JPRS ID: 9384 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9384
7 November 1980
West ~ ~ r~ e Re c~rt
p p
CFOUO 45~80)
FBIS FOREIGN 6ROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAY, liSE ONLY ~
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r:~TE
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JPRS J,/9384
7 Nove.mber 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT
, (FOUO 45/80)
CONTENTS ~
- THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
SPAIN
'DEFENSA` Polls Readership on Attitudes Toward NATO Entry
(DEFENSA, Jul 80)........o .............o........~.....ooo.... 1
The People Should Dedde, Editorial
Poll Results
COUNTRY SECTION
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
PCF llissident Elleinstein Views New Book on Soviet Rulers
(Jean Elleinstein; LA NOM~TTKLATURA, 1980)............o.a..... 11
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMI~IVY -
Otrag Missile De,~y With Saudi Arabia Allegedly Planned
(Karl Guenther Barth; STEI2N, 25 SEp 80) o ~ , . . . . o . . . 17
Trade Unions Quarrel on Leadershig, Policies
(Heiko Tornaw; STERN, 25 Sep 80) 21
SPAIN
Ganzalez on PSOE's Future Relationship With Suarez Government
(Felipe Gonzalez Interview; CAMBIO 16, S Oct 80) 24
- a- IIII - WE - 150 FOUO]
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES SPAIN
`DEFENSA' POLLS READERSHIP ON ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO ENTRY
The People Should Decide
Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Jul 80 p 1
[Editorial: "Let the People Decide"]
[Text] Since the poll by DEFENSA among its readers regarding the still pending
- though so far moribund theme of Spain's joining the Atlantic A1liance was taken--
with the effects of u veritable bomb--the Spanish and foreign mass media as well
as top personalities, same Spanish and some foreign, have been speaking nonstop
about the problem. The starting gun was fired by the minister of foreign affairs,
Marcelino Oreja, when he disclosed that the Madrid government hopes to become a
member of the Atlantic Alliance before 1983. On the subject of these statements,
scored by the Spanish left and hailed in Brussels, where the secretary general
of NATO continued to promote Spanish membership which he considers desirable,
discussion has continued at a high level--discussion which was undoubtedly
triggered by the disclosure of our poll's results.
We have already stated on more than one occasion on this editorial page that as
far as the thorny issue of NATO is concerned, we seek only one thing: that Spain's
interests should prevail over those of other powers and that on this score we .
consider two questions to be key ones: the solution of the intolerable and humil-
iating problem of Gibraltar, and the linking of our membership in NATO with our
entry, as full-fledged members, into the European Common Market. It is neither
tolerable for us to be allied to a power which occupies militarily part of Spanish
territory nor, in the well chosen words of Jose Ramon Alonso, would it be wise for
us to participate in the Europe of the guns but remain outside the Europe of the
butter.
But there is something else. If in a specialized periodical like DEFENSA a. really
high percentage of readers admit their knowledge of NATO to be scanty or nonexis-
tent, one can imagine what this means to the man in the street. For that reason
we believe that before deciding whet}~er to join NATO, we must inform public opinion
so that the latter, with sufficier..t information at its command eo make a~udgment,
may approve a resolution. For. that purpose it is necessary to mobilize the mass
media, the parties, and therefore parliament.
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To decide Spai.n's entry into NATO without undertaking this type of information
campaign wouln mean making a decision by force--a "fait accompli "--something
improper for a country which believes in democracy and whose people consider
themseives sufficien~ly mature to be able to express an opinion on matters that
affect their own survival and that of their children whenever they are given the
opportunity to become informed and to speak out. If, once that point has come,
they say "yes," all the more power to Spain's joining NATO. But if they answer
"no," let the will of the majority be upheld in that case, too.
COPYRI(~iT: Ediciones Defensa, S.A. Madrid 1980
Poll Results
Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Jul 80 pp 64-68 `
['r~Xt) We have poiled our readers on whether. or not Spain should join NATO in
the belief that the time has come for the citizens to express themselves about
an issue of such importance which will not only affect their security but also
that ot other nations. GThar we did not imagine was the immediate and overwhelm-
ing response we would receive. Not on].y did the completed questionnaires begin
to reach us in very large numbers, but many individuals, dissatisfied with the
form, wrote us to elaborate on their opinions and to formulate suggestions of the
most varied nature.
Finally, at a discotheque in downtown Madrid we presented the results of the po1.1_,
and once again, we had occ~sion to be surpris~d since, even though we had antici-
pated some degree of attention, at no time did we think that so much play would
be given to our endeavor. Deputies, senators, diplomats, Spanish and foreign
military personnel, politicians, top newsmen, and others personally wished to
determine what the first poll ever taken on the subject of NATO among Spanish
publi.c opini.on had shown.
After distributin~ a tally sheet with the basic results and following a few
words of introduction by our director, Jose de Sanmillan, coordinator of DEFENSA,
a discussion got under way in which several of the personalities attending took
part. Darlos Argos of the Popular Alliance [AP] came out in favor of widespread
parti.cipation in the planning of our foreign policy, arguing for a national dis-
cussion so that everyone mighC express himself. He described as excessively
oversimplified our question of "NATG yes, NATO no," which in his opinion should
be asked within the framework of the defini.tion of a foreign policy for Spain.
Fernando Faba of the Spanish Communist Party [PCE] emphasized the fact that those
_ who said "yes" and those who said "no" were almost equal in number and noted that
in a period of stabilization of democracy such as the one now being experienced
by Spain it does not seeni appropriate to open a debate that could cause a danger-
ous polarization of publ.ic opinion. He held that the recent pro-Atlantic Alliance
statement by the Spanish minister of defense, Rodriguez Sahagun, had made things
more complex.
The deputy chairman of the de�ense committee of the Congress of Deputies, Social-
ist I,nr~_que Mugica, after stating that his party [the Spanish Socialist Workers
Party--or PSOE] is opposed to Spain's joining NATO, especially when there. are
problems such as that of Gibraltar which have to be solved first, expressed his
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satisfaction with the result of the poll, assuming that since so far military
issues have not been of interest to the Spanish left, the average reader of
DEFENSA is of "liberal-conservative" persuasion. This means that if a broader
spectrum of people had been polled, the responses would undoubtedly have been
negative. The Socialist deputy added that if Spain joined NATO its hands would
be tied and it would lose its enviable present position respecting Latin America
_ and the Arab world.
In complete contrast to the opinion of Enrique Mugica was that of the chairman
of the defense board of the Senate, Alberto Ballarin, a member of the Democratic
Center Union [UCD], which is the majority party in Spain. Alberto Ballarin, in a
very lively manner, said he felt satisfied with the results of the poll since,
as DEFENSA (according to him) has published an editorial against Spain's entry
into NATO, this would have influenced its readers whose share of "yes" responses
without such an editorial would have been much higher.
At this point our director asked for the microphone and he pointed out that our
publications had adopted an independent stance since its first issue. He denied
that an editorial of this type had ever been published and he cited, alluding to
two diplomatic aelegations present in the room, that DEFENSA had carried its
neutrality to the point of holding back for several months an interview (still
unpublished) with a Soviet general because that same set of questions, officially
submitted to an American general, had still not been answered.
~
Among the newsmen the comments of the director of the daily PUEBLO and of the
state newspaper network, Jose Ramon Alonso, were brilliant. He said: "If Spain
has to join the Eur~pe of the guns it must also join the Europe of the butter.
The issues of the European Common Market and NATO must be linked in a single
package. To assume the risks without enjoying the benefits would be a mistake."
Jose Ramon Alonso explained that "there is no communist threat but rather a Soviet
threat: the imperialism of the USSR. Cuba does not threaten us and neither does
the Spanish Communist Party."
One of the numerous foreign newsmen, Eppo Jansen of the Dutch television network,
also spoke to say that he does not think that Spain will join NATO because "I
believe that it is more interested in remaining outside to cultivgte its poten-
tial special relations with Latin America and the Arab countries."
The next day the entire Spanish press--especially that of Madrid--made extensive
coiiiments on the poll. ABC carried the headline "The majority of the field offi-
cers are in favor while junior officers are against. There is a generational
discrepancy among the military regarding NATO." In its headline EL IMPARCIAL
wrote: The fans of DEFENSA wish to join NATO," while EL PAIS had a large box
stating that "junior officers and noncommissioned officers do not favor Spain's
joining NATO." YA noted the words of Alberto Ballarin to the effect that Spain's
membership in NATO will not decrease Spain's bargaining position with the Euro-
pean Common Market and will make it possible to solve its dispute concerning
Gibraltar and reassert the Spanishness of Ceuta and Melilla. EL ALCAZAR, in an
extensive article, quoted some statements by the deputy secretary general of the
Popular Alliance, Guillermo Kirkpatrick, who seized the occasion to criticize
the government and to wonder about the satisfaction of Alberto Ballarin and of
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Enrique ~tugic~.. with the results of the poll. Among editorials that of MUNDO
OBRERO, the organ ~of the PCE, noted that "Spain is not about to touch today, busy
as it is with so many complicated and urgent problems, that hot potato of NATO
throcr.l in its lap from the outside."
