JPRS ID: 9379 JAPAN REPORT STATUS OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 159
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 59
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/OS: CIA-R~P82-00850R000300040059-0
~
~~T~~~~ ~T~~U~ G~F ~E~~~~E I ~~~~T~~' ~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFI(:IAL USE ONLY
JPRS ~L/9379
31 October 1580
Ja an Re ort
I~ p
- CFOUO 29/80)
STATUS OF QEFEiVSE iIVDUSTRY
FBIS FUREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICFAL USE ONLY
I.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044459-4
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primaril; from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
' other characteristics retained.
:~ieadlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
' are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [TextJ
or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or following the
last ~i.ne of a brief, indicate how the original information was
pracessed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
- given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGUI,ATIONS GOVERNING OWDTERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ODTLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300044459-0
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/9379
~ 31 October 1980
JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 29/8a)
STATUS OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY .
- Tokyo NIHON NO BOEI SANGYO [JAPAN'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY] in Japanese
23 Aug 79 pp 1-217
[Book by Kazuo Tomi;iama]
~ONTENTS
I. The Other Defense Issue 1
II. Nature of Defense Industry 2
1. Enterprise Groups that Surround Defense Agency 2
2. Nature of Defense Industry Productivity ( -
Definition of "Military Use" h
Latent Defense Industry Productivity $
3. Present State of Deferise Production q
Scale and Items of Procure.ment g
Arms Manufacturers 10
III. Revival and Growth of Defense Industry 16
1. Beginning With Special Procurement 16
. The Korean War and Special Procurement 16
Full Scale Arms Production 18
, - a - [III - ASIA - 11.1 FOUO]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
rux ur~r l~l~, ua~ uriLz
2. Evolvement of Equipment Development 23
Establishing the Self Defense Force and Its Equipment............ 23
The Role of the Defense Agency's Technical R&D Institute......... 25
Progress of R&D 26
R&D and Private Enterprise 36
3. Progress of Domestic Equipment Production 37
High Ratio of Domestic Production 37
Present State of Domestic Production 38
w
IV. Actual State of Defense Industry 42
1. Role of Major Enterprise Groups in Defense Industry 42
2. Internal Structure of Defense Industry 46
;
Defense Industry Has a Broad Base 46 ;
Makers of Aircraft Parts 47
Position of Aircraft Industry Within Defense Industry............ 49
V. Japan's Defense Industry From the International Viewpoint............ 52
1. Unique Characteristics of Japan's R&D 52
R&D Lacking in Most Advanced Fields 52
Lack Original Development of Technology 54
Priority of Technological Imports Over Development 57
Systematization of Equipment Lacks Consistency 58 ~
2. Stable Arms Market 59
R&D With Minimum Risks 59
Delivery With Continuity 61
3. Typically Japanese Joint Industrial-Military Complex 63
Role of Former Self Defense Force Officers 63
"Defense Industry Family" 66 ,
- b -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300044459-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Link Between Dre- and Post-War 67
4. Internal Struggle Over pomestic Production 69 ~
Suspicion Surrounding the Import of Fighter Planes 69
Suspicion Surrounding the Import of Missiles 71
Suspicion Surrounding the PXL Issue 72 "
VI. Issues of the Defense Industry 74
1. Domestic Production or Imports? 74
. Pluses and Minuses of Domestic Production Versus Imports....... 74
Dangers Inherent in Domestic Production 76
2. Impact of Defense Production 77
Macro Impact Difficult to Grasp 77
Far-reaching Impact of RS~D on Industry 79
Technological Impact on Individual Enterprises 80
3. Profitabi.lity of Defense Industry 83
Does the Defense Industry Make Money? 8:i
Prices Are Set High 85
~
Production Under Guarantee 89
r
VII. Defense Industry's Age of Uncertainty 91
- 1. Widening of Arms Market 91
Defense Industry Enters Mass Production 91
On To the "5th Defense Buildup Plan" 96
2. Significance of Overall Limit On Defense Spending 97
Steady Increases in Defense Spending 97
Defense Spending Not Small 98
- c -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044459-4
r~n ~rrl~lrw u~c V1VLI
3. Dangers of the Arms Export Proposal 99
Pressures f.or Arms Export 99
Distortions of the Three Principles on Arms Export............ 102 ~
_ Dangerous Road to "Merchant of Death" 104
r~
_ VIII. The Constitution, Armed Forces and the Defense Industry........... 106
Addenda:
Appendix 1: Scale of Self Defense Force Equipment 108
Appendix 2: R&D and Standardization/Dep"loyment of Equipment...... 110
Appendix 3: Present State of Domestically Produced Equipment..... 122
_ Postcript
~
- d -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL,Y
,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[Text] 1. The Other Defense Issue
- Thz debate on the defense issue has attracted increasing attention in recent
years, centering on the argument for promotion of arms export, the move to
abolish the defense spendinb ceiling (under 1 percent of the GNP for the tim~~
being), the "emergency" legislation, etc. In his policy speech at the Diet
in January 1978, former prime minister Fukuda became the first postwar prime
minister to present the defense issue as a separate item on the agenda. The
debut of the "hawk" prime minister added intensity to the defense debate,
while the strong influence of the arms producing trend in industry coinciding
with the shift to a low-growth economy became an underlying factor.
Also, relative to the recent signing of the Japan-China peace treaty and
normalization of U.S.-Cliina relations, the U.S.-Japan mutual security pact
~ is undergoing a different kind of appraisal. jJhen the Chinese leaders
adopted a positive attitude towards Japan's defense capability with a forward- ~
lookin; evaluation regarding the U.S.-Japan security pact, Japanese reformist
groups tvere somewhat perplexed. As such concern towards the defense issue
increases, the more important it becomes to accurately understand the nature
of our defense industry.
Since early 1979 the people have been suspicious regarding the question of
~ importing the Grumman E-2C as an early warning plane (AEW). The previous
"Lockheed affair" was greatly shocking as a display of "the suspicious be-
havior of a prime minister." It concerned the sale of passenger planes to
private enterprise which revealed the close union between government offi-
cials and the business community, as well as manipul~ation of government
officials by politicians pressing for vested rights. A similar case occur-
red in late 1978, when the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) indicted
the Douglas Aircraft Company regarding aircraft sales. The recent case in-
volved more serious problen:; based on doubts surrounding government purcY~ases
of military aircraft. In the process of clarifying those doubts, there i~
strong suspicion that politicians may have played a ro1.e in the purchase of
the F-4EJ fighter plane and the selection of the about-to-be-imported J-15. _
The search for the truth depends on the turn of future events, but the over-
all picture could be buried without clarification except for partial revela-
tions.
Nothing is so corrupt as competition over sales of military ai.rcraft. It
_ involves the structural factor of common interests between thrPe parties~
the producer whose operations cannot make er.ds meet without selling his air-
, craft somewhere; the trading company which seeks to negotiate a"good deal"
, at substantial gains; and the politician who is unable to "sustain his level
of. spending" without vested rights through connections with such business
firms. The problem is not confined to only r_ertain companies, but consti-
tutes a common and latent factor among all of today's specializing munitions
enterprises.
1
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850ROOQ3QOQ4Q059-0
r~ux urrl~itw u~~ UNLT
Since 1950, Japan has in reality taken the road to rearmament and is doin~;
so today. Moreover, its weapons are now largely produced domestically.
Undeniably Japan depends highly on the U.S. and Europe for its aircraft.
But concerning the scale of its defense industry as a whole, it rates amon~
the world's most productive nations. The defense debate cannot be under-
stood by isolat.in~ it from such realities of the defense industry. Nonetlte-
less, in comparison to the mounting interest in the defense debate towarcls
such specific issues as the import of military aircraft, public awareness
towards the defense industry cannot be said to be very high in general. It
is impossible to understand the essential nature ~f the defense industry by
merely taking up the industry's individual problems as they occur and then
f.orgetting about them later.
There ar~ very few documents which explain Japan's defense industry as a
whole. There are quite a few which explain the present holdings of arms
and equipment, but they merely refer to the stockpiles of Japan-made and
imported arms. Those which refer to the industry are often limited to list-
ings of principal weapoary and main contractors. We know that the production '
of main arms and equipment is concentrated in a few enterprises. Un the
other hand, it should be realized that, while the enterprises deeply involved
in the defense industry may limit their production to specialized military
uses, ~heir numbers are considerable. It cannot be definitely stated whether
even such basic facts, such as the variety of arms and their producers, have
beer~ sufficiently made clear.
This treatise aims to outline Japan's defense industry on the basis of such
circumstances. The objective is first and foremost the defense industry as
it exists today. It does not refer to conditions prior t~ World War II and
it limits the period under survey to the post-1950 era. Without denying the
technical and business connections to the previous era, minimal reference is
made to it. Also, foreign munitions industries and the import of equipment
are mentioned only in the context of their relationship to Japan's defense
industry.
II. Nature of Defense Industry ~
1. Enterprise Groups that Surround Defense Agency
It seems that the term "defense industry" is more often used in a broader
sense than that of the weapons industry or munitions ind~istry. Yet it is not
easy to describe an industry which has a certain cohesiveness as a defense
industry.
In Japan arms export has not been recognized in principle, and limits to the ~
size of the deiense industry are determined by the amount of procurement set -
by the Defense Agency. Since imports (mostly aircraft, missiles, etc.) are -
included in the procurement, the size of the defense industry can be generally
assumed to be total procurements less imports. Of course, this is the so-
called "general framework" and includes not only arms but also provisions and
clothing. Therefore, there is quite a variety in content. Leaving aside
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
i
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. analyzi.ng the contents, we shali first take a look at the overall framework
and the enterprises concerned.
' A go~~d portion of the Defense Agency's procurement budget is set by the
Centr4l Pr.ocurement Office (CPO). Three methods ~ised by the CP~ are:
general competitive bids, designated competitive bids and free option con-
tracts. In terms of cost, designated bids and free option contracts play
a large role. But the greatest number of enterprises are involved in general
competitive bids. At any rate, in order to participate in the CPO bids, the
bidders must be registered as qua.lified companies.
The goods procured by the Defense Agency and th~ f.irms consigned are numerous.
� Generally speaking, tlie only fact being pointed out is that procurements are
concentrated in a certain number of business establishments ~the tendency is
conspicuous rEgarding main weapons). But the fact must not be overlnoked that
many other companies supply various equipment although in smallPr quantities.
