditional analyais of foraign policy. The orientation to national
security, American authors emphasize, adds a new measure to the theory of
conflict situations in traditional foreign policy and provides an opportunity
for comprehensive analysis of general :fnternational problems. Finally,
analysis done from the sL-andpoint of national security presupposea the es-
_ tabliahment of an interrelationship between domestic and foreign policy ac-
tions by states and begins from the notion that the behavior of a state in
the world arena can only be understood in the context of the national se-
curity policy it follows. Thus this analysis makes it gossible to consider
foreign and domestic policy together, as an instrument for defending the same
values and, ultimately, maintaining the national and international systems
- that suit the ruling classes in the West.
_ Critical notes are also beg;tning to be heard lately in the vast stream of
literature on national security problems. Amung the repreaentatives of what
is called the "neorevisionist" school, the views of the prominent American
political scientist A. Laswell are widespread today. He believes that with
the establiahment of the national security system there appeared a"garrison
state" in which "policy is managed by specialiats in the use of force.~re
- The broad use of the principles of the national security doctrine in prac-
tical politica and the considerable voluQe of primarily apologistic litera-
ture in the United States on this aub~ect make it urgently neceasary to have
a critical analysis of this doctrin.e, to reveal the true purpose concealed
behind its outward conceptual pluralism - the power approach to interna-
- tional affairs, and to determine realistic ways to resolve such a truly
_ important problem as national security in the preaent day.
- FOOTTIOTES
1. American authors discern the source of the concept of "national security"
- in the theory of "national interest." The first definition of national
aecurity in the categories of national interest was given by the American
~ournalist and sociologist W~ Lippmann. "The nation is in a state of
security," I,ippmann wrote, "when it is not forced to sacrifice its lawful
interests to avoid war and when it can defend these interests, if neces-
sary, by war" (W. Lippmann, "U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the
Republic," Boston, 1943, p 5).
As American political scientist A. Wolfers recognizes, however, even
with the standard acknowledgement that states must have such interests,
the simple conversion of "national interest" into "nationaZ security
interests" did not lead to any satisfactory solution to the problem of
defining "national security" (see A. Wolfers, "National Security as an
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Ambiguous ~ymbol," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 1952, Vol 62, pp 481-502".
Different viewpoints on the que~tion of the interrelationship of the cate-
gories of "national interest" and "national security" are quite broadly _
representen in th~ ~976 collection of works enti~led, "U. S. Foreign
Policy: Pr.inciplea for Defining National Interest" (New York, 1976).
New attemPts to define t~iis concept appeared with the spread of behaviorism
and systems analysis in American writing. In the work of American soci-
- ologist M. Kaplan "Syst an and Process in International Politics" (New York,
1957), national interests and the interests of natioaal security are con-
sidered as just one, although important, aspect of the problem of main-
taining the international system.
It is typical that all these attempts to define national security take a
non-class approach to the ob~ect of atudy and ignore the decisive im-
partance of the socioeconomic essence of thia phenomenon.
2. See H. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," New York, 1975;
R. McNamara, "The Essence of Security. Reflections in Office," New York,
1968; A. H. Kahn, "Un Thermonuclear War," Princeton, 1960; J. Kahan,
_ "Security in the Nuclear Age. Developing U. S. Strategic Arms Policy,"
Washington, 1975.
3. 5ee H. Rowen, "National Security and the American Economy in the 1960's,"
U. S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, Study Paper No 18, 86th Congress,
- 2nd Session, Washington, 1968.
4. Brodie, B., "Stzategy in the Missile Age," Princeton, 1959; A. George and
- R. Smoke, "Deterrence in American Foreign Policy. Theory and Practice,"
New York, 1974.
5. See R. Osgood, "Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy,"
Chicago, 1957. -
6. See K. Knorr, "Military Power and Potential," Lexington, 1970; G.
Schlesainger, "The Political Economy of National Secur{ty. A Study of the -
Economic Aspects of the Contemporary Power Struggle," New Yo:k, 1960.
7. Huntington, S., "The Common Defense: Strategic Programs ia National
Politica," New York, 1966; A. Yarmolinsky, "Tha Military Establishment.
Its Impact on American Society," New York, 1971; M. Halperin, "National
Security Folicy-Making: Analysea, Cases and Proposals," Lexington, 1975.
8. Laswell, H., "The Garrison State Hypothe.sis Today - Changing Patterns of
. Military Politics," New York, 1962.
