JPRS ID: 9339 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/9339
8 October 1980
`l1/est Eu~~~ ~ Re nrt
p p
CFOUO 39/80~
~8~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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~ JPRS L/9339
8 Octobe~ 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FnUO 39/80)
CONTENTS
C~UNT~tY SECTION ~
_ F'RANCE
PCF Evinces Contradictory Stance Toward Polish Strikes
(Robert Schneider; L'EXPRESS, 30 Aug 80) 1
Harris Poll Shows Giscaxd Fa~rored, Measures 1981 Election
Mood
(Albert du Roy; L~EXPRESS, 6-12 Sep 80) 4
- Election Analysis; Demise of Union of the Left Hinders
_ Giscaxd
(ftobert Badinter; I,E NOUVEI, OBSERVATEUR, 30 Aug-
5 Sep 80) 16
- New Book Indicates Ex-PCF Members~ Motives, Fate
- (Various sources, various dates) 20
Outline, Review, by Max Ga,llo
Coirmientary on Main Points, by Alain de Benoist
FO Secretary General Bergeron Interviewed
(Andre Bergeron Interview; PAftIS MATCH, 29 Aug 80).... 26
Dissension of Left Apparent at Avignon Festival -
- (Paul Chambrillon; VAI,EURS ACTUEZI,ES, 1 Sep 80)....... 29
West~s Inaction Vis-a-Vis T~ts~litarianism Deplored
(Jean-P`rancois Revel; I,''!;XP'RESS, 6 Sep 80) 32
CNPF Predicts Labor Unrest, PCF Sees Benefit for Marchais
(Roger Priouret; I,E NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 30 Aug-
5 sep 80) 35
- a [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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Current, ~.iture Ocean Exploitation Plans I7iscussed
(Yves I,a Prairie Interview; I,E NOWEL OB5ERVATEUR,
23 Aug 80) 37
Brief s
Uranium Shortage Expected ~1
CGT Authoritarianism ~1
Arms for Afghanistan 4i
~
'i
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COUNTRY SECTIdN FRANCE
PCF EVINCES CONTRADICTORY STANCE TORIARD POLTSH STRIKES
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 30 Aug 80 p 70
jArticle by Robert Schneider: "PCF: Small Echo of Warsaw"]
[Text] "While rejecting demands aimed at the gains of socialism, tfie deci-
sions presented by Edward Gierek run in the direction toward an in-depth
development of socialist democracy." On 2S August, the Frencfi Communist
Party, through the voice of 'Maxi~me Gremetz, the Political Bureau officer
responsible for foreign affairs, approved wfiat the leaders in Plarsaw had
done. On that same da --is this ust a coincidence?--the Soviet Union
y ~
for the first time responded to tfi e events in Poland.
In the same terms as the news agency TASS [Telegraph Agency of the USSR],
Gremetz expresses the belief that economic problems are behind the strikes.
Like the Soviets, he does not say a single word about political demands:
abolition of censorship, labor union pluralism, and release of political
prisoners. These undoubtedly are "demands aimed at the gains of socialism."
For the PCF jFrench Communist Party] the Polish affair is more delicate than
the Kabul coup. In this case it is impossible to accuse those who'charge
communist power with being made up of Backward feudal leaders. All one has
to do is watch television: the Polish strikers, massed be:~ind the ~ron
fences of the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk, look like brothers of the strikers
at the Penhoet shipyards in Saint-Nazaire. How can one explain to the
French workers that their Polish colleagues are in the pay of American
imp~rialism?
In Rome an3 in Madrid, the communists support the Polisfi strikers. In Paris,
the PCF cautiously follows the evolution of the government in Warsaw.
1~4archais has chosen fiis position: there must be no question of bothering
~ Moscow in any way. But there~must be no question either--upon the approach
of the presidential elections--to create too clear an impression as to a
ltneup witfi the Polish position. To convince confused znilitants, the
communist press has for the past 2 months been attempting a difficult
demonstration consisting of five points.
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1. Conflicts are limited. "The d~sengagPtnent movements fiave today been
campletely termfnated" (T~'HUMANITE, 6 July~. "We may expect tfiat aliaut
half of the workers at the Leniu shipyards participate in the~movement.
The others are at home, visibly less enthus3astic about the nea~ content
given to their initial demands" (L'HUMANITE, 22 August). Invited by tfie ~
Polish party, Gremetz only met happy workers on 11 and 12 July. The
- special correspondents from REVOLUTION, the weekly of party intellectuals
(18 July issue) discovered a town where nothing happens: "Here, the party
uf the working class plays its role. The self-management structures are
very well developed. They resolve their problems through discussion wit:h
all of the worke~s." That idyllic city is Gdansk.
2. The crisis is not political. ~n that topic, L'HUMANITE on 13 August
rather complaisantly gave the floor to ~iice Premier Mieczyslaw Jagielski.
But not to the strikers. Their demand for the right to stri~fce was to be
mentioned only after it had been accepted by Gierek. L'HUMANITE on 21
August reported the arrest of 14 "dissidents" in the following fasfiion:
"In A]arsaw, the report according to which 14 diss~dents were arre5ted is
considered true althougfi there has been no official news release on it."
OnE-must indeed ac3*nire this way of putting it. The newspaper never con- ~
firmed the arrest.
3. The causes of the crisis are not to be found in sliortages but rarT~er
on the contrary in excessive abundance. "Supply problems are not du~a to
a crisis but to growth" (L'HLTMANITE, 5 July~. The living standard ~ias
gone up considerab'gy and pruduction canno~ keep up with the demand. What
to do w~th this unused volusne of -money?" (~tEVOLUTTON, 18 July~ . On 26
- August, the leaders in Warsaar tfiemselves figur ed the Polish debt at
$20 billion.
4. Those who ~rant to go be~ond economic-social demands are enemi~as of
socialism. Tfie communist daily pi.cked up the slogan of the Polisfi govern-
lnent, "Tfie Znovement has become ~mare lucid regaxding tiie nature of certatn
desnands ~rtiich are afined at challenging tfie socialist system" (T~`EnJMANITE,
23 Augus-tZ.
5. Relations between the working class and the boss-state are fundamental-
1y diffexent from conventional capital-latior relationsfiips. For the past
2~months, evexy headline dealing witfi Poland in the communist press ~ias
been including such terms as: dtscussions, negotiations, dialogue, co-
ordination. Each arti:cle recalls tbat the difficulties mentic,ned by the
strikers had been anticipated long ago ~iy the government. On:1y tfie
particular economic situation at this time delayed the solution of pro-
blems. The institut3ons are not tfie cause of tfiat. L'HUMANYTE acts like
the rig~i.t-w~ng press: justification of tfie employer, a reserved attitude
- toward the demands of the ~rorkers.
On 15 January, after the serious events in the Baltic, L'HUMANITE put out
the following headlines: "Gdansk sh~pyard discussions." The article's
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author was Jacques Coubard, the same man who, as special correspondent in
Afghanistan, saw the exact opposite of what the international press saw.
All assertions by the co~nnunist press have been disproved by tfie facts.
So what! The PCF does not hesitate, after the conciliatory speech ti~
Gierek, to reclaim for France the example of Warsaw. Seguy, tfie boss of
the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] and a CP leader declared on
25 August: "What a contrast between Polisfi coordination and tfie kind of
repression we have here at home!" On 26 August, tfie communi~t elected
- representatives wrote to Raymond Barre: "Do it tfie way tTiey are doing it
~ in Poland." On 27 August, L'HiTMANITE had the following front-page fieadline:
"At Gdansk, they are discussing; at Le Havre they are beating on tfie
workers." ~
How is one to justify later on a possible intervention by Moscow, after
having praised "Polish coordinatton" so highly? The following explanation
was advanced: "If the antisocialist forces fail, will they not resort to
violence"? (~E'yuLUTION, 22 August).
, The Soviets fiave already been excused. ,
COPYRTGHT: 198C S.A. Groupe Express
5058
CS0:31Q0
.
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- COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
HARRIS POLL SHOWS GISCARD FAVORED, NIEASURES 1981 ELECTION MOOD
Paris L'EXPRESS in rr:~nch 6-12 Sep 80 pp 91-95
[Article by Albert du Roy: "Presidential Elections: Who? by Whom? Why?"]
[1'ext] For the next 18 months the presidential election
is going to be dramatizing the French political climate.
L'EXPRESS and the Louis Harris-France Institute present
f.;he first poll making it possible to answer the basic
~ n:;@St10I1S.
K'ha? By whom? i~'hy? Who will be elected president of the Republic in the
apring of 1981? By what majority: the young, the old, ~:he rich, the poor?
Why that candida*e and not another? And why do it7
Who? Early in this September of 1980---�eight months before the deadline--the
answer to this first question seems easy. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the out-
going president, is th~ favorite. And even, as of today, almost unbeatable.
The first "Presidential Election Instrument Panel," published this week by
L'EXPRESS and the Louis Harris-France Institute, confirms the political anal-
ysis we did on 30 August, as it confirms even while it corrects the IFOP
[French Public ~pinion Institute] poll published afterwards by the weekly LE
Point. Our figures, in fact, are different. And that difference is a fanda-
mental one.
By whom will he be elected? Who will vote for his opponents? Our "Instrument
Panel" No 1 contributes indications on this point that the political staffs
musr. take into account. from now on. An example: can Giscard, who is attached
to hi.s modern.president image, admit without damage that he is seeing the cat-
egory of higher officers who had been said-to be for him, preferring his chal-
lenger, Michel Rocard? Another example: the Socialist candidate--whoever he
is, he will carry the colors of a party tl~at claims to be new and dynamic--can
he accept the fact that the youngest voters are voting more for a Georgss
Marchais who carries the colors of the most archaic communism?