[Je wi~l take a look at the "~ualif~ed companies" listed by the C~'0. In 1978
there were 2142 suppliers listed (See Table II-1).
Table II-1: Qualified Sup~liers (1978)
(Category) (Producer) (Seller) (Total)
lJeapons 13 2 15
Electric Communications 240 45 285
r4ilitary Supplies 263 142 405
- Textile Goods 173 60 233
Leather Goods 14 3 17
Rubber Goods ~1 4 35
' Ammunition 15 0 15
_ Chemical 57 29 86
Sanitation 107 142 249
Food Provisions 38 19 57
Fue1 26 27 S3
Ships 96 4 100
Machinery 251 94 345
Vehicles 50 13 63
Afrcraft 52 S 57
Imports 0 104 104
Transportatior./Labor 0 7 7
Leases 0 14 1.4
Consignments 0 2 2
- Total 1,426 716 2,142
(Date: "General State of the Central Procurement Office")
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
rvic urri~.icw u~L v1vLi
Lack of space requires omitting concrete details concerning these supplies. -
However, a concrete description of each category will be provided in order
to clarify the extent of these enterprise groups. Since our empllasis here
is on domestic industries, we will begin with the producers.
l~irst, in the "weapons" category, there are 13 companies, including Nisse.i
Machine Works, Ishikawa Seisakusho, Kobe Steel, Shin Chuo Kogyo, Nittoku
Metal Industry, Japan Steel Works and Howa Machinery.
In the "electric communications" category, there are 240 companies. The
principal suppliers are Ikegami Tsushinki, Iwasaki Tsushinki, Oki Electric
Industry, Shin Kobe Electric Machinery, Tateishi Electric Machinery, Shibaura
Engineering Works, Shiba Electric, Shinko Electric, Sumitomo Electric Ii~dus-
tries, T~kyo ~eiki, Toshiba, Toyo Tsushinki, Toyo Electric Manufacturing,
Nippon Aviotronics, Nippon Electric, Victor Co of Japan, Hitachi, Fujitsu,
I'uji Electric, Furukawa Electric, Matsushita Communications Industrial,
Matsushita Electric Industrial, Matsushita Electronics Corp, Mitsubishi
Electric Corp, t4eidensha Electric Manufacturing, The General Co, Yaskawa
Electric Psanuf acturing, Yokogawa Electric Works, Mitsubishi Precision, Aiwa,
Tokyo Electric Chemical Industries, Oki-Univac Kaisha, Hishiden Special
MachinPry and Kanegafuchi Chemical Industry.
In the "supplies" category, there are 263 companies which handle office
machines and instruments, kitchen appliance~ and utensils, ~nd illumi,nation
and photographic equipment and materials. They include ~akushu Kenkyusha,
Canon, Sekisui Chemical, Nippon Light Metal, Fuji Photo Film, Ricoh, Asahi
Optical, Nil:katsu Corp, Tokyo Electric, Aichi Tokei Denki, Citizen Watch,
Hitachi Thermal Appliances, Idemitsu Pe~rochemical, Sunwave Industries,
Dantani Plywood, Shochiku Motion Pictures, Toho Motion Pictures, Toei Motion
Pictures, Pilot Pen and Fuji Xerox.
There are 173 companies in the "textile goods" category which include all
major companies in the cotton spinning and synthetic fiber trades. They
include Asahi Chemical Industry, Asahi-Dow, Kanebo, Kurabo Industries,
" Kuraray, Kureha Chemical Industry, Teijin, Toyobo, Toray Industries, Unitika,
Nissin Spinning, Fujikura Parachute, Mitsubishi Rayor and Mitsukoshi Sewing.
The "leather goods" category has 14 companies which supply shoes and bags.
They include Otsuka Shoe, Toyo Cloth and Nippon Shoe.
~ The "rubber goods" category lists 14 companies. The chief suppliers are
Kokoku Chemical Industries, Sumitomo Rubber Industries, Toyo Rubber Industry,
Nippon Goodyear, Okamoto Riken Gomu, Bridgestone Tire and Yokohama Rubber.
~
_ There are 15 companies in the "ammunition" category, including Asahi Seiki
Manufacturing, Ricoh Watch, Japan Carlit, Nippon Kayaku and Daikin Kogyo.
As many as 57 companies are listed in the "chemical" category, including
Kansai Paint, Shinto Paint, Onoda Cement, Nippon Paint, Nippon Oils and Fats,
Riken Keiki Fine Instruments, Showa Highpc�lymer, Sumitomo-3M and Fujikura
Kasei.
4
FOR UFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The "health and sanitation" category lists 107 companies which supply mainly
_ medicines and medical care (therapeutic) equipment. They include Eisai Co,
Olympus Optical, Kyowa Hakko Kogyo, Shionogi & Co (pharmaceutical), Tanabe
Seiyaku, Daiichi Seiyaku, Takeda Chemical Industries, Sharp Corp, Yamanouchi
Seiyaku, Mei~i Seika, Toyo Tanabe, Konishiroku Photo Industry and Hitachi
M~dical Corp.
The "provisions" category lists 38 companies including Daiichiya Bakery,
Cupie Co, Taiyo Fishery, t4orinaga Milk Industry, Snow Brand Milk Products,
Piorinaga & Co and Takasaki Ham Co. There are 26 companies in the "fuel"
category centering on petroleum products. Included are Teikoku Oil, Hok-
kaido Colliery & Steamship, Idemitsu Kosan, Maruzen Oil, Mitsubishi Oil and
Showa Oil Co.
Included in the 96 companies in the "ships" category are Ishikawajima Harima
Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy IndLStries, Sasebo Heavy Industries, Nippon
Kokan, Hakodate Dock, Hitachi Shipbuildinb & Engineering, Mitsui Shipbuilding
& Engineering, Mitsubishi Metal, Yamaha Motor, Yanmar Diesel Engine, Hokushin
Electric Works, Ebara Manufacturing, Mitsubishi Steel Manufacturing, Sumitomo
Shipbuilding & Machinery, Nippon Steel, Mitsubishi Chemical Industries and
Kurushima Dockyard Co.
� The 251 companies in the "machinery" category rate second only to the "sup-
plies" category. They include Ikegai Iron Works, 0-M Seisakusho, Nippon
Nogaku, Ishii Iron Works, Mitsui Seiki Kogyo, Sumitomo Metal Industries,
Furukawa Mining Co, Fuji Robin Industries, Riken Seiki Machine~dorks,
Nippondenso, Sanyo Electric, Toyoda Machine Works, Hitachi Koki and Tokyo
Keiso Co.
The "vehicles" category lists 50 companies which include Isuzu Motors, Cater-
pillar Mitsubishi, Komatsu International Manufacturing, I~omatsu Ltd, Suzul~;i
Motor, Tokyu Car Corp, Toyo Kogyo, Toyoda Automatic Loom idorks, Nissan Motor,
Honda Motor, Tadano Iron Works, Nippon Trailmobile, Nippon Sharyo Seizo and
Yanase Co.
Finally, there are 52 companies in the "aircraft" categar;~. They include
Showa Aircraft Industry, Shin Meiwa Industry, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
and Japan Aircr3ft Manufacturing. More details will be given later.
Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries also be-
long here, but are already listed in the "ships" category.
As the foregoing lists show, the "qualified suppliers" are numerous and
varied. Most,of the top companies of the various industries are listed.
In addition to these 1,426 companies (only 174 have actually been named,
while some 1,250 companies have been omitted). There are some 70C~ companies
which handle sales. Not a few among the sales firms were formerly distribu-
tion divisions of msnufacturing concerns and have become independent enter-
prises (e.g. Toyota ~fotor Sales, Mitsubishi Motor Sales, etc.), It is
evident therefore that, in addition to the aforementioned producing companies,
a considerable number of enterprises have the capability of supplying products
5
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300044459-0
r~x ~rrl~irw u~r. UivLY
_ through their directly affiliated but independent firms. And, of course a
large nunber of producing companies are affiliated with general sales firms.
Also, the aforem~entioned producers often have their own chain companies or
~ooperating companies. The defense industry is thus widely and deeply in-
volved in Japan's industrial activities.
There is a total of some 104 "qualified suppliers" which deal in imports.
In the mainstream are the general trading firms which are also specialized
enterprises dealing in the import of special equipment. Examples are C Itoh
& Co, Sumitomo Corp, Nissho Iwai Co, Marubeni Corp, Mitsui & Co, Mitsubishi
Corp, Kanematsu Gosho, T~oyo Menka, Nissho Iwai Aerospace Co and C Itoh Avia-
tion Co. The products imported by these companies of~en include important
equipment, but this should be considered as a separate issue from defense
production.
Among the "qualified suppliers" are the dealers who principally render
services concerning the distribution of goods to the Defensz Agency, such =
as transportation, storage and packaging. There are also dealers who lease -
and rent computers, etc. We have so far gi~en an outline of the variety of
businesses receiving procurement orders from the Defense Agency, and the =
variety is considerable. (See Note) Herein lies a basic problem in analyzin~
the defense industry or munitions industry.
Note: In addition to the aforementioned procurement items, the Defense ~
Facilities Admin~stration Agency handles new construction, repairs and
management of facilities. The participating firms are listed as "registered
contractors 2or construction projects." This could probably bE: included
under munitions ia a broad sense, but since there is no space to give details, -
our figures will be limited to general items. The "registered contractors
for construction projects" include 5,509 companies for complete projects and
6,153 companies for special projects, or a total of 11,662 companies. "Par-
ticipants in design, planning and supervision" include 149 companies for -
complete projects and 685 companies for special projects, or a total of 834
companies. The grand total includes 12,496 companies (FY75).
2. Nature of Defense Industry Productivity
Definition of "Military Use"
Procurement good~ may be divided int~ ordinary commercial products and
specialized "frontal ec~uipment" for military purposes. Defense needs in the _
broad sense or munitions usually pertain to procurements as a whole, but
quite often they pertain on~y `o specialized fron:al equipment.
i
~ Clearly, only specialized equipment for war purposes are not sufficient to
- maintain,, an army. Therefore, any defense industry which is ehe base of
military power. should include, in addition to production of specialized
equipment for war purposes in a narrow sense, broader production for war
support. Although both types could be defined as defense industries, there
_ is clearly a distinct difference between the two.
