JPRS ID: 9314 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 34
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= GIA-R~P82-00850R000300030034-5
~ ~ ~ ~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFI('I:~l. t'~h' Otil.l
JPRS L/9314
26 September 1980
, Ja an R~ ort ~
p p
(FOUO 2~/80~
i
4
FB~$ ~OREIGN BROADCAST INFO~RMATION SERVICE
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE aNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
NOTE
- JPRS publicatio:~:; contain information primarily from foreigr.
_ newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language _
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
- or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted. ~
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
_ enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other ur.attributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
- The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
' cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
, For further infor~narion on report content
ca?1 (703) 351-3067 (Japan, Korea,
r[~ngolia); 351-2760 (Vietnam, South and
East Asia) .
COPYRIG7-iT LAWS AND REGUI.ATIONS GOVERNING 0~ 'rRSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE; THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICTAL USE ONI.Y.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OF'FICIAL USE UNLY
,
JPRS L/9314
26 September Z980
JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 24/80)
CONTENTS
= POI,ITICAI, AND SOCIOI,OGICAI~
'AKAHATA' Editorial on Japan's Course in 1980~s,
Security Treaty
(JPS, 8 Sep 80) 1
S~izuki Pol.itics Criticized
- (Editorial; THE DAILY Y~'IIURI, 19 Aug 80) 3
Blue Paper on Diplomacy: I}iplomacy Switch Cited
(Editorial; THE DAILY YaMIURI, 20 Aug 80) 5
_ Justice Minister Okuno~s ~Hawkish Remarks~
(Raisuke Honda; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 8 Sep 80) j
- 'AKAHATA' ^omments on I~~o~s Trip to Asian Nations� PRC
(JPS, 5~ 6 Sep 80) 10
Trip Criticized !
Editorial on Asian Tour ~
Relationship Between Abe, Tanaka Analyzed
' (Takehiko Takahashi; MAINICHI DAIZY NEWS, 27 Aug 80) 13
'AKAHATAt Urging Action Against Constitution Revi.sion
(JPS, ~ Sep 80) 15
Miyamoto Speaks at JCP Prefectural Committee Chairmen
Meeting
(JPS, 12 Sep 80) 16
= Sonyo Leader Proposes Division of Socialist Party
(JpS, 15 Sep 80) 19 -
- a - [III - ASIA - 11.1 FOt.;O]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL 'JSE ONLY
ECONONiIC
- Paper Views Report on U.S.-Japan Trade Favorably
(Editorial; THE JAl'AN TIMES, 11 Sep 80) 2~
'ASAHI SHIl~IBUN' Views Carter's Economi.c Revitalization
Plan
. (Editorial; ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 6 Sep 80) 22
Petrodollars Flood Japanese Maxket
(MAINICHI DAIZY NEWS, 27 Aug 80) 2~
Scandal Surrounding Iran Petrochemical Project Reported
- (SHUKAN SHIN~HO, 7 Aug 80) 27
Discussions on Mexico~s Oil Supplies to Japan
(JIJI, 10 Sep 80) 33
Activities of the 'Overseas Ecnnomic Cooperation ~nd~
in Africa Reported
(NL4RCHE5 TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.ANEENS, 8 Aug 8~).... 3I~
Brief s
tsed Cars to China 36
Zarge Iraqi Automobile Order 36
- Steel Technology for Romania 36
SCIENCE AND TEC?~10I,OGY
Goverriment Plant To Extract Urarium From Seawater
(THE DAILY YOMNRI, 11 Sep 80) 3?
Hitachi To Develop 200 MW Power Reactor
- (NIHON KEIZAI SHIl~IBUN, 15 Aug 80) 39
Booming Semiconductor Industries, Their Future Examined
( DEr1PA SHIl~'IDiJN, 15 Aug 80 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L~1.
a - t -
FOR OFFICIAL I~SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'AKAHATA' EDITORIAL ON JAPAN'S COURSE IN 1980'S, SECURITY TREATY
OW080931 Tokyo JPS in English 0858 GMT 8 Sep 80
["Japan's Future Course in the 1980's and October 31 Action,' AKAHATA
' Editorial"--JPS headline]
[Text] Tokyo Se~ 8 JPS--The September 7 issue of AKAHATA carried an
- editorial entitled "Japan's Future Course in the 1980's and the October 21
Action," pointing out "Japan today is facing the most dangerous situation
in the 30 years' history of the Japan-U.S, security treaty."
The editorial said that this danger is clearly reflected in the arguments
of Tomoo Mihara, president of the committee for investigation into the
Japan-U.S. security treaty of the LDP and others, who were attending the
"sem~n~r of the day of the 20th anniversary of Japan-U.S. secuYity treaty."
(The persons of Japanese and the U.S. political fields, and researchers
of strategy)
The editorial quotes Mihara as saying, "Japan-U.S. security treaty should ,
be amended to correspond to an actual and substantial strengthening of
the Japan-U.S~ and a U.S. strategical demand."
The editorial says, "Such arguments aim at geCting Japan to assume an
important role of a U.S. world strategy together with NATO countries as
a military power appropriate for the economic power, the second in the
" gross national products in capitalist ceuntries, and establishing the
system enabling the se]..f defense forces to send anywhere in the world
without any limitations."
The editorial emphasized that "Never before was there an important occasion
in Japan for the Japanese democratic forces to make successful the
'October 21 Action, the day for joint action of all democratic forces,"'
and continued, "Appeals for the creation of the 'people's congress for
prevention of political action and military state' (temporary name) and
'generai actions centering on the ^ctober 21 action' by Motofumi Makieda,
~ chairman of the General Council of Trade Unions of tY:e Tapan-U.S, security
treaty. [as received] This is very serious in that th ey destroyed
11 years' historical tradition."
~ 1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
The editorial also stressed that "at this juncture, it is the duty Eor
all persons standing on the poaition of progress not to allow the change
in nature of the October 21 national action and endeavor to make success-
ful this united action with the banner of abrogation of the 3apan-U.S. .
security treaty, prevention of political reaction and defense of living,
togeth~r with various organizations affiliated with the united working
committee for the October 21 action maintaining its Frogressive
tradition."
CSO: 4120
.
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340030034-8
FOR OFFICI9L USE ONLY
POLITICAI, AND SOCIOZOGICAL
- SUZUKI POLITICS CRITICIZID
Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 19 Aug 80 p 2
[Editorial: "Speak Up, Mr Suzuki"]
[Text]
. After one month in office Prime Miaister Suzuki
- gives the impression of being overly influenced or
even d'ictated . to by hawks !uithin the Liberal-De-
mocra.tic Party (LDP).
At a press conference at the Japan National
Pre~ss Club, he seemed to feel natura.l in his new
role as prime miniater, but hie individuality never-
thelesa appeared weak.
- The Suzuki administration caa be likened to a
custom-made suit before the Stting. Moat of the
- policies which he is following were bequeathed to
him by late prime minister ~asayoshi Ohira.
' At the press conference~ he said his goals were
to establiah political ethics, reform the national -
coastituency elections for the House of Councilors, -
rehabilita,te public ~nance, carry out admin~stra-
tive reforma and take steps to cope with national
security and Japan's aging society.
These are fihe goals of the Ohira cabinet. How-
ever, Suzuki did sa.y �that he intended to tackle
these problems with determination, and this we
appreciate.
The LDP Influence
Suzuki is being strongly critici'zed for not dia-
playing leadership and being led by the LDP and
dictated to by i*.,~ hawks. Suzuki insisted that it ~
was x^~ght and proper for the government to con-
sult the party. And he cited as an example of
correct consultatioa the process used to settle the
prodacer's rice price. .
3
FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
~
t;er[ainly, tnere is nothing terribty wrong for `
Suzuki's government to conault the LDP. How ever,
it is questionable when LDP officers express their
views on such. a delicate and sophisticated matter
as revising the official discount rate.
We have the impression that the LDP is atill -
so elated over its landslide ~ ictory that it is ignor- ~
ing the government Only confusion can arise i.f
Suzuki is influenced by LDP members who aggres-
sively assert their views.
Ya?~a~kuni Shrine Bill Isaue .
Thsre is criticism too that Suzuki has set . a
course towa= ' Japan's ~ilitary buildup. VVe do
not ~ielieve that the deciaion to increase the de-
fense budget indicates this, but we are concezned
by Suzuki's prnmotion of the Yasukuni Shrine bill
, by visiting the ahrine with most of his cabinet
officers on the 35th annivPrsary of the end of the
Pacific War.
Suzuki did say at the press conference that the
pesce constitution littuts Japan's military buildup,
a~d thus came out against LDP hawka who want
unbridled arma expanaion. He should make his views
on defense clear to the LDY. Most particularly Suzu-
ki should not 3u anything to cause alarm amon; _
_ Japan's neighbors. Fie should aiake it clear our
defense capabilities will not be upgraded without
limit. '
Suzuki should diaplay more resolute :eadership
- to prevent a sharp division of public opinion and -
to work toward consensus on tnajor i9sues.
COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri I980
CSO: 4120
' ~ -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAI~
BLUE PAPER ON DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY SWITCH CITID
Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 20 Aug 80 p 2 -
[Editorial: "Diplamacy Switch"]
jTextl ~
The 1980 blue paper on diplomacy abandons Japan's
multidirectional peace diplomacy in favor of strength-
ening cooperation with other free countrles to cope
with threats to the world order.
_ The blue paper says thia must be done because of .
the holding of the American hostages in Iran, the
Soviet Union'a ~invasicn of Afghanistan and other
upheavals in the world. And the paper says Japan as
a member of the community of nationa must 1~e
prepared to make hard choicea and sacriSces.
The tone of this year's blue paper is different than
thc>se of past years when multidirectional peace di-
plomacy dominated Japan's view toward the world.
Japan then sought to maintain friendly relationa with
every country to the same extent
- "Multidirectional" peace diplomacy" was often on
the lips of former prime minister Takeo Fukuda,
and although it never gained official usage, it was the
principle ~which the government foliowed. :
Multidirectional Uiplomacy . �
For example, the 1978 blue p~per said the guading
principle of Japatt was to "build relations of mutual
trust with all other nations regardless of their po- -
litica.l structure, aize and geographical location. And -
last year's paper sa.id Japa~ should accelerate tlie
progreas of dialog with countries whose political
syatems were differeut than Japa.n's.