Why are the French vo~ing this way? This is the main point. L'EXPRESS did
not want to limit itself to being a barometer--specta.cular, but superficial--
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- of voting intentions. It is the iob of a political weekly to attempt to
explain the reasons for the voters' ..,~oices. Our poll ~rovides the first
~ elements of the explanation. Between now and the ballot it will be rcunded
out by other "Instrument Panels." And also, soon, by inquiries of a kind -
that is new to France, which the Lauis Harris Institute, strengthened by its
American experience, has completed at our request.
Since 1958 the office of president has taken such a decisive place in French
political life that the dramatization of the 1981 confrontation is inevitable.
From month to month--Debre's an.nouncement of his candidacy already; Marchais'
in October; the choice of the Socialists in December or January; Chirac's de-
cision; Giscard's campaign in April--the pace is going to accelerate, passion
will mount.
Even though, as of today, the French political pulse is not yet beating, its
heart is not far from beating ~vildly. This is one of the three basic indica-
tions of our poll.
The First Indicators
The interest indicator is still low: only 14 percent of the voters say they
are "very interested" in the preparations for the election, and 27 percent say
they "are not at all interested." Considering the length of time remaining
before the ballot, one would be tempted to say that this low indicator is nor-
- mal. But in this case the norm is subjective, since there is no precedent.
The three universal suffrage presidential elections that France has known
were themselves abnormal: the first, in 1965 with de Gaulle, because it was--
the first; the 1969 election between Pompidou and Poher, because it was im-
provised in 34 days, after the General's resignation; the 1974 election, be-
cause it was organized in 33 days, af~er Pompidou's death. This is the first
time the institutions of the Fifth Republic are operating in an ordinary way.
The influence indicator is still moderate. But a noteworthy difference is ap-
pearing: on the one hand, 23 percent of the voters believe the election will
have "great influence on 'cheir living and working conditions," while an iden-
tical number, 23 percent, believe it will have "no influence at all;" on the
other hsnd, 34 percent of the French people believe it will have "a great in-
fluence on the independence and the international security of France," while
only 10 percent say it will have "no influence at all." The inferior economic
and social situation appears at this point to be fatal to any expectation of
a miracle coming out of the presidential election. On the other hand, in the
world climate of tension and instability, the choice c:f the Elysee host is
much less immaterial. In a country where, traditionally, international themes
have never been considered "profitable," electorally speaking, this indicator
does not prove that the French are granting more importance than before to
these problems--we shall see later on--, but that the chief of state as es-
tablished by the Fifth Republic is the privileged, and perhaps exclusive, de-
pository of the country's international responsibility. In other words, one _
might conceive of a president who is not France's best economist, but he must
be its best diplomat.
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The determination indicator is already high. Over half of the voters (51
" percent) say they are certair~ to vote for the candidate they selected on the
day of our poll. Les than one third (29 percent) admit that they might still
change their minds, a figure to which it is probably necessary to add the -
20 percent who are uncommitted. For a ballot that still s2irs little passion,
this determination is surprising. But the assurance varies enormously, depend-
ing on the candidates. Marchais' electorate is granitic: 77 percent� say they
are completely determined to vote for him. Mitterrand's and Rocard's is solid:
66 and 63 percent. Giscard's is a little less so: 57 percent. Chirac's is
fragile: 35 percent. Which is unusual for the Gaullist electorate.
These last figures by themselves would be reminder enough that a poll is never
more t:~an a photo of public opinion at a given moment. And that the game is
, far from over for the candidates. Notice to the militants who, upon reading
the voting.intentions, would be inclined to shout victory or throw in the
towel.
From the scores obtained by the different candidates, declared or potential--
with a Mitterrand hypothesis and a Rocard hypothesis (see our table)--the po-
litical staffs can draw six conclusions.
1. Under both hypotheses Giscard in the first round obtains a higher
number af intentions to vote (36 and 34 percent) than the number
of his votes in the 1974 first round (32.9 percent). Almost all of
~ the UDF [French Democratic Union] sympathizers, one-third of the RPR
; [Rally for the Republic] sympathizers and one-tenth of the Socialists
; are voting for hi.m. In the secand round, his victorp is less clear
i against Rocard (52 percent) than against Mitterrand (55 percent),
~ the second attracting only 10 percent of the RPR sympathizers, com-
pared with 15 percent for Rocard. But in both hypotheses, Giscard
surpasses his limi*.ed score of the 1974 second round (50.7 percent).
~ The Opposing Comrades
' 2. In the internal competition in the ~ocialist Party, Rocard is once
again revealed as a better flag-carrier than Mitterrand. However,
the difference,is nor enormous (four points for the first round,
three points for the second), and does not change the outcome of the
voting. In the second round both attain the total of leftist votes
of the first round and attract the ma3ority of ecologists' votes. In
- the Socialist electorate, in the first as in the second round, the _
two "opposing comrades" have the same score. Rocard, contrary to
what one usually would expect, attracts as many Communist sympathiz-
ers as Mitterrand. Rocard's slight advantage is due to his being
slightly more attractive to the RPR and UDF electorates, and the mar-
ginal electorates. -
3. Georges Marchais with 17 or 18 percent is not maintaining his party
at its traditional 20-21-percent level. One Communist sympathizer
in eight votes, in fact, from the first round for the Socialist candi- -
date , which Mitterrand or Rocard claim to be. The secretary general .
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TABIEAI! DE BORd ~E L'ELECTION PRESIDENTIELLE 1981 1
3 SEP7EMBRE 1980 2
5
ONj ~a~s ~N~R~ESSES~OP~q R ~ O~~~r,ON ~6) ESTIMENT nUE L'~LECTION
o~~ 20 ~qj~ AURA BEAUCOUP D'INFLUENCE
SUR LEUR VIE SUR L'INOEPENDANCE ~
QUOTIOIENNE ) DE U FRANC~~
_ ~4 100 �b 100 ~ i
� ~ ~
� Fp~T SURg ~ 9 80 % 80 w
J~ P 50 % F (
~O 40 % 64 �6 FG,9
L
~?(10 00?6 60~b
h 51 70 %
30 ?6
40 ?6 40 �6 %
20~ 80�b
20?5 ,4,.�;' 20'6
t0�b':., 90%
0 1~0% 0 s:'; 0
~ ~ ~ 11
14
13 ~ 12
ROGIRD GISGIRO OEBRE
MITTERRAND GISCI~RD OEBRE HARCHAIS IALONOE CHIRAC
MARCHAIS IAlONOE CHIRAC _
50 %
50 %
. _
d0 %
36%
30 %
30 %
24 9.
20 �b
20 46 ~ 96 18 96
, 17 % f : 12 % : 10 % 11 �16 ~ o
10 ~ i'~ ` 5 b
5~6 3%;:
a % o
O , 21
15 � ~ ~ 23 �b
16
� ~ �
� GISCARD ROCARD GISCA!~D
MITTERRAND ~ ~ 52 %
45 9~0 55
NE SE NE SE ~ ~ f
PRONONCENT PRONONCENT
. PAS PAS
~ ~
_ ' ~
~1~~ Dessin de Tanguy de Remur
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Key to Chart on Preceding Page:
1. 1981 Presidential Election Instrument Panel
2. September 1980
3. Interest
4. Very interested in the election ~
5. Influence
6. Believe election will have great influence ~
7. On their daily life
8. On France's independence
- 9. Determination
10. Completely sure of their vote
11. Voting intentions
12. For the first round
13. Hypothesis No 1 .
14. Hypothesis No 2
15. Uncommitted
16. For the second round
17. Design by Tanguy de Remur
- of the PCF is suff:~ring the erosinn of..his electorate,..but not the
collapse that some were predicting. -
4. Despite hxs campaign's fast start, Michel Debre is not penetrating.
But the 5 percent of the voters--most of them Gaullists--whom he at-
tracts for the moment--are enough to place the president of the RPR,
Jacques ~hirac, with 12 or 11 percent, fax short of the already medi- -
ocre score obtained by Chaban-Delmas in 1974 (14.6 percent). All the
more so since one RPR member in three will vote for Giscard straight
away.
5. The unranked candidates in the election carry little weight. With
the exception of the ecologist Brice Lalonde (3 and 4 percent) we
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have not sh~wn them on our tab1P. On the extreme left
Arlet~ce Laguiller, F.lain Kriv~ne, t~uguette Bouchardeau ar:d
~ Roger Garaudy total between 3 and 4 percent, the leftist radical
Mic}iel Crepeau does not exceed 1 percent, all the others (the No 2
ecologist Jean-Claude Delarue, Niicliel J~bert and the extreme right
candida�~s Le Pen and Gauchon) are "weighed" in tenths of a percent.
6. The elec' oral structure revealed by the Louis ~larris poll appears to
conform much more to the logic of the last IFOP poll, which predicts
Marchais' collapse at 13 percent and Giscard's triumph at 61 per-
cent facing blitterrand and 56 percent facing Rocard. Something to -
cause perplexity in the staffs! If these extreme figures correspond-
ed to reality, this would mean that a background movement, to say
nothing of a tornado, has overturned the ?rench electorate. Well, _
this electorate has had, since the war, an extraordinary stability
throughout the meanderings of the Fourth Republic and the switch-
backs of the Fifth. Can the candidates take the risk of coun.tLng on
such an upset to organize their campaign? A tough bet.
n Our poll furnishes elements of information on this point: they indi-
cate movements, not an upset.
If one car~~~s up the first round electorate acc.ording to age bracket, three
indications must be focused on:
The youngest electorate (18-24 yea.rs of age) is divided into three blocs:
Marchais and Giscar~ with 23 percent each; Mitterrand with 20 percent;
the rest axe scattered. These figures hardly vary if Rocard is the So- _
cialist candidate.
Mora variable distribution for the 25-34-year-olds. Giscard (27 percent)
anu Marchais (24 percent) are ahead of l~iitterrand (19 percent) . But in
tlie second hypothesis Rocard, with 32 percent, is ahead.
In the higher age categories Giscard increases his advantage: fron? 30
percent for the 35-49-year-olds (wliere Rocard again is running almost
even with 29 percent) to 60 percent of the over-65 gr~up.
The cleavages are much more complex when the electorate is studied according to
socioprofessional category.