With the issue catapulted to the fore in this manner, a few days later Spain's
minister of foreign affairs, Marcelino Oreja, made a few explosive pro-Atlantic
Alliance statements to EL PAIS which Radio Nacional, in its program "Spain at 8,"
linked (as was obvious) to the results generated by the DEFENSA poll. As a reac-
tion to those declarations the parliamentary left requested, through its Socialist
and communist representatives, a referendum on Spain's entry into NATO, an event
announced by Minister Oreja as slated to occur prior to 1983. On that same day
tlie president of the Congress of Deputies and spokesman for the UCD, Landelino
T,z~villa, requested that Spain end its isolation from the Western community and
move from simple pacts with tlie United States to "coresponsibility, the only
viable approach in a system of multilateral cooperation and integration such as
that of NATO where our present and potential military weight is greater than that -
of many of its members."
We hail, should there be any doubt, the dynamic effect that the poll by DEFENSA
has had, but now that we have arrived at this point, we remain outside the
debate. We did not poll our readers looking after our own interests. Only to
the extent that we have completed an enlightening endeavor do we believe we have
done a goad job.
Results of the Poll: 10,307 Readers Responded
Of the Spaniards polled 40 percent were military and 60 percent civilians.
The military was broken down as follows: 40 percent field officers; 53 percent
junior officers; and 7 percent noncommissioned officers.
The civilians were broken down as follows: 64 percent technicians; 16 percent
liberal pr~fessions; and 20 percent other occupations.
Spanish Military Personnel
1. Field officers
Up to 40 years of age, 26.6 percent; from 41 to 60 years of age, 53.3 per~ent;
and ov~r 60, 20.1 percent.
'rhese consider their knowledge of NATO to be as follows: high, 12.5 percent;
_ average, h8.7 percent; scant, 18.8 percent.
Some 93.75 percent believe in the so-called "communist threat" while 6.25 percent
do r~t believe in ir.
Some 50 percent believe that Spain's entry into NATO would significantly affect
the existing international strategic situation while 43.7 percen.t consider that
it woulu affect it little and 6.3 percent believe that it would not impact on it
at all.
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Some 31.25 percent believe that Spain is already highly involved in NATO despite
the fact that it is not a member state of that organization, while 62.5 percent
consider Spain to be relatively involved in it. Some 6.25 percent feel that Spain
is not involved at all.
One hundred percent of those answering are of the opinion that Spain's entry would
enhan~e the NATO bloc a great deal.
Regarding whether in a general way Spain's entry into NATO would be positive for
Spain, the responses were as follows: 68.7 percent said very positiv~; 18.8 per-
- cent said not very positive; 12.5 percent said that it could be negative; and 0.0
percent said it would make no difference.
Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would affect world peace the answers
were as follows:
It would place wozld peace in dar~ger: 0.0 percent; it would not affect world
peace: 37.5 percent; it would strengthen world peace: 62.5 percent.
, Regarding whether if Spair. were to join NATO, the respondents thought that Spain.
would be affected in case of conventional war Uetween NATO and the Warsaw Pact:
a lot, 50 percent; somewhat, 50 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.
And in case of nuclear war: a lot, 93.7 percent; somewhat, 6.3 percent; not ~t
all, 0.0 percent.
Regarding whether if Spain were to remain outside NATO it would be affected in
case of conventional war between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact:
a lot, 37.5 percenC; somewhat 62.5 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.
And in case of nuclear war: a lot, 62.5 percent, somewhat 31.25 percent; not at
a11 6.25 percent.
Regarding the principal benefits or disadvantages (one or several) which Spain's
entry into NATO would bring: political benefits, 62.5 percent; political disad-
vantages, 25.0 percent; military benefits, 93.7 percent; military disadvantages,
18.75 percent; economic benefits, 50 percent; economic disadvantages, 56.2 per-
cent; other benefits, 6.2 percent; other disadvantages, 6.2 percent.
Regarding whether Spain should join NATO: yes, 87.5 percent; no, 12.5 percent;
indifferent, 0.0 percent.
2. Junior Officers [below the rank of major]:
Up to 25 years of age, 61.9 percent; from 26 to 40 years of age, 33.4 percent;
from 41 to 60, 4.7 percent.
Knowledge about NATO: high, 19.2 percent; average, 66.6 percent; scant, 14.2
percent.
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Some 76.2 percent believe in the"comm;~nist threat," whil~ 23.8 percent do not
believe in it.
Sp~~in's entry wou.ld affect the international st.rategic situation: a lot, 43
Percenl; a little, 52.3 percent; not at all, !~.7 percent.
Some 61.9 percent believe that Spain is already very i:zvolved in NATO; 33.4
percent believe tl:at it is relativel~* involved~; and 4.7 percent believe that it
i~ not invalced at all.
Some 95 percent feel that for NATO Spai:~`s e.ntry would be a very positive step;
_ 5 percent feel tr~at it would not be very positive.
RegardinP whether entry would be positive for Spain: very positive, 47 percent;
not very positive, 38.1 percent; would make no difference 0.0 percent; perhaps
ne~ative, 14.9 percent.
Some 14.2 percent believe that Spain's entry into NATO could endanger world
- peace: 57.3 percent believe that it would not affect wc~rld pesce; 28.5 percent
, believe that it would strengthen world peace.
~ Regarding whether if Spain were to join I~~TO it would be affected in case of
conventional war with the other bloc: a lor,, 61.9 percent; somewhat, 38.1
percent; not at all, O.b percent.
In case of. nuclear war: a lot, 85.' percent; somewhat, 14.3 percent; not at all
0.0 percent.
~
Regarding whether if Spain remained outside NP.TO it would be affected by a con-
ventional war: a lot, 28.54 perc~nt; somewhat., 66.6 percent; not at all, 4.76
percent.
And in case of nuclear war: a lot, 42.8 percent; somewhat, 57.2 percent; not
at all, 0.0 percent.
Regardi.ng benefits and disadvantages for Spain if itjoined N~TO (one or several
r::sponses): political benefits, 42.8 percent; political disadvantages, 38.1
percent; military benef.its, 95.2 percent; military disadvantages, 4.7 percent;
economic benefits, 19.0 percent; economic disadvantages, 71.4 percent; other
benef.its, 4.7 percent; other disadvantages, 19.0 percent.
Regarding u;hether Spain should join NATO: yes, 42.8 percent; no, 47.6 percent;
indifferent 9.5 percent.
3. Nonccmmissioned Officers
P'rom l9 to 25 years ofage, 57.2 percent; from 26 to 40, 42.8 percent.
Regar.ding their knowledge of the Atlantic Alliance: high, 28.5 percent;
average 61.5 percent; scant, 10.0 percent.
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Those believing in the "communist threat," 71.5 percent; not believing in it,
28.5 percent.
~ Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would significantly affect the exist-
ing international strategic situation: a lot, 42.8 percent; not very much, 57.2
percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.
Re~;arding whether Spain is already involved: a lot, 71.5 percent; not very
much 28.5 percent; not at all, C.0 percent.
Regarding whether Snain's entry would be positive for NATO: very, 14.2 percent;
not very, 42.8 percent; would have no effect, 28.5 percent; would be negative,
14.5 percent.
Regarding whether world peace would be affected by Spain's entry into NATO:
peace would be endangered, 14.4 percent; peace would not be affected, 71.4
percent; peace would be strengthened, 14.2 percent.
Regarding whether, if it were to join, Spain would be affected in case of con-
ventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact: a lot, 71.4 percent; somewhat,
28.6 percent; not at all, 0.0 percent.
In case of nuclear war: a lot, 71.4 percent; somewhat, 28.6 percent; not at all,
0.0 percent.
Regarding whether if Spain did not join NATO it weuld be affected in case of
conventional war: a lot, 28.5 percent; somewhat, 57.3 percent; not at all, 14.2
percent.
I:n case of nuclear war: a lot, 57.3 percent; somewhat, 28.5 percent; not at all,
14.2 percent.
Benefits and disadvantages (one or several responses): political benefits, 71.4
percent; political disadvantages 28.5 percent; military benefits, 85.7 percent;
military disadvantages; 0.0 percent; economic benefits, 0.0 percent; economic
disadvantages, 100 percent.
Regarding whether Spain should join NATO: yes, 42.8 percent; no, 57.1 gercent;
indifferent, 0.1 percent.
- Spanish Civilian Personnel
1. Technicians (representing 38.3 percent of the Spanish total)
Knowledge about NATO: high, 24.3 percent; average, 72.7 percent; scant, 3.0
percent.
From 19 to 25 years of age, 16 percent; from 26 to 40, 66 percent; from 41 to
60, 18 percent.
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Regarding thE:ir belief in the "communist threat": 60.6 percent believe in it;
39.4 percent do not believe in it.
Regarding whether Spain's entry into I1AT0 would affect the existing interna-
tional situation: a lot, 54.5 percent; not very much, 42.5 percent; not at all,
3.0 percent.
Regarding w~:ether Spain is already involved: very, 45.5 percent; not very, 51.5
percent�; not at all, 3.0 percent.
Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would be positive for that organization:
very, 78.7 percent; not very, 21.2 percent; not at all, 0.1 percent.
Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would be positive for Spain: very,
45.4 percent; somewhat, 18.1 percent; indifferent, 0.2 percent; negative, 36.3
percent.
Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would affect world peace: it would
endanger peace, 15.2 percent; it would not affect peace, 60.6 percent; it would
strengthen peace, 24.2 percent.
Reg~irding whether if Spain were to join NATO it would be affected in case of a
conventional war between ~IATO and the Warsaw Pact: a lot, 61.5 percent;
somewhat, 38.4 percent; not at all, 0.1 percent.
In case of nuclear war: a lot, 84.8 percent; somewhat, 15.2 percent; not at all,
0.0 percent.
Regarding whether if Spain did not join NATO, it would find itself affected in
case of conventional war: a lot, 21.2 percent; somewhat, 60.6 percent; not at
al.l, 18.2 percent.
In case of nuclear war: a lot, 57.5 percent; somewhat, 33.3 percent; not at all,
9.2 percent.
Benefits and disadvantages (one or several responses): political benefits,
60.6 percent; political disadvantages, 45.4 percent; military benefits, 72.7
percent; military disadvantages, 18.1 percent; economic benefits, 33.3 percent;
economic diadvantages, 39.3 percent; other benefits, 24.2 percent; other dis-
advantages, 18.1 percent.
Regarding whether Spain should join NATO: yes, 48.4 percent; no, 45.4 percent;
indi f f erent , 6. 2 percer.t .
2. Liberal Professions
From 19 to 25 years of age, 11.1 percent; from 26 to 40, 66.6 percent; from
41 ta 60, 21.2 percent; over 60, 12.1 percent.
Regarding their knowledge of NATO: high, 33.2 percent; average, 66.6 percent;
scant, 0.2 percent.
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Regarding whether they believe in the "communist threat": yes, 88.8 percent;
*~0 11.2 percent.
Regarding whether Spain's entry would affect the strategic international
situation: a lot, 65.3 percent; not very much, 23.2 percent; not at all, 11.5
percent.
Regarding whether Spain is already involved: a lot, 89.8 percent; not very
much, 10.1 percent; not at all, 0.1 percent.
Regarding whether Spain's entry into idATO would be positive for that organiza-
tion: yes, 100 percent.
~ Re~arding whether Spain's entry into NATO would be positive for Spain: very,
54.5 percent; not very 1.0 percent; would have no eLfect, 24.2 percent; would
be negative, 20.2 percent. _
Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would affect world peace: it would ~
endanger peace, 12.3 percent; it would not affect peace, 53.5 percent; it weuld
strengthen peace, 34.2 percent.
Regar.ding whether if Spain were in NATO a conventional war between the blocs
would affect it: a lot, 77.7 percent; somewhat, 22.3 percent; not at all, 0.0
percent.
In case of nuclea r war would Spain be highly affected? yes, 100 percent.
Regarding whether if Spain remained outside NATO, in case of conventional war
it would be affected: a lot, 45.5 percent; somewhat, 43.3 percent; n~t at all, ~
1.2 percent.
In case of nuclea r war: a lot, 74.5 percent; somewhat, 24.6 percent; not at a11,
0.9 percent.
Benefits and disadvantages of Spain's joining NHTO (one or several responses):
political benefits, 57.3 percent; political disadvantages, 45.4 percent;
military benefits, 88.4 percent; military disadvantages, 19.1 percent;
economic benefits, 33.7 percent; economic disadvantages, 58.5 percent.
Regarding whether Spain should join NATO: yes, 50.5 percent; no, 38.3 percent;
indifferent, 11.1 percent.
3. Other Professions
Up to 18 years of age, 14.2 percent; from 19 to 25, 35.4 percent; from 26 to 40,
37.8 percent; from 41 to 60, 12.6 percent.
Regarding how respondents consider their knowledge about NATO: high, 21.0 per-
cent; average, 74.9 percent; scant, 4.1 percent.
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Regarding their belief in the "communist threat": 68.4 percent believe in it; ~
31. 6 percent dc t~ot believe in it .
Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would affect the international strate-
gic ~ituation: a lot, 63.1 percent; not very much, 36.4 percent; not at all,
0.5 percent.
Regarding whether Spain is already involved in NATO: a lot, 73.6 percent;
somewhat, 21.2 percent; not at all, 5.2 percent.
Regarding whether Spain's entry into NATO would be positive for that organiza-
tion: a lot, 84.4 percerit; not very, 10.4 percent; not at all, 5.2 percent.
k~~garding whettier Spain's joining NATO would be positive for Spain: very, 31.5
percent; not verv, 21.~; percent; indifferent, 10.3 percent; negative 36.8 percent.
Regarding whe~her Spain's entry into NATO would affect world peace: it would
endanger pea.ce, 15.9 percent; it would not affect peace, 52.6 percent; it would
strengthen peace, 31.5 percent.
Rega rding whether if Spain joined NATO it would be affected in case of a conven-
tional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact: a lot, 73.6 percent; somewhat, 26.3
percent; not at all, 0.1 percent.
Re~arding whether if Spain remain~=d outside NATO it would be affected in case ~
ot conventional war: a lot, 15.7 percent; somewhat, 68.4 percent; not at all,
15.7 percent.
In case of nuclear war: a lot, 84.3 percent; somewhat, 15.7 percent; not at all,
0.0 percent.
Benefits and disadvantages (one or several responses): political benefits., 31.5
- percent; political disadvantages, 57.8 percent; military benefits, 68.4 percent;
milirary disadvantages, 36.8 percent; economic benefits, 21.0 percent; economic
disadvantages, 63.1 percent; other benefits, 10.5 percent; other disadvantages,
21.0 percent.
Re~a rdi.ng whether Spain should join NATO: yes, 42.1 percent; no, 57.8 percent;
indi fferent, 0.1 percent .
Not~: We shall publish the results of the responses from our readers in Latin
America and Europe in our next issue since we are still receiving answers
especi_ally fram Latin America.
S~me of our questions are subject to more than one answer, for which reason
it Ulil.l be round that in a few cases the responses add up to more than 100
perce~ ` .
COl'YRIC;HT: Ediciones Defensa, S.A. , Madrid, 1980
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, COUNTRY SECTION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
PCF DISSIDENT ELLEINSTEIN VIEWS NEW BOOK ON SOVIET RUI,ERS
Paris LA NOMENKLATURA in French 1980 pp 15-28
~
[Preface by Jean i.~leinstein of book by Michael Voslensky translated from German ,
by Christian Ilugue, published by Belfond, 1980]
- [Excerpts] Nomenklatura, the Russianized latin word that until now was known
only to a few specialists, is becoming as famous as the term Goulag which was
ignored until Solzhenitsyn thought of using it as the title of his works des-
cribing the system of Soviet concentration ca~aps. Michael Voslensky did not
invent this word, no more than did Solzhenitsyn invent the word Goulag. His
merit is giving it a new dimension, a symbolic character, because behittd this
word lies what Moliere described as a well-established fact, and that well-
established fact is the leading class of the Soviet Union. It is indeed an
enormous fact since the Nomenklatura directs the second largest power of the
world and by virtue of the influence that it exercises in the world it is equal
to playing a determining role in the evolution of history.
Michael Voslensky, born in 1920, is a historian by profession. He completed his
studies at the Lomonosov University in Moscow. He then worked as a translator
at the Nuremberg trials, and later at the Council of Allied Control in Germany.
At the Institute of International Relations in Moscow, he prepared a thesis on
the history of German reconstruction, and was later a~ournalist and Soviet
editor at the Council of Peace in Prague and in Vienna. Professor at the Lumumba
University in Moscow, he assumed various responsibilities at the Academy of
Sciences and became vice president of the Commiseion of Liistorians of the USSR-GDR.
He left the USSR in 1972 and became a university professor in the Federal Republic
of Germany and in Austria. He has Ueen closely associated with the ruling app ara-
tus of ~the Communist party of the Soviet Union and himself belonged to the Nomen-
klatura. "Brought up in the seraglio, he knowa all the ir.s and outs." He writes
as a professional historian and at the same time from his personal experiences
obtained over several decades.
I do not intend to summarize Michael Voslensky's book; one simply does not
summarize such a book, one reads it--and I not only hope but believe--with
passion. I only wish to draw the reader's attention to a few ideas and to a few
facts capable of maintaining and stimulating debates which have been underway
for decades concerning the Soviet Union. France is in f act one of the countries~
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where the Soviet experience has stimulated great interest and always animated
and often acerbic polemics. The reasons for such interest are quite diverse.
They stem in part from the rational but also from the irrational. The existence
of a powerful and influential communist p arty is an important reason. However
zt is not the only one. There are the links that a century of history has woven
first with Russia and later with the Soviet Union, the ties established by the
united allied forces during the two world wars, the good diplomatic relations,
the influence of General de Gaulle, etc. For millions of French over a score of
years, the Soviet Union constituted more than a model: a type of test continent
very different from our country and in many respects worthy of admiration. This
idea extended over ann above the ranks of communist voters. But it took the
XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 and its con-
sequences before the truth o~ the S~viet Union came to light to penetrate suffi-
ciently to the grearest part of the working class despite the resistances and
behind-the-line combat of the French Communist Party. Even in 1980 with the PCF
again maintaining a pro-sovier attitude which it had abandoned in part for a
short period, no one any longer dares say--with the exception of a few.unwavering
supporters--that the Soviet Union is a model. What remains however is that it
continues to exist--and to dominate the left--as a still very optimistic concep-
tion of Soviet reality and taboos which should not be underestimated.