- Not too long ago the government did not think
any further than just getting along with all countriea.
The government did not really know'what it would do
if some nation used military force a.gainst anot~�er or
took unjust action. No one could say if Japan would
keep silent when its national interests were not a
atake or whether it would take a position to defend
interaational juatice.
5
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Great Shocks To Japsn
However, the upheavals in Iran and Soviet aggres-
sion in Afghaniatan came as great ahocks to Japan
and also encouraged Japan to consider the relationship
� between Japan's security and prosperitY, and interests
shared with other free nations.
This led to the blue p$per sta.ting this year that -
a strong faith in defending freedom and democracy"
ahould be the basic principla of this nation's foreign
policy. It says Western countries should unite to pro-
tect their common values and Japan has to fulfill its
appropriate reeponsibilities.
Japan did join in the boycott of the Moscow Olym-
- pics and curbed its trade in sophisticated induatrial
products and personnel exchanges with the Soviet _
Union in line with US and Western European policies.
However, as Prime Minister Suzuki has ~tated Ja-
pan should on a long-range basis improve i~elation3
with the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union should
create an environment and conditiona for this, includ-
ing a change in ita aggressive policies toward Afgha- _
nistan.
COPYRIGHT: The Dail}~ Yomiuri 1980
CSO: 4120
6
FOR OFFICIAL LTSE OIdLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
JUSTICE MINISTER OKUNO'S 'HAWKISH REMARKS'
OW091057 Tokyo THE DA.ILY YOMIURI in Enolish 8 Sep 80 p 3
["Political Beat" column by Raisuke Honda: "Silencing the Hawks"]
[Text] Prime Minister Suzuki and other government and Liberal-Democratic
Party (LDP) leaders appear perplexed over repeated "hawkish" remarks by
Justice Minister Seisuke Okuno regarding the highly sensitive issue of
a constitutional revision.
r
Their embarrassment over the Okuno remarks seems to be related to mounting
criticism among the opposition parties for the Suzuki cabinet's "swing
to the right."
Among the signs that the opposition and the public regard as the Suzuki
administration's "prorightist leanings" are the visit to Yasukuni Shrine
made by Premier Suzuki and most of his cabinet members on 15 August,
the anniversary of the end of the Yacific War, and the government decisions
to arm air self-defense force planes and maric.ime self-defense force
escort ships with missiles and torpedoes, respectively.
Close aides of the premier are reportedly anxious that s uch a sequence
of events would lead to serious "misunderatanding" by th e people of the
fundamental policy lines of the Suzuki government, unless it comes out
explicitly with its major policy goals.
The LDP leaders have thus decided to issue a special statemer.t during an
_ LDP policy study meeting under way in Hakone since Sunday to the effect -
that the premier has no intention at all to revise the war-renouncing
constitution.
Apart from the current fuss over the justice minister's remarks calling
for amending the constitution, the LDP's platform does make it clear that
its goal is to introduce a new, "independent" constitution to replace
the Qxisting charter, which the party says was drawn up under the pressures
of the occupation authorities.
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
It is therefore only natural for any Liberal-Democrat to take a view
favoring revision of the constitution.
In fact, most LDP Diet members have been affiliated with the Dietmen's
- League for the Realization of an Independent Constitution chaired by
former prime minister Nobusuke Kishi. -
Those LDP members who belonged to the now disbanded faction led by the _
~ late premier Masayoshi Ohira, however, were said to be the most "dovish-
minded" compared wit h other LDP members.
Such former senior members of the late Ohira's faction as chief cabinet
secretary Kiichi Piiyazawa and foreign minister Masayoshi Ito have not
jained the Dietmen's League for Revising the Constitution, although
Premier Suzuki, who was also a leading member of the same faction, is
affiliated with the league.
Therefore, there is no reason why the opposition parties should accuse
the Suzuki cabinet of being the "most rightist cabinet" in the history
of postwar politics.
The current rash of events that seem to indicate a"tilt to the right"
by the LDP is mainly attributable to some LDP leaders sounding off after -
the landslide victory of the LDP in the last "double" Diet elections.
The problem in this connection is that Premier Suzuki has been unable to
show effective enough leadership to hold such inadvertent remarks in check.
One former member of the late Ohira's faction says: "The Suzuki cabinet
is undoubtedly dovish in character. It is regettable that the premier -
is so affable as to allow his cabinet members to make remarks as they
like to the extent of incurring unnecessary misunderstanding from the
public."
"The premier as well as the chief cabinet seeechaandsbehavio~r~helstressed.
the cabinet members to be more careful in sp
Meanwhile, the faction led by former premier Kakuei Tanaka at its senior
members meeting 3 September decided to make utmost efforts lest justice
minister Okuno, known for his friendly ties with the Tanaka faction,
should be forced to resign his post because of his recent remarks.
Indications are that Premier Suzuki would find it virtually impossible _
to fire Okuno as justics minister as long as the power base of the Suzuki
administration is heavily degendent on the stx�ength of the Tanaka faction.
But the premier's right-hand man, Miyazawa, has openly expressed his
displeasure at Okuno's remarks, saying: "I cannot understand why he has
made it a point to speak out what might well be left unsaid."
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FUk OFFICIAL US~ UNL~'
7
Even LDP secretary-general Yoshio Sakurauchi., who himself caused an
earlier commotion for his remarks in favor of revising the constituti~n,
~ including war-renouncing Article 9, is critical of Okuno's remarks as
"having gane too far."
Although there is no immediate sign of in*raparty strife in the LDP,
= the lack of leadership of Premier Suzuki, if left as it is, would
eventually lead to growing discord in factional relations.
COPYRIGHT: DAILY YOMIURI 1980
CSO: 4120
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
rvc~ vL�r l~i~u, uoc. V?vLi
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'AK.AHAT~' COMMENTS ON ITO'S TRIP TO ASTAN NATIONS, PRC
Trip Criticized
OW050935 Tokyo JPS in English 0855 GMT 5 Sep 80 ~
[Text] Tokyo Sep 5 JPS--Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito flew
home on September 4 after winding up his trip to five Asian countries,
including Thailand, Burma, India, Pakistan ancl China. The September 5
issue of AKAHATA carried a commentary, strongly criticized his trip to
_ these countries. Excerpts of the commentary follow: -
"The greatest feature of Ito's round trip at this time is that he in his
diplomac.y toward Asia has put into specific terms the line of the policy ~
set out by the late Prime Mini~ter Masayosh3, Ohira, who pledged to share
the respc~nsibility as a"member of the Western allied powers" at the
Japan-U.S. summit talks in May.
This is ~learly reflected in the following po3nts: commitment to the
strengthening of strategic bolstering to Thailand and Pakistan, which
are called a'front line of the Western camp'; co~nitment to the
strengthening of international support for the Po1 Pot clique, a hotbed
of intensification of tension in Asia; driving of a wedge into a non-
aligned movement, which was attempted a* in his trip to Burma and India.
A new Japanese diplomacy, which has thrown down a signboard of 'all
direction diplomacy' is anything but a'maintenance of peace in Asia':
it wi11, on the contrary, become a new hotbed of intensif ication of
tension,
"His trip also indicates that Japan as an 'act in U.S, place' and an
'adjutant' has become more active than ever, as he willingly expressed
Japan's cooperation with strategic support for Thailand, and Burma at
the request of the U,S, and announced th at JaFan will assume a political
role (indicated by the Japan's diplomacy toward South East As3a) in bring-
ing ASEAN countries, 'honor students of the Western powers' (the Japanese
Foreign Ministry) in the Western camp [as received],
- 10 _
FOR OFFICIAL i1~E ^:JLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY c
, ~
Thus, the Japan-U.S. consultations, which are to be held on the basis of r
Ito's trip to Asian countries, will have an important significance on
future Japanese diplomacy,
"What is to be noted in connection with his trip is that China highly
appreciated Ito's trip, saying 'His visit will have a positive influence
on peacs and stability in Asian region'. China outspokenly called~for
political alignment between Japan and China to carry out an 'act in
U.S. place.'
"It can be said that the three countries' political alliance between
the U.S., Japan and China, which is to be spread to the whole of Asia,
was thrown into sharp relief by a design that Japan will strengthen its
role as an 'act in the U.S. place,' and that China will add impetus to
Japan's role."
Editorial on Asian Tour
OW060947 Tokyo JPS in English 0859 GMT 6 Sep 80
["'A Political Role of Round Trip by Ito,' AKAHATA Editorial on Sep 6"--
JPS headline]
[Te.ctJ Tokyo Sep 6 JPS--Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito, who
returned on Sep 4 from his trip to five Asian countries, is now emphasiz-
ing the need of Japanese diplomacy to assume a"polit~cal role," The
September 6 issue of AKAHATA carried an editorial entitled "'A Political
Role' of Round Trip by Ito," coannenting on his remarks and statements.
Excerpts of the editorial follow:
"What should be clarified first is that 'A Political role appropriate for
an economic strength' does not mean at all the change in Japanese
diplomacy to its independent diplomacy.
"It (the political role) means the 'political role' of assuming part of
U.S. world stratPgy, while basing itself on the Japan-U.S. military
alliance
"Thls is clearly demonstrated above al? by his trip to Asian countries ~
of which major feature is economic and political b~olstering of Thailar,d
and Pakistan, What we cannot~overlook is that the' country we visited as
- ~ the last fo~t was China, which has common interests with the U.S. and
Japan in hegemonistic intervention in Indochina, and forms actually
political alliance between the U.S., Japan and China. China said, 'Ito's
trip was very successful.'
"He in his course of trip appealed to give support to the Pol Pot clique,
a bandit group and~was forsa~Cen by the Canibodian people, and he expressed
the Japan's readiness to assume the role of operation of gaining majority
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
~
- support for the maintenance of its representation in the United Nations.
This explicitly indicates the true nature of a Japanese 'political role.'
"We must say that the 'political role' assumed by Japanese diplomacy is
clinging to the falsehood in the framework of a U.S. world straregy and
the alliance between the U.S., Japan and China, and that it aims at
prolonging tensions and troubles in Asia.
"In additi~n, this 'political role' is the other side of the turning of
Japanese diplomacy with military strength at its back and the policy line
of a military power.
"Japaaese diplomacy with its military strength at its back will inevitably
link with military bolstering on the pretext of 'peace and stability'
- in ASEAN countries.