COPYRIGHT: "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya", 1980
11,176
CSO: 1801
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BOOK EXCERPT~: YEPI~HEV ON IDEOLOGICAL WORK
Moscow IDEOLOGICHESRAYA RABOTA V SOVETSKIRH VOORUZIiENNYKH SILAKH (Ideological
Work in the Soviet Armed Forces) in Russian 1979 signed to press 7 Sep 79
pp 1, 334, 332-333, 3-6, 7-9, 51-52, 89, 130, 161-162, 194-199, 200-201, 232,
268, 304, 327-331
[Annotation, table of contents, introduction, excerpts from chapters, and conclusion
of book by Army Gen A.A. Yepishev, second,supplemented edition, Moscow, Voyenizdat,
1979, 50,000, 334 pages] '
~Excerpta7
This book reviews timely issues of ideological work in the Soviet Armed Forces, the
Marxiat-Leninist conditioning of military cadres, and patriotic indoctrination of
young people ia light of the d~cisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the decree of
the CPSU Central Committee entitled "Further Improvement in Ideological and Political
Indoctrination Work." It gives a s3gnificant place to problems of ideological con-
frontation on military issues and to exposing the reactionary ideology and aggres-
sive policies of imperialism and the hegemonistic, great-power policies of Maoism
under contemgorary conditions.
The book ie intended for a broad group of readers.
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Table of Conteats
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Part 1. Ideological Work and ~Tays to Make It More Effective
Chapter 1. Marxism-Leniniam - the Theoretical Foundation of Party -
Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1. Marxist-Leninist Ideology and Problems of Building Communism.
Military D~~elopment as a Constituent Part of It 9
1.2. Marxism-Leninism and the Interaational~Activity of the CPSU.
The Role of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Contemporary World. 18
1.3. 'The Increased Role of the CPSU in Military Development and
Ideologica7. Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.4. The 25th CPSU Congress on the Presaing Challeages of
Ideological Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Chapter 2. Ideological Work Under Contemporarq Conditions and Ite
Characteristic FPatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.1. The Principles of Ideological Work and Zts Characteristic
Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
- 2.2. Ways To Increase the Efrectiveness of Ideological Work
and Its Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3. The Comprehensive Approach in Ideological Work 81
Chapter 3. Ideological Work and Indoctr~nation of Army and Navy
Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.1. Ideological Means of Communist Indoctrination 89
3.2. FoYVnation of a Communist Worldview - the Heart of
Ideological L;ork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.3. Instilling Ideological Conviction in Soviet Fighting Men 109 .
3.4. Ideological Work and Questions of Instilling Discipline 118
Chapter 4. Ideological-Theoretical Training of Military Cadres 130
4.1. Ways To Improve the Teaching of Social Sciences at
Military Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.2. Mil~tary Problems in the Social Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.3. The Constitution of the USSR - the Ideological-
Theoretical Document of the ~arty and State . . . . . . . . . 148
- Chripter 5. Issuea of Patriotic Indoctrination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.1. The History of the Great Patriotic War as a
Factor in Patriotic Indoctrination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.2. The Com~at Traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces -
an Important Means of Ideological Indoctrination 168
5.3. Art and Patriotic Indoctrination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
5.~.. A School of Moral-Political Conditioning, Courage,
and Heroism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
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Part 2. The Ideological Struggle on Military Issues
Chapter 6. The Ideological Struggle in the Field of the Methodology
of Military Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
6.1. The Methodological Role of the Marxist-Leninist Doctrine
of War and the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
6.2. The Concept of the Essence of War as an Ob~ect of
Ideological Struggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
6.3. The True Causes of the Occurrence of Ware 218
Chapter 7. The Struggle Against Bourgeois Falsifiers in the
Field of Military History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
7.1. Military History - an Arena of Ideological Struggle 232
7.2. The Bourgeois Myth of the Origin of GTorld War II and the
Contribution of the Allies to the Victory over Fascism 243
Chapter 8. The International Character of Defending Socialism and
Ideological Sabotage by the Bourgeoisie . . . . . . . . . . . 268
8.1. The Ob~ective Necessity of Defending Socialism 268 -
8.2. Internationalism and the Defense of Socialism 276
8.3. The Warsaw Pact Organization and Its Imperialist Critics 282
8.4. Instilling Soviet Fighting Men with Implacable Hostility
to Bourgeois Ideology and the En~ies of Socialiam 294
Chapter 9. The Fabricated "Soviet Military Threat" and the Real
Threat to Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
9.1. The Underlying Cause of the My~:h of the "Soviet Military
Threat" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
- 9.2. The Growth of Militarism - the Real Threat to Peace 310
9.3. Militarism and the Foreign Policy of Imperialism 319 -
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
Introduction:
The building of a developed socialiat society in the USSR, the enormous rise in
the material and nonmaterial potential of the country, and the auccesses of the
- CPSU and Soviet State ia the struggle to bolster peace on earth have created
broad opportunities for achieving the program objectives of our party with re-
spect to developing a new type of person.
