JPRS ID: 9300 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9300
15 September 1980
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 689
FB~$ FOREIGN BROA~DCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9 300
15 September 1980
SUB-SAIIARAN AFRICR REPORT
FOUO No. 689
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Tanzam's Shutdo~~n To Have Serioua Effecta on Tanzania, Zambia
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 6 Aug 80) 1
UMOA Financing in 1979 Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8 Aug 80) 2
French Oil Comp any's Activiti~s Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8 Aug 80) 4
ANGOLA
Couunission Appointed To Study State Structures
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8 Aug 80) 5
Briefs
Brazil-Angola Air ?.ink 6
CAMEROON
EDF Aid for Rai lroads, Cacao, Coffee Marketing
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 6 Jun 80) 7
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBL IC
France Said To Have Serious Doubta About Dacko
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 6 Aug 80) 8
Briefa
Multipar tyism Favored 11
Loan Agreements Signed 11
Kirsch's Viait 12
French Educational Financing Agreement 12
CHAD ~
Briefs
Developments in Military SiCuation ~ 13
f
a- ITZT - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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COMORO ISLANDS
BADEA Financial Aid icr Alutsamu~u PJZI Extension Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ~iEDITERRANEENS, 8 Aiig 80) I4
CONGO
Optimistic Forecast Concerni~g Petro7.eum Confi~med
(MARCHES TROPiCAUX ET MEDI7'ERR,APIEENS, 1 Aug 80) 15
GAI~ IA
Briefs
FRG Agreemen~_ Si~ned 17
GUINEA
Bank Loan To Finance Aluminum ~xide P1ant Modernization
(MARCH.ES T~OPZCAUX ET i+~DITtiF.1tAN~ENS, 6 Aug 8Q) 18
KENYA
Vice President Di.scusses Fozeign znvestment Pzospects
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ME7ITERR~,NE~NS, 8 Aug 80) 19
Briefs
Petroleum Company Ylanned 22
_ Austxalian F:inancial l~id 22
NIGER
President Discusses Mational Development Company,
~ 5-Year Plan Goa1s
(MARCHES 1'ROPICAU~ ET i~DITERRANEENS, 8 Aug 80) 23
Briefe
Floods in Agadez
RWANDA
Prospects for ~ontinued Nationa7. Stability Analyzed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANF~NS, 8 Aug 80) 26
SENEGAL
Reasone for France's Prompt Economic Aid Noted
(Sennen Andriamira~o; JRUNE AFRIQUE, 6 Aug 80) 32
Effects of Dr.ought Persiet Despite Rains
(M~.RCftES TROPICP,trX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 1 Aug 80) 38
FAD-Financed Rural Development Project
(MA.RCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERREINEENS; 8 Aug 80) 41
` b
~'~F{ ~F'.T".'.:.~`i~-~i.~ U.~~ ~rTlaY
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Dakar-Marine Floating Dock To Begi.n Operating Early October
(MARCHES TROPICAU% ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8 Aug 80) 42
Briefa
Iron Ore Exploitation 43
France Donatea Maize 43
Netherlands Wheat Donation 43
SIERRA LEONE
New BADEA Loan for Agricultural Development Granted
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 1 Aug 80) 44
SOUTH AFRICA
South African Defense Forces Deeerter Describes Experiences
(Janie Jacobs Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 Jul 80) 46
Coa1 Exports to EEC Countries Diacuased
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 27 Jun 80) 49
Briefs
Trade With France 50
TANZANIA
Problemr, Delay Transfer of Capital to Dodoma
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8 Aug 80) 51
Briefs
Presidential, Legislative Elections Scheduled 53
ZAIRE
Belgian Development Cooperation Diacusaed �
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITF.RRANEENS, 18 Jul 80) 54
Coffee: Export by Air From Goma to Mombasa
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jul 80) 55
Mini.mum Agricultural Plan Goals Reported
(MARCAES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 1 Aug 80) 56
Briefs
Isiro Airport Commission 58
New Oil Depoaits 58
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
TANZAM'S SHUTDOWN TO HAVE SERIOUS EFFECTS ON TANZANIA, ZAMBIA
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Aug 80 p 19
(TextJ One of Africa's most prestigious railroad lines is not operating.
The Tanzam (Tanzania-Zambia) line, which connects the Tanzanian port of
Dar es Salam with the Zambiari "copper belt," is in effect paralyzed and has
been since 21 July because of "ina.dequate technology" and financial neax-
bankruptcy. The bi-national company, TAZARA (Tanzania Zambia Railway Author-
ity), which manages the line on behalf of the two governments concerned, is
in danger of failure if new subsidies do not come along between now and Sep-
tember.
The Tasizam, 1,900 km in length, which went into service on 24 Octob er 1975,
was built in record time--and at very low cost--by technicians from the
People's Republic of China. But it never operated normally. For 1 ack of
spare parts, the fragility of the Chinese locomotives, the chronic fuel short-
age in Tanzania, the bureaucratic heaviness of a two-headed administration, etc.
Though it was supposed to export to Dar es-Salaam a good part of the Zambian
copper production, the Tanzam failed in that role, which could hav e enabled
Zambia to be less dependen~ on the South African railroad infrastructure.
Thus, several thousand tons of copper are immobilized in the mining town of
Chozi. Other stocks are waiting to be exported on the wharves of Dar es-
Salaam, which--as if to darken the picture a little more--is a port that is
almost .+cQU.tinuausly clogged.
For Tanzania, whose financial situation is desperate, and Zambia, which is once
again going to have to export via South Africa almost all of its cooper pro-
~ duction, the Tanzam's bankruptcy is serious.
COPYRIGHT: Jsune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980
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FOEt OI~'FICIAL U~'E ONT.Y
INTER-AFRICAN AFFt~IRS
UMOA FINAI~ICING IN 1979 REPORTEll
Paris MARCH~S TROPICAUX Et MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1969
[Text] T}~e Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) recently published
its annual report on the operation of the West African monetary mark�t (Benin,
Ivory CQast, Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal and Togo) in 1979.
' Founded on 1 July and initially dealing only with "day-to-day" operations, the
UMOA [West African Monetary Union] monetary market was extended, as of 1 August
1978, to include one-month and three-month operations.
The monthly volume of the day-to-day operations of the monetary rnarket, or-
fers and demands satisfied, after experiencing a regular increase until 1977,
followed by a strong decline in 1978, registered a re~~iv~l during 1979. Dur-
ing the entire year the total demands exceeded the offers, the average month-
ly deficit amounting to 380,000,000,000 CFA fr~~ncs, or a daily average of
14,000,000,000 CFA francs.
Forward operations, of relatively little importance in 1978, were appreciably
filled out in 1979, especially on the demand side. On the one-month market,
a monthly average of 920,000,000 CFA francs were granted in 1979 and 500,0OO,OQO
CFA frar~cs were recycled to the day-to-day. The three-month narket was char-
acterized by.the insufficiency of offers and the regularity nf demands, es-
pecialiy in Abidjan; the daily average of advances amounted to 10,000,000 CFA
francs.
In ~3enin ths numbex of participants since October 1978 has been three insti-
tutions. The market is lar~ely in deficit. In the day-to-day the o�fers, em-
anating from a single establishment, varied between 1,000,000 and 6,000,000
CFA francs per month, compared to demands for between 1,000,000,000 and
88,000,000,000. T'he total of advances ~ranted was established at
199,000,000,000 CFA francs, 84 percent of that amount from aid from the other
UMOA states. On the one-month market, demands for the year increased to
97,000,000,000 CFA francs, the opposite of a nonexistent local offer; however,
a total of 500,000,000 CFA francs could be handled out of aid from Union
partners.