"The genuine political role that should be assumed by Japan for peace
and stability in Asis cannot be found in Japanese diplomacy with its
military strength at its back, If the Japanese Government hopes for the
set~.lement of refugee problems, and peace and stability in Asia, it must
approve the Heng Samrin government establishing an eifective rule in
the whole of its lands, and going ahead with rebuilding of its state.
Japan also must increase the support f or the recovery of Cambodia through
- the Heng Samrin government.
"More f undamentally, Japan.should halt its role as a'magistrate of Asia'
of the Western powers led by the United States, secede from a military
block, take the attitude of non-alignment and neutrality, and create ~
political and economic relatio.ns based on equality and mutual i~terests
= with Asian countries. This is the way to make the most use of the
strength of an 'economic power' for peace and stability in Asia." ~
CSO: 4120
12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE O11LY ~
POLITI~AL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
RELATIONSHIP BEZWEEN ABE, TANAKA ANALYZED
Tokyo MAiNICHI DAILY NEWS in English 27 Aug 80 p 5
["Nagatacho Doings "Column by Takehiko Takahashi: "Friends and Rivals--
Abe and Tanaka"]
[Text]
11I'1'1 minis[er " xoxusuKe Abe's father ~vas also a Diet positions are entirely different.
- Tanaka and Shintaro Abe, member. His w~ife's father is Abe has been attached to the
chairman of the LDP Policy former Prime 141inister camp of former Prime
Affairs Research Council, ��ere ~ Nobusuke Kishi. In this respect, hIinisters Kishi and Takeo
invited to a seminar of leaders he has grown in an environment Fukuda. As against this,
of the Japan Federation of that has made him called a Tanaka has been directly ~
E m p 1 o y e r s A s s o c i a t i o n prince of the political ~r�orld." associated a~ith the late Prime
( ~ ikkeiren~ held at Karuizawa. 1 In contrast to this. Tanaka ~iinisters Hayato Ikeda and _
These two, Tanaka and Abe, was born into a merchant's 1~lasayoshi Ohira. Tanaka's
are friends and at the same family. He had no political decision to leave jo~rnalism
time rivals. They will both be affiliations and built up his and enter the political world
~ playinga big role in lhe Liberal- political foundation through his ~cas made w~ith lkeda's support.
Democratic Party and in o~vn ability. Following Ikeda's death, ,
Japanese~politics fn~m now on. Notwithstanding, Abe and Shigesaburo ~iaeu. former
It wil~ be interesting to watch Tanaka became friends speaker of tl~e House of
whether they will advance as because Tanaka had . a close Representati~�es. succeeded as _
triends or act as rivals. rela~ionship with people ~round head of the Ikeda faction.
Abe has a Jonger experience former Prime i~tinister Kishi. Dissatisfied ~vith Alaeo's
as a politician than Tanaka. Tanaka was also a cumpanion political attitude, Tanai:a led a
Abe first becamP a Diet of Kawabe and vakamura ~vho coup within the faction and
member in 1957 and Tanaka in figured in tt~e Nissho-Iwai case. made Ohira the representati~~e
196~, a difterence ot six years. Abe and Tanaka became on of the Ikeda faction's I~ochi ~ai.
In age, Tanaka is one year older such Iriendly terms as to call It was from about this time that
than Abe. Both worked as each . other_ "Abe-Chan:', . a,nd , biaeo came to be recognized as
political reporters tor ."Rol~u�San:'`. the actual po~cer in the Kochi
newspapers at one time. Abe, a Politically, however, their Kai.
graduate of the University of
_ Tokyo, was with the 1Vlainichi
I~~ewspapers. Tanaka, a w'aseda
University graduate. ~r�orked
for Nihon Heizai Shimbun.
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
1'VL\ VL11VlaW u~~.. vl\6.,a
"T'rinCe" cooperation. Being a man �~ith 1 anaha s maneuscr~nh suc� _
fighting spirit, as soon as ceeded. The Suzuhi cabinet
On the other hand. Abe gre~v Tanaka decided to :upport ~~'as iormed. Tandka ticas ap-
up as a"prince" of the Fukuda Suzuki. tie be~an to ac~ pointed to the important post ~~f
faction. The first time that energe[ically. Tan.ai:a sough[ lo ~IITI r:~inister. Tanaka ha~
these t~so men. Abe and persua~e former Prime kno��n such leaders ot ihc
Tanaka, clashed head-on was illinister I~ishi and Abe. Thi~ iinancial ~~~orld as Shi~~eu
during the LDP's tirst open eventuall}~ became the muti~~e tiagano and TaReshi Sakurada
election of the partr president. po~~^er leading to i~ uhuda's through their relations ~c�iti~
Abe backed Fukuda w~hile statement that "Suzuki �~ill be 11~eda and Ohira. The t~~~o.
Tanaka supported Ohira. �'ith ali right." ~`agano and Sakurada, ~~~ere
tne full backing of the Kakuei During ihe formation of the earlier graduates.of the pre�~ar
Tanaka faction, Ohira emer;ed Suzuki cabi~~et, Abe and SiKth Higher School i~shich ~be
victorious. Tanaka again resumed their also attendedl. Abe kne~r� the
Under the Ohira cabinet, [ormer relationship as friends. i~ro men weil.
Rokusuke Tanak~ became the In this, the intermediary �~as :~be did not became the cl~~ef
chief cabinet secretary. Since tt~e father of Abe's wife, Kishi, cabir,et secretary but ~~~as
Abe had been the chief cabinet ��ho had once helped Tanaka. selected as chairman of tl~e
secretary under the Fukuda Presenting "Abe as chief LDP's Policy affairs Re~earch
- cabinet, Tanaka sought the Council. In that post he ~ti~ill be
cabinet secretary as a con-
same post. Tanaka's feeling of dition, Tanaka obtained the �'orking closely �~ith Tanaka.
ri~~alry with Abe ~cas clearly suppo~t of tiishi, Abe and These t�~o men, Abe and
apparenthere. erentuaily Fukuda for Suzuki. Tanaka. are destined to
Ohira's death came as a bi~ :~s far as political negotiations cooperate ~vith each other _
shock to Tanaka. This ~ti~as are concerned. Tanaka seems ~~'hile, dt the same tin~e,
because Tanaka lost a figure to be a better actor than Abe. cheching each other as rival~.
who~n he coWd support. At as they move ahead from no~~,
the beginning, Tanaka had no on in the political ~4orld.
intention of backing .Pcime tThe w�riter is a? adviser to -
..Minister Zenko-~ -Suaulr~: Bt~t The Mainicfi Ve�~spapers and
S u z u k i a s k e d f o r h i s tormer chief editoriaJ writer~.
COPYRLGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1980 _
CSO: 4120
1L~
FOR OFFI~IAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'AKAHATA' URGING ACTION AGAINST CONSTITUTION REVISION
OW041003 Tokyo JPS in English 0902 GIIT 2 Sep 80
[Text] Tokyo Sep 4 JPS--Regular sessions of local assemblies are l;eing
held in September one after another. And the September issue of AKAHATA
carries an editorial entitled "'Revision of the Constitution' Forces
Maneuvering in Local Assemblies" warns moves of the forces of reaction,
s aying :
"The Liberal Democratic Party and the forces of reaction are intensifying
their maneuvers for maximum utilization of local assemblies to gather
public opinions for mal-revision of the constitution and other reactionary
political purposes."
.
Resolutions calling for the revision of the constitution have already been
adopted by the assembly of Beppu C~ty, Oita Prefecture, Kyushu, three towns
and one village. In addition, "resolutions calling for an official visit
to Yasukuni Shrine," which adds impe~:us to the reviva'. of Japanese -
militarism, have so far been arbitrarily adopted by 22 prefectural
assemblies, ~nd 325 town and village assemblies.
_ The editorial says, "These moves are in line with reactionary offensives
embodied by remarks af Seisuke Okuno, justice minister, Yo~hio Sakurauchi,
secretary general of the I.iberal Democrat3c Party and others paving the
way for the total revival of Japanese militarism, while basing themselves
on local assemblies."
The editorial points out that "dangerous intention can be found in arbitrary
adoption of resolutions calling for the revision of the constitution -
throughout the country, utilization of these resolutions for gatheri*~g
public opinions fo?- their reactionary purposes, and the steady creation
of conditions for mal-revision of the constitut3on." ,
The editorial emphasizes that "In these circumstances the progressive forces
must react swiftly to their reactionary moves, and make known to the broad
strata of residents their dangerous intentiun. It is important for them to
nip black designs in ~~he bud." The editorial continues, "The progressive ~
forces should gather all strengths of local people seeking for improvement
, of living, the defense of rights, peace and democracy, and develop greatly
the struggle in and outside local assemblies."
CSO: 4120
15 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
POLITICAL E+ND SOCIOLOGICP.L
MIYAMOTO SPEAKS AT ,iiP YREFECTURAL COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN MEETING
OW121031 Tokyo .7~'S in English 0913 GMT 12 Sep 80
[Text] Tokyo Sep 12 JPS--At his introductory speech given at the
prefectural committee chairmen meeting, chairman of the JCP Presidium
Kenji Miyamoto spoke abouc the political situation since the fourth
Central Committee plenum (June 28-June 30).
1. Political events since the fourth plenum, though it is very regrett-
able, have endorsed the correctness of the definition of the 'second
reactionary offensive in the postwar period.' The correctness of this
definition was demonstrated by the following political events: most .
all Suzuki cabinet ministers' official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine
and an attempt to submit again the bill for state management of the
shrine; remarks of Seisuke Okuno, justice minister, for a malrevision
of the constitution; the approval by 70 percent [of theJ ministers of
the Suzuki cabinet of Okuno's remarks; maneuvers for Japanese style
fascism by the introduction of a small-constituency system; a rapid
development of security problems related to the changing of the Japan-
U.S. military alliance into an offensive and defense treaty.
- What is importazt is that the counterattack from the progrPssive position -
~ against the danger of turning rightward has not yet been. made.
2. 'I'he feature of recent conventions of national trade union organiza-
tions is: the Japan Teachers Union, the All-Japan Prefectural and
Municipal Workers Union and other trade union organizations which are
affiliated with the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo)
had to speak about "anti-security" and "antimonopoly capital" in their
action programs. They imposed the sccialist-Komei agreement line on
unionists, but they were not able to defenci themselves theoretically.
Another feature follows: the JSP said when its congress approved the
JSP-Komeito agreement ttiat "joint struggles with the communist party
will be develope~" in the Diet and in self-government administrations, ~
although the JCP [was] "excluded from a government power plan." However,
when we review the elections for heads of municipalities held over the
past 6 months, joint struggles in communist-socialist cooperation in
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
preceding elections were re~ected by the socialist parLy in 4 prefectures
and 16 cities in this period, and JSP-JCP joint struggles were success-
- ful only in 4 cities and 3 towns. This provides us with clear evidence
that the JSP- Komeito agreement has brought about splits not only in the
struggle for political power but also in various fields of mass movements.
3. The other question is the question of the attitude toward the con- ~
ference of trade unions for promotion of a united front (CTU-UF). The
CTU-UF began its activities 10 years ago, in 1966, and is 1.2 million
- strong now. Z"ae reason why the Sohyo~JSP bloc suddenly began regarding
it as taboo, and calling it fractionist or splittist is that they have
fallen into an anticommunist splittist line, encoura~ing Komei leaders.
4. Despite the fact that the dangerous current toward the revival of
Japanese militarism and Japanese-style fascism is clear, any progressive
joint actions or a united front hava been obstructed by the anti-
communist splittist line, even deepening cracks in mass movements--joint
actions and a united front which are truly able to struggle against
the r~~ival of Japanese militarism arid Japanese-style fascism. This
is a terrible situation.
5. Succeeding the cenventional tradition of October 21 actions, five
organizations, including the central executive committee for abrogation
of the security treaty and other demands, decided on September 10 to
carry on united actions while hoisting the banner of the abrogation
of tne Japan-~.S. security treaty. This has very important significance
at this time, as the JSP-Sohyo bloc hauled down the banner of abrogation
of the treaty and destroyed the conventional joint struggle setup on
the pretext that they would establis:l a"people's congress" in which
even the new liberal club and the Democratic-Socialist Party can take part.
Though the socialist-Komei agreement, which is a betrayal to the Japanese
people, appeared in mass movement ftelds, the Japanese working class
and the progressive forces are resolutely defending the banner of pro-
gress in mass movement fields by their actua.:~ actions. This has
important significance at home and internationally.
- 6. The mass media have madly played Ritsu Ito up as if he was a very
influential person and was acquainted with party history, and could
. rewrite the party his''ory if he wanted. But the fact is that he was
elected merely a member of the Central Committee by the Fifth Party
Congress.
" Taking up Ito at present, the Liberal-Democratic Party, Democratic-
Socialist Party, and Komei party are trying to connect questions con- -
cerned with Ito ta the Japanese Co~nunist Party, with the aim to launch
~ attacks on the JCP. They are trying to create various stories and
arguments claiming that the JCP is responsible for Ito's case. We are
prepared to make proper counterattacks to whoever tries to distort the
party history and to attack the party by using the Ritsu Ito question.
- 17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
rvA vrL~i~.icw ..i.... -
_ 7. Speaking of relations with China, the Chinese side also said it _
seems right that Ritsu Ito was a b etrayer. They may know well ab~ut
- that as rhere are clear evidences. Now China is in the process of
~equidation [as r~ceived) for themselves of the "Cultural Revolution."
Nevertheless, those who are now in charge of Japan-China relations from
the Chinese side are the same persons who have taken the command of the
subversive activities against the Japanese Communist Party at th.e Cime
of tne "Cultural Revolution, on the dogma that the "Cultural Revolution"
is correct and that the Mao Zedong course is the supreme revolutionary
course throughout the caorld. Therefore, it may take some time till
their self-criticism of the era of the "Cultural Revolution" will develop
into self-criticism of the foreign policy in that era, and into self-
criticism of the error that tried to unify the communist parties all over
the world on the basis of the Mao Zedong course. The Japanese Communist
Party is the party which has looked through, at the earliest moment,
the character of the "Cultural Revolution. Just in the same manner
as looking at the progress of history, we will look quietly at the
change taking place in China.
- CSC: 4120 -
18
FOR OFFICIAL iTSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
FOR UFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL Al\TD SOCIOLOGICAL
SONYO LEADER PROPOSES DIVISION OF SOCIALIST FARTY
OW150953 Tokyo JPS in English 0921 GMT 15 Sep 80
[Text] Tokyo Sep 15 JPS--Mitsuo Tomizuka, secretary general of the
General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), and one of central
promoters of the socialist-Komeito agreement, a key factor of the
rightward shift of the socialist party, has reportedly proposed a
"division of the socialist party," alleging that a"Sohyo party" shou.ld
be established, and that the JSP should turn into a"national mass party."
_ This was announced in an interview with an editor of the Kimura Economic
Institute, and his statement was carried by the August 20 issue of its
publication. (Kimura: The Late JSP Memtxer) [as received] He said that
_ if there had not been the agreement, influence of the JSP would have
been decreased and the Sohyo organization itself would have been damaged.
At the same time, Tomizuka favorably spoke about joint struggles with
the Democratic Socialist Party, arguing that "it is already 26 years
since the Japanese self-defense forces were set up." "No results will
be expected, though we continue an opposition to the SDF." Thus, he
_ denounced the movement against the SDF, which are insubordination to
- the U.S., and runs counter to the constitution. He made it clear that
he will deny past- struggles by the socialist and communist parties and
Sohyo, saying that "it is of no use carrying on conventional struggles
by restricted peoples.
The Sohyo leadership has recently thrown down the banner of abrogation
of the security treaty in coming October 21 actions, and set forth a
policy of dissolving and splitting a united working committee for the
October 21 struggle. Tomizuka's.remarks are worthy of drawing
attention, as his remarks were made against the background of Sohyo's
anti-progressive line, said the September 15 issue of AKAHATI?.
CSO: 4120
19
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
ECANOMI C _
- PAPER VIEWS REPORT ON U. S.-JAPAN TRADE FAVORA~3LY
OW120250 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 11 Sep 80 p 12 _
[ Edi torial : "U . S. Trade Report on Japan" ]
[Text; It is heartening to learn that at le3st a segment of the U.S.
congress has a good understanding of the Japanese market and of Japan-U.S.
trade relations. A report recently released by the subcommittee on trade
of the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means points out
- tha t Japan today is no longer a"closed" market.
The report says that, with the exception of certain agricultural products
and high-technology items, notably beef, citrus fruits and teleco~nunica- _
tions equipme*_:~ , ours is generally an open market. The large trade
imbalance is blamed more on the lack of U.S. efforts to expand exports
than on Japanese trade barriers.
- That is where the report differs significantly from the so-called Jones
report, which was completed in January last year by the Japan-U.S. task
force, h~aded by Mr. James R. ~Tones, of the same subcommittee. The
Jones report, which was widely read here because it offered a compre-
hensive, and most2y objective, analysis of Japan-U,S. trade problems,
was concerned primarily with short-term measures to open up the Japanese
ma rket and correct the "unacceptab le and destructive" trade deficit that
reached a record $12 billion in 1978.
Mr. Jones' contention was that Japan still maintained a wide range of
tr ade and structural barriers, including.even government-business
co operation, to protect its domestic market against foreign competition. .
H is message, therefore, was directed mainly to the Japanese audience--
th at Japan should buy more from the U.S. and build more manufacturing
fa cilities there in order to reduce the imbalance.
Much progress has been made so far in that direction. Nevertheless, the
t r ade gap remains dangerously wide. Is this because the Japanese
market is still protected? The second Jones report in effect says it
is not. Instead, it reminds the Americans that the U.S. should try
harder to sell abroad and after its trade and domestic policy to
f acilitate such attempts.
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Thus the new report challenges the deep-seated perception in the U.S.
that Japan is not an open trading nation, and that the trade deficit
will shrink only if Japan dismantles its protectionist barriers. That
perception is not likely to change overnight, but the unjaundic~d view
_ expressed by the trade subcommittee provides a welcome sign that U.S.
understanding of the Japanese market is gradua lly improving.
The latest report is worthy of note in another important respect. While
the f irst report focused on immediate trade problems, the second one
~ takes a long-range, and constructive, view of the basic problems that
the U.S, faces. It attacks the root causes of the relative decline in
the competitiveness of American products.
The basic direction is toward so-called "re industrialization." "We
believe that Japan's rate of industrial progres s and stated economic
goals should be as shocking to Americans as was the Sputnik," says the
report. "Like Sputnik, we should be shocked in tc responding to the
challer~ge." The analogy is exaggerated, but the call for revitalization
of American industry is not.
What the report envisions is something like "U.S. Incorporated"--the
U.S. version of a cooperative government-industry relationship designed
to strengthen Amer~Lcan industry and beat b ack Japanese campetition in
such high-technology fields as computers, indus trial robots, an.d semi-
conductor chips. And it suggests that the U,S. Zearn from Japanese
experience in order to improve the quality of products and develop more
productive labor-management relations.
Al1 in all, the second report seems to ref lect a belief that many problems
the U.S. faces in trade with Japan are int ernal--and, by implication,
that Japan is not solely to blame. However, this should not lead us to
complacency overt the present and future state of our trade and economic
relations with the U.S.
Th e report itself notes that there still remain "very tough, residual
attitudes of protectionism" in Japan. Whether or not "protectionism"
is the right word to describe it, there is the underlying problem of
Japan's different cultural backgrounds that tend to create U.S. mis-
understandings and unnecessarily increase economic friction. -
There are also immediate problems, including the disputes over cars and
teleco~nunications equipment buying, that continue to strain our economic
relations with the U.S. and in the long term, Japan faces the prospect
of new disputes arising in other fields, in which the two major industrial
nations appear headed for intensified competiti on in the years ahead.
COPYRIGHT: The Japan Times 1980 -
CSO : 4120
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
E CONOMI C
'ASAHI SHIMBUN' VIEWS CARTER'S ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION PLAN
OW081317 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 6 Sep 80 p 5
[ASAHI SHIMBUN 5 September editorial: "Revitalizing U.S. Economy"]
[Excerp ts] The United States is suffering f rom a two-digit inf lation rate,
high unemployment and a drop in its international competitiveness as a
result of low productivity. Now there is debate in the U.S. about re-
- vivin~ the economy. President Carter's ar.nouncement of an economic
revival plan may have been just an election ploy, but it shows that the
United States wants to make its economy strong once again. -
Besides tax reductions, Carter's plan advocates greater governmental in- _
volvement in the workings of the economy. For example, the government
would do more in the fields of unemployment assistance and occupational _
retraining and would provide recession subsidies. Carter also wants to
create a forum in which the government, comp anies and labor unions can
discuss economic matters and create trading f irms.