The president's present advantage is massive (between 53 and 56 percent)
with the retired and inactive.
Also a significant advantage (between 42 and 46 percent) among the small
merchants and craftsmen, wiiile Chirac, Marchais and Mitterrand or Rocard
swing between 13 and 16 percent each.
Among farmers, behind Giscard (between 33 and 34 percent), Chirac--who
was an active minister of Agriculture--is evenly matched (between 20 and
23 ~�rcent) with the Socialist car.a i:
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- The working class electorate is divided into three groups: a slight
_ advantage for Marchais (27 percent against Mitterrand to 32 percent
against Rocard); equality (between 23 and 25 percent) for Giscard and
the Socialist candidate.
It is among the middle executives and white-collar workers that Rocard
_ finds his best advar.tage: whereas M~tterrand (25 percent) does not ap-
- peal to them any more than Giscard does (26 percent), his challenger from -
tha PS [~ocialist Party] fills in the gap: 35 percent, against a mere
2;i percent for the present chief of state.
An identical mix-up--and even more surprising--amo:lg higher executives
- and liberal professionals: Mitterrand, 18 percent to Giscard's 38 per-
cent; Rocard, 32 percent to Giscard's 31 percent.
~ Comparison of Two Second Rounds
These cleavages, quite naturally, are found in the second round, in which
- Mitterrand prevails over Giscard in only two age groups (under 34) and two
socio-professional categories (middle executives-white-collar workers, and
blue-collar workers), whereas Rocard gets ahead of the outgoing president up
to age 49 and, in addition, among higher executives and liberal professionals
(56 percent against 44 percent for Giscard).
The last important element to be evaluated: the evolution of the Giscardian
electorate between the second round of the 1974 presidential election (SOFRES
[French Opinion Polling Company]- LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR study of 10 June
1974) and the second round as it woicid come ~out if it were to take place to-
_ day, according to the L'EXPRESS-Louis Harris poll. Comparison shows that dur-
ing his seven-year term of offi.ce the present president has won votes among
the female electorate, among older voters (over 50, but chiefly over 65),
among blue-collar workers (where his score is nearly even with that of the
Socialist candidate) and among the non-working population (where he reaches
almost 70 percent).
On the other hand, although he gains gr.ound against Mitterrand-among the 21-
49-year-olds, he loses ground against Rocard in the same age brackets. And
he loses ground against both opponent~s--but more if it is Rocard--among farm-
ers, among higher executives and middle executives-white-collar workers.
Thus the Giscardian electorate has ag,ed. He wins in the working class what he
loses in the middle and upper classes. The majority of the working classes
vote left.
The objective of the third section of our inquiry is to bring to light the pro-
found reasons for the French people's vote. Those reasons, at least, that go
beyond ideologic solidarities or traditional sociological solidar.ities.
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REASONS FOR FRENCH VOTERS' CNOICES
- or Each of the Following Objectives: [in percent~
What do you consider Which candidates are in the
top priority? best position to attain it?
Fight unemployment 84 Giscard ...................23 ~
Rocard ....................22
Mitterrand and Marchais...19 -
Fight inflation and Giscard ...................32
rising prices 76 Rocard ....................24
j
Mitterrand ................15 ~
Fight social Rocard ....................23
inequalities 62 Giscard ...................22
D,itterrand ................21
Maintain order and Giscard ...................37
- security in the 60 Chirac ....................18
country Rocard ....................12
Brote.ct the inter- Giscard ...................26
ests of the so- 50 Rocard ....................19
cial class to Mitterrand ................17
which you belong
Assure France's oil Giscard ...................40 ~
supply 49 Mitterrand and Rocard.....ll
Improve public Giscard ...................26
equipment (hos- Rocard ....................20 -
pitals, schools, 48 Mittsrrand ................18
common carriers,
etc. )
Modernize the French Giscard ...................32
economy, make it 45 Rocard ....................20
more competitive Chirac ....................12
Effectively provide Giscard ...................40
France's national 42 Chirac ....................14
- defense Rocard ....................13
Preserve environ- 33 Giscard ...................22
ment, ecology Lalonde ...................20
Rocard ....................ll
[Table continued on following pageJ
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REASONS FOR FRENCH VOTERS' CHOICES
or Each of the Following Objectives: [in percent]
What do you consider Which candidates are in the -
top priority? best position to attain it?
Assure morality in
political life 31 Giscard ...................24
' (scandals, corrup- Rocard and Debre..........13
tion, etc.)
Strengthen France's Giscard ...................45
- ties with its 26 Mitterrand ................12
Western allies Rocard ....................10
' Build Europe 23 Gi.scard ...................43
Mitterrand and Rocard.....12
Aid under-developed 22 Giscard ...................39
countries Mitterrand ................12
Rocard ....................ll
Conduct relations
with USSR and the Giscard ...................33
Eastern countries 18 Marchais ..................19
according to our Mitterrand and Rocard.....ll
interes~
This poll was conducted for L'EXPRESS by the Louis Harris-France Institute,
. between 22 and 28 August 1980, with a sampling of 1,000 persons representa-
tive of the French population age 18 and over.
These reasons are of th~ee kinds: the criteria by w}iich the French choose their
president; ~he personal image of each of the candidates; their real or supposed
ca}aacity for solving the problems judged to have priority.
A Strong Personalization
In France the office of president has, more than ever, a personal tonality _
that takes precedence over the political aspects of the office. What counts -
for much more in the voter's decision is "the candidate's competence, his =
statesmanlike qualities," the criterion placed at the head of the list by 48
percent of the voters. To whom must be added the 17 percent who cite the oth-
er, personal criterion: "The candidate's personality, his human qualities."
The political criteria axe held respectively by 19 percent ("the candidate's
program") and 10 percent ("the candidate's party").
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The only electorate that diverges from the national average is that of
Georges Marchais, in which the relations between "personal" and "political"
are reversed, the program being at the head of the list for 41 percent of the
Communist candidate's supporters.
This strong personalization of the choice probably works to the advantage of
the man who has occupied the office for almost seven years.
Valery Giscard d'Estaing's sec~nd advantage is his personal iniage: he is con-
sidered more sympathetic, more intelligent than his competitors. There again
the "incumbent's bonus" plays in his favor: he obvious has, more than any of
the others, the makings of a president--since he is one; he is more suitable
than any of the others for representing France abroad, since he has done it
- since 19,74. His weak points: he does not have "the authority" with which
Chirac is credited, but his Socialist challengers have even less; he is not
felt to be "close to the concer~is of the people," wliich is nothing new.
As far as "presidential material" is concerned, Chirac comes in second, before i
' Rocard and Mitterrand. Perhaps because as the former prime minister he has
experience of goverrunent. A comment that will reinforce the Elysee's intention
to stress Rocard's "inexperience."
Rocard has 2 public image more positive overall than Mitterrand's. As for
Marchais, he outclasses the others only in his ~ulldozer-style performances
on television. ~
On the day of the presidential election, what is going to count for the
most in�your choice?
The candidate's personality, his human qualities ................17 percent
The candidate's competence, his statesmanlike qualities.,....��.48 percent
The candidate's party, his political label ......................10 percent
The candidate's program .........................................19 percent
No opinion 6 percent
Finally, the large table on the preceding pages mar?ifestly indicates the third
advantage of the incumbent president. On the left, the list of priority ob-
jectives, arranged in diminishi..tig order. On the right, in the same order, the
three or four candidates in the best position to attain these objectives. In
all cases, one exception aside, Giscard is in first place.
A miracle man? Not at all. At the head of the list of priorities is a tierce
[French betting system] of economic and social problems: unemployment,
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inflation, inequalities. Two comments emerge. First, it is in fighting in- -
equality that Giscard is being outdistanced by a pretender, Michel Rocard. -
It is, then, in two of these three domains--unemployment and inequality--that
the incumbent president achieves his worst score. Therefore he is suffering,
however slightly, the repercussions of the bad social situation.
For each of these qualifiers, can you say which are the candidates to whom
- it best applies? [in percent]
Giscard Mitterrand Rocard Chirac Marchais
Sympathetic............ 45 18 28 18 13
Intelligent............ 66 30 40 "s4 19
Has authority.......... 25 13 13 41 22
Interesting to look at
on television........ 29 13 17 14 34
Inspires confidence.... 39 13 23 11 8
Has the stuff of a presi-
dent of the Republic. 53 18 22 25 6
Suited to represent
France abroad........ 54 18 15 18 7
Suited to manage the
country's economic
affairs............ 38 16 26 16 8
~ Capable of assuring =
order and calm in
the :,ountry........ 37 13 14 21 9 =
Close to the people's ~
concerns........... 26 20 7.1 10 20
Total over 100, because of multiple answers.
His predominance over his opponents is much more marked when the question is
_ one of the objectives of international policy. It is true that, with the ex~
ception of the oil supply, those objectives are considered to have priority by
only a small minority of French people.
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Of the 15 problems Rocard, like Giscard, :~ppears 15 times among the three or
four candidates capable of solving them. Mitterrand appears ten times, Chirac
three times, Marchais twice, Debre once (for morality in po~itical life) and
Lalonde once (for the ecology, obviously).
In the months to come the "L'EXPRESS-Louis Harris-France Instrument Panel"
will continue to record not only the variations in voting intentions, but
also the in-depth movements and motivations of the electorate.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
8946
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
ELECTION ANALYSIS: DEMISE OF UNION OF THE LEFT HINDERS GISCARD _
Paris LE NOW'EL OBSERVATEUR in French 30 Aug-5 Sep 80 pp 24-25
~Article by Robert Badinter: "We Have a Winning S*_art"; passages enclosed
in slantlines printed in italics~
~Text~ What is this strange blindness that "sees" V~lery Giscard d'Estaing
the sure winner this coming May?