These last few months I was quite surprised by the refusal of a number of com-
munist and non-comraunist intellectuals to clearly and firmly conde~ Soviet ~
intervention in Afghanistan. A few approved it, but many still back away from
the necessary condemnation and manifestation of solidarity.
For us, men of the left, the situation is more difficult in many respects. That
is why many of us content ourselves with condemning the unacceptable, which is
honorable, but in the process overlooking the reasons for such a situation.
P~ichael Voslensky's book forces us to give a most exacting proof--under pain of
intellectual dishonesty and above all as concerns ourselves. Either what he
has written is false--making it thus necescary to respond to him and contradict
him--or what he says is true--thus requiring us to draw all the conclusions.
Namely, thai: the Soviet Union is not a socialist state, that it does not really
have a socialist economy and society, but on the contrazy that it is a society
of classes or of one class--the Nomenklatura--relatively few in number which
exploits the ma~ority of the population and dominates it by virtue of a~totalita-
rian state. The difficulty for us other westerners is that we study and ~udge
the Soviet Union by our own criteria, our own habits, our own mentality. We
ask ourselves for example whether the USSR is capitalistic or socialistic. We
speak of capitalism of the State, or even of primitive socialism, or pre-
soci.alism, etc.
The USSR is not capitalistic. If it were, its economy would function better and
it would certainly have resolved a ni:mber of economic problems which continue
to crop up there and wl~ich no doubt have compounded:, agriculture, the industry
_ of cons:..r.ar goods, the quality of production, the methods of management and
planning. The entire economy has becom~ State owned and almo:;~t every trace of
the private sector has disappeared. However, it is wrong to think that the
disappearance of the private sector has given rise to a socialist economy and
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society. The mechanizations of domination and of exploitation are not the same
as in a capitalist country. This does not imply that they ma~ have less severe
_ consequences and that man is more free and less alienated: and above all by
virtue of the omnipotence of the State and the total absence of ~olitical demo-
carcy.
We thus have assigned ourselves the problem of knowing the real state of the
classes in the USSR and their relations. In our country in the capitalist West,
we are familiar with them to a certain degree thanks to economic and sociological
studies and to statistics that are detailed, controllable and criticizable.
This is not the case in the Soviet Union. The total absence of freedom of the
press and �reedom of research makes a socio7ogical account of the country ex-
tremely difficult. The reality of the classes is hidden under incomplete or
manipulated information. The social truth is camouflaged more than it is in our
country where all the information can be foi;nd and verified by researchers and
where the social transparency, without being either total or perfect, is in no
way less rea1.
The conditions which gave rise to the Nomenklatura were more favorable than others,
but it was a question of a new phenomen which developed in the years after the
death of Lenin. Stalin was in eff.ect the product of that new Nomenklatura that
was controlled by an organ of the Secretariat of the Party, created in 1924,
called the section of organization and assignment (orgraspred). It conducted
nominations not only in the party apparatus, but in all administrative organs,
the sections of government, the OGPU (the political police), the Red Army, and
economy and culture.
The bureaucratic phenomenon was incontestably a dominating characteristic of what
was called Stalinism, but Stalin emanating from, as well as forming an essential
part of, the Nomenklatura was lEading a State which was playing a relatively
autonomous role as compared to thzt of the social classes. The Nomenklatura
suffered the terrible purges that the State made as its expense. It lived in
both terror and in insecurity. One could even ask whether Khrushchev wasn't,
at Zeast at the beginning, a new avatar of the Nomenklatura, destined to bring
it security and well being. Neverthel.ess, the concept of the existence of a
dominating class in the USSR gradually became stronger.
Reading the work of Voslensky convi.nced me of the existence of a real dominant
class in the Soviet Union. I still think that it is rather a matter that for
30 years there has been a leading social group, a caste perhaps.
Since 1956, the Nomenklatura has en~oyed security. The bloody purges of the
Stalin period had come to a close. For that reason and also because of economic
and cultural development the Nomenklatura had expanded.
The system of socio-cultural reproduction functions much more efficiently.
_ "Heirs" certainly exist and in turn occupy positions left by their parents, not
necessarily the same, but equivalent positions. Voslensky is correct :i.n saying
that in contrast to the capitalist West where the large middle class possesses
and thus governs, in the S~viet Union the Nomenklatura governs and for that
reason possesses. It is true that the part of the product of work extracted by
the Nomenklatura cannot be reinvested. It is thus consumed, which from an eco-
- nomic point of view is a disadvantage rather than an advantage.
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The existence of this dominant and exploiting clasr obviously constitutes an
obstacle, a slowing down of the development of prociuctive forces.
_ The Nomenklatura has privileges that extend in all sc~rts of areas. These privi-
leges are material and financial, which count a great deal more than can be
imagined in the West.
Perhaps above all are the pr.ivileges of power. The complete absence of political
democracy and public liberties gives the Nomenklatura even greater facilities
to develop its interior hegemony and extend its power even outside the USSR.
Let's take as an example the military budget. In France there is a parliamentary
control such that it is difficult to dissimulate the funds earmarked for the army.
Perhaps it can be done to a certain extent, but in very limited proportions. '
This is not the case in the Soviet Union where the absence of freedom of the
press and of real parliamentary control allows all possible manipulations with
all the appropriate camouflages. This is what makes the role of the Nomenklatura
particularly dangerous internationally. ~
I do not douot the desire for peace of the people of the Soviet Union, and it is
probably one o~ the diffic~ilties encountered by the Soviet ].eader~. They must
to a certain degree take into consideration the profound pacifistic feelings of
the Soviet people. Obviously they throw the res~onsibility of international
tension on the United States, but the decisions of the Helsinki conference have
allowed western radio stations to be heard over large areas of the Soviet Union.
The "Iron Curtain" which Stalin fashioned to prevent the circulation of informa-
tion from the West to the East really doesn't exist any longer. For this reason
the Nomenklatura runs into difficulties more serious than can be imagined in the
FTest. Dissidence is only the most visible part of the iceberg, because it is
the most courageous.
For a long time, the Soviet people have resistQd power by removing it from the
sphere of politics. Today, they have begun in a realistic and limited way to
focus on this or that aspect ot daily life, its difficulties and its contradic-
tions. The coat of mail that the Nomenklatura has clothed the Soviet Union with
is no longer as impenetrable as before. Workers have started to demonstrate
for their rights despite the fact that strikes and free unions are forbidden,
as opposed to the official and obligatory unions. The intellectuals, researchers,
and other creative persons are fighting to impose a minimum of liberty which
still does not exist.
One cannot be optimistic in regard to the evolution of the Soviet Union over a
short term, but one can imagine that in the next 10-15 years, that country will
undergo great transformations. It will question in one way or another, peace-
fully or not, the power of the Nomenklatur~.
And in all of that, how will marxism and communism fare? In my understanding
they or~:i_;~ constitute an ideological disguise designed to maintain order. The
Soviet Union stands above all others as the countzy of moral order because all
that threatens this moral arder risks placing in question the power of the
Nomenklatura, in the same way as in the France of MacMahon or in Victorian England,
the moral order is intimately linked to political order and to economic and social
order.
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The Nomenklatura is not an ordinary class. It possesses a power unprecedented
in history since it is the State itself.
We can question ourselves constructively on the expansion of this system, not
be means of military intervention or war, but by repetition or the siraulation
of the conditions which gave rise to it. Since the role of the State is essential
and that it absorbs a decisive part of economic and cultural activities, and since
there is neither political democracy nor public liberties, the birth of such a
system seems inevitable to me and contemporary history clearly shows that it has
appeared and that it exists everywhere where conditions permit, especially in
insufficiently developed countries. This system offers more or less extensive
varieties.
It could be very bloody as it was in the USSR during the Stalin years or in Cam-
bodia under Pol Pot, or it could be just the opposite. It is characterized by
the absence of public liberties, the existence of a single party, the absence
or the mediocrity of a market economy and often the presence of a charismatic
leader. In all cases it results in the formation of the Nomenklatura.
I certainly do not advocate the system which predominates in our country or in
the capitalist West. It has multiple disadvantages which have not been surmounted
but rather aggravated by its recent evolution. The contradictions which it
produced are exasperated by a whole series of factors which are becoming even
more wei~hty. The crisis of western capitalism is deep and touches not only the
economy, the society, but also the culture and ideology. Let's not harbor illu-
' sions, the case of Germany in the thirties with the victory of Hitler shows the
threats which weigh upon a society in a crisis. We ourselves are not protected
from a totalitarian adventure under differ~nt forms, but no less dangerous. If
alienation due to work has fallen back because of technological transformations
and the struggle of the workers, that caused by the State has increased over the
last century. The present crisis does not favor immobility. It risks obliging
the western society to return to the established order with all the disadvantages
that that suggests, unless it allows going towards a new organization of the
economy and the society, towards a new democracy, towards a new culture.