In the Ivory Coast 17 banks regulaxly intervened in the operations of the mar-
,keL. In the day-to-day the volume of operations diminished slightly under -
1978; local demands largely exceeded market offers. During 1979 the total o�
advances granted was 1,800,000,000,00~ CFA francs, 650,000,000,000 of which
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came from other partners. On the one-month market the demands also exceeded
the local offers and the total advances for the year amount to
4,600,000,000 CFA francs, of which 480,000,000 are aid from the Union. On
the three-month ma-rket the Abidjan market recorded 1,800,000,000,000 CFA
francs in demands, with no local offer; aid from Togo made it possi.ble to
satisfy 400,000,000 CFA francs.
. The day-to-day monetary market of Upper Volta was characterized by dise~ui-
librium, the demands exceeding the local offers. The total of advances a-
greed to was 186,000,000 CFA francs, of which 58,000,000,000 was aid from
the other partners (31 percent of the total granted).
In Niger the day-to-market was in excess until April 1979; after May the ten-
dency was reversed. Over the year advances totaled 271,000,000,000 CFA francs,
of which 86,~.~~0,000,000 was UMOA aid (32 percent of the total). The one-month
market was balanced and in May 1979 a total of 500,000,000 CFA francs was re-
cycled to the day-to-day.
~ In contrast to 1978, Senegal's monetary market was in deficit over the whole
of 1979; demand.s were 1,700,000,000,000 CFA francs, compared to
1,200,000,000,000 in local nffers. In all, the advances granted totaled
1,300,000,000,000 CFA francs, 6 perce,:t of it from other Union partners. On
the one-month market, which operated from September to December, a balance was
realized between demands and local offers. It was the same on the three-
month market, where from .June to September 2,300,000,000,000 CFA francs in op-
erations were recorded. �
Togo remains the only place clai.ming a surplus since the UMOA monetary market
~ was founded. For 1979 the accumulated total of offers in the day-to-day re-
presented 998,000,000,000 CFA francs, or 24 percent of the total Union offers,
compared to 263,OU0,000,000 CFA francs of local demands; the surplus offers
sexved to feed the markets in deficit. On the forward market Togo's offers,
480,000,000 for one month and 400,000,OOO~for three months, fed the Abidjan
market.
The market rates suffered various raises during 1979, bringing them, since
1979, to 10 percent for day-to-day advances (7.25 percent at the end of 1~78),
to 10 1/8 percent for one-month advances, and to 10 3/8 percent for three-
month advances.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
FRENCH OIL COMPANY'S ACTIVITIES REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET 1~DITER~NEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1961
[Excerpts] The 1979 fiscal year report of the French Oil Company (CFP) re-
lates the group's various activities in the world. The CFP's presence is
manifested in several African ceantries.
In Angola, subject to the signing of final agreements, a 17.5 percent inter-
est has been taken in one of the blocks offered at sea; another block has been
allotted to the local affiliate.
In Cameroon, interests obtained in two are being added to the title acquired
in 1978. The two wells drilled during the year resulted in discoveries, one
the discovery of two light oil reservoirs in the Victoria permit, the other
of substantial gas reserves in the South Sanaga permit. New seismic surveys
performed during the year are making it possible to start drillings in 1980
to determine its extent.
In uranium exploration activities the CFP has started operati~ns in Nigeria.
Other interventions concerned Namibia, where modifications of the Rnssing mine
processing plant were completed in the first quarter, as well as xepair of the
damage caused by the fire that occurred in 1978. Production reached its nor-
mal pace in April and the production for the year was 3,834 tons of uranium.
In Gabon the COMUF [Franceville Uranium Mining Company] produced 1,100 tons of
uranium. In Niger the SOMAIR [Air Region Mining Company] produced 1,777 tons
of uranium.
As cultural aid, the CFP took care of three Nigerian scholarship students.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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ANGOLA
COMMISSION APPOINTED TO STUDY STATE STRUCTURES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1990
[Text] An ad hoc commission will be appointed within the Angolan Council
of Ministers to study the structures of the central state apparatus,
Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the chief of state, announced on 27 July.
Mr dos Santos, who presided at the first Council of Ministers meeting held
since the 8-12 July reorganization, explained that this commission is
� expected to propose concrete solutions, with a view in particul~r to re-
ducing the number of national depaitmenta in the economic ministries and
to strengthening enterprises by means of better-qualified cadres.
The most recent reorganization did not involve "profound changes" in the
government, Mr dos Santos said, but these "ad~ustments" should lead to a
"more dynamic and efficient" government in some technical sectore (con-
struction, energy, state budget).
The chief of state also stressed the need for the drafting of national
plans "with a greater realism" in the approach to situations. "The
experience gained since independence was won is sufficient for correcting
errors," Mr dos Santos specified.
In conclusion, the Angolan president urged the ministers to reduce imports
of goods which could be produced in the country "gradually," while devoting
special attention to the energy, agriculture, oil and construction sectors.
Angola, it wi111be recalled, exports oil, diamonds, coffee, iron and
cement.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980.
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
BRAZIL-ANGOLA AIR LINK--The Angolan airline TAAG and the Brazilian Varig ~
airline iaaugurated air service on 3 August linking Sao Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro with Luanda, witn a stop in Lagos. Henceforth planes will leave
Brazil every Sunday, arriving in Luanda the following day. The protocol
agr.eement with Varig providing for this link was signed in 1977, but was
never put into effect. Numerous citizens of Brazil are working in Angola
as cooperative aids. [Text] [Paris MAF.CHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 8 Aug 80 p 1990] 5157
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CAMEROON
EDF AID FOR RAILROADS, CACAO, COFFEE MARKETING
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 6 Jun 80 p 1325
[Te$t] From 27 to 30 May in Brussels a meeting was helci of diverse finan-
cial donors involved in p:~ja~ts related to the trans-Cameroon railroad
and the Douala-Yaounde road, in order to refi~te finance plans for addi-
tional needed inputs.
:
We recall that a mission from the European Development Fund (EDFO led by
the director general f~r development; weat to Cameroon from 28 to 30
April 1980. The aim of this working visit was, beyond follow-up on pro-
jects to which EDF is contributing (in particular the realinement of the
Douala-Yaounde railroad and the extension of the port of Douala), to
program the Fund's sid for the next 5 years (see MTM of 16 May 1980, p
1157) .
Cacao and Coffee: Commercialization
On 26 May, internal purchases of cacao in the Cameroon totalled 115,950.9
tons, againat 98,087.8 tons at the same point in the 1978-1979 harvest,
- for an increase this year of 17,$63.1 tons. Of this total, 67,149.3 tons
went for export, and 31,549.2 tons were delivered to local factories.
leaving 14,252.4 tons theoretically in stock.
Purchases of "robusta" coffee on 23 May to~alled 53,153 tons this year,
against 60,558 tons the year before, for a decrease in 1979-1980 of 7,542
tons; the total exported was 10,470 tons, to which was added 5,320 tons ~
of cargo in transit, leaving 35,226 tons theoretically in stock. Pur-
chases of "arabica" coffee on 23 May totalled 3,323 tons, of which 2,693 -
tons were exportedr leaving a theoretical stock of 630 tons.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
FRANCE SAID TO HAVE SERIOUS DOU~3TS ABOUT DAC:CO
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in Fretich 6 Aug 80 pp 26, 27
[Article by Francois Soudan: "And if France Abandoned Dacko--"]
[Text] Ten months after Bokassa's eviction, is his
;~redecessor-successor really the man for the situation?
"David Dacko? If 'Operation Barracuda' were to be done again, I am not sure
one of our Transalls would be taken on board again. He is too heavy..."
A joke or a confidence, it doesn't matter much. That sentence, thrown out in
late July by a highly placed French official, illustrates the feeling of an-
noyance that the 10 months of power of the Central African president are in-
spiring in Paris. Even David Dacko's francophilia is scarcely appreciated:
- it is considered "excessive." "Laok, he invited 400 of our paras [paratroop-
ers] to dine at the presidential residence for midnight supper on December 31.