_ To hear the professionals--the political leaders and the news commentators
--tell it, there can be no doubt of Valery Giscard d'Estainq's reelection
to the presidency of the Republic. Even the opposition are stating, in a
low voice and among themselves, that the incumbent president's victory in
1981 is probable--not to say a foregone conclusion. The carefully hedged
polls and the sometimes inspired commentaries are constantly reiterating
this conviction: absent an unexpected development, a social upheaval or
a shocking scandal, 1Mr Giscard d'Estaing will be reelected in 1981.
Now then, for anyone who can manage to steer clear of the political action _
and its fevers, and who applies himself to a lucid analysis of the poli-
tical situation in France, it is the contrary conviction that emerges: The
defeat of Mr Giscard d'Estaing in 1981 is Frobable, absent an unexpected
development. ~
Let us put aside the polls. Nine months before the elections, and taking
into account their formulation, these polls are n~ n~ore significant than
- those which up to the ver.y eve of the legislative elections were predicting
a victory of the left... Let us simply examine the force relationships in _
being--and that which I will call the new political deal of the cards,
which is still poorly perceived by public op~nion, but which will determine
the outcome of the presidential election.
Let us first consider what is at the heart of every current political
analysis: Valery Giscard d'Estaing will be reelected because the left as a
united political force no longer exists. The latter fact is undeniable.
But its consequences are exactly the opposite of those one constantly hears
being drawn from it.
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rvn vrr i~,icw uoc VLVLL
Valery Giscard d'Estaing was elected in 1974 not /despite/ the Union of the
Left but very much /because/ of it. An incontestable mobilizer of politi-
cal power, the Union of the Left had its dynamism and its limitations.
While among the majority of its militants it generated enthusiasm, among
many voters it gave rise to fear. Since the leftist vote alone cannot -
produce a majority in France, and since fear is a more powerful feeling
than hope, the candidate of the Union of the Left was foreordained to
receive the largest number of votes in the first round and to be defeated
in the secon~ round. He was handicapped by a heavy burden in the vying for
uncommitted votes, because in the eyes of the voters yet to be persuaded he
personified a united political force in whicl, the influence of the dreaded
Communist Party was preponderant. In view of this vPry real handicap, the
result obtained in 1974 in the second round by the candidate of the Left ~
was truly remarkable--and almost astounding.
The Union of the Left is dead. And even though, by ~vay of understandable
nostalgia, there remains a yearning for it on the left, the international
situation is a bar to its rebirth. The Union of the Left, it is now clear,
was a product of detente. From the moment the Soviets entered Kabul--where
their military power seems to be overshadowing all other considerations--
there could no longer be any union ef the left, for the simple reason that
there could not be a government of the left wherein some would oppose the
invasion of Afghanistan and others would approve of it. Henceforth, and
for years to come, international tension, whatever its forms, will deter-
mine the fundamental political choices. ~
Confining ourselves to the electoral consequences, the demise of the Union
of the Left, far from aiding Valery Giscard d'Estaing in the forthcoming
presidential election, will weigh neavily agains him. For, the real basis
~f his electoral majority lay in the fear of a government that would in- _
clude strong communist Farticipation. This basis has now disappeared
along with that possibility. The fundamental law of every election is that
second-round votes are cast not for the candidate of one's choice but
rather /against/ the one whose election is feared. And the determining
force tnat led many second-round voters then.to vote against the candidate
of the Left no longer exists. In the second round of the forthcominq elec-
_ tion, the opposition candidate, who can be none other than the socialist
candidate, will be perceived by the electorate as freed of the yoke of
Communist Party influence. And the inevitable violer~ce of the Communist
~ Party attacks against the socialist candidate during the campaign will only _
serve the latter's cause in the second round.
~ It will undoubtedly be objected that the votes the socialist candidate will
thus gain from the center in the seccnd round will be lost by way of com-
munist vote defections. It is here that the second error emerges on the
part of the political analysts. Although the Union of the Left is dead,
the fundamental rule of the left--I would call it the electoral reflex of
support in the second round for the best-positioned candidate of ~he left--
still holds. The leaders of the Communist Party well know they cannot
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revive in 1981 the "six of one, half a dozen of the other" theme used so
effectively by Jacques Duclos in 1969 against Poher. Simply because the
communist voters--if;not the militants as well--would not respond to it.
And because no political leader can risk ?~eing publicly and massively
disavowed by his constituents.
No longer benefiting from this essential political factor--the fear of
seeing the communists access the government of France--where else can Mr
Giscard d'Estaing turn in search of a vehicle to victory? The Union of the
Left is dead, but together with it--and not by happenstance--the majority
coalition is also dead. Politically, this is fully attested by the state-
ments of the RPR's ~Rally for the Republic~ leaders as well as by the
behavior of its parliamentary representation. The inevitable--and ever
sharper--criticisms th~y wi11 level, throughout the long months ahead,
against the policies of the president of the Republic, will bring out
glaringly the existing conflict between Valery Giscard d'Estaing and the
P.PR.
~ The electoral consequences of this conflict cannot be other than the exact
inverse of those Y~sulting from his socialist-communist conflict. The _
automatic shiftin; of the majority's second-round votes to the sole candi-
date standing against the Union of the Left has lost its reason for being,
since there is no longer either a Union of the Left nor a leftist unity
- candidate. The majority voters who refused to vote for Valery Giscard
_ d'Estaing in the first round will, /for the first time/ in a presidential
electior, have to choose between a rightist liberal president and a left-
- ist socialist president. The latter having been freed of any bonds to
communist participati~n in the government, why should the Gaullist elector-
ate, the RPR voters, whose social origin and leanings are more populist
~ than aristocratic, be expected to choose the rightist liberal candidate?
Absent any significant backing from the ecologists or any. other political
faction, Mr Giscard d'Estaing, to win the new political deal ~f the cards,
can only rely on two factors. The first one is of a personal order: the
mysterious political charism that causes people to identify with one man, ~
as was the case with General de Gaulle. Now then, though it is true that
Mr Giscard d'Estaing's rivals are not endowed with that power, it is not
underestimating his talent to say that Mr Giscard d'Estaing's public .
appearances do not give rise to popular paroxysms of enthusiasm. Bewides,
~ it is difficult for Frenchmen to identify with Mr Giscard d'Estaing. Cer-
tainly a question of build or of pure chance...
ThP other factor could have been the record of the past 7 years, had they
been marked by successes or by outstanding undertakings. But as to the
gray dullness of these years, how much of it has been owing to the situa-
tion and how much to Mr Giscard d'Estaing's inherent nature? It is too
early to pass judgement. It is certain, however, that, in the economic
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~
domain, Raymond Barre's complacency is hardly shared at all by the French.
Nor will Mr Giscard d'Estaing's international performance rally voters who
still remember France's prestige abroad under de Gaulle. Where then lie
the motivations that could bring the majority's minority round to returning
a rightist liberal president to power?
Thus, from whatever angle one views it, the new political deal augurs the
defeat of Mr Giscard d'Estaing and the victory of the socialist candidate.
It is up to the socialists to profit immediately from such a favorable
situation, by designating their candidate without further delay, uniting
around him, and also drawing up a platform that, designed as it must be to
be accepted by thP French, who are for the most part not socialists, cannot
be an electoral translation of the "Socialist Plan." Besides, perhaps it
is on the divisions among the socialists and on the doctrinal passion
- among some of them that Mr Giscard d'Estaing is secretly banking to come
up the winner. We will soon know whether that hope, in the manner of
Frederick II, will p:~ve well founded.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
9399
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COIJNTRY SECTION FRANCE
Ni.W BOOK INDICATES EX-PCF MEMBERS' MOTIVES, FATE
Outline, Review
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 6-12 Sep 80 pp 50-52
[Article by Max Gallo: "The Heretics' Victory]
[Excerpts] They are suppressed, suspected, unknown...
But they are an innumerable multitude: the heretics
of the PCF [French Communist Party]. Pierre Daix
sp eaks out for them in a wor~. that leads into the
most burning question of the day. Max Gallo reviews
it. ~
_ "The Heretics of the PCF," by Pierre Daix. Laffont, 348 pages, about 65 Fr.
Their story is cursed, suppressed, distorted, always suspect, and mos~
often ignored: these are the heretics of the French Communist Party. ThPir
party, when they broke with it, accused them of being renegades, traitors,
agents of the City of London, of Hitler, or of the CIA. Traitors, they wenr
into the service of the bourgeois and imperialism. For Maurice Thorez, the
writer Paul Nizan, who refused to approve of the German-Soviet Pact, was
nothing bu~ a"police infornier." But calumny was not enough. These here-
tics had to disappear from History, in the same way as in the stereot,ypes
of the October Revolution, the Soviets rubbed out the silhouette of Trotsky.
"The annihilation of comrade Nizan was thus decided," Sartse could write.
"This death would clean up History, his name would fall into dust, his birth
would be exf oliated from the common past."
But the party was not alone in pushing its heretics back into the shadows. ~
The adversaries of the communists, who one imagines had to listen to them,
seemed to respect the excommunication and, after a brief period of atten-
tion, to forget them and even to share the suspicions. Heretics are always
unsettling the game of the Churches.
The most outstanding feature, and it is a fine one, of the book that Pierre
Daix consecrates to them, is to give them a voice. He covers, from the be-
ginnings in 1920 all the way to the present day, this other side of the
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history of French communism. He recounts, compares, sheds light on, and
explains the ruptures, and evaluates what the PCF apparatus rejected and
disowned.
This history is essential. For it is not just a settling of accounts
that would be of interest only to communists and their former comrades.
When the Italian writer Ignazio Silone--who was close to Togliatti, before
' becoming a heretic--writes: "The final struggle some day will be between
communists and ex-communists," he does not being to life the fanatic hos-
tility of inembers thenceforth severed from the same sect. Daix, who was
himself also a communist entrusted ~oith responsibilities--editor in chief
of "French Letters," this former deportee from Mauthausen was the "first
of the non-excluded" [sic] of the PCF, but he lef t the party in 1974--
proof that heretics are the main enemy of the couununists, because, to
varying degrees, in given circumstances, they have discovered the truth
about the communist apparatus and pierced its secret.
From which arises the necessity, for the party, of preventing their voice,
their story, from reaching new adherents. "The PCF," writes Pierre Daix, ,
"is built by successive levelings of the memory." What is known today, in
the ranks of the communist party--or even of the socialist party--about
Boris Souvarine, de Frossart, Rosmer, Monatte, the founders of the PCF and
its first heretics? What is known of Vassart or Ferrat, members of the
Political nureau in the Thirties? Is it certain that the testi.mony of
- Charles Tillon or Auguste Lecoeur--though their names Ue not unknown--is
understood outside of a circle of several thousand readers? And yet the
militant courage of these men, their commitment in the Resistance to
Nazism, in 1940, is a part of the history of the French workers' movement.
Pierre Daix rightly points out the price pai.d by this workers' movement be-
cause of the policy of the PCF. The heretics--militant workers or intellec-
tuals--were most often the best of the social class to which they belonged.
Excommunicated, isolated, banned from political activity by the communists,
their experience could not fecundate social reality. In this sen~~, the
history of the national community taken as a whole is involved in the fate
they met, and the non-communisC leftist groups who ignored them out of fear
- of attacks by the [PCF] party bear a heavy responsibility. In this way,
the sentence passed against them by the communist party was accepted, since
~ one yielded to intimidation.
The Secret of the Party
Now Daix shows what treasures of reasoning by some of these heretics were
suppressed. ONe Boris Souvarine, for example a member of the executive of
the Communist 1'r_ternational, denounced "state Bolshevism" in 1924, unveiled
the meaning of Stalinism, told everything about the USSR and the parties
that followed from it. He was already noting that "all the different kinds
of communism are only varieties of the same phenomenon, despite the exter-
~ nal influences that are beginning to make themselves felt in them."
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One could find it astonishing that, 50 years later, the dissidents in the
PCF have not yet arrived at the point Souvarine reached. Or even Leon
Blum, in 1920, at the Congress of Tours, when he denounced the "Moscow
system," "no more temporary dictatorship..,but a system of stable govern-
ment."
This inability to incorporate th e experience of the pa:~t derives nc~t only
from t~lat ignorance of the past in which generations of communists are
held, but also f rom historical circumstances: P~~;~iar Front, Resistance,
cold war. The USSR seems each time to repr_ese:~t the "good camp" against
Nazism or imperialism. And the individual, social, and natior.al reasons
(in a country marked by the memory of the French Revolution) for becoming
- a communist exist. All the more since the militant does not know the
"secret" of the party. How, for example, would he know that Maurice Thorez
was following, in every political decision, the directives of the envoy of
the International--that is to say of Moscow--the Slovak Fried! Only un-
_ expected reversals, such as the German-Soviet Pact, in August 1939, the
rupture of the Union of the Left in 1977, or spectacular crises, such as
the condemnation of Tito, the Khrushchev, the insurrection of Hungary, the
invasion of Czechoslovakia, provoke sharp twinges of conscience, a blazing
of heresy which pulls men out of the party who have ceased to be completely
J blind. To name them would mean li~ting a sizeable portion of the French
intelligentsia (see L'EXPRESS of 16 February 1980), from Marguerite Duras
~o Edgar Morin, from Annie Kriegel to Claude Roy or Serge July. And the
multitudes of unknown militants cannot be counted.
"There Is No More Heresy"
~ Each time the issue is the demand of the~e communists for their party's in-
dependence with respect to the USSR. The desire to see the birth of a
"national communism." Then, faced with refusal by the leadership, a more
refined analysis [is made], and many realize the imposture of the Soviet
regime! Often, heresy began only with the determination to see these ques-
tions discussed "freely" within the party. Now submission to the policy of
the USSR expressly connotes "democratic centralism," the rejection of inter-
na1 debate. Daix doubtless fails to lay enough stress on this link between
the "structure of the party" and "loyalty to the USSR." The heretics who
followed the light [of reason] and analysis to the end understood that the
functioning of the communist party cannot be reformed without jeopardizing
the link with the USSR.
So Pierre Daix's book leads into the most burning question of the day:
Poland, and its possibilities of internal liberalization without a break
with the USSR. A natural link: the history of the PCF heretics is dictated
by that of the communist world. Now it is Pierre Daix's firm conclusion
that "there is no more heresy." To concede his point it is enough to listen
to the repetitive stammerings of the dissiden.ts in the PCF who today are
_ once more playing the anthem of 'democratization." "The communist world is
unreformable," says Daix.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
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rutc urrL~.1tiL u~n u~~LY
Commentary on Main Points
Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 6 Sep 80 pp 70-71
[Article by Alain de Benoist: "The Strange Fate~ of F`CF Heretics"--passages
between slantlines originally published in itaiics]
[Excerpts] Already a historian and critic nf art, Pierre Daix has just
made himself into a geologist, by plumbing the strata of swallowed-up mem-
ory: the history of dissidence within the PCF from the beginning to our
own day--from l~oris Souvarine to Henri Fiszbin, by way of Frossard, Doriot,
Nizan, Till on, and Garaudy. A story told from the /inside, / as Pierre Daix,
before himself breaking with the party, was deputy director of Editions
Sociales, then, from 1948 to 1972, editor in chief of "French Letters."
A story, too, which could not replace the work of a David Caute on intellec-
tuals and the PCF, but which rather adds to it, like an oveYflight midwa~
between a testimonial and a historical narrative, without, however--and
sometimes this is to be regretted--being distinctly more one than the
other (as in the autobiography of Philippe Robrieux, "Our Comsnunist Genera-
tion, 1953-1968," Laf font, 1977) .
From this work seve.ral conclusions can be drawn. The first, emphasized by
Pierre Daix, is that from all the evidence the PCF /"has been historically
and intellectually the most stalinized of the western communist parties, i
and that it still is today. The second is that it is very hard to be right, -
against the party. Naturally, on the ideological plane, one c.:n always ~
speculate on what Marx would have done in such and such a circumstance, on
what he "really meant," etc. By contrast, historically, heresies are never ,
right against the Church. To be right, they would have to /become/ the ~
Church, so they would cease being heresies. Now it is quite remarkable that
none of the innumerable ruptures, none of the multiple schismG chronicled
by Pierre Daix seems to have cut into the real power of the party, nor to -
have caused its share of the vote to decline in the least. From that point
of view, the dissidences have been just so many defeats. One is not right
against the party.
I
Another conclusion is that one does not f inish with communism by leaving ~
the party. / One frees oneselr from communism as one heals a neurosis,"/
said Ignazio"Silone. Experience shows that one can also be neurotic while
being a"heretic." /"An incredible number of [those] excluded [from the
- party] Daix writes, "have spent the rest of their adult years proving
that they were real communists, / This is because many Marxists, some of
them anti-clerical, are above all believers, and as such, are incapable of
following their logic to the end. If the party makes mistakes, well at
least Marx could not have been wrong. So it is the party which is no
longer Marxist and, by consequence, it is they them~elves who are the depos-
itories of true revolutionary orthodoxy, the carr.iers of the "true party"
that the actual PCF has disfigured . Souvarine himself , af ter his exclu-
sion, launches LE BULLETIN COMMUNISTE, just as Zecoeur in 1956 founds
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THE SOCIALIST NATION: NOTES ON DEMOCRATIC AND NATIONAL COP�4iUNI5M. It
also explains the emergence of all these groups, and all these organiza-
tions, all of whose leadezs wanted to create "count --parties."
� From One Fanaticism To Another
The "humanist" preoccupation is however itself relatively recent among
- the "heretics." Recalling the great purges of the Thirties, Pierre Daix
says that with the exception of Charles Rappoport, there could not be
found in France /"a sir~gle co~mnunist of importance to break with the PCF
- over the [reign of] terror in the USSK."/ It was the same at the time of
the revelations about th e Gula~ at the beginning of the Fifties.
Some, in the final analysis, ended by rej ecting everything: the party
and communism with it. One thinks especially of Boris Souvarine, the
founder of the PCF between 1920 and 1929, and whose figure dominates a
large part of the history, not only of French communism, but also of the
International. Auguste Lecoeur, himself, does not hesitate to write that
/"the duty and the honor of every free man, who intends to remain one,
require him to carry the banner of ideological anti-communism."/
Others, on the contrary--and apparently these are the most numerous--ob-
stinately refuse to break with socialism. When they criticize the pres-
ent USSR, where the state, more even than the party, "commands the guns,"
_ it is by comparison with the Twenties. They denounce "liberticidal"
communism, but take care not to criticize egalitarian communism. Better
still, it is not that wh ich is more fundamentally communistic that they
denounce in the PC, but on the contrary the fact that the party is in
their eyes /less/ communistic than before. Thus, Jean Elleinstein, who
thinks he can discern /"an overall nationalism of the PCF which is orient-
ed toward Gallo-communism"/ ("Battle f or the Diaspora," 1980-1).
Many, ultimately, have gone from one fanaticism to another, bringing to
new beliefs--ecology, Zionism, leftism, "micro-democracy," critique of -
the state--the same ar3or and the same intolerance. Once out of the
part~~, they have had the renegade complex. Above all they must not be
_ accused of having veered to the right. So, to be armed against this -
charge, they have become something more. And such a"heretic," scourged
in his time for "Hitler-Trotskyism" and "social-fascism," sometimes mani-
fests, in matters of intellectual terrorism, rather curious flashbacks
to bygone attitudes. This has been evidenced recently--to cite only two
examples--by the incredible campaigr_ pursued in Paris last June against
The anthropologist Ilse Schwidetzky, and, at about the same ti.me, the
"kritique" based largely on spacious attacks against Noam Chomsky, in the
columns o~ NOt~RL OBSERVATEUR, by Claude Roy, former collaborator of JE
SUIS PARTOUT anu ex-member of the PCF*.
*Cf, the /samizdat/ text of Serge Thion: "The Docemendacity of the Week:
Some Commentar~.es on a Recent Disgrace of NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR," La Vieille
Taupe (B.P. 98-OS, 75224 Paris Cedex 05).
2~.
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.va~ vra i~.a.av.~ uJL' V17LL
When one has spent a part of one's life showered ~aith calumnies and lies,
one should think twice before hurling anathemas. But, evidently, old
- habits remain. ~
Why should we be astanished to realize that every stratum of the dissidence
has endorsed the exclusion of the preceding one--sa that the "ex" camp in- -
cludes both "heretics" and some of their former persecutors? Elleinstein
supported the indictment against Pierre Daix after the appearance in 1973
of "What I know of Solzhenitsyn," just as Henri Fiszbin in 1970 was through-
out the anti-Garaudy campaign the loyal coadjutor of the inquisitor Georges
Marchais.
The "ex" party, Pierre Daix affirms, is the biggest party in France. In the
intellectual world it is in any case the majority party. To be communist
is no longer in fashion, but to have been one remains an excellent passport
_ to press and publishing house circles. So an entire sub-culture has been
created, united by common memories, common references, and fundamental con-
victions, and there is a goodly number of excluded members. To accredit
this party, it would be necessary to be able to examine it in detail.
Overall, in any case, it remains the most dangerous. /"The final struggle
- some day will be between communists and ex-communisLS,"/ said Ignazio
Siione to To~liatti. And the others, those who were /never/ communists--
will they all already have been killed?
i
"The Heretics of the PCF," by Pierre Daix, Laffont, 350 pages.
"The Strategy of the~Lie: From the Kremlin to Georges Marchais," by _
Auguste Lecoeur, Ramsay, 227 pages.
"The PCF In The War: De Gaulle, The Resistance, Stalin," by Stephane
Courtois, Ramsay, 585 pages.
-
j
9516
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
FO SECRETARY GENERAL BERGERON INTERyIEWED
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 29 Aug 80 p 81 _
jlnterview with Workers Force Secretary-General Andre Bergeron: "Communist
Party and the General Confederation of Labor Will Seize Every Opportunity
to Step up Social Conflicts"]
[Text] jQuestion~ Are you likewise predicting a hot return from vacations
in social terms?
[Answer] I predict nothing at a11. Ma~or social events or otiners will al-
ways take place when you do not expect them. There will be difficulties.
_ But tfiose wfiich we are going to run into this year will not Be fundamentally -
different from those we usually encounter.
[~Question] Nevertheless, are we not presently having a kind of "decay" of
the social climate?
jAnswer] What we are having for sure now is a situation where the Communist _
Party and the General Confederation of Labor will ~ump on every opportunity
to step up the social conf licts as part of the prospects of the presiden-
tial elections. The concern of the comanunists, backed up by the CGT
jGeneral Confederation of Labor] is to regain the ground which the socialists
have taken from them. Because of that, we are going to see the rise and
spread of all kinds of confli~ts.
jQuestion] This is what Edmond Maire has ~ust written in his weekly magazine _
when he s~aid that the CGT will not came out for labor uniontsm but ratfier -
for the CP.
jAnswer] I find that Edmond Maire is in the process of saying what we have
been saying now for 33 years. It is obvious that the CGT and tfie CP are
exactly the sgme thing and that the CGT is permanently with the CP. That
Matre is discovering these facts today, facts which have always existed,
is something which is lnaking~me happy but I cannot ~ust the same refrain
from saying: it is a good thing that he discovers them today!
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[Question] Some people say that this will not w~rk and that things will go
' even worse in the textile industry, in the auto iridustry.
jAnsorer] There are indeed many reasons for worry. On the part of the ad-
ministration, there seems to be some kind of fear, for tfie end of tT~e year
and the start of the next year, that there would be serious economic dif-
ficulties. The manufacturers, as far as I know, are divided in their
views. flere again it is difficult to~make a prediction. Everything depends
on international developments.
jQuestion] Do you believe that we are in the midst of an economic crisis?
[Answer] I believe that this is undeniable. This crisis is foreseeable in
countries such as France but it is also foreseeable in countries with a
so-called socialist system. To realize that this is so, it suffices to
observe what is happening right now in Poland. I always s~aid tliat the
current crisis was more serious than the one during the thirties and that
it ~may run for a long time.
jQuestion] Do you not think that this crisis situation is incompatible with
the claims as to a reductidn in working hours? j
jAnswer] No T do not believe so. Everyb~dy knows only too well that a ~
reduction in working hours ~rould, in any case, be progressive. Noliody has
ever imagined that one could, avernight, for example, cut working hou~s from
40 down to 35. But in the end we are indeed gotng to have to try to reduce
the number of unemployed. One cannot res~ign oneself permanently to liave
1.1 million unemployed who-must be given compensation. We must realize ~
that, i~n 1980, the cost of unemployment benefits came to 4.5 percent of t~ie
wage volume, with 3.6 percent taken care of by the enterprises and 0.9 per-
cent taken care of by the government. That is rather considerable. T do
not believe tliat there is any problem in financing the ASSEDIC [Association
for the Promotion of Employment in Tndustry and Business] between now and
the end of the yeaz; but what we shnuld really be afraid of, is happening,
that is- to say, an increase in the number of unemployed, so that tlie pro-
blem wi11 be coming up quite naturally.
= jQuestion] How will FO jWorkers ~'orce] go into tfie presidential campaign?
jAnswer] The confede*-ation will not i~sue any voting instructions liut tfiat
does� notTnean that, as of the moment the presidential campaign is underway,
we are going to become silent and go into htbernation. We will lienefit
from the s~en~fi tization of public opinion i:n order to bring out our positions,
our detaands, s~tarting wtth the idea-~and I hope you ari11 f orgive ~me for
saying this with a~ome~hat ironic tone of voice~--that the polittcians are
o^nerally more sensitive to demands before the elections than afterwards.
jQuestion,of Tnanahement personnelC~planetotput up aacandidatepinS1481Y]~
the unio g
Do you find that normal?
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[Answer] I would not get the idea of running a candidate. One must not mix
styles. The labor unions do not have the mission of managing tfie affairs -
of state.
_ COPYRIGHT: 1980 par Cogedipresse S.A. -
5058 -
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FUIt Ur~r~IC1AL U5E ONL.Y
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
DISSENSTON OF LEFT APPARENT AT A~IIGNON FESTIVAL
Paris VALEURS ACT1fJELLES in French 1 Sep 8Q p 46
jArticle by Paul Chambrillon; "The Schisms of Avignon"]
jTe,~t~ The Avignon festival has served to bring out the
disunity among the lef t. Between the socialists and tbe
communists tiut also between the intellectuals and the
- Coamtunist Party ~machinery.
"Puaux, you made the festival veer to the right! Even though the shows
became Bettex, this does const~tute treason.~' The statement is by 2'Ir A1ain
Pauly, deputy mayor af Avignon in charge of culture and member of tlie
CP. The man thus accused is Mr Paul Puaux, festival director until last
year, but still present this year in various capacities. He is also a
communist.
This year, the recent Avignon festival will have been an opportunity for
publicly bringing out the big and little quarrels which rend an errviron-
ment that is supposed to be hamogeneous; apart from the senator-mayor,
Mr Henri Duffaut, and his deputy, Mr pominique Taddei, both of them being
socialists, all those who kept "the ideological debate" going around this
35th festival, are regi:stered zaesnbers of the PC'F [~rench Com~aunist Party] .
Here is an example of internal quarrels: the violent and public alterca-
tion, in the orchard of jPope] Urban V, between Mr Bernard Rothstein, dir-
ector of the Gennevillier Theater and of the magazine THEATRE PUBLIC, and
Mr Jack Ralite, a communist deputy, who is also the assistant to tiie mayor
of Aubervillier, and liy virtue of that, protector of the Tfieater of the
Commune, subsidized by his city. 'Mr Rothstein strongly reproached him for
wanting to "conceal the party's internal difficulties."
This backgrouna for the quarrels among the left has been a tradition since
1968. Before that, and ever since the creat3.on of the fes~t3:va1 in 1947,
Jean Vilar, ~ras its uncontested boss. He had given the festivities their
"popular overtones in the huge court of honor of the palace of the Popes.
This style is similar to the style us~ed in the scenes staged in tlie National
People's Tfieater, on a stage as fiuge as the Palace of Chaillot.
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During the awmner of 1968, the people on half-pay fr~m the Latin ~{ua:ter
"descended" upon Avignon. Jean 'Vilar felt insulted when called a fas~t~ist
by the Amer~can anarchists of the troupe from the Living Theater. Dis-
_ gusted, he turned the affatr over to his deputy, a former teacher born in
- 1920, by the name of Paul Puaux.
' The festival's ambiance changed. Mr Puaus, who is not a man of the theater,
does IiOt stage any shows; he prefers to invite troupes from all over France
and even from abroad. This orientation is not to everyone's taste. Here
is a warning from Mr Jacques Lassalle, director of the ~iitry Ttieater and
likewise a-member of the CP, w~io this year was unable to stage the show
at Avignon which he had planned:
"It is desirable for the festival to produce shows rather than to be content
with receiving ~.hem. This year, we ~ere d0omed to silence. Tfiat casts
light on the situatipn confronting creativity *ahich is not profit~-oriented."
- These internal quarrels of tfie G'P aze paralleled by conflicts involving the
for.ner alli:es of tlie Union of the Left. Senator-Mayor Henri Duffaut, an
old-line socialist, deprived Mr Pauly of the position of festival supervisor.
Pr~text: the latter took over a demonstration of CGT jGeneral Confederation
of Labor] miners from Ales who had come to present their ideas on the energy
crtsis at the cloi~ter~of the Carmelttes. That evening, a piece was tieing
- pres~ented by the pvet Nazi-m H3:lemet, devoted to the conscience of a certatn
Benerdji, in a performance staged by Mr Mehmet Ulusoy. All three of them
are members of tfie Turkish Communtst Pazty.
Tfiis~ eviction was not to the liking of Mr Guy Hermier, member of the FC~
, Political BurPau and managing edictox of the ~ouxnal REVOLUTTON. He
threatened:
"We ~311 not postpone until tomorrow any concrete action to prevent a widen-
ing of tlie gap between the working class~and living creation."
But it ~rSll be difficult to counter the "resumption of contXOl By the
socialists." This 35tt~ fes~tival ~ras the first one organized by Mr Puaux's
- successor who happens to be'Mr ~aivre d'Arcier, an enarch, an ad~ministrator
_ in the Min~stry of Culture, director of the Cultural Intervention Fund and
~ a member of the Socialist Party. The cammunists are already accusing him
of wanting to "dismantle the festival through the financial disengagement
of the gover~ent."
This is a bad quarrel. The festival's financial structure has alwaqs been
of municipal origin. And this year's~tiudget, more tfian F7~million, for
3 weeks of shows, was more than respectable.
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Mr Faivre d'Arcier, a manager, furthermore does not intend to become bogged
down in artistic work: a festival, such as the one in Avignon is a heavy
machine, comprising permanent installations which cauld be be~ter used
during the remaining 11 months. The new director (~ppoir.ted in November 1979)
asserted: "I give myself 5 years to succeed."
COPYRIGflT: 1980 "Valeurs actuelles"
5058
CS0:310Q
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
WEST'S INACTION VIS-A-VIS TOTALITARIANISM DEPLORED ~
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 6 Sep 80 p 113 -
[Article by Jean-Francois Revel: "What Should the West Do?]
[Text] The Polish people do not rely much on the West, which explains its
notable prudence and at the same time the contradictions of an endeavor
which Jacek Kuron, promoter of the KOR (Movement ~or the Def_ense of Workera)
summed up as follows when he left prison: "We must broaden the sphere of
freedom and reduce that of totalitarianism, i~i.thout crossing the boundaries
delineated by the Soviet tanks." The western governments ohserved the
greatest caution, including verbal self-control, knowing that any encour-
agement from them to the Polish strikers would probably furnish the Soviets
with a pretext to inveigh against an imperialist plot. This moderation of
course did not prevent the USSR from denouncing that supposed plot.
However, western moderation does not restrain the USSR from intervening
militarily. I t is the relationship of forces; it is the probable resistance
~ of the Polish people, and even of the army. In any case, it is also the
Kremlin leaders' awareness, after the invasion of Afghanistan, that two
colonial wars in less than 1 year would be a little too much. After some
vague grwnblings, the West swallowed the Afghan affair. Thanks to France,
the Olympic games provides a creditable half-way propaganda success. There-
fore, why precipitate matters in Poland? The Russians are chess ~layers:
they know what a gambit is. Sometimes it is necessary to sacrifice a
pawn in order to finally win the game.
_ But in this planetary game, st~o~.~ld the West continue to forego exploitation
~ of the communist camp's weaknesses? When difficulties crop up in the West,
the Soviets s trive to aggravate them. When difficulties manifest them-
selves in the East, the West tries to resolve them. Moreover, in order to
envenom our.disputes, the Soviets have means in the West that we do not have =
in the USSR.
With respect to central Europe, since 1945 the West has been so timid that
it very often reached the point of making concessions to the Soviets that _
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the latter had not expected. Kissinger notes this in his memoirs. Orig-
inally Stalin did not expect to be able to encircle all of eastern Europe
within a satellite zone. His first actions af~er the war, like agreeing
to free elections in Czechoslovakia and Hungary--elections which had been lost
~ because of.the communists~*show that'he was about to be satisfied with tem-
porarily grantin~ these countries a status similar to that of Finland. .
It was only afterwards, in the face of a patent lack of concern on the~ssirt
of the West, that he launched a series of coups d'etat that made it p
- ble to establish socialism in central Europe and the iron curtain.
When the satellized people, after having experienced communism for some
years, began to revolt, the West again underestimated its trumps and -
overrated Soviet determination. Does one know, for example, that at the
time of the 1953 workers' riots in Berlin, Beria (still the Politburo's
strong man right after Stalin's death) was thinking of letting go of the
GDR?
Should Democracies Exploit the Crisis of Totalitarian Systems?
At the time of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, the Western governments
lavished exhortations, or allowed them to be lavished, on the revolution-
aries tr~at were then followed by a spectacular, complete abandonment.
After the defeat, Eisenhower sent his vi.ce president, Richard Nixon, on a
symbolical visit to Vienna, to refugee camps, but not to Budapest. UN
condemnation of the USSR of course was not followed by any effective
action. As Francois Fejto ("Budapest 1956," Julliard) wrote: "There was
a big difference between the violently anti-cc~unist and in~erventionist _
propaganda expressed by Radio Free Europe and Washington'~ actual diplo-
matic action."
This difference has since then come to a peak. Our words have beea i.n
line with our actions. Like them, they are nonexistent, or insignificant,
at least at the official level. This was seen at the time of the 1968
defeat of the Czechoslovaks, and in 1980 in the face of fears of interven-
tion in Poland. Moreover, between these two dates the West gav~ a royal
presen~ to the Soviet Union: official recognition in 1975, in the Helsinki
Accords, of the Soviet sphere in central Europe. We have ~ust proved that
we have respected those agreements, sinca we did not even utilize propaganda
weapons during the height of events in Poland. Besides, they would have
hurt, rather than have served, the capable and delicate maneuver of those
on strike.
A counterintervention, or a preventive warning, or a threat of aid to the
members of the resistance were still among the West's means of theoretical
retortion in 1956, and even in 1968. Today, none of that is within the
realm of possibility, even a theoretical one. The only means of pressure
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left to us to influence the course of events beyond the iron curtain is
an economic one. Should we continue to help communist regimes to overcome
their difficulties, or should we instead let them experience to the bitter
end the consequences of their ineptitude with respect to the economy? The
first fo rmula, in addition to offering us, too, same economic advantages,
aims at sparing the Soviet world an implosion, with external repercussions
that could be dangerous. The second would aim to let the system shrivel
up under the consequence of its wealmesses. The present policy, that of .
subsidiz ed detente, raises two questions. Does it not encourage excessive
Soviet armament? Does it not supply sid that makes it possible, not to
improve the people's standard of living, but to maintain totalitarian
govemments in force? Is it a question of helping mankind to live or of
helping governments to oppress mankind?
We would be very wrong to forget that totalitarian regimes, too, are fra-
gile. They cannot guarantee their populations either material well-being,
individual freedoms, or political drmocracy. In Poland and elsewhere,
tomorrow as today, there thus will always be moments when we will have to
opt far either the governments or the people, and to choose between the
camp of the colonizer and that of the colonized.
COPYRIGHT: 1980, S.A. Groupe Express
8255
CSO: 3100
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rvn urrl~icu~ ua~ V?vLi
COUNTRY SECTIbN FRANCE
CNPF PREDICTS LABOR UNREST, PCF SEES BENEFIT FOR MARCHAIS
- Paris LE NOUVEL OBSER''ATEUR in French 30 Aug~S Sep 80 p 23
[Article by Roger Priouret: "Employers Foresee a Bleak Autumn"]
jText] This has been the most worrisome return from vacations in 3 years;
this is the official f eeling a~ the employers. The CNPF jNatfonal Council
of French Employers] has notiiing to say. But it asked its collaborators
Who are in charge of social-matters to come back by 15 August. Tlie enter-
prise managers however a~e talking.
The first point of concern is this: orders are down, except for capital
goods which, with the exception of agricultural macfiinery, "are fiolding
up" and which even continue to grow when we include information science and
electronics. Althougfi retail sales seem to have gone well in July, tfiat
is not enough to wipe out two-ma3or facts: on the one hand, the three bad
months in trade (kiarch, Apri1, and Ma.yZ; on the other hand, tI~ fact that
the heavy purchases from July 1979 until the end of January 1980, inclusive
were made with a blocked purcfiasing power and by drawing on savings wbicfi
will not soon be repl~ced.
But concern goes beyond that. The price rise in ~rance~-higher than in
Japan and in the country's neighbors to the nerth and east--sfiows that
French industry is losing its competitive capacity, not only on foreign
~markets--which slows French exports down--but also in France itself, where,
often aided by the big distributors, the foreigners are increasing their
share of the market for household equipment, textiles, pharmaceuticals, and
small tools.
To retain this competitive capacity, there are only two solutions: reducing
the personnel force, perfecting more high-performance tools, and fighting
- against demands for wage hikes. These are not eas~ily applied remedies.
They generate social tens~ions in tfie enterprise itself and they cause
additional unemployment throughout ttie land; ~obs eliminated in industry
will hardly be compensated for by the~creation of new ~obs in tfie national-
ized sector, in commerce, and in transportation, everything included in the
' services, and it will be necessary to classify the 230,Q00 young people
as being surplus on the latior -market--something tliat fiappens each year
anyway .
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There are two othex reasons for h~ying a tougher social clisnate than during
the last return from~vacations. What happened in 197Q-19AQ? Tfiere were no
severe strikes except when a company closed its~doors or laid workers off.
Tbe social events itrvolved interrupt~ons in tfie work of puTlic services,
where job security was assured. RI~ will again find these two causes for
~ tension tfiis year, tfie first of tfiem aggravated by an economic activity
inferior to that of last year plus ~more numerous- bank.ruptcies-.
But in 1980-1981 we will moreover have the pre-election attitude of the
CGT [General Confederation of Labor]. During the 1R74 presidential elec-
tions, the united left was interested in winning votes in the center, in
other words, it did not want to disturb the social climate too much. For
the vote on this coming 26 April, the CP--in other words, the CGT--must,
in order to assert itself, cause a maximum of agitation so that Georges
Marchais will appear as the exclusive and intractable champion in defense
' of wage~. This is at least what the employers are thinking.
For the CNPF analysts, this does not necessarilq mean more strikes--liecause
unemployment, in their eyes, slows them down--but rather "revolutionary
actions," such as the kidnapping of-managers and acts of vandalism. Ac-
cording to them, here is another element of worry: until recently, the
CGT "was leashing" the leftists and prevented acts of sabotage; it will
not do that any longer.
The other cause of the hardening o� the social cltmate, as far as tfie
employers are concerned, will be the awakening of the o.ld conf lict between
wage earners and machines. French workers for a long time were among tfi ose
in the world who ~aost easily accepted productivity gains due to iTnprove-
ments in tools. Tfie silkweavers war ended a long time ago. The employers
are convinced that electronics and information science will revive this
sort of tfiing botfi in industry and in the service sector.
- Here is one consolation for the employers: this hardening on the part of
the CGT, like the acts of violence against the production machinery,
will--they think--serve the candidate who has their preference and will
help beat tfie left. The premier who will replace Raymond Barre could ~nly.
be a man of firmness. And, ~ust as~the employers managed to lay tfie
ground~rork for the victory of March 1978--with mor.Qy, power, and tfie fight
- against the labor unions--as well as the presence of a faitfiful ally in
Matignon jHouse], so ~rill they not fail to exploit the polit~cal situation
which will be created by the new economic and social situation.
- COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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rvA Vr a� L~.i.au. .J..u v,.a..
~
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
CURRENT, FUTURE OCEAN EXPLOITATION PLANS DISCUSSED
~
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 23 Aug 80 pp 42-43 =
[Interview with Yves La Prairie, president of the ASTEO, by Claire Briere;
' date and place not given]
[TextJ Yves La Prairie was formerly director of the
National Center for ExpZoitation of the Oceans (CNEXO) .
For the past 2 years, he has been president of an asso- �
ciation of private firms, the Scientific and Technical
~ As~~;:iat=^^ for Exploitation of the Oceans (ASTEO). _
[Question] What role can your organization play in the battle for control -
of the oceans?
[Answer] Ever since I became presiclent of the ASTEO, I have laid great
stress on exporting. I view myself as an ambassador, or more modestly as
a traveling salesman representing French manufacturer~ abroad.
[Question] Will France's assumption of jurisdiction over the 370-kilometer
exclusive economic zone alter its oceanograph.ic activities?
[Answer] At the present time, nine-tenths of our oceanographic activity, .
financially and technically speaking, is related to oil and the search for ;
oil offshore: deepsea diving companies, construction of platforms,
development of tool~ and equipment for seabed operations, and the laying
_ of pipelines . These exploration and exploitation operations are being
condacted in waters off the five continents. On the other hand, among our
- overseas territories, only Guiana and the Kerguelen Islands are of poten*_ial
interest to oil companies. -
The most urgent task at this time is to evaluate what fishir~g, biological, _
and mineral resources can be expected from that area. For this purpose,
we are establishing oceanographic center.s ~atterned after the one at Bres~. �
~he latter was the world`s first multidisciplinary center and remains a
model for such ~ facility.
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The Pacific Oceanographic Center in Tahiti was completed in 1975. It
has a staff of 80 experts in multimetal nodule exploration and in aqua-
culture. The center's aquaculturists also assist local fisheries. We
also keep a close look on the area's phosphate resources. A branch of
' this center has been established ir_ New Caledonia. It specializes in
tropical shrimp aquaculture. We are also in the process of installing
the nucleus of a research and exploration team in the West Indies and
_ we h ave an embryonic aquacultural program in Guiana.
� [Question] Are we also establishing oceanographic centers in foreign
coun tries?
[Answer] Some oil-rich Middle Eastern countries are asking us to design
and build almost completely equipped marine research and exploration centers
for them. The same is true of certain South American countries, namely
Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil. And then there is also the case of Ecuador.
That rather small country wants to move directly into economic development
programs and recently signed a contract with France-Aquaculture, a CNEXO
~ubsidiary, for the design of a series of shrimp "farms."
But, I repeat, wh at has really revolutionized oceanography these past 15
years is primarily oil. Major oil companies, electronics firms like Thomson -
and chemical firms like Pechiney have literally plunged into the sea. They
have been followe d by small and medium-size businesses, like COMEX [Maritime
Appraisal Company], which specia.lize in entirely new marine activities. -
Combined, these companies represent an important part of French economic
stre~gth. In 1970, exploitation of the oceans accounted for a turnover of
about 1 billion francs. In 198Q, this volume of business has increased
tenfold.
[Question] Can you estimate France's industrial and technical chances?
[Answer] We rank 18th among the world's fishing industry countries, but ,
third in aquaculture. And we are first in Europe. In offshore oil, we
rank second, immediately behind the United States. Depending on whether
. we consider drilling leases, platftirm construction, or financial involve-
ment, we account for, by ourselves alone, between 12 and 15 percent of the
world's oil activity. In underwater diving, we are the leaders. COMEX had
succeeded in capturing a little more than half of the world market. In
undersea exploration by bathyscaph or saucer we rank first, in a tie with
the Americans. Lastly, there is another successfully expanding field of
activity. I refer to the desalination of sea water, a field in which we
, are third or fourth, depending on the process used.
(Question] And where do we rank in the nodule field?
l
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[Answer] Inasmuch as commercial exploitation of these nodules has not yet -
begun, it is difficult to determine any ranking. I would say, however, that
we are among the six leading countries in the nodule field. We have compiled
= extensive mining~data that enables us to know where the best depoaits are,
their density on the seabed, and their ore content. In this respect, we can
consider ourselves first ar~ong the six countries, possibly .in a tie with the -
Americans. As f~r nodule metallurgy, each of the six countries has its own
eff icient process. When the time comes, only the actual cost of the opera-
tion will determine which process is best.
On the other hand, in nadule-mining teckinology, we are far behind the Ameri-
cans and those--the Japanese and Germans in particular--who are partners
in the American consortia. France's financial outlays in the nodule field
total some 20 million francs ~cr year. The Americans are spending five and
ten times more than that.
We are studying a very conventional and even somewhat archaic method of ~
bringing the nodules up from the depths. It is a dredging system emp~oy- ;
ing buckets and two ships. At a depth of 6,000 meters this means 12 kilo-
_ meters of cable! We are also studying a self-contained machine, a sort
of undersea bulldozer, which would descend with ballast, form a heap of
nodules on th2 ocean bottom, load this heap, and then rise to the surface -
~ by discharging its ballast. In contrast, the Americans prefer a sort of
vacuum cleaner system with two pipes, one for pressure, the other for ~
drawing the nodules up to the shi.p. Lockheed is reported to have already
- completed tests at a depth of 5,000 meters with a scale model one-fifth of ~
f ull size.
_ [Question] Are there also such consortiums in France?
- [Answer] Our consortium i~ AFERNOD (French Association for Nodule Studies
and Exploration). It was formed in 1973 and its membership inc~udes three
government agencies--CNEXO, Atomic Energy Commission, and Bureau of Geolo- ~
gical and Mining Exploration--and two private firms, the Nickel Company and
the Schneider industrial group's France-Dunkerque Shipyards.
~
[QuesicionJ What are the relationships between the public and private sec-
tors in these new activities?
iAnswer] The ASTEO offers manufacturers the possibility of following up
or~ public research and exploration. I am pleased to note that they are
beginning to do this, and on a large scale. But in all counCries, the
public sector remains the prime mover. ~
- During the 10 year period from 1965 to 1975, the CNEXO had a great deal
of money. This enabled us to take a substantial lead over those countries ~
which appeared likely to be our closest competitmrs, Great Britain, the
_ Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Canada, and Sweden. Since 1975, I
i
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however, this financial effort has decreased to a point I consider disquiet-
ing. Because if public research and exploration lags behind, the follow-up
industri~s are liable also to lose their drive.
[QuestionJ Yet there is talk of a 31 percent increase in the budget.
[Answer] I welcome that increase. But I am obliged to state that it will
merely allow us to regain the level reached 3 years ago. Just think of it,
during all these past few years, the German and Jap2nese governments were
increasing their budget 50 to 60 percent year after year. Such support can
truly be considered giving priority to the oceans.
[Question] On the whole, you then believe that France remains well-placed
but that its chances are in jeopardy if it does not go all-out. -
[Ansker] Precisely. We still hold som~e trump cards. We have to be very
caref ul, however, because we are liable to drop far behind. You must
realize that 80 to 90 percent of the petroleum-related sector's work is for
_ the export trade. Some 95 percent of the desalination sector's volume~of
buisness is in exports.
In these new sectors where we already hold an altogether noteworthy position,
it is essential for us to open nPw markets, particularly in new locations,
by intensifying our effort, especially in traditional activities.
As for the nodules, if we do not shift gears and pick up speed, we will
not mine these nddules on a commercial scale. Then the capital invest-
ment required will no longer be in millions of francs, but in billions.
The Americans have set 1988 as their target date. As for us, we cannot
count on starting before the next decade.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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FRANCE
BRIEFS
URANIUM SHORTAGE EXPECTED---Uranium is expected to be in short supply within
a few years, according to a note from [Minister of Industry] Giraud to
[Prime Minister] Barre, who has advised forming a stockpile as a precaution.
The minister of industry is to sign an agreement with Australia soon provid-
ing for the purchase of this mineral. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French
19 Sep 80 p 33]
CGT AU~iORITARIANISM--Zhe nonco~unist members of the CGT's executive
committee will henceforth be kept out of the committee's deliberati~s.
Zhe commmist sympathizers [on the committ~e] have been asked not to pax~
ticipate. Zhe orthodox commimists are supposed to d3.scuss their activi-
ties only with the close collaborators of the secretary general [Georges
Seguy]. [Text] [Faris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 22 Sep SU p 30]
ARrS FOR AFQiANISTAN--1he weapons of Soviet and Czech origin confiscated
by the SDECE's Action Service d.uring Bokassa's overthraw in Bangui in the
stunmer of 1979 were to be discreetly shipped to the Afghani reaistance
fighters. When informed of th is, Giscard is s aid to have iu~ediately
ordered the project terminated and its authors punished. 1Y?is probably
e~lains the crisis that recently affected the top levels of the SDECE.
[Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 22 Sep 80 p 30]
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