6
FOP~ OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- In other words, specialized war equipment have the follo wing characteristics:
(1) Since they are specialized to;aard military objectives, their use is not
of a genzral nature. And even whEn converted to general use, they are
zxtremely litaited in scope. (2) The relationsh;p between supply and procure-
ment is limited t~ special enterprises. It is an exclusive relationship whicl~
begins a:. the trial manufacture stage when the Defense Agency seeks to import
specific equipment, and once the eqaipment is imported the relationship does
not change f.undamentally as long as the equipment is under use. Such a
military-industria]. relationship will be discussed later with respect to
actual equipment.
Consequently, there are specific suppliers organized to provide specific
categories of equipment such as firearms, tanks, aircraf t, etc. but ~he dis-
tinction between specialized products for military use and those for non-
military use is not an absolute one, and sometimes industrial nroducts for
general use are diverted to military use. It is quite important to note this
potentiality of general industrial products.
In analyzing the defense industry, we are apt to emphasize the typical
aspects of the industry in the narrow sense. But it is also necessary to
bear in mind the fz�inge industries or the latent potentiality of converting
them ~o military purposes. Typical examples of general industrial products
being used intact for military purposes are jeeps and trucks (of course,
some are produced as mi.litary vehicles) . However, as we have seen during the
Vietnam war, pro3ucts by Japanese makers of electric machinery were used as
_ parts and components for TV-guided weapons, and general industrial products
are modif ied or converted for military use.
Cven materials researched and developed for purely peaceful purposes have
the poten*_ial of being converted to military use. In Japan, R&D of observa-
tion rockets has been conducted since 1955 as a space development project
(more accurately, a research group was formed and began activities in 1954).
In April of the same year, the Tokyo University Production and Tectinical
Research Institute began launch tests on the "Pencil" rocket (See Note 1).
It was quite primitive compared to today's rocket quality, but rocket
- research is basically research in transport mettiods and, depending on the
means of transport, rockets could be used for either military or peaceful
purposes. Therefore, rockets were later involved in the issue of "arms
export." For instance, in April 1967 the Tokyo University rockets which
were bein g exported to Yugoslavia and Indonesia became a:~ issue at the Diet
as having the capability of being converted as weapons. The rocket satel-
lites launched by Tokyo University and the National Space & Development
Agency today are capable of carrying tactical warheads. This does not mean
R&D is being conducted for such mili[ary purposes. Rather, regardless oE
the subj e ctive goal of research, ~ae point to the cold fact that the end
result could be development of the rocket as a transporting device and con-
version to military purposes. We emphasize that awareness of tliis fact
would contribute towards vigilance against such conversions (See Note 2).
Note 1: The test launch of. the "Pencil" rocket was conducted in the weapons
test launch pit of the firearms proclucer, Shin Chuo Kogyo Co. Hideo Itogawa,
7
FOR OFFICIAL USF ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
- t�v~~ vi�i~L~.ini, u.~u vL~a~i
director of the research project, was formerly in charge of military aircraft `
(the Model 97 [M97] carrier-bssed attack plane) developed at the Nakajima
Aircraft Mfg Co. This could be regarued as a good exampie uf technolog~~ and
knowhow being utilized for defense-related purposes.
Note 2: For example, the launch rocket called the "N-rocket" could now put ~
a 130-140 kg satellite into orbit. The modified version (N-II rocket) is
being developed with the goal of launching a 350 kg satellite into orbit.
The domestic production ratio of the N-rocket is slightly above SO percent.
But the company in charce of its production is the same company which pro-
duces military rockets.
Lateat Defense Industry Productivity
Let us uevelop the subjecr further and discuss the latent capability of to- ~
~ day's so-called "peacetime industries" in turning to militarization. Japan's
industries have concentrated on heavy chemical industrialization during the
era of high economic growth, and productivity in potential weaponry has in-
creased. The development of the machine industry in a broad sense (manufac-
ture of general industrial ma~hinery, transport machinery and precision
- equipment) underscores this point. To understand tnis, one need onl.y to
_ recall the role played by the American car industry during World War II.
The American car makers supp~ied 20 percent of all U.S. munitions with the ~
producr.ion of 5,950,000 firearms (47 perce~zt of the national volume of
machine guns and 56 percent of all carbine rifles); 2,810,000 tanks and mili-
tary trucks (57 percent of all tanks); and 27,000 finished aircraft. More-
over, the majority was achieved through conversion of existing facilities
dating back to 1942. In other words, a nation's latent defense productivity
is closely related to its economic and industrial capai,ilities. This is one �
reason why any inclination of the economy and industry towards defense pro-
duction must be cautioned and forestalled.
The same logic applies to nation.al wealth. When one realizes that there
are in Japan today 30 million cars, including more than 10 miilion trucks,
the possibility exists that they may be used for military mobilization under ,
unusual circumstances. The police forces and Maritime Safety Agency (MSA)
have greater potential in becoming militarized. In fact, the mine sweeping
forces of the Maritime Safety Agency were deployed in the Korea Sea in 1950
to support activities of the American Far East fleet and suffered casualties
in ships and human lives. This fact had been reported only piecemeal and =
was then confirmed by the then director of the MSA in 1978. (See Note)
Note: It was reported in Takeo Okubo's book, "Roaring Days At Sea." (1978)
'rhe book deals at length with the process leading to the establishment of ~
the MSA, but a more interesting fact is that the book treats the MSA function
as a partial takeover of the old Imperial Navy with the U.S. Coast Guard as
its ideal. It includes a memoir by a participant in the Korean War.
In today's society, many things are latently capable of being converted to
military use. But a realistic analysis would point to those industries
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
which are involved in the production of special equipment for military use, ~
= based on sufficient understanding of their latent capabilities.
3. Present State of DefensE Pr~duction
- ~cale and Items of Procurement
The present combat capability of the Defense Agency (Self Defense Forces)
is viewed as being far superi.or to that of the "Imperial Army and Navy"
during World War 2. The fact was generally accepted that, when the third
5-year buildup plan was completed, the Self Defense Force combat strength
surpassed the old Japanese armed forces. During the present fourth buildup
plar., seven years later, the SDF has become yet more powerful.
1
Table II-2: Defense Agency Procurement By Categories
(Unit: 100 million yen; Item)
(1973) (1975) (1977)
(Category) (Items) (Cost) (Items) (Cost) (Items) (Cost) .
Weapons 300 453.8 235 238.3 258 505.1
Communications 2,811 426.5 2,230 506.9 2,~~33 540.6
Supplies 1,816 62.1 1,386 74.7 2,143 107.3
Textile Goods 470 42.5 400 5Z.6 387 57.0
Ammur~ication/Chemical 409 130.0 321 150.4 370 198.7
Fuels 1,472 112.0 1,914 253.7 1,723 334.1
Ships 124 113.0 99 465.2 64 552.1
Machinery 760 24.~~ 539 25.8 460 50.4
Vehicles 297 187.2 269 251.0 285 266.2
Aircraft 1,058 1,155.5 914 1,443.0 818 1,523.1
Trial Products 63 81.6 78 93.0 66 104.0
General Imports 839 148.9 445 90.3 522 1.17.7
FP1S 120 159.6 88 80.8 96 160.3
Total 10,539 3,097.6 8,918 3,725.7 9,625 4,516.6 I
(Detense Agency Data)
The difference is not in manpower. The decisive factor for the differ.ence ~
in combat strength between the o1d military forces is the difference in
equipment. Whether it concerns arms, tanks, battleships or a:_rcraft, the
efficiency of the frontline equipment in each category is significant. Also,
most of the equipr~ent is produced domestically. It signifies great progress
in Japan's productivity.
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
rux ~rrl~ltu, uar. ULVLY
' The ratio of the defense indt~stry to Japan's averall manufacturing i.ndustry
is the lowest among the advanced industrial nations. Even in terms ~~f
, defense production in the broad sens~, thz ratio to general industrial
exports is only between G.3 to 0.4 percent. But aside from this ratio, in
terms of the absolute volun~~ of def.ense productivity or in terms of combat
w strength resulting from its equipment, the level of Japan's defense produc-
tivity ranks among the world's leaders. Therefore, it behooves us to under-
stand its conditions accurately.
Whenever the state of Japan's defense productivity is questioned, the first
data to be cited are the itemized procurement f.igures, the procurement
record of principal suppliers (usually the top 20 companies) and the princi-
- pal items of procur~ment (recent figures show each item in e::cess of 1 bil- _
lion yenl. Such data are of course elemental and important. The itemized
procurement figures (See Table II-2) show the procurement scale and a break-
~ down of figures by items. Of course, by items we mean not individual `
products but a cumulation by category. At the same time, a general procure-
ment outline is indicated. For example, according to the table, the procure-
ment of aircraft ranks at the top. Second position is divided between
communications equipment, ships and weapons, depending on the year. Also,
the procurement of fuels and vehicles is tabilized from year to year, while
the figures for ammunition and chemical equipment (despite heavy reliance on ~
munitions needs) are not so stable. '
Arms Manufacture�s
Data concerning the suppliers of defense procurement is provided by the Table
on Shifts in Defense Agency Procurement Orders to Principal Suppliers (See
Table II-3) and the Table on Principal Items of Procurement (See Table II-4).
The tables show that suppliers of expensive equipment such as aircraft, ships
and electronic machin.ery and equipment rank at the top.
