JPRS ID: 9402 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/9402
19 November 1980
_ ~li/est E u ro e R e o rt
p ~
= CFOUO 47/80)
FB~~ FOREIGN BROADCA~T INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9402
19 November 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 47/80)
CONTENTS
THEATER NUCLEAR FaRCES
INTERNATIONAL AFFAZRS
Soviet Naval Presence, Strategy in Mediterranean
(Rair Simonian; DEFF.NSA, Jul 80) 1
COiA~ITRY SECTION
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
- Allensbacher Compares Election Results, Po11s
(ALLENSBAQiER BERICHTE, No 25, 1980) ..................o..... 4
FRAN CE
Prime Minister's Four Right-Hand Men Characterized
(Michel Chamard; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 13 Oct 80) 11
_ Career of PCF's Juquin Seen on Rise
(I~ubert Chavelet; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 6 Oct 80)..0.......... 17
Stolezu Interviewed on Status of Immigrarlts
(Lionc:l Stoleru Interview; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 6 Oct 80)...0. 19
Terrorist Organizations Infiltrate Police Force
(Georges Marion; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 27 Sep-5 Oct 80).... 21
Police Involvement in Terrorist Attack Implied .
(Liliane Sichler, Jacque~ Derogy; L'EXPRESS, 11 Oct 8Q)..... 24
ITALY
Union Leader DisPutes Minister on Labor Mobility
(IL SOLE-24 ORE, 4, 5 Oct 80) 28
~ Statement by Labor Minister, by Fra*!co Foschi
Reply to Labor Minister, by Felice I~brtillaro
� - a- LIII ~ WE - 150.FOU0]
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ITALY
- Grandi Interviewed on ENI's Energy Policy _
(Alberto Grandi Interview; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 4 Oct 80)... 31
CGIL Socialist~ Defend Union Autonomy ~
(Rita Bisestile; IL SOLE-24 ORE, 2 Oct 80) ................~0 36 ;
EFIM, IASM Conclude Agreement an Aid to South
- (IL SOLE-24 ORE, 3 Oct 80) 38 ;
LUXEMBOURG '
Economic Situation Considered Among Best in West Europe ~
(Jean Pourbaix; POURQUOI PAS?; 2 Oct 80) 39 ~
SPAIN ~
- Constitutional Provisions for Andalusian Autonomy
- (CAMBIO 16, 5 Oct 80) 42 !
Article 144, 151 Controversy
Rojas Marcos Interview ,
Rafael Escuredo Inter.v.iew
Economic Deterioration, i3nemployment Plague Basque Area
(CAMBIO 16, 21 Sep 80) 49
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- 'IIiEATER NUCLEAR FORCES INTERNATIOIdAL AFFAIRS _
`
. SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE, STRATEGY IN MIDIT~RANEAN
Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Jul 80 pp 4-5
[Article by Soviet Arn~y Major General Rair Simonians "The USSR and NATO's South-
ern Flank." Major General Simonian is a doctor of military science and a special-
ist in atrategy]
[Text] Shortly before leaving his post, the former supreme commander of the Atlantic
Alliance Arm~d Forces, Gen Alexander Haig, stated that all e~fo~ts made to date by -
NATO "have not been enough to solve the b~oader problems th~.t now face the 2lorth
- Atlantic Allia.nce," considering that one of them is the need to xeinforce the south-
~ ern flanIt, particularly NATO's southeast. According -Eo him~ this area is of high
priority because of "the extraordinary xeakness of the southeast flank of NATO" due
to the fact that "Creece is still not totally involved in the NATO military struc-
ture, and that there are still several thorr~y politicaZ problems between Greece
and Turkey that must be resolved." Secondly, the problem stems from "increasing
Soviet capacity fbr interference there is taking on considerable importance polit-
ically."
Simlar reasoning, f~equently appearing in the Western press, is based o n the much
touted theory of "aggressivity" that is attributed ta the Soviet military doctrine.
However, it is obvious that the essence of Soviet military policy and strategy boils -
down to a guaxantee of an efficient defense of the USSR and its allies.
Allegations that the USSR and other Warsaw Pact nations want to engineex a military
take-over of the NATO bloc are totally lacking in substance.
~ But as lon~ as the threat of wax is present, the Sov3et Union wilZ cons id~,r it -
necessary to maintain the military potential to securely defend the peaceful life
of the Soviets. For that reason, the Soviet military dOCtrine combines in a single
whole the peaceful nature of the Soviet foreign policy and its willingness to respond
accordingly to aggression, no matter where it comes f~om.
This primary ~ostulate of the Soviet military doctrine is the basis o� the practica,l
activities of the Soviet Armed Forces, also in the southern flank. The Soviet Union, -
1 ike the People's Republic of Bulgaxia and the Socialist Republic of Rumania, is
a poxer on the B1ack 5ea. But since the Black Sea communicates with the Mediterran-
_ ean through the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, the 3oviet Union, as a Black Sea
~ and therefore Mediterranean power, could not remain impassive in the face of the
_
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creation ri~ht along its borders and those of other ~aropean Socialist countries,
of a poxerful concentration of forces 3irected at them. The Soviet warships entered
the Mediterranean in order to contribute to stability and peace in that region.
- Mediterranean No I,onger "American La,ke" 4
By its very presence in ~his sea~ the Soviet fleet has cooled off the hotheads of
~ NATO leadership. It is no coincidence tha.t THE NEF1 YORK TIMES .felt the need to -
~ confess~ "The Russians have built up enormous political ca;pital thanks to the
presence there of their naval forces." Those forces, the newspaper admits, "con-
stitute a political and moral guarantee for Moscow's friends in the Mediterranean."
~ -
The changes that hav~e taken place in the Mediterranean and in other areas of tne
world's oceans, ha.ve apparently displeased the Penta.gon and its allies, especially
considering that the Arab states and mar~y African nations look favorably upon the
Soviet Navy. That is why there is a great hue and c;ry about "the harmor~y and bal-
ance of forces," "the intensification of the Sov3.et threat" to NATO's southern
flank, and other similar asguments. However, all this is aimed at justifying the
high level of activity by the United States and other North Atlantic bloc states =
for the purpose of expanding and consolidating their own positions there by ar~y
means possible.
Accarding to Atlantic strategists, that area is a very convenic~nt base for NATO,
because it allows for a threat to the left flank of the Waxsa.w Pact nations and the
_ Arab states of the Middle and Near East. It is also withi.~ firing range of Soviet
military and industr3.a1 targets and those of other Socialist nations in southeastern
European, and provides a base for deploying electronic surveillance methods.
NATO, United States and Mediterranean Nations -
r
Any country in the Mediterranean zone is considered by NATO and the Pentagon, in
the first place, as an enclave that could be used for actions against the 5oviet ~
Union and as a base of support for the repression of movements counter to their ~
interests. Lately Washington has paid special attention to plans to officially
incorporate Spa.in in "the defense of the southern flank" of NATO, and insists on
maintaining in its territory large America.n air ba,ses in Torrejon (near Madrid)
and Zaragoza, as well as the important a3r-naval complex at Rota, on the Atlantic
coast. Discussing the strategic importance of this country for the United States, ~
_ the ma~azine MILITARY REVI~'W points out tha.t Spain is not orLly in a very convenient
position~ being at the nexus of the main Mediterranean ~orta, but it also reinforces,
~om the rearguaxd~ "the defensive structure of NATO on the southern flank."
Italy is given an equally important role in the strengtheni..ng of American positions
in this zone. As a member of NATO, it permitted the United States to move the coas-
tal General Sta~f of the Sixth Fleet to Naples.
There are also abundant American and NATO support ba,ses in Greece. In establishing
them, the Atlantic strategists were taking into consideration the fact that this
countxy .~s at the crossroads of the maxitime an3 air routes that communicate Europe
wlth the Near East and Afr3ca, and that border on the Socialist states. There axe
foreign military air bases on Crete and on continental Greece.
2
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In ~zrkey there are some 40 American military targets, of which 26 are bases. The
most important of them axe in Indgirlik (Adana) and the city of Izmir. In the areas
near the cities of Sinog, Kramursel, Diyarbakir, and Belbahi there are scanning
posts, whose task ~s to obtain information on Soviet activities.
As a result of events in Iran ~ the military bases in 'I~,~rkey ~ which bord~rs on the -
USSR~ have taken on added importance. According to THE NE~1 YORK TIMES, the Americans
J had alreac~y begun in January of 1979 to w~.thdraw f`rom Iran and place their serxet
equipment in ~arkey. Accord.ing to that newspaper, part of the equipment was installed
on English ba.ses in Cyprus, violating those bases' status.
Aware of growing discontent in Mediterranean countries with the constant increase
in the level of military confrontation in the region, Pentagon experts claiu! that
there is no sensible American strategy that could envision a future U.S. militaxy
~resence in the Mediterranean ba,sed on existing enclaves. For that reason, emer-
gency plans have to be taken into consideration, and those plans are being drawn
up. In a.ddition, it is curious that absolutely no response is being made to Soviet
proposals for the reduction of Soviet and American Warships in the Mediterranean, .
primarily those fitted out with nuclear weapons.
- These are the facts, and they all indica.te that it is not Sov iet strategy, but the
manner of proceeding of both NATO and the Pentagon an the sou~hern flank, that is -
presenting the serious obstacle to ~enuine security for the people of that region.
COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defensa., S. A. Madrid 1980
8926
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COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
tiLl.~.dSBACHER COriPARES ELECTION RESITLiS, POLLS
Allensbach ALLENSBACHrR BERI QiTE in German No 25, 1980 pp 1-7 - ~
/Report datelined Allensbach am Bodensee, 6 October 1980: "The 1980 Bundestag Elec-
tion and the Allensbach Election Forecast"/
/Text/ On election Sunday, at 18.00 hours, the German television s~rvice introduced
the Institute for Demoscony Allensbach which offered a"forecast" of the election
results, published fixst on 2 October in STERN and backed by interviews during thc
period 12-20 September. _
To provide full and complete information we are prespnting to y~u the text of our
forecast which we published on Sunday, 5 October, at 18.00 hours on Austrian radio -
and, subsequently, the OkF television service. The forecast ~aas based on 3,000 in-
terviews conducted from 27 September to 3 October 1980.
- We are ehe only institute to publish an explicit forecast on the outcome of the
Bundestag election before n otification of the first official result~. We did so
because we wished to test ourselves, regardless of the fact that, ~n3ike for earlier
Bundestag elections, German television had not this year commissioned a poll fr4m _
us. -
The Allensbach forecast appears to be the only one to separaCe first and second
preference predictions. When only first preferences are considered, the CDU/CSU
definitely emerges as the strongest party. No such precision was possible for se- .
cond preferences, because second preferences depended much more on last minute deci-
sions. We clearly d~fined the limits of demoscopy when we said that not even the
very last polls provided a true indication whether the CDU/CSU or the SPD would be
the strongest faction in the new Bundestag. _
,
T"ne FDP's sec~nd preferenc~ propagr,~nda was extremely successful. For the first
time the CDUiCSU received far less second than first preferences-~-and this is a
political event of the first order.
*
Hereunder the text of the forecast initially given on Ai~strian radio at 18.00 houra:
* The conversation in the co!irse of which Professor Noelle-Neumann introduced the
- Allensbach forecast was taped shortly before 18.00 hours and broadcast at
18.10 hours, before the first official projection by the Austrian radio service.
at 18.25 by the ORF television network.
~
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~
_ What is the purpose of the Allensbach election forecast? Within a few minutes we
_ are expecti;~g the first projections to b~ puhlished, it is therefore not a matter
of knowing the ourceme just a fe~a minutes earlier. Nor is it mesnt to be a tip for -
gamblers,. to show hcki gaod o~tr tips are; nor do we claim to be psychics: In any
case demoscopy works with margins of statistical errors--in polls involving
_ 2,000 intervies~e it is generally plus oY minus 2 percenC. Not even the most out-
stanc~ir~g pallster can do anything about that. Therefore, why bother with this fore-
cast?
A~iY election forecast i~ designed to demonstrate that a political situatinn may be
correctly appraise3 by the methods of demoscopy. Important for forecasts or other
news abaut the results of pools are not decimal pcints, important is the correct
~ssessment of the situ~.tion. Election forecasts test the m~thods of demoscopy, that
which it can do, and that which it ::annot.
Following our last poll we see the political situation arising from the German -
Bundestag election zs follows: The Allensbach Institute carried on anott~er 3,000 in-
terviews from 27 September to 3 Octoher. The following seven points represent our
interp~etation of the situation as revealed in tttese interviews:
Forecast 1: The SPD/FDP coalition will continue to rule, strengthened in the ~undes-
tag by, possibly, 25 additional seats. We estimate its share at 53.5 percent of
second prefer.ence~.
Forecast 2: This also means that the FDP will be represented in the co*ning Bundestag.
In fact we foresee that it will be the victor of the Bundestag election; it may well
obtain second preferences runn_.ng into two digit figures. We estimate its share at
10 p~rcent.
Forecast 3: T.h.e Creens will not manage the 5-percent hurdle, will not arrive in the
Bundestag. We estimate their share at 2 percent.
Forecast 4: The CDU/CSU is the lu3er ir. this election. Compared to 1976 we expect ~
it to lose 4-5 percent of second preferences. We estimate its share o; second pre-
ferences at 43.5 percent.
Forecast 5: Even now, assessing the last 3,000 interviews, wP are unable to say
whether the CDU/CSU or the SPD will be the strongest faction in the new Bundestag.
The CDU/CSU will be the strongest party w~ith respect to first preference voCes; we -
estimate this at 45.5 percent. _
- When it comes to second preferences, decisive for the size of the parliamentary
faction, the CDU/CSU is lagging behind first preferences for the first time and
noticeably Ro. Our l.ast poll therefore showed a stand-off with regard to second '
preferences between the SPD and the CDU/CSU. We estimate them at 43.5 percent each.
Here az~ the limits of demoscopy. iJltimrately the question of who will be the
strongest faction must depend on la~t minute decisions: How many CDU/CSU voters
will decide to cast their second preference for the SPD or the FDP?
_ 5
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Only in the past 10 days did we note an increased tendency for CDU/CSU voters who
do not spprove of Strauss (about a third of all CDU/CSU voters) to split their
votes, in other words cast their first and second preferencPS~for different parties.
= Every fifth CDU/CSU voter who does not approve of Strauss intended to split his
~ vote. Actually this means a 1 percent gain for the SPD, a 1.5 percent gain for the
FDP.
The difficulty here lies in the fact that such decisions ma.y eventually be reversed
once again.