Our party has always and consistently followed the L~inist doctrine of devoting
apecial attention to raising the consciousness of the masses. The 25th CPSU
Congresa stressed that the "party caneiders inatilling communist consciousnese
and the readinesa, will, and ability to build communism to be a constant con-
cern." Without comprehensive development of the builder of a communist so-
ciety and without this person's high level of consciousness it is not poesible
to build the material-technical base of communism and ahape caaimunist social
lg
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relations. Therefore, the party worka on all of these problems comprehen-
sively, on a single fron.t.
Ideological work has always been a focus of party attention. There is no area r~
of public life or production activity of Soviet people that is outside the
sphere of ideological influence. Ideology and party ideological work today -
have become a mighty apiritual force whose r_ole is steadily growing. There
are two determining groupa of factors in the growth of the role of CPSU ideo -
logical work under contemporary conditions.
The internal factors expreas the need for continued comprehensive idaological
substantiation and support for communiat building and solving its problems.
This means party theoretical work, predicting social phenomena, raising the
new type of human being, creating a socialist moral climate in collectives,
strengthening friendship among peoples, and other crucial questions in which
ideological means have an exceptionally large gart. The process of building
communism objectively presupposes increased attention to ideological problems.
One of the new manif estations of CPSU concern for the nonmaterial developmen t
of Soviet people and their ideological conditioning is the decree of the party
Central Committee, adopted on 26 April 1979, entitled "Further Improvement in
Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." This important general party
document puts the tasks of ideological work set forth by the 25th CPSU
Congress in concrete form, summari2es accumulated experience in this area, and
formulates new requirements for the organization, content, and methodology of
ideological and political indoctrination work.
The external factors make ideological work more signif icant; they are ex-
pressed in intensif ication of the struggle between the ideas of Marxism-
Leninism and the ideas of capitalism. In the new internation~l situation
where, thanks to the efforts of the CPSU and the other fraternal partiea, a
certain normalization of relationa between states with different social orders
has taken place, ideological struggle has not lessened at all, but rather has
become noticeably sharper. Militarfstic circles, the military-industrial
complex, all kinds of "madmen," as well as opportunists of all stripes are
intensifying their ideological sabotage against the socialist world. For
this reason, the steps, measures, and actions being taken to organize and ~
carry out ideological countermeasures to bourgeois influence occupy a growing
place in ideological work. This influence may show up in different forms and
spheres. Therefore, as emphasized in the CPSU Central Committee decree of
March 1978 entitled "The State of Lecture Propaganda and Steps To Improve It,"
instilling implacable hoetility to bourgeois, Maoist, and revisionist ideology
is one of the paramount challenges of ideological work. Under contemporary
conditions the state of international relations and the political atruggle in
- Che international arena exercise a very direct influence on problema of ideo -
_ logical struggle and many questiona of iadoctrination. In the current phase
of building communism when the process of social development has accelerated
and '~~e scale of economic ~uilding has increased, when the educational and
cult~~ral level of Soviet people is growing rapidly, and when the principles -
of peaceful coexiatence are becoming established in the international arena
- at the same time as ideological struggle broadeas and becames more complex,
the significance of ideological work and the attention given to it by the
- whole party are increasing immeasurably.
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It is common Imowledge that all ideological work in the USSR Armed Forces is
organized in full conformity with the directives and decisions of our party,
which devotes constant attention to the questions of communist indoctrination
_ of Soviet people and their ideological conditioning.