Table II-3: Shifts in Defense Agency Procurement Orders to Principal Suppliers
(Unit: 100 million yen)
(Ranking Order) (Company Name) (Amount)
(1973)
1 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 611.9
2 Mitsubishi Electric Corp 363.7
3 Ishikawajima Harima 308.3
4 Kawasaki Heavy Industries 203.8
5 Toshiba 111.9
6 Shin Meiwa Industry 83.4
7 Nippon Electric 54.4
8 Komatsu Ltd 53.3
- 9 Hitachi 50.7
- 10 Sumitomo Shoji 40.0
11 Fuji Heavy Industries 39.2
12 Shimadzu Seisakusho 39.1
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ _
~
(Ranking Order) (Company Nam~} (Amount)
13 Nippon Koki Kogyo 32.5
14 Nissho Iwai 28.9
- 15 riitsubishi Precision 27.1
16 Tokyo Keiki 26.I. ~
~7 Japan Steel Works 24.9
18 Isuzu Motors 24.4
19 Daikin Kogyo 24.4
20 Nissan Motor 21.9
(1975)
1 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 911.8
2 Ishikawajima Harima 564.5
3 Kawasaki Heavy Industries 218.6
4 Mitsubishi Electric Corp 207.7
5 Nippon Electric 91.3
6 Toshiba 82.4
7 Shin Meiwa Industry 64.3
8 Japan Steel Works 61.2
9 Komatsu Ltd 54.7
10 Fuji Heavy Industries 52.3
11 Shimadzu Seisakusho 45.6
12 Hi.tachi Shipbuilding 41.2
- 13 Nippon Oil 40.8
14 Nippon Koki 38.3
15 Tokyo Keiki 33.8
16 Hitachi 30.8
17 Oki Electric 30.1
18 Daikin Kogyo 29.4
19 Maruzen Oil 27.1
20 Mitsubishi Motor Sales 27.1
(1977)
1 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 973.7
2 Kawasaki Heavy Industries 395.6
3 Ishikawajima Harima 364.5
4 Mitsubishi Electric 349.0
5 Toshiba 127.3
6 Sumitomo Iieavy Machinery 116.7
7 Nippon Electric 105.2
8 Shin Meiwa Industry $g,g
9 Komatsu Ltd g3,g
10 Mitsui Shipbuilding 65.0
11 Hitachi 64.0
12 Nippon Oil 60.9
13 Fuji Heavy Industries 56.6
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044459-4
rux urr~l~ltu, ua~ U1VLY
(Ranking Order) (Company Name) (AmounC)
14 Japan Steel Works 52.6 `
15 Shima~zu Seisakusho 50.8
16 Nissan Motor 44.E
- 17 Nippon Koki 44.3
" 18 Oki Electric 43.6
19 Tokyo Keiki 35.9
20 Hitachi ~hipbuilding 34.5 ~
(Date: From Defense Agency)
A look at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' figures for FY77 shows a total of some
97.4 billion yen allocated mostly to large orders as follows: approximately
11 billi~n yen for tanks (45 tanks of two M74 types); approximately 9.4 bil-
lion yen for a mine sweeper vessel (1); approximately 4.2 billion yen for
HSS-2B type aircraft (4); approximately 19.7 billion yen for F-4EJ fighter
planes (12); and approximately 19 billion yen for F-1 support fighter planes
(18) .
' rigures for Kawasaki Heavy Industries show a total of some 39.6 billion yen,
broken down into approximately 14.3 million yen for one (1) submarine; ,
approximately 3.4 billion yen for main machinery carried on one (1) defense
- escort vessel; and ap;~roximately 6.3 billion yen for two (2) C-1 transport
planes. In the case of Ishikawajinia Harima Heavy Industries, out of a total ;
of some 36.5 billion yen, about 20.2 billion yen is allocated to aircraft ,
engines (73 turbo engines) alone. Similar cases are seen with respect to
Mitsubishi Electric Corp and Toshiba. ~
The top companies share the bulk of total procurement. Sut the following
tw4 points must be emphasized. (1) Although these companies supply procured
goads directly to the Defense Agency, in many cases they mobilize a large
number of parts makers to produce the goods. (2) In addition to the top
suppliers, there are numerous companies which supply specialized equipment
for military use.
The defense industry has a broad base. Nonetheless, in tracing its ramifica-
tions one should not vaguely confuse its extensions with industry or the eco-
nomy at large. The main equipment consists mostly of assembled products and
systematized products. Numerous suppliers of parts, machinery and instru-
ments participate in their manufacture. Sometimes their organizational
structure takes the form of parent company-subcontractor in a vertical rela-
tionship. In other cases they are interlinked in a horizontal relationship.
The true relationships of these industries have hitherto not been made very
clear. Even the conditions of domestic equipment production have not been
understood concretely in terms of actL,al equipment. This is not only due to ;
the complexity of their makeup, but perhaps also to the emphasis put only on
certain companies or certain equipment. The defense industry should be under- .
stoon in terms of a single and whole industry.
12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044459-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Table II-4: The Defense Agency's Principle Items of Procurement
(FY77; each item in excess of 1 billion yen)
(Cost)
(Procuring (Quan- Unit: 100
Offi~ce) (Item) tity) mil. yen (Contractor)
_ GSDF Staff
Office
Modified "Hawk" guided
missile system compo- Mitsubishi Elec-
nents (1) 1 set 93.6 tric Corp
M74 tank~ 25 58.3 Mitsubishi Heavy
- Industries
M74 tanks (equipped with
noctovision sights) 20 51.5 " " "
Modified "Hawk" guided
missile system
components (2) 1 set 46.0 Toshiba
T473 large trucks 355 18.1 Isuzu Motor
155 mm howitzers 10 16.6 Japan Steel Works
105 mm HMI howitzer
shells 40,926 13.1 Komatsu Ltd
105 mm tank gun mounts 48 12.7 Japan Steel Works
Short-range SAM induction
shells (test shells) 1 set 12..3 Toshiba
M75 105 mm adhesion
shells Type 2 12,248 12.0 Komatsu Ltd
M75 mobile 155 mm Mitsubishi Heavy
howitzers 10 11.0 Industries
MSDF Submarine (8089) 1 142.5 Kawasaki Heavy
Staff Industries
Office
Defense escort ship Sumitomo Heavy
(2201) 1 116.5 Industries
Mine. layer ship (1002) 1 93.5 Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries
13
FOR OFFIC IAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044459-4
r~x urrlt;i~ ua~ UNLY
(Procuring (Quan-
OT.`ice) (Item) tity) (Cost) (Contractor)
~ M~llF Defense escort ship (1226) 1 64.8 ~fitsui Shipbldf;
. Staff
Office Ocean environmental survey
~ systern (1) 1 set 48.3 US Navy Dept
HSS-2B type aircraft 4 42.1 Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries
' US-1 type aircraft 1 33.6 Shin Meiwa Industry
Main machy for defense Kawasaki Heavy
escort ship (2201) 1 33.5 Industries
PS-1 type aircraft 1 27.2 Shin Meiwa Industry
Medium minesweeper (350) 1 24.0 Hitachi Shipbldg
Instruments for ship-to- ~
ship missile SSM system 1 set 23.5 US Navy Dept ~
Medium minesweeper (351) 1 12.4 Nippon Kokan
P-2J overhaul 11 16.0 Kawasaki Heavy Ind
Main batteries for subs For 1 13.5 Yuasa Battery
sub
Short-range SAM system
and components for tar-
get indicator system 1 set 13.5 US Navy Dept
- Batteries for subs 4 sets 12.4 Nippon Denchi ,
Parts/supplies for mine
layer ship 1 set 12.3 US Navy Dept
Main machy (gas turbine
for defense escort ship for 1
1226) ship 10.4 Kawasaki Heavy Ind
Parts/materials for
SSM system 1 set 10.2 US Navy Dept
ASDF F-4EJ aircraft 12 196.7 Mitsubishi Heavy Ind
Staff
Office F-1 support fighter planes 18 190.0 Mitsubishi Heavy Ind
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ASDF TF40-1H1-801A turbo fan
Staff e~zgines (for aircraft) 36 106.4 Ishikawajima Harima
- Office
AIM-7E missiles 180 82.0 Mitsubishi Elect Cori~
C-1 transport planes 2 62.9 Kawasaki Heavy Ind
J79-1H1-17 turb~jet
engines ~for aircraft) 24 56.5 Ishikawajima Harima ~
TF40-1H1-801 turbo fan
engines (for maintenance) 13 38.8 " "
Original parts for F-1
engine (Japan-made) 1 sPt 34.2 " "
Firing control systems
JA-APQ-120 12 29.5 Mitsubishi Elect Corp
Original parts for
F-4EJ engine 1 set 16.8 Ishikawajima Harima
Original parts for F-4EJ
airframes (Japan-made) 1 set 20.8 Mitsubishi Heavy Ind
Original parts for
F-1 airframe 1 set 20.8 " " "
T-2 (late model) flight
simulator 1 20.2 Mitsubishi Precision
Stabilized 3-dimension
radar system FPS-2 1 set 16.8 Nippon Electric
Firing control systems
J/ANG-12 18 16.5 Mitsubishi Elect Corp
T-3 primary trainer
planes 12 12.2 Fuji Heavy Industries
Inertial navigation Japan Aviation
systems J/ASN-1 18 11.8 Electronics
JT8D-M-9 turbofan
engines (for aircraft) 4 11.4 Mitsubi.shi Heavy Ind
Periodic repairs for
F-104F aircraft/frames 25 11.2 " " "
15 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
r~ux ur~r�lc;le~ u~~ ULVLT
- Periodic repairs for
F-104EJ/DJ aircraft
& aizframes 23 10.5 Mitsubishi Heavy l�d
ASllF 20 mm regular shells 649,937 ?0.0 Nippon Koki K~~yo
5taf f.
Office AIM-9J-1 missiles 135 10.0 US Air Force DepC
Defense 2nd-stage trial manu-
Agency facture of shortrange
Technical ASM projectile 1 set 31.0 Mitsubishi Heaw Ind
: R&D Inst
New type OH communi-
cation system
(XJ./FRQ-501) 1 set 10.1 Nippon Electric
III. Revival and Growth of Defense Industry
l. BEginning With Special Procurement
The resumption of Japan's defense industry after the war actually coincided ;
with the beginning of rearmament in 1950. It was triggered by the breakout i
of the Korean War. But at the outset, the resumption of defense producCion !
was not directly related to Japan's rearmamenC.
The Korean War and Special Procurement
The Korean War began on 25 Jun 50. In July of the same year, SCAP commander-
in-chief Gen MacArthur sent a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida urging rearma-
ment and the increase of Maritime Safety Agency personnel. On receipt of the
letter, the Police Reserve Corps Act was promulgated and implemented in AuFust
of the same year. It was the first step toward rearmament linked to the
present Self Defense Force (the P4SA'increased its personnel by 8,000 men).
The duty of the Police Aeserve Force was "to maintain peace and order in ,
Japan and to maintain public safety." The following September (1951), the
peace treaty with Japan was signed and at the same time the U.S.-Japan joint
security pact was concluded. These two treaties became effec~ice on 28 Apr 52. ~
Almost simultaneously (on 26 April), the Maritime Police Force was established
within the already existent Maritime Safety Agency. It was the predecessor of
the present Maritime Self Defense Force.
At any rate, Japan's military forces, which thus made a fresh start, were
to be equipped with arms provided by the US armed forces. Of course, they
were hardly the most advanced weapons, but were surplus arms produced and
left over from World War II. On the other hand, since immediately after the
outbreak of the Korean War, "special procurements" brought relief to Japan's
economy which was sufferin~ from the so-called "Dodge infl.ation." Textile
products constituted much of "special procurement," but the volume of arms-
� related production was also considerable. Thus US-made arms were provided
to Japan's military forces and Japan-made weapons were supplied to the Ameri-
can armed forces which were fighting the Korean War.
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE aNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- Japan's defense production thus made a new start through the formula of
"special procurement." "Special procurement" was directly pegged to the
Korean war, but the arms produced were not directly related to Japan's
rearmament. H~wever, there is no denying the fact that it helped to foster.
the revival of Japan's defense industry. The chief suppliers of firearms,
etc, for the Defense Agency today made their debut during that time. We
will expand on this point ~vith data obtained from the Economic Deliberation
Agency.
"Uuring the first year (July 1950-June 1951), special procurement contracts
_ totalled approximately 329 million dollars (goods - 230 million dollars;
services - 99 million dollars). Textiles led with 62.53 million dollars of
27 percent of total goods. During the first half of the year, contracts for
jute bags (used for sandbags) constituted an ovenahelmingly large share, but
in the last half woolen blankets, cotton cloth and cl.othing increased for
seasonal reasons. Transport machinery was second, totalling 43.99 million
dollars. They consisted mostly of trucks, while railroad freight cars,
steam locomotives and other rolling stock and battQries made up the rest.
Metal products were third, totalling 35.03 million dollars. They included
large contracts for napalm tanks, aircraft fuel tanks, barbed wire poles,
metal frame buildings, oil drums (55-gallon) and fuel tanks (165-gallon).
These items reflected the tierce.ness of the war going on. Among service-
_ related contracts, repairs occupied the largest share, totalling 39.6 million
~dollars. Auto repairs were conspicuous, while ship and engine repairs were
also significant."
(From the OFFICIAL GAZETTE ?U May 54.
Underlined portions are by the citer)
_ This indicates that wars are not only conducted with weapons, but also con-
sume various goods. At the same time, it should be noted that, already by
this time, "metal products" such as napalm tanks had appeared on the scene.
The napalm bomb was one of the most important weapons used by US armed forces
during the Korean War. The special procuremei~~ of napalm tanks totalled 7.3
million dollars for the entire Korean War.
"Special procurements during the second year (July 1951 - June 1952) totalled
331 million dollars or almost the same as the first year (goods - 246 million
dollars; services - 85 million dollars). Among the goods, metal products led
with 45.19 million dollars - including large orders for barbed wire, barbed
wire poles and steel building materials; and oil drums were also ordered in
large quantities. Weapons-related orders constituted an over-whelming
majority. On the heels of new contracts for shuttlecock bombs and parachute
flare bombs for the air force, orders began to come in for complete (finished)
weapons late in this period and attracted great attention. Orders for tex-
tile goods were less than th~ first year, but the procurement wo~th 44.72
million dollars equalled the orders for :~etal products."
(From the OFFICIAL GAZETTE 10 May 54)
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
rvn vrrt~.icw uoL vlvi..i
Toward the end of the period in other words, when the peace treaty with
Japan became effective the emphasis of p*:ocurement by the US armed forces
shifted to finished weapons. Prior to this, a General Command directive on
8 Mar 52 served notice that the produetion and repairs of weapons and air-
crsft would be possible by permission from the Gpneral Command hdqtrs.
Accordingly, on 8 Apr 52 the Japanese Government revised and i.mplemented t}i~
"Potsdam Ministerial Decree" (joint decree by the ministries of MITI, Trans-
portation, Education and Agriculture) controlling production of ~rms, air-
craft, etc., th~is opening the way to systematic arms production. Whereas
arms production had previously been "contraband," (See ~iote) it could now be
conducted openly.
Note: 'lfie companies involved at this time were Shin Meiwa Industry, Fuji
Industries, Shin riitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, et al.
The financial community also moved adroitly to meet the new situation. The
Federation oF Economic Organizations ("Keidanren")--hoping for US military
aid, the buildup of Japan`s defense strength and U.S.-Japan economic coopera-
tion following the sign~ng of the peace treaty--formed the "Nichibei Keizai
Teikei Kondankai" (Japan-U.S. economic cooperation deliberation society) in
February 1951. As procurement orders for finished weapons entered full
swing, the society was reorganized as the "Keizai Kyoryoku Kondankai" (Eco- !
nomic cooperation discussion society) and the "Defense Production Committee" i
was established as one of its subcommittees in August 1952. There were two ~
other subcommittees under the "discussion society" which barely f~inctioned. ~
The defense production committee has subsequentiy 'aeen active as a central
. organization representing the financial communicy within the defe.nse industry.
Full-scale Arms Production
The procurement of finished weapons entered full sway after May 1952. The
Korean war was already drawing to an end (the ceasefire treaty was signed
in July 1953), and "special procurements" for the Korean War shifted to MSA
assistance and overseas special procurenent. However, in Japan the total
picture is not clear--whether the arms and ammunition and repai~red vehicles
ordered under "special procurement" were shipped to the Korean peninsula by
the U.S. armed forces, or whether they were left in Japan or Southeast Asia,
or exported to the NATO countries. (See Note)
Note: It has been confirmed that the ammuniton procured from Japan during
this period was stockpiled and used in the Vietnam War.
Also, 18 weapons-related companies actively invested in facilities until the
end of 1954, with the bulk reportedly financed through capital increases and
internal reserves. Except for those who depended on self-capitalization, t}te
majority have relied on state (national) capital. Those financed by the
Export-Import Bank were Komatsu Ltd, Osaka ~Ietal Industry, Nippon Oils & Fats,
1 Asahi Chemical Industry and Dai Nippon Celluloid Co. Those financed by MSA
wheat funds were Takano Precision Industry, Asahi-Ohkuma Industry, Toyo Seiki,
Toyo Chemicel Industry and Japan Steel Works. (The MSA pact was signed on
1 Mar 54 and became effective 1 May. The wheat funds were allocated syste-
matically to defense-related industries.)
18 i
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY +
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
We will next look at the production of finished weapons under "special
procurement." The amount of orders on finished weapons which Japan received
from the U.S. armed forces from May 1952 to June 1957 reached 52 billion yen
(144.6 million dollars).
In US FY52 (which began in July of the previous year and ended in June 1952.
The actual special procurements took place during the 2 months of May and
June, since the peace treaty became effective in April of that fiscal year),
and special procurements totalled some 5.5 billion yen. The main items were
as follows: ~
4.2 inch mortars (528, by Osaka Kiko Co)
81 mm mortar shells (630,000, by Osaka Metal Industry and Komatsu Ltd)
4.2 inch mortar shells (360,000, by Komatsu Ltd)
I'lare bombs for 81 mm mortars (32,000, by Nippei Industrial Co)
Smoke bombs (70,000, by Komatsu Ltd)
In US FY53, orders almost quadrupled from the previous year and totalled
20.7 billion yen. The breakdown by companies was as follows:
_ Kobe Steel LJorks (various types 105 mm howitzer shells - i50,000)
Komatsu Ltd (155 mm howitzer shells - 260,000;
4.2 inch mortar shells - 270,000)
- Osaka Metal Industry (various types 81 mm mortar shells - 800,000;
57 mm recoilless gun shells - 110,000)
Daido Steel Co (various types 60 mn? mortar shells - 280,000)
Nippon Kentetsu (3.5 inch rocket shells - 475,000)
Howa Machinery (hand grenades - approximately 1.2 million)
Nippei Industrial Co (bazookas, bayonets, grenade throwers for rifles, anti-
tank land mines and 12.7 mm rifle ammunition - quantity unknown)
Japan Steel Works (57 mm recoilless guns - 837)
Sumitomo Metal Industryes (75 mm recoilless gun shells - 198,000)
During US FY54, contracts increased to 22.8 million yen. Followup orders
for items being supplied constituted a major portion. But there were also
new items on order and the chain of ammunition producers was virtually com-
plete during this period. A major role was played towards that end by the
Weapons Manufacture Act established in August 1953 and government coordina-
tion of enterprises based on a permit system.
New orders were received for the trial manufacture of 81 mm mortars (24, by
Howa Machinery) and 75 mm recoilless guns (16, by Japan Steel Works), as
well as the following:
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
rvK ur'r'lt;i~ u5r. U1VLY
7.7 mm rifle bullets (122 million, by Asahi-Ohkuma Industrial and Toyo
Seiki Co)
4.2 inch mortar smoke bombs (10,000, by Komatsu Ltd)
155 mm howitzer smoke bombs (25,000, by Komatsu Ltd) `
3.5 inch rocket smoke bombs (22,000, by Nippon Kentetsu)
Smoke grenades (quantity unknown, by Howa ;iachinery)
105 mm howitzer shells with clock fuses (571,000, by Kobe Steel Works)
155 mm howitzer shells with clock fuses ( 89,400, by Komatsu Ltd)
81 mm howitze= shells with time fuses ( 8,000, by Osaka P1eta1 Ind)
The production chain formed to supply these orders is shown in Table III-1.
It is evident that it was comprised of companies which subsequently supplied
ammunition to the Defense Agency.
i
Table III-1: Production Chain for Supply of Ammunition
I
Rifles and pistols -*Asahi Ohkuma Industrial, Toyo Seiki
Cannon shells -*Osaka Metal Industries, "Komatsu Ltd, Daido International,
Sumitomo Metal Industry, Kobe Steel Works
Rocket shells -*Osaka Metal Industries, Nippon Kentetsu
Fuses -*Osaka Metal Industries, Takano Pr~cision. Industries, Aichi Tokei
Denki, Sanoh Industrial, Shin Chuo Industry, Eikosha, Dowa Metal Industries
Cannan shell cartridges -*Osaka Metal Industries, Kobe Steel Works
Smokeless gunpowder -*Asahi Chemical Industry, *Dai Nippon Celluloid,
*Nippon Oils & Fats ;
TNT -*Nippon Oils & Fats, Mitsubishi Chemical Industry, Piitsui Chemical '
RDX - *Showa Kayaku Kogyo I
~ Gunpowder charges - *Showa Kayaku
Notes: (1) *denotes companies supplying directly to the Defense Agency.