We had a great deal of trouble witc? the German system of second preferences on which _
:inges the representation in the Bundes tag. This is due to the fact tl:at half the
voters are not even aware of the signif icance of first and second preferences.
Our second difficulty--it is not new, we have had to cope with it since 1965--are
- the FDP voters, only a third of whom are firm support4r.s. The other two thirds
fl~at and often come to their final dec ision very late indeed. Even in reply to our
last poll every fourth FDP voter said: "I am still thinking about it.
Forecast 6: Hereunder our first preference forecast which m.3y be compared with the
actual result on Monday morning only:
CDU/CSU strongest party 45.5 percent
SPD 43.5 percent
FDP 7.5 percent
Others 3.5 percent
- Forecast 7: Fewer votes will be cast than in 1976 or 1972.
Tncidentally, this is the seventh Allensbach Bundestag election forecast to be pub-
lished anead of the receipt of the firs t official data.
, 6
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Key:
1. First preference votes
2. Second preference votes -
3. For comparison: The last publication of Allensbach resiilts in STERN, based
on 1,739 interviews, 12-20 September 1980.
4. IFD forecast
5. Preliminary official election result _
6. Other parties
7. Average deviation of the IFD forecast
8. Maximum deviation of the IFD forecast
9. Voters going to the po11s: IFD forecast
_ Preliminary official election results _
8
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Table 2--Allensbach Election Forerasts 1957-1980 ~
Dfg~Aflensb~c~~~er WahlprognosenT~~~957 EN1~80 ~ ~
Progrose C~ A~tltches Ergehnis~ E
- ~4 ~ couftsu so ~
Be~ sieben aufeinanderfolgenden 8undestags- SPD 32.0
- uahlen uurden voa Institut fur Oemoskopie 32,Q
Allensbath Prognosen uber den varaussicht- F,O.P. 7�5
- licnen 1;'anlausgang ausgearbeitet und vor Sonstige ~ 19 57 -
Bekanntgabe der ersten Auszahlungen des 10'2
amtltchen kahlergebnisses veroffentlicht: COU/CSU 4 6.0
1957 und 1961 in FAZ, 1965 und 1969 im ZOF, SPD 36.5
- 1972 im F_rn;ehen der ARO, 1976 im 1Df, -
int!0 im ORF. F.D~g ~ ~ 2~ 1 61
Bas~s der Prognosen: Hehr-Themen-Umfragen, Sonstige g,p Q _
~uotenausvahl. im Ourchschnitt rund 2000 5~4 aJ _
COU/CSU a9.5
Befragte. Abschlue der 8efragungen: Jeueils 4 8,7 -
sechs Tage vor der Wahl, 1972 fGnf Tage, SP~ 3 8.5
40.1
1976 vier ~ag? vor der 1;ah1, 1980 z~ei iage r,p,p, 8.~
vor der M'a ~l. Son3~c~e 4.O~~y 1965
3.3
CDU/C5U a 4,8
4 6,6
SPO a 5,9
44,Q
5.3
(Gi
Z W E I i S T i M M E N Sonst)ge a:6 19 69
a4.7 CDU/CSU a5 0
44,9 15,4 _
4 6.4 SPD 48,4
45.8 6,5 F.O.P 4,5 48.9
~ 8 4 0 9 Sonstl~e 0.9 8 1 7 72
48.5 COU/CSU 49.2
48,6 48.9
- 4 ,8 SPD 43.5
42.6 7,9 F.D~S~ 6.4 43,7
0;9 Sons4ige ~;9a~o 1976
a5,5
COU1C�U
44,5 ~ c 43~~
a3,5 SPD
42.9 106 ~F.~~.) ~Z 44.5
2,~ Sonstige �5 ~ 7a~,
BUNDES AHIEN 7~ j 19Q0 (q1 ERSTS IMMEN Maximal- Ourch:chnitts-
1M'EI1S~N Maxl'~a1- Our'ttisEhnitts- abweichung') abveichung�)
- abueichung') abweichung�) 1957 0,8 Z 0,40 ~
~~72 1.9 1.Q5 % 1961 1,5 n 0�75 < -
t 1b 1,g ~ 0 95 ~ ~�E~> ~ o,ao w ,
~ 1.80 1,0 X 0;80 ~ 1965 1,9 b 0 a6
( 1 0) 1972 t 2 S 0:~0 ~ _ 7_
Abweichun~en der Pra~nosen des Institut fur i976 0:~ � o1e b
Oemoskopi AIJ,ensbac r,v.genuber.dem amt~ichen Erst- 1960 r ~ 1, ~ 0;75
stiaunen- und [u itstirtuoenpr ebms. - Berechnet auf oi; ~rrgly~e .ar auf lunf Pnrtei~ertc am~elegf,
der 8asis: CDU/~SU, SPO. ~.~.P, und sonstige Parteien 14n~ wrd! a,e NPO r,e5ondqrt aus ge~+ese~.
Key on following page
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Key:
1. Forecast
2. Official result
3. FirsY. preference votes .
_ 4. The E.illensbach Institute for Demoscopy prepared forecasts on the probably
outcome of seven successive Bundestag elections and published them before
notification of the first counta of the official election results:
1957 and 1961 in the FRANKFt1RTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 1965 and 1969 yjr ZDF.
_ 1972 the ARD television services, 1976 the ZDF and 1980 ORF.
~'urecast base: Multiple topic polls, random selection, on the average about
2,000 polled. Last polls: Six days before the respective election, 5 days in -
1972, days in 1976, and 2 days in 1980.
5. Others
6. Second preference votes ' -
- 7. Bundestag elections
8. Maximum deviation
9. Average deviation
10. Deviation of the Allensbach Institute of Demoscopy's forecasts from the offi-
cial first and second preference result:--Computed on the basis: CDU/CSU.
SPD, FDP and other partiea .
- 11. This forecast included five headings for the.parties. In 1969 the National
" Democratic Party of Gertnany was counted independently.
- 11698
CSO: 3103
~ ,
i
~ .
~ ~
- ~
~ -
~
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PRIME MINISTER'S FOUR RIGHT-HAND MEN CHARACTERIZED
Paris VALEURS ACTUII,LES in French 13 Oct 80 pp 4~2-45
- [Article by Michel Chamard: "The Four Heads of Ba.rre"]
[Text] They have been called the "deputy prime ministers." There
are four of them. The ma,in files pass through their hands. And
nothing gets done without them.
More than 4 yeaxs at the Hotel Ma,tignon: bar~ing an accident, Mr Raymond Barre will
rema.in in his position until the presidential elections. The latest reorganiza.tion
has not really altered the ~tructure of his ministerial team. Even if people talk
about the "foiarth Baxre administration."
In the center of the system: four "deputy prime ministers," with very different _
careers and temperaments. One of them is assistant director of the staff, the other
three have the title of adviser. The ministers a.~e required to work through ~them.
Some of them complain about it:
- They,serve as a screen between us and the hea.d of the government. They impose
their views at the expense of those of our departments. They take Ba.rre's place in
those sectors for which he does not manifest any interest at a11.
There is, first of a11, a 45 year old treasury inspector, a typical upper level
civil servant climbing the rungs of a b~illiant administrative career: Mr Francis
Ga,vois, assistant director of Mr Barre's staff. Then there is a WO year old public
- administrator. Mr Raymond Sou}le, the man with a bi~ plan, relaxation of social
tensions. A 46 yeax old academic with political ambitions, Mr Jean-Claude Casanova.
Finally, a technocrat who trusts only- logic and rationality, Mr Albert Costa de
Beauregard, 38 yeax old chief engineer of mines. Two gradua.tes of the National
Administration School, a professor of economics, and a graduate of the Ecole Poly-
~ technique, in place at the Hotel Matignon since Mr Ba.rre's appointment in August -
- 1976.
The old government hands either end up putting up with them or stand.up to them at
- their own risk, such as Mrs Alice Saunier-Seite, minister for universities, whose
run-ins with Mr Casanova cannot be counted. The others remain bewil~:ered by them.
_ - Only those of`us who were in the government at the time of their arrival axe able
. to counter them, stated a former minister. _
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, Where does this power~ which seems superior to that of the ministers and almost
equival ent to that of the head of the government, come from?
~ In the F~fth Republic, the prime minister's staff has~ along with that of the head
of state, been appreciably broadened. The council presidents of the Fourth Repuhlic -
surrounded themselves with a dozen or so assistants. Mr Barre's ~taff includes 33
individuals. N~ Jean Massot, counsel for the Council of State, who has analyzed
the phenomenon in "The Hea,d of Government in France" (DOCUMFNTATION FRANCAISE), _
_ explains:
- The r~ain characteristic of this complex structure is the distinction between the
assistants, who have overall responsibility for several ministerial departments,
a.nd the other members of the staff.
The chief assistants supervise large sectors of government activity and are asso-
_ ciated with the decision making process. The project heads attend to the implemen-
tation. The technical advisers ha.ve an intermediary role, which varies according ;
to the dossier they are in chaxge of.
_ Mr Baxre personally saw to the recruiting of his chief assistants.
In 1976~ the new prime minister's director of sta,ff,. Mr Daxiiel Doustin, was assigned
to form the team which would surround Mr Baxre. Mr Soubie joined the team: he had
been recommended by Mr Jacques Chirac.
Messrs Gavois, Casanova and Costa de Beauregard, on the other hand, belong to "the
_ Quay Branly ~ang": the one which surrounded Mr Barre at the Ministry of Foreign
= Trade. They f'oTlowed ~their "boss" to the Hotel Matignon.
Ta11 and thin, with a receding hairline, cordial behind his wire framed g;lasses,
Mr Gavois represents the typical inspector of finance in a political milieu. He
has a particularly brilliant resume: at 31 years of age, following his 4 ye~r
"period of suffering" (first post assigned to an inspector fresh from school), he ,
found himself project head for Mr Michel Debre, who was then minister of finance.
Next, he joined the staff of Mr Roland Nungesser, secretaxy of state to the Ministry
of the Budget, then those of Messrs Couve de Murville, Ortoli and Giscard d'Estaing,
ministers of finance. -
In 1973, he left the Rue de Rivoli for the Quay d'Orsa.y, and became project head
for Mr Michel Jobert. Next~ as incumbent to the enviable position of deputy direc-
tar for economic relations in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, he was chosen as di-
rector of staff for Mr Barre, when the latter arrived at the Quay ~anly, in ~
January 1976. He has never left him.
This graduate of the National Administrat~on School~ who went so far as to get a
degree in literature, was entrusted with supervising the budget, in cooperation
with Mr Ma.urice Papon. The various confidential letters from Mr &~.rre to his '
ministers on a reduction of the st le of living of the state (VALEURS ACTUII,LES
publish a certain number of them~ were prepared by Mr Gavois. For him, the
ministers are more heads of their departmants, setting an example, than they are
political personalities. Convinced that the state machinery cannot remain isolated ~
from the constraints imposed on enterprises, he has the full confidence of the prime '
minister, who sha,res his point of view. ,
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In i976, Mr Ba.rre took direct control of the Ministry of Finance~ and then stren~-
thened the prerogatives of the Hotel Matignon in the economic and financial fields
by disma,ntling 2 years later the stronghold of the Rue de Rivoli. This con-
- ferred a major role on N1r Gavois. -
- One of his colleagues at the inspector~,te of finance said~
, I am not aware of any ambition he might have to be a politician. He appears to
be destined for an important position, outside of the hierarchy of the Ministry of
Finance, something like the Land Savings Bank or deputy governorship of the Bank of
France .
Another graduate of the National Administration School, originally from the Gironde, _
- Mr Soubie, on the other hand, has specialized in social affairs.
- He is the "worst" of a11, contended one minister.
It is said that Mr Barrot flies into wild rages when this pale little man, paralyzed
in one arm, bends over the Ministxy of Health files. Within Mr Jean Matteoli's
circle~ it is conl�.ended that the minister of labur "took a slap" in the sena.te
during the deba.te on worker participation because Mr Soubie h~.d not supported him. -
Another minister accused him of going over his head to ca~.l his directors.
Discovered by Joseph Fontanet on the staff of the prefect of the Rhone-Alpes region,
he became his assistant at the Ministry ~f Labor in 1969, then at the Ministry of
Education. Mr Soubie was "passed on" to N~r Chirac~ who did not know him~ on his -
axrival at the Hotel Matignon. At Soubie's request, Mr Ctiiirac similarly passed him
onto his successor 2 yeaxs latex. Ardor and loya.i.~y nave established his reputa-
tion.
Taciturn, taking refuge in his work, Mr Soubie is characterized by his lack of sec-
tarianism. He maintains close contacts with Mr Bergeron and the Workers Force. He _
has also opened a dialogue with Mr Ma,ire and ma,y be considered an architect of the
~~return to the center" of the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor].
Members of the General Confederation of Labor even noted a close conformity between
the prime minister's adviser and Mr Michel Rolant, close collaborator of Mr Maire.
- He has made my task easier, contends Mr Chirac.
When the latter was prime minister, Mr Soubie was promoted and successfully carried -
out the policy of unemploym^nt compensation. At the time of the very intense con-
flict at the PTT [Administration for Posts, Telephone and Tele~aph], in 197~,
during which the supervising secretaxy of state got bogged down, he took the ma,tter
in hand. -
Mr Baxre's social adviser likes nothing better than lengthy discussions with trade
unionists in his office. The maintenance of the cl.ialogue depends on him~ in spite
of his boss' antipathy toward pressure groups. Some people claim that for 10 years
he has ensured the continuity of the government's social policy.
- He is a social Fierre Juillet, one of his colleagues says of him.
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What future does this opera fanatic foresee? He seems destined, by choice~ to the -
_ role of social adviser until the end of his days. And yet~ this centrist does not _
lack political sensitivity: linked to Mrs Gaxaud at the Hotel Ma,tignon~ he was '
often taken in tMe confidence of Mr Chirac, and overall his advice seeined judicious.
Auth,~ritarian~ N~ Soubie? One of his colleagues on Mr Chirac's staff stated:
- 4t that time~ he was not. It is possible that, in view of Barre's lack of taste
for social ma.tters~ he may have had to develop a stronghold against the industrial
clan of Gavois and Costa.
"Costa" is Mr Costa de Beauregard: a curly haired Parisian with a chubby face.
_ He gives total priority to the economy. A former mining engineer at the Lorraine
coal mines, at the age of 29 years he becaane assistant secretary general of the
interministerial committee, which~developed the French position for the discussions
held in Brussels. Froject head for the minister of foreign trade in 19?6, he fol- '
lowed him to the Hotel Matignon in September.
