JPRS ID: 9389 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300050009-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9369
7 iVovember 1980
Ja an Re ort ~
p p
CFOUO 30/80)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
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mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enr_losed in paren~heses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
_ Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item or~ginate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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JPRS L/9389
7 November 1980
= JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 30/80)
~
CONTENTS
POLITICAL AND SOCIOI,OGICAL
Commeats on Suzui~i Policy Speech
(JPS, 4 Oct 80) ..............................................o. 1
Construction Is Factor in Effort To Stay Neutral in Iran-Iraq
Conflict
(Minoru Hirano; ~E DAILY YOMIURI, 5 Oct SO) 3
Japan CP Delegation Attends Dinner Given by Kim-� I1-song
(JPS, 15 Oct 80) 5
Briefs
Nishiza,aa Meets Kim Il-song 6
MILITARY
Suzuki Cabinet Places Priority on Defense
(ECG~TOMISUTO, 26 aug SQ) 7
White Paper, by Haruo l~jii
Increasing Expeuditures, by Tsutomu Haaayama
Japanese Defense Official: Nuclear Arms Acceptable for Self-
Defense
(7SE JAPAN TII~.S, 16 Oct ~0) 24
'YOMIURI' Criticizes Hawkish Trend of Defense Arguments
(Hiroshi Tarazaki; YOMIURI SHII~IJ~T, 14 Aug 80) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
ECCNOMIC
'JAPAN TIIrIES'Supports Japan's Views Given at U.S. Auto Hearings
(Editorial; TSE JAPAN TII~S, 16 Oct 80).....a...........o...... 29
'ASHHI' Views Recent IMF-World B~nk Meeting
(Editorial; ASAHI E7ENING NEWS, 9 Oct 80) 31
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUOj
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Industrial B~nk of Japan Surveys Equipment Investment
(MAINI(IiI DAILY NEWS, 8 Oct 80) 33
'YOMZURI' Raps Oil Iadustry for Forming Price Cartel
(Editorf.al; THE DAILY YOI~URI, 28 Sep 80) . . . . . . . o . . . 34
- Japanese Firms Win Alaska Pipeline Orders
(THE JAPAN TIMES, 9 Oct 80) 36
SCIENCE AND ZECHI~TOIAGY
Status of New Satellite Launcher R& D Discussed
(Pierre Lavereux; AIR ET C06M06, 20 Sep 80) 38
Japanese Weather Satellite Se;zds Faulty Data
(MAINI(HI IIAILY NEWS, 15 Oct 80) ..................o.......... 49
P4 I,evel Research ~enter To Be Fstablished
(NIKRAN ROGYO SHIMBI~1, 16 Jul 80) 5G
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
COPII~iENTS ON SUZUKI POLICY SPEECH
OW040941 Tokyo JPS in English 0854 GMT 4 Oct 80
[Text] Tokyo Oct 4 JPS--Prime Minieter Zenko Suzuki delivered his
first policy speech at the Diet on October 3.
At the beginning the premier stressed the "strict restrictions Japan
is facing both internally and internationally," expressing that "Japan
will make active contributions proper to its economic potential."
Thus the premier announced that the government will call for austerity
on the people, and that it will meet d~mands from the United States
and business circles.
Giving no words at all on tha elimination of plutocratic and corrupt
politics, Suzuzi made clear his intention to place restrictions on
freedom of election movements, on the pretext of "establishing morals
in politics." Evading admitting LDP-government'~ responsibility for
the present deficit in the national finance, the premier said the prime
cause of the deficit was "the expansion of social insurance," to
launch an attack on the people's weifare.
On the foreign affairs, Suzuki said that Japan will expand solidarity
in every field with the so-called "free countries," with the Japan-
U.S. relations as its core, and will "full~ perform her responsibility
and role" as a Western ally. He expressed that Japan will actively
take part in the U.S. global strategy, and stressed Japan will
strengthen aid to south east Asian cauntries.
1
In hi.s policy speech Suzuki set up an item especially on the "total
- se~�urity system." He stressed that Japan's basic policy is in the
"maintenance of the Japan-U.S. security treaty," expressed efforts for
"highly qualified self defense forces." Thus he expressed his
, intention to push ahead with military buildup in line with demands
from the United States. He also said that he will "promote a policy
of comprehensive security systE:m" which is to be established from
broader viewpoints including the economy and foreign policy. Thus
he declared to push ahead with militarization of every field of the
people's living.
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On the constitution, the premier deleted the phrase "strict observance
of the constitution" from the draft speech, and only said that he will
"strictly maintain the idea of the constitution."
Giving no words at all on the death sentence on Kim Tae-chung, the
premier on the contrary expressed praise and support for the
Chon Tu-hwan regime in South Korea, by saying tt.st the Japanese Govern-
ment "heartily hope that a steady progress will be seen in the efforts
_ for the stabiliZation and development of South Korea." -
AKAHATA in its comment dated on October 4 said that so many issues
have appeared in the two and a half months since the inauguration of
the Suzuki cabinet, which have caused concern over the cabinet and
- uneasiness among the peoplE~. Those include the surfaci.ng of a new -
suspicion over the sale of DC lOs, tHe case of fund donation to Welfare
Minister Kunikichi Saito from a slanderous hoepital, the special favor
given to military budget by lifting the ceiling in complication of the
next fiscal budget, and the virtual group visit by ministers to the
Yasukuni shrine.
The reply given by Premier Suzuki in his policy speech was, however, a
declaration of "strengthening an all-out reaction in every field of
security, diplomacy, people's living and democracy, with the backing
of the majority of the LDP in the Diet."
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POLITICAL AND SOCICILOGICAL
CONSTRUGTION IS FACTOR IN EFFORT TO STAY NEUTRAL IN IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT
Tokyo THE I)A.ILY YOMIURI in English 5 Oct 80 p 3
~"Behind the Scen~~" column by Minoru Hirano: "Why Japan Must Be Neutral"~
~Text ~ ~en the ima-lra4^~var ~broke out',: Cf1e~i
Cabinet Secretary Biichi MSYazawa .1oat'
no tiate in 1asu1n8 a statemeat that, the
Sapanese C3overnmeat desSred an tnrly
cessatlon oi . hostilities and conveyed . this
statement~ to the governmenbs oi' both
countries. ~ : , ' . .
Thia step is natural because Jagam , de-
pends heavily on Mideast oil, sad nnn-
. escalation oi the war and an early ; oeaae-
. 8re are vital to this nation's . eoonomic
survival. ~ -
Japan, hamever, lacks the power to iorce ~
the warring nationa to stop Sghting im-
mediately or even bo~ serve aa a mediator
to bring about an early truce: Tlserefore.
while stayiuB aloof from the dispute, this.
nation must avoid inc~olvement in any
exteraai moves ~vhich may escalate tdie �
Sghting. ' ~ . . . .
Japan has economic relations with both
Iran :and Iraq. There ar~ many Japanese
in both countries. Japan ahould maitstain
strict neutrality in order to nnaintain fta
relatlona with both countrles and protect
the Hves oi tlie Japaaese .!n Iraa and Ir~uG�
The Foreiga Ministr9 is strictly avoiding
- any comment on the� ~var. . . .
- '~'~is is Japa.a's basic position. toward
the war. In line with tYifs ~ positlon, Ja-
pan did not support President Carter'a call
Sor a six nation conference on lreedom of
navigation . in t~e Persian C~ult. $`rance
- and ~est Citrmany reportedlY opposed the
call on tY?e iollowing grounda:
(1) Instead o! ,a .~ummit or minieterial
conferenae; a worting-level conierence be="
hind the scenes ,should be held..
~ (2) Instead o! settiug .up a nebv bodY,
talks shou:d be held through such e~dst-
ing organa as tYie International Energy
~ Agency �(IEA) or the Organizatioa ior
Economic Cooperation and Develop~ment
(OECD): , . . .
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. (3) ~'f the VPestern camp sta8es '~i
~large-scalt � political ~ show, the Soviet �
r,nion'will be givan a pretext to inte~tvme
- in 1vIIddle East aSair's. Then, the ~acar -will
eacalate, crushing hopes ior, an eaxly end.
Formation oi an international surveillance
Beet composed of the Seeta oi Western
countrles :would enhance this danger. ~
~ Fiy aaqing it w~ould take part 1a discus-
sions on economfc problems,ynot.~inllitar,~
issues, .Japan virtually sided wlth;,FranCe.
and Weat C3ermaay. Inasmueh ~ as;.Japan~
cannot send ehipa`.oi :lfis Ma~itf~ae;.9eli='�
~ Deiense Forc~ .(M8L1P:) to . tal~e' in.
~ the proPosed interns~al. s. ce
Seet, the~ nation ~would ~_-:~t~ae11; ~i~:'a:
predicament. ii miiltary ~~asue.s~"e,~e-b?'at~ht;.
up. It is natural =that . JaPas ~is.~ �rektc~ast~
~to take-~art in such s .canfefeaoqk`-fa~w-~
ing this danger. . - - - ~
' One ranking Fbreign M1si3~i~. xtlSdaT,
said nonchalantiy that t13e six
nation. con~~
ference Plan has � been drg~ped:,~:_; ~
� A more urgent ;~roblem, ;;~or ,Ja~ari
ahether to . continue -:.the:.� ~ oO~Ltrrnd3
work on the Bandar ;'Kl}om~nl~ :petro=
chemical oomplex, a Japaa-Iraa ~oint. ven~
~ ture in eouthern Iran, and how to prot~
the 750 Japanese eaBaB~d in.the pro~ect:~
Some oi tkiem .deslre to . return to Japan, :
bnt the sea snd air routea . between Japaa
and Iran. have been, cut hy the� wRi M~ze=
over, the Iraaian side ia opposiag re-
patriation ~oi, the d~panese. , Unsble ~to.
abaadon t~ie hope oi contlnuing the con-.
~ struction work, ttre'Iranieas ~re't~lag,to
make the ~JaDaneae staq thei~e by saying
, that the war is developing. lavorably- to~
~.Iran and tl~t once the rapaaeae .~with~:
draw, it w1ll take much time tb asaemble
them again. . ~ � ,
The government c~nnot ~ i~ore' tlie
Iranian wishee lrat securing the safety
of tYie Japanese is a more important taak:
Foreign Minister Ito. Wednesday instrucLed
'Fore~iBn vice Miniater Mastw Ta.ksahima'
to consider the safety of the Japanese ~o
be of top importance. . -
However, _ Lhe government says no pre-
pr;~rations to repatriate ~the Japanese en-~
gaged in the construction work have been
made yet. The governme~t has dedded Lo
ask . tor Iranian cooperation to enable them
� to take refuge in Tehran temporarily:
~ ~ If the war becomes protrac~ed`~br ea=
calates and the petrochemical oomplex. is
Jlombed again s~d ii ~the dasiger to .tlse
lives of the Japanese in that cauntr~+ in-.
: creases further, the � government ~vlll have
to take the last action. To.~avert that, the
government stxonglq wlshes that the war
will end quiciclY� . .~..t,...::.,.,
.:e:...
COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomi.uri 1980
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- POLITICAL AND S(3CIOI~~JGICAL
JAPAN CP DELEGATION ATTFNDS DINNER GIVEN BY KIM I'i,-SONG
OW151005 Tokyo JPS in English 0915 GMT 15 Oct 80
[Text] Tokyo Oct 15 JPS--The delegation of the Japanese Communist Party
headed by Tomio Nishizawa, v~ce~chairman of the JCP Presidium, attended a
dinner given by Kim I1-song, general secretar.y o~E the Workers' Party of _
Korea [Wi'K] on the evening of October 14 after the 6th congress of the
WPK ended.
The JCP delegation on October 12 attend~d a mass rally welcoming them in `
Taean City. The meeting in which about 1,000 citizens participated in
honor of the Japanese Communist Party was the first time in these 14 years
in the DPRK. [passage as received]
Head of the delegation, Nishizawa gave a speech. He expressed greeting to
the 35th anniversary of [the] founding of the WPK, and its 6th congress.
Nishizawa said that the JCP had struggled in prewar days in support of the
Korean peeple's struggle for independence and liberation, and that, now in �
Japan broader struggles are being carried out to save democratic persons
in South Korea, including Kim Tae-chung.
Vice-chairman of the JCP referred to the 1966 ~oint statement between the
two parties which stressed the important norms of equal rights and noninter-
_ ference in other party's internal affairs. Nishizawa pointed out, based
on this principle, cooperation between the communist and workers' parties
should be developed for the commonly agree tasks. (as received] The -
3apanese Communiat Party will continue its activities in line with this
policy, stressed Nishizawa.
Head of the JCP delegation concluded his speech expressing solidari*_y to
[the] Korean people who, led by the Workers' Party of Korea, are making
progress in their socialist co,zstruction and reunification of the country,
and he expre~sed his hope for a new success of the WPK and Korean people.
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAI,
BRIEFS _
~ NISHIZAWA MEETS KIM IL-SONG--Tokyo Oct 11 JPS--Vice Presidium-Chairman Tonijo
Nishizawa of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party on
October 10 met with General Secretary Kim I1-song of the Central Committee
of the Workers Party of Korea. I~ishizawa is now staying in Pyongyang to
attend the sixth congress of the Workers' Party of Korea. Nishizawa deliv-
ered a congratulatory message to the 6th congress and the 35th anniversary
of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea. The vice presidium chair-
man of the JCP on the same day met and exchanged views wfth 12 foreign
d~legates attending the congress, including Santiago Carrillo, general
secretary of the Communist Party of Spain; Guillermo Garcia Frias, member
of the Political Bureau of the Commiunist Party of Cuba; Petar Stambolic,
member of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; Ilie
Verdet, member of the Po litical Executive Committee of the Romanian Commu-
nist Party and prime minister. [Text] [OW110945 Tokyo JPS in English 0907
GMT 11 Oct 80]
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MILITARY
SUZUKI CABINET PLACES PRIORITY ON DEFENSE
White Paper
Tokyo ECONOMISUTO in Japanese 26 Aug 80 pp 10-1~6
[Article by Haruo Fujii: "White Paper on Defense: Psychological War Planned for
the Public"]
[Text] The sixth White Paper on Defense ("Defense of Japan") was released. The
white paper is essentially a government report on the state of affairs. Doea this
year's white paper reveal the actual facts about defense administration?
The White Paper on Defense was first draf ted in October 1970, when Yasuhiro Nakasone
was the director general, and since the second report (June 1976) by Director
General Michitaro Sakata, it has been published annually in summer. When the white
papers, totalling six reports in all, are analyzed and compared in detail, it
becames apparent that the reports are gradually becoming less ob3ective. The trend
became noticeable in last year's white paper and is especially glaring in this year's
paper as noted below. It reflects the degree of r~ghtist turn of defense admin-
istration.
Under the Mei~ i Constitution, the people were not peruvitted to meddle in the exercise
of military authority. The governing rule, "issue orders, do not inform," was most
clearly demonstrated in the military circle. Is that tradition still being followed
faithfully by today's defense authorities?
It seems that the democratic principle of maximum disclosure of government inf or-
mation to the people, who are the sovereigns and taxpayers, does not app ly to
defense matters. Reading the White Paper on Defense, one does not feel that he has -
received a satisfactory, logical explanation as to the true conditions of defense.
Why is that? One of the reasons is that the white paper is being prepared in
accordance with the public information strategy of the Defense Agency. The one who
- is teaching ua "how to read the white paper" is Army General Yoshio Takenaka who
was superintendent of the Ground Self Defense Force Staff College (equivalent to
former Military Staff College) until March of thia year.
As important measures in seeking national security, he ha.s listed, toge ther with
military, diplomatic and economic strategies, public information strategy and
explains it as follows:
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"In goveming, we have advanced to an age where we must pay increasing attention to
the domestic situation. In execution of overseas strategy, winning aupport of the
people ~s a prerequisite and is an important and an increasingly difficult task.
This writer places public in�ormation on the same leveZ with military affairs,
diploma.cy and economics in security strategies because he believes that the public -
information intended for overseas and domestic audiences plays an important role in
the purauit of security strategies" (December 1978 issue of KANBU GAKKO KIJU [Staff _
College Articles]).
In public information strategy, what will be disclosed and what will be kept con-
f idential are decided upon after analycical, evaluative and comparative processes
based on ob~ ectives and circumstances, conditions, etc. The Takenaka theory further
states: "Probably, there does not exist, in the past or present, a single person
who believas that whatever is publicly disclosed reveals the whole truth. How ~
publicly to reveal the objective is an essential facet of public information strategy.
Not only are public announcements withheld but instead, it is customary to release
"black information" or "grey inf ormation," i.e., false information, the source of
which is unknown5 or information which distorts facts, although the source can be
verified.
He continues to say that public information actlvities ar.e "frankly, a part of
psychological war but Lo conduct 'paychological war' in peacetime and against one's
own people is senseless and diff icult to ~ustify as a governmental task." 'Lfiere-
fore, the term "public information" is used.
The White Paper on Defer_se is the product of public information activities, which
are a part of the ps~chological war against the people, and only by realizing this,
can one correctly interpret its contents.
The Defense Agency established, in Ma.y 1973, the public information committee
chaired by ths administrativa vice minister. According to the organizational guide-
~ lines, the public information committee has the obj ective to "deepen the peop~e's
understanding and awareness of defense" and tihe responsibility to perform the
following duties:
1. To consider, from a comprehensive viewpoint, the various problem~ related to
public inforniation activities of the Defense Agency.
2. With respect to the various problems affecting defense, to consider which infor-
mation to disclose publicly.
Committee members belong to the top echelon, including chiefs of internal buresus of
the Defense Agency, chiefs of staff of Ground, Maritime and Air Se1f Defense Forces,
chiefs of auxiliary organs,.et al. Inform~tion considered by the public information
committee as appropriate for public disclosure is being presented to the peoPle.
The Ground Staff Office made official stipulations, regarding psychological war on
the people, in March 1968 at the time of revision of "f ield order" (former operational
field service regulations). At this time, psychological war was separated into
psychological war (narrow sense) directed against the enemy and psychological war
(broad sense) against the pt:ople and self-defense forces [SDF] members. Propaganda
was considered a means of nsychological warfare in the narrow sense and publlc infor- _
mation a means of counter psyck~ological warfare.
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Zn June 1978, "Field Order 2d Section" was revised, and together with disaster
prevention support, public welfare support, etc., public information was cousolidated
into external liaieon and cooperation functions and a responsible staff wa8 establiahed. -
The anti-people activity was raised to the level of operatioas, intelligeace, per-
sor,nel and supply as one of the basic functions of operational camanand. Psychological
- war in a narrow sense (against the enemy) waa put vnder the jurisdictian of the
~ op~rations staf~. ~
Deceptive Myth of "Northern Threat"
The first distiaguishisig feature of the 1980 white paper is clear mention of the
Soviet threat. To be specific, in Part 1 on "World Military Situation," a portion
touches on "Military Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan," and here it states,"... _
strengthening of Soviet Far East troope aad their stepping up of activities are
affecting the military balance between Americans and Soviets in the Westem Pacific
- and can be regarded as an increase in the potential threat to Japan's security."
_ In the 1979 white paper, this statement concluded, "...has become a mllitary capa-
bility over which close ~~gilance must be maintained for Japan's defense."
What was coneidered as requiring "close vigilance" came to be regarded as a"potential
threat." It is said that in the preparation of the 1978 white paper, the Defenee
Agency tried to clearly designate the USSx as a country to defend against but a
consensus could not be farmed within the government and the Soviets were mentioned,
only indirectly, as targets of national defense. From the standpoint of military
geography, Northeaat Asia was designated as an important front equal to Europe and -
it was hinted that both fronts �aced USSR,
Throughout the 1979 whit~ paper, the "fact" of Soviet military increa~se is mentioned
to attract attention. In this year's white paper, the government's ~udgment was
added and it was affirmed as a"potentia.l threat." Since the defense white paper is
a document approved by the cabinet, it is aa officia.l acknowledgment of Suzuki -
Cabinet`~ defense policies and the bases of those policies. It is authoritative
and does not stmply reflect Defense Agency's views.
Ftowever, is the quality of the ana.lysis made by the white paper worthy of its
authority? In July 1979, the Soviet navy assigned the anti-submarine aircraft
- carrier M2nsk (32,000 tons) to the Pacific Fleet. Let us compare the 1979 white
_ paper which was drafted before tha Minsk deployment and this year's white paper.
Changes can be noted in two places. One is the number of carrier-based aircraft r
which increased from about 30 to 40 aircraft. Secondly, the statement, "when com-
pared with U.S. navy carriers, there is a great difference in operational capability,
such as the offensive and defensive powers of aircraft, etc." has been entirely
omitted.
The data vary as to the number of aircraft aboard the Minsk (Kiev-class carrier).
Probably, about 40 aircraft is correct. It should be noted, however, that it has
certain weaknesses since it carries only vertical take-off and landing [VTOL] air-
craft and anti-subm.arine helicopters. Zt has the capability for reconnaissance
within 500 lan and for anti-submarine attacks but its capability for landing assaults
and air defense is woefully weak a~ compared with U.S. carriers. Therefore, in
emergencies, it c~nnot venture out into ocean areas which cannot be covered by land-
based aircraf t.
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T~ continue, the following account in the white paper is ~IICUIIS~BtEIIt. "T"nis ship...
in emergencies, within an ocean territory which can be defended by land-based air-
craft, can became the cammand center of the fleet and fun~tion in anti-submarine
warfare, surface battles, landing assaults, etc." ~The statement ie correct up to
this point.) It then emphasizes the threat by stating, "Although on a limited acale,
the fact that it was assigned to the Par East...newlq poaeesses air support capa-
bility for landing assault troops..."
To be accurate, it should have read; (1) Kiev-class antisubmarine carriers ha.ve
limited air support and fleet command capabilities, and (2) it would be diff icult
to operate in open waters which cannot be defended by land-based air power. Zts
- activities, since its assignment in Vladivostok in July of last year, should also
be dieclosed. It is said that in its new assignment, t.:.E new ship hae shown no �
movements ior over a year and not even emitted an eleccronic signal.
Only one-sixth of the ships in the Soviet navy are deployed. Of the U.S, ships, 30 -
percent are fully battle ready and deployed overseas, 40 percent are combat ready
and based at home ports and the remaining 30 percent are under repair or conducting
- basic training ("FY 1979 L.S. Navy Budget and Plans," Admiral Hollaway, Chief of
Naval Operations). Soviet ships have a low operational rate. Probably, there ar~
problems with the techni~al level of construction a~d repair and with facilities.
In other words, with the publicity aim of focusing on the "Soviet threat," the ~
white paper gathered and colored only suitable data and deleted facts which did not
serve the purpose. Por example, in assessin.g military balance, the U.S. 7th Fleet
and the Soviet Pacific Fleet are compared on a graph. This is the lowliest of tricks
even in psychological warfare. Zf changes in strength are to be shown, comparisons
should be made with the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Since Pacific Ocean deployment accounts
for 45 percent of U.S. ships, the total tonnage is 2.56 million tons. .
To get into details, the Soviet Pacif ic Fleet increased by 140,000 tons over the ~
previous year and totals 1.52 million tons. Including the Ivan Rogov, which was ;
deployed with the Minsk, there was an increase of 50,000 tons but there is no
explanation as ta the remaining 100,000 tons. On the other hand, with regard to
the U.S. 7th Fleet, three ships, including the nuclear aircraft carrier U.S.S. Nimitz
which was deployed in the Indian Ocean, account for 5~,000 tons. Since the U.S.S.
Nimitz alone weighs 91,400 tons, why is it claimed that there was an increase o~ _
only 50,000 tons for U.S,S. Nimitz and accompanying ships?
Presentation of accurate facts is sought in the white paper. However, one-sided
data and distorted ev~).uations are noticeable in this year's white paper. On the
one hand, it demonstrates the low caliber of Defense Agency's analytical and
_ research capability while on the other, it reveals that the whitepaper is being used
more and more as a psychological warfare tool.
~
Znternal Drive Toward Military Eicpansion
The RIKUSEN KENKYU [Land War ResearchJ has begun a campaign directed toward
reorganizatiQn of the division. The RIKUSEN KEbTKYU is a military periodical which
began publication in January 1980. It is the successor to KANBU GAIQCO Y.IJI
- (publication terminated in December 1979) of the Ground SDF. On 22 December 1979,
the "Rikusen Gakkai" [Land War Research SocietyJ was formed and the monthly RIKUSEN
KENKYU began to be published as the society organ.
c;:'
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Reasons given for the change of periodical title and formation of a research society
are to eliminate any impressions that they might be governmental in character. To
avoid miaunderstandings, a voluntary organization wae formed and the periodical was
made its organ. Hawever, as president of the "Rikuaea Gakkai," the superiatendent
of the staff college was autouiaticall~ chosen and, in reality, there has been no
change.
Proposal for c~ivision reorganization was carried in the July issue of the said
periodical and in the following Auguet issue, a special edition was published. The
introduction to the special edition notes "contributors' names are kept confidential,"
and four unusual, imsigned proposals are presented. _
At the beginning of the August issue is a proposal by a certain Mr "KI" titled, "a
truly effective division capable of winning." As the image of the new division is
pictured a"division which can fight on equal terms with the maneuver counterforce
unit (A)." The "A" unit points to the Sovie~ forces and its 1969-type division
(E~9Z) is the goal of SDF. The present SDF division has 9,000 membera or 40 percent
of the strength of "A" u.zit. Therefore, the standard division to be organized
should be "a mechanized or armored division composed of ten and several thousand
troops equipped with over 200 high-performance tanks and over 400 armored vehicles."
Mr "KI" claims that if defense outlays equal "about 2 percent of GNP, it i.s fully
possible to build the division portrayed in the image" and strongly advocates that,
in politics, one should "resolutely demaad what is due."
If a division "capable of fighting on equal terms" with the Soviet divisian is to be
dieployed, a drastic increase in strength is required. According to the article,
"The Division Has Aged," in the July iesue of the said periodical, one GSDF divisi~n
has only about 30 percent strength of the Soviet 1975-type division (75Z). The
Soviet division has been strengthened from 62Z to 69Z and then to 75Z. Preaent GSDF
ozganizational plans, against aa imaginary enemy, are based on 69Z "maneuver counter-
- force unit (A)" (Apr~l 1978). In the near future, the plans should be revised and
based on 75Z. Comparisons in strength between a Soviet division and a GSDF division
are shown in the following table:
Camparison of Japanese and Soviet Divisional StrPngth
Soviet Division � ~~~~~p
62Z b9Z 75Z A v' [units]
Troops 10,500 1Q,100 12,000 9,000 persons
Medium Tanks 190 188 266 60 tanks
Armored Cars 31 410 320 13 cars
APC's 90 carriers
Artillery 93 126 126 48 pieces
Ground-to-Ground Hockets 16 22 22 rockets
Ground-to-Air Missiles 57 166 missiles
Antiaircraft Artillery 48 28 24 20 pieces
Antitank Missiles 36 36 36 15 missiles
- Source: July I978 issue, FUJU GAI~O KIJI [Fuji School Articles], August 1980 issue,
RIKUSEN KENKYU [I.and War Research], etc. .
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If they are to fight on equal or better terms against the super miiitary power, USSR,
the SDF must be greatly strengthened, quality- and quantity-wise. The second dis-
tinguishing f eature of this year's white paper is the creation 3n Part 3 of a new
- section, "Present Status of Defensive Power," which presents a general review of the
capabilities of Ground, Maritime and Air S~F. It exposes the weaknesses in all areas
including the armament to be used on the frontline to rear logietics support,
military bases, human fighting strength, etc. What emerges are a demand for complete
moderr_izatian of materiel fighting power and hopes for the establishment of an
emergency readiness setup. Related to this, in the buildup of defense power, this
year's white paper is conspicuous in that it totally rejects the "Basic Concepts of
National Defense" [adopted by Cabinet in 1957].
- The "National Defense Program Outiine [Outline]," which was a~proved by the National
Defense Guuncil [NDC] and the Cabinet in October I97E was based on the basic concepts
of national defense. The intent was to adapt defense buildup to cope with new
threats as they appeared. Since it was evaluated that chances were slim for the
emergence of new threats at this tjme, quantitative buildup of defense capabi?ity
was ~o be limited. Based on this assumption, the 1978 white paper delineated the
limits of defense buildup.
That was entirely omitted in the 1979 whita paper. Furthermore, in actuality the
basic concepts of national defense are denied in this year's white paper and instead,
the day-by-day maintenance of military strength to cope with emergencies is strongly
~ advocated. The reason. given is that "since defense capability buildup requires a
lengthy period, i~ is not an easy task, in the event of sudden change in t~1e inter-
national situ.ation, to rapidly build up defense power to cope with the change"
(Section i, Part 3).
Thus, the "Necessary Concepts for National Defense" were revived. The intent is to
build up defense power on the basis of realistic capabilities against "threats."
As f~r the Outline, only bui.idup goals shown in the table remain intact and the
basic policy has been repudiait~~d. That is, the Outline states that "in actually
implementing the program, the economic and financial situation, etc. existing at the
time will be considered and harmonious coordination will be maintained with various
other measures of the country."
What will happen now?
As for the 1981 estimated budget requests, the Suzuki Cabinet decided on 20 July
to handle defense-related expenditures separately and approve a 9.7 percent increase
(7.5 percent increase for all other government expenditures). From a position of
"harmonious coordination" with other measures, the stance changed to priority on
"defense." The government, on its own, repudiated the basis of the Outline.
Viewing Southeast Asia and Middle East
What role will this streagthened defense power play? it ~s noted that in Part 2,
"Japan's National Defense Policies," to the "independt�nce and security of this
country," a new section on internationa.l responsibility was added. It states, "In
con~unction with Japan-U.S. security arrangements, Japan's def ense capability con-
tributes to the maintenance of peace and stability in East Asia, and thereby, con-
tributes to the maintenance o~ world peace." Thus, the third distinguishing feature
of this year's white paper is that it made clear the posture to extend strategy
overseas.
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With regard to East Asian problems, the explanation of the situation on the Korean
Peninsula changed greatly. This year's white paper aclmowledges that "preservation
of peace and stability on che Korean Peninsula ia urgent for the maintenaace 4f
Japan's security." The wording in last year's wr,ite paper, "poeaesses an important
relationship," has been changed to "urgent." On the military atrength of North and
- South Koreas, it evaluates that ROR is "somewhat inferior" in land forces and that
"situation on the Rorean Peninsula is unpredictable."
A new section was established on the military situation in the Middle East and
Southeast Asia. As a result of Soviet invasioa of Afghanistan, following the Iranian
revolution, the Middle East aad Indian Ocean have become target areas of U.S.-Soviet
confrontation. The white paper states that guarantee of "peace and stability of
oil-producing countries of the Middle East and safety of maritime transportation
routes from the area" is an important problem for the Western countries, including
Japan, and takes the attitude of supporting, as an "indispensable measure," the
continued presence of American forces in the Indian Ocean and surrounding areas.
For the first time, this y~ar's white paper makes detailed comments on ASEAN,
Auatralia and New Zedland. The following camment must not be overlooked: "The
various ASEAN countries are located in strategic positions along the routes to trans-
port natural resources to Japan and also hold close economic ties with Japan. There-
fore, the security guarantee of ASEAN countries has an important relationship with
. Japan`s security maintenance. Japan is increasing its cooperation in the effort to
strengthen ASEAN countries, notably Thailand, and is watching future trende with
considerable interest."
The white paper clearly stated that the Kozean Peninsula was an "urgent" area and
- that the security guarantee of ASEAN countries has an "important relationship" with
Japan. It can be interpreted as an indication of military strategy directed abroad,
i.e., of cooperating to strengthen the governmental setup of these ASEAN countries
and of promoting closer ties based on defense of ocean transportation lanes.
As car be seen fram MSDF participation in the Rimpac-80 maneuvers (February-March
1980), with the U.S. Navy as the core and involving the navies of Australia, New
Zealand and Canada, the joint defense or maritime transportation routes is looming
as a significar:t task in the overseas atrategy to maintain security.
In the explanation of the present status of defense power, this year's white paper
states that the main duties of MSDF are: (I) defense against invasion from the
ocean; and (2) maintenance of traffic safety in Japan's peripheral waters. However,
it is said that the MSDF ships and aircraft are intended mainly for anti-submarine
warfare. In other words, MSDF can carry out the first duty only with the support of
the mobile striking power of the U.S, Navy. While protecting the U.S. Navy, MSDF
forces will perform the second duty.
If defense of ocean transportation routes are limited to "Japan's peripheral waters,"
it is meaningless. Of the 600 million tons imported annually, 99.95 percent depend
on maritime transportation and via the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, the
routes range all over the world. The Strait of Hormuz in Middle East is 11,000 km
away and America is 9,000 1~ away.
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The MSDF regards as its duty, the defense of ocean transportation lanes up to 1,000
nautical miles (1, 852 1~) from Japan proper. What will it do if attacked in waters
1,001 nautical miles away? No matter how strongly the MSDF is reinforced, it i.s
unlikely that it can defend the ocean transportation routes spreading throughout the
world.
Thus, the concept of maritime joint deiense was born. The navies of the Western
countries detezmine their respective ocean areas to defend and conduct ~oint
defensl.ve actions as necessary. The Americans have suggested the formation of a
Pacif ic patrol fleet and the Defense Research Council of the Liberal-Democratic
Party is proposing revisions of the laws to assign and authorize MSDF the mission of
patrolling territorial waters and high seas. In these actions, the movement toward
maritime joint defense can be discerned.
Bring Up the People's Burden
In order to counter the massive military power of the Soviets, on the one hand, and
on the other, to "contribute to maintenance of international peace" from the
Pacific basin to the Indian Ocean, including the Middle East, it is inadequate si ply
to build up and strengthen the SDF. It is only natural that establishment of aa
emergency readiness system and insuring of the people`s cooperation (general
mobilization) will be sought.
_ The 1979 white paper simply revealed that studies~were continuing on legislation for
emergency situations. This year's white paper reports that priority has been
: placed on studies concerning problem areas in SDF laws and Defense Agency Establish-
ment Laws and that revisions of these two defense laws will be carried out first.
Discussion of reserve strength, which will become necessary in the event of emer-
gencies, has taken up considerable space in this year's white paper. Troop strength
_ and system of reserves are considered in detail, giving comparisons with the
situations in other countries, and a reserve officers' system in the SDF is strongly
advocated as "extremely necessary." The white paper reports that in England and
the tJnited States, recruits without any military experiences are being organized
and from this, it can be surmised that revisions of the system are being studied.
- An article titled, "Inclusion of Reserve Officers in Division Formation," in the
special edition of RIRUSEN KENKYU (AuSust 1980 issue) on division reorganization
proposals, makes the following comment:
"No one now believes that 180,000 troops can provide adequate land defense. The
backbone of Japan's defensive power is the unified, combined strength of active and
reserve forces...We look forward to the inclusion of reserve officers, as a bold
_ step, to form divisions which can adequately battle the opposing forces."
In this event, reserve officers will be recruited from "youngsters with sound
beliefs (excluding ex-SDF)." For the presenta while maintaining the volunteer
system, recruitment will be expanded to cover aIl youths. It is said that the Defense
Agency and GSDF are thinking along these lines.
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In addition to above, the defense burden of the general populace extends to many
other areas, e.g., (1) system to convert civilian transport capability to military
uses; (2) securement of support of comanercial shipping in emergencies; pro-
curement of various types of operational supplies, including fuel; (4) repair and
maintenance of armamznts; (5) elimin.3tion of various restrictions on maneuver
g~ounda, airf ields, etc.; and (6) c.onsolidation of technological strengths of non-
government~l enterprises and of all damestic endeavors.
In order to wage battles, the SDF must obtain the people's cooperation and build a
system whereby the people car..fight together. The fourth distinguiahing feature of
this year's white paper is the mention tlzat all-out consideration toward this end
is on the day's agenda.
Adequate buildup of defensive power and maintenance of Japan-U.S. security arrange-
ments are the "most essential elements" (1979 white paper) in the government's
policy to preserve security.
Military defense is the basis of national security and its buildup is advocated in
each year's white paper. Only data suitable toward that end are selected for `he
situation analyses. The merits of security and SDF are propounded but the dangerous
_ aspects or limitations of defensive capability are not touched on.
When discussing defense of ocean transportation routes, it should be mentioned that
it is extremely difficult, strategically, physically and geographically, and it
- should also be pointed out that defense on the high seas is useless unless the
cargo handling ports and pipelines are secure and safe passage through the straits
can be guaranteed. Switzerland has commercial ships but no navy. However, its
ocean shipping has never been threatened. This fact should also be brought out.
Of the approximately 130 countries which have commercial ships, only 30 countries
possess forces (over 10,000 peraons) which can be called a navy. Countries with
antisubmarine capability are even fewer. Regariiless, since World War ZI, the
safety of maritime traffic of all countries has been guaranteed. This is due to
nonmilitary measures. By maintaining maritime order and deepening multifaceted
mutual cooperation, ocean transportation can be ensured and that is the way it
- should be.
The same can be said of land and air defenses. The government should study the
possibilities and limitations of all military and nonmilitary means, then point out
the options and obtain the people's judgment. The white paper should not be used
as a tool of information manipulation.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1980
Increasing Expenditures
Tokyo ECONOMISUTO in Japanese 26 Aug 80 pp 16-20
[Article by Tsutomu Hanayama: "Medium-Term Operations Estimate"]
[Text] The chorus of voices, including those of the United States and Japanese
politico-financial circles, supporting increase in defense buildup continues to
grow louder. Decision has already been made for priority increase in next year's
defense expenditures. [This article] scrutinizes the expectations and realities of
the arms industries which have come to life.
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Priority Increase in DefenEe Expenditures
Gne of the highlights of the defense issue was the heated clash between the Ministry ~
' of Finance and the Defense Agency over allocations of the FY 198i defense budget
requests. si~:ce implementation oi the medium-term operations estimate [hereafter,
abbreviate3 as medium-term opeiations"], which was to actually start in 1981, hung _
in the balance, not only the Defense A.g~_ncy but the arms industries watched ttie
development with interest.
Japanese arms industries have b~en steadily inc.reasing their production but the _
annual total output amounts to no more than 500 billion yen. Since thdt is the case,
it is only natural that the arms industry circle should intently await to see how
the medium-term operations would be budgeted. The clash was eventually resolved
- politically, at a top-level meeting between Finance Minister Watanabe and Defense
Agency Director General Omura, with the agreement that, including the sutomatic
incr.ease of personnel expenses, there would be an increase of 12.2 percent over the
previous year (9.7 percent without personnel expenses).
Although the amount requested by the Defense Agency was not fully granted, it is
sl.gnificant that it won the commitment that "in the event it becomes necessary to
make supplementary requests because of changes in internal and external situations,
suct: requests will be considered separately." Accordingly, not only has it become ,
possi~le to "accelerate" the medium-term operations but the door has been kept open
for supplementary requests when the final budget negotiations are held at year end.
At any rate, the course has been set for headlong expansion of defense expenditures.
What are the goals ~f this defense program called the medium-term operatione which ,
are to star_t in FY 1981? Much of the plan is still veiled because the Defense
Agency ha.s disclosed only a part of the operations for the reason that they are
considered as "ref~erence materials for internal use of Defense A.gency only." It is
possible, however, to grasp the rough outline from thE supplementary explanations
submitted to the Diet ~nd the media such as newspapers. Putting the bits of infor-
mation together, one can say that the plan follows th~ basic guideline of the
"National Defense Program Outline [Outline]" (adopted by the Cabinet in October 1976).
For the present, the plan aims to increase total defense expenditures to 1 percent
of GNP by FR 1983. If the plan materializes as scheduled, the goals shown in the
tables attached to the Outline will be practically attained, with the exception of
a certain number of MSDF sh3.ps. In that sense, it is a defense plan that has the
earmarks of a post-4th Buildup Plan.
Concretely, the buildup plan is as follows--
' stimates of "frontline expenditures" of the tri-services within 5 years sub- I
1. E
sequent to FY 1981 are: GSDF, 760 to 790 billion yen; MSDF, 1.08 to 1.12 trillion
yen; ASDF, 860 to 890 bilZion yen; total, 2.7 to 2.9 trillion yen.
2. Particular emphasis is being placed on the strengthening of MSDF armament.
Plans are to: build 16 escort ships, S submarines and 39 other ships o~ various
types; remodel and equip active escort ships with missiles; and import 37 P-3C
anti-submarine patrol aircraft and 51 antisubmarine helicopters.
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3. GSDF plans are to: obtain 3~1 Model 74 tanke, 180 self-propelled howitzers,
110 armored vehicles and 110 aircraft (including helicopters) for tactical operations;
deploy improved Hawics; and conduct speedily the feasibility study of air defense
system, including Nike-J's.
4. ASDF plans are to import 77 fighter-interceptors (F-15s), 13 suppott fighters
(F-I's), 4 early warning aircra~t and 12 replacement aircraft (C-130's) for C-1 -
transports.
Although the goals of the medium-term operations are within the parameters set by
the Outline, implementation of such a plan without deliberation of the National
Defense Council [NDC] runs counter to popular sentiments and raises a number of
questions. ~
Unclear Nature of "Medium-Term Operations"
First, if such a detailed defense plan were to be drafted, why wasn't it placed
before the NDC for d~liberation? In drafting the medium-term operations plan, the
views of the Defense Agency were: (1) it would conform to the Outline and it would
be on a single year basis rather than for a designated period as heretofore; (2)
the goals would be based on the charts attached to~the Outline; and (3) the plan
would be nothing more than a reference material for budget requests.
However, as the Defense Agency itself recognizes, although the defense plan is to
be drafted on an annual basis, it is necessary in carrying out actual operations to
determine the future course, within possible limits, of critical and important
tas~CS. Actually, the medium-term operations incorporated such obj ectives when it
was drafted as the medium-term defense capability buildup plan. Putting aside the
formalistic argument as to ~how ~t was drafted after adoption of the Outline, the
medium-term operations plan is clearly, in fact, the 5th defense buildup plan and -
therefore, it will not be limited to being the reference material of Defense Agency's -
internal bureaus.
As a matter of fact, in the procurement plan of frontline equipment, e.g., import
of the F-15 fighter-interceptor aircraft or the P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft,
_ their deployment was decided upon not only on a yearly basis but with a certain
future outlook. Since this has been made clear in previous discuasions and if its
conformance to the Outline were not considered, how can one deny that the true
nature of the medium-term operations is not that of the 5th defense buildup plan?
Unless the medium-term operations are reconsidered, from this viewpoint, it is only
natural that consensus-building within the government would face rough sledding.
The awkward confrontation between the Defense Agency and Finance Minietry aroae not
simply out of financial matters but because there was an undercurrent of doubts
about the attitude of the Defsnse Agency. Since this is a plan that would require
a great amount of public funds over a long period, it is only natural that the entire
plan should have been presented to the people and discussions sought, especially
at this time when defense issues are being debated as matters of public concern.
The second problem is that the "basic concepts" which form the basis of defense
buildup, that is the "philosophy," is missing. Increase in defense capability
should be proposed from the standpoint of protecting "what against what kind of
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threat" and this is the fundamental issue when considering defense, Of cours~, as
Zong as the medium-term operations follow the basic policies of the Outline and con-
form to the underlying defense concepts, it might be logically contradictory to
present anew "defense concepts," as the Defense Agency claims. However, nearly 5
yeare heve elapsed since the NDC adopted the Outline and during thia period, the
international ~ituation has greatly changed.
- Particularly, after the 1970`s, compounding the shock of Soviet military invasion
of Afghanistan, there has been a retrogression in detente, which signifies the real
collapse of post WW II U.S.-Soviet strategic arrangements, and a resulting increase
of military tension in Europe. On the other hand, the zxpanding and worsening
Iranian revolution not only hurt American pride but greatly cut down America~s role
as the leader of the dollar market and world military police. American journalism
seriously views this situation as the "bpginning of a new cold war." We must be
aware that "short-sighted" defense proposals are being presented in Japan with these
changes in international situation and deepening crises as the background.
To comment further on the Far Eastern situation, the continuing warfare on the
Indochina Peninsula and the increasing deployment of Soviet navy in Far Eastern
waters, about which the Defense Agency is constantly harping, are factors which ~~P
greatly changing the Japanese defense enviranment. It is a fact that Japan is at
the crossroads of new options, including that of self defens~e. In this situation,
it is inconceivable that long-range defense buildup can be planned and designed
without an analysis of the new international situation and consideration of realistic
counterstrategies. -
It is true that Japan's defense concepts specified in the Outline are based on
strategic reliance upon the Japan-U.S. security setup and for the present, on
maintenance of f ighting strength capable of resisting small-scale aggression, . _
directed against possible Soviet att~cks.
It should be emphasized again here that the medium-term operations plan is not merely
reference materials for internal use in making budget requests. As long as ic is
conceived as a defense buildup plan with long-range viewpoints, the government has
the obvious duty of presenting the plan in entirety, including defense concepts
adapted to the newly unfolding international situation.
Is 1 Percent of GNP Possible?
- The same can be said about the question of scope of defense force strength to
maintain which should be specified in "defense concepts." Although the scope of
defense force strength is clearly indicated as an "objective" in the Outline charts,
military strength must not be judged solely by direct combat standards such as the
unit organization. The rapid progress of military technology in recent years, due
mainly to computer systematization, has greatly altered the concept of fighting
strength and this reality must be considered in the evaluation. There�ore, the
funda~uental concept of "defense of what against what" must be clarified and wlthout
considering it, it is meaningless to discuss the limits of defense force strength.
In the past, during the time of Tanaka Cabinet, the "scope of peacetime defense
f orce strength" became an issue. The Defense Agency came out with the figures that
four escort flotillas and 250,000 tons of n.aval ships were required by MSDF.
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However, when the medium-term operations plan was compl~ted, the goal of naval
strength had become 260,000 tons and is certain to sxceed the "scope of peacetime
dafenae force strength." The isaue here is not simply on.e of deciding what ie the
appropriate quantitative level of defense strength. Rather, it is the fear that
once inCrease in military buildup g~3.ns momentimm, it cannot be arrested. Even if
limitationa were set on the defense plan through raonetary means, in terats of GNP,
since the latter is based on the anticipated economic growth of the "new economic
society 7-year plan," which has strong variables, it would be also pointless to dis-
cuss, from that angle, the limits of defense force strength.
For this reason, it was clea~ly stated in the basic policies for national defense
that in implementing the defense buildup plan, the government will "consider the
economic and financial situation, etc. existing at the time and maintain harmonious
coordination with other government measures of the coun*_.ry." A braking mechanism
to arrest limitless expansion of military expenditures is sought in the "denfese
concepts."
The third problem is whether, in view of the financial situation, it is possible to
carry out the various plans, including procurement of frontline equipment, of the
medium-term operations. Furthermore, owing to American pressure to increase defense
expenditures, a new demand has been made to accelerate execution and complete the
.medium-term operations by 1983.
Here are projected figures compiled by the Finance Ministry on the assumption that
defense expenditures would amount to 1 percent of GNP. This projection is based on
the condition that Japan would fulf ill the U.S. diplomatic request of "making steady
and noticeable increase in defense expenditures. First, the GNP for various years
were calculated on the assumption that the economic growth rate would be 11.4 percent,
based on pro~ected financial situation and the new "economic society 7-year plan."
1fien, on the assumption of a certain general account with certain financial outlays,
the financial burden was pro~ected if defense expenditures amount to 1 percent of
GNP .
According to the projected calculation, to secure [GNPJ 1 percent defense expenditures
from FY 1981, finakzcial revenues must increase 23.8 percent or 2.76 trillion yen
- over the previous year. To attain the same goal in the 3 years between 1981 and
1983, defense e~enditures must increase 15.4 percent annually for a total increase
of nearly 1.2 trillion yen.
Except for tax and grant allocations to local governments and national bond outlays,
which can be called fixed charges, increases in annual expenses must be held down
to between 8.9 and 9.2 percent over the previous year. If defense expenditures are
extended to 1985, the growth rate for the respective fiears would be 13.8 percent
(total increase of about 2 trillion yen) and increases in expenditures, aside from
defense and fixed costs, must be restricted to between 9.0 and 9.3 percenC. In
spite of that, if priority is to be placed on increases i.n defense expenditures, it
would become necessary to reduce social welfare expenses and it is absolutely certain
that new problems would arise.
At the Japan-U.S. summit meeting in May, to the U.S. request that "cotapletion of
medium-term operations be accelerated by 1 year, the late Prime Minister Ohira
replied, "we will give it serious consideration and efforts." Therefore, Japan is
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obligated, diplomatically, to increase defense expenditures to 1 percent of GNP within
~ the 3 years but even without the projected calculations, it is clear as to whether
or not its realization is possible. For the moment, in formulating the budget
estimates �or 198 1, a political decieion was reached to approve the Defense Agency's
request of 2.393 trillion yen as general funds and 55.2 billion yen as special funds
for purchase of already contracted sireraft. Because of the financial situation,
as to whether or not the medium-term operations can be realized as planned is still
up in the air.
Increasing Reliance on Imports
The last problem that should be pointed out is that the medium~term operations is a
- plan that relies heavily on imports. The plan is focused on qualitative improvements
of equipme,it, in keeping with the pro~ress in science and technology, and its nost
important taska are the buildup of various types of defense capabilities and the
modernization of weapons system. What must be expedited is the buildup of planned
equipment and only the required units must be procured in as short a time as possible.
Furthermore, ano ther requirement levied on the medium-term operations is the easing
of economic friction between Japan and United States through purchase of weapons
from the United States and it is under that premise tha.t Japan-U.S. negotiations r3ve
been conducted. If that is so, it is only natural that to that extent, reliance on
imports would increase in the medium-term operations and because of such practices,
there is still deep-rooted opposition against the plan by defense arms industries.
The problem became a real one in the selection of an aircraft to replace the C-1.
As the mainstay of the air transport unit, the C-1 aircraft was manufactured with
independently developed technology and 24 aircraft have been actually deployed. How-
ever, for the reason that with a limited cruising range (700 nautical miles), the
C-1 cannot adequately fulfill the varied transportation needs arising in emergencies,
the Defense Agency included in the medium-term operations a decision to replace
36 C-1 aircraft, which was slatedfor aeployment, caith the Lockheed-manufactured
C-130s.
If the C-1 aircraft cannot meet performance requirements, even if it is a domestically-
made aircraft, r eplacing it with an imported aircraf t might be a necessary measure
from the defense standpoint. However, it appears that this measure was ad~pted
because top priority was given to the political decision to accelerate the medium-
term operations and this is the reason for the opposltion by arms industrtes.
As though it were speaking on behalf of the arms industries, the Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry [MITIJ atates: (1) do not rush imports of C-130s and
wait for an economic arrangement for licensed production (30 aircraft); (2) piece-
meal imports planned by ~he Defense Agency will not only aggravate the short-
comings of the a ircraf t industries but hinder the maintenance of defense capability;
and (3) domestic capability to produce transports has received a certain inter-
national recognition and is not as poor as claimed by t~~e Defense Agency and pra-
curement of domestic aircraft will not adversely affect Che defense p1an. Thus,
the MITI plans to obtain detailed explanations from the Defense Agency. `
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It is said that within the MITI, strong opinions are being voiced that if satisfactory
explanations cannot be obtained, they will use the import quota rights of trade con-
trol laws to demand concessions while the Defense Agency is taking an adamant etand
that to expedite modernization of defense equipment, there is nothing wrong with
deploying imported aircraft. It seems that it will take some time to resolve the
diff erences between the two parties.
The deployment of transports might be an extreme case but even at that, the ratio of
domestic production of equipment earmarked in the medium-term operations is still
too low. It also reflects the existing aituation of Japan's arms industries. For
example, with the F-15's, the deployment of which is planned by the Defense Agency,
the ratio of domestic product ion is limited to 75 percent, which means that aircraft
parts for the remaining 25 percent must be imported from the United States.
Similarly, in the licensed production of F-4EJ Phantoms, for which the Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd. was the prime contractor, the domestic production ratio was -
85 percent.
The problem is not simply the decreasing ratio of domestic production. With the
increasing sophistication of military aircraf t production technology, the United
States is taking a passive attitude toward overseas transfer of technology and
"black box" restrictions are increasing in the licensed production of weaponry..For
example, the "black box" of F-15's includes the software of various electronic parts _
carried aboard, knowhow of the engine intake controls, the fCFRP] used in apeed
brakes, etc.
Of course, if it so desires, with its level of industrial technology, Japan can
produce high-performance items but the costs are exceedingly high and when the
problem is compounded by the restricLing time factor, the only way out is to import
from the United States. The increase of "black box" restrictions for new equipment,
such as the F-15's which are considered the key to strengthening Japan's defense and
the antisubmarine patrol aircraft P-3C's, creates concern as to whether it mi~ht not
become a serious hindrance to defense buildup in the future.
To explain further, one begins to have doubts when the med3um-term operations, which
is to be the axis of defense capability buildup during the first half o~ the 1980s,
promotes a weapons production system which relies heavily on the United States and
ia manipulated by clever U.S. tactics to restrict independent weapons development
of various countries by increasing "black box" restrictions and thereby, maintain
its relative supremacy.
Hopes for Arms Export
In order to promote the development of domestic weapons production, the Def ense -
Agency is concerned about str engthening the industrial-military complex through
fncreasing expenditures for defense procurements and R&D. A step in this direction
is the beginning of a study to change the method of calculating prices and profits
in defense pracurements. This study was undertaken in response to the diseatie-
faction of the arms industries that "the prof its of arms makers are being held down
unreasonably by using the present calculati~n method which is designed for profits
of main manufacturing industr ies," and in the deliberations underway, advice is being
sought from third parties. At the same time, there are other ob~ectives such as:
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(1) by making arms manufacture attractive, to sti.mulate defense production and
investments; and (2) with increases in the unit price of Defense Agency's procure-
ment items, seek increases in the defense budget. This is part of the move to
strengthen the industrial-military cooperative setup.
It is true that since the proaurement system has been based on and implemented
according to the "directive concerning calculation method" issued in mid-1930's,
there are many asFects which are not compatible with the present situation. There
are doubts, however, that profit inducements will lead to increased defense pro-
duction and structural improvements or promote the development of independent
_ technology in defense production. It seems that the problem lies in the defens~e
production system which is becoming extremely reliant on American imports for pro-
duction.
The proposal is being made to reevaluate the self-restraining policies concerning
arms export. There has been criticisms from before that unlike other manufacturing
industries, arms production cannot count on the merits of mass production and that
practically all of the main weapons production are dependent on U.S. licenses because
_ af continuing policies which ban exports.
Recently, new arguments tieing arms export with r~eources acquisition are being
presented to eliminate the export ban. Deepening diplomatic and political commit-
ments with selected countries through arms export m3ght invite the antagonism of a ~
third coun try. Therefore, as to whether it is an effective meane to secure re~aurces
is debatab le but it is a fact that the arms industries are trying to find a way out _
through abolishment of the export ban.
Still, as given in the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
arms expor ts did amount to $20 million in 1978 and was not totally nil.
The problem may well include the def inition of what is arms and by narrowing the
definition, a means to dissolve the ban~is being sought. Th3s frontal approach to
dissolution is unique and different from previous attempts.
Although the government cannot be expected, at present, to permit exports of weapons,
the issue is certain to become a political one from the pressure of the arms
industries. The immediate issue is the "Japan-U.S. joint weapons development plan,"
scheduled to be presented to the NDC by the defense production committee of the
Japan Federation of Economic Organizations. This is a pl~n to export electronic
parts, prided by Japan, to the United States and to assemhle them into weapons for
- ~oint use. Concrete~y, precise guided mis:~iles (PGM) and cruise missiles are being
considered. Of course, the aim is to tear down the government's export-ban policy
- through implementation of the joint development plan. In oL~ier worda, the ob~ective ~
is to begin arms export without waiting for the government's deciaion to eliminate
the ban.
There is danger in the conduct of short-sighted defense talks which completely dis-
regard past taboos and which are dominated by hard-line arguments. Z'here ie danger
in the ac tual implementation of the plan without awaiting the people's consent. In
view of these dangers, the def ense buildup must be carried out with self -restraint.
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Also, the aim of the United States in applying pressure on Japan to strengthen
defense capabilities is to obtain Japan's aid to leasen its fjnancial burden in
reestablishing "Pax Americana."
To make it clear that that is an entirely different matter from Japan~s defense
problem, it seems that defense iseuee must be reconsidered from another standpoint.
COPYRZGHT: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1980
9134
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MZLITARY
JAPANESE DEFENSE OFFICIAL: NUCLEAR ARMS ACCEPTABLE FOR SELF-DEFENSE
OW170425 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 16 Oct 80 p 1
[TextJ A top-ranking official of the defense agency told a DIET committee
_ Wednesday the agency is of the view that the nation is abie to poasess
nuclear arma but for strictly self-defense purposes even under the present
constitution.
In reply to an oppoeition internellator's questions, Akira Shiota, director
of the agency's defense bureau, told the house of representatives audit
- committee that although the government maintains the ao-called three-point
non-nuclear principle not to poasese, manufacture, or introduce nuclear
arms, what are aubject to the constitutional constraints are those weapon
syste~~ whose deatructive power "is irrelevant to the nation's need to
defend itself."
"The question of whether such devastating weapons ~all into the category
of nuclear arms or conventional arms is not a matter of concern from the
constitutional viewpoint," Shiota said.
Shiota said Chat Japan cannot possess for instance, the intercontinental
, ballistic missiles (ICBMS) because zhey do not conform to the nation's
defense neede.
In this connection, another top-ranking defense agency official told reporters
later that "there ia no (legal) problem at all" for the self-defense forces
(SDF) to be armed with such weapons systems as the 155 mm and 203 mm Howitzers
and the Nike surface-to-air mit~sile a11 of which can be tipped with both
nuclear and high explosive warheads.
In fact, the SDF presently has these three types of weapons in its ordinance
inventory.
CSO: 4120
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MILITARY
'YOMIURI' CRITICIZES HAWKISH TREND OP DEFENSE ARGUMENTS
Takyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN in Japanese 14 Aug $0 p 5
~'bpinion" column by Reporter Hiroshi Tarazaki; opinions given by 'At and 'B'--
no specific names given:"'One-sided' Arguments on Defense in Vogue, Unusually
Hawkish '15 August
[Text] [AJ "15 August" is coming again. Thirty-five years after the lost war,
a desire to go on talking about the experience of the war seems to be still
strongly reoted among the people, as it is evidenced in the YOMIURI SHIl~BUN's
special co?umn for readers' contributions. Digging up and reexamining the
- facts related to the experience of the bomb victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
and "the experience of the assailants," as seen from the U.S. side, go on
_ endlessly.
.[B] On the other hand, debates on defense, or more specifically arguments for
increasing the military strength of Japan, are vociferously in the air. As a
result, this year's "commemoration day for ending the war" is, unlike other
years, steeped in hawkish atmosphere. What can we make out of this?
Ikutaro Shimizu's Monograph.
[A] In ~ournalism, a work which recen~tly touched off controversies was the
manograph of Ikutaro Shimizu (former professor at Peer's University), "Nuclear
Option." It was published in the Julq issue of "SHOKUN!" a magazine put ouz
by Bungei Shunshu Company, which included unusually provocative elements, as
can be seen in the cluster of opinions expressed in it such as the Liberal
Democratic Party's argument on defense, the business world's argument for
increasing the defense expenditure, and former Joint Chief of Staffs Hiroomi
Kurisu's argument on emergency defense legislation.
[BJ There are two main points in the Shimizu monograph. One is, as the title
of the first part of the monograph indicates, an advocacy nf "Japan, be a state."
It says: "The United States absolutely forbade Japan to maintain any military
power under the Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. A state is supported
by moral authority and physical power. Therefore, Japan, forbidden to maintain
the armed forces which, together with the police, constitute the physical power
of a state, is an entity devoid of the main aubstance of a state." In other
words, it argues that Japan is not a state, and it should have military power
to become a state.
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The other point is, as the title of the monograph itself indicates, an advocacy
that Japan should have nuclear weapons. Mr Shimizu wrote it in the following
- manner. "If the nuclear weapon is important, and if we are privileged to haae
been the first nation victimized by the bomb, wouldn't it be Japan above all
others who should have the privilege of making the nuclear weapon first and
foremost and of possessing it? Isn't this co~onsense?" But this cannot be
read as a theme supported by adequate logic.
[A] Na wonder it created controversies. Mr Shimizu used to be a"shining"
opinion leader of the post-war peace movement, and helaunched his polemics at
the s:tde of the student movements and the workers' movements during the Security
Treaty struggles of the 1960's. That person has changed to this ex.tent...so in
this respect, too, it probably cannot be but a target of controversy.
EvEn to the Extent of Lies and Agitations....
[B] Against the Shimizu monograph, Mr Masamichi Inoki (former president of
Defense University, the director of the Research Institute for Peace and Security)
raised a criticism, even though he himself maintains the position of strengthen-
ing the military, saying "do not be misled by dangerous agitations" (September
Issue, CHUO KORON).
(A] Aside from the Inoki's essay, Professor Ikuhiko Hata of Takushoku University
recently wrote a criticism in Tokyo Shimbun under the title of "What Was the
Pacific War?" Thus, the ripples caused by the Shimizu monograph do not seem
to go away easily.
[B] According to the S June issue of SHUKAN BUNSHUN, Mr Shimizu made a statement
about the monograph as follows. "Because I wanted you people in the Self-Defense
Forces and the Defense Agency who are responsible for, and active in, the real
problem of military affairs to read it, I printed it (at first) in an unadulter-
ated form for limited circulation." Thus, (he) threw the provocative remark
about the nuclzar weapon at the Self-Defense Forces, and then let it be pitched
toward the general audience through journalism. It may not be wrong to say
that the remark was intend.ed to give defiantly a shock treatment against the
nuclear allergy, isn't it?
[A] In that sense, the ripple-effect it caused may be exactly what he wanted
as an agitator. But one thing that cannot be overlooked is the fact that the
Shimizu monograph cut out only one aspect of ~:istory to give convincing logic
to his arguments.
[B] It must be difficult for many Japanese to accept "the dogmatic assertion"
that today's Japan is not a state. Moreover, Mr Inoki, the aforementioned,
said that "Mr Shimizu has completed a 180 degree turn from chimerical pacifism
to chimerical militarism," and that the monograph, "Japan, Be a state", can be
regarded as "a gigantic lie, to put it bluntly, studded with brilliant truth."
[A] Also, in the special column for readers' reactions to the Shimizu monograph
provided in the August issue of "SHOKUN!" one reader sharply pointed out: "I
cannot understand why it is so necessary, in the discussion of the defense of
Japan for the 1980's, to emphasize that the old war which was fought more than
35 years ago was a"sacred war."
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Debates on the Constitution Also Sho~ a Common People Version
[B] Jun Eto's "the Constitution of 1946--Its Restrictions" in the same August
issue of "SHOKUN!" also bothers me because, whereas it gives a detailed account
of what went on between the Occupation Army Headquarters and the Japanese Govern-
ment in the process of making the constitution after the war, it does not put
proper weight to the circumstances leading to the acceptance of the Potsdam
Declaration, the surrender and the occupation, nor to the occupation policies
and the domestic political situationa of Japan, or international situations of
that time.
- [A] Mr Eto says that the constitution, particularly the Article 9, was forced
upon by the McArthur Headquarters, and the headquarters used its censoring
system to the fullest extent in order to conceal the imposition and to put up
an appearance that the constitution was initated by the Japanese Government, so
that it could "manipulate the psychology of the people."
[B] Even if it was an "imposition," not only was there the so-called "Matsumoto
draft" formulated by the Shidehara Cabinet of that time but also were other
constitutional drafts proposed by the Communist Party, the Socialist Party and
even by private individuals, and the consensus for establishing a democratic
constitution was thus strong in the nation. In this midst, because the govern-
ment tried to muddle through with a partial revision of "the Meiji constitutional
system" while it had accepted the Potsdam Declaration, the Occupation Forces
who aimed at the demilitarization and democraticization of Japan had to exercise,
it seems, "coercive power."
[A] The account of how the ordinary people took the constitution of Japan should
not be neglected, I believe. Did (they} think it "unsuitable," as did the
leadership? The contrary was true, wasn't it?
[B] Incidentally, how do we explain the tendency of building an argument by
slicing out only one aspect of histoTCy and linking it to the current defense
arguments?
[A] Of all possible reasons, it is due to the weathering of war-experience and
bomb-experience in 35 years after the war. When a slice of history is taken
out of the context and Xhrusted upon to people, they can hardly judge it it is
a correct view or not--this must be the reason. "The generation who do not know
- the war" now constitute one-half of the people; herein lies an opportunity to
be exploited by the agitators.
[B] In that respect, the opinion of a university student which was presented
in this column on the 13th was sharp indeed. It said "the stories of war-
experience are either a one-sided story of sufferings or a story of the complete
victim. I will not listen to any story that is devoid of a reflection that war
is a catastrophe for the humanity." The continuing tales of war experience
should be elevated from the utterly individual level to a social and historical
level. It will not be easy, though.
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[A] In addition to these arguments stemming from journalism, the heightened
arguments on defense c~ming from the financial world also make this year's
"15 August" hawkish. In February and March this year, the president of Japan
Chamber of Commerce, Shigeo Nagano, and the president of the Kansai Federation
of Economic Organizations, Hosai Hyuga, asserted one after another: "work
out a plan to promote defense industries," "the defense expenditure should be
increased to 1.9 percent of the GNP," and "look into the conscription system
for the time of emergency." ThesQ statements are made with the knowledge that
the increase of defense expenditure is directly linked with the interest of the
business world, and "the elders" who make such statements do not, of course,
become soldiers. Those who are to become soldiers are the younger generation ,
who are lamented for their lack of determination to defend the country. Hasegawa
Nyozekan, a social critic renowned for his pointed remarks, once uttered a
warning: "as the law of preventing wars, make it obligatory for the marshals,
the generals and big businessmen to stand on tre foremost frontline," and I
wonder if Mr Nagano or Mr Hyuga remembers it.
[B] The Iranian crisis since last year and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
accelerated debates on defense. But, international situations are always fluid.
At this moment China is supporting the arms build-up of Japan; but until a
short while ago, it was severely criticizir_g the rearmament of Japan. It is ~
indeed now more than ever that we need cool-headed debates, keeping our eyes on
every possibility, and not to be washed ~~!r by the weathering of war-experience ~
an.d A-bomb experience. -
COPYRIGHT: Yomiuri Shimbun 1980
9368
CSO: 4105
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ECONOMIC
~JAPAN TIMES~SUPPORTS JAPAN'S VIEWS GIVEN AT U.S. AUTO HEARINGS
- OW170441 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 16 Oct 80 p 14
[Editorial: "U.S. Hearings on Auto Imports"J
[Text] The four days of hearings held recently in Washington on the problem
of auto imports served to clarify main points at issue over the central
question: whether imports of Japanese cars have caused, or threaten to
~ause, any substantial damage to the American auto industry.
The hearings, sponsored by the International Trade Commission (ITC), an
~ indep~ndent government agency that advises the White House~on import relief
measures, came against the background of two concurrent economic develop-
ments in the U.S. One is the slump in the U.S. car industry and the other
the growth in the U.S. sales of Japanese cars.
The two developments raised the question of whether there exists any cause
and effect relationship between them--namely, whether the influx of Japanese
cars is the cause of the difficulties facing the U.S. car industry. Thia
is not an easy question, of course, as shown by past controversies on
dumping charges, for example.
But the four-day session at least provided Japanese and American automakers,
in particular, with a good opportunity to give their views a full public
airing.
The United Auto Worker.s (UAW) and Ford Motor. Co., which are requesting
action by the ITC to limit imports from Japan, maintained that the plight
of the U.S. car industry stemmed directly from the expansion of Japanese
imports. And they argued that U.S. carmakers needed protection from import
competition for at least five years in order to modernize and produce their
own fuel-efficient, small cars.
On the other hand, representatives of Japanese automakers, including Toyota
and Nissan, argued that the cause of predicament lay in the failure of the
U.S. auto industry to meet effectively the structural changes in the domestic
car market. The energy crisis, they pointed out, pushed up gasoline prices,
prompting U.S. consumers to buy small, fuel-saving cars imported from abroad,
especially from Japan.
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The difficulties have been compounded, the Japanese argument went, by changes
- in the U.S. business cycle. That is, the recesaion in the U.S. economy
itself further reduced the demand for large, "gas-guzzling" cars, tradition-
ally the mainstay of American cars. As a result, the stocks of unsold cars
increased, and sales dropped sharply, forcing the producers to lay off large
numbers of workers.
, It is up to the ITC to determine which side, USA and Ford or Japanese
makers, is correct. Our own impression of the hearings is that the Japanese
argument is well-grounded. It is the production and sales of large cars
that have suffered. Obviously, they do not directly compete with small
Japanese cars.
In this respect, the Japanese side received "support" from none other than
General Motors, which made it clear that the growth of imports was not the
direct cause of the slump. When the largest U.S. maker is saying, in effect, -
the same thing as Japanese producers, what is one to make of the complaint
by Ford, for instance, that imports are chiefly to blame?
The Japanese argument against import restrictions was also endorsed by the
U.S. Fair Trade Commission (FTC). The commission made a point that is hard
to refute: import quotas or higher tariffs on cars will impose sacrifices
on U.S. drivers in the form of higher car prices, they will also make it
less compelling for the American auto industry to make itself more competi-
tive.
Conspicuously absent from the hearings were representatives of the U.S.
Government, which decided not to attend--for reasons not fully explained.
But Washington's known position is that it is against import restrictions--
a position which is likely to be supported also by U.S. buyers of imported
cars.
As for the question of whether Japanese cars will pose a"threat" to the
U.S. auto industry when cars of a similar type start rolling off assembly
lines, Japanese makers stressed that no such threat existed. And it may
well be. Sales of American small cars are already beginning to pick up.
If U.S. producers can do what Japanese makers can, and we are sure they
can, then there ought to be no need for them to fear.
On balance, the auto trade hearings seemed to have strengthened the posi-
tion of Japanese makers. Although the debate will not be the only deter-
minant in an ITC ruling in November, we hope that commission members will
make a fair and just decision by taking these arguments fu11y into account.
COPYi ZQiT: The Japan Times 1980
cso: 4i2o
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ECONOMIC
'ASAHI'VIEWS RECENT IMF-WORLD BANK MEETING
OW102012 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 9 Oct 80 p 5
[ASAHI SHIMBUN 5 October Editorial: "Currency Diplomacy"]
[Text] The joint annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank in Washington, D.C., has ended quietly. This is not because the
global economy is in a good state--the foreign exchange problems faced by
the developing countries in particular are grave. The conference was no
~ more successful than any other in coming to grips with the true situation
~ because of the uncertainty created by the war between Iran and Iraq and
; the elections in the United States and West Germany.
Nevertheless, the fact that the participating nationa reaffirmed the impor-
tance of curbing prices was noteworthy. The U.S. Federal Reserve Board
recently raised its official discount rate. From the end of May, it had
been keeping interest rates low, but reverted to a tight-money policy
because of signs that inflation was increasing again. The Federal Bank of
West Germany is also keeping interesC rates tiioh.
Japan can afford to ease its monetary policies because of the improvement
in its international balance of payments and the drop in the rate of infla-
tion. But there is a limit to what Japan can do toward increasing its
economic growth rate when the global economy is sluggish. Jacques de
Larosiere, the managing director of the IME, said in his concluding remarks
that the adverse effects of relaxing monetary and banking policies too soon
were likely to appear over a period of several years. Japan should heed
this warning.
At the joint meeting, support was given to a World Bank plan to create an
organ that would be exclusively concerned ~with financing the efforts of
developing countries to develop energy sources. An agreement was also
reached to expand the IMF's financing framework and to reduce the interest
burdens of countries with low incomes.
Unfortunately, although they acknowledge that preventing the developing
countries from becoming bankrupt is an urgent task, the advanced nations
are still hesitant about extending a helping hand.
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At the meeting, the countries of the south asserted that the IMF was too
much under the control of the advanced nations of the north and demanded
reforms. G. William Miller, the U.S. secretary of the treasury, responded
irt a conciliatory way by saying that the IMF should change at a apeed com- ~
menaurate with changes in the world. The other advanced countries, however,
were less prepared to accept the demand.
The Japanese finance minister, Michio Watanabe, asserted that the I*iF' should
_ not take on tasks that would maice it indistinguishable from organizations
whose function it is to finance development projects. With respect to the
IME's procuring funds for the loans it will extend to the developing countries ~
in the private money market, Watanabe said that this should be strictly tem- ;
porary. ~
It is true to say that the IME is likely to encourage inflation if it grants i
special drawing rights and extends loans too easily, but if the advanced
countries remain intransigent because of this, the gulf between the north ~
and the south will never be bridged. To encourage understanding, the door ~
I_
for dialogue must be opened wider than before.
Because the Palestine Liberation Organization was not allowed to participate
as an observer in the recent joint meeting, the oil-producing nations in ,
the Arab world have little trust in the IMF. But if the global monetary ;
instability is to be corrected, the cooperation of those nations that possess
oil dollars has to be gained.
At the joint meeting, Muhammad al-Ali Aba al-Khayl, the Saudi Arabian mini- 1
ster of finance and national economy, said that the amounts that individual i
nations are required to invest in the IMF are not commensurate with the ~
economic strengths of these nations. This is what Japan has long been i
maintaining. It is only right that the advanced nations should recognize
what is reasonable in the oil-producing nations' representations, that both
groups of nations should join in stabilizing the global economy. Japan
should try to mediate in this. ;
I
COPYRI(~IT: Asahi Evening News 1980 j
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ECONOMIC
INDUSTRIAL BANK OF JAPAN SURVEYS EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT
OW092134 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 8 Oct 80 p S
[Text] Amid growing signs of an economic slowdown, plant and equipment
investments by business corporations are increasing at a higher pace
than a year ago, according to a b ank report.
The Industrial Bank of Japan Ltd. compiled the report on the basis of
a survey covering 1,732 corporations capitalized at 1 billion yen
or more on their investment plans as of mid-September for fiscal 1980
ending March 31, 1981, and for fiscal 1981.
Total investments planned by the corporations for the current fiscal
year came to 12,648.5 billion yen, up 21.9 percent over a year earlier.
~ This compares with the 16.5 percent increase in fiscal 1979.
Investments planned by manufacturing companies remained high at
4,157.6 billion yen, a 18.2 percent gain over a year before while
those of nonmanufacturing firms rose 16.2 percent to 4,067.8 billion yen.
:dotable among such manufacturers were those in the electrical, auto,
machinery and shipbuilding indus tries. Reflecting brisk exports, these
processing and assembly industri es will increase investments 30.6 percent
and those in material-oriented industries, 9.4 percent.
In tl~e nonmanu~facturing sector, electric power firms will boost invest-
ments 34.2 percent. Gas, shipping, leasing and mining companies involved
in oil development also will increase investments, sharply, while con-
struction and land transportation firms, department stores and super-
mark~ts will reduce their inves tments.
Meanwhile, all the corporations surveyed planned to increase investments
in fiscal ].981 by 4.7 percent from fiscal 1980. Among them, electric
power firms are planning to increase investments 16.4 percent.
Total investments planned in fis cal 1981 are expected to rise further de-
pending on the future situation, officials of the b ank added.
� COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1980 _
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E OON OMI C
`YOMIURI'RAPS OIl INDUSTRY FOR FORMING PRICE CARTEL
Tokyo THE Df~ILY YOMIURI in English 28 Sep 80 p 2
~Editorial: "Illegal Oil Price Cartel"~
~Text~ _ _
The Tokyo Higb' ~Court'y~idaY rul~ that tlie oil
3ndustry was gnilty of forming ~ a price cartel but was
innocent of jointly limiting. ita prbduction following '
the Srst oil crisia in 1973. The ruling ~ support~ the
general view tha.t the. cartels were responsible for
shorEage of certa.in' goods and extra.oidinary price
increasea which caused a panic among consumers.
The trial. drew attention 'because ~t was the first
c~iminal trial of cartel casea uncler the Antunonopoly
La~~?. Although the court recognized the two illegal
conducts of the oil industry, it .acquitted the defen-
da~ita of the charge of forming the production cartel
on the' grounds that the compa.nies had not been
aware of the illegality of their conduct because of
ceasive "adminiatrative guidanee" on production by
the International Trade a.nd Industry Minietry tNIITI)
and obscure unplementation of the Antimonopoly I:aw
by the Fair Trade Commission (F'~C). .
The ~ruling virtually' proved that not'only oil execu-
tives ~ but also the administrative ~ authorities weat
aetray beyond the objective of the Antimonopoly -
Law , which is aimed at protecting consumers by as-
- certaining free ~competition in domeatic economy. �
� . . ~ , .
Guiding Point
The oil industry, the administrative authorities
concerned with the national economy and ~the Fl'C
ahould accept the verdict modestly and use it as a
guiding point in their subsequent business 'and ~ ad-
ministra.tive activities:
The prosecutors charged that the Petroleum Aaso-
cation. of Japan and the then association president
and the association's ~upply and demand committee
- chairman had inatructed oil refiners to lunit their
prod~iction. . . ~ ~ . . . �
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The court said that' I~TI had guided ~the oil indus-.
try in regulating ite production a.nd the F'1~C hsd
fa.iled to wara the oil reflners or take any action
against them. ~ , ~ . -
Taking this background into consideration,� the
court acquitted the three defendanta, saying that euch
actions of ' MiTI aud the FTC made the defendants
believe that their conduct did not constitute illegality. :
Regarding the price cartel, the .court ruled that
MITI had not issued any guidelines in this respect ~ .
and tliat the de�endants had raised the prices dt their ~
own initiative, but administrative intervention .by ` '
MITI had made it easier for the .oil companies to
agree on the price cartel. ~
~ ~ . . . ~ .
Cozy Realtionship . � ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ . .
The court, therefore, ~aentenced 15 `executive~ of 12
oil compauies to prason ternas up to 10 months with
probation o~. two years and order"ed the companies
to pay fines up to ~�2.5 million. ~ ~
In this instance, we canriot ignore the exiBtence ~.of
the Oil Industry I.aw and a.dministrative guidance :
~ ~~hich nrompted the oil industry to eo easily reeort
to ca.rkels. . - , . . ' ~ ; ,
The oil companies and the aclminiatrative authori=
ties concerned are reflecting on thei~ conduct while
' carrying out restructuring .of 'thP industry, but~ the
cozy relationship between ~ the indu'stry and ~ admin-
istrative authorities is yet to be eliminated.
COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri 1980
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ECONOMIC
JAPANESE FIRMS WIN ALASKA PIPII.INE ORDERS
OW100529 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 9 Oct 80 p 7
[Text] Japanese steelmakers have won a slice of American orders for
steel pipes for construction of an Alaska natural gas pipeline, industry
sources said Wednesday.
. Northern Plains Natural Gas Co. of the U.S. is about to place a formal
order with the consortium of four steel mills--Nippon Steel, Nippon ~
Kokan, Sumitomo Meta1 Industries and Kawasaki Steel--for 120,000 short
tons (10 8,000 metric tons) of large-.diameter pipes, the sources said.
The figure accounts for ab out 20 percent of 581,000 tons on bidding in
what was billed as one of the largest pipeline deals ever offered in
the world.
Northern Plains is undertaking construction of a 1,300-km segment of the
Alaska highway pipeline project for Northern Border Pipeline Co.
Apparen tly mindful of an industry-advocated buy-American policy, the
sources said, Northerr~ Plains has awarded American producers more th ~n
67 percent of the total orders.
They s aid Bethlehem Steel has won an order for 139,000 tons, Kaiser
Steel 136,000 tons and U.S. Steel 73,000 tons.
The balance--113,000 tons--has been ordered from Italsider of Italy.
The deal started in November 1979 and estimates were resubmitted
several times because the 42-inch pip~s are required t~ meet the
stringent quality specifications of API X-70.
The se gment, called the eastern leg, forms part of the 7,660-km Alaska
Natural Gas Transportation System, consisting of four s.ections running
through Alaska, Canada and the continenta~ li. S.
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~
The Canadian segment will be linked with the eastern leg leading
eventually to Dwight, I11. , and the pro~ ected western leg reachiag
near San Francisco.
The eastern leg will initially carry natural gas from Alberta in
wes tern Canada to t!-~e midwes tern and eas tern U. S.
The contracts call for delivery in January-Jun~, providing the
suppliers with a relati~ely short lead time.
_ COPYRIGHT: THE JAPAN TIMES 1980
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SCIENCE ANA TECHNOLOGY
STATUS OF NEW SATELLITE LAt,TNCHER R& D DISCUSSED
Pari4 AIR ET COSMOS in F'rench 20 Sep 80 pp 47-~0 -
[Article by Pierre Lavereux--passages enclosed in slantlines published in
bold face]
[Text] The Japanese have been interested in r.ockets for 25 years (since
1955) following upon the work performed by Prof~ssor Hitokawa, director
of the Induatrial Science Institute of. the University of Tokyo (TODAI).
Shortly thereafter,incidentally, the TODAI launched its first rockec
probe, Y.appa 6, which reached an altl.tude of 50 kilometers.
But it was oniy 10 years ago that the Japanese space program truly got
underway with the launching of the OSUMI, the first artificial sateliite
by meana of a aolid fuel rocket, the Lambda 45, on 11 February 1970.
Everything then proceeded very rapidly, thanks above all to American aid.
- /In a single decade Japan has launched 18 scientific technological, and
applications satellites/--more than any other space power except the
United States and the USSR.
Since 1978 Japan has thus surpassed France which for long hel.d third place
behind the two space greats, both in the number of satellites launched and
in the size of Che space budget. At present--and for so long as Europe
shall not have placed the Ariane launcher into service--/Japan has estab-
lished itself as the third ranking space power./ The space a~bitions of
the country of the rising sun, moreover, forecast the intention of re-
maining such. /Launching of 14 satellites over the next 5 years has in
fact been decided./
The National Space Activities Commi~sion, established in 1960, kicked off
the Japanese space progr.am by organizing activities and creating the
necessary infrastructure.
/The Aerospace Sciences Institute (ISAS) of the University of Toky~ was
made responsible for the construction and launching of the scientific _
satellites./ It has its own facilities for this, in particuiar, /the
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Uchinoura-Kagoshima launching base/ (131�-OS' east, 31�-15' north). The
first rocket, the I.ambda 45, which began its career with four successive
failures between 1966 and 1969, was abandoned. It made wa,y for the new
Mu solid fuel rocket series. It was a Mu-45 which launched the Shensei,
the first scientific satellite, in September 1971. Since then the Mu
rockets have been constantly improved (Mu-3C, Mu-34, and Mu-35 versions}.
And, /beginning in 1985 a new and still more powerful version, the Mu-3S-Kai 1
will be placed into service./ This three-stage solid fuel rocket, 27.2
ueeters long and 1.41 meters in diameter, will have total weight of 61.2
tons with two solid fuel boostere for take-off assistance. It will be
able to place a payload of 720 kilograms into a low terrestrial orbit
(250 kilometers), which is two and one-half times the launch capability
of the present Mu-35 rocket.
/Up to the pres~nt the Univarsity of Tokyo has accomplished 17 rocket ~
launchings which have ~nabled 11 scientific and technological satellites
into orbit./ Since 1970 there have been only two failures of Mu rockets.
The TODAI plans to launch /five more satellites between now arid 1985/,
including the first Japanese interplanetary probe, PLANET-A, to Venus.
/Eleven othex scientific satellites are for the 1985-90 period and beyond
are in the planning stage./
/The National Agency for Space Development (NASDA)/ was established on
1 October 1969 for the purpose of constructing and launching applications
satellites. The NASDA also 1:as its own facilities, in particular /the
7~anegashima launch base/ (131�-50' east, 30�-34' north) situated upon
the island of the same name, about Z00 kilometers from the Kagoshima
launch base.
- The NASDA also has available its own N rockets, the Japanese version of _
the American Delta launcher, constructed under license in Japan.
/Since 31 July 1969 Japan and the United States have a space cooperation
agreement/ enabling the Japanese to have direct access to American
~echnology (unclassified) for construction of launchers and satellites. -
It is also believed that Japanese industry is participating to the extent
of 50-60 percent in the construction of Japanese rockets and 70 percent
in construction of Japanese satellites.
The large American aerospace firms have contributed, sometimes greatly,
in the construction of numerous Japanese satellites: ETS and EOS (Ford
Aerospace), BSE (General Electric), GMS (Hughes Aircraft), and so on.
Likewise, the Japanese N 1 launcher, which uses the first stage of the
American Delta, is built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) under
licenses from McDonald Douglas (stage) and Rockwell International (motor);
the third stage is built under license from Thiokol. On~y the N 1 racket's
second stage was developed in Japan, by MHI, with a license from TRW for
the verniers. The Castor solid fuel boostere are made by Nissau under the
license from the Thiokol Corporation. Development of the N 1 rocket was ;
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completed in May 1975; the first NASDA satellite, Kiku 1, was ].aunched
with this rocket from Tanegashima on 9 September 1975. In its wake the
NASDA has started development of a new and more powerful version, the N 2,
which, this time, will be built completely under license, the second stage
being replaced by an American stage with an A110-118 F motor of the Aero~et
Liquid Rocket Company made by Ishikawa;jima-Harima Industries (IHI). The
N 2 rocket ia the Japanese copy of the American Delta 2914 l~uncher, alias
the Straight Eight because it has a total diameter of 8 feet (2.44 meters).
The first flight test of the N 2 launcher is planned for February 1981 with
the technological satellite Kiku 4(ETS-4) and the first operational
launching a year later, in February 1982, to launch the geostationary
meteorological satellite GMS 2. The N 2 rocket can place 350 kilograme
into geostationary orbit [line or Iines of source text apparently cimitted]
...~f the N 1 rocket (130 kilograms).
The NASDA also has the benefit of American launchers for putting into orbit
three geostationary satellites which are too heavy for the N 1 rocket.
/In toto seven NASDA satellites have been placed into orbit. The NASDA
itself, since 1975, accomplished sia~ launchings which have placed four
technological and applications satellit~s into orb.tt./ Tt?e last two ~
launchings by the N 1 rocket (Ayame/ECS satellite) in February 1979 and !
February 1980 were marked by failures, which cause@ the resignation of
NASDA's president, Akiyoshi Matsuura, replaced last June by Mzseo Yamanouchi. !
Japan is in fact preparing a very ambitious space program based in part on.
/the space development plan/ presented in March 1978 by the Space Activities
Commission to Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda. This plan proposed uo less than
/launching 80 satellites over the space of 15 yeara to 1992 at a rate of
at least five satellites annually./ The cost of such a program was estimated
at 3 billion yen (13 billion dollars) to construct and launch 17 tele-
communications satellites, 39 bbservation satellit~s, 14 experimental
satellites, and 6 satellites intended for various applications. Th~e plan
also contemplated sending an automa.ted probe around the moon in 1985 and
two probes to Venus in 1990 (with release of balloons~in the atmosphere).
In toto this would necessitate 76 rockets of various types. This p~an,
which would have required doubling the annual budget devoted to space,
has not been adopted in its enti~ety. But some projects have nevertheless
been retained, such as sending a prabe to Venus (PLANET A), the flight of
a Japanese in space aboard the Shuttle in 1983, and construction of the
H 1 launcher.
The H 1 Launcher
/On 2 July 1980 the Japanese government decided authorize construction
of the new H 1 launcher of three stages, one them fueled by liquid
hydrogen and liquid oxygen./ This will be the most powerful Japanese
launcher and the first such launcher to use cryogenic propulsion, and'.is
to be equipped with an inertial guidance system.
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The H 1 launcher, which will be the principal Japanese launcher of the
1980 and 1990 decades will, in fact, be developed in /tvo veraiona:/ the
firat version, H lA, will be able to place a/550-kilogram payload into
geostationary orbit/ and the improved H 1B version will be able to launch
' a payload of at least /850 kilograms--and evenl ton--/ into the same orbit,
which correaponds to the present performance capability of the European
Ariane launcher.
For the time being only development of the first version, H lA, is committed.
The development of the H 1B version (also designated the H 1) will be decided
later on, depending upon the results achieved with the initial version. The
canfiguration of this future H 1B rocket, moreover, has not yet been defined.
It is only lu~uwn that it will probably be a/rocket of about 200 tone/
retaining the "upper portions" of the first launcher, including the second
crypgenic stage, with a new first stage equipped with either two motors
of the H lA o�r a new LOX-RJ1 motor with 120 tons of thrust. But the design
may evolve further.
~The development cost of the H 1A rocket is now estimated at between 137
and 150 billion yen, or between 2.560 and 2.720 billion francs,/ including
the two flight test launchings of the new launcr.er and one Qperational
firing. /The construction cost of the H lA launcher is estimated at 14
billion yen, or 260 million francs./
/The first flight test firing of the H lA rocket/ at Tenegashema, Japan,
where a new launch area is lnder construction,'/is planned for 1987./ The
flight tests are above all intended for qualification of the cryogenic
second atage for the first stage of the H lA launcher uses, with little
change, that of the new N 2,rocket, itself directly descended from that
of the present N 1 rocket which has been flying since 1975. The two test
flight firings of the H lA rocket will therefore be with a three-stage
version, bnt with a duumry thiid stage:,'�/The first operational firing/
--with an applications satellite--is supposedly planned for /1988./
Studies of the first H lA launcher began a few years ago. Several options
were contemplated (see configuration table below): solid or liquid fuel
first stage and launching capacity of 500, 600 or 750 kilograms into geo-
~ stationary orbit. The choice finally made was a rocket retaining the
liquid fuel (LOX-RJ1) of the N 2 launcher with launching capacity of
500-550 kilograms to reduce the risks and expenses of the launching.
Innovation was effected at the levels of the second stage (cryogenic)
and the third stage (solid fuel, improved in comparison with that of
the N 2).
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� LIQUIDES ~ SOLIDES
i ~ I
~ ' ~
~ _ Mrt S Mw ~ I I ~ .
~ � ~ ~ �
~ � ~
~ ~ I ~ .
~ ~ I
~ i ' i
~ ~
~ : I ; ~
~ 500 kg 600 kg 750 kg S00 kg ~ _s 500 Ic~ 750 1c~
Configurations studied for the H 1 launcher with first stage using either
liquid fuel (three versions on the left) or solid fuel (three versions on
the right). i
The adopted configuration is thms a three-stage rocket with liquid fuel I
first and second stages and solid fuel-third stage with nine solid fuel
boosters to assiist take-off. This rocket, 39.6 meters long, weighs 140.1
tons of which 124.8 tons are fuel and develops 220.2 tons of thrust at
take-off (six of the nine boosters being ignited along with the first
stage and the remaining three later). The capability in geostationary
otbit (550 kilograms) is one and one-half ~imes as great as that of the
N 2 rocket (350 kilogranis) which will fly in the beginning of 1981, and
four times as great as that of the present N 1 rocket (130 kilograms).
This capability of the H lA rocket still modest in comparison with itis
rivals (Delta, Ariane, and Atlas-Centaur), will nevertheless be sufficient
to launch the new Japanese teleco~unications, direct television, meteor-
logical, teledetection, and oceanographic satellites planned for the end ~
of this decade. The H lA rocket can~~a~~"o ~dn:ch~a 1u3-~ton ~ay~oad�~ii~to
heliosy~ichrorio~is o~bit at 1,000 kilometers altitude or 3.2 tons into ~~w
terrestrial orbit (2,000 kilometers at 30�) which is indeed not negligible.
What is essentially new in the H 1 launcher family is therefore at the '
second stage level, /cryogenic propu~sion and inertial guidance./ The
guidance system will in fact use an inertial platform, ~ointly developed '
_ by the University of Tokyo and the National Aeronatuics Laboraroty, as
well as a guidance computer derived from the NEAC 3200 minicomputer of
the Nippon Electric Company the logic for which is by Mitsubishi Space
Software Company. This inertial guidance system may be flight tested on
a N 2 rocket in 1982. '
The cryogenic second stage, Whoae development had been practically decided ~
in 1978 will be 5.5 meters long and 2.44 meters in diameter and weigh 800
i
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kilograms empty. It will carry 8.45 tons of cryogenic fuels, including
100 kilograms not burned, in the ratio of 6,400 liters of liquid oxygen
(LOX) and 20,000 liters of liquid hydrogen (LH2) in tanks of isogrid
structure in aluminum alloy (A1 2219). These pressurized tanks are
protected by polyurethane foam heat insulation, the intermediate common
bulkhead or honeycomb construction also being insulated. The stage's
altitude control is provided by gas ~ets (roll) and by piloting of the
main motor (pitch and qaw).
The cryogenic motor develops a/thrust of 10 tons/ Q.in vacuum) with a
nominal specific impulse of 440 seconds at the present (initially it was
430 seconds). Weighing 200 kilograms, with diameter of 1.65 meters and
length of 2.7 meters, this motor has t~arbopwmps with separate shafts,
is fitted with a combustion chamber cooled by circulation of liquid
hydrogen and extended into a divergent "eggc~.C" (cross-sectional ratio 140).
The ratio combustion pressure ia now 35 kilograms per square centimeter
(initially it was 25) with a mixture ratio of 5.5. The turbopumps for
the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen circuits rotate, repsectively, at
16,500 and 50,000 revolutions per minute with discharge presaures of 52.5
and 56 kilograms per square centimeter; the respective fue~ flows are
19.28 kilogram per second (LOR) and 3.5 kilograms per second (LH2).
Electrical ignition of the fuels is effected in a combustion antechamber
and each of the turbopumps is driven by a turbine actuated by a gas
generator operating under pressure of 26 kilograms per square centimeter
with a mixture ratio of 0.9.
Testing of the critical components of the second stage--cryogenic tanks,
supply lines, combustion chamber, turbopumps, guidance co~uter, and
inertial platform--have been intensified since 1976. New test installa-
tions have been specifically built at Tashiro and Kakuta for tests of
the ~tor and the stage, and at Tsukuba for perfecting the inertial
guidance system.
- The first comglete long duration tests of the combustion chamber (with
- regeneraticn) and of the turbopumps took place last year; the cryogenic
tanks are being fabricated. The NASDA plans on verifi.cation of the
designs being completed in the vicinity of April 1982.
The first stage of the H lA launcher has been assigned to Mitsubishi
Heavy Induatries, and the second stage to Mitsubishi fleavy Industries
in cooperation with Ishikawajima-Harima Industries; the third stage and
solid fuel boosters are being fabricated by Nissan
43.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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.a'~i . .
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e F:
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Mu-3 H rockee firing at Kagoshima
.45.
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APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300050009-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
40 m
FusEES oE H-I
LA NASDA ' ~
N-II
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NOTE: Symbol � means diameter
All dimensions shown are in millimeters
46
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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FOR OF~'ICIAL USE ONLY
~ I
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General configuration of second stage cryogenic motor: 1. gas generator;
2. liquid hydrogen turbopump; 3. liquid oxygen turbopump; 4. combus-
tion chamber; 5. nozzle; 6. main LH2 valve; 7. main LOX valve;
8. t~irust control valve; 9. mixture control valve; 10. motor starting
valve.
_ ~
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General con~iguration of cryogenic second stage of the NASDA rocket, H lA
Characteristics of the Future NASDA Launcher, H lA
lst 2nd. ~;3rd ~ Boosters Nose Launcher
.sta e sta e sta e 9
Fuel LOX-RT1 LOX-LH2 Solid Solid
Length, meters 22 10 2.7
Diameter,.T,~tebers 2.44 2.44 (X.3) 1 2.44 2.44
Total weigh~, tons 85.8 10.1 3.1 4.5 0.6 140.1
Weight of fuel, tons 80.9 8.33 �1.85 3.75 124.8
Thrust, tons 78.0 10.0 8 142.2/71.1 220.2
Specific impullse;;seaonds.252/254 430/440 285 238
Manufacturer MHI MHI&IHI Nissan Nissan
,47
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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COPYRIQiT: A. C. 1980 48
CSO: 4200
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
JAPANESE WEATHER SATELLITE SENllS FAULTY DATA
OW161347 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 15 Oct SO p 12
[Text] The unreliability of pictures sent from the Japanese weather satel- -
lite "Himawari" was causing the meteorological agency to make wrong predic-
tions about the course of typhoon no. 19, it was found late Monday night.
The disclosure, which came as z great shock to the agency, was learned
after 10 a.m. when data about the typhoon were sent from a U.S. observation
plane.
The U.S. plane observed the typhoon near Yasushima Island at 9:39 p.m. but
the location was some 40 kilometers away from the point set by the agency
on the basis of picturPs sent from the Himawari.
At that time, the typhoon was at a point very important for weathermen to
predict whether it would hit Kyushu or not.
At that time, the agency was saying that the typhoon was likely to hit _
southern Kyushu. After it was found that the storm was actually located
some 40 kilometers eastward, the agency quickly changed its forecast, saying
that the storm would skirt the southern tip of Kyushu.
Together with the alteration of the prediction, the agency had also to
revise the projected couxse of the typhoon it had earlier announced on the
basis of Himawari's pictures received every three hours.
The revision demonstrated the lack of dependability on data sent from the
weather satellite launched under great fanfare.
Shocked officials of the agency said that they would i~ediately start
checking on the cause of the satellite's transmission of incorrect data.
COPYRI(~iT : Mainichi Daily News 1980
CS0 : 5500
,
49
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
P4 LEVEL R~SEARCH CII`;TER TO BE ESTABLISHED
Tokyo PdIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 16 Jul 80 p 2
- [Excerp ts] The Science and Technology Agency [STA] plans to allocate
800 million yen in JFY i981, the f irst year, and expend a total of approx-
imately 2 billion yen to complete the "P4" level research facility in
_ FY 1983. It is anticipated that with the completion of the facility, gene
, engineering in which Japan had lagged behind Europe and the United States
will make remarkable progress. The STA had d~cided to build the installa-
tion--which requires the highest degree of airtightness--in the Tsukuba
univer~ity town. While the P1 level research facility is a common experi-
mental laboratory for microorganisms, the P2 level a laboratory which pre-
vents waste matter and aerosol from escaping, and the P3 level an isolated
research area, the P4 level is equipped with shower rooms, high-pressure
steril izing apparatus, etc. and is a research facility completely isolated
from human beings. With this facility, sophisticated gene-recombination
research utilizing cells of primates can be conducted and Japan will come
to possess a world level research center.
Plans are to construct a building with total floor space of 6,000 square
meters to house not only the P4 level research facility, established accord-
ing to guidelines, but the P1, P2 and P3 experimental laboratories, a re-
search wing (2-story f erro-concrete) anc' a dormitory. The planned construc-
tion site, to be rented, is a 5-hectare plot adjoining the research installa-
tian of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in Shimoyokoba, Yatabe-
machi, Tsukuba-gun, Ibaraki-ken.
For th e present, this research center aims to develop Japan's lagging gene
engineering by conducting researches on safety aspects of gene-recombina-
tion technology and re-evaluation of guidelines as well as training person-
nel and undertaking new gene-recombination researches.
"Tsukuba Research Center" to Open
Upon c ompletion of the transfers of nine research organs, including the
_ Mechanical Engineering Laboratory and the Electrotechnical Laboratory of
the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology [AIST), to the Tsukuba
50
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university town, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry held the
opening ceremony of the "Tsukuba Research Center" from 1500 hours, 15 ,Jul
1930, at the lecture hall of the AIST Tsukuba Administrative Office.
Present at the ceremony were guests, including Benzaburo Kato, chairman of
the R&D Division of Industrial Techniques Council~ Buzaemon Shindo, chair--
man of [Japan Industrial. Standards Research Association] , et al. , and
e:
about 500 interested persons.
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kagyo Shimbunsha, 1980
9i34
. CSO/ 8129/0031A END
� 51
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