JPRS ID: 9385 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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FoR oFFic~A~, usE oNi,~~
JPRS L/9385
7 November 19~80 -
/ th Afri~a Re ort -
Near East Nor p
CFOUO 40/80)
FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAS~ INFORMATION SERVICE
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I
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JPRS L/9385
~ 7 November,1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 40/80) -
CONTENTS
TUNISIA
Restrictiona on Growth of Free Prese Reported
(Souhayr Belhassen, Abdelazia Barouhi; JEUNE AFRIQUE,
24 Sep 80) 1
Problems of Migrant Workers Discussed '
' (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 26 Sep 80) 4 -
WESTERN SAHARA
Morocco 5aid To Control More Terrain, POLISARIO To
Control Propaganda
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 24 Sep 80) 8
Briefa
POLISARIO Gets Soviet Weapons 14
Mauritanian Prisonera of POLISARIO 14
_ a_ [III - NE & A- 121 F~UO]
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TUNISIA
RESTRICTIONS ON GROWTH OF FREE PRESS REPORTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Sep 80 pp 46, 4~
[Article by Souhayr Belhassen and Abdelazia Barouhi]
[Text] Although there are important differences, the national pres~ from all
~ sides have accorded a favora~le prejudice to Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali for
5~onths. There is little difference between LA PRESSE, a pro-government daily,
and the independent ESSABAH group (Arab language daily). Headlines, articles and
editorials applaud the action of the government: liberation of political prisoners,
elimination of some dubious party leaders. "It is no longer necesLary to follow
Mr Mzali's rhythm of liberalization," stated the enraptured ESSABAH.
"Mzali forges ahead," a headline in the 10 August issue of LE PHARE, the 8+amonth-old
independent French language weekly. Somewhat regional and cultural at first,
LE PHARE is also forging ahead, and remarkably, is supporting the "legitimate"
UGTT.
On the occasion of Aid (the end of Ramadan, 12 August), one of its journalists,
who paid a visit to Mr Habib Achour in his closely guarded residence, reports
the words of the ex-secretary general of the UGTT (Tunisian General Federation of
Labor) in an article entitled "A Morning With Habib Achour" (24 August issue).
- Doling Out
The latter was addressing the members of his executive board and of the loyal
unions. While recognizing the present i.mproved political atmosphere, he recommended
that they: "Hold on." These are words which could have been interpreted as a
challenge to the authorities at a time when difficult negotiations are straining
to "normalize" the life of the affiliated trade unions. Thls issue wiZl not be
put on sale, and LE PHARE has been suspended for 3 months by a court order.
Officially, it ie .r_ot the 24 August issue that is under indictmen*_, ~out the -
previous number (on sale for a week, since there was no preliminary censorship),
- for publication of false news. Specifically, which was actually erroneous, news
of the reception of the secretary general of OATUU (Organization of African Trade
~ Union Unity) by President Bourguiba.
"This action must not be interpreted as putting the brakes on openness," an
official source assured us. It is to avoid giving weapons to defenders of
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orthodox opiniun within the pSD [Destourian Socialist Party]. These party mem~ers
would have exploited the article on Achour to demonstrate the "dangers" of
democracy.
It should also be noted that an issue of the satirical newspaper KOL CHAI BIL
MAKCHOUF, published quite openly by the party, was also seized for "defamatory
attacks." In all, one blow to the left, one blow to the right. Mohamed Mzali
is categorical: "Freedom of the press must not be used against openness. Everyone
must understand his rights and his duties."
While profiting from the critical support of the PHARE, TUNIS HEBDO (independent) ~
and the liberal opposition newspapers ERRAI (OPINION) and DEMOCRACY, the Mzali
goverrunent has paradoxically had more trouble from the party newspapers ~EL AMAL,
1'ACTION, DIALOGUE and LA PRESSE). Still in the hands of loyal followers of the
ex-director of the P~D, Mr Mohamed Sayah, they only dole out certain news items.