They tried to make him understand that this was awkward as far as relations
with the population were concerned. There was nothing to be done. He is stub-
born, on top of everything else..."
Obstinate, David Dacko? Undoubtedly. Provided, say those who hardly like him,
thar, you add to that semiquality a full-scale fault: indecision. It is true
that Central Africa, paralyzed since the public safety government was dis-
solved on 9 July and led by a cabinet without a prime minister (at least of-
ficially), gives a slight impression of being a ship with neither captain nor
compass. In Bangui they are even talking of conspiracy and coup d'etat:
"Dacko has been abandoned by Paris. He is going to fall..."Of course, those
phrases whispered from mouth to ear about "5 km" to Boy-Rabe, are still merely _
rumors. But they only grow in times of malaise, and Central Africa is in cri-
sis.
Economic malaise first of all: the 1980 budget is in deficit by 4,600,000,000
CFA francs; the public debt is over 75,000,000,000; un the markets, the cur- ~
rent prices o� foodstuffs are climbing, whereas the average wage of a worker
is still 15,000 CFA francs per month. The big backers' conference that was
held in Bangui from 23 to 28 June, which proposed (implicitly) �to "change
Central Africa into a new Gabon," ended in a half-failure, Apart from France,
Iraq and--Gabon, no participating state really committed itself.
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The Government for the 'I'aking
A corollary of a worrisome economic situation, the social and political agi-
tation has resumed more vigorously than ever. On three occasions oii 7, 27
and 28 June, the high school students, who were the spearhead of the arlti-
Bokassa protests, took to the streets again, demanding the resignation of
Prime Minister Bernard Ayandho, who was considered responsible for the cri-
sis, and Vice President Henri Maidou, who was for a long time tlie closest
associate of the former emperor. Simultaneously, clashes between peasants
and gendarmes were reported early in June in the regions of Ouham and Ouham
: Pende, close to Chad. Finally the decision, taken in the interest of auster-
ity, to suspent the integration of young cadres into government servi~e in
1981 was taken very badly.
For the time being these various movements are not coordinated, insofar as the
two main opposition organizations, the Ubangian Patriotic Front of Abel Goumba -
and Ange Patasse's Central African People's Liberation Movement have not man-
aged to federate them. But one is frightened of those Libyan weapons looted
at the time of Bokassa's fall, which are circulating on the black market in
the people's quarters. One also worries a.bout the methods of governing of a
David Dacko who lives surrounded by his Praetorian guard and every morning at
0600 receives his informants: a large, quiet troop in loincloths, tee shirts
a;~~ boubous [translation unknown], "which shares," a witness recounts, "fur-
tive eyes and a ticket in the pocket."
It was this man alone, rather at bay, who on 9 July announced the dissolution
of the public safety government. It was immediately affirmed that this bid
for power was dictated by the streets. That all of Bokassa's former associ-
ates were going to be excluded from the government and that Bernard Ayandho
will also be swept out. That tivas to be expected. For Dacko, too, it seemed,
since he was retiring to his farm 130 km from Bangui. Around Dacko's two
henchmen, Bernard Ayandho and Henri Maidou, the atmosphere is feverish.
Some people close to the latter are pushing him to "try something:" "You are
not popular, but you are intelligent. The French don't want Dacko any moxe;
the government is there for the taking." On 11 Jul~ Dacko xeturns to Bangui
and presents the new government. Economy and Finance Minister Alphonse
Koyamba, a former associate of Bokassa's, no longer appears in the government.
Surprise: not a word is bxeathed about the posts of prime minister and vice
president. "We are negotiating," they say at the presidential residence.
In fact, although David Dacko undoubtedly wanted, by dissolving his govern-
ment, "to please the streets," that is, to sacrifice Ayandho and Maidou, lie
seems momentarily to have gone back on his decision. For what motives? Pres-
sure from Paris, especially in favor of Henri Maidou, are not to be ruled out.
Especially when they are murmuring that the middle term replacement of Dacko
by Maidou was provided for from the beginning of "Operation Barracuda." it is
also recalled that Bokassa's former prime ministe-r enjoys a good image with
the French: serious, responsible, in short the man who is needed for Central
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Africa, which since the withdrawal of the French paratroopers from Chacl is
becoming rather a garrison-state of the French army on the continent.
Men of Quality
Already, in the Franceville talk between Bokassa and Rene Journiac on
1 August 1979, Paris had shown a great deal of interest in Henri Maiduu:
"You have men of quality in your entourage," Journiac said to Bokassa. "Your
prime minister, for example. You might fade into the background behind him."
The fcrmer minister is known to have refused angrily. Likewise his predeces-
sor and s~ccessor, David Dacko, today seems to have found that the presidential
fits his measurements. Stubborn, David Dacko? Certainly. After all, 4
Valery Giscard d'Estaing's adviser for African affairs, Martin Kirsch, whose
visit was expected on 30 July in Bangui, may give the reason. He who some-
times confides, "Journiac's friends are not necessarily my friends."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUDLIC
BRIEFS
MULTIPARTYISM FAVORED--The Central African Republic is r.eady for a multi-
party system, said Vice President Maidou in an interview on national
radio, on 22 July in Bangui. Nevertheless, he emphasized that multipar.ry-
ism should be limited to two or three parties and not based on regionalism
or ethnic groups which, in his view, might lead to political and social
instability. Such a formula, he specified, has the advantage of creating ~
broadly based popular parties and strengthening national unity through
the mixing of ethnic groups and the exercise of democr3tic power.
Furthermore, the system will encourage the ruling team to act efficiently
if it is to remain in power. "The experience of controlled multipartyism
is worthy of being tried and we are deeply convinced that, properly
carried out, this experience will protect ~he country from any upheaval _
or possibility for a brutal seizure of power," Maidou concluded. [TexC]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1,924]
5157
LOAI3 AGREEMENTS SIGNED--Recently, Enoch Derant Lakoue, director general oL
the Development Bank of the Central African States (BDEAC) signed in
Bangui two loan agreements. The first has been granted to the OCPT (inter-
African Posts and Telecommunications Office) for the organization oE a
temporary assistance service for the telephone system in Bangui. This
operation will be carried out by Sofrecom, the French study bureau. Ir_
will constitute the first part of a program for modernization of the
circuit. The loan totals 240 million CFA, repayable over eight years,
with a two-year grace period, and with an interest rate of 8.5 percent.
The second loan goes to the SNCT (Central African Public Works National
~ Company); it toals 325 million CFA repayable within five years at 11.5
percent rate of interest. It will enable this public works company to
purchase construction and road maintenance materials. On the Central
African side the agreements were signed, respec~tively, by Guy Darlan,
chairman of the administrative council of the OCPT, and by Paul Bi.det,
director general of the SNCT. The Central African state had already ~o
approved the two agreements which were countersigned by Mr Koyamba, the
then minister of finance. These two loans are the first to be made. by
the BPEAC to the Central African Republic. [Texk] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1,924] 5157
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KIRSCH'S VISIT--Mr Martin Kirsch, adviser on African affairs to the
president of the French Republic, left Bangui early on the morning of
1 August for Paris, at the end of a 24-hour stay in the Central African
Republic. Mr. Kirsch, for whom this was the first visit to the Central
African Republic since he replaced Mr Rene Journiac, met at length on
31 July with President David Dacko, prior to having an interview with
Vice President Henri Maidou and Prime Minister Bernard Christian Ayandho.