The CPSU Central Committee decree of June 1976 entitled "Tasks of Party Educa-
tion in Light of the 25th CPSU Congress" emphasizes that ideological work and
Marxist-Leniniat training are expected to arm communiats and all working people -
_ with knowledge of the ideological heritage of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and the -
hiatorical experience of the CPSU, a clear understaading of party policiea, and
the ability to defend the principles of communist ideology, Soviet patriotism,
and proletarian internationalism, evaluate new phenomena in public life from
a acientific standpoint, and draw correct conclusions for practical work.*
These ob~ectives can be accomplished by meaningful, well-organized, carefully
thought-out ideological work that bringe its influence to bear on all the men,
on all army and navy personnel. Thus, ideological work as a apecific non-
material factor now affords a powerful accelerator in solving economic,
social, and political problems and queations of military development. The
above-mentioned decree of the CPSU Central Committee was a strong new impetus
to improving the quality and eff ectiveness of ideological work. This docu-
ment reviews a broad range of issues whose solutions will make it possible
to substantially raise the effectivenesa of the forms and methods of ideo-
logical work and to etrengthen its tiee with the life and practical activities
of building communism.
There is no area of military activity today, combat and political training,
combat duty, activities to strengthen militarq diecipline and organization,
leisure activities, and everyday life, which could be represented as outside
the aphere of ideological influence. New heights in improving military
skills, raising combat readiness, and in moral-political and psycholagical
toughening of peraonnel have been achieved by intensifying the ideological in-
fluence in units and on ships. The main thing is to insure a steady rise in
the intellectual level and effectiveness of ideological work. ,
This problem can be solved primarily by further improvement in the training
and skills of ideological workers. Success in the struggle to improve troop
combat readiness, develop socialist competition, and strengthen military
discipline depends signif icantly on the ideological conditioning, level of
theoretical training, and methodological skills of ideological workers.
It is important to consider here that ideological workers are not ~ust people
who are expected, on the basis of their ~ob description, to work on ideo-
logical indoctrination, but rather all generals, officers, and warrant offi-
cera [praporshchiki, mictmoany], all who are involved with questions of train-
ing and indoctrination. This requirennent follows directly from the CPSU
Central Committee decree "Increasing the Role of Oral Political Agitation in _
Fulf illing the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress." This decree aays that
it is "important to develop the Leninist tradiCion of constant and compulsory
participation by leadership cadres in the political indoctrination of Che -
' working people by all means, using diverse forms of work for this purpose." -
*See PRAVDA 12 June 1976.
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I
The present ~ook is devoted to a review of certain preasing problems of ideo-
_ logical work in the Armed Forces in the current phase. The author hopes that
- it may prove useful to the ideological cadrea of the army and navy who are
working hard to strengthen the ideological influence on all facets of army
and navy life.
Part One. Ideological Work and Ways To Make It More Effectiv e
Chapt er 1. Marxism-Lenism - the Theoretical Foundation of Party Activity
- The e ssence of ideological work, of course, is making people aware of Marxist-
Lenin iat idsas and seeing that they are realized in practice, in people's ac-
' tions. In large part success in the constructive labor of the Soviet people
and d efending their revolutionary achievements depend on the maturity of the
indiv idual and social consciousness. That is precisely why V. I. Lenin
stressed that "development of the consciousness of the masses remainsT as it
always has been, the foundation and principal can~ent of all our work."*
The strength of our system is in the consciousness of the masses, in the
presence of communist ideology at the service of the party and the people.
_ The 2 Sth CPSU Congress emphasized that the CPSU organizes the work of commu-
niat indoctrination, l~ke all its revolutionary-transforming activity, on the
solid foundation of Marxist-Leninist theory. Marxism-Leninism is the only
relia ble basis for developing correct strategy and tactica. It gives us an
understanding of the historical perspective aiid helps determine directions of
development for many years into the future and to orient ourselves correctly
in in ternational events .
The id eol~gy of Marxism-Leninism, which expresses the fundamental claes in-
terests of the working massea, has become the practice of millions of people.
Communism long ago changed from a"specter stalking across Europe" into a
mighty reality that determines the course af contemporary world development.
The strength of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism lies in the fact that, as the
only truthful reflection of real social processes, they enab~e the working _
massea to fundameutally ttransform the world.
- Marxist-Leninist ideology enables the Communist Party to formulate questions
raised by experience at the proper time and tn decide them correctly. It re-
lies in its development on the achievements of revolutionary experience and
gives the mighty weapon of social foresight to those who f ight for communiam.
Marxism-Leninism concentrates the creative experience of the world revolu-
tionary movement and the vast achievements of the Soviet Union, which has ~
built a developed socialiat society, and of all the fraternal countries of
social iam. Marxism-Leninism discloses specific ways and means of creating
the material-technical base of communism, improving social relations, and
raising a new type of human being. Marxism-Leninism arms the builders of the
new society with a scientific theory of defending socialist achievements:
_ the :