At the pnd of August, the management was turned over to young Destourian t~:chnocrats
without any political past.
As for the other political currents, since his nomination, Mr Mzali has proclaimed
too loudly that the opposition press is urell-situated, since the birth of new
headlines cannot be prevented. Already, Mr Ahmed Mestiri, leader of one wing of
the Movement of socialist democrats, has obtained authorization, during the month
, oC July, to publish two periodicals, 1'AVENIR and AL MOSTAKBAL--although it is
still not known when they will appear.
As for the organ of the PCT [Tunisian Communist Pa::�ty], it seems that it will
not finally be authorized. It is said, "The comrusnists should be the last to
claim the riglit to freedom of speech when it is known that they have it when they
are in power."
As for the Popuiar Unity Movement (MUP of former minister Ahmed Bsn Salah), on
the other hand, the request presented in July 1978 by Mrs Brahim Hayder, wife
of one of the leaders of the movement, is reviving a debate with~n the PSD.
The "pros" stress that freedom of speech cannot be exclusive, and that there is
nothing to be feared from her newspaper, JNITY. The "cons" bring up the past
"antidemocratic" policy of the former minister.
The Doctrine
We tend to believe that the response will finally be positive. It is not out of
the question that this is related to the issue of political contacts ~which would
develop between tre friends of Ben Salah. and the regime (J.A. No. 1025).
And the "integrationist" movement? It is said that it is taken for granted that
its newspapers will reappear. "A contingency," it is said. The authorization
would be on condition of the ending of the alignment of this group with Khomeyni's
ideas. An alinemenC that caused the suspension of AL MOJTAMAA (the Society)
in January 1980, although 1 month earlier the integrationists had requested
- authori.zation to publish under a new title. The Ba'athists, who may also have
intended to establish newspapers, apparently had no opportunity to do so.
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The doctrine that is emerging is one of authorizing only newspapers that give
proof of independence, and those whose national characteristics are established.
' ~n this case, it is said, no matter what ideas are concerned, authorization
comes "automatically." This is the official line of "progressive" establishment
of "the democracy of speech," while awaiting "the democracy of organizations."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
9174
CSO: 4400
~
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TUNISIA
PROBLEMS OF MIGRANT WORKERS DISCUSSED
Paris MKRCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Sep 80 pp 2339, 2340
[Text] The 14th seminar ofTuni.sian workers abroad, which was held in
Tunis in August and was opened by Pr.ime Minister Mohammed Mzali, has assumed
special significance. On the one hand, general economic conditions make
it desirable that enigrants receive technical ~raini,ng and eventually
return to Tunisia to invest their savings. On the other hand, the open
door policy inaugurated in Tunisia requires atrict loyalty on the par~ of
the emigranta who, more than other groups, are subject to being diverted by
the action of opposing Tunisian groups which have been establiahed abroad,
particularly in France.
The migrant workers generally complain of the atrictneas exhibited by
Tuniaian customs that would interfere with importing of equipment that they
intended to employ in Tunisia and of a lack c,f understanding by the
government with regard to the plana that they intend to implemznt after
returning to their country.
Therefore, the seminar recommends, in addition to improvement of the services
dealin~Z with repatriation of the workers, streamlining of government red
tape and effecCive technical assistance for the purpoae of implementing
their plans for establishment of regional or local enterprises as well
as consideration of the establishment of a national bank charged with
promotion of their investments.
Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali assured the participants of the seminar
that he would do everything in his power to eliminate any difficulties
arising from red tape, which he said is "a word that simply does not exist
in the Arabic language." He announGed that the initiative taken by Monzi
Kooli, leader of the party, led to creation of the economic snd social
service of the Destourian Socialist Party which will aesist interested
parties in taking the necessary administrative steps. Furthermore, Hedi
Mabrouk, Tunisian ambassad~r to France, volunteered to establish a"cell"
in esch coneulate which would help each repatriated emigrant with the -
fc,nalities required to create a new enterpriae.
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At the same time, Mr Mzali informed the emigrants of efforts that will
be made to achieve a large-acale eeonanic boom which will benefit all Tu-
nisians and which will "eliminate the causes of emigration." This invol- '
vea solving the unemployment crisis eince, as he said, "this ie a problem
that atares us in the face, although eome people are reluctant to speak
about it." Consequently, it will be necessary ta create 600,000 jobs during
the next 5 or 6 years in accordance with the Sixth Plan. The solution -
will conaist of establiahing large agricultural and industrial enterprises
"in continental Tunisia between Jendouba and Medenine" which are regions
that do not bene~it from "the same rate of growth as the coast."
.
Meanwhile, in accordance with the resolutions of the seminar, the fate of the ,
migrant workers should be improved in the countries where they are employed
and where the problem exiats. However, this is nnt the case in France which
contains 210,000 Tunisian emigrants, more than half of whom are qualified
workere (of a total of 350,000 emigrants) and very few c anplaints have been
made by them. Nevertheless, it is an urgent matter to conclude an agreement
_ with the East German Government and to provide social security benefits and
equal rights for Tuniaian workera.
The participants of ~he seminar expressed "their deep satisfaction with
regard to the new political climate which ten~eto aolidify national unity."
However, one of the mo~t important recommendations generated by the aeminar
deals with "the need to strengthen the power of the Deatourian Socialis t
Party for the purpose of informing as many as poaeible of the migrant w orkera
and, for greater effectiveness, to coo~dinate the actiona of the adminis tra-
tive organizatfons of the national government with those of the services of
the party abroad." -
While praiBing the patriotic spirit of the 7Junisian emigrants, their at-
tachment to their country and the active role that they play in deFc~nae of its
intereste, Mr Mzali denounced the dangers that they run "due to certain
organizatione and governments" which sub~ect them �to blacl~ail and attempt
to aline them against t}?eir country by making them beli~ve "that the policy
employed is not the proper one and that the choices offered are not
satisfactory" and by endeavoring to transform them "into eubversi~~e agenta
ready to overthrvw the government."
The name of no country or organization was cited. However, certain allusions,
particularly to actions taken against "all Africans", auggest that the moat
likely nation is Libya, which is known to be involved in the Gafsa affair,
and which shelters approximately 80,000 Tunisian migrant workers. Neve r the-
lesa, the approaches taken by amall cells which tend to convert the worker
~ into "a revolutionary, a left or a right extremist" indicates that the
su bv eraive propaganda conducted by the weatern nations is also being
conaidered.
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At the present time, the cammunist infiltration does not seem to ins~ire
tl-:e moat ter~or, Clandestine units of the Tunisian c.ommuniat party in ttie ~
hone counkry itself on 25 August distributed copiea of a leafiet stating that,
under pree~ent circumatances, they believed it was indeed poasible "to arrive
at a national co~promi.ae provided that substxntial politic~l cna:tges were -
made," that is, that z general r~mne~ty, guarantees of freedom of apeech
and tt~e pru~er modification of trade union and atu3ent representation should ~
be provic3~d. ~he question of amnesty is indeed of primary import~nce since
the approval o� this me~sure would permit r~election of inembers of the -
former governing staff of rhe Tuniaian General Federation of Labor, which
was recently ~ardoned but, because of this, did not regain their civil .rights
- zhat would only be retur~ed by means of an amnesty.
On the other hand, relations between the Destourian Socialist Party and
the French Socialist Par,ty have not been restored in spite of the excellent
r~ce~?tion accorded Alai:~ Savary due to the services rendered by him to the
cause of Tunisian independence. Foliowing the events that took place ir~
January 1978, relations betwecn these two parties had become strained and
the Socialist Party had drawn clos~ to the opposition Tunisian organizationa
in France and in particular to the Popular Unity Movement headed by Ahmed
_ Ben Salah.
Following a secret "national conference" h~ld in Tunisia in July, the Popular
Unity Movement refuaed to consider its participation in "epotty or partiat
political solutions" unless there was a"basic and real.change" and, in
particular, general amnesty aci3 respect for ci~il liberties. The decision
of the Popular Unity Movement, fahich is $ppreciably harder than the
position of the Tunisian Commurd.et Party, makes the former the most determined
opponent of the policy of gradual overtures now being firm the importance
of the Popular Unity rlovement in ~rance, it is obvious that c~ntamination
of the migrant workers by its propaganda is worrying Mr Mzali. The strengthen-
ing of overturea ~f the Destourian Socialist Party in France is aimed at
cambatting such actions.
"The atrangest part of it", said Mr Mzali to the members of the seminar
of the migrant workers "is that some parties and groups try to make contact
with you. Wouldn't it be better for them to operate in their own back-
yard? Whether they come from the West or the East, what right do they have ~
. to give us lessona in advanced social doctrine?... It is unreasonable that
- the last word should go to the one who speaks loudly and who banga hie
fiat on the table...".
rIr'Mzali, who was interviewed by France-Inter during the seminar, atated
- that the situation of the migrant workera in France is one of the matters
to be aealt with by him ~ointly with the French prime minister and said
"The most important item on the agenda is the future of cooperation."
_ "We must", continued Mr Mzali, "reorganize the cooperation effort, advance
t~ a higher level and consider not only the problem of commercial exchange
or the problem of technical assistance. We must go further than this.
It is necessary that the Tunisiana and the French be able to make ~oint
investmenta, to take joint economic risks, to pr anote the trilogy together,
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to employ Arab capital and to create the wealth that will benefit the
French as well as the Tunisiana and the Arabs since cooperatinn~means
reciprocity.... Large Franco-Tunisian plants can be constructed for ex-
porting and the French will find certain advantages in this arrangement."
We can see that it is a queation of employing more Tuniaian labor efficiently
in Tunieia. It ie not neceesary for the Tuniaian worker to e.migrate.
Everything depends on the flexibility and logic of the political thinking
of Mr Mzali and the Destourian Socialist Party.
In fact, even during this vacation period, the effort of the party is
directed to other social and economic facets. It is a question of satisfying
the needs of the citizena in all aspects and in various activities. It was
in this vein that Mongi Kooli, head o.f the party addressed the new members
of the National Office of Destourian St~3er.ts. "The important thing" said he
"is to impart new life to the student movement in order to rally to the party
the greatest number of competent students." The lzader stated Mr Kooli .
"should first of all be devoted to success in his studies which will earn
him more respect and influence. He mU.st a~so possess the gift of persuasion
- and must conduct himself in an exemplary fashion." An office has been created
under the direction of the Party for the purpose of teac;hing and guiding
the r~tudents.
At the same time, Abdeaselem Dinassi, secretary general of the Tunisian
ilnion of Youth Organizations told the presa that the time has come for the
atudenta "to organize themselves freely and democratically in one or more
organizations of their choice.... There is no longe1 any place for careerists,
unscrupulous individuala and opportunists.... Our major objective is to en-
dow all of the youth organizations with a functional, democratic and re-
presentative function."
During the eame day, Mongi Kooli chaired a meeting of the Destourian cell
of skopkeepers and craftsmen of the Tunis native markets whose problems,
according to him, concern the government a great deal. He recalled the role
played by the markets in ttxe struggle for freed an, for the apread of civil-
ization and for maintenance of the Tunisian personality. In regard to
this aubject, he said "What :L recommend to you above all is to never allow
a single handicraft industry to die out." He concluded by insiating on
the values of morality and integrity as well as the complementary nature
of the interests of the producer and the consumer. It should be pointed out
that the nativ~e marketplace is an important employer of labor. Its prosperity
will contribute to the elimination of emigration. Thus is demonstrated
and coherence of the socioeconomic policy of the Tunisian Government.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
7619
CSO: 4400
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WESTERN SAHARA
MOROCCO SAID TO CO~TTROL MORE TERRAIN, POLISARIO TO CONTROL PROPAGANDA
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Sep 80 pp 30-34
[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "The Turning Point"]
[Text] The wind has changed in the Sahara, and over the past few months it is
blowing more and more to Morocco�s advantage in the long war that sets it against
the POLISARIO. On the eve of the fifth anniversary of this murderous confrontation
I am almost inclined to write that Morocco is in a fair way to win its war, for very
substantial reasons and with a number of indications in evidence.
Counterstroke
While crossing through.the parts of the Sahara r~puted to be the most dangerous,
the most "rotted-out," at the end of August and the beginning of September 1980, I
noted that the climate of this war has markedly changed in the last f ew months.
First it is in order to correct some false pictures. The Sahara war is absolutely
not "the war of the sands." More properly, it is the war of the mountainsides, of
the bald peaks, hollowed out by the sun, the cliffs of Che Hamada, the beds of the
dried-out wadis, the rubble, the caches and the rare water-holes. The sand is
~there sometimes, for the sake of nostalgia and poetry. It is a marginal factor in
this war of position which picks up activity more often than not in the disputing
of the most mountainous regions, such as Ouarkziz or the manifold irregularities of
terrain in the Saquiet E1 Hamra. Further south the Guelta Zesnmoun is already more
firmly in Moroccan hands. Control of these regions determines~the security of a
great many towns, hamlets and garrisons. And Morocco_is gaining more territory
every day.
It was precisely into the foothills of Saquiet E1 Hamra that I asked to go,
incidentally expecting a polite refusal. But General Ahmed Dlimi and his aides,
such as Colonel Abdelaziz Benani, chief of staff at Southern Front Headquarters,
- gave me the run of the area and supplied all necessary means for getting there. I
counted no less than 29 lai~dings by helicopter, Bell and Puma, and several trips
, by Land Rover, that new came~. of the deserC.
Last March and April, however, it was the triumphant communiques of the POLISARIO
that then seemed to be in control of the major part of Quarkziz, right in the midst
of "uncontested Morocco," and the foothills of the Saquiet. The Ouarkziz mountain
chain along the Algerian-Moroccan frontier, then the so~lth flank of. Wadi Draa,
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almost to the Atlantic coast. This is the axis that enabled the POLISARIO to carry -
the war all the way into Moroccan territory, fram Akka to Tan-Tan, over an arc of
several hundred kilometers. It was enough to control these mountainsides and the ~
unavoidable passes, to know the terrain well, to have secure caches and a few
accomplices to strike swiftly and disappear.
- Tt~~us, during the first three years of the war the Moroccan Army had to endure the
blows of the POLISARIO. Masquerading under the guise of strategy was a static -
policy, content with mere defense of the towns, mines and highway axes, abandoning ~
the desert zones. It was dangerous, as the Sahraoui guerri~las could organize as
they pleased and had the initiative the whole rime. The result: military def eats
and the lowest possible morale.
The riposte began in October 1979 with mobilization of the Ohoud group, followed by
the Zellaka and Larak units. Their objective was to rake the Sahara, progressively
push back the POLISARIO, regain control of Guelta Zemmoun and Ouarkziz. Up to
mid-April 1980 the POLISARIO score. Since then the change in strategy has borne
fruit, and for the Sahaoui, it is the turn of the tide.
Great Discretion
This change is also to be explained by the new state of morale in the Moroccan
Army, which appears to have gotten over it complexes and traumatisms of the past.
The officers are full of confidence, starting with General Dlimi who has directed
the totality of operations since last April and Ma}r. A tall man with a lean f.ace,
eyes very mobile and wrinkled brow, white at the temples, the commander of the Army
of the Southern Front, age 48, is an officer with "command presence," which does
not exclude a certain timidity and a d iscreet sense of humor.
En3oying the confidence of King Hassan II, h~ is chiefly known for his great
discretion and his capacity for adapting te every kind of terrain and condition of
~ lif e. Thanks to a good supply system and an excellerit communications network it was
possible to see him that very day--in the Sahara, with binoculars and a General
Staff map in hand, then later in the royal palaces of Rabat or Fez in his capacity
of Chief of ADC's to His Majesty. This particular hat he wears enables General
Dlimi to function as one of the closest collaborators of Hassan II. He is also one .
of the few Moroccan officials, tagether'with Ahmed Reda Guedira, who is familiar
with the fundamentals of the Sahara affair, in all it facets. A bit of this stems
from his origins--the Dlimi tribe--a lot f.rom a profound knowledge of the terrain
acquired since age 5, without mentioning several diplomatic missions conducted
discreetly, including certain "secret".meetings with Algerian and POLISARIO
emissaries at Bamako, Geneva and elsewhere.
But let u:~ get back to Ouarkziz, only recently a hangout for Moroccans, where I
have just spent several days which turned into a... tourist promenade. There,
for the mere asking, the helicopter took me taxi-fashion, together with the region
commander, Colonel Boujendar, to Assa (attacked by thQ POLISARIO on 4 Jixne 1979),
to Foum E1 Hassen (attacked and occ.upied 14 July 1979), to Akka (attacked and
parti.~~lly occupied 25 January, then 29 June 1980). Each of these towns (each with
some thousands of Berber or Arab inhabitants) are about 50 kilometers distant
from th~ theoretical Alger ian-Maroccan frontier, below the Bani chain and next to
,a the Drac, valley, while to the east E1 Ouarkziz raises its dark and ominous bulk.
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A Regular Billiard-Table
T f.lew over this mountain chain at several different points, with some anxiety on
take-off. But the serenity of my two pilots who fly the routes withou t maps, and
the friendly company of Colonel Bouj end~ar quickly a'llayed my fears. From Assa we `
- even plunged ~LSt above ground-level toward the Algerian frontier and flew over the
Braber Pass, where we saw a traffic-,jam of trucks! Those in one direction, fully
- loaded, were bringing supplies to Zag; the others, empty, were on the way bac~ to
Foulimine. It was suggested that I land there, if I wished, and go along with some
of the convoy as far as Zag, on the other side of Ouar kziz. I preferr ed to drop
down half-way along, at Tisgui-Remz, on the eastern slope of Ouarkziz, where the
POLISARIO often took jourz~alists. Below begins the enormous plain of Hamada, a
regular b~lliard-table, which leads to the environs of Tindouf...
Tizgui-Remz today hardly gives the impression of a threatened garri:son. Despite .
temperatures of 46� C in the shade, I ate fine frzsh grapes brought in from the
north.,. At Assa, Foum E1 Hassen, Akka, I was particularly astonished by the
casual bearing of the military, for whom "all thought of danger is from now on
out of the question." And as it was just about ~everywhere I went, the preoccupation
of the moment at this time, beginning of September, was being separated fr~m one's ,
family. Particularly the circumstances that children were soon to go back to ; _
school, those from the north, to various parts of the country.
At Assa I found a small town cut in two by a palm plantation. The old town of
' Ksar T;1 Haratines has a mainly black population. Lots of new buildings and even
some TV antennas, e~~en though there is no electric power in the town yet. Water,
on the other hand, is abundant there, breaking out of the ground in ma.ny places.
Unable to find any signs of anxiety, I set about finding a Berber necklace in the
local souks. This piPce of jewelry alone brought back old memoriea. Here the ~
Ali-Youssa (the local population) were from time immemorial sworn enemies of the
Reguibets a living burden in Algeria and present skeleton-framework of the POLTSARIO.
[Typo in text, last sentence a guess, Tr.]
For centuries the Reguibets attacked the villages of Bani (and vice-versa) to raid _
the livestock and bring back from the other side of the Hamada of Tindouf the
jewelry of the Berber women as trophies �or their own wives.
[dithout Escort
I encountered the same situation at Foum El Hassen and at Akka, inhabited by the
Ait Mribet (Berbers) and the Ou1ed Jellai (Arabs). Akka nestles on a hillside and
the palm plantation is bigger than anywhere else.
At Akka, in the early afternoon of this 2d of Septem~er, I 3.eft Colonel Boujendar
to settle some military matters and did a tour of the town, then of th e palm
_ plantation, some 17 kilometers, in a little 4 hp Renault accorr~panied by the Caid
(a young administrative official of the region) . No escort of any kind. Even
- when visiting the adjoining villages of Tagadirt. Ait Antar, Douar E1 Kasba,
Agad~.r-Ouzrou. The quest for a Berb~r necklace became a pretext for many �
discussions and stops for tea. Behind humble facades they sometimes serve you tea
in glasses manufactured over a century ago in the famous French crystal-works of
= Saint-Louis. In the late afternoon--with the t~mperature more clemen t--we found
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ourselves under the pomegranate-trees of the Caid's house, and he pressed hard for
us to spend the night there. The colonel`s appointment-book gets us off the hook!
We take our leave with regrets. We learn later on that on the following day, _
_ 3 September at dawn, the POLISARIO attempted to approach Akka (and Tata) and that it
was halted by one of the Ouarkziz patrols some 20 kilometers from its ob~ective. .
Prestigious Officers
Thia did not surprise me. The day before this attack I overflew several elements 1
of the Moroccan Army well deployed on various hills and plateaus with impressive `
mat~riel: armored vehicles, heavy machine-guns, tractor-drawn artillery camouflaged
behind stone walls. Moreover, the inhabitants of Assa, Foum E1 Hassen, Akka and
other villages recently received arms at their request so they might participate in
the defense of their families, property, livestock...
At this time in the beginning of September Ouarkziz, even though bordering on Algeria
and despite the attacks of 3 September on Tata and Akka, is no longer the f irst
concern of the Moroccan Army. Tata and Akka were harried fram a distance, thank5
to the exceptional range of the "SLalin-organs" and above all, it would seem, to
impress the members of the Committee of Wise Men of the OAU who were supposed to
hold a meezing a few days later at Freetown.
The thr.ust of the current war effort aims to control the region crossed by the path
- from Tan-T~n to Smara, especially the obligatory passes of the Abatteh region at
the l~a1f-way mark, from Tan-Tan to the holy city of Smara. Several times in the
past few weeks the POLISARIO announced that it had attacked and evet~ occupied
Abatteh. ~I went there three times at the end of August, and on the afternoon of
Saturday the 30th, taken there in Colonel-Major Abrouk's Bell helicopter, I
witnessed an award of decorations by General Ahmed Dlimi in the name of King
Hassan II. Some twenty officers, noncommissioned and enlisted men of other ranks
received war-palms for high feats of arms... Among them a bearded captain named
Khomeyni. As it happened, several days before, a POLISARIO column, under siege
and starving, was driven to the imprudent move of attacking almost right out in the ~
open a food supply convoy... The result was 80 vehicles destroyed and several key
positions lost on the hillsides of Saquiet El Hamra.
At that point a vast clean-up operation began, and immediately Morocco regained ;
several hills, making the opening of the Tan-Tan - Smara path by control of the '
obligatory passages to be expected soon... This region south of Abatteh was where ~
I saw, even more than on E1 Ouarkziz, the greatest concentration of military ~
equipment and the most prestigious officers. ~ ~
On thls peak, unnamed on any map, even a Headquarters military map, an entire ,
ballet-troupe of helicopters simultaneously landed General Dlimi, Colonel-Major
Abrouk (chief of the Zellaka Group), the colonels Benani and Ben Othman (chief of
~ the Larak Group) as well as a large number of their staffs. The vacillating morale -
of ].ast year is nc longer in zvidence, all the more so as the opposition is no
l.ongnr fighting with the same faith or the same conviction.