The Republican Party, however, b elieves tha t greater government involvement
~aill encourage the people to rely too much on welfare and make them
less self-reliant.
Neither of the two parties, however, has looked at the relationship between
government deficits, which will come about as a result of the tax reduc-
tion, and inflation. Both parties are advocating the greater production
of armaments, but it is doubtful whether this is compatible with the
present level of welfare spending,
It has also been suggested that the U.S. should adopt the system used in
Japan, where the government and business companies work closely together. "
This, however, would mean a great change in the thinking of the American
people who tend to regard the relationships between the administration and
companies and between business companies and organized labor as being
necessarily adversary.
The deb ate about revitalizing th e American economy is in the early stages;
_ it should produce more than slogans for the presidential election.
22
FOR C~FF~CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. An economically strong U.S. is also good for Jap an, which would be placed
= in a d.ifficult position if the U,S. resorted t o p rotect3onism, Healthy
competition between the U.S. and Japan is a force for the improvement of
the global economy. Japan should act generously and increase its invest-
, ment in the U,S. and provide information about Japanese management methods.
In this way, it can help in the revitalization of the American economy.
COPYF.IGHT: Asahi Evening News 1980
I
CSO: 4120
.
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
i VL\ Vr ? t~.tcv. ~+v~. va~i+~
ECONOMI C
PETRODOLLARS FLOOD JAPANESE rIARKET
Tokyo i~IAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 27 Aug 80 p 5
[Text]
The world's oil-producing nations- UYE(; nations, at the receiving end of
flush w~ith petrodollars amid ever�rising perhaps the greatest transfer of ~cealth
crude prices-are diversifying their in human history, are espected to earn
in~�estments worldwide to protect their surplus rerenues of about 5110 billion this
ne�~ riches from the ravages of inflation. year alone on top of morQ than S30u
Considering its economic strength and billion accumulated in the past.
potential, it is hardly surprising that The trans[er of the massive oil-
Japan is fast becoming a major haven generated wealth w�ould pose a danger of
fur the gusher of oil money fiowing into serious disruption to the world economy
the coffers of the oil-rich investors. ~cithout effective recycling of the
- btass buy~ orders-both direct from Fetrodollars. _
Arab nations and through international The increasing oil-money investments
financial institutions handling their in- in Japan are stirring fears in some
vestments-are flooding the Japanese quarters that the oil-producing nations,
stock and bond markets. acquiring substantial equity stakes,
� might try ta take o~�er Japanese cor-
Diversification Efforts porations.
But government officials discount such
"The oil-rich financial barons are fears, pointing out that the present
increasing their investments in Japanese regulations bar foreign investors from _
stocks at a fast clip as part of their in- ~~9~~g an equity share of over 25 _
~~es!ment di~~ersification efforts," sa}~s percent in a Japanese corporation.
one analyst. "The Japanese stock The oil-rich nations haVe so far limited
market ow�es much of its present their investments in Japan to
prosperitytopetrodollars." securities-stocks, bonds and deben- .
To handle OPEC's growing petrodollar tures. Thou~h thev have been investing _
surplus, the Bank of Tokyo has joined the in real estate in the U.S.. the Arabs ha~�e
Bank ot America, Citibank, Chase engaged in no such aetivity in Japan,
~Ianhattan and other international banks �'here land prices continue to sl:yrocket.
in opening a branch in Bahrain, the Arab No esact tigures are available on the
amount of oil money t7o~~�ing into Japan
financial center. Several other Japanese but securities industr~~ esti:nates
banks and securities firms are also generally put the balance ut petrodollnr
reported planning to open offices in investments in Japanese ~ecur~ties at S~
Bahrain. biltion.
~4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
As tar as Japanese stochs are cori- million? monthiy. ~
c,erned, foreign portfolio buying topped The purchases, presumably by such
selling by a record 2~5 billion yen ~ 51.1 Arab nations as Saudi Arabia, the United
- billion) in the first half of this year. The Arab Emirates, Iraq ar.d Kuwait-center
excess inflows continue to rise monthlY. on national bonds but include govern-
A check o[ the stockholders lists of inent-guaranteed bonds uf public cor-
ma jor Japanese corporations in the last porations and corporate debentures.
fiscal year sho~ved that oil-rich investors The Bank of Japan is seUing Japanese
��ere among the stocl:holders of 195 national bonds-reportedly 200 million a
companies, 11 percent of the firms listed month-to the Saudi Arabian 1Ionetary
`y on the nation's stock~ exchanges. The Agency (SA1IAi.
= number of shares o~~~ned by such in- At the same time, there are
vestors rose 2.6 times over a}~ear ago. widespread mo~�es among Japanese
Actual figures are believed to be much firms to sell bonds in the ;~liddle East in
larger, since the Arabs often make their the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen and the
investments anonymously in the names dinar cKu�~aiti currency).
af European financial institutions. A number of Japanese firms. including
kubota Ltd., Niigata Engineering Co.,
LOng-Term Investments Toshiba Corp. and ~tilitsubishi Hea~�y
Industries, have floated ~ bonds in the
And it looks as though oil-rich 1~Iideast to raise funds.
moneymen tend to make long-term in- Such activity is expected to increase
vestments. Their equity shares declined following the Japanese Finance
from the previous year in only 41 of the ~7inistry's decision earlier this vear to
195 firms involved, holding steady or allow Japanese firms to sell ~~en-
increasing in the others. denominated bonds in the 1~iideast. ~
The check also shqwed that Kuwait led Yen~quoted bonds involve no rishs
the oil-rich stockholders in Japan w~ith from currency exchange fluctuations.
- 109 million shares, followed by Brunei unlike those, denominate~ in the L'.S.
with ZO million. Qatar ~vith 1�l million and dollar and other ioreign currencies. -
Saudi Arabia 7 million.
Hitachi, Toshiba and i~Iitsubishi l~Ioves to induce �oil money are
Electric-the electronics giants-~~ere spreading from plant exports and other
favorites with oil-rich investors, who firms with close business ties to the
seem to favor high-technology stocks. A~ideast to firms having little business -
The stepped-up petrndollar investment there,' like Ito-Xokado Co., the super�
in Japanese stocks obviously reflects the market chain.
economic strength of Japan, whIch has Ito-Yokado sold yen-quoted convertible
successfully weathered business bonds worth 5 billian yen (S22 million? in
disruptions caused by oil price spirals. July in Kuwait.
Japan has stayed in relatively good
economic hea~th ~r�hile the rest of the Ignoring Mart Trends
industrial world has been suffering from
double-diglt inflation and recession. �'hat is significant about oil mone~~
Oil-producing nations have also been investments in Japan these days is that
making heaw investments in Japanese they now have little to do with foreign�
bonds. eschange market trends.
9ince April, foreign portfolio buying of Until recently, such investments
Japanese bonds-much of it ~vith oil tended to rise when the yen's value w�as
money, again-have been exceeding high against the li.S. dollar and tended to
selling by more than I00 billion ven (5450 drop when it was lou�.
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FoR ur~r~lcl~ u5~: UNLY
That is no longer true. and in recent
months, when the y~en's value was
easing, oil-money investments were
active.
This is evidently because oil-rich in-
vestors, in continuing to increase their .
stakes in Japan, believe the yen is
basically strong in the long range. -
l Kyodo)
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1980
;
CSO: 4120
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ECONOMIC
SCANDAL SURROUNDING IRAN PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT REPORTED
Tokyo SHUKAN SHINCHO in Japanese 7 Aug 80 pp 136-139
[Text] Former King Pahlavi of Iran has finally passed away. Around that
time, the Japanese Government had ~ust about decided to resume financing
the Iranian petrochemical national pra~ect, which had been held in abeyance.
This is thesecond phase of financing; the first phase was executed in late
March of this year. The amount: 2.6 billion yen. This means that the con-
struction work which was stopped in the conf~zsion of the aftermath of the
Iranian revolution wili finally be resumed- but wait awhile: Although it is
said that the fierce will of new Minister of International Trade and
Industry [MITI] Rokusuke ~'anaka had c].inched this government financing,
scandalous rumors are already emanating from behind the scenes.
"How could he have handed down an administrative decision on the Iranian
problem when he has been minister for only a few days? Generally speaking,
the minister is still being briefed on ~urisdictional matters. Of course,
all newly appointed ministers, even if they are not fully knawledgeable of
their ~ob requirements, grope their way and declare their feelings. If
these, then, axe to be considered as administrative decisions, then they
� are nothing more than premature actions."
So saying, the secretary to MITI Minister Rokusuke Tanaka promptly threw up
a smokescreen. Be that as it may, no one can say otherwise on the matter
but that the second phase of government financing was unofficially -
decided quickly after Mr Tanaka's appointment as minister. (Note: It has
been specui.ated that the officiel decision will be made about 10 Augusta )
Actually this isthe state of affairs after the explanation by Ken~iro
Taguchi, head of the Economic Cooperation Section of MITI's Trade Industry
Policy Bureau, who has been involved in the resump~;ion of financing.
"Sinc:e this second phase or financing occurred after Ambassador Extra-
ordinaxy and Plenipotentiary (Kuhiya) arrived in Japan in mid-June as
Iran's representative, and when administrative axrangements were being
actively pursued in Japan, it wasn't only the mi.nister's doings. The minis-
ter was fully aware of this matter during his service as chief cabinet
27
FOR OFFICIA,'.. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
secretary, and it is true th at he showed enthusiasm soon after his appo~_nt-
ment, but as for the coincident thinking of the minister and the administra-
tive agency, this was purely accidental,"
~ In other words, if the new minister had not been especially ag~essive about
this matter, then it would mean that the resumption of financing would
_ probably not h ave been unofficially decided as rapidly as was the caseo
Actuel7,y, the determination shawn by MITI Minister Tanaka "on this problem"
was an extr aordinary show. Soon after hzs appointment as minister, he not
only resumed government financing but also decla~ed, "tf necessary, increase
the finance allocation; but by a11 means the p:o~ect must be brought to
n
completion. As forthe promotion of the pro,ject, differing opinions of
sorts alreac~y have been lodged strongly, ar.d so its course is unknown. And
fai~ from the "groping" described by the secretary, an aggressive posture
' with the ful].est of confidence was taken.