- His ambition is extraordinary, stated a high official in the Ministry of Industry. -
First in the entrance examination to the Nozznal.e-Sciences [Training College for
Science Teachers] and to the Ecole Polytechnique, reserve officer in the cavalry,
Mr ~ o sta de Beauregaxd has the reputation that he enjoys making his authority felt.
- Mr Barre appreciates him because he resembles him, murmured a PR [Republican Par-
ty] representative.
People also attribute to him the axt of shock techniques.
His taste for equations and logical constxuctions ha,ve led the prime minister's
industrial adviser to misjudge human realities, with sometimes unfortunate conse-
quences.
Tt took a11 the insistence of Mr Pi.erre MeYlaignerie ~ minister of agriculture, and
of Mr Pierre Aigrain, secretary of state for reseaxch, to obtain an easing of a
reform project for the National Institute of Agronomic Research, which would have
penalized this reputedly effective body, a project which was urged upon his boss by
Mr Costa de Beauregaxd.
Mr Casanova, who is academic adviser to Mr Ba.rre, is also interested in research.
Born in Ajaccio, from an old right wing family, warm and haughty at the same time,
endowed with a great sense of humor, and a movie fanatic~ Mr Casanova has a taste
for discussions and cliques: hence, his belonging (like Mr Baxre) to the Trilateral -
Commission, which attempts to ma.intain a dialogue between the lea.d.ers of the large
industrial countries, and his attraction for radicalism.
In politics and in the Ministry for Universities, N1r Casanova like his boss
belongs to the "3eanneney clan": he was.project head for the minister of industry '
in ].959, ^t a time when Mr Barre was the minister's director of staff. Successor
to the current prime minister as professor of political science, Mr Casanova also
held the position of director of the service for the study of economic activity,
like Messrs Jeanneney and Baxre before him. With his round face behind wire rimmed
glasses and his bow tie, he actually shows a family resemblance with Gene.ral De
Gaulle's former minister.
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A frieiid of Mr Raymond Aron and director of the review COM1+~+31TAIRES, reader of
- Rebatet and de Tocqueville, whose complete works he wants to republish~ Mr Casanova
does not hesitate to claim to be anticommunist. But his desire not to hurt the left -
at the university has often led him to want to correct Mrs Saunier-Sei~te's initia- -
tives.
This specialist in staff work and files~ one of the developers of the B1ois program~
carries out with Mr &~.r_re activities which go far beyond the university sector. He
nourishes an ambition: to leave the wings of politics for the front of the stage.
This is why, for m~nths, this anti-Gaullist has been conducting patient negotiations
to achieve the succession of Mr Rene Tomasini, former secretary general of the UDR
[Union of Democrats for the Repuhlic (Ga.ullist Paxty~]~ whose entry into the senate
will cause a partial legislative election in the .ndelys. -
A fifth individual plays a ma.jor role in this picture. But the mirLi.sters who com-
plain about the "deputy prime ministers," spaxe him their criticism. And yet, if
there is a deputy prime minister, it would certainly be Mr Philippe Mestre, director
of staff for Mr Barre since April 1978.
Endowed with a composure and c~ol sense of humor, which are very ~itish, this 53
year old man fram Vendee is a graduate of the College of France Overseas: he belce~s
to that "mafia~" whose solidaxity is still strong within the departments, 20 yeaxs
after the loss of our colonies. He was technical adviser to Mr Pierre Mesmer (who
was also one of the "colonials") at the Army Ministry from 1964~ until 1969, then at
the Hotel Ma.tignon from 1972 unt~l i973� As a matter of fact, this former regional
prefect has served three prime ministers: he was a staff inember for Mr Jacques
- Chabaxi-Delma,s in 1969.
These titles and a solid network of friendships give him the authority and self-
assurance which he displays before the ministers and the assistants of the head of
state: those who have a hard time putting up with the role of Mr Barre's advisers~
- accept Mr Mestre's interventions without recrimination.
Twice a week, Mr Mestre presides over a meeting of the prime minister's assistants
to prepare the work. In the ha11s of the National Assemlaly which he often visits
to "take the temperature" he knows how to be cordial at times, at other times
curt, with the representatives and the reporters.
Mr Mestre has a taste for secrecy and for sma11 team work. He is alleged to have
the ambition of succeeding Colonel de Marenches as head of the SDECE [Fbreign Intel-
ligence and Counterintelligence Ssrvice], a service with which he worked when he was
with Mr Mesmer.
- He loves spy stories, said one of his collaborators.
Some ministers complain that the~~ do not get to see the head of the government often
enough. Mr Barre receives the minister of interior once a week, and the minister
of justice once every two weeks. The others are received upon their request.
_ Then~ 'there are the advisers. -
Their specialty is interministerial committees, two or four a week, to'arbitrate
differences among ministers. This is where they can show their worth by prepasing
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notes for their boss, by sub;nitting proposals to him for his consideration. The
ministers get annoyed at seeing their work dissected and sometimes rejected on the
basis of advice from the prime minister's entoura,ge. ~
Around ;~.r Barre, it is said ironical.ly:
- They would prefer private discussions to win their case in 10 minutes. It would
be a rejection of the role of the Hotel Matignon if decisions were made in ~ach of
the ministries.
The prime minister emphasizes that he is responsible for the political consequences ~
of all government measures, and �hat it is therefore normal for him to "tighten the
= screws.'~ At the Rue d~ Varenne, people still talk about the incident in Toulon, at
the time of the unveiling last June of a monument to French Algeria by Mr Jacques ~
Dominati: the secretaxy of state ha,d not informed Mr Raymond Barre, who had to
take the responsibility for the affair before the Gaullist representatives. '
When the ministers accuse Mr Baxre's advisers of forming a screen between them and ~
him, they reply that the prime minister himself makes notes on the files that are
submitted to him: .
- It is yes or no, without verbiage, said one of them.
But the "deputy prime ministers" have an enormous advantage: they axe on the spot :
and can react immediately. Mr Massot told us: ,
- You should not believe that the prime minister's schedule is completely rigid. '
There are always "holes" into w_hich his direct assistants slide. It is very obvious
that those appointments are not programmed and tha,t they do not appeax on the prime
_ minister's agenda.
In "The President's Advisers" (PUF [French University Press]~, Mr Samy Cohen quotes ~
a close collaborator of the president of the Republic who, notwithstanding the power
- attributed to the entourage of the head of state, commented:
- P'rance is governed by the Matignon. It is the Hotel Ma,tignon which controls the
ministries. There is no problem which cannot be solved by the prime minister.
~ COPYRIGHT: 1980 "Valeurs actuelles"
84~63
CSO~ 3100 '
;
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
~ CAREER OF PCF'S JUQUIN SEEN ON RISE
Paris VALEURS ACTZTEI.LES in French 6 Oct 80 p 31
[Article by Hubert Chavelet: "The Secretary's Shadow"]
[Text] He was chosen by the Co~nunist Party as rheir spokesman in the debates for
the senate elections. fle repeatedly used the word "magouille" referring to the
socialists.
Now that Marchais has become a candidate in the presidential election and must _
answer to the publication of new documentary information dealing with his past
during the occupation, Juquia steps into the limelight. And F~.terman is for-
gottea. ~
Fifty years of age, with hair slightly out of place, a direct look and a smiling
face, he has the keen wit of an intellectual and the pleasant personality of a
public relations man. This graduate from the Ecole Normale Superieure, whn for-
mally taught a class at Lycee Lak~al to enable students to compete for entrance
in Ecole Normale Superieure, is a staunch supporter of the CP's secretary general.
His entire career proves it.
, First of all, he is careful to claim that he oaly joined the party in 1953.
After Stalin's death. Is this simply a pose or a deliberate choice? He joined
the party in 1952 "as a reaction to rearmament beqond .the Rhine." But he has _
chosen to resd~ust the date when he joined it on account of the de-Stalinization.
In 1978, he declared in L'HUMANITE:
"On~ can be both a communist and an anti-Stalinist, or better still, an anti-
Stalinist because one is a communist."
Iiis communist career started in the federation of Se3ne-Sud, the breeding ground
of French Communist Party leaders. That of Maurice Thorez anc' March~is.
His first campaigns took place in the aatifacist cammittees, in the "peace move-
ments" and in the dialog wi.th believers where he is still at work.
He came into view in 1964. He became a member of the Central Co~ittee, un-
doubtedly promoted by Marchais who was Chen secretar}* in the partp organization.
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~
In 1967, he was elected as deputy for Long~umeau, the third electoral district
of Essonne. He ran againat a UDR jUnion of Democrats for the Republic] candi-
- date. He won again in 1973 and 1979.
Soon the press saw him as a future secretary general of a new kind. But in 1968,
Roger Garaudy was chosen instead of him to represent the intellectuals in the
Political Bureau.
In the intervening period, there was indeed a"hitch": an article published in
the newspaper L'HUMANITE which appeared on 3 May 1968 under Marcfiais' signaCure. ,
But it had been written by Juquin who was responsible for matters of education
_ within the party. DeveZopments were to prove that his analysis was wrong (he
thought that Daniel Cohn-Bendit's agitation was leading to an impasse).
Juquin started his years of wandering in the wilderness. He had to wait until
- 1974 before he assumed responsibilities on a national level and until 1979 be-
fore he could finally enter the Political Bureau (21 members)--11 years of pur-
gatory.
"He owes his second chance to the friendship that Georges Marchais feels towards
- him," his associates claim.
Juquin has alwaya manifested the greatest solicitude towards his mentor. When
Marchais was questioned by ~ournalists at the Press Club of Europe I[radio sta- ;
tion] about his stay in Germany during the war, Gaston Plissonn~er, the party ,
political boss, helped hi.m to prepare his defense together ~ri.th Juquin.
Reward
He is "responsible fox promoting the struggle of ideas, in~ormation, press and the
struggle for freedoms" in the party. A position which gives him overall control
of L'HUMANITE and makes him a privileged interlocutor with the mass media. Hence ~
his new notoriety. ~
Undoubtedly, the career of this man who is the sc~n of an assistant suryeyor of the
SNCF jFrench National Railway Company] and the father of two children, has not
reached its peak as yet. Within the party, and short o~ getting the general secre-
tariat, he still has to win a position in the Central Co~mmittee secretariat (seven
members).
On a local level, he must establish his authority and could be a candidate to suc-
ceed Brosseau, cac~unist councilman and mayor of Savigny, who died last week. '
Those are targets within his reach. His only outstanding failure was the oral ;
philosophy test in the examination to enter th~ Eco1e Normale Superieure where
- he went, it is said, encouraged by his shrewd schoolmaster. The name of the
examine:r was Maurice Merleau-Ponty. ~
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "Valeurs Actuelles"
8796 ~
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
STOLERU INTERVIEWED ON STATUS OF IMMIGRANTS
Paris VALEURS ACTIIELLES in French 6 Oct 80 p 41
[Interview with Lionel Stoleru, secretary of state for the�condition of immigrant
workers, by Francois Lebrette; date and place not given]
jText] jQuestion] For several years now, you have been pramoting a policy of
return for the immigrants. Does the French-Algerian agreement, signed on
18 September, indicate a real progreas?
[AnswerJ ~ao years ago, nobody believed that France and Algeria could reaeh an
agreement on sending workers back, nobody thought that there could be coopera-
_ tion in that sphere. But here is s aign that cannot be misleading: no sooner
was the agreement signed that several countries, including Tunisia, notified us
that they were interested in that formula.
jQuestion.] Won't the cost that France has to pay be out of proportion with the
expected result?
[~.nswer] On the contrary, the agreement is very advantageous for France: the �
return allowance amounts to approximately a 4-month salary which is far less
than the cost of unemployment benefits today.
jQuestion] You also ~ustified that agreement by referring to the 4 billion
francs surplus balance in our trade exch~nges with Algeria. Isn't that balance,
in fact, a French subsidy to Algeria disguised as loans? At present, Algeria's
aggregated deht amounts to 100 billion francs
jAnswer] I did say that should we break off with Algeria, the flow of gas and
oil would he turned off, our exports would disappear and, as a result, many 3obs
would be lost: 4 hillions worth of ~nports against 8 billions worth of exports.
Speaking in texms of ~obs, the imported oil products do not result in a loss of
any ~obs while the 8 billions worth of exports represent very real ~obs.
[Question.J How can you reconcile tbe figures mentioned in connection with the
agreement: 700 million francs for 105,000 departures?
[AnswerJ Very eas~ly. It is expected that one-third of those returning wLll
not require any financial`incentive or special training. As for the aesistance
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in the creation of enterprises, it will probahly be very ma,rginal. Finally, the
figure of 35,000 returns per year will onlp be reached progressivelp.
_ [Question] Based on our past experience, can we believe that so many workers
will voluntarily decide to go back?
[Answer] This is already happening but it is difficult to establish figures. The
Algerians claim that tens of thousands are returning every yea.r but we do not have
any proof: those who leave take their work permit cards with them and we have no
way of knowing that they will not be used again. By them or by others. But from _
now on, the picture will be clearer since the cards will be systematically handed
over to the French Government before departure.
[Question] Are the incentives to depart and to be resettled sufficient?
[Answer~ Of course, financial aid is only a trigger factor: nobody has been
persuaded to go b ack by 13,000 francs. But the agreement contains advantages
_ which are far more important than the allowance: a journey which is taken care
of, cuatoms facilities and accomodation on arrival. In ttlis bilateral frane-
- work, both goverrnnents take care of the fam3ly who applies to go back from the
moment of departure till the moment of arrival.
[Question] This cooperation on departures, does it not run the risk of being -
cancelled out by new arrivals?
[Answer] There is no new immigration, that has ended. In 1972, we still issued
10,000 work permit cards per month. Last year, counting the refugees from Latin
America and Southeast Asia, I only signed 80 cards per month; these were special
cases dealing with exceptional family situations. .
jQuestionJ Does not your policy imply that anybody who wants to remain is en- ~
titled to do so?
[Answer] We knaw thaC a large se,gment of the foreign population will select to _
remain here forever. France has always beei~. a countrp which welcames people and
immigrants. But since 1968, the ~rork permit cards ~rere automa.tically renewed
every 10 years. Now, they will be renecaed for a period of 3 years and 3 months
the same as the interim agreement. When th~ agreement expires, we shall reex-
~ amine the situation on the basis of the results obtained. The main thing now is ;
that after 25 years of people iimnigrat~ng to France, we have started getting
Chem to go hack forced to do so by unemployment. The fact that Algeria recog-
nizes thia new necessity is a big aehievement for us.
COPYRIGHT: 19.80 "Yaleurs Actuelles"
8796 .
CSO: 3100
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COtJNTRY S~CTION ~ FRAYCE
- TERRORIST ORGANI2ATIONS INFII,TRATE POLICE FORCE ~
Paris L~ N~WE'L QBS~tVATEUR in F'rench 27 Sep-5 Oct 80 p 39
[Article by Georges I~:arion: "Well Protected Fascists" : For
related article please see JPRS 76730, 30 October 1980, No. 1647 of this
aeries pp 29-36~
[Text ] Direct Ac.tion b.x~o.ken up; 1200 kg of explosives dis-
covered on a farm in Ardeche, the formex~ girl frier~d of Pierre
Conty and two other persons arrested last week. Coming after
the exciting capture of Jean-Marc Rouillan and Natha].ie Menigon,
it seems clear that, this time, it should be the end of the
terrorist organization. At the headquarters of the criminal
police, they are rubbing their hands with glee and revealing,
'~in confidence," the trick wh~.ch permitted lightning fast
operation: the infiltration by a police officer ~rom RG
jIntel.ligence] into the network. It was the police officer
who succeeded in luring the terrorists into a trap b~ promising
them a meeting with the eluaive Carlos. In th9 langua~e of _
the police, it was what is callad a"fine ~ob."
On the other front, however, it is a different story: the
fascist tarrorists ma.ke free use of' Uombs and P~olotov cocktails,
whil~ the police remain powerless. The latest target9: Henri
Ilogueres and Salomon Milgrom. During the night of 21-22 Septem-
ber, in Paris, an incendiary device destroyed the apartment of
the daughter of Noguer~s, a law~er and chairman of the League
_ of the Rights of Man. At the same time, a f ire set by an
arsonist destroyed the business place of Milgrom, who was a
_ Jewish merchant in tha Sentier distr3.ct. During the night of
25-26 September, again in Paris, a Jewish synagogue, nursery
and school, as well as the memorial to the urilil~nnown ~'ewish -
martyr were machine-gunned. In all these cases, there is no
doubt about the origin of the attacks: at the home of Henri
Nogueres, the police discovered about a dozen squares of cloth
bearing the swastika and, the next day, the network calling
itself '~The Honor of the Police," took eredit for the attacks.
As for Salomon Milgrom, the walls of his store were covered
- with iiitlorian sl.ogans and symbols.
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.
These attacks, which closely follow the trial of Marc Fredriksen, -
head of the farmer FANE (National and ~,uropean Action Federa-
= tion), charged with inciting racial hatred, were predictable.
An anonymous mess age had announced that if the fascist head
were convicted, a dozen people, identified by name, would have
- to fear for their lives. The verdict against Fredriksen will
not be handed down until next 17 Octob~r, but his followers have ~
already gone into action. With the obvious intention of intimi-
dation.
- In a few months, some 30 similar attacks have been perpetrated, -
- aimed at Jewish stores and also buildin~s inhanited by immi- _
grant rloslems, offices of antiracist building or leftist
bookstores. Anti- Jewish or anti-Arab '~pogroms" accompanied
them. '~Tith few exceptions, due, for the moat pert, to chance,
the police have no t discovered the perpetrators. Worse, the -
courts have been lenient with them and severe with the victims... -
On last 2 June, two FANE militants were arrested in Clichy-
sous-Bois with, in their car, clubs and P~folotov cocktails,
- Avoiding any s9rious investigation, even though 3 days earlier =
an Algerian had been attacked with a razor~ not far from there,
the prosecutor of the Republic turne~ over the young I~Tazis to ~
- the criminal court, which condemned them ~0 4 months in pris~n,
- with a suspended sentence. Two weeks later, six young Algerians,
armed with clubs and determined to protect their conununit~, were '
arrested in turn. They are still in priso n, awaiting trial and
- may be eapelled.
Wh~t kinds of help are these French Nazis receiving? Asking for .
~ the formation of a parliamentar~ investigat~on committee, the
General Police Unio n, the main organization of' the Paris
"gardiens de la p aix," "wonders about the few serious results
which have been obtained at the end of these investigations'~
and condemns "those who spread or allow to allow to be spread
a racist and fascist ideology in certain branches of the police."
For its part, the National Autonflm~ous Union of Plainclothea
Police, which counts aa members 80 percent of the inspectors of _
the National Police, reveels that an inspector working in an
important ~ob in the personnel office and in the police academies
wasa member of the former FANE. An isolated example? It is
now certain that the organization which has been dissolved had
in its ranks a sizeable number of police--30 out out of 500
members:--and that in certain branches, in particular the
Paris RG branch, assigned to th~a surveillance of the extreme
right, fascist po lice are not rare. It is not surprising that, :
under these conditions, the Criminal Brigade often lacks infor-
mation which would allow it to make progresa in their investi- _
gati~.:,zs of fasci~t attacks.
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Effective against Direct Action, inuperative against the extreme
- right, the police are on the carpet. But, for many, the reasons
for this strange situation is a problem which has gotten ou~ of
- hand. Determined, a spokesman for the Jewish Defense League, _
which ~ras organized after the attack on the university restaurant
on the Rue de Medicis in 1979, explains : "The Naz is are go ing
_ to pay dearly for the freedom to caT.l themselves Nazis. The
police have done nothing to protect us. After the next attack,
some of us have decided to go very far in repris al. Right up
to the irr~eperable." A dangereus, eaplosive situation whic;h
can only be changed by the ssrest of the thugs belongi.ng to
the extreme right. Is that really so dif:'~icult?
COP.YRIGHT: 1980 "Le Nouvel Observateur"i =
8956
cso : 3100
- e~,
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i
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE _
h
_
I
i
POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ATTACK IMPLIED
_ Paris L'EXPRESS in French 11 Oct 80 pp 125-126
_ [Article by Liliane Sichler and Jacques Derogy: "Police: the Crisis of Confi-
_ dence"] ;
[Text) After the crime in Rue Copernic, the police are investigating, the police ;
are accusing, the police are accused.
- The inveatigation? In the Central Department of General Intelligence, the data ~
card~ are piling up by the hundreds. "We are not suffering from a shortage of ~
- trails to follow," remarks a General Intelligence inspector, "but from an excess."
What about the accusations disclosing infiltration into the police by neo-Nazi
elements? Everyone is holding his breath after the shattering declarations by the
Independent Federation of Police Trade Uniona. The accused? A shadowy list of
- 30 names of police officers is circulating. No one has seen it; even those who
talk about it refuse to give details.
~
To arrive at this hodgepodge of anathemas and convulsive passion, a crime was nec- :
eseary--the butchery of a racist, anti-Semitic outrage that reawakens the night- ,
mares just below the surface.
On Friday 3 October, there were many children in the temple of the Israeli LiberaL ~
" Union on Rue Copernic. It was the "Joy of the Tora" (Simhat Thora) feast day, and
in accordance with tradition, the youngest were going to receive sweets and exotic
fruits. Seventeen meters away, assassins were watching. They had parked a Suzuki
125 motorcycle on the sidewalk acroas the ~treet, ite bags full of explosives. At
1838 hours, a few minutes before the esit of the 300 faithful, the str~et was sud-
denly ripped open. The mixed odor of smoke and coagulated blood in the gutters
grabbed at the throat. Four dead, torn to pieces. Wounded screaming in pain
were laid out on the tables of the Cafe Le Villarceau, transfnrmed into an opsrat-
ing room. All of France woke up and shuddered: "they" have dared, "they" have ~
etarted in again. ;
"We Are Hitting from ~11 Sides"
"They," ln public opinion, and there is no doubt about it, are the fascists, the
~ neo-Nazis, the racists, the underground forces of a terrifying Black Internation- -
al. For the men of Commissioner Marcel Leclerc, the boss af the Criminal Brigade,
_ things are not so simple: "We are hitting from all sides." The hypothesis of far-
_ right outrage is cnly one of the possibilities being considered. Another trail is
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being followed: that of a foreign plot. On ~a~-.;,rday, General Intlligence was
talking about a node of black terrorism in Belgium. On Monday evening, two tiny
neo-Nazi groups were under examination--La Nouvelle Acropole [The New Acropolis]
and Totenkopf (literally, Death's Head). Finally, the idea emerged on Wednesday
that the bombers came from the Near East.
In the Criminal Brigade, 160 policemen are mobilized. Some 20 fascist militants
have been interrogated, then released. Out of 100 militants of the former FANE
(National European Action Federation), 96 have given information to the police.
It includes gosaip, tattle, jealousies, etc, and it is difficult to sort through.
At the site of the outrage, the police are scraping for any clue, no matter how
small, For the moment, they have only one serious trail to follow: the carbonized
motorcycle. It is the only vehicle that has not been claimed. From the engine
number it has been possible to identify its most recent owner--a holder of a Cyp-
riot pasaport, �aho, according to the police, r~poke good French with a Middle East
~ accent. He bought the Suzuki in France, with dollars. The strange buyer's trail
was picked up in a Paris hotel, Le Celtic. Too late. He spent only one night
there--likewise paid for in dollars. He disappeared on 22 September.
On Thursday, though, no line of inquiry was a favorite yet: on the demand of the
Court of State Security, warrants have been issued in the Rhone, Isere and Drome
departments. Several persons in~them have been questioned.
Wearing tennis shoes and shabby clothes and with circles under their eyes, the in-
spectors pass one another on the monumental stairways of 36 qusi des Orfevres.
Arit-like work goes on day and night.
While the Criminal Investigation police are quite tight-lipped, policemen else-
where are talking and accusing, microphone in hand. "naenty perc~nt of the mem-
bers of the former FANE are Policemen, Christian Bonnet, minister of interior,
is in possession of a complete list of this neo-Nazi group." Jose Deltorn, sec-
retary general of the Independent National Trade Union of.Plain-Clothes Police
Officers (SNAPC), chose the solernnity of a p~ess conference, the morning after
the outrage, to make these revelations. Henri Buch, in the name of the Indepen-
dent Federation of Police Trade Unions, went farther: "The top hierarchy of the
police knows about this, there are complicities...." These men through whom the
scandal is coming out are not unsettled persons or more or less irresponsible
extremists. They represent 80 percent of the plain-clothes and unif4rmed po-
lice. Why, khen? '
At the headquarters of the SNAPC, in Rue de Lyon, the telephone rings constant-
ly. Rank-and-file policement grumble and gripe. "I was called a fascist in my
apartment building this morning." "You're not improving our image." "If you
keep on, I'm resigning...." Deltorn, his face blurred behind enormous eye-
glasses, drawls in a sunny accent: "It is not easy, for a policeman, to do what
I am doing. Our rank and file were not prepared for this kind of action, we are
going to expldin ourselves."
Called to the Inspectorate General of the National Police (IGPN) on Monday, Del-
torn softened his remarks a little. "I had said that the minister was aware of
this; I meant to say the hierarchy.... I said that information had been delib-
erately withheld, but I simply wanted to raise a question that it was important
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to raise." Buch, ~slled to the IGPN the same day, declared that he had "handed
over some new items that he would later provide to the higher organisms. The
- ball," he said, "is now in the minister of interior's court."
What iteme, what ball? Everyone is on pins and needles. Who are theae 30 po-
licemen whose namea are euppoaed to be on the liet seized from the FANE? Who
are theae black eheep of the police? The trade unions obstinately refuae to
give the namea. They assure that the liat aeized by the Criminal Investigation
police had to be transmitted to the highest level. If, by chance, it has not
arrived there, they demand to know at what level the information was blocked.
No one seriously thinks that the assassins or the accomplices of the assassins _
of Rue Copernic are to be found on this elusive list. But in the face of the
horror awakened by the Nazi outrage, what ia being manifested is perhaps the .
symptoms of a very old malady of the police.
The Miniatry's "Mole"
_ Nazi police? Racist police? No, quite obviously. The trade uniona are the
_ first to speak of isolated events, a"tiny handful of undesirables." But every- -
one knows that there have been precedents--the Charonne metro massacre in Febru-
, ary 1962, by policemen of a prefecture company who were never restless; the re-
inatatement into the police of those "purged" at the Liberation, thanka to pre-
fec Jean Baylot, in 1951; and then those engaged in far-right movements in 1958. -
In his book "La Police, pour Qui? Avec Qui?" [The Police--For Whom? ~With
Whom?], Gerard Monate, the former secretary general of the Federation of Police
Trade Unions, accused two trade unions--the Middle-Ranks Union and the Indepen-
dent Trade Union--of deriving from the former Friendly Society of those "alien-
ated" from the administration, the purged.
01d diatressea, old obse~sions, old shames are thus surfacing again. Even if
the poli~e hierarchy expresses surprise: "Racists, did yau say? Impossible!
- Nazis? Ridiculous!" Even if the 30 police officers who are supposed to have
belonged to the FANE have never existed. There are some facts that legitimize
all the questions.
In 1975, police sergeant Jacques Delmas was sentenced, in the court of first in-
stance and on appeal, to 2 years for having emasculated an Arab in the police
station of the 5th Arrondissement of Paris. The administration obt~ined the
preaident of the republic's pardon for him. Delmas did not spend a single day
in prison; he was simply removed from his duties in the Public Security depart-
ment.
On 3 September 1974, Sergeant Marchaudon killed the perpetrator of a holdup. He
had to be overpowered to keep him fro~ killing the other bandits. The matter _
w~s shelved and had no sequel. Three days later, he killed an Algerian pick-
pocket at the Anvers metro station. The cas.:'was diamissed on 24 June 1977.
Transferred to the Sceaux police station, on.:.''3 August 1977 he killed Mustapha
Boukh~zzer at point blank. Suspended, he is still under criminal inveatigation,
but he has become one of the "martyrs" of the Legitimate Defense organization,
whose gospel he propagates from police station to police station.
Theae are a few "case histories" which by themselves created an atmosphere, a
favorable ground for many accusations. The list--true or false--of the 30 Po-
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lice officera in the FANE underlines a crieis, a malaise that has hung over the
police for a long time. "I.Pt them give me names," exclaims Marcel Bonnecarrere,
director of peraonnel and schools; "what ia thia mysterious list?"
~ In the Yolice Department adminiatration, they swear that acarcely five names are
involved, listed under the heading "policemen to contact," in a notebook seized
from the entourage of Marc Fredriksen, the "fuhrer" of the former FANE. As for
the neo-Nazi "mole" who infiltrated the Ministry of Interior, Bonnecarrere now
admits that he has known his name since the Durand affair: "I put trust in him,
I made inquiriee, and no one can accuse this man of anything. He does not be-
long to any organization. And I know that the crime of opinion does not yet
exist in France."
~riminal investigation may be exiling the phantoms of the neo-Nazi nightmare to-
ward the Mediterranean basin. This police crisis will have made it pcssible,
despite everything, to drive a raving fauna of French Nazis into the orbit of a
far more formidable Terrorist International.
COPYRIGHT: 1980, S.A. Groupe Express
11267
CSO: 3100
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_ C(~IMTIZY S~C'CION ITALY
~
i1NI('N T.EADER DISPllTE5 MINI5TER C`N LABC'R MCBILITY
Sta.tement by La.bor Minister
Milan TL SC~I~E-24 C`HE in Ita.lian 4 Qet 80 p 1 _
[Signed sta.tement by Minister of Labor F~anco Foachi1
[Text~ The most heated discussions have developed around the
sub~ect of labor mobility. We are publishing herexith a _
atatement by Minister Foschi on this sub3ect.
In the course of the Fiat dispute I have been accused. on severa.l sides of being
= opposed to mobility. In reality (arxi I have attempted on various occasions to
explain this) the problems are very complex both from the contra,ctual standpoint
and in genera.l. For this reason I believa it appa~opriate to clarify--at least in
its general aspects--the viexe of the mini~ater of labor on this sensitive sub3ect.
The request for an active labor policy must be reconciled xith an economy such as
the Italian economy~ xhich is incorpora.ted into the broader xorld ma.rketa: an
economy which--beca.use it has to take into account the necessary technical progress _
and the changes in world and domestic demand--tenda continuowsly to produce sur-
_ pluses and shortages of manpoWer at the various stages in the economic system.
When these phenomena are not rapidly reabsorbed.~ the effect on the enterprise system
is negativa. -
The problem of mobility is therefore of �undamenta.l importance. It is ba.siaally a
- question of transforming into variable coets those costs xhich have become fixeii
labor costa~ so as to give companiea greater flexibili~y in the utilization of their
labor for.ce While at the same time~ taking advantage--together rrith the labor cor.fed-
era.tions--of the opportunity to adopt new forn~ of e~ployuent on a predetexhnined
variable schedule. This should inerease employment and avoid recourse to foreign
labor. contract labor and home labor--that is to ~ay, an unetable labor supply.
An active policy, and th~ need for creating t,he instruments essential to implemen-
tation of that policy, should therefore be the ob~ect of a mexi.aum effort on the
part of the Mini~try of Iabor. Moreover, agreement has been achieved among all the
political forcea to support this polioy--because the delica,te na.ture of the problem,
and the urgent neces$ity of a eolution, could not escape the attention of these
forces. _
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The problems of the labor ma,rket require first of all an ~updating of an information -
syetem that is today seriously inadequate, so as to ma~.e possible a timely determi- -
na,tion of the trands in supply and. demand, a,nd also t;ne developaaent of the necessary
experimentation Hith respect to the measures to be adopted and tt~e choices to be
mRde.
If occupe,tional imbalances of a quantitative nature persist in particular p,eograph-
ical regiona~ the specific problem xill be the impoesibility of striking a balance
betxeen supply and demand in the labor market because of the qualitative differen-
tiatiot~s xhich characterize them.
These efforts xould be reinforced by entrusting the collabora.ting regional and
_ district oxgans xith more serious tasks, including ttfose sensitive functions ~+hich
axe acknowledged to be theirs in the interest of achieving mobility. In this
- context, the profound innovations introduced should make it posaible to atta,in the
qoal of reemploying the surplus Korkere srhile reconciling this necessity xith the
. need for guaranteeing the right to xork to those xho have never four~d employment.
The principle of ha.rmonizing the rosters of xorkers xho are in a sta.te of mobility
- with those of the unemployed--a p~inciple borroked in essence from the 19 July 1979
agreement concluded for the meta.lKOrkers of the private sector--is situa.ted in a
context xhich is quite different f~om the one identified in the laK of 12 August
1977, No 675, the implementary gapss in xhich are quite obvious.
This measure ls equa.lly definitive by virtue of the fact that it has provided a
xell-defined arrangeroent for observation of the phenomena that tend to characterize -
the labor market.
Reply to I,abor Minister
Milan IL SOTE-24 RRF in I~ta3.ian 5 Oct 80 p 2 ~
[Signed statement by Felice Mortillaxo, director general of FEDERMECCANICA~ ~
~Text~ Felice Mortillaro, director genera.l of FEI7FRMECGANICA, ~
t~day repl.i.c:d to Nlinister of Labor Poscf~i's statemenl (released
~ y~~SL~~rday), cm thr: subject of l~bor mobility.
In Italy the subject of labor mobility has been diacussed for at least 6 years,
durin~ xhich time the government organs, the politica.l gartiea and the unions them-
sel.ves have had to accept the evidenee of a xorld economic situation that has not
allow~d (and does not allow) our compa,nies to esca.pe from the stern lax that
compels the utilization of la.bor (and therefore the defrayment of the costs of that
labor) in ac~ordance with the requirements of the roarket, which reflect one thing
and one thing onlys the dema.hd on the part of millions of consumers all of xhom--
whe; they select a groduct--are acting in conformity with the implacable laK of the
grreatest benefit.
Mobility therefore means the utilization of manpoxer where the actua.l need for it
exists, with a view to producing goods competitively~ at prices which axe the most
appropriata to the quality of the goods and the purcha.sing power of the consumer..
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These are obvious considera.tions which for a long time have been disregarded in
Italy, where in many cases an ef.fort has been made to protect ~obs after the need
for the labor they represent has ceaaed. to exist--beca.use the goods produced by
that labor ha.ve subsequently been diaplaced by other g~oods xhich are of superior
qua,li.ty at~d offered at loNer prices.
Hoxever. alti~~�~gh everyone professes to agree in principle xith these "truths"
little has been done so far to translate them into reality: that is to say,
little has been done to prepare the technical and social instruments that ~?ill make
it feasible--on the Italian political and economic scene--to carry out a,n operation
such as fox exam~le the "Labor Mobility" operation, xhich impacts delica,te ba.lances
involving individual interesta, habits, ax~d personal relationships which ba.sically
constitute the motivation for living of millions of human beings.
The 16 [sic~] July 1979 I~litica.l contract of the metalworkers esta,blished rather
- precise and caordinated procedures for transferring "labor mobility" from the r~alm .
of debate to that of everyday reality. I xant to emphasize (and can do so because
~ I personally participated in the negotiations le~,ding to conclusion of the agree-
ment) that these ~rocedures were painstakingly considered, thoroughly discussed and
meticulously negotiated, and arc not, as alleged, a mere indication to future
legislators. They xere supported by the unions as an "historic" decisions "hia-
toric" in the senae that they ma.rked--for the la.bor movement--the tranaition from a
- last-ditch defense of existing ~obs to a pollcy that gets the labor force back into
the me.rket without neglecting the defense of the individual worker. The fact that
- today, in the Fiat cor~fliet, the unions axe refusing to apply these provisions and
are finding authoritative supporters for their position should open everyone's eyes
to the fact tha.t industrial relations in Ita,ly are becoming increasingly ungovern-
able. _
The procedures fox mobility that are set forth in the metalworkere' contra.et axe too
Nell known to require repetition here. It should be noted, hoxever, that they can
be applied immediately by utilizing existing law~. It is a question of the killing-
- ness of the government organs and the unions to set in motion a mechanism Khich ca,n
function quickly and xell and na.turally xill be directed xith care.
An organic mea.sure to pro~ide for labor mobility is aesuredly necessary. Pending
action by the legislators, however, let us implement xhat has already been accom-
pliahed at ~:eat cost and xith great effort. It Kould be--among other things--a
not inconsiderable opportunity to reevaluate the function of the collective indus-
txy-Wide contra,cts, xhich continue to be the target of blotrs that kill ultimately
result in their destruction. -
0(?PYRIGHT: 1980 Editrice I1 Sole 24 Ore s.r.l. .
10992
cso: 3104
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
- GRANDI INTERVIEWED ON ENI'S ENERGY POLICY
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 4 Oct 80 p 13
[Interview with Alberto Grandi by Alberto Mucci: "ENI Counts Heavily on Coal;
Results of U.S. Trip"]
[Text] Alberto Grandi has been president of ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] for
little more than 4 months. He repeated, "no interviews. You will judge me by my
deeds." Hia first commitment? "To close the open meetings of the Group Companies, ,
to give directives after the power vacuum created by the well-known events of the
'E1VI Summit."' Today he decided to speak. It was a 3-hour discussion in the EUR
skyacraper. A~ had no notes or data. An i.nternational cyclone blowe from the
Middle East that can have important consequences if that cyc]~one is not confined;
another cyclone has directly and heavily involved ENI and is tied to the fall of
the "big economic decree:" Important commitments risk collapaing; completed programs
can be subject to profound changes. Grandi is confident, as befits a businesaman
who believes in professional commitment. But he does not hide the difficulties from
himself. There is the question of the chemical industry with SIR and Liquichimica;
there is the petroleum question linked to strategic stockpiles; there is the matter
of settling relations witr *.he Monti group; there is the energy plan that changes
the map, focussing on coal:..
[t~uestion] Engineer Grandi, do these cyclones lead to a change of strategy, to a
, rediscusaion of commitments taken; or is ENI equipped to rasist the blows of sudden
_ storms? Let us begin with the war between Iraq and Iran.
[Answer] Certainly, but I must say immediately that ENI for some time has followed
a strategy of diversification of energy s;~urces. The conflict in the Middle East
poses industrial and organizational problems for us; we have brought our workers
and their families home and all this will create, beyond the developments of the
war, delays tn the completion of current pro~ects and questions concerning future
pro,jects. But for the time being ther.e is no supply problem. T.wo days ago I
authorized one of our tankers to pasa thr.ough tlie Straits of Hormuz: It wi11 load
_ crude in the Persian Gulf. From Iraq we import 10 million tons per year, equal to
25 percent of the petroleum acquired by ENI (10 percent of the national supply).
- We are ~.,~vered until the end of the year. And I Y:ope that in the meantime those
nations with which we have above all good relations will return in peace!
[Question] But there are the 10 milI.ion tons you mention, while Iraq has let it
be known that it has blocked supplies for the time being.
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[AnswerJ The 10 million tons is the annual supply and we are already in the month
of October. Therefore the eventual shortage, at least for 1980, is a lot lower.
In any case, in the last trip to the United States with Miniater Bisaglia, I obtained
an option on crude from an American company which would permit me to make up for the
ahort�all. The appropriate AGIP [National Italian Oil Company] officials are dis-
cussing te~ms of supply with their counterparts.
[Question] For the moment, therefore, we need aot worry. There are the necessary
stockpiles; possible "holes" will be covered. Then let us turn our attention to
the medium-term strategy. There is the revival of coal. You went to the United
- States with Bisaglia after having made trips to Iraq, Kuwait and to Algeria. What
_ is the overall picture?
[Answer] ENI counts on a still more marked internationalization, on a diversifica-
tion of the sources of supply and the energy sources themselves. All this, as far
as ENI is concerned, involves an organizational plan and a rationalization, an
improvement of our activities, a bureaucratic refinement and the reduction of
centrifugal tendencies.
- [Question] Let us proceed in an orderly fashion, Mr President. ENI is seeking new
supply areas (the North Sea beyond the 62nd Parallel, for example). But in the
meantime the sub~ect of coal is an immediate one...
[AnswerJ Yes. Not only is it necessary to diversify the sources of supply, but
it is also indispensable to reduce the relative weight of petroleum in the mix of
energy products used to satisfy the overall national consumption. That ts, the
consumption of certain products would have to be favored, such as for example
methane and coal, without neglecting nuclear power and certain other alternative
sources which become competitive as the price of petroleum rises. ENI has done
much and can still do much more. But the problem also and above all must be
- answered in political terms.
[Question] Coal, then, which has been rediscovered by the new Italian energy plan.
The "big decree" appropriates 60 billion lire for SULCIS; did you discuss this
possibility in the United States?
- [Answer] Here we enter into the substance of the Italian position. But I would
like immediately to report some news that in my view is positive and important.
We made an agreement with ENEL [National Electric Power Agency]: Coal from the
mining activities in which we participate, or in whict-~ we will participate in joint
- ventures with companies or agencies of individual countries, will be absorbed by
EI3EL on the basis of agreements ~hat wi11 be stipulated by a special ~oint committee.
The hypothesis is to produce enough coal to cover 50 percent of ENEL's need. Another
piece of news: In the very recent trip to the United States we established the
basis for entering into important American research projects into de-sulfurization,
degasification, and the liquefaction of coal. These procedures are indispensable
to permit use of coal by SULCIS. And Chere is the specific possibility that the
American Department of Energy or U.S. companies will make agreements, and even
industrial agreements, with us for the exploitation of Sardinian coal. In 1985 to
1986 we could ext_ract 3.5 million tons of coal.
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[Question] But at what price? And wouldn't the collapse of the economic "big
decree" which appropriated 60 billion lire make possibilities more remote?
[Answer] We shall see. The political forces are committed to overcoming the impasse.
Certainly no one can think of cancelling measures of such vast social and national
acope. Regarding the price, it will be in line with those on the international mar-
ket. The energy plan puts the cost of a kilowatt hour produced by a coal-burning
plant midway between the cost of a similar kilowatt hour from a nuclear power plant
and that produced by a thermoelectric plant. But Italian nuclear power plants today
face construction difficulties. Even if--as I hope--this pre~udicially negative
_ poaition can be over come, it will be difficult ta develop them in adequate numbers
in this decade.
[Question] And what about Algerian gas? Where are we after your recent visit?
And here too there is a problem of price~..
[Answer] The problem of Algerian gas belongs in the framework of the supply program -
of gas in the near future. ENI believes that it must increase the quantity imported
within the framework of diversification of sources: And where possible, vary the
geographical source. In the meanwhile, the present imports of Dutch and Soviet gas
(we are now negotiating in order to evaluate the possibility of buying new Soviet
gas) carried to Europe through the planned mastodontic gas pipeline from Siberia,
in whose construction ENI has hopes of participating, and that coming from Libya
- in the form of liquefied gas, will be added also the gas that will come from Algeria
through the methane pipeline, the formidable engineerfng pro~ect completed by companies
of our group. From Hassi R'Mel it will reach Italy through the Sicilian Canal.
. Prices are being discussed for all these supplies, taking into account that the
present market does not permit precise points of reference. However, I believe
that a solution could be found if we should run into notable methodological differ-
ences in the definition of price by resorting to short-term contracts.
[Queation] ENI is being called to new tasks. SULCIS rained down on it as a result
- of the collapse of EGAM [Agency for the Management of Mineral and Metallurgical
Concerns]; now it must "activate" the so-called "public pole" of the chemical indus-
try, and then there is the matter of settling Monti, with journalistic polemics
that also touch it personally.
- [Anawer] If you want, I also can engage in polemics, but before entering into the
merits of the question, I am anxioua to repeat that ENI is not a company integrated
with community service in name only. We have a precise role, and we carry it out ;
an the basis of business criteria. The cost-benefit comparison is read by me and
my collaboratora with extreme care. We are proceeding on the road of "homogeniza-
tion" of the businesses we have absorbed and of those which, by our choice, we
found it necessary to b~iy in function of a precise strategy of efficiency.
[Question] Does that statement refer to the discussion about the Monti group?
[Answerj Exactly. And I will now come to the merits. We have begun negotiation ;
for the acquisition of the Monti group's industrial activities because it was in
the intere4ts of ENI to do it. When I was named president, I immediately called
a meeting with the AGIP management to learn about the status of current contacts
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and reasons why AGIP had already made agreements on the purchase value of certain
plants. I discovered an AGTP priority interest in the purchase of the SAROM
[Elevator Company, Rome] of Ravenna (which was not under the administration of a
commissioner), for many reasons, all of which in my view were very valid (location,
agreement with ENEL for the supply of fuel oil to the nearby electric power plant
of Porto Tolle, exieting participation by ENI in the relative pipeline, the possi-
' bility of liaison with our IROM [Petroleum Refining Industry] refinery of Porto
Maxghera, etc.) -
~ AGIP, then, was interested in the MACH [Indnstrial Plants] distributi~in facilities,
for which it had already made a purchase offer in agreement with other companies, -
as well as the storage facilities of the Volpiano and Gaeta refineri.es, in the
event that by government regulations (Decree Law 655 presented to parliament on
14 January 1980) it would have had to take on the responsibility for supplying
administration of a considerable part of our country's strategic stockpiles. In
this case, it would have been necessary to build new storage facilities at much
higher cost over a longer period of time, leaving existing storage'facilities unused.
AGIP did not demonstrate great interest in the Mediterranea refinery (Milazzo),
instead demonstrating a willingness to participate as a min~rity interest in it if
its participation could have induced other interested parties to buy it.
[QuestionJ Then you confined yourself to advancing the AGIP proposals despite the
explosion, immediately after your entrance into EiVI, of the Kuwait trouble which
threatened a tawsuit against Monti?
[An~wer] Yes, Kuwait's position concerned the government considerably because it
could have caused irreparable harm with a nation that is an important supplier of
crude. I intervened and I created a mixed joint company administered by AGIP,
through which ENI controls the SAROM Financial Company and, consequently the
Ravenna Refinery, The price of SAROM Financial Company stock bought by GALFA of
the Monti group was 1,600 lire (when the value on the basis of accounting data
was 2,400 lire). Taking into account this difference and the fact that we held
the GALFA stock as collateral in the mixed company referred to, I can calmly say -
that the entry of ENI into the debtor position of the Mediterranea Company to Kuwait
is fully guaranteed even if the sale to~.third parties of the Milazzo Refinery by -
the receiver were by an absurd hypothesis to be for a zero sum. But there is more.
On the basis of the resumption of good relations between ENI and Kuwait, following
its entry into that position, we opened negotiations to purchase crude oil from
Kuwait and furthermore the possibility was advanced of a representation of the Kuwait
Petroleum Company in the Milazzo Refinery. All this can be finalized if the SIR
problem were to be resolved in a short time, because even that company was a Kuwait
_ debtor.
- ~Question] Then,even this settlement is delayed by the collapse of the economic
~ "decree?"
[Answer] That's right. I had a check ready to gay the debt to Kuwait, but it was
not signed. We will see.
[Question] The SIR problem is only a small part of the much more complex problem
of the chemical sector. Even here everything still has to be defined, while
Montedison shows a sharp increase in losses, following the recovery in the early
months of this year...
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[Answer] The limits of our intervention in SIR show up in the "economic big decree."
We await operational guidelines by the government in order to be able to define our
_ programs. Through the more efficient incorporation of company plants that will be
~idminister.ed by ENI, our programs aim toward the objective of creating lines ot _
production that also will be attractive to international producers. This will per-
mit not onZy the purchase of important financial shares (and therefore foreign
c~pital), but especially acquisition of more modern technologies and markets. In
this way, ENI will immediately take a position on the international chemistry mar.-
ket, in my view taking the only road possible to correct deficit situations that
otherwise could seriously and definitively compromise the economic solidity of the
Group. Naturally this possibility of rationalization of public chemical companies,
which I hope to achieve through foreign partlcipation, could be profitabl.y achieved
also through sectoral agreements with Montedison.
[Question] The social debate today is polarized around the employment theme. The
priority objectives you announced for ENI, when you took the position, are: Inter-
nationalization, rationalization of the chemical sector, careful administration of
energy sources. And what about employment?
[Answer] .Tust a minute. In my judgment industry cannot alone solve the country's ,
employment problems; this must be done in a broader context. ENI is a large devel- ~
opi~lg enterprise with precise programs that surely will be a tonic for employment
especially in some particularly delicate regions such as Sardinia and Sicily. The
possibilities of success are much broader the greater the cooperation between the
polit:ical forces and trade unions through confrontation onfactual data. Realism ~
- is needed. In particular, it is necessary to be able to implement a true reasoned
mobility which will permit us to close gaps and at the same time to open new possi- ~
bilities. A strategy of movement also is needed in the field of labor. We will
make an effort to explain it, and then to implement it.
The Group's Financia~. Profile
(Data refers to 280 controlled companies, in
~ billions of lire, as of 31 December 1979) '
Sales net of intragroup exchanges 18,403.7
Sales net oF taxes on petroleum products 15,655.4
Consolidated profits 42.1
Amortization 1,512.6
Investments 1979 1,545.5
rive-year in~estment plan 1980-84 15,703.8
Net .tndebtedness 7,092.8
Number of employees 121,257 ;
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
6034 ~ ~
CSO: 3104
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FOR OFFICIAI, LISF. ~~N],Y
Cl)UN'I'ItY SLCi'IUN ITALY
Cr,IT� SOCIALISTS DEFEND UNION AtJTONOMY
Milan ZL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 2 Oct $0 p 7
- [Article by Rita Bisestilel
[Text~ Milan--La,bor union autonomy is in danger: the exit of Berlinguer, who had
promised the support of the PCI [Italian Communist Party~ organization in the event
of the occupation of Fiat, is only the tip of the iceberg. _
Th1s problem has already been faced on numerous occasicns by the UIL [Ifi,a.lian Union
of La,bor~ and CISL [Ital.ian Confederation of La.bor Unions~. This time it is the
aocialist component of the ~IL [Italian General Confederation of Labor~ that is
involving itself with the problem and is not concealing ita fears and concerna
Yesterday in Milan the Lombard socialist cadres of the CGIL met "to discuss the
effects of the government crisisi the time and methods of organization of the prspax-
atory eonsultatio2'ts for EUR-3 and tlie problems oL- aiitononry."
In the course of the debate the political arxi organizationa,l aspects have suddenly
become issues of secondaxy importance. The most serious tensions pertain to rela-
tions xith the PCI and are manifested most violently among the ra,nk and file, gradu-
ally attenumting into attitudes that are increasingly cautious ar~d restrained as one
approaches the top levels of leaderehipi but this does not mean that there is any
ambiguity about the decision of fi,he sacialists to defend union autonomy against
interference by political parties.
The ha.rshest accuBation has come frnm a factory delegate: ~the ~,11-out agitation in
I?esio and Turin represents a return to methods of struggle concerning which the
~ unio n has already had second thoughts. The resuunption of these ~ethods is designed
solely to "obtain publicity for the party which ha.s talcen so~e hard knocks in an -
effort to regain votes." �
Validation of this hypothesis ca,n eeeningly be fourid in the ambiguous behavior of
the CGIL's communist element, which after recently acousing the socialists of having
frequently radicalized the struggle are them$elvea currently encowraging extremist
forms of agitation. Whereas we xere merely advancing a trade-union ~theais, hoWever,
_ the thesis that the communists are promoting today is ~ntirely political in tone.
3f, -
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Brum Marabeae, regional secretary of the FLM [Federation of Me+,alxorkers]~ has '
attempted to relate the diecuselon to obeervation o~ the reslity xith ~rhich Ke must ~
_ cope ~ the "all-out" atruggle~ are already in pmgreee, he esye , a~nd it 18 not aa
important nox to "take up the cudgele to contml the ga~e xith the oosmuniata as it -
ia to for~ a united front agai~nst th~ att4cks on the union."
= "we eoeialiete, " said Alberto Belloeehio ~ CGIY, regiona,l aecretary, in hi~ introduc-
tory report~ "deeire a unified OGIL that x111 lead to a retorxiet policy, and ar~y
interruption of this policy aannot ~ail to le~d to serioue diesen~sion." Bellocchio
had axpreeeed his oxn d~~sent by sharply ani reaolutely criticiz~.ng "the ir~tancea
, of intarPerence that have ocaurred in recent months in the affa.irs of tha union."
What meesulres are available to cope Mith the situ~tion? In the opinion af Mario
- Dido, a member of the European Parliament, the old xeapons are blunted and nex
capacities a~ nex instrument~ axe nece~sary to gua.r�ntee internal de~eocracy in the
' union and prevant exploitation of the dissansioii a~ong the extreais~ aactions.
Dido said �hat the PCI h~is not yet "d.ecided to accegrt the Fxoposition that the
union can be a pol~ticsl arbd econo~ic entity. Its concept of econ~omic democracy," ,
he added, "contiriues to ~ocus on the atate's role fn the economy and on the nation-
alization of private companies rather than on socialization of the econo~}? and the "
governtaent . "
Agostino Marianetti, deputy aecretary general of f.he CGIL, spoke at the conclusion
of the debate. He said it is nonetheleea ob~ectively f~apossible for a union euc=~~ ;
as this Italian union to firxi iteelf alMays--on each at~d every occasion--in circun-
st~,nces of the most complete autonoffiy. '
The C~IL componbnt is undoubtedly the one most exposed to thie danger, even iP the _
PSI does mt renounee ita tradition o~ independence and struggle in order to ensure
the autor~omy of the union.
"There ~ust be a limit to internal cotapetition, hoxever~" Ma~ian~tti declared, "eo
- that the strength and unity of the Working class laay be preeerved."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 ~ditriae I1 So1e~24 Ore s.r.l. _
-
i o992 -
t~o: 3104 ~
~
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALX
a
EFIM, IASM ODNCLUD~ AG~EMENT ON AID TO SOUTH
- Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Itaaian 3 Oot. 80 p 2
[Article by M.B.~ "A Greater ~E'IM Preeence in the South"]
[Text] Rome--In the expectation that the "~iou;.hernist" policy will find a nex lax
in xhich to inco rate ~.ts concepta, EF'IM ~I~anufacturing Induatry Holding and
Fi~.ncial Oompar~y~is p~epe~ring to b~ttle to nske ita pree~nce in the South -
increaeingly pervaeive. In this connection, an agreeaent has been ~igned Kith the
- IA3M [Inetitute for Aeisiatancs to the Development of the South] providing for ~
$yeteaatic collsboration bet~een th~ t~eo entitisa in the search for oaeee in the
eouthern regions where the preeence of enterpzi~ea belonging to the EF'IM group might _
be app~opria,te. The ob3ective is to activ~te 3oint ventures imrolving esall and
nedium-sized p~ivate eirterpriaes~ in accordance xith +the younger o~ the Ita?iaun
public entities ~ xhich is c,ha,rged xith operating in the area of nanudacturfng
initiativee of aodeBt diiensio~.
The role of the IASM will primarily be to serve as a charm~l betWeen the p~ivatA
entrepreneuPS and EFIM, involving a~tttual exchange of ir~or~ntion~ Peasibility -
atudiea ~ an3 ma,ricet research. A$ of nox the agreement ia valid uritil 31 December _
1981. and its renexal xill depend on the result~ it has produced in the meantime.
In ar~y event, these actior~s xill be in srddition to those irhich EFIM ia ~,lready
implementing in tI?e South, xhere--eince ~..he tiue IN3UD [New ~ni~zaziv~s, for the
South J(which several months ago passed under the 'control of CASMEZ [Fund for
Southern ICaly]) was still operating in its jurisdiction--the policy of productive
combinations with the private entrepreneurial sector has been chosen. It is a pro-
cess which has continued over a period of time and is now being implemented in the
- construction of a factory fo~t the manufacture of special heat-formed panels for
the construction industry and automotive industry; a plant to refine oils for the
" ' pharmaceutical industry; a detached facility of the Breda Research Institute; a -
new research center for mobile proteins; and an aquaculture facility.
This aggrega,te of initia.tives involves Campsni.a in particular, a,nd xith an invest-
ment of apgr~ximatsly 50 billiora lire should p~ovide for the occupe.tion o! nwre
than 500 units tha,t xill aerve to reabeorb the nanpoxer Mhieh x~ll beco~e aurplua
folloxing the restrueturation of certain enterpriaes of the Ital.ian Tobs,cco Ooapar~.
COPYRIGHT~ 1980 Dditrice Il Sole-24 ~re a.r.l. .
10992
cso, 31o~r =
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COUNTRY SECTION LUXEMBOURG
ECONOMIC SITUATION CONSIDEp.ED AMONG BEST IN WEST EUROPE
- Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 2 Oct 80 pp 22, 23, 26
[Article by Jaan. Pourbaix: "Bordering an Exhausted Belgium: The Prosperous Flower
Beds of Luxembourg's Garden"] ~
[TextJ The grand duchy of Luxembourg is so close to us, in so
many ways, that we only very partially ~udge the nonetheless
very perceptible differences that separate Belgium's and
Luxembourg's economies. Differences that, we have to say from
the outset, are quite to the credit of the grand duchy's cfti-
zens and quite to their legitimate advantage.
A comparison of *_he growth of Belgium's economy and of the grand duchy's economy--
to which the FINANCIAL BULLETIN of the Lambert Brussels Bank recently* devoted a
very interesting expose--showa that, in contrast to the difficulties of all sorts
that are afflictin~ our unfortunate Belgium, the grand duchy is en~oying a clearly
advantageous sit~~ation, that is certainly not due to the whims o.f chance. Further-
more this impxession is borne out by reading the ~.arge supplement on Luxembourg
that the ~INANCIAL TIMES published in the first half of September.
The Lowest Unemployment Rate in the Community
- Three basic evaluative factor$ brought out in the Lambert Bru~sels Bank survey make
it possible to judge how much better and healthi~r the grand duchy's economic situa-
- tion is than Belgium's.
First unemployment: 1,100 long-term unemployed in 1979 compared to 294,400 in
Belgium. "With a 0.7 percent unemployment rate in 1979, Luxembourg has the lowest
number of unemployed in the Community, while the 8.8 percent unemployment rate in
- Belgium is by far the highest of the Nine." �
Going on to public finance: It is on this very important level that the grand
duchy stands out the most brilliantly again'st the disorder reigning in Belgium.
"Government services in the grand duchy;" note the Lambert Brussels Bank experts,
*"Some Thoughts Concerning the Compared Growth of Belgium's and Luxembourg's -
- Economies," FII~ANCIAL BULLETIN: Lambert Brussels Bank, No 24, 1980.
. _ 39
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- "have been benefiting from a regular and sometimea relatively high surplus for 20
years. Their current revenue (taxes, Social Security and other contributions), -
expressed in percentages of the gross domestic product, ia among the highest in
the EEC and well exceeds their expenses."
So Luxembourg is currently the only country in the EEC to record a surplus 1.2
~ercent in 1980) in the public sector, while Belgium stands out with one of the
most excessive deficits 7.5 percent of the GDP) right below those of such uncom-
mendable countries as Italy 11.5 percent) and Ireland 11.2 percent).
The Only Balance of Payments of the Nine Showing a Surplus
It is not only on the public finance level that the grand duchy is outdoing Belgium
and all its European neighbors. It is also outdoing them with regard to balance of
~ payments, since the oil "shocks" the Achilles' heel of European economies.
The currEnt balance of payments of the grand duchy--whose stability, we know, influ-
_ ences the monetary state of health of every country--was already ahowing a large
surplus before the first oil crisis set off at the end of 1973. It was possible
to maintain this precious surplus a1tl~.ough in somewhat pared down amounts, during
the period that followed. Things went completely differently in Belgium: our '
country saw its surplus diminish completely and become, beginning in 1976, a deficit.
Of ~ourse, since 1973-74, Luxembourg has experienced a trade balance heavily burdened . ,
by the incidence of the extravagant rise in the price of oil products and other raw
materials.
In 1974, the grand duchy's balance of trade--the difference in the amounts of
exported and imported goods--still continued to register a positive balance of 9.4
billion francs. As positive as it was, this balance became progreasively negative
to the amount of 10.9 billion in 1977 and 12.5 billion francs in 197$. This--ines- ~
capable--deterioration of the trade balance has not prevented Luxembourg's overall
current payments or settlements with foreign countries from showing a surplus of
20 billion francs or thereabouts in recent years (18.1 billion in 1976, 21.0 billion
in 1977, and 21.7 billion in 1978). This is explained by the fact that rhe trade
deficit was more than balanced by the surplus brought in by payments for services. -
In other words, the negative balance of the trade balance found its antidote in ~
the positive balance in the balance of services: financial services fir~t of all,
but also air transportation, communication services, Luxembourg Radio-Television,
- European institutions, etc.
The "Service~" Precious Manna ~
In short, there where the trade balance for fiscal year 1978 (the latest known)
shows the previously mentioned deficit of 12.5 billion francs, the balance of ser- ~
vices is positive to the amount of 35.3 billion, while the positive valance was
only 15.:~ billion in 1974. It is not without interest to know that *_his saving. -
balance oP services is basically brought in by trading and investment revenues and
this for a net amount going from 12.8 billion francs in 1974 to approximately 28.4
billion in 1978, while the net product of "other services" advanced from 3 billion
to 7 billion in the same time period. ~
40 ~
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Consequently, according to the estimates of the Lambert Brussels Bank and corrobo-
rated by the statistics of the European Communities Commission, the grand duchy in
1980 will probably be the only country in the EEC to record a surplus in its cur-
= rent balance of payments.
The Luxembourg surplus (for a population of 358,000) could be as high as approxi-
mately 600 million ECU [expansion unknown], or approximately the equivalent of 24
billion francs. On the contrary, Belgium (9,860,000 inhabitants) in tts current
payments with foreign countries, will see a new "hole" open up--larger than that
of the preceding years--of 4 billion ~CU, the equi~valent of some 160 billion francs...
The least that we can say, seeing the excellence of the grand duchy's domestic and
foreign finances as well as its employment situation is, to quote the words of
Lambert Brussels, that "Luxembourg's ecc+nomy appears to be one of the most privileged
in West Europe," contrary to a dreadfull; handicapped and mortgaged Belgium economy.
After the ~ituation reversals and the setback; in fortune that have occurred in a ~
atill relatively recent past, even though not s:tperstitloug, we no longer dare use
the term economic "miracle."
Yet it is something a little, if not very, "miraculous" that tinges Luxembourg's -
unexpected economic prosperity in these years when Europe is being tormentd by tlie
pangs of the crisis.
It would be informative and instructive to try to uncover the bases and incentives
of this Luxembourg miracle. And perhaps also the hidden weaknesses.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 POURQUOI PAS?
9064
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN -
CONSTITtTTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR ANDALUSIAN AUTONOMY
Article 144, 151 Controversy
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish S,Oct 80 pp 21-24
- [Text] Andalusia is well worth a late of lentils. Alejandro Rojas Marcos, leader
: of the Andalusian Socialist Party (~P~A), negotiated with Martin Villa a comp~omise
to clear up the Andalusian autonomy p~ocess. Hours later, Jose Rodriguez de la -
Borbolla~ regional secretary of the 3panish Workers Socialist Party (P30E~ in And- ~
alusia~ did not mince words when he claimed in Cordoba that the f3rst l~eak and be-
trayal of the spirit of 28 Fehruary (the date of the Andalusian pre�autonomy ref- -
arendum) had a name: the Anda.lusian Socia.list Paxty. Miguel Angel Arxedondo~ dep- _
uty for Malaga 3n the PSA, came out in defense of his party; he asserted to CAMBIO
16 "tha,t u~y party would be willing to sell its soul to the devil or to whomever,
to defend Andalusia."
I Can't ~
The government party, the Democratic Center Union (UCD~, meanwhile, came out in
defense of the P3A xhen the Andalusian party president and miniater of labor, Felix
Manuel Perez Miyares, stated in Seville "tha.t the government's offer had. been
public, and there was never ar~ything done under the table with the PSA." Juan de
Dios Mellado and Santiagro Traver ~ of CAAfBIO 16, followed the co,~troversy from And-
alusia.
"I can't, but you can." Jose Ppdro Perez I{lorea, then minister of territorial ad-
ministration, stared at the spokesman of the Ca,talonian Minority, Miguel Roca Jun-
yent, while at the sa.me time he asked that he make public the lk~ solution--the
compromise--to open up the Andalusian autonomy p~ocess, as well as sound out the _
Andalusian nationalists of Rojas Marcos and await the reaction of the PSOE.
The Democratic Center Union, after the;,disaster of 28 Fe'b~uary, in which with the
exception of Almeria the seven remaining provinces of Andalusia expressed their
inclination to go with the 151 solution, did not want to chalk up more mistakes
in Andalusia; it preferred to test the water before taking the plunge. ~
Former UCD a~ember Manuel Clavero ca.me reluc#antly to its aid; in a speech before
- the Club Siglo XXI and in several newspaper articles, he left open the door for
~ a b~oad interpretation of Article 144 of the Constitution to help Andalusia extract -
itself from the mire of autonomy. �
'
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Felix Manuel Perez M~yares, president of the Andalusian UCD~ would be in charge of
"testing the water" among the leftist parties and talking with the president of
the Andalusian Junta, Rafael Escuredo. He offered the 14~ solution to the latter,
but the p~esident of the Junta answered that there could be no negotiations with ,
the government on this situation unless the PSA entered into the deal. Perhaps
he feared~ as CAMBIO 16 wae informed by a high-ranking UCD official, that the Rojas
nationalists Woulc~ capitalize on all the discontent and ~ustration resulting from
the 28 Feb~ua,ry .i.nciderit.
Roca Solution
Rafael Escuredo tried in mid-summer to gather together the re}~resentatives of the
PSOL~, PCA [Communist Party of Andalusia] and PSA at the Junta to explain the govern- ~
ment's offer to them but the nationalists refused to meet with him, accusing him of
acting as a member of the~ Spanish Workers Socialist Part at the head of the Junta. -
At the sa,me time, Perez Miyaxes took it upon himself to explain to the UCD leaders -
of Andalusia what the Roca solution consisted of, and hox i~ wass beginn,.ng to be
knoxn in 9ocialist and Communist ejrcles. Jose Pedro Peraz Llorc~, and later Adolfo
Suarez, were informed punctually by Perez Miyares. The president of the government ~
was even reported to have confided to his closest a3visers that clearing up the
Andalusian autonomy process could be a key element when he reappeaxed before Par- ~
liament, putting Felix Manuel Perez Miyares and Rodolfo Martin Vi1.la in charge of ~
paving the way for Rojas Marcos and at the same time feeling out Rafael Escuredo.
Two days before the plenary session, at xhich Adolfo Suarez called for a vote of ~
confidence, Perez M~yases told Rafael Escuredo that an agreement had been reached ~
with the PSA to channel Andalusian autono~r~y through Article 1~4, He invited the ;
_ Socialists to join in the government's proposal. Escuredo consulted with Alfonso
_ Guerra and sa.id they would only accept the 151 solution. Perez Miyares~ moments
before Rodolfo Martin Villa announced to the Cha,mber of Deputies the points for
opening up Andalusian autonomy, looked for Rafael Escuredo to convince him and
make a deal w ith the Soaialists. He couldn't find him.
The ones who had to convince their followers were the PSA leaders~ who as soon as ;
they arrived in Andalusia began a race against time to explain their surp~ising
decision. While Rojas Marcos kept sa.ying that everything would move forward, in
the streets of Andalusia began to appeax signs saying: "E1 PSA, con 151, Rojas ;
Marcos ^ UCD" [PSA with 151~ Ro jas Maxcos = UCD].
The Andalusia.n leader commented to CAMBIO 16 that those signa ~rere being painted by
the PSOE, not his members. He asked Jose Rodriguez de la Borbolla, secretary gen- ;
eral of the PSOE, to prove his allegations tha,t PSA members were quitting the party !
in Cad1z, Sev ille, Granada and Cordoba.
_ Clavero and the Constitution '
Manuel Clavero, who continues to pluck the petals of the party daisy~ remarked to
CAMBIO lr tha.t "the Martin Villa formula is unconstitutional. I say this as an
~ expert; the manner in which autonomy is pursued is a constitutional question. Any
regul.ation of this process hy a law other than the constitution would mean encxoach- ~
ing upon the Constitution's jurisdiction, modifying and degrading it."
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Clavero downplaya the accusations that he defended the 14~ idea, claiming "that
- I always sa.id that the best thing was to modify the Referendum La~r~ as I proposed
in the Cortes. Article 1~ could only be applied to recognize the triwnph of the
Anda.lusian people and to declaxe that the autono~y initiative was successful in
Anda,lusia through the 151 $olution, in view of the results of 28 Fel~uary and the
diff icult3es tha.t were experienced in Almeria. But I always said that the statute
ehould be drawn up through 151, not using ar~y other organic law. That Hou1d be a
degradation. "
I'erez Miyares completely disa.grees with Manuel Clavero, and after assert3ng that
the UCD is not concerned that the former minister oi~ culture has launched "his"
party, claimed that "Article 144 has the advantage of not contradicting the res-
ults of 28 Feb~uary and assuming that political result. That is, the deaire for
autonomy expressed by the people of Andalusia. Moreover, this forraula allows the
Andalusian :funta to be heard, a requirement tha.t is not met by 143 or 151."
Who Won?
Clavero, xho ha.s presented a new bill to amend the Referendum Law, sums up his
viewpoint thus: "What is at issue here is who won and who lost 28-F, With the
Roca.-Martin Villa formula, accepted by the PSA, Andalusia continues to be the
loser. I am certain that the Catalonians would never accept for Ca.ta.lonia a de-
graded formula such as tha.t proposed for Anda.lusia."
As far as the communists are concerned, their leader Fernando Soto sees the issue
very clearly: "Article 1~+ is a'rumble' among ghetto youths. It is a doubtful
- compxomise, and there is nothing that can be done. From it emerged the improvised
143 solution~ which was designed by some to win votes and by others to justify them."
Concerning whether or not the autonorr~y initiative will be pursued, Soto was unequiv-
_ ocal: "I don't think they wi11 daxe to. They would be irresponsible to attAmpt
an autonomy move against the Junta, which represents the Andalusian people~ and
against the majority parties."
Since those of the PCA know that the UCD will not go for a repetition of the Almeria
referendum~ they ha.ve come up with another alternative. "We have had. to go around
and around with this issue, but in the end it did not turn out to be such a hard
nut to crack."
This formula consists of a variation of the bill ~o amend the Referendum Law. "With
regard to Point 4 of Article 8, we would have to add tha.t the autonot0.Y initiative
- would be ratified whenever a single province remained behind, and whenever three
conditions are met: that there be a simple majority of affirmative votes in the
province in question, and tha.t the Parliamentaria,n Assembly agree to ito In this
case the process would continue, and in the ratification of the statute there could
be a requirement that there be an abaolute majority for that grovince to join,
while in the others only a simple majority would be necessary."
They plan to present this alterna.tive to Congress, as long as they earn the support
of the Jun~ta, "which could present it persona.lly," and of the other parties tha.t
oppose the system proposed by the Democxatic Center Union, and surprisingly accepted
by the Andalusian Socialist Party.
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Articles for Debate
Article 143 ~
The initiative of the autonomy process corresponds to the competent municipal or town
councils, and to two-thirds of the municipalities whose population represents a
ma3ority in the censuso -
In case of defeat, the process may. be repeated after 5 years.
Article 14~4~ _
The General Cortes, by means of orga.nic law, may authorize the establishment of an
autonomous community when its territorial area is not greater than +hat of a prov-
_ ince, or it is a member of the provinc3.a1 organization, and may replace the initia- ~
tive of the local Corporations for reasons of na,tiona,l interest.
Article 151 -
The initiative corresponds to the loca.l Corporations and to three-fourths of the '
provincial municipa,lities with the majority of the electoral eensus, and ma.y be '
ratified by means of a referendum with the affirmative vote of the absolute majority
_ of the electorate in each province. '
In ca,se of defeat in one of the p~ovinces, the establishment of an Autonomous Com-
munity 1r ~;,he ma,nner established in Art3cle 143, shall not be prevented for the re- ~
maining provinces.
COPYRIC,~iT: 1979 Informacian y Revistas, S.A.
Rojas Maxcos Interview ~
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 5 Oct 80 p 22
[Interview with Andalusian Socialist Party leader Alejandro Rojas Marcos; '
date and place not given]
[Text] Hours after the end of the debate in which Suarez submitted his program to
a vote of confidence in the Congress, Andalusian Socialist Party leader Alejandro
Rojas Marcos explained for anyone who cared to listen his reasons for casting his
controversial yes vote after the deal with Martin Villa. Here is the interview he
_ gave to CAMBIO 16:
[Quastion] :iosr was this agreement reached? _
[Ans~~rer] It origina,ted in a conversa.tion with Catalonian Roca, Jur~yent, who assured
me that he would support us if we decided to favor the 1~F formula as an entry to
151. AftPrwards~ there were talks with the government during the summer~ and the ~
process di~ not end unt3.l minutes before my speech.
[Question] But this is not the 151 on which the people voted on 28 Febr.uary. !
[Answer] It is the sa,me 151. That is not a number, but a text. Article 144 serves
to promulgate an organic law to attain autonomy through 151. There axe two ways to '
;
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achieve an autono~}r of this types amend the Referendum Law, or use the special org-
_ anic law that comes from Article 1~. We ga.ve 151 to the people, and that is what
they voted on. The people did not vote on whether it should come f`rom an organic
law or a specia.l law. ~
[Question] But the experts sa.y that the two axe not the same, and tha.t it is anti-
constitutional or unconstitutional. . .
[Answer~ The opi~nions of the experts that have been published are respectable, but
partial, because they are all tied to the PSOE or some other party. I do not think
it is unconstitutiona.lf it is s~mply a matter of stretching the Constitution~ because
clearly 14~ refers to an autonomy attained through 143, but nox it is an extension
of the Constitution. We will apply autonomy through 151. The amendment of the
Referendum Ia,w~ according to that version, would also be unconstitutiona.l. I think
that would be stretching the Constitution more than this application of 1~. The
constitutiona.lity of the Basque and Catalonian ca.ses was also doubtful, as was the
ca.lling of referendums by decree law, and no one said anything about that.
[~Question] They sa,y that the UCD tried first to reach that agreement with Escuredo.
(,Answer] I don't know what number we were on the menu. I doubt tha.t they negotiated
with Escuredo, because they only do so with Parliamentary groups. The fact remains
that we were able to do it and the PSOE was not. We gave five votes to Suarez, and
in exchange we ma.naged to cleax up Andalusian autonomy. We demanded tha.t this be
made crystal clear to the public, that the Spanish people be awaare of the a.greement.
[Question] They also sa.y tha.t the agreemen~i included a guarantee of the mayoralty
of Seville and some 50 million tha.t the PSA owed to Legio Septima., the a.dvertising
agency linked to the UCD.
[Answer] Absolutely not. The mayoralty gua;rantees itself; we cannot negotiate that.
_ I challenge anyone to prove that we owe a cent to the Legio Septima. If xe did
- indeed get those ~0 million for continuing to work for Anda,lusia in ad.dition to
achievin~ the opening up of the autonomy process~ then we are pol~.tical geniuses.
[Question] Then there was the issue of the questioning of Martin Villa.
- [An~wer] Appaxently you axe well prepared. No one ca.n think that we come to Par-
liament, press a button and Martin Villa answers~ as if it were the "Cesta y puntos"
show. We demanded that public explana.tion.
- ~Que~nn] But even Clavero came out against it.
[Answer~ I was glad that Clavero could speak. ~'he Spanish Workers Socialist Paxty
earlier promoted the Platforms of An.ti-Ca.pitalist Workers (PT~) to erode the Span-
iah Communist Party and us. Now it is putting forth Clavero to erode the UCD and
" the PSA. I am glad beca.use Clavero ha.d publicly defended the 1~ solution, and ha.d
to pay for ceding the floor to the PSOE by allying himself with them.
[9,uestion] Do the people understand the PSA's position?
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~ [Answer] I am absolutely convinced that they understand our efforts. The sa,me thing
happened Khen we supported the investiture, because afterwards in the municipa.l elec-
_ tions we garnered more votes than in the general elections.
[Queation~ Wouldn't it be presumptuous to assume that the people of Andalusia now
want this method of proceeding, when the majority of them voted for the other one?
[Answer] It is the vocation of politica.l parties to interpret the people's inten-
tions. We have interpreted it thus in order to open up the autonomy process. Until
now~ Andalusia ha.s been a center of con.~ontation for the centralist parties, just
~.s Ca.talonia and the Basque Countries have been areas of consensus.
- COPYRIQii 1979: Informacion y Revistas, S. A. ~
Ra.fael Escuredo Interview
Ma~id CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 5 Oct 80 p 23
[Interview with Andalusian Junta President Rafael Escuredo; date and place
not given]
[Text] The Seville airport was the site of a fiesta. Like a victorious bullfighter,
Ra.fael Escuredo was acclaimed, cheered and carried on people's shoulders from the
~iana Bridge to his home. The president of the Andalusian Junta once again became
a popular leader after his definitive statements "As long as I am president of the
Junta, Andalusia will orLly go along xith 151." That was something akin to the
_ matrimonial promise "until death do us part." The problem is, the divorce of 144
was approved.
[Question] The part about 'as long as I am president' _
[Answer] I stand by everything I said, even though the PSA has ca.lled me antidem-- '
ocratic. I saids "As long as I am president and have the support of the institu-
tional majority in the Junta." I think the real ~~idemocrats are those who spend
their time making that kind of minority pact. And with Martin Villa no less, who
was behind the autono~y strike.
[Question] Is it logica.l for a minority group to argue the interp~etation of the
people's feelings?
[Answer] I think it ineonceivably audacious for a group of five deputi.es to daxe '
make that interpretation of the feelings of an entire people, and to discredit those
who have done so. They only represent those who voted for them; we represent the !
2.5 million Ar_dalusians who vote:i yes on 28 Fehruary. -
[Question] But now the autonomy proces~ ha.s been cleared up. ;
[Answer] I don't think all the obstacles have been removed. But my answer is a '
personal cne, and the real answer will come from the Plenary of the Junta. One thing
is cleax: on 28 February the people voted for the 151 solution to autonomy. It ;
- is not ,just out of whim that we are confronting the government, The 14~ procedure ,
does not give us the autanomy we desire, not in any way~ shape or form. The statute
that was agreed upon is granted, and thus ha,s been cut and devalued. For that ;
_ reason we must continue working and striving to ensure that Andalusia. obtains the
right to acknowledgement of the victory of 28 Feb~uary.
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[Question] They say that Fscuredo was in favor of 144.
[Answer] That is not true. I always said I refused to recognize tha.t procedure.
Parez Miyares talked to me this summer, and only vaguely outlined what it could
mean. I told him tha.t he would have to ta,ke into consideration the 2.5 million
Andalusians who had voted yes, and tha.t the issue Wou13 have to be discussed,
[Question] But afterwards, before the Plenary, there was a kind of negotiation
with the president of the Junta.
[Ansxer] I wouldn't ca.ll it negotiation when they track you down in the hall and -
tell you that the formula is good. I don't think that is the procedure. ~`urther-
more, the formula xas not specified. Actually, we still do not know what it con-
sists of. We ha.ve only the fa.mous questions and answers by Martin V~lla to tell ~
us wha.t it means.
~Question] Can't the present situa.tion lead to the creation of two blocs, which
could be damaging?
[Answer] When we had the referendum on 28 February, there was also considerable
~ confusion, and everytriing fel]. into place; as someone said~ in a ct-iaracteristica.lly
Andalusian way, we were lea.ding the Andal~usian people to the slaughter. I do be-
lieve, however, that now someone ha.s acted ha,stily and has given carte blanche to
the government. But I think time will reveal once a.ga,in that those of us who are
- willing to cross the desert, despite the misunderstandings, are right. In the end,
we will obta3n maximum protection for our autonomy.
[Question] Ha,sn't this situa,tion driven the Junta up against the wall?
[Answer] Sometimes the government manages to pull a rabbit out of the ha.t, to deal
an effec~cive blow; but it is only tha.t, if we carefully study the Constitution and -
the results of the 28 February referendum in Anaalusia.. We are not up against the
ropesf the government is. I am fully convinced tha,t within a month the government
will reconsider the matter. It is the classic caution of someone who is going ta
buy a blanket from a Gyvsy. We must remain firm~ beca.use if. it hadn't stocd firm
until now, the government would not have taken that step. _
_ [Question] Let us play political futuristics: Suppose the process is begun in .
Parliamen~ and a statute is written that must be voted on.
[Answer] Such a statute, p~oduced in that manner, xould be born dead. It wuuld
~ be much more serious than the case of Galicia, beca,use thare ii: took place with the
opposition of the national parties. Here such opposition Would exist too, along
with that of the Andalusian Junta, which represents all the people. It is pure
science fiction to assert tha.t such a statute could be written and that all that
could happen.
COPYRIGHT; 1979 Information y Revistas', S. A.
8926
CSO~ 3110 _
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COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
ECONOMIC DETERIORATION, UNEMPLOYMENT PLAGUE BASQUE AREA '
Madrid CA1~I0 16 in Spanish 21 Sep 80 pp 46-48
[A,rticle: "Euskadi On the Bri:nk"] '
[Text] In 1975, the available family income in Biscay Province was the highest in
Spain; in 1977 it ranked . 8th," and now -it ~s not among the top ten. A prominent
Gui.pu2coa financier told this magazine, "This is going to the brink, and we could
all collapse."
The flight of investment, a galloping unemployment, fear in the streets, distrust
among politicians and the indiscriminate violence being spread by terrorist gangs
comprise the essential features of a very serious crisis that extends throughout
the Basque Country with greater danger than an epidemic of plague.
There is every indication of the arrival (slowly but relentlessly) of a long period
of very lean years,which will remind us of the flourishing times when rapid growth '
was sought in steel (what was called the "iron and steel monoculture") as Weii as
strengthening of the large sectors for ship construction and capital goods, on ~
which the battered Basque economy is based.
The crisis in those sectors ha~ caused all th~ public funds to be insufficient to
pay wages, cover the cost of unemployment and back business forms, in order to
prevent ever~thing from collapsing in an uproar. The downfall of the markets
traditionally supplied by Basque industry, the structural time-lag in the large
iron and steel companies and the lack of economic decisions do not seem to indicate
any courses of action for a soluti.on.
Among the business sources queried, the disappointment at the Basque government's
negotiating capacity is one of the reasons for the present discouragement. They
said: "The situation is qualitatively the same as it was 3 years ago, because we
still lack what we need: control of the resources in order to be able to take action ~
on them, and hence be able to enact a really autonomous policy." ~
Social Ills ~
How does the average Basque citizen react? A disturbing symptom of social ills
seems to have compounded the threat of economic bankruptcy. The leader of ELA-STV
(Askatasuna) [Basque Workers Solidarity], Javiex Fresnedo, remarks: "The Basque
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- social fabric is so deteriorated that it can break anywhere. There is a lack of
conviction that this can be improved by working and working." He adds: "We must
- make our business firms profitable and competitive. We cannot request billions all
of a sudden for Babcock Wilcox and companies of that kind, when once they consume
it it will be necessary to keep on requesting. tQor can general strikes be called
- every 2 weeks, or time be wasted in the Basque Parliament discussing the basic law
- on employment, when it is already in the Senate."
Fresnedo, secretary o~f the National Committee of ELA-STV (Askatasuna), an indepen- -
dent union considered to be in the minority, which, strangely enough, is ranked
among the leading forces in the large business firms on the left bank of the
Nervion estuary, is afraad that his opinion may be regarded as reactionary, but
- he is convinced that, without the effort of the entire Basque society, bankruptcy
is certain. -
The Risk of Being a Businessman
The economist Juan R. Ibarra, member of the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] and
general director of industry in the previous Basque government, remarks: "This is
~ a country in a state of delirium, with little social health, and I don't know
whether we are at the point of no return. It is possible." The collapse of the
business-owning sector also has to be included in this category. "Being a business-
man today is a rather unattractive role," claims Miguel Ma.rtinez~Palacios, spokesman
for the Biscay Metal Business-Owners Federation, an entity including about 3,500
firms with some 135,000 workers. He continues: "Being a businessma.n is no longer a
business, because industry here is losing its competitive status in giant steps, and
the Basque businessman is risking his property, money and life."
The ETA's [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] extortion lettPrs or the so-called
"revolutionary tax" have terrified most of the Basque business owners. This maga-
zine was told by a well-known Guipuzcoa official, "What can we do? It is a matter =
of money or our lives." The ex~mple of Juan Alcorta is difficult to imitate. There -
are some who prefer to pay and be in peace with the terrorists, rather than have to
hire a security service and retain the risk and a high cost for a bodyguard.
David Morin, secretary general of the Biscay Workers Commissions and member of the
executive bodie~ of Euskadi and the Spanish State, claimed: "I am certain that 80
percent of the business owners pay."
The Unemployment Causes Fear
"Only Andalusia and Extremadura surpass us in the rate of unemployment," declares
the Basque minister of labor. The race has just begun. Unemployment is a phenome- _
non in Euskadi which, because it is unfamiliar, is causing as much dread as the -
terrorism, although the two things are related. According to a spokesman for the
Workers Gommissions, "If there were not so much une~nployment, there would not be ~
so much crime and terrorism. This is the basis for the nervewracking situation of
the Basque people."
It is Ttat easy to change, within a very short time, from being an area with full -
employment that could absorb the unemployment in the other sections of the country
SO
r.nn nr.--^- TTCL~ /~*TT V
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300050022-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300054422-9
to bein~ one of the candidates for the head of the poverty "list." The concern has
reached such an extent that, in Vitoria, they had to move the Laotians whom they
had taken in i:o the southeast. After the visit by a UN representative to the Alavese
capital, it was observed that ~obs were very difficult to find. -
The problem can no longer be conceaJ.ed, not even on the atreets. Who would have
imagined a few years ago that the main streets of Bilbao would be filled with beg-
gars? The latest off icial figures indicated 76,761 unemployed in the entire Basque
Countr.y; which is equivalent to 9.4 percent of the active population. Added to this `
are the workers with regul