(2) Most of these companies are suppliers today.
(3) The company names were in use in 1954.
Several companies produced relatively simple items like cannot shells. From
1954 to 1955, the Osaka Metal Industrie~ (present Daikin Kogyo Co), Kobe
Steel Works and Komatsu recorded the production of 1 million shells each.
Celebrations were held (twice) to commemorate the achievements at which the
presidents of Kobe Steel Ldorks (Chohei Asada) and Komatsu Ltd ;Yoshinori
- Kawai) gave speeches. (See the Keidanren's "Ten Year History of the Defense
20
FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Production Committee," pp 81-83). President Asada announced that K~be Steel's
ammunition contracts "did in fact reach 44 million dollars (15.84 billi.on
~ yen)" and he continued:
"We have decided to supply the various parts and components, each according
to our special fields in order to provide finished shells. In other words,
Kobe Steel has supplied the shell frames, Shinko Metal Industry the cartridges,
I~itsubish i Chemical Industry the TNT explosives, Dai Nippon Celluloid the
discharge powder, Takano Precision Industry the regular f uses and clock iuses,
Sanyo Kako and Chugoku Kayaku the powder charges and assembly, and Hishimori
Industry the fiber containers, respectively. Also, we have asked for the
cooperation of such outseanding producers in their respective fields as
~ikosha, Nippon Kayaku Kogyo and Sanoh Kogyo in order to complete the produc-
tion chain."
- (Underlined portions by citer)
' The payments received are described as having "e~cually benefittzd Kobe Steel
and its affiliated companies, as well as a large number of subcontractors,
_ and also contributed to the ~:evival of Japan's ~fense industry." (ditto)
President Kawai of Komatsu L,td expressed pride ~n having supplied 3a million
dollars (13.68 billion yen) worth of goods and services. He then went on to -
express i rritation at the lack oi large orders for the future: "In any case,
we have s ucceeded in completing one of our projects without mishap. Today,
one company alone has the capacity of easily producing large gauge gun shells
at the rate of 1 million annually, and it is not impossible to produce 5
million in an emergency.
As far as ammunition is concerned, we are able to comply with the demand in
rhe Southeast Asian countries, in addition to fulfilling Japan's defense
needs.
We are not only without regrets for having engaged in this project, but we
have also built a vast export industry for 3apan. We have offered job oppor-
tuniries for a great mass of workers, provided work for a great number of
small and medium businesses, and have in effect built a bulwark for. the
nation's defense."
(Underlined portions by citer)
Another e lement which played an ~mportant role in "special procurement" was
repairs performed as ~arr of "services." Special procurement repairs were
performed on many items, among which automobiles and other vehicles const:~-
tuted the greatest share in the e arly stage. Fuji Jidosha, Shin Nippon
Aircraft, Victor Auto, Brirlgestone Tire, Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy Industries
(Tokyo plant) , ditto (Kawasaki plant) , Showa Aircraft Industry, Sagami Indtis-
tries, Komatsu Ltd, Hino Diesel, Japan Steel Works (Akabane plane) and ditto
(Musashi plant) utilized former military facilities in meeting orders. The
income from repairs for such vehicles was considerable, but often contained
an element of uncertainty from the standpoint of business management.
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
L'Vl\ VL'L'LV1[~Li UJli VLYLL
~ The demand for aircraft-related repairs had a different kind of importance.
In July 1952 immediately after the peace treaty became effective, orders
were received for the dismantling and repair of light communication planes,
and this became the first step in the revival of the J:anese aircraft
industry. ('~he recipt.ent of these orders was Showa Aircraft Co) . Subse-
quently, orders were r.eceived for the repair of fighter planes~ and training
craft (Kawasaki AircraEt Co and Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Lndustries), engine
overhaul (Showa Aircraft Co), and repair of flight instruments, auxiliary
_ instruments and communication devices (Tokyo Aircraft Instrument, Tokyo c
Keiki, Japan Radio, Shinko Electric, Japan Aviation Electronics Industry and -
Kayaba Industry) .
Table III-2: Japan's Arms Exports (1956-68)
(Cost: in
(Year) (Client) (Item) (Quantity) dollars)
1956 Burma 6.5 mm rifle bullets 899,000 84,150
1957 Burma 6.S mm rifle bullets 100,000 8,570
Taiwan M91 torpedoes 20 500,000
Brazil 9 mm pistols 1 45
S. Vietnam Rifle bullets 24,000 6,480 '
S. Vietnam RifZe ammunition plant 1 950,000
1958 S. Vietnam Rifle bullets 24,000 7,200
1959 Indonesia Firing control system 1 set 83,000
1960 Indonesia Machine gun parts 36,200
India Practice mines 2 12,975
1961 Indonesia Machint gun parts 125,100
1962 USA Pistols about 800 9,300
1963 USA Pistols " 3,000 37,500
Indonesia Machine gun parts 24,000
1964 USA Pistols " 5,000 66,000
1965 Thailand Hunting rifles 5,000 540,000
Thailand Rifle bullets 2,500,000 230,000
USA Pistols about 7,000 97,000
1966 Thailand Hunting rifles 5,000 540,000
USA Pistols about 8,000 132,000
1967 USA Pistols " 12,000
1968 USA Pistols " 15,000
(Source: KOKUBO, August 1970 edition)
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
From 1953 to 1954, jet aircraft repairs were added. Through this experience
it hecame possible to learn new techniques concerning hitherto unfamiliar.
jet airframes and engines (F-86 jet fighters and T-33 jet trainers, on which
- orders were received by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Aircraft Co).
In 1955, the overhaul of F-86D all-weather fighters (by Japan Aircraft Mfg Co)
and repairs f.or the navy twin-engine planes and flying boats (by Shin Meiwa
Industry) were added. It thus became possible to comply with orders for ~
repairs in virtually every field. This proved to be of great value later in
the production of jet aircraft.
Since the detailed progress of subsequent "special procurement" is not the
purpose here, it will be omitted. Eventually, with the decline of "special
procurement," arms exports were limited to a trickle of small firearms for
Southeast Asia and the United States. Known Japanese arms exports after
1956 were as indicated in Table III-2. The costliest in dollar terms was
the rifle ammunition plant exported to South Vietnam in 1957 and, symbolically,
it was merely a second-hand surplus facility belonging to Toyo Seiki Co. (The
facilities of the Asahi Ohkuma Industry Co were sufficient for supplying simi-
lar needs in Japan. Also, although not shown in the table, a new rifle
_ ammunition facility was shipped to the Philippines in FY68.)
2. Evolvement of Equipment Development
Establishment of the Self Defense Force and Its Equipment
Japan's armed forces which made a new start as the Police Reserve Force
subsequently organized its system at a steady pace. Soon after the peace
treaty with Japan became effective, the National Security Agency was estab -
' lished (August 1952), the Police Reserve Force was renamed as the National
Security Force and the aforementioned Maritime Police Force was renamed as
the National Police Force. It thus became a unified organization. On
8 P4ar 54 the so-called MSA agreement was signed. On the same day, the
"two Self Defense Force Law resolutions" (the Defense Agency establishing
resolution and the Self Defense Force Law resolution) were submitted to the
Diet. The two SDF laws went into effect on 1 Jul 54. By virtue of the laws,
the previous Security Agency was renamed the Defense Agency, the Security
Force became the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF), the Police Force was
reorganized as the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self
Defense Force (ASDF) was r~ewly established. Thus the Self Defense Force,
consisting of the ground, sea and air services, was organized as a single
entity.
The main duties of the SDF are defined as "the defense of Japan against =
direct and indirect invasion, as well as the maintenance of vublic order as
necessary." Whereas the Police Reserve Force defined its purpose as "the
maintenance of public order," the SDI' put primary emphasis on resistance
against "invasion." This could be said to clarify the military nature of
the SDF.
- 23
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044459-4
rux ~rr t~ltu. uan v?vLz
1'he equipment of the SDF (the terms "SDF" or "Defense Agency" will be omit-
ted in later ref.erences to the period following the advent of the Police
Reserve Force, unless it is necessary in expl.aining the various systems.)
consisted mostly of those provided by the US armed forces in the early stap,e.
This is clear from the record of weapons procurement. (See Table TII-3)
Table III-3: Record of Equipment Procurement (unit: 100 million yen)
(Fiscal (Domestic (General (Onerous (Free
Year) Procurement) Imports) Aid) Aid) (Total)
1950-61 5,907 266 253 5,234 11,661
1962 975 76 41 204 1,296
1964 1,120 70 60 �31 1,332
1966 1,396 126 55 59 1,636
1968 2,425 124 194 1 2,745
1970 2,308 156 51 0 2,515 ;
1972 3,477 358 117 0 3,951 i
1974 4,372 152 89 0 4,613
1976 5,197 166 122 0 5,486 ~
1977 5,846 222 194 0 6,261
Note:
1. Figures for domestic procurement, general imports and onerous aid were
ba~ed on original contracts. Figures for free aid were based on equipment
received.
2. Free aid includes lend-lease ships. Receipt of free aid ended with FY69.
(Data) Based on Defense Agency data.
During the 12 years from 1950 to 1961, the cumulative total for domestic pro-
curement was 590.7 billion yen, comprising about 1/2 of total procurements.
Most of the remainder consisted of free aid. This covers a 12-year span and
the ratio of free aid was greater retroactively. At first, all equipment was
provided by the United States. Even today, there is quite a volume of remain-
ing equipment provided to the GSDF and MSDF in their formative years (mostly
firearms).
Equipment procured by the Defense Agency from Japan's own defense industry
was virtually nonexistent from 1950 to 1953. Durin~ the years 1954-56, it
amounted to several hundreds of million yen annually; in 1957 it rose to 1.15
billion yen; in i958 to 1.57 billion yen; and in 1959 to 5 billion yen. ,
As for the defense industry, it responded to the reorganization of the Police
Reserve Force as the Security Force, and further as Che SDF, and it sought a
market to replace special procurements. But, because of the defeat in the
24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ,
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
war and the subsequent vacuuous state of the nation, and also because of
the technological gap and competition from U.S. surplus weapons, thing~
did not work out smoothly �or the industry.
Role of the Defense Agency's Technical R&D Institute
t4eanwhile, the SDF's plans for technical surveys and research on weapons,
ships, aircraft, provisions and facilities moved forward quite early in its
formative stage. Concurrently with the establishment of the National Security
Agency, the Agency's Technical Research Institute was formed as its subsidiary.
Preparations for it had been made for more than a year since July 1951. The
NSA's Technical Research Institute emphasized (1) research on standardization
of equipment; (2) improvement of existing equipment and (3) uniformity of
materials and standards for parts and components. Much of the research was
conducted for remodeling purposes. Principal items of R&D were machine gun
mounts for vehicles, snow tractors, radio equipment for vehicles, materials
for parachutes, heavy snow plows, practice shells for mortars, magnetic
materials, radar testing systems and high tensile steel (for ship structures).
The NSA Technical Research Institute was reorganized as the Defense Agency
Technical Research Institute in July 1954. It became the Technical Research
& Development Institute in May 1958 when the lst defense buildup plan began
and it assumed an important role in equinment development for the Defense
Agency.
, The divisions of the Defense Agency directly involved in R&D are: (1) the
Internal offices, (2) Technical R&D Institute, (3) GSDF staff office,
(4) MSDF staff office and (5) ASDF staff office. Details concerning these
offices will be omitted, but of course the Internal Bureau, centering on
the defense division and the materiel division, plays the most important role.
The Technical R&D Institute coordinates R&D affairs for the ground, maritime
and air branch forces, while the R&D themes are actually determined by the
Internal Bureau and the Equipment Inspection Conference.
The reason for focusing attention on the Technical R&D Institute is because
it plays a major role in the domestic equipment production. The production
consists of using technology developed and imported from foreign countries
on the one hand, and the use of technology by Japan itself on the other. The
latter, including equipment technology, is tagged as "genuinely Japan-made"
and originated mostly from themes adopted by the Technical R&D Institute.
More will be explained later concerning the relationship between Japan-made
equipment and R&D by the institute. However, prior to that, an extremely
important fact must be pointed out concerning the development methods of
the institute. That is, during the R&D process, trial manufacture is as a
rule consigned to private enterprise.
When the results of trial manufacture are translated into standardization
and deployment of equipment, the conpanies in charge of trial manufacture
almost invariably are selected as the actual producers, resulting in a close
union between industry and the military. Therefore, it is of major concern ~
to the companies how they can re'late to the Technical R&D Institute at the
trial manufacture stage (or even at a prior stage). Very little has been
clarified thus far regarding these relations.
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
In any case, it is our view that activities of the institute are signif.icant
as prior indicators of domestic equipment production. It is also possible to
forer_ast the future of Japan's equipment from the present ongoing R&D. More-
over, the presence of private enterprise is inseparable from such forecasts.
Progtess of R&D
Changes have also occurred in R&D themes. It can be said that there are
qualitative differences between the simple firearms adopted in the early
stage and those of the present. Here is a brief explanation of the trends.
(a) R&D During the lst Five-Year Defense Buildup Plan
A look at the period prior to the lst buildup plan (up to FY57) indicates
that equipment procurement was by no means conducted systematically, but
R&D was initiated in such areas as aircraft, guided missiles and communica-
tions equipment, where Japan was generally lagging. The principal items
were bulletproof steel plates, 105 mm recoilless guns and ammunition,
miniaturized communications equipment components, reciprocal pulse jet
engines and light metal ship structures (FY54); long-range air defense radar,
snorkel apparatus, medium size tanks, guided projectiles, antisub torpedoes i
(FY55); armored tractor vehicles, medium-range jet fighter planes; super- ~
sonic projectiles and gas turbines (FY56); 155 mm howitzers; UHF communica- ;
tions equipment, forklift apparatus, induction mines and air-to-air rockets j
(FY57) . '
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
H ~
H ~
N I n
N
~ ~ c~d N
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I m u
a' I ~ 3
~ ~ ~
'~O c~0 N ~ ~ ~ G "
N cU
r-I ~ ~t a y ~
~ fA DC ~
P~-~ ~ ~ I c~tl 'U~' ~-i " i U~i 'b
G.. ~N U+~ M~ a~~ ~I
~ ~ ~ q N ~ ~ ~
.`~,o r� a, ~ o~ a~i w I ~ ~v ~ ~ ~ i
~ ~ ^ c~ ~ v~ ~ m ~ ~
N O~, M U cd 1.r N N I c~ ~
4~ ~O �r~ 'L7 h �r~ U ~O ~D w . w ~p ~ I
~ ~ v 1~ ~ 1J �rl 'LJ
U L~ N W N ^ r 1-i
v ~ ~ ,7 tA Gl �r-1 N F ~ N N r-~~ i
~ P~+ ~o ~ ~ A~ ~ O c~n O a u I
o cs~ ~ a�~+ x o cn s~ ~
�rl ~
F+ 'b O U~N ~ O ~ t/~ ~ H .N.i
rl ~O �rl U
F+ �r~ 11 �r1
~O `.-L S-+ W Cn ~
v ~ ~
r.Tj PU ~ N~ cSf ~-I ~ y.,~ ~ ~l
c0 N ~ I I u1 ~rl `t3 G~+ u
~ O O
W ~ I A ~ ~ G �~I +.r ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ cb 'U u o0 a0 ~
~ I ~ O ~7 ~ "7 O ~ . ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ v S-t N ~ R~ 'b
a a s~ x ~
A ~ n ~ h ^
~n ~n ~n ~n ~n H u ~ ~ a~i u~i o
~ v �rl u ~
P4 ~ ~ ~ ~ O fA 4-I N ~ tA ~
~O
~ N ~ ~D' ~rl Q G ~O r~ O ~ .D O
~ ~D C+ N ~ u'1 ~ i-~ O~d tfl r-I �rl vl ~O -
ri v Ul vl R3 r7 W A~t r-1 ^C7
H u1 ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~O O ~ ~
H u1 W v'1 ~r1 ~ v~j ~ ~ ~
H ~ ~ W ~
v
~r'1
v ~ ~
O~ al N
~ r-1 rl C1. C
M I
~ i~r1 H r~7 .u c~d ~
O d'
U ~-r~ ~ ~ ~ ~
c"1 M ~ v
~ ~ M M .
~ ~ u'1
r~
~
N
N ~
~ ~
i". r-I ~
a ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~
s�+ ~ ~ v~i
~ OJ ctl cO L
~ ~n ~ a' U 41 ~ r~-I fn
~ C .f~ Sa v ~n ~-1
U cd r-I tl7 N �N 1.~ O ,U
w .u b a a~ a~ u a~ ~
c.~n c~.,o ~ o ~ n ro G .-�1i o c~a ro ca
3 u v v
ro u a~i a~i ti ~ ~u~i ~ ~ m ~n
~-i 1.r cd N ~ N O tJ ~ q O .a ~ ~
~ d ~-~i a h a.~ ~ ~ ~ � ~n ~ a cn ~ ~
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL1'
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFIClAL U5E UNLY
i m
u a~ ~v
c~ ~ ~ ~ ~
w W ~ N Pa td
G ~ ~ ~H ?~-i c�~d W ~
v td 00 F+ H~+
~ ~ ~ ~ h b
~ ~ ~ v O
~!1 r-I I v1 �r1
L3. ~D N N Cn ~O
' ~ v a a
v �
~ ^ ~
ou
~ ~ o ~ ~I G
" .-`~i ~ ~ I ~ ~
r-i JJ
~ N I v~
"d ~ cn � I cn a~
c~ .o I s~ .o o a
.i ~ N 00 ~ S-+ ~ ~7 ~
~O ~ ~O 3 ^ ~ ~ ~O tlyd ~ ~D N
O u1 >
~ I ra-I O I "d ~
r-I ri 41 ~ ~ G ~
~ ~D ~ ~ ~ bG0
~
~ 0 6 ~ ~ ~
a .o b .o ~n
~ _ ~ a a~ ~
~ ~v oo m i v ~o
~ r. v G ~
rn ~n o ~ w p
a~a v ~ ~ ~ ti ~ 6
,u r+ ,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
rl u1 u1 tf1 u1 N O ~ ~
v ~
^ ~ v ~ I
^ ^ n \
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I
~
~ ~ ro
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ a
~ I
~ I ~
v I
n
lf~ ~f'1 ~
v
~ .
r1
~
~
~ �
v
O
~
F+
~
a
, ~
a
~
~ a
~ H N ~ ~
~ 1J W ~I 3~+ ~ ,
p ~ �O 5~~+ S-Ni t~U 'b ~ A
O '~23 ~ 'C N N 1-i ~ ~ ~ ~
r.~i cn m ~ u ro cn m a~ a~
~1 G a.~ .C �r~ ~ C G oo ~ va ~
u o s~ o0 3 3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
o o 0 0 on ~ a b
w ~d 6 ~ .c .c E ca u ~
~n 3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ aNi ~ u c~d -d ~n ~n
~ b ,-a ~s a~ a ai
~ ~ ~n ~n ~n ~r, .a u u w �cs ~v o 5C u
c~ ~a ~n o o ~n o ~d ~s ~o a~ G o
a .-I rl r1 ~ ~ ~ r~ ~ u] � ~n cn z
28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
i
u
. a~
~ ~ ~ ~
~o N m D
~ N
v1 ~S 9 GJ W O
~ ~O lC r-I O 1.1 JJ yJ
~ t0 ~-I ~ ~ ~rl O C'+ 'C7 f~
~ ~ ~c ~ 0 3 a~ ai o
~ n~ o H w q a a~-+
w ~ oo caa~.. o~~v�1~
,v M ~A~a r~aai~v�~
rl ~O r-I ~ Q U 6~d
~ ~ c0 6 ~G ~
~ N ~ R1 ~a 3-+ 'L7 ~ .