To begin with, at this stage there is no need to tediously explain the
- details on how the Iranian petrochemical plant plan, initially undertaken
privately by Mitsui & Co., Ltd., h ad been converted into a national pro~ect
in the midst of its prominence last autumn, or how government financing was
achieved with a sum reaching a total of 20 billion yen received from the
Overseas Economic Development Fund. In brief, the government took over a
private enterprise that was at a standstill because of slipshod planning,
and pumped into it hard-earned taxpayers' money,
But construction work was suspended because of the confusion that followed
the Iranian revolution. With Iran still in a state of political instabil-
; ity, even if 85 percent of the pro~ect is said to be completed, with the
original construction cost estimate of more than 200 billion yen swelling
to 550 billion yen because of the oil shock, with the rate of inflation in
Iran being an appalling 50 percent per annwn, and the outlook on the con-
struction work being gloomy, there is no way of determining how much more
has to be invested before it b ecomes a paying proposition" (according to a
large business firm executive in charge of petroleum). Such being the sit- -
uation, even t;he government, as may b e expected, has come to hold back on
the second phase of financing.
In a sense~ it would be correct to say that this unofficial decision was a
frontal assault through these so-called pessimistic situations.
Was the Ministeria.l Appointment a Fasce?
Be that as it ma.y, why is Minister Tanaka showing such a fierce determina-
tion to promote the Iranian petrochemical pro~ect?
Already scandalous rumors have been springing forth.
An authority on Iranian affairs explains thusly: "Graft is the most
repeatedly mentioned sub~ect a.mong authorities on Iran. When the Iranian
28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
petroch.emical plan was converted into a national pro~ect last autumn, the
rumor being circulated was that Mitsui had contributed 3 billion yen to
then Prime M3nister Ohira; this rumor was a topic of discussion by
Te.kamoto Hosokawa and Hirotatsu Fu,jiwara on their TV program "Ra.mblinga
on Current Events." But the truth is that the sum of 3 billion yen was
not handed over at that time. 'I~he secret agreement was tha~ 'when every-
thing is saf'ely completed, 3 billion yen will b e delivered'; of that sum 1
billi~n yen was said to have been delivered to Prime Minister Ohira at the
time of the plan's conversion as a national pro,jecto"
But Pri.me Minister Ohira accomplished only the first phase of financing
before meeting a sudden death.
"An d," continues the authority after a pause, "the fact is that this graft
was inherited by leaders of the Ohira faction as the legacy of Mr Ohira.
Consequently, new Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki fi.Ll.ly acknowledged this
graft arrangement. But since becoming �'rime Minister, he cannot be involved
in this sort of intrigue. Therefore, it is said that Mr Tanaka, who
singlehandedly had been handling Mr Ohira's dirty deals from way b ack, has
taken it over."
If this is true, then one would be apt to describe the amount of 500 million
yen [received] in the Lockheed scandal by the black market shogun who
resides in Me,jiro [former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka] to b e a paltry sum:
But, possibly, apart from this "graft report," the following sort of talk
caused a stir at Nagata-cho right after the formation of the new cabinet,
"At the outset of the cabinet forma,tion Cdiscussions], Roku-san [MITI
Minister Tanaka's nickname] was not especially considered for ar~y position.
Although the public unanimously accepted that Roku-san had distinguished
himself in the forma.tion of the Suzuki cabinet, Zenko had the formation of
a suprsparty cabinet in mind and felt that picking Tanaka for an important
position would be too obvious as a rewesd recognizing his party services.
Meanwhile, Roku-san himself spread the word of his selection as chief
cabinet secretary, but upon learning that the position was filled he
suddenly switched to drumming for the position of MITI minister. Backup
reasons given for the cabinet selection were that he had once served as
MITI's political affairs undersecrete,ry and that he was deeply involved in
the energy problem, but under those circumstances several others are ,~ust
as eligible as he. But his selection without ar~y noticeable opposition was
the result of his quick visits even to the leaders of financial circles and
his forceful actions to prevent any debate on his suitability," (by a
political commentator)
_ Thus, the fact is that Mr Tanaka had reasons to tenaciousl,y seek the posi-
tion of NLITI minister. To add to the previously mentioned "graft report,"
Prime Minister Suzuki at the beginning did not select Mr Tana.ka to the
position of MTTI minister because, in his farsighted reasoning, he wanted
to avoid ar~y direct link with Tanaks.'s graft involvement--and so, could
Ta.naka's selection have been a rigged affair?
. 29
FOR OFFICItiI, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
,
' A political a.nalyst knowledgeable about the inside affairs oi the Liberal- _
Democratic Party has this story. In reality, to the leaders, sucti as
Suzuki and Tanaka, who took over the Ohira faction, the i mediate problem
is the settlement of the debt left by Ohira. From the two elections, held
this year and last year,Ohira left a debt of several billion yen and died.
Loans were obtained from security companies and banks, and the truth about
the failure of Nakasone to form a cabinet was that he could not shoulder
the burden of this debt
This is to say that the need for money was the crwc of the matter.
"Gas Supply" Suspended
And there are others--such as that a Mitsui executive serves as an adviser
to Prime Minister Suzuki, or that MITI Minister Tanaka had actively worked
to establish a direct line to Mitsui, and countless other tidbits of
information. But they wi11 be dispensed with because of sp~ce limitations.
In ar~y case, the truth for the present is nowhere but in the center of the I
thicket . ~
But, on reflection, even the Lockheed scandal sta.rted off with small bits of ~
information. Isn't the moral of all this to have all "scandalous rumors"
~f the political world written down?
In ar~y case, the problem is whether the second phase of government financing
will turn out to be a"fortune" or a"misfortune." Soon afterP~lavi's
unofficial decision was made, the announcement of former King
death was received. Will there be changes in the Iranian state of affairs?
As back~ound for the goverrunen~'s support for increased capitaliza~ion now
is the fact that Japan had deferred to the Uni~ced St ates up antil now and
had exercised restraint. It was not clearly knawn whattcof thetAmeri an~
- ~apanese petrochemical plan (IJPC) should take, in ligh
sanctions revolving around the hostage problem. But n~r the IJPC is the
only means of restoring relations between Iran and the advanced nations of
the West. The government decided that this above a11 must be maintained
totally as an exception," said Mitsui executives with poker faces to cover
up for the government.
Co~u.d this be the truth? But the experts unanimously say that "the entire
matter should not be taken too lightly."
~An economic ,journalist wh~ travels frequently t~ Iran had tYiis to say .
The workers at the site in (Bandaru Khome.yni) (the Iect willtbe successful.
site) are most pessimistic. No one believes the pro~
In agreement with this is Kunihiko Adachi, IJPC president, who is stationed
in Iran. Of course it will be unsuccessful. Iran today is like Communist
China during the Great Cultural Revolution. Co~nands issued by superiors
are not obeyed by subordinates. In addition, the country itself is divided
- into a dual porwer structure of the [government] administration and laborers'
- 3G
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
commLittees who are reportecl],y more powerful than the administration. Even ~
with the resumption ~f the construction work, not everything is operating
smoothly. Etiren without doing anything, today both Japan and Iran are
assuming 3 million yen a month in interest. Although i~t is reported that,
for the months of July, August, and September, about 3.9 billion yen from
the 100 companies involved in the plan and about 2.6 billion yen from the
government's second phase of financing will be paid, the expenses are mou.-~t-~
ing. But back in Tol~yo, no one listens to such woes of the people at the
site. Rather, ~ust recently, President Adachi~s reappointment was approvedo"
According to another authority on oil problems: "To ca.i�ry out the Iranian
petrochemical pro~ect in the present manner and to further increase govern-
_ ment financing will only raise issues. Even if it is openly completed,
the prospect of peyback is extremely poor. Simply speaking, Iran's crude
oil production.output since the revolu~tion has fallen considerably. Where-
as 6 million barrels formerly were produced dai~jr, today the amount is onl;~
1.6 million barrels. Original~}r the Iranian petrochemical pro~ect was
planned for maximum utilization of natural gas, whose emission would follow
crude oil production. The f uel and products are supported by this gas.
- Besides the dearth of this gas, the facilities to draw the gas were
operated under contract by an American firm, Parsonso Said firm has
evacua.ted,and not considering the hoste,ge problem, and purely from the
standpoint of economics, the prospects of this firm's returning are dim.
Even if crude oil production is revived, the bulbs axe all rus-ted and
things will not work out as they are planned on the drawing board. The
Iranians are saying that naphtha should be used as a substi~tute, but in the
original plan the LPG produced from natural gas was to be sold and from
this, 100 billion yen was to be transferred for construction costs; this
naw is only a dream. Japan was sost desirous of producing LPG, which can-
not be obtained from naphtha. This is fine with the Iranians, since their
ob,~ective is to produce a petrochemlcal product called "aroma," w.~.ich can
be obtained from naphtha, but for Japan it would mean the loss of the
ob~ective of the pro~ect itself.
Outbreak of a New Upheaval
A college professor whose research specialty is Near Eastern economics
summarizes in conclusion: "Pahlavi~s death in a sense can be considered as -
- only the removal of one of the stumbling blocks in the hostage affa.ir. In
the beginning the request to "return the Shah" had a direct connection
' with the hostages, bu~ subsequently the focus has been on the spy accus a-
tions, the U.S. Embassy, and related sub,jects. To be sure, the possibility
exists th~t with the 'Shah's death, the hostage problem will be resolved in
a different direction. Hereafter the Iranians will try to prove to the
world that the hostages were spies, but the punishment will probably be
~ust a formality. But,"continues the professor, "Iran's biggest dilemma
is the reduction of its petroleum revenues. As of the present, things axe
safe, because the export charges up until April will be received in payment
up until August, but the revenues thereafter will be sharply reduced when
economic sanctions are applied by the various countries. The bulk of Iran's
- 31
FOR OFFICIEw USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
FOR OFFICIAI. USF. (1NLY
national buc:get goes to pay the salaries of government workEi�s and ttie
wages of laborers. After 10 months, Iran's foreign currency holdings are
reported to hit bottom. Urider these circumstances, occurrence of a panic
situation in the country is unavoidable.
Will a new upheaval occur?
The latter part of the scandalous r1m?or is still to be described, to wit:
"Presently the word "success" in the phrase "payola on success" has taken
on a new meaning. It is based not on completion oi the pro~ect, but on -
continuation of government financing until the Iranians cry, "We quit."
If Mitsui should give up, this is because there won't be ar~y payment of
export insurance against the invested mone.y.
As for the eyes of "misfortune," perhaps it would be more apt to say that
they are focused not on MITI Minister Tanaka, but on us, the people, who
ere forced to pay our hard-earned te.x money.
COPYRIGHT: Shinchosha 1980
9 Slo
cso: 4105
32
- FOR OFFICI~I. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
EC c?NOMIC
DISCUSSIONS ON MEXICO'S OIL SUPPLIES TO JAPAN
Tokyo JIJI in English 1411 GMT 10 Sep 80
[Text] Tokyo, 10 Sep (JIJI Press)--President Tokio Nagayama of the
Japan Petroleum Association said Wednesday he hopes to confer with
President Jorge Diaz Serrano of Mexico's state-run oil company PEMEX
on an increase in crude oil supplies to this country when he visits here -
in mid-October.
Prospects are brightening thanks to an oil glut worl3wide, he said at
a news conference. By the end of the year, he predicte d, Mexico's oil
supplies to Japan would probably be raised to 100,00Q barrels a day.
Serrano will visit Japan to attend the J.2th meeting of the Japan-Mexico
businessmen's committee to be held in Tokyo for 3 days from 13 October.
Nagayama said the Mexican oil shipment to Japan in September would be
increased from 50,000 barrels a day to 75,000 barrels, pointing out
the easing of the world oil situation is working favorab ly for this
country.
His remark virtually reversed a gloomy view he had earl ier expressed on
Mexican oil supp~y problem. The dominant view last month was that it
would be impossible to get the supply increased to 100,000 barrels a day
by the end of the year.
Under an agreement, PEMEX is to supply 50,000 r.o 75,000 barrels of crude
per day in July-September and 75,000 to 1Q0,000 barrels per day in
October-December. But it notified Japan last month that the ceiling of
its supplies in the last quarter will be reduced to 75,000 barrels a day
and that the amount could be further cut by 15 to 20 percent.
CSO: 4120
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ECONOMIC
ACTIVITIES OF THE 'OVERSEAS ECONOMIC COOPERATION FUND' IN AFRICA REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1962
(Text] Created in March 1961, the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation
Fund (OECF) limited its activities to a policy of loans and investments with
Japanese firms that were setting up installation or expansion projects in
developing countries. The role of the Fund was expanded in 1966 by the power
to grant direct loans to foreign states in the final stages of development.
" From 1961 to 30 September 1978 the Fund intervened in 959 operations repre-
senting a total of 1,889,000,000 yen, 1,684,000,000 of it in direct loans to
states and 205,000,000,000 in financing for investments and interests of
Japanese firms in developing countries (1 yen = approximately 0.018 French
francs or 0.9 CFA francs).
Naturally, Asia was the principal fie13 of action of the Fund (84.4 percent
of the public loans). Fund interventions in Africa have totaled since the be-
ginning 191,400,000,000 yen in loans to states and 27,100,000,000 in invest-
ment financing for Japanese companies.
The di,stribution of the direat: lo~ns .is as follows (in millions of yen) :
Algeria ..................10,800 Madagascar............... 5,200
Egypt ...................95,125 Malawi................... 4,594
Morocco 3,000 Rwanda................... 1,107
Sudan 8,000 Tanzania................. 3,748
Tunisia 4,000 Zaire....................34,496
Ethiopia 3,700 Zambia................... 4,500
Kenya ....................13,097 Tota1................191,367
Recent interventions concerned the projects listed below:
Algeria: A loan of 3,700,000,000 yen to expand the telecommunications
system by building microwave connections in the northern and southern
parts of the country, within the framework of the second Four-Year De-
velopment Plan.
3~.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
Egypt: A loan of 23,000,000,000 yen to realize the first phase of the
_ work of deepening and wideni.ng the Suez Canal.
.
Morocco: A loan of 3,000,000,000 yen to improve the railroad and purchase
traction equipment, within the framework of the third Five Yea,r Develop-
ment Plan.
Tunisia: A loan of 4,000,000,000 yen to finance the purchase by the
Tunisian Navigation Company of two freightexs for transport of phosphates.
Kenya: A loan of 3,400,000,000 yen to realize a road program in rural
areas.
Madagascar: A loan of 3,000,000,000 yen for the hydro-electric develop-
ment proj ect at Namorona.
Malawi: A loan of 4,600,000,000 yen to build a new international airport
20 km north of Lilongwe.
T anzania: A loan of 2,400,000,000 yen to install and equip an earth
station for satellite communications.
In the financing for J apanese firms, most often realized in joint-venture form
in ~.tne,rshi~r.with local companies, African operations are as follows: in
. Swaziland, a sugar refinery; in Zaire, extraction of copper ore; in Senegal,
. maritime fishing; in Niger, prospecting for uraniferous ores; in the Sudan, _
. prospecting for chrome ore.
On the other hand, the Fund is studying the matter of its participation in the ~
financing of geologic prospecting in Libya and developing the manganese ore
deposit in Tambao in Upper Volta, both projects being joint venture partner-
ships.
Kaneo Ishihara is assuming the presidency of the OECF; he is assisted by four
general managers: Tateo Suzuki, Shigeru Yuki, Yutaka Takemura and Fumio Araki.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moret~c. et Cie Paris 1980
� 8946
CSO: #~00
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8
~
ECONOMIC
BRIEFS �
USED CARS TO CHINA--Tokyo, 5 Sep (JIJI Press)--Toyoda Tsusho Kaisha, Ltd.
of the Toy~ta group has concluded a contract with China to export 580
used cars, all made by Toyota Motor Co., informed sources disclosed here ~
Thursday. Of the total, 160 units are the van-type "C~rona Mark II"
and the remaining 420 units the delivery van-type "Liteace." This is the
first export of Toyota's used cars to China. China has expressed a
strong desire to import secondhand automobiles, while the Toyota side
has placed priority on exporting new vehicles. But in view of used
- car glut in the domestic market, Toyoda Tsusho decided on the exports,
the sources said. [TextJ [OW071341 JIJI in English 1227 GMT 5 Sep 80]
LARGE IRAQI AUTOMOBILE ORDER--Nagoya, 8 Sep (JIJI Press)--Toyota Motor
Sales Co., a marketing arm of Toyota Motor Co., has landed an order for
60,000 motor vehicles from the automobile state enterprise of Iraq, it
was announced Monday. This is the biggest single order for automobiles
Toyota has ever received from abroad. It calls for Toyota to supply
10,000 "Crown" passenger cars, 40,000 "Corona" passenger cars and 10,000
small trucks by Augusr r~ext year. Shipments will start this month.
Iraq is vigorously pushing industrialization with its expanding oil
revenue, bringing growing demand for automobiles for public works.
Moreover, there is a brisk auto demand in the private sector, causing a
- rapid increase in imports of small passenger cars and trucks. Last
October, Toyota received a massive order for 46,820 automobiles from -
Iraq. The firm's exports to the Middle East country will likely exceed
the 80,000 unit-level in 1980. [Text] [OW091115 JIJI in English 1446 GMT
8 Sep 80]
STEEL TECHNOLOGY FOR ROMANIA--Nippon Seikko Company has signed a 7-year con- _
tract with Uzinexportimport, a Ro.manian firm engaging in the er.port and im-
port of iron and steel"products, to export Japan's technology for making
large-size steel forgings to Ro.mania. Romania will use this technology to
make rotor-shafts for turbine generators. Technical assistance under the con-
tract covers the entire process from ma.king 400-ton steel ingots to electro-
analysis, forging and processir~g of machinery. The Japanese technology will
be used in IMGB, a large heavy machinery plant under Uzinexportimport, which
is being expanded. The contract price is 2.5 billion yen including techni-
cal guidance fees. [OW290507 Tokyo NIH~*T KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 27 Aug
80 morning edition p 7J
CSO; 4105 ?6
FOR OFFICIA~. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY -
GOVERI~IENT PLANT TO EXTRACT URANIUM FROM SEAWATER
OW121139 Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 11 Sep 80 p 1
[Text] The government, with a view to realizing domestic production of
uranium, will begin construct ion next spring on a pilot plant f or ex-
tracting uranium from seawater as part of a 3-year long, 4.1 billion yen
test pro~ ect, it was learned Wednesday.
The projected plant is envisioned to be completed at a total censtruc-
_ tion cost of 2,400 million yen by the end of fiscal 1983 on a tract
- of 10,000 square meters of r~claimed land in Niomachi, Western Kagawa-ken,
said officials of the International Trade and Industry Ministry (MITI).
The plant is to start a three-year operation on an experimental basis
f rom fiscal 1984, producing about 10 kilograms of uranium annually,
th ey said.
Th~ pro~ect~ if successful, will make possible mass production of uranium
from seawater on a commercial basis in the 1990s, according to officials
of MITI's natural resources and energy agency, which is responsible for
' the project.
Agency officials said the planned uranium extraction will contribute
greatly to "energy secui�ity" for this country, now department on foreign ~
countries for 100 percent of its uranium requirements.
~ Japan!s current electricity output at nuclear power plants is the world's `
_ second largest next to the U.S.
The seawater uranium extraction plan will therefore do much for realizing
goal set by industrialized countries at the International Energy Agency
(IEA) meetings and th e Venice summit of jointly finding a way out of
the present dependence on petroleum resources, the officials noted.
_ The project, if successful, will also contribute to stabilizing the
international uranium market, presently plagued with highly unstable
factors to the extent that export prices of uranium have increased more -
than fivefold in the past three years, they said.
37
FOR O~FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
The go-ahead Wednesday for a test platit for seawater uranium came after
the me~al mining agency, MITI's extradepartmental body, recently
succeeded in developing the technology for the uranium extraction from
- seawater.
The agency has been undertaking the developmental researches since
fiscal 1975 to tap seawater for uranium.
Experts es timate uranium in seawater all over the world at some 4,000
million tons, or about S00 times as much as the presumed uranium
reserves on land,
_ The percentage of uranium contained in seawater, however, is very small
0.003 ppm, or 3 milligrams per 1,000 tons of seawater, according to
the experts.
The uranium extracting ~echnology developed by the metal mining agency
is aesigned to absorb uranium in seawater with activated charcoal soaked
with an oxide compound of titanium, the agency officials said.
The production cost of uranium through this means is presently estimated
at $120 to $130 per pound, or three times as high as the current export
prices of uranj~.~u.