In truth we do not really kn~w what this new thing could be. We know only that
we are noC sat~sfied with that which exists and that the equilibrium upon which
our society rests is threatened and fragile, We also know that this new thing
- cannot be and should not be similar to that which is the Soviet Union today.
To speak of an "anti-model" is to show clearly and firmly that the Nomenklaturia--
a word coined by Voslensky, that is, the country where the Nomenklatura rules--
is neither socialist, nor communist. That does not mean that socialist and com-
munist aspirations do not come to light. fihe contradiction between ideology and
reality provokes numerous reactions and crea~es a zone of turbulence that one
must clearly see.
The Nomenklatura in essence is ashamed of itselF, It does not want to be recog-
nized. It does not consider itself as such. It only lives at night and fears
t~~ light. It hides in places where the science of sociology has a difficult
tirne detecting it. It masks its privileges. It is in complete contradiction
with the ideas that it inculcates in citii.cens of its country. Rarely has the
gap been so great between what is said by a dominating class and what it does,
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between the ideal it advocates and the reality of its domination. It is this
that makes the Nomenklatura particularly dangerous and at the same time vulnerable.
It is dangerous because not being transparent it does not consequently and immedi-
ately grovoke the criticism that it would otherwise provoke in the contrary case.
One only has to look at the western world and the violence of the criticisme
aimed at the dominating class, that is at the upper middle class, criti.cisms
_ which in my opiriion are well founded, but which are only made and are only poss-
ible to the extent where public liberties obviously exist and where the domina-
tion of that class appears openly. In France a child entering the 6th class
knows all this by heart! The Nomenklatura is hawever vulnerable because it has
to preach in complete contradiction with reality.
It is nationalistic and speaks of internationalism. It is racist and speaks _
of antiracism. It is privileged and speaks of the struggle against privileges.
It is expansionist and hegemonistic and speaks of the struggle against imperialism.
The Soviet Union is dominated by two essential contradictions which permits being
not too pessimistic as far as the future is concerned. The Nomenklatura applied
breaks to the economic rise of the country which resulted in the failure of all
the economic attempts at reform over the last 25 years. Its only resl success
is seen in the military field. By its discourse, it feeds tY.~ forces which could
crush it, Sakharov in his exile to Gorki, the editors of the Metropole Almanach, ;
- the authors of numerous books, films, and plays that were published, toured and
played in the Soviet Union--even the works of Zinoviev, of Solzhenitsyn or of
Voslensky published in the West--are also certainly dangerous for the Nomenklatura
as were the writings of the philosophers, of Voltaire, of Diderot and of Rousseau
for the Old French Regime.
In the Soviet Union today there is a real working class, millions of intellec-
tuals ~aho do not belong to the Nomenklatura, millions of kolhozniks. The forces
therefore exist to use the contradictions, the importance of which we have
e:~phasized.
Without a doubt, never in history, and I say this weighing every word, has a
regime ever given proof of such hypocrisy and underhandedness. This should not
be seen as only the result of an iron will, but rather.the systematic setting
up of inethods of givernment and of direction without precedent.
We can obviously smile at the account Voslenskq wrote at the end of his book
about the day in the life of Denis Ivanovich Vokhouch, Section Chief of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Since I know ,
qt~i.te we11 all those Vokhouches in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, I felt like
laughing as much as I did crying; no doubt it is this that causes the tragic
destiny of the Soviet Union's contemporary history, if not of all contemporary
history.
Let thi~, book upset us, let it challenge us with all its truths, let it push us
to the v~ry edge of our powers of reflection; for it is just these qualities that
make it octstanding and deserving of our attention.
COPYRIGHT: Belfond 1980 for the French translation
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_ COUNTKY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
OTRAG MISSILE DEAL WITH SAUDI ARABIA ALLEGEDLY PLANNED
Hamburg STERN in German 25 Sep 80 pp 324-329
[Article by Karl Guenther Barth: "A General as a Secret Weapon"]
[Text] German firms want to equip the sheiks in Saudi
Arabia with rockets.. The middleman in the shady transac-
tion is the former commander-in-chief of the Federal Armed
Forces, General Harald Wust~
Friday, 20 June 1980. On the second floor of the building at 29 Leimenrode,
Frankfurt, staff inembers of the "Hessian Peace Research Committee" are
engaged in a heated discussion on the subject of "disarmamen.t." Three
floors higher up, in the conference room of the "Meaplan" AG [Middle East
Industrial Construction and Development, Inc.], a group of 10 men is no
less heatedly studying ways of arming the oil sheiks in the Near Ea.at, one
of the hottest trouble spots in the world, with rockets.
The coffee has hardly been served when a man--1.94 meters tall--gets up and
states with military brevity: "Gentlemen, my impression is on the whole
positive." The nine men are beaming with pleasure and host Dietrich Nickel,
chairman of the "Meaplan" supervisory board, nods his approval to the 59-
year-old man: "Carry on, General!" _
Harald Wust--Inspector General, ret., who until the end of November 1978
had been the high~st-ranking soldier of the Federal Armed Forces and who
then resigned from his office after a clash with Defense Minister Hans
Apel--is reporting on his recent secret mission to the Near East.
This mission was the prelude to an unprecedented arnis deal--the rearmament
of the Arab world. Wust reported that the King of Saudi Arabia in particu-
lar wanted to free hi~self from the influence of the linited States an~--by
means of rockets from the Federal Republic--"to cement his position of
Ieadership in the Arab world" (Wust).
So far, all of the Saudis' official arms requests--such as that for the -
"Leopard 2" combat tank--have been turned down by Bonn. Bonn has pointed
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rux ur~rt(:lAL u5r: UNLY
out that Arabia was a trouble spot and that according to German law, arms
exports to such regions were a criminal offense and that even an arrange-
ment of such transactions was punishable under the Arms Control Law.
According to the Federal Ministry of Economics, which has jurisdiction over
matters of this kind, a license for the export of rockets and rocket acces-
sories has not been applied for and w~uld not be granted in any event.
On 5 June 1980, at 11:15 ~'clock, General Wust, ret., had flown from
Frankf urt to Ryad. Upon his arrival at 19:55 o'clock, he had been welcomed
by Shuya H. Khan, secretary of tlle Saudis' Prince Nawaf, who ha3 then
escor ted the German guest to the Intercontinental Hotel, where room 503
had b een reserved for Harald Wust by the Saudi Government.
Princ e Nawaf Bin Abdul Aziz, one of the numerous sons of the legendary Ibn
Saud, had made the preparations necessary to bring the General into contact
with the interlocutors appropriate to the occas~on. Wust conferred with
Defens e Minister Prince Sultan, with the chief of the General Staff,
Habbam, and with Sheik Saleh Kamel, the head of the desert state's secret
se rvi ce .
The German General presented his hosts with a 200-page booklet on the
"Del ta" pro~ ect--the code name of the secret rocket deal . The "gif t
volume" (Wust) had been produced in Zurich at the cost of 37,254.55 Swiss
franc s; it was printed and bound by the Schoeb Printing Co. and contained
illustrations by Rudolf Gerbig and cliches by Ritter Co. The contributors
informed STERN that they had been ordered by their client to "observe
stric t secrecy," since this was a matter of "national security."
In Ryad, the profusely illustrated prospectus produced the desired effect.
Accor ding to Wust, the head of the secret service "was obviously satisfied
and e xpressed the willingness to support the project." Prince Nawaf of the
Royal family would "do his utmost to promote the project."
Only infrequently did questions interrupt the precise report of Wust, who
aside from his rocket job holds the pasition of defense policy adviser of
the FDP's parliamentary fraction. Talking to STERN, Juergen Moellemann,
the FDP's expert on military affairs who is party boss Genscher's closest
advis er on defense matters, had nothing but praise for the ex-General: "We
simply could not let this expertise go to waste, especially since this man
turne d down fantastic offers on the part of industry."
At lea st in regard to this point, deputy Moellemann is in error. For
Wust's clients in the deal with the Arabs are leading industrial concerns:
Present ~.t that Friday conference in Frankfurt were Rolf Degele of "Gode
Plann ing Ltd", Zurich; Yves Bertrand of "Blanchut & Bertrand S.A.", Geneva;
Direc tor Dr Schroeder of the Nuremberg arms manufacturer Diehl and Mssrs
Schulz and Winkler. of "AEG-Telefunken."
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A rather dubious figure in the Frankfurt group was Frank Wukasch of the
Munich rocket firm "Otrag"--the enterprise that with inexpensive rockets
had wanted to launch satellites from the African state of Zaire.
The activities of Wukasch's boss, Lutz Kayser, caused considerable turbu-
lence in the FRG`s foreign relations (see STERN 22/1978: "Monumental Bluff
in the Kayser-Reich" [pun on the term "Kaiszrreir.k~"~ Empire]). Neighbcrs of
Zaire such as Angola feared Kayser's projectiles might be aimed at them
rather than at the cosmos. The Soviet Union was not the only country to
suspect these activities were concealing secret, internationally outlawed
rocket experiments of the Federal Republic.
However, Otrag boss Lutz Kayser had repeatedly and verbosely denied any
military use of his rockets. This now appears to be outdated. For Wust
informed his Arab interlocutors that the new Otrag rockets had been
"redesigned for military purposes." For October, two test launchings are
scheduled, which are intended to test "homing accur~cy from A to B, a
distance of 300 kilometers."
However, the test launchings will no longer take place in Zaire. For in
the meantime, chief of state Mobutu has turned out the German rocket
designers on account of his difficulties with his neighbors. For the time
being, Otrag has lef t undecided th e question in which country it now wants
to laLmch its rockets. Executive board member Helmut Billen stated: "For
political reasons, we will not disclose this until after the event."
According to information received by the Bonn Foreign Ministry, Brazil,
Libya and Saudi Arabia were the countries under discussion. A well-known
German arms dealer provided more detailed information. He claims to have
_ seen--as early as 12 months ago--rockets and equipment containers bearing
the inscription "Otrag" in Libya--in a desert area between Bengasi and
SiL:e. This man told STERN: "I saw that with my own eyes."
Kayser's economy projectiles could be likened to a people's Porsche among
the highly complex rockets of the superpowers. His simple recipe is based
on old Nazi plans and reads: Aggregation of simple propelling charges that
"are turned into space transport vehicles for 200 to 10,000 kilograms of
payload."
Ob~ections such as have repeatedly been r.aised against the Otrag rockets by
space scientists were not even voiced at the Frankfurt conference. Accord-
ing to the minutes of the secret Frankfurt session, the group was agreed
that the electronics specialists of AEG-Telefunken--who were also furnish-
ing the fire-control system for the Federal German show tank, the "Leopard
2"--should "contribute their share." The representative of the Nuremberg
Diehl Concern assured the group that "conventional rocket warheads" could
be delivered "at once;" only the "advanced technologies of the end-phase-
controlled munitions" (examples: "Copperhead" and "Bussard"), guided
missiles, would require "adaptive changes."
19
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rva vrr i~teu., uar. vLVLi
In regard to "adaptive changes," Diehl should have no difficulties. The
Nuremberg enterprise is one of the last family concerns. It derives its
income from "Junghans " watches, "Mauser" rifles and machine guns, highly
advanced electronics such as the system used in IQATO's "Tornado" multi-
- purpose aircraft, ammunition and tank tracks. Defense technology accounts
for approximately 40 percent of the concern's turnover, which in 197$ was
quoted at just under DM 1.5 billion.
Patriarch Karl Diehl, 73, is an en trepreneur of the old stamp and an inti -
mate friend of Franz Josef Strauss, the CDU/CSU's candidate for the
chancellorship. There are also personal ties between the CSU and the
enterprise, which in the 1970's furnished the Shah of Persia with a tank
track plant. Bernhard Goppel, a son of the former minister president of
Bavaria, is head of Backhaus, a Diehl-owned company in Remscheid. Accord -
ing to information received by STERN, that firm already tested tracks for
Chinese tanks. After equipping their tanks with this German quality
' product, the Red Chinese planned to sell them in Third World countries. Th is
Diehl deal collapsed, when the Federal Criminal Police Bureau arrested the '
middleman of the transaction for violation of the Arms Control Law (STERN
No 31/1980: "Always Trouble Wf.th the Expense Account").
The Remscheid firm--presen~.ly a Diehl subsidiary--also played a role in the
notorious "Uncle-Aloys-Affair" during Strauss' term as defense minister.
By the guod offices of the Defense Ministry, "Uncle Aloys" Brandenstein, a
friend of Strauss' parents-in-law, had been appointed adviser of the
Remsche id Backhaus Co.
When shortly afterwards the flow of Bonn orders suddenly stopped and the
firm was on the verge of bankruptcy, "Uncle Aloys" quickly came up with a
buyer: the firm of Karl Diehl. After the change of ownership, the orde rs
from the Strauss ministry suddenly started to come in again.
At the Frankfurt meeting with Wust, the Diehl men were especially cautious.
Like the colleagues of AEG-Telefunken, they demanded "strict secrecy" an d
insisted on including in the minutes the statement that in the rocket deal
with Saudi Arabia they would function only as "subcontractors" and that the
responsibility for the hot deal rested with the Geneva firm of "Blanchut &
Bertrand." The Swiss need not be concerned about the stri^t provisions of
the German Arms Control Law.
The Frankfurt gentlemen'~ party also played it safe in regard to the future
negotiations with the sheiks. All of the firms participating in the secret
"Delta" pro,ject want to prepare themselves for all questions the Saudis
could cor.ceivably ask. In a role-playing exercise, they then want to tes t
the persuasive power of the arguments. The prospects "of obtaining in
advance the Ryad test questions from the Saudi-Arabian commission were con-.
sidered not very good" (conference minutes). This task had proved too much
ever, for ex-General Harald tdust.
COPYRIGHT : Ly ~('j ~rtme r& Jahr AG & Co .
20
8760
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION F~DERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
TRADE UNIONS QUARREL ON LEADERSHIP, POLICIES
Hamburg STERN in German 25 Sep 80 pp 288-290
[Article by Heiko Tornow: "Disconcerted Functionaries--the Causes of the
Ferment~in the Trade Unions"]
[Text] The medics of the ~Jorker Samaritan Association had settled down to
a~hat they thought would be a leiaurely week in Mannhef,m's Rosengarten Con-
gress Center. According to the experience gained at previous con~resses,
first aid wae unlikely to be required during the Union Congress of the
IG Chemie-Papier-Reramik [Chemical, Paper and Ceramics Workera Union]. On
the 4th day, however, the first-aid center was filled to capacity. The
S~-unaritans had to attend to functionaries who--beside themselves and shak-
in~ with cryin~ fits--could be calmed only with difficulty. Dieter
Schreiber, a union staff inember, lay on a stretcher--unconscious; and the
Saarbruecken delegate Egon Bielefeld was hospitalized on account of symp-
toms su~~estive of a heart attack.
With nervous and circulatory breakdowns, a number of--usually hard-boiled--
trade unionists reacted to a ballot defeat that they regarded as a poli.ti-
c~l and personal catastrophe: In the elections to the full-time executive
Uoard, Paul Plumeyer, leader of the intra-union opposition against the con-
servative union leadership of Chairman Karl Hauenschild, lost his post.
Plumeyer's defeat signified the collapse of his .`ollowers' hopes for a more
democratic IG Chemie. They consider their union a clique, in which battle-
~veary board members make underhand deals with ttie conformist workers'
council princes of t' � i1 ~
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DENMARK
POLICE CRACK ALGERIAN DRUG GANG WHICH SMUGGLED HASHISH
C~penhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 8 Oct 80 p 5
[Article by Anders Wiig]
* [Text] Suicide pilots, that's what the Copenhagen narcotics police call a gang
of hashish couriers who walked one after the other into traps set by the police
and customs officials at Kastrup Airport over the last 8 weeks. All are unem-
ployed Algerians hired by professional gang leaders in Paris and London to
amuggte several hundred kilograms of hashish to the Danish and Swedish markets
from Karachi, Pakiatan.
T}~ey were called suicide pilots because they always turned up with their suit-
cases filled to the brim with 15 kilograms of hashish--unconcealed, simply -
wrapped In something like Bjorn Wiinblad gift wrap, but never cleverly hidden
out of sight in double bottoms, lids or tucked into the sides of the suitcases.
Big Hauls
Since 12 August the Copenhagen narcotics police have cracked an extensive
hashish gang which in the opinion of the police is lsd by three or four Alge-
rians. As of now the gang is accused of smuggling in several hundred kilograms
_ of hsshish. The police are investigating the possibility that this goes back
to 1978 when Algerian hashish smugglers apparently took over smuggling opera-
tions after a Danish-Pakistani gang. Since then 42 Algerians have been de-
tained and a half ton of hashish has been seized.
- The latest wave of arrests included 1:wo Danes and ~9 Algerian couriers and gang
leaders--arrested in Copenhagen and in Paris. It started at Kastrup or_ 12 Au-
gust. A suitcase aroused suspic?.on whEn it was delivered to the passenger
~ luggage office by one southerner, picked up shortly afterward by another and
finally brought back by a Dane. The polic2 kept an eye on the bagga.~e office -
and arrested three Alger3~ns who came to pick up the suitcase for the second
tlme. It contained 350,.,~0 kroner. The same autiount of money was found in
their rented car along with false passports and a pistol. One of the Algerians
was going to travel to Geneva to hand the money over to one of the leaders of
a hashish gang dominated by Algerians. He went under the name of "Mr Interpol,"
lived in London but traveled frequently between London, Copenhagen, Paris,
Geneva and Karachi.
52
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Mr Interpol Seized in Paris
The same thing happened to two other gang leaders the police found out about in
an intense secret investigation, the details of w~hich are being withheld pend-
1ng court proceedings. Several hundr~d kilograms of hashish, almost 1.5 mil- .
lion kroner and 18 couriers ended up in the hands of the police after airport
seizures and raids in Copenhagen. The couriers turned up one after another with
su3.Ccuses full of hashish without suspecting that the gang had been found out.
The police know that the couriers were to get 50,000 kroner for a successful
_ smuggling trip with 15 kilograms of hashish at a"retail price" of 600,000
kroner. The starting point was a hotel in Karachi where gang leaders often had
a dozen couriers sitting and waiting for a trip. When it was their turn, they
were told to go to Karachi Airport where they were shown a suitcase brought on
board by corrupt officials. The couriers saw the suitcase in Kastrup when they
arrived and their job was to take it to someone else. But in 18 instances the ;
Crip ended up at the police station.
The police know the gang leaders suapected each other and the couriers of cheat-
ing when one shipment after another disappeared. So did one of the gang leaders
wh~n he came to Copenhagen from London to pick up some.money. Thus it took a '
long time before they discovered that the police had been rounding up the gang
leaders. Those working on the case also know that leaders had cynically counted
on losing a ce.rtain percentage of couriers and shipments. In additi~n those
who had been arrested were kept in total isolation while they werr_- being detained. ~
On Thursday Mr Interpol was arrested at the Apollo Hotel in Paris ~ust after he
a:-r.ived by plane from Africa--and after he had received special delivery letters ~
from Copenhagen and London containing two false ID cards. It was requested
- Lhat he be turned over to Denmark and his position on ~he charge is still not
known. On the same day four suspects were detained in Copenhagen and in a '
cellar in Osterbro the police found 240,000 kroner hidden in a plastic bag. '
6578
CSO: 5300 ;
~
i
,
~
53 ~
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FINLAND
Pfl`ISICIAN SAYS FAKED PRESCRIPTIONS WERE FOR OWN USE
He.lsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finni3h 20 Sep 80 p 18
[Article: "Doctor Wrote 650 Prescriptions: 'I Used All the Drugs Myself
('1'ext] The female doctor imprisoned on Thursday by the Helsinki criminal police
hf~a confessed under interrogation that she heryelf used all the drugs ahe received
on t.he over 650 prescriptio.is ehe wrote.
According to her statement, she must have used about 16,000 strong doses of morphine
during Che la~t 5 years.
"It aeems impossible," say the police and the Central Medical Board.
The drug section of the criminal police imprisoned a female doctor of zhe surgical
department of a Helsinki hospital. According to the investigations, the doctor had
written a total of 664 drug prescriptions during the last 5 years.
She wrote 318 "pro auctore" prescriptions for herself, and 346 prescriptions in the
name of another peraon.
Witti the prescriptions the doctox' received over 8 liters of morphine, 6,300 Dolorex
tableCs, and almost 500 milliliters of the drug Petidin.
Under interrogation she persistently claimed that she used the drugs herself.
According to thaC she would have had to us 16,008 half-milliliter doses of morphine,
ln additi~n to other things. Morphine doses for medicinal use start at 0.2
mi11111Cer~, for example.
According to her claim, the doctor must have used 4 milliliters of morphine every
a~y.
"lt seems impossible. No proof of the woman's explanation was found during the
investigation," says section head Unto Vuono of the Helsinki criminal police.
'lhe police are noC yet prepared to state whether or not the doctor may have sold
9ome drugH to others.
I)ru~s Stored at Home
Morphine ia a narcotic drug, and the doctor apparently wrote also some prescriptions
~ Eor cancer and asthma medicines, among others, in an effort to mislead so that no
attention would be paid to the drug prescriptions.
51~
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Slie kcpt ttie a?~dtcines at home. In a house search, the police found at the doctor's
linmc dozen~ of kiloR of these medicines, some of which were already too old [to use].
'l'he doctor explained during the investigation that the person in whose name she
wro[e some o� the prescriptions suffered from cancer. According to the investiga-
ti~n, ttiia claim ie noC true. The person does not exist, but according to Vuono
tl~e per.son htts nothing to do with the matter.
Ui~covered Already in 1977
- ()ff~tce manaRer Antti Marttila of the general office of the adminisCrative section
of the Centrul Medical Board says that the imprisoned doctor was caught during
nn inspection by the Medical Board already in 1977, but the doctor was able to
give ~ sr~t~l.sfactory explanation for the drug prescripi~.tons at that time.
Now tlic doctor has been caught again, but this time the Central Medical Board is
not reacting favorably to her explanations.
"We let the police investigate the matter, because we thought that drug offenses
miFht be 1.nvolved."
Vuono snye thAt the Dolorex scandal uncovered last sum~er is contiinuing to spread.
Pre.acriptions written for 300,000 Dolorex tablets have been uncovered so far.
Accordin$ to this, over 10 million marks have been apent on Dolorex in street
4ri.les, but the rimounts will atill increase as the affair keeps growing the more
l.he invesf.i~ation progresses.
9611
(150 : 5 300
�
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FINLAND
BRIEFS
' 1~~:W~R YOUTH ON llRUGS--A poll of recruits shows that the use of narco ~ ics by youth
l~as cl~arly decreased. Of those induct~d last spring, 9.2 percent had used drugs
~~t lenat once. According to the corresponding poll made by the research section
of. the Social and Health Mi~istry in 1971, the percentage of drtig use rs was 16.2
percent. The uae of drugs continues to be concentrated in Southern Finland.
~:leven point one percent of the group from Southern Finland and 2.6 of the group
, from Northern Finland reported having used drugs. Moat of the use of drugs
represented experimentation out of curiosity, however: about 60 percent of the
"u~ers" had tried drugs only once. The drug experimented with was almost always
~ne af the cannabia preparations, haehish or marijuana. About 16 pe rcent ~f the
experimentera had used thinner or some other solvent. Researcher Markku Heinonen
observes that the results from recruits cannot be directly generalized to use by
youth i.n general. Those that work with young drug users have, howeve r, observed
the same direction of development since the beginning of the 1970's, the use of
dr~ige aiaon~ the youth has decreased noticeably. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN
SANOMAT i.n Finnish 26 Sep 80 p 12] 9611
CSO: 5300
~6
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FRANCE
BRIEFS
DRUG SEI7,URES NOTED--Between 1 and 13 August, 500 kilograms of
various drugs worth 2b million francs were seized by French customs
personnel. The Finance Minis~ry points out thr~t these seizures,
which did not occur in Paris alone, are the largest since 1972. ~
At the border between France and Spain, Perthus customs officials `
uncovered more than 220 kilos of cannabis resin, while in Marseilles, -
79 kilos of liquid cannabis were seized, and 85 kilos in Toulouse-
Blagnac. Also, maintenance workers in che SNCF [French railroads]
ehop at Oulins (Rhone) found 4 kilos of Indian hemp worth 60,OOQ
francs ln one of the cars of the "Corail" train linking Amsterdam
to Paxis. In Spain, according to AFP [FRENCH PRESS AGENCY], 1.222
kilo of extremely pure heroin, which could have been used to produce
$0.000 doses, wae �ound in a Madrid apartment. A couple was arrested.
Also ae reported AFP, Yugoslav customs officials have, since the
beginninA of Che year, seized 259 kilos of heroin and 1.2 ton of
ha~hiyh. In 1979 only 34 kilos of heroin had been seized on
Yu$oslav soil. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 17-I8 Aug SO p 5)
1 J.936
- CSO: 5300
~
~ tY�i
57
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ITALY
BRIEFS
iJNF.MPLOYED HEROIN ADDICT ARRESTED--Sandro Frau di Quartu, an unemployed youth 19
years old, was arrested yesterday for possessing drugs: he was found to be in
poasession of 380 milligrams of heroin which the police considered to be ~:.are than
a"small quantity" and therefore for personal use. With the expression, "small
quant~.ty," the 1975 Antidrug Law opened the way to ambiguous interpretations:
this is shown by aentences which, from time to time, absolve or condemn drug ad-
dicta �rom whom small quantities of drugs have been confiscated. Sandro Frau was
arrested by agents of the police department's narcotics squad; he was traveling
with three friends in an automobile when stopped for inspection in VialP Marconi.
After a thorough search he was found in possessioa of the heroin which, wrapped in
tinfoii, he was carrying in a pocket of his blue jeans. Taken to the police station,
= the youth maintained that he was a drug addict and had purchased the drug in
Selargius. [TexC] [Cagliari L'UNIONE SARDA in Italian 25 Sep 80 p 5] 856$
INTERNATIONAL DRUG 'COURIER' EXPELI~:D--Sassari, 27 September--An internatianal
drug "courier" was expelled from the country this morning shortly after being
released from the Alghero territorial prison. A police car was waiting at the
exit ta transfer the "courier," Singaram Kerisnan, a Malaysian citizen, 30 years
of age, immediately to the offices of the foreign division of the town's police
department. Singaram Kerisnan had beea arrested by the Genoa police in January
~ 1977; atopped at the port for normal inspection, he had been found to be in pos-
session of 3 kg of pure heroin valued at more than 3 billion lire. [Text]
[Cagliari L'UNIONE SARDA in Italian 28 Sep 80 p 11] 8568
HEROIN SEIZED IN NAPLES--A Fedelissimu patrol arrested Aniello Benestare (32
years old, of Torre del Greco) and Antonio Conte (40 years of age, of Castellam-
mare) in San Giorgio a Cremano. Upon seeing the officers, the two had fled,
ecatCeri.n~ ehe contents of some small envelopes in the street. However, one of
the "peckeCs" was reeovered and was found to contain 1. gram of heroin. [Excerpt)
(Napl.~s IL MATTINO in Italian 26 Sep 80 p 15] 8568
ARRESTS IN ITALY--Three Frenchmen were arrested in Italy on Friday.
15 August aH they were leaving a bar reputed to be a drug users'
hanRoi~t. Patrice Badin, 29, of Longue (Maine-et-Loire), Pierre-
Uiclier Mathieu, 27, of Paris, and Yves-Alain Pensa, 35, of Nimes
w~.re found in possession of several doses of cocaine and heroin.
[Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 17-18 Aug 80 p 5j
]1s36
~ C50: 5300
~
)U
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NORWAY
- DtSURDER IN IRAN RESPONSIBLE FOR CHEAP HEROIN WAVE
Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 24 Sep 80 p 2
~Text] The turbulent political situation in Iran has led to a breakdown in
c.ontrol over the Lllegal drug ~rade and the cour.try will very probabl}~ be the
_ world's biggest heroin producer this year.
ThQ chief of the Oslo pr~lice force's narcotics division, Ai-ne Huuse, told NTB
[NORWEGIAN PRESS AGENCY] that on the basis of reports from international con-
tacts. . .
Up to 2 years ago the Chinese dominated the illegal narcotics market in Europe
with shipments of heroin from the so-called Golden Triangle, Thailand, Burma and
Laos.
"Now most o� the heroin comes from Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan which consti-
tute~an important new triangle. Suppliers from that area are now delivering
drugs at outright dumping prices to outcompete the Chinese heroin syndicates
ancl that is perhaps the most disturbing thing ahout this development," Huuse
said.
"With thet kind of price drop there is an overwhelming danger that addicts will
find it easier to go over to the use of a harder drug, heroin which would lead
to ~ further increase in the number of drug-related deaths," Huuse said.
In severaL recent narcotics cases the Norwegian narcotics police have been
given clear indications that international drug rings are increasingly oper-
ating their own routes to Norway and tha t they probably see the Norwegian
market as a very attractive one due to a traditional high price level. These
are professional profiteers who do not belong to the addict scene.
G578
CSO: 5300
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NORWAY
AREA NARCOTICS POLICE CHIEF DETAILS NEW DRUG ROUTES
Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 25 Sep 80 p 9
[Text] Oslo and the Ostland area in general are no longer the only ports of
entry fnr narcotics entering Norway. "We have a number of examples of smug-
gling rou tes that go directly from the continent to places like Sorlands Vest-
land and North Norway," the chief of the national central narcotics division,
Police Inspector Arne Huuse, told NTB [NORWEGIAN PRESS AGENCY].
There have also been other marked changes in narcotics supplies. The price
_ paid for drugs in this country is remarkably high compared with the prices in
the re3t of Europe. This makes Norway attractive to the more professional
suppliers who don't belong to the drug abuse scene themselves.
NTB has learned that several recent cases provided clear indications that in-
r~znational narcotics rings have their own contacts in Norway. In the past it
was more common for Norwegians to travel to the big narcctics centers to buy
cirugs. At the same time the addict milieu has become more brutal ar~d harder
for the police to penetrate.
Although heroin sales are now a daily occurrence throughout the country the
smuggling of hashish is still widespread. According to the police there are
strong indications that a new "hash wave" has arrived in this country. Hashish
ia the drug young people usually come in contact with fi.rst.
Pnlice Inspector Huuse also said that the police are noting a rise in the sup-
plies of cocaine which is mainly smuggled in from the cultivation areas in
South America via Spain to the rest of Europe. Morphine and speed (ampheta-
mines) are still being sold extensively.
Pc~lice Inspector Arne Huuse said Tuesday that they are noting a substantial
- reduction in the price of heroin because suppliers from Iran, Pakistan and Af-
gh~nistan are trying to outcompete Chinese:heroin syndicates in an effort to
knock them out of the European market altogether.
"1: Am not ruling out the possibility that this could affect the narcotics situ-
a~ic~n in Norway. A price war with heroin being sold at prices far below normal ~
increases the risk that more addicts will go over to the dangerous drug," said
lluuse. '
In Denmark the price of heroin has gone down to 1000 kroner per gram. tn this
country, by comparison, the price is ten times that. One gram provides 32
doses each coating 3-400 kroner. ,
657~ 60 ,
Cs~: 53~)0
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SWEDEN
CANC ~)C'THAI , SWED~I.SH DRUG SMUGCLERS CHARGED
Stock}iol.m I)AGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Sep 80 p 12
[Arelrte by 1,eif Du1111n]
[Text] A Thai and Swedish drug ring managed to sell heroin worth over 10 million
kronor on the Stockholm market before being exposed. Six Tr~ais and four Swedes '
were indicted Monday by prosecuting attorney, Bernt Adamsson or Stockholm's District
(;~urt. The heroin was smuggled in specially made shoes. A large portion of the
profit was deposited in 5wiss banks.
One of: the principle figures, a Thai, began smuggling heroin to Sweden back in 1978.
I~e was in collusion with a shaemaker in Bangkok who "sewed" the heroin shipments
into newly made platform shoes.
I:t wna in 1978 that the Thai and a fellow-countryman smuggled in the fi.rst shipment
o~ 400 gram:~. Over 6 kilograms of heroin was smuggled to Sweden in this manner, a .
pur~ at 3 time. I.n most cases the courier traveled by air from Sangkok by way of
(:npenh~gen to Arlanda.
'I'l~iK May, two of the Thai couriers were apprehended. They were att~mpting to
smi~gg.l.e 70,000 kronor. out of: the country, a part of the profit from sold narcotics.
'I'hey }~nd l~idden t}~e money in a cigarette carton.
One of thosr arrested had smtiggled part of the profit to Switzerland. It is
stiypc~r. ted ti~at hundreds af thousands of kronor have been deposited into accounts
tliere. One of the couriers bought a gold bar, which was placed in a Swiss
stiFe-depoHit box. It has been delivered to the police here.
'1'he contacts in Sweden were two Swedes who distributed the drugs to solve:it buyers.
9'wo of the larger hotels in downtown Stockholm were used as meeting places for ttie
dea~.4.
I)rug~ vxluecl ~t over a million kronor have been confiscated. The ring leader.'s
profitK from the drug sales are estimated to be around 800,000 kronor. For tt~is
r~a~on Ch~ prosecuting attorney has requested that the sale of the Thai's row '
houae in Si~tuna be prohibited. When the man's house was searched, 38,100 kronor
tn cash and a bankbook wi~th tens of thousand s of kronor on deposit were found. It .
is believed that those closest to the ring leader ma~e at least 400,000 kronor.
BankbnakH, gold watches, a gold medal and a gold bar have been confiscated.
61
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, With confessions from several of the gang members and physical ~vidence, the
proseciiting att~rney has enough material so that all the gang members will be
~ convicted. The ring leaders may expect long prison sentences.
'I'iie proRecutor will requesl- that all the Thais be dep~rted. _
~ 9336
- GS~: 5300
62
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- . swEnr�.~
COUR'I' c;IVES STIFI~ SF.NTENCF.S 'PO 'fURKISH DRUG SMUGGLERS
Stockliolm SV1s[~SKA DAGBT~ADET in Swedish lI Sep 80 p 4 "
[ArCicle by Claes von Hofsten]
[TextJ Last Wednesday the aentences of both principle figures in the Turkish drug
rinK that w~s exposed laet winter in Stockholm were upheld by the Svea Court of
Appec~lr~. Accor.dinp; to the sentences, 36-year-old Naif Durak and 27-year-old
'l'evfik Seker will ser.ve 10- and 9-year prison terms respectively before being
permanentLy d eported from Sweden.
~ '('l~e other three main figures in the ring, which smuggled 8.5 kilograms of heroin
into Swed en, had their sentences reduced somewhat. One had his sentence reduced
Crom 8 co 7 years in prison and another received a reduction from 6 to 5 years.
'I'he tt~ird member had hie 8-year sentence upheld but was spared the deportation
- y~:ntence hunde~i down by the district court.
~rhe court of appeals felt that since he had come . to Sweder~ as a child and had
- ~ttencled scho~l primarily in Swed en, then in accordance with the new alien laws
he should be considered sufficiently ad~usted to Sweden that he ~_.ould remain here
even if he is guilty of crimes.
The:9iaCr~.ct court concluded in its aentence that the five should pay the state a
CoCO.' of 3.~3 million kronor, corresponding to the profit made in the heroin trade.
The court of appeals redur_ed the sum to 2.2 miilion kronor, although only a half
mi.lli~n ha~ bQen secured. The court of appeals decided that the state would pay
che extenaive court costs.
A1L�ogether, 19 people in the ring have been ser~tenced. ~ne of tY~~m will request
Fi new trial in the near future. Atnong other things, he was convicted of once
having amuggled 3.7 kilograms of heroin into the country. He confessed to this
under interrogation, but he later withdrew his confession and has subsequently
denled committing the crime.
tlc i~1.HO uppealed the conviction, but the court of appeals also convicted him of
emugglin~. After the conviceion had gained legal'.:~rce, this same smuggling
episode came up in connection with the trial of the five gang leaders. It waa
deame