b ~ > a w a~
b
v
N ~ A ~d O U ~rl
~ ~ v
N r-I r-1 ri i~ ~rl ~
~O ~ O ~O ~ (A 1.1
~ ` V N Q r-I
}i v },i y~
~ cd I
F+ ~ O ~v1 w O~ p o U
r-I ~O rl V1 ~p A p p~,~ ~
'Ly a O~ r~l ~t d I, Q'
'U tr1 ~ W~r~l u'1 Vc~ U C7
a ~ A 3 Q ~
^ ~ ro -
r-~'t ~ v~1 ~ ~~r1 A ~ li t~ -
~G
JJ v ^ ~
O U ~rl O
cC m ~ ~ A L~ t~ c0 w
W r-I ~ ~1 O ~/1 C7 tf1 �rl O I W
~ -n G U a~ ~ cGd a~ I~,
~
~ ~ ~ b ~ ~ b
A v1 U i~+ ~ 'd U l i.~
x a T7 ~ c~+0 n u n ~
- A ~ ~ O N IA N
~d7 ~ O ~ ~ .a I GJ 1
~
~ ~ a ~ o~~i a'i '^~dA~
cv a �~1 q q C.7 D
~.~n ai a~i~ ~ ~ ~
H ~ ~ O UI a ia U N ~
1~ M A~ 'U I cd I U'C7 U I~
c}''0 rn c'~1 O H I ~3-~+' 3~~+ ~ C.~~ L~
U v u1 w P~~ H~Q+ t~~ C,
C
O
~
cd m m
U tA uj
�rl ~ Gl
W ~-i r-I
�rl N ~
tn N ~
~ 3 3
U ~ ~
v
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0
r~x urrl~lEU. u~n UNLT
00
~
~
r. N
~ ~
~p U 41 ~
_ a
..r w a~ v
v1 ~f1 ~ ~ F ~1 ~ t~U
~O ~O ~ Aq ~O 1.1 Q
~ A 'b D4 ~00 O G~1
~ �rl ~ rl
r-1 rl N OI N
Q, v r-I ~ GU1 ~ ~ ~ N
~
~ M rl N R1 'd 1J N GJ ~
q ~ ~ J~ 41 G 'O H~ 1~
I~ 9 C7 ~ N ~ t~j G~J A RS
b N c0 O R1
cv ~ ~ c~u ~3 ~ ~n aai ~ ~
M ~ a ~o m �o ~
r. I 9.~ R� w G al a1 G w
~ U A~C~O cd O~ ~ .C ~ H O
..i
~ r-1 r-I C Cl. ~ r-I
~ ~ O O ~rl N �rl cC
r-~I ~ O
p., .�o ~ c~i aai i ~ A 3 i
~
'L1 r. ~--1 U I U C+ tA I U
~~-I v1 ct1 .t ~ I O U~ u't .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044459-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Onboard operations training plane YS-11T-A - Japan Aeroplane Mf g(engine by
British Rolls Royce Co)
Early training plane KM-2 ("Komadori") - Fu~i Heavy Industries
Trainer plane Beech-65 ("Umibato") - Built by (U.S.) Beechcraft; modified
by Shin Meiwa In~lustry
" " TC-90 - Built by (U. S.) Beechcraft Co; Shin Nippon Koku Seibi
- Antisub patrol helicopter HSS-2 ("Chidori") - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
(developed by United Aircraft Co - U.S.)
Mine sweeping helicopter V-lO1A ("Shirasagi") - Kawasaki Heavy Industries;
developed by (U. S.) Boeing Bertel Co
Rescue helicopter S-62 ("Raicho") - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries; developed by
(U. S . ) United Aircraft Co
Mui~ipurpose plane S-61A ("Chidori") - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries; developed
by (U.S.) Sikorsky Co
Early training plane Be-11-47G-2A ("Hibari") - Kawasaki Heavy Industries;
deve loped by (U . S,) Bell Co
Early training plane OH-6J - Kawasaki Heavy Industries; developed by (U.S.)
Hughes Co
III. ASDF Equipment
_ (1) Aircraft
C-1 transport - Kawasaki Heavy Lndustries
F-4EJ interceptor fighter
Airframe - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
Engine - Ishikawajima Harima H Industries (developed by U.S. McDonnell
Douglas Co; engine by U. S. General Electric Co)
F-104J interceptor fighter ("Eiko")
Airframe - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
Engine - Ishikawajima Harima H Indust (developed by U.S. Lockheed Co;
engine by General Electric)
147
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044459-4
Cun urrtVitu. u,~ VLVLi
F-86F daytime f ighter ("Kyokko") .
Airframe - i4itsubishi Heavy Industries
Engine - General Electric
Engine repairs - Kawasaki Heavy Industries (developed by U.S. North
American Co)
F-1 support fighter
Airframe - Mitsubishi H Industries
Engine - Ishikawajima Harima H Indust (modified T-2)
F-104DJ jet trainer ("Eiko")
Airframe - Mitsubishi H Industries
Engine - Ishikawajima Harima H Indust (developed by U.S. Lockheed Co;
engine by General Electric Co) j_
I
T-lA jet trainer ("Hatsutaka") I
i
Airframe - Fuji Heavy Industries ~
Engine - Rolls Royce C o(engine repairs by Kawasaki H Ind)
T-1B, jet trainer ("Hatsutaka")
Airframe - Fuji Heavy Industries
Engine - Ishikawajina Harima H Industries
T-2 supersonic advanced trainer - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries ,
T-3 early trainer - Fuji Heavy Industries (developed by U.S. Lye Cumming Co)
T-33A jet trainer ("Wakataka") - Kawasaki Heavy Industries (developed by
U.S. Lockheed Co; engine by U.S. Allison Co)
T-34 recipro trainer ("Hatsukaze") - Fuji Heavy Industries (developed by
Beechcraft Co; engine by Lye Cumming Co; engine
repairs by Fuji Heavy Industries) -
MU-2 rescue search plane
Airframe - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
Engine - U.S. Air Research Co (engine repairs by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries)
148
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044459-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
YS-11P medium transport
Airframe - Japan Aeroplane Mfg Co
Engine - Rolls Royce Co
5-62 helicopter ("Raicho")
Airframe - Mitaubishi Heavy Industries
Engine - Ishikawa3ima Harima H Industries
V-107 helicopter -
~ Airframe - Kawasaki Heavy Industries
- Engine - Ishikawa~ima Harima H Indust (developed by U.S. Bertel Co)
(2) Onboard instruments
Optical sight (firing control system) - Toshiba TESCO (developed by General
Electric Co)
Onboard clatter system (AN/ARN-52) - Nippon Electric
Onboard wireless (AN/ARC-552A) - Mitsubishi Electric Corp
Ally identification system (AN/APX-35) - Toyo Tsus::_.ik.i.
Rescue wireless (J/URC-2 - Fujitsu Ltd
Onboard wireless (J/ARC-2) - Nippon Electric
Data link (ARR-662) - Nippon Seisakusho, Toshiba
Onboard wireless (AN/ARC-27) - Mitsubishi Electric Corp
(3) Ground Instruments
Automatic warning control system TAWCS (BADGE) - Nippon Electric, Nippon
Aviotronics (,joint venture of Nippon Electric and U.S. Hughes Co.
Developed by Hughes Co)
Fixed 3-dimension radar (J/FPS-1) - Mitsubishi Electric Corp
Mobile 3-dimension radar (J/TPS-100) - Nippon Electric
Mobile wire communications system - Nippon Electric
0/H mobile multiple communications system (J/TRO-1) - Nippon Electric
149
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044459-4
Radar approach control system (RAPCON) (J/FPQ-3) - Nippon Electric
Wireless (JAN/CRC-27) - Kokusai Electric
Weather radar (J/FPH-1, 2, 3) - Japan Radio Co, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric
Corp
Rawin receiver (JAN/GMD/lA) - Kobe Kogyo, Nippon Electric, Kokusai Electric,
Meisei Electric
Hard Redome - Sumitomo Electric Industries -
Multiple communications system (,J/FRQ-3) - Fu3itsu Ltd
0/H multiple communications system (J/FRQ-8) - Nippo~i Electric
(4) Vehicles & ground instruments
Fuel supply truck - Hino Motors, Nissan Motor, Toyota Motor
" " " semitrailer - Tokyu Caro Corp i
Demolition/rescue truck (3/4-ton 4x4 truck) Toyota Motor I
" " fire truck (A-MB-1, 2) - Tokyu Car Corp ~
Personnel carrier (4x4 TSD40B) - Isuzu P4ators
Forklift - Komatsu Ltd, Nissan Motor, Shinko Electric, Toyo Electric Mfg
Ammunition operations truck - Hino Motors
Cargo loader - Genoa, Shinko Electric
Oil pressure wrecker (2C-48C) - Hino Motors ~
� i
Crash crane (20-ton W25) - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
Aircraft tow truck - Toyota Automatic Spinning Machine Co, Kato Seisakusho,
Toyo Electric Mfg, Toyota Motor, Shinko Electric
Vacuum sweeper (HSD70) - Hitachi Ltd
" " (VRS-1) - Tokyu Car Corp
Road roller - Watanabe *~achine Mfg Co
Semi traa.ler - Tokyu Car Corp, Fuji Car Mfg
Water truck - Isuzu Motors
Snowmobile - Komatsu Ltd, Ohara Iron Works ~
150
FaR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300044459-4
~
, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
i
I
;
. Snow plow - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
� Heavy duty snow plow (rotary-type) - Nissan Diesel Motor, Nippon Snow Remover
Mf g Co
~ Residual snow remover (trailer-type) - Kato Seisakusho
Motor grader (snow plow attached) - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
� Generator set I;E125-60K) - Toyo Electric Mfg, Shinko Electric
" "(KB8H) - Niigata Engineering Co, Meidensha Electric P4fg �
Mobile c~ane (KM2, 3) - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Nissan Diesel Motor
Silencer (Fixed type for F104) - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (developed by
U.S. Air Logistic Co)
~ Noise muffler for F-4EJ (for airframe) - Ishikawajima Harima
" " C-1 (for airframe) - Kawasaki H Industries ~
Portable silencer - Kawasaki Heavy Industries
Crash barrier (for F-86F, T-33) - Showa Aircraft Industry
(5) Rescue equipment
Automatic expansion equipment (lif~ saving jacket) - Hosoya Fireworks Co
Life saving raft for 6 persons (JE-2B) - Mitsubishi Electric Corp
Life saving raft for 20 persons - Mitsubishi Electric Corp
~ Life saving raft for 1 person (JC-2B) - Fujikura Rubber Industry,
Mitsubishi Electric Corp
Life saving raft for 2 persons - Fujikura Rubb~r Industry
; Helmet - Mitsubishi Electric Corp
(6) Others
"Nike" - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
~
COPYRIGHT: TOYO KEIZAI SHIMPOSHA, 1979
~I
i
~ 5884
` CSO: 8129/0758 END -
. i.
~
I
~
151
FOR OFFICIAL ITSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040059-0