Since sharp price rises of uranium are expected for the future, however,
the prices of seawater-extracted uranium is expected to become commercially
feasible in the 1990s, or at least considerably closer to prices of
mined uraniums, they said.
- COPYRIGHT: ThE Daily Yomiuri 1980
CSO: 4120
,
38
FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HITACHI TO DEVELOP 200 MW POWER REACTOR -
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 15 Aug 80 p 7
[Text] Hitachi Ltd has turned against the trend toward atomic reactors of
_ ever greater capacity and has begun using its own technology to develop a
small reactor of the 200 MW class as a part of its boiling water reactor
(BWR) development strategy. The reasons for this decision are that if in
the future the export of atomic reactors becomes a serious effort, this will
meet the demand from developing countries, and that domestically too, and
site constraints will mean a growing need for smaller reactors. A research
team for the 200 MW reactor was recently formed within the company, and the
conceptual design is to be undertaken soon. Because development of reactors
requires huge sums of money, manufacturers have restricted their development
activities. Thus Hitachi's active development shows that company's high
hopes for the field.
Atomic reactor manufacturers' views on development of small and medium reac-
tors were sounded out in May of this year by the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, which wa~ thinking in terms of atomic power site promo-
tion and multiple use of reactors. Because the ministry's idea was the
broad one of asking each company for reactor designs in the 200 to 400 MW
class, it was met with attempts to confirm the ministry's intent, asking
for a more specific call for designs or blueprints of actual use after
development. The mood of avoiding involvement in development was stron~.
Behind this was the thinking that so far development and production arrange-
ments had centered on large reactors of the 1000 MW class, and it would not
_ be good strategy to extend the battlefront when even those operations were _
highly unprofitable.
Hitachi realized, however, that light water reactors of diversified capacity
would be essential--domesticall;~ to find sites in urban areas in addition to
those in nan-metropolitan coastal areas, and also to meet the demands of the -
overseas market if it becomes possible to enter that market. Thus Hitachi
decided to break away from the other companies and begin development. More-
over, America`s General Electric Co. (GEj which has a technical tie-up with
Hitachi, has also begun development of a 200 MW class reactor for developing
3S
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
co~intries, and ASEA Atom (Sweden) which like Hitachi talces part in AET
- (Advanced Engineering Technology), a group of reactor n:anufacturers seeking
development oi new BWR, has completed designs in that class and shifted
- toward production. This served as further impetus to Hitachi's decision.
Hitachi has for the most part depended on technology obtained from GE for its '
780 :~iW and 1100 MW power reactors. But it intends to design tha smaller -
reactor independently by trying to apply the technology gained sa far in
development of light water reactors, since the level of technology is nearly
the same. To do this it has formed a research team with the goal of com- -
pleting designs for an experimental reactor in 4 or 5 years, and has begun
to firm up the basic concepts for the reactor. If this reactor becomes a
reality, it will be the first produced independently by a Japanese manufac-
turer.
Hitachi recently concluded a contract with America's Bechtel, the world's
largest engineering company, for introduction of atomic power plant engi-
neering technology, clearly taking the offensive in the field of atomic
energy. This diversification in light water reactor development is a part
of this offensive, and may well elicit a response from the other manufacturers.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1980
9601
CSO: 8129/1645
1~0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
BOOMING SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRIES, THE~R FUTURE EXAMINED
Tokyo DENPA SHIMBUN in Japanese 15 Aug 80 p 1
[Article: "Super LSI Continues Extraordianry Growth, IC Production to Increase
60 Percent"]
[Text] Japan's semiconductor industrial world is planning a total of more
than 130 billion yen during JFY 1980 for plant investment (total of nine
companies), and great interest is being displayed to see just how this in-
vestment will affect the future demand relationships of the semiconductor
market. According to the results of the study this paper conducted along
these lines, this increase in production will have the effect of creating an
increase of 60 percent in IC production. The nature of these investments will
be such that this increased production effect will come some time after next
spring. Assuming that the market picture will continue next year the same
as this year, the demand can be expected to keep pace with the supply. On the
other hand, production of these growth products~ such:as memory is being Fro- -
moted by all these industries and there seems to be no way of avoiding in-
tensified competition in these areas.
According to the production statistics issued by the Ministry of International
~ Trade and Industry, Japan's IC industries topped last year's production by
50 percent to produce 200 million units as of May, and this was equivalent to
a 55 percent increase in money value to a little less than 50 billion yen.
These piant investments on the part of these different companies is not being
directed to unit semiconductors such as transistors and diodes but are being
concentrated on IC, and many of these moves are characterized by their emphasis
on LSI and super LSI.
The semiconductor market last year saw great shortage of inemory and standard
logic IC in world-wide manner, and this year has seen shortage in small signal
use transistors resulting from the increased production of household use
- VTR as a result of which the directions in the demand and supply situation
accompanying this increasing market are beginning to assert themselves in
various areas. The 26 Kbit dynamic RAM whose shortage was a problem last
year is this year beginning to see some lowering in price indicative of the ~
startling changes in the demand and supply picture, and future directions
are being watched with great interest.
1~7.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
Trend to Installing Production Equipment
This was why this paper interviewed the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, the varj.ous semiconductor companies, and the companies producing
semiconductor manufacturing equipment who are directly involved in these
investments to delve into the possible directions in the demand and supply
picture as it affects the semiconductor market centered on Japan. One of the
methods available was to look at the trends in equipment installation that is
one of th~ beneficiaries of this plant investment and determine its influence
on the production picture. One of the yardsticks for this evaluation is the
diffusion tube for use with diffusion equipment, and it has been said that
"in July, there were 200 diffusion tubes installed throughout the industry"
(according to a technological department head of a certain large semiconductor
maker) .
On the other hand, the two large diffusion tube makers Tokyo Electron and
Kokusai Electric say, "it is unthinkable that the time has come when the
scale of diffusion tubes can be used to determine production capacity, the
ion injection system is presently developing making it difficult to use dif-
fusion equipment data alone to establish production" (Tokyo Electron), "while
rhere is possibility that an instantaneous trend may have resulted in shipping
out 200 diffusion tubes, it most likely did not happen in J~sly" (Nippon
Eaton).
In this manner, the equipment related people are taking negative views. When
seen from the levels of the industry, the increased production effect is ex-
pected to assume the following course.
Assuming 200 tubes are installed per month, the daily operating rate (with
two shifts) will be 200 x 4 cycles (all the processes necessary to production
are lumped together in a cycle) = 800. Further assuming 100 wafers per lot,
there will be 800 x 100 or 80,000 wafers. Putting this production on a monthly
basis allowing 20 working days, this will be 80,000 x 20 = 1,600,000 wafers.
If now it is assumed that each wafer can produce 50 IC, this will total
1,600,000 x SO = 90,000,000 IC. In other words, there will be increase in
production of 90 million IC units.
One Billion Units Increase in IC Production
To be sure, any information relative to the number of wafers handled or the
_ number of IC units produced per wafer ~stockpile) comes under the classifica-
- tion of highly secret information as far as any semiconductor maker is con-
cerned so that none of these makers will release such details, but if we
' judge from this situation, the semiconductor industry this year will come to
possess the capability of increasing its IC production by one billion units.
According to the statistics released by the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry, Japan's IC production two years ago was about 1.7 billion units.
,7udging from the trends thus far, this year's production is estimated to be
roughly 2.5 billion units while next year's productior., taking into account
the increased production resulting from this year's plant investments, is
expected to rise to more than 3.5 billion ~~~its in the growth trends that are
predicted.
42
J FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Do Eight Process Lines Represent Something New?
~
In another direction, it is possib le to estimate this increase in production
from the degree of new equipment lines installation for producing semic~n-
ductors by new processes. The to tal outlay of the industry will be 130 bil-
lion yen for plant investment, and this sum includes considerable allotment
for converting some existing 3 in ch lines to 4 inch lines. Assuming that
60 percent of this investment is directed at entirely new process lines, it
would seen that about 8 process 1 ines will be newly established within the
entire industry (it is the present situation that a new process facility for
inside a building will cost about one billion yen).
In the case of the Sharp Company which built and started operating a third
plant, there was an outlay over a two year period of 1.4 billion yen excluding
land but including the building for this plant to produce high quality LSI for
% super LSI use. Its present monthly production is 1.3 million units which is
expected to be increased to 5 million units this October. Even when seen
from this industry's figures that a single process line can produce 2 million
LSI units more or less per month, there can be expected increase of roughly
_ 16 million LSI units production p er month just from these new facilities.
There is also the increased production of the on-line process lines which
also has to be taken into account.
In addition, the term investment effect (an index on how much sales can be
expected within a given period is being used as the measure of the increased
production effect in the United States. If this type of comparison is adepted,
_ Japan's semiconductor industry in 1981 can be expected to exceed the previous
year's production by 36 percent (calculated on the basis of an investment
effect of 1.5). Assuming that this volume production will bring about a
degree of cost lowering, there wil 1 still be increase of SO-60 percent from
which it: can be thought that the supply and~demand picture will be stable.
The Unit~ed States is thought to have a semiconductor market scale of roughly
twice that of Japan, and its total plant investments on the part of its semi-
conductor companies is expected to be between 29 and 30 billion yen from which
it can be seen that investment double that of Japan is planned for a market
which is also double that of Japan. The semiconductor industry is seeing
increased outlays for plant investment, and this trend is increasing with the
passing of the years from which it is evident that there is considerable
thought being directed at excessive capacity. On the other hand, the entire
industry seems to be meshed in the thought that "semiconductors represent
an area which will see nothing b ut expansion f rom here on. Production of the
64 K-RAM has started, and this wil 1 be followed by the super LSI. It will
be possible to follow in the foots teps of the latest technology before ex-
cessive capacity sets in. If that does not happen, there will eventually be
a double layered structure" (Minis try of International Trade and Industry
hierachy).
43
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034434-8
In this manner, if one considers that events such as the age of super LSI
envisioned for the future actually will transpire, the overall demand and
supply situation for semiconductors can be expected to follow a line repre-
senting expansion in production capacity which will be in tune with the mar-
ket growth, and even allowing for temporary confusion as represented by the
recent cost cutting in memory units, a stable growth can be anticipated.
- COPYRIGHT: Denpa Shimbunsha 1980
2267
CSO: 4105 END
�
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030034-8