- Warriors from Elsewhere
Somethinb fundamental about this war began to change in May, and as these officers
see it, the end of. the war seems closer. Nor is there any question in their minds
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� any more of letting go the slightest bit of "thPir" Sahara, now that they see with
ever increasing certainty the profile of military victory behind the next row o�
hills. Peace? "That's the business of the political people," one of them told me.
Curiously enou~h, it is in the most recent "triumphalist" communiques of the
POLISARIO that certain officers are today assessing their own measure of success.
- At the time of the Battle of the Rgueibiyne on 21 August, in the Abatteh region,
_ the POLISARIO announced that 582 troops of the Royal Armed Forces had been "put out
of action." As interpreted by Colonel-Major Abrouk, who knows what really happened
that day, "The POLISARIO must have reported to their own headquarters in Tindouf _
three times the number of their own dead in order to camouflage their defeat with
an illusory and mendacious victory."
In this battle the POLISARIO may well have lost the chief of this region. At the
bottom of a gully was found a service tunic with a clean collar, spotted with blood
and riddled with bullet-holes, with the white scarf of a major commander, but no
body. Th~ measurements r_ally with those of the famous Algerian-Sahraoui major
commander Ayoub, who for the past S years.has always given a formidable account of
himself to any who opposed him. Neither has there been any official confirmation
of this casualty. The corpse--if there ever was a corpse--or the gravely wounded `
man, was removec3. The fact that the POLISARIO in the last Tew months has been
leaving more dead bodies than usual behind on the battlefield is because they are
recruits who come frum further and further away (from Mauritania or Mali) and
because the guerrillas no longer feel the compunction to remove them to send them
back to their families, as they do for the authentic Sahraoui.
Ambushes
How many are there left of these Sahraoui guerrillas, who came from what was the
_ Western Sahara? According to very reliable sources, and after interrogati~n of
some deserters and prisoners, there could not be much more than a thousand, many
of whom are tired, ill and suffering backaches from the tens of thousands of kilo-
meters of riding a Land Rover.
This situation paradoxically brought about a net change in familiarity with the
terrain. The original members of the authentic POLISARIQ are fewer and fewer,
while over 5 years the Moroccans, of whom there are more anyway, have made themselves
totally familiar with the desert and its traps and ambush-points. It is, however,
still necessary to use guides, Sahraoui who have chosen to come over to the
Moroccan camp.
Unless Algeria
From the week I spent in the hottest spots of the ~aha�ra I drew the conclusion
that Morocco is effecting a lot of cleanup operations silently, thanks to an air _
force that is becoming increasingly operational. Several of ~�ese victorious
strikes have never been mentioned. Contrarily, the POLISARIO is putting out a lot
of psychological activity which reverberates the next day all over Africa and the
world. Today's reality is that Morocco controls more ground, and the POLISARIO
controls the propaganda. .
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_ At the beginning of September an influential POLISARIO leader cladestinely based at
r~ouadhibou in the north of Mauritania chose of his own free will to abandon the
struggle and disappear in the direction of Dakar. He passed the following terrible
confidential remark: "In the field, Morocco, silently, is in the process of getting
rid of the POLISARIO, one man after the other. And there aren't very many of us
left." Unless Algeria, Libya...
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
2750
CSO: 4400
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WESTERN SAHARA
BRIEFS
POLISARIO GETS SOVIET WEAPONS--French officials are concerned about deliveries of
sophisticated missiles to the POLISARIO. This Soviet-manufactured equipment is
supplied by Lihya which is involving itself more and more on the Sahraoui side.
While Algeria appears to be keeping itself apart. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE
in French 17 Sep 80 p 50] 2750
MAURITANIAN PRISONERS OF POLISARIO--Two hundred seventy-eight Mauritanians are said
_ to be still prisoners of the POLISARIO. This is the total of confidential tabula-
~ tions made by Headquarters at Nouakchott following the recent liberation of 125
military and civilian personnel. (Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Sep 80
p SOJ 2750
CSO : 4400 g~
1Lt ~
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