No detsils were available in Bangui on the talks Mr Kirsch had with the
Central African authorities. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1980] 5157
FRENCH EDUCATIONAL FINANCING AGREII~NT--An agreement involving
1.5 million French francs has just been signed in Paris by
Mr Jean-Philippe Ricalens, director of the office of the minister of co-
operation, and Dr Jean-Marie Frisat, the Central African Republic ambassador
to France. The agreement pertains to a subsidy which will be directed in
particular to the Office for Cooperation and University Enrollment to
"enable it to deal with some urgent cases and repatriate a certain number
of students concluiling their studies. The renewal of this aid granted on
an exceptional basis is not foreseen," a communique released in Rue Monsieur
explained. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
8 Aug 80 p 1980] 5157
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cE�n
BRIEFS
DEVELOPMENTS IN MILITARY SITUATION--A group of inembers of Lhe original
FROLINAT, headed by Dr Abba Siddick (nonmilitary trairiing) has decided t.o
joiri the FAN (Armed Forces of. the North) of Hissein Habre which are
fighting against some elements represented in the Goukouni Oueddei. Two
_ representatives of this group, Chere Mahmat and Guealbaye Mannasset stated
on 25 July, in Paris, that they had decided to join the FAN to fight for
the defense of "Chadian integrity and unity." "We want to fight Lybian
expansionism and countryless agents and mercenaries in Ndjamena," they
specified. Furthermore, Chey criticized "the ambigious policy pursued by ,
France toward Lybia," as well as the "wait-and-see" policy of Abba
Siddick." ~n the other hand, the AFP has pro~~ided the following informa-
tion on the development of the Chadian conflict in July. Following the
attempt launched on 9 and 10 July by the Papular Armed Forces (FAP) of.
President Goukouni Oueddei to capture by assault the "13 April Camp"
located in the center of Ndjamena and held by the FAN, the fighting is
taking pl.ace outside the capital city, in particular along the northern
route. On 14 July FAN elements returning from Moito (240 kilome*ers from
Ndjamena), on foot, after having abandoned their vehicles, had an alterca-
tion with the FAP, south of Massaguet, a settlement occupied by the FAP,
located 80 kilometers northeast of the capital. On 16 July oeher FAN
troops were ambushed by elements commanded by Ahmat Acyl (FAC-Joint Action
i~ront) in the proximity of Massaguet. On the political level, observers
have noted a genera2 trend toward negotiations, following the rrip to
Ndjamena by Marcel Beaux, French ambassador to Chad (MTM, 18 July 1980,
p 1,803). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
1 Aug 80 p 1,925] 5157
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COMORQ ISLANUS
BADEA FINANCIAL AID FOR MUTSAMUDU PORT EXTENSION REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1986
[Text] The BADEA [Arab Bank for African Economic Development] board of direc-
tors on 28 June approved an $8,000,000 loan to the Federal and Islamic Repub-
lic of the Comoros, for the Mutsamudu port development project. The project,
which is to cost $33,130,000 overall, is intended to extend the receiving ca-
pability of the Mutsamudu port (on Anjcuan Islan), whi~h is virtually the only
port in the country in a position to receive heavy-tonnage freighters in re-
turn for improvements. The anticipate~ extension will enable the port to
serve all the other ports of iiie islands and put an end to the present extreme-
ly costly practice of shipping merchandise through continental ports before
their transportation is provided from or to the islands on barges.
The groject's main components are as follows: enlargement of the present
_ breakwater and construction of new piers along 250 meters for reception of
large ships (170 meters) and tramps (80 metPrs); dredging of the basin, con-
struction of warehouses, administrative buildings and opening access roads to
the port; purchase of materials aitd equipment for handling, needed for opera-
tion of the new port.
The port extension will provide direct access to the islands for large freight-
ers, which will be accompanied by a reorganization of all maritime transport
activities and as a consequence will provide important economic advantages,
by preventing transfers and ~ostly delays. In addition, in the cyclone season,
which extends over four months, barging becomes vir~ually impossible, depriving
the archipelago of vital importation and exportation movement. in this con-
text the interest of the project app~ars especially demanding, ch'_~fly because,
in addition to the security it will ensure for provisions, it will have ex-
tremely positive effects on the creation of jobs, foreign currency gains, in-
_ creased exports, mariti.me transport costs and air transport costs (in the cy-
clon~e season), local commerce, tourism, loss of cargoes and human lives (in
transfer operations on high seas) and delivery delays.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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' CONGO
OPTIMISTIC FORECAST CONCERNING ~ETROLEUM CONFIRMED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1926
[Report: "Chalandon Confirms Petroleum Hopes"]
[Text] The optimistic forecasts formulated one year ago in terms of
petroleum production have been confirmed, stated Albin Chalandon, presi-
dent of the Elf Aquitaine Company, on 26 July, during his Congo trip.
Chalandon, who was given an audience in Kinkala by President Sassou
Nguesso, added that Congolese petro~eum output would rise in the years to
come. He emphasized that whereas for Che current year the expected out-
put was 3 million tons, the output for the next two years could reach,
respectively, 4 million and over 5 million tons.
Chalandon let it be kr~own that the question of the participation of rhe
Elf Congo, 80 percent of which is owned by Elf Aquitaine (the rest being
held by the Congolese state) in the development of the Congo in areas
other than petroleum, had been discussed with the Congolese President.
Let us recall that the 1979 Congo petroleum output totaled 2.7 million
tons.
Petroleum extraction in the country began in 1957 from the Pointe indienne
deposits under which a small natural gas field was located (exploited for
local needs).
After producing 7U0,000 tons in 10 years, the Pointe Indienne deposit
began to decline. In 1979 its output was no more than 10,000 tons per
year with a total output of about 800,000 tons. ,
The search rapidly turned to the sea. In 1969 Elf Congo undertook to
explore the deep Pointe-Noire sea area. At the same time the Italian
company Agip Recherches Congo was given the license for Madingo Marine.
The companies granted each other, reciprocally, a 35 percent participation
based on their licenses.
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The research was successful and in 1972 Elf Congo undertook the exploita-
tion of the Emeraude underwater deposit s. The operarion proved to be
more difficult than expe~ted. All in all, by the end of 1979 the total
output was 13 milLion tons. The curren t pace averages 1.3 million tons.
Agip Recherches began extraction at the Loango underwater deposit irt 1977. `
In 1979 production reached a pace of 1.3 million tons.
_ Last April the Likouala-Marine deposit was opened. It was discovered and
developed by Elf Congo holding the lice nse for deep extraction at Pointe-
Noire. Over a full year the expected output should tot~11 1.5 million
tons.
Future petroleum extraction in Congo also involves the exploitation of
the Yanga and Sendji deposits and further prospecting of Pointe-Noire as
well as prospecting und~rtaken on the basis of the following new licenses:
- The High Sea license, granted in 1973 to an association consisting of
Elf Congo as the operator (85 percent) and Hydro-Congo Nati.onal Company
(15 percent);
- The Loeme land license, granted in 1973 again to the Elf Congo (85 per-
cent) and Hydro-Congo (15 percent assoc iation). The ground exploitation
marked an initial success in 1979 by discovering petroleum indications in
the ,:iengo 101 drill; they were confirme d in 1980 with the Mengo 102 dr.ill.
The Elf Congo investments since its establishment total 160 billion CFA
francs.
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
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a ~
GAMBIA
BRIEFS
FRG AGREEMENT SIGNED--An agreement on a gift of DM 2.5 million from the
FRG to Gambia was concluded on 25 July in Banjul by Lamine Jabang, Gambian
minister of foreign affairs, and West German Ambassador Udo Hartmann with
embassy in Dakar. The gift will be used for the building of a medium-
sized foundry. Let us recall that as a result of the negotiations which
had taken place in the~FRG last June, the FRG had promised to supply
Gambia in 1980 loans totaling DM 15 million (about $8.6 million), either
as outright gifts or loans for financial and technical aid. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX E1 MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1,916]
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GUINEA
BANK LOAN TO FINANCE ALUMINUM ORIDE PLANT MODERNIZATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1972
[Text] Within the framework of the first Lome convention, the European
Investment Bank (EIB) has granted a loan with an exchange value of
4.4 million units of account (about 117.35 million sylis or
1.287 billion CFA francs) to help wi*_h the modernization of an a~uminum
oxide plant in Fria-Kimbo, 150 kilometers to the noxth of Conakry. This
loan, which represents the first activity of the EIB in this country, was
granted to Friguia, a mixed economic company, in which the state is the
main stockh~lder. The funds are in the form of a 10-year loan at a rate
of 8 percent, taking into account an interest rebate from the resources of
the European Development Fund.
The investments to which the EIB is contributing are designed to increase
the productivity of the plant, which ia installed near bauxite deposits
the known reserves of which are substantial. Built 20 years ago, this
plant initially had a capacity of 480,000 tons of aluminum oxide per year,
subsequent~y increased to a technical maAimum of 70~,000 tons. `
The work, the total cost of which is estimated at about 23.6 million units
of account (about 629.41 million sylis or 6.903 billion CFA francs), and
which is acheduled to be completed by the end of 1982, will make it pos-
sible first of a11 to improve the certain operation of the plant at its
maxima.l capacity and to neduce pollution risks, thanks among other things
to the construction of a holding basin for air residues. This work also
involves improvement of the storage and shipping capacities, in particular
at the port of Conakry, and technical improvements (furnaces, filters)
making a reduction in production costs posaible. This work may represent
- the preliminary phase for future further expansion which is currently
under study.
The Central Economic Cooperation Fund is also part:~cipating in the
financing of these investments.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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KENYA
VICE PRESIDENT DISCUSSES FOREI6N INVESTMENT PROSPECTS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 pp 1983-1984
[Text] The EEC as is known has decided to provide very substantial aid to
Kenya in the next 5 years to enable it to cope with its current diffi-
culties (MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 March, p 634). This aid
is to be added to that granted by a number of ~ther international bodies
and European and Arab countries. As a result it seemed to us of interest
to publish here parts of the answers given by Vice President Mwai Kibaki
in the course of an interview reported in the EEC LE COURRIER in the June-
July issue, as the lead article in a supplement devoted to this African
nation. These carefully considered responses express hope tinged with '
concern, as tY:e reader will be able to see.
To the question as to whether, current prospects being somewhat gloomy, he
would regard Kenya as a"good riak" for investors, Mr Kibaki said:
"Kenya has always been attractive enough to investors, and thia is atill
true today and we hope that it will continue. At present we are recording
a reasonable number of investmenta, particularly in the tourist sector and
in the field of industrial processing of our farm products. We would like
to continue to welcome an increasing number of such investments, for we
lack capital and know-haw and are not ashamed to admit it. As you know,
in 1964, ~ust after we won our independence, our par~.iament passed a law
protecting private investments providing full guarantees where their capi-
tal, foreign remittance of prof:~ta and employees' righte are concerned.
And so we hope that investors wi11 continue to come to Kenya, for in these
inflationary periods, we need them especially,"
Questioned subsequently about the implementation of the 5-year development
- plan (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 13 April 1979, p 950) the
amendment of which will doubtless prove necessary (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS,.18 JuZy 1980, p 1807), the vice president admitted that
~ many previously established goals will not ia fac: be achievable.
"Well," he said, "the 6.3-percent goal (rate of annual economic growth)
will not be achieved for the simple reason that we will not have sufficient
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funds to finance a number of Frajects zor which the plan calls. We will
also spend a great deal more money for our oil and equipment goods imports,
which will involve quantities substantially greater than the plan estimates.
This means that we have had to postpone certain investments and because of
that we will not achieve our goal. But we have not abandoned the planned
strategy. We will make progress along the path of reducing poverty. This
iS what we have done, in any case, since independence. What the gresent
situation means is that the changes we had planned in the income levels of
the people will not be achieved in the course of the next 5 years. This
wi11 certainly take more time."
On the subject of unemployment and the steps taken to correct it, i.e. the
request that employers increase their personnel by 10 percent (MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 26 January 1979, p 205), Mr Kibaki said:
"This decision has in fact been implemented. This was closely supervised
by the government, such that only the companies which had the means, which
projecced investments and thus could take on more personnel, were able truly
to develop. Some of them even increased their personnel by more than
10 percent. Because other means of providing incentives for them to employ
more manpower instead of borrowing capital, which proved to be too costly
in any case. But I must correct one point: while we have such a high
number of unemployed in the urban centers, in the farm sector, which is the
main base o.f our economy, job offers are not being filled, and there is
even a manpower shortage on the farm. This unfortunately is because of
the nature of our educational system, the entire pattern of thinking of
- our young people, who tend to migrate to the cities instead of working the
land."
On the sub~ect of the free distribution of milk in the schools, Mr Kibaki
confirmed that this measure is now in full application.
"This is going well for the time being," he said. "Kenya has the means
for this policy, for it produces surplus milk which it processes into
cheese, butter, etc. Thus the milk is available on the spot, and we
should not take it away. Thus everything wQ have done is to orient milk
consumption toward those who need it most. This is truly a welcome measure."
Finally, on the subject of the prospects for Kenyan cooperation with the
Arab world, the vice president showed optimism.
"The prospects are excellent," he said. "We are already exporting sub-
stantial quantities of flowers, food products and even articles of clothing
to the Middle East. We have very good relations with the Sudan, Kuwait,
Abu Dhabi and the United Arab Emirates, with which we have developed our -
trade. In fact, our relations with the Middle East existed prior to the
colonial era, dating back to the seventh century. Also it is a good thing
that we have established this traditional trade current between East
Africa and the Gulf, tt~e Middle East in particular. We hope that it will
develop.
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"Where the sanctions the Arabs want to impose on the countries trading
with Israel are concerned, this pertains only to the member countries of _
the Arab League, and we are not in a position to tell them how they should
deal with this or that campany. Where Kenya is concerned, the sanctions do
not affect as many companies as is thought. It is a question, strictly
speaking, of a few firns which are affiliates of intern~tional companl.es
based for the most part in Europe." _
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
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l~~rn; ~rrlc~rAr, tr~~,. r~ra~,~~
KENYA
BRIEFS
PETROLEUM COrfPANX PLANNED--Accordin~ to a statement made on 31 July by
Kenyan Minister .for Energy John Okwanyo, certain Arabian Gulf countries
want to sell oil direct to Kenya without intermediaries. The Kenya Oil
Corporation, which the government will establi~h ahortly, will thus impo rt
23 million barrels of crude oil per year, and .:he other 23 million Kenya
imports every year will be purchased through the intermediary of oil
companies already located in the country. The decision to create this
Kenyan compan5� was made precisely because of the fact that the producer
nations in the Gulf area want to deal directly with Kenya, without inter-
mediaries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDTTERRANEENS in French
8 Aug 80 p 1g84] 5157
AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL AZD--The Australian government has allocated
30 million Kenyan shillings (about $3.75 million) for the launching of a
settlement project in Magarini, ne~r Malindi, in the coastai province on
the Indian Ocean. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 8 Aug 80 p 1984] 5157
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i~'0!t OEFICTAI, USL ~)NI.,Y
NIGER
PRESIDENT DISCUSSES NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 5-YEAR PLAN GOALS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 pp 1974-1975
[TexC] Development Company
Just prior to the 20th anniversary of his country's independence,
President Seyni Kountche announced in a speech delYvered on 2 August that
the national committee for the launching of the development company, a
body which to date has had a specific and limited assignment, may in the
future on its own initiative submit to the government "recommendations,
justified opinions and situation etialuations to supplement and balance the
decisions of the administrative authorities or the government in the social
and economic sectors or in connection with the ma~or political guidelines
of the country."
In addition, when the committee is not in session, its members may "offer
the prefect authorities their advice with a view to strengthening the
capabilities of our districts to organize massive campaigns of information
on sub~ects of regional or national interest, and to organize in order to
see to the still better circulation of information and, finally, in order
the better to produce and live."
The committee, created last October, is headed by
Maj Moumouni Adamou Djermakoye, minister of youth, sports and culture, and
a member of the Supreme Military Council. Made up of 84 departmental
representatives of movements, associations and professions, its initial
goal was to define the framework of a policy of "accelerated" economic and
social development and to establiah institutions based on effecCive par-
ticipation by all the social atrata in Niger.
Uranium Price and 5-Year Plan Goals
In another counection, President Kountche stated that the sale price for -
uranium, "the fuel which currently provides for e7.ectrical energy production
at the lowest cost," has for a certain time been experiencing a rapid drop,
"at the very time when the prices of other energy substances are increasing
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constantly." "This paradoxical situation," he s*_ressed, "is the result
both of i11-defined political factors and powerful economic interests
working subtly are quick, it is said, to play coal against uranium in reso-
lute fashion."
President Kountche added that Niger will do everything possible to ensure
the continuation of suitable remuneration om m~jor investments made in the
mining sector, but "without a doubt there is a difficult and disagreeable
. period through which we must pass."
The government of Niger will insofar as possible maintain the investment
programs which will dictate the future of the country, but it is possible
that the goals of the 5-year plan "will undergo some changes, above all in
the non-productive infrastructure sector."
In conclusion, the chief of state announced that the public establishments
and mixed economic companies will be subjected to detailed study and the
state bodies incapable of demonstrating their viability wi11 be eliminated.
"We are determined," President Kountche added, "to place stress on the
exclusive search for positive resulta, guaranteeing remuneration for state
investments, at a maximum, and a guarantee in the realm of self-financing,
at a minimum."
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980
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NIGER
BRIEFS
FLOODS IN AGADEZ--Following the collapse of about 100 meters of protective
dike, the water from the rainfall on the night of 14-15 July in the
Agadez reg3on swept into the town, causing ma~or damage, The wat~r, which
flowed dewn from Mount Air, located upstream of the town, destroyed in fact
almost everything in its path. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1975] 5157
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roti OFF'ICIAi, trs~ orai,Y
RWANDA
_ PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED NATIONAL STABILITY ANALYZED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRt1NEENS in French 8 Aiig 80 pp 1953-1954
[Text] A poor country but a stable one--these it seems are the
characteristics which stand out in the image of Rwanda in business circles.
That the country is poor is a known fact, as are the causes. A landlocked
area more than 1,500 kilometers from any maritime coast, Rwanda has terrain
such that only a limited arable area is available. Its population density,
with nearly 200 inhabitants per sqLare kilometer--doubtless the highest in
Africa--is substantial, while because of the low level of the purchasing
power of the greater mass of ail these potential consumers, the domestic
market remains very small.
But it is a atable country. The social revolution prior to the winning of
independence marked the end of. the hegemony of the Watusi group over the
Bahutu *.nasses. Simultaneous with the disappearance of the domination of
a feudal type, the largest ethnic group (the Bahutu group) took political
power in hand. Wasn't stability guaranteed from then on within the logic
of a system firmly based on the largest number? A comparison with Burundi,
a neighboring country in which, in the form of an inverted pyramid, the
Watusi numerical minority is essentially in control of the political power,
can only strengthen confidence in the structural stability of Rwanda, whicYi
stability however recently suffered a shakeup.
Stability Challenged
It is generally difficult for a foreign observer to obtain a precise idea
of the internal polieical developments in Rwanda, a country in which, with
the exception of the very official Rwandan Press Agency (ARP), there is
practically no written press coverage, and in which the news system complex
comes to next to nothing. The great reserve of the citizens of Rwanda with
regard to strangers, which is but a reflection of the particularism of which
Rwandans aie proud, represents an additional hindrance to a proper under-
standing of events. Everything proceeds as if nothing were happening.
This was clearly evident in the spring of 1979. The war in Uganda had
caused the exhaustion of fuel stocks in Rwanda (since the Mombasa-Kigali
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r.nn nr~r~,T n'r ttc;i~ I1TdT,Y _
road leads through Kampala), and yet there was no reference in Kigali to
the crisis situation Uganda was experiencing.
In March of 1980, pamphlets circulated in Rwanda which were drafted in
violent terms, denouncing embezzlement and incompetence among those closest
to the chief of state. Then an attempted coup d'etat is said to have
occurred. Certain facts still remain unclear. But this time, the media
, emerged from their usual silence. The chief of ~,tate,
Maj Gen Juvenal Habyarimana, president and founder of *_he National Revolu-
tionary Movement for Development, himself has addressed the nation on a
number of occasions. His statement published in the ARP on 6 June 1980
stressed the seriousness of the events and explained the historic "context"
in which they should be viewed.
After recalling that the cultural revolution of 1979 had as its goal giving
power to the majority ethnic group, the president of the republic also
noted that for better or for worse, the coexistence of the three ethnic
groups (Bahutu, Watusi and, to a very limited extent, the Batwa) had
resisted all threats well, and that it was to safeguard this coexistence
that he had to establish the second republic in July of 1973 and assume
the highest post in the nation as of then. Without naming him, the presi-
dent of the republic clearly indicated Major Lizinde, who was in charge of
the nati.onal security forces for 7 years, as the inspirer of subversive
undertakings. His personal ambiiion, supposedly, led him to arrange the
"distxibution throughout the country of namphlets criticizing the regime,
the person of the chief of statz himself and the policy of unity," a
policy to which some were unwilling to rally, the chief of state noted.
- We should make it clear that Major Lizinde, put in prison at the end of this
pamphleteering campaign, is the author of a book which was published in _
the course of the sumRner of 1979 in Kigali. Entitled "The Discovery of
- Kalinga or the End of a Myth--A Contribution to the History of Rwanda," it
is a work whose author does not hesitate to voice a certain mistrust about
the sincerity of the support of the Watusi group, and in which he repre-
sents himself as the choirmaster of Bahutu resurgence.
The chief of state emphasized that the last word wi11 lie with the courts,
whose duty it is, without recourse to emergency measures, to punish those
responsible for the subversion and to acquit those who were not.
Remaining a poor country as it has, is it possible that Rwanda ceased a
short ttme ago to be a stable one? It would be doubly threatening to the
prospects of economic development because to date, stability hss been
successfully cited to foreign investors as an :~dvantage likely to compensate
for the handicap of poverty.
A Situation Seemingly in Hand
For the time being, despite the large number of arrests which have been
ma.de, this frustrated palace revolt does not seem likely to have an
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2~(1~: l1l~FlCiAT~ t)SI~; t~Nl~l'
afterma.th. But it would doubtless be an error to see in it only a
movement reflecting popular discontent. The calm evidenced by the president
of the republic with regard to recent events, his concern with re-
establishing his authority in legality are both elements serving as
guaranteea of complete resumption of control of the situation by the ex-
isting authorities.
Rise of the New Social Forces
In the longer range, these events will however doubtless have their
effects. In this regard, the following repercussions can be foreseen:
Another challenge to the ethnic balance within the very frontiers of Rwanda,
a challenge which certainly inspired the attempted coup d'etat (not to
speak of the latent civilian-military opposition), an indication that Rwanda
will doubtless not be i~une to a new ethnic flareup, should such a flareup
develop in Burundi. There is a riek here of destabilization through con-
tagion. ,
Speaking through the voice of the chief of state himself, the government
emerged in March-April 1980 from its usual silence, because it wanted to
guarantee itself the support of th~ masses against its opponents. This
appeal to the popular wisdom comes within the policy of democratization of
the political system, with regard to which we wi11 mention only the two
fellowing indications. At the beginning of 1980, the chief of state in-
vited each of his ministers to ma.ke himself available for a presa conference
providing newsmen representing the national press with an opportunity to
ask about the activities of each ministerial department, which activities
in some cases were sharply criticized. The preparations for the third
national congress of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development
led to the establishment of connmunal committees, and then, in May of 1980,
- to the election of prefectoral coffinittees in each of the 10 prefectures in
the country.
On the principial level, the path chosen, that of democratization, cannot
be criticized. Let us not forget however that once undertaken, such a
process is irreversible, and it can lead to unexpected excesses if the
political statements and institutional reforms are not accompanied by
some improvement in the fate of the masses. Recent events in Liberia pro-
vide a tragic illustration of this. Despite his liberal intentions, didn't
Tolbert have to atone for the autocratic actions of the likes of Tubman?
Thus it is indeed in the realm of economics that the government of Rwanda,
if it intends to remain master of the situation and to resist any further
effort to destabilize the country, must launch ard win the political
battle.
The recent events have made it clear--as dencunced by the opposition--that
there exists a rich class--the high officials, officers, merchants and
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shipping agents. Their growing wealth is particularly intolerable to the
- popular masses because they do not even get the crumbs from the feast, and
thus the chasm between the people and the national elite is growing ever
wider, in an economic environment which has nat yet been able to overcome
a certain stagnation.
A Fancy Facade
It is true, in Kigali in particular, that outward indications suggest that
the economy is healthy. Without ye~ firuly offering the aspect of a capital
city, Kigali has little by little abandoned that village aspect which it
�long retained. Kanombe, an international airport, will soon be equipped
with a runway which can accommodate ~umbo ~ets. The road network, already
extremely dense, is being improved with the increase in the number of
asphalted roads. The rural environment is being modernized somewhat.
Tourism and the hotel trade are developing. The social sector can pride
itself on a costly reform, some of the ramifications of which cannot yet
� be measured, but which must be credited with the increase in the population
attending school. Process3.ng industries have been established: plastics,
banana wine, nail making, soup production, retreading tires, a pyrethrum
distillery--or are soon to be established: textiles, matches, oil plant,
cement plant, brick plant, quinine extraction, a new brewery. There is
even talk of a possible assembiy unit in Rwanda for light automotive
vehicles.
In a country which has the sad honor of being one of the poorest in the
world and where, as a result, everyth3ng remains to be done, these un-
deniable achievements are hailed as that many successes wrested from
underdevelopment, without the realization that in most cases they affect.
, only a limited sector of the economy~ in which the "country in depth" does
not participate. In this regard, basically nothing has changed. The
economy is still characterized, as it was in the colonial situation, by the
duality of sectors: the masses participate only in the traditional sectors,
while a favored group, no longer foreigners but citizens of the country,
participate almost exclusively in the modern sector of the economy.
Economic StagnatioiY in the Country
Underneath the visible surface, the reality of Rwanda in 1980 is that of a
poor country, a reality which demands that the anguishing question as to
the state, if not indeed the very survival, of Rwanda in the year 2000 be
posed immediately.
In less than 20 years the present population of Rwanda will have more than
doubled, and will exceed 10 million inhabitants in a country with a total
area smaller than that of the former colonial power, Belgium, and lacking
a r3ch subsoil stratum. Already in 1978 an agronomer had written that
"the maximal area of crop land having been calculated at 1,250,000 hectares,
and the area currently in use being 877,000, there remain 363,000 hectares
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available for future expansion. At the current rate of growth of
3.6 percent (in fact the annual rate of population growth is near 4 per-
~ cent), i.e. about 30,000 hectares per year, all possible expansion of
crops will be exhausted in less than 12 years." In other words by 1990
the average land surface for cultivation per peasant family, an area which
is presently 1 hectare, wi11 begin to diminish.
AVOiding an Impasse
The public authorities will have to give evidence af imagination, first of
all to establish a clear view of what Rwanda will be in the year 2000, and
subsequently to take, beginning now, all the steps within their power to
improve a situation which, if thin~s follow their present course, threaten
to lead to an impasse. Is there not too much of a tendency on the part
of the public authorities to rely on food aid from friendly countriea, for-
getting that this sid may not p~rhaps be always available when required,
while Rwanda has already experienced, in its not-so-distant history, a
number of famines (13 serious ones are said to have been recorded between
1894 and 1924). Farm yields are generally low in traditional cultivation,
perhaps because Rwanda is not properly speaking either a tropical or a
temperate country, but is very sensitive to climatic variations.
Birth control, presuming as would be desirable that it is effective begin-
ning now, would still be unable to prevent overpopulation in Rwanda by the
year 2000, taking the inertia of demographic phenomena into account.
The fact remains that a certain number of options do exist for preparations
for the year 2000, in order to enable Rwanda to escape the threats and
menaces which loom:
The creation of jobs outside the farm sector, in c~~der to relieve Lhe
pressure of the active population in the farm seczor and thua make pos-
sible the intensification of farm production, which in turn will require a
strengthening of_ farm cadres, better motivation of supervisory personnel
and strengthened means of action.
A real policy of cooperation with neighboring countries, to allow in-
dustrialization on a regional scale and the transfer of population fram
the more heavily populated countriea (Rwanda, Burundi) toward those ler3s
heavily populated (Zaire and Tanzania, among others).
A policy of more deliberate openness to foreign capital, which is cer-
tainly welcome in Rwanda, but there is smnetimes a tendency to forget thae
such capital is anly attracted to Rwanda to the extent that the investors
can make profits there.
A bolder monetary policy favoring the �inancing of productive investments
by nationals and foreigners, even if it means strengthen3ng control over
speculative financing of investments (housing, transportation of goods).
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An upward revision of the level of compensation for state and public
' collective agents. The nominal level of the remuneration of state employees
is in fact too low to allow tlie state, despite the goodwill of the majority,
to demand of its servants their entire devotion, with dedication and coni-
petence, to the serv~ce or the nation.
It will be as ~ function of the direction Rwanda is able to adopt, in
particular in connection with the preparations for and implementation of
its next development plan (the 5-year plan in progress runs through 1981),
the realism and the example of which its leaders are capable with regard to
the masses, that one can in retrospect either consider the events of
spring 1980 as the first herald of a deterioration in the situation leading
to an impasse or, we would hope, as a healthy warning. The awareness of
the socioeconomic situation of the country which recent events have forced
us to acquire should in fact aid Rwanda to overcome the difficulties which
face it while at the same time safeguarding the stability which has been
valuable as an example in the course of the past few years.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
5157
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SENEGAL
REASONS FOR FRANCE'S PROMPT ECONOMIC AID NOTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Aug 80 pp 14-17
(Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Senegal and France: a Friendship That
Pays Off"]
[Text] Like ma.ny other African countries, Senegal
is going through serious economic troubles. Its
leaders make no secret of it The situation is
explained to the people. In addition, President
Senghor sent his prime minister to Paris. Where
he'received more than he went there for.
"Senegal is undeniably going through a very serious economic and financial
crisis." This is the admission of Ousmane Seck, the Senegalese minister of
Finance and Economic Affairs, who is throwing out a series of figures with the
paucity of sentimentalism that characterizes technocrats.
Peanut production has taken a breathtaking plunge: it brought in 70,000,000,000
CFA francs in 197.?, followed by 23,000,000,000 in 1978, while prices remained
stable. .
In 1979, thanks to a rather good�harvest (900,000 tons) and despite a decline
in world prices, exports contributed 43,000,000,000 CFA francs to export re-
ceipts, but this year, in 1980, prices were 25 percent lower and the harvest
was short: peanuts will have brought in only some 12,000,000,000 to
13,000,000,000 CFA francs.
In three agricultural seasons, therefore, Senegal's quasi-monoculture, which
makes up 45 to 50 percent of its total expo�rts, has "lost" nearly
57,000,000,000 CFA francs, a figure that will eventually make more of a hole
in the trade deficit.
An Attentive Listener -
Minister Ousmane Seck, ;:ccording to rumors in Dakar, very nearly lost his po-
sition. For sticking to the truth of the figures and for having sounded the
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alarm. The members of Parliament who met in budgetary session in June could
not believe their ears: a member of the government who also had responsibil-
ities in the Socialist Party (the majority party) told them bluntly that
Senegal was experiencing economic d~fficulties.
However, Ousmane Seck had an attentive and curious listener: Sheykh Abdoul
Ahad Lakhat Mbacke, the general caliph of the Mourides--the most influential
religious brotherhood among the 85 percent of Senegalese who are Muslims--,
who s~mmoned him and asked him to explain what the crisis was and why the
economy was in trouble. "For two hours I explained all the economic mechan-
isms to him (in Wolof)," Ousmane Seck told us. The lesson has been revealed
as paying off. The caliph promised to explain everything in his turn to the
believers. President Leopold Sedar Senghor himself suggested that his Finance _
Minister give the same course in economics to the other great religious head,
Serigne Abdoul Aziz Sy, the general caliph of the Tidjane brotherhood.
These popularization meetings certainly express a governmental desire to m0-
bilize public opinion around a theme: hit hard by the international crisis,
Senegal, whose economy depends on dry farming (the peanut is queen) and on
exports (many peanuts and a few phosphates--13 to 15 percent of exports), is
in a bad position.
It can be explained, of course, by climatic disturbance. Since the great
drought of 1973-1974 the Senegalese economy has adjusted poorly. Because from
one year to the next rain is becoming more scarce. Between 1976-1977 and
1977-1978, for example, the volume of precipitation diminished by 50 percent.
The result, a disastrous lowering of agricultuxe production: peanut produc-
tion declined by 41 percent, millet by 40 pexcent and sorghwn by 45 percent.
Whereas paddy rice--which provides the daily rice for the Senegalese--went
from 133,000 tons in 1975-1976 to 112,260 tons in the 1976-1977 season, and
fell to 83,671 tons in 1977-1978.
Backward Leaps
However, the number of mouths to be fed continues to increase: the 5,400,000
Senegalese are increased by 156,000 others per year. According to the pre-
di,Ctions mad.e by the National Population Commission, 200,000 new Senegalese
will be born every year after 1996, and after 2016 the population will increase
by at least 262,000 and possibly 351,000 inhabitants per year. Which means
that between now and the year 2000 rice production will have to be multiplied
by 20. A tour de force that the chronic drought does not seem ready to allow;
instead of making forward bounds, production is making backward leaps.
The lowered production has harmed the balance of trade. Exports have gone
from 190,000,000,000 CFA fr~ncs in 1977 to only 133,000,000,000 in 1978, and
then to 121,500,000,000 in 1979. A drastic export restriction policy reduced
the trade deficit of 1979 to 54,000,000,000 CFA fxancs (compared with
59,700,000,000 the year before). But again this year the vital minimum re-
quires that 14,000,000,000 CFA fxancs' worth of cereals be imported.
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Misappropriations
The theory that Senghor has been trotting out for 20 years is confirmed every
day, namely the det eriorating terms of exchange: the peanuts exported by
Senegal have lost 25 percent of their value on the world market, while the
equipment goods it must import cost 15 percent more than in 1979. President
Senghor even stated, "Between 1974 and 1978, our export prices increasec! by
57 percent, while import prices rose 196 percent."
To which is added the rise in the price of oil. Prime Minister Abdou Diouf
said again on 18 July in Paris,"The oil bill (Senegal's), which in 1973 a-
mounted to 5,000,000,000 CFA francs, will be over 50,000,000,000 in 1980."
So mu�h~foreign currency to be mobilized to maintain economic activity. Just
when Senegalese businesses are suffocating. Because they are less and less
able to pay for the oil and fuel they need. Because they are less and less
able to resort to b ank credits that are in default.
The industry slowdown, added to the agriculture slowdown, has reduced all
economic activity. Production is inadequate, the volume of trade is dwindling,
and money, the oxygen of the economy, is becoming rare. Business firms are
earning little and no longer pay the banks, which in their turn do not have
enough money to loan it out and start production up again. The circle is
complete.
Figures? They are eloquent. In the public sector alone the administration
owes (as of 30 June 1980) some 15,000,000,000 CFA francs to its private
suppliers; public institutions o~re another 15,000,000,000 to the banking sec-
tor, to which are added the 7,000,000,000 that the government as such owes to
the national banks.
As for the ONCAD (N ational Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Develop-
ment), which is supposed to be the spearhead of the entrepreneur-state in
marketing peanuts, it is suffering from two maladies: misappropriation of
funds, into which investigations have been ordered; trouble in recovering
its debts, which amount to 30,000,000,000 CFA francs--19,000,000,000 is con-
sidered permanently lost because the peasants who owe it lack the means to
pay.
For, although scarcity is not really rampant, the lowered production has
bled the rural world: no peanuts, no rice, no money. Which has led the
government to distribute free provisions in the regions most affected by the
drought.
The Strangulation of the State
The final consequence of the economic crisis is that the state is out of wind.
Commercial activity being in a slowdown, indirect taxes are yielding with in-
creasing difficulty the 60 percent of budgetary income they are traditionally
expected to provide. Income is diminishing, collecting the indirect taxes
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that supply 60 percent of those collected is also becoming difficult to do.
While the government, the principal employer, must pay its 57,U00 civil ser-
vants 4,000,000,000 CFA francs per month. The danger of strangulation was
such tllat the Senegalese government imposed a rigorous discipline of austerity
by deciding on a stabilization plan (1979-1980) and by restraining its own ex-
penctitures. Thus, the 1980-1981 budget, adopted in June by the National AS-
sembly, was almost frozen,. at 191,617,000,000 CFA francs, at the level of
- fiscal year 1979-1980, or 190,715,000,000, the slight 11.1-percent increase
serving to cover the rate of inflation, estimated at 12 percent.
Official Autamobiles
Among the stabilization measures the freezing of recruitment of civil servants
ranks in first place: no commitment is authorized, with the sole exception of
Senegalese cadres graduating from training schools, who are considered to be in
a pre-employment situation during their studies. The second Draconian mea-
sure: a lowering of the government lifestyle. Noblesse oblige, the r~embers
of the government must set the example; very probably, the official automobiles,
the Peugeot 604s, will be replaced by 504s. Putting the s~.ibstitution into op-
eration will cost 150,000,000 CFA francs, but at the Finance Ministry it is _
estimated that the savings in fuel thus realized (the 604s are noted for their
- voracity} will very largely compensate for the initial expense.
With respect to government-owned or semi-public businesses or corporations,
austerity is also standard from now on. This sector, which has grown too fast,
is today the subjec~ of systematic investigations.
Except for the misappropriation of funds that is peculiar to certain firms,
a general ~bservation has been made: in the good old tradition of all bur eau-
cracy, the personnel of these companies has swelled immeasurably and in six
years the mass of the wages they distribute has grown by--80 percent. A dis-
ease that requires surgical intervention. Which is recommended in the 100
investigative reports that the government's Inspection General submitted to
Mr Senghor in 1979.
But these measures, however courageous, merely serve to close some gaps.
They attend to first things first. They do not start the economy up again.
Neither new investment nor production activity nor trade exchanges. The state
seems to have planned to do all it can. But it cannot do more than that. Be-
fore even thinking of launching new investment plans, the Senegalese state
has therefore chosen to stabilize the existing ones, to make the economic ma-
chine start up again.
Discreetly, the Senegalese leaders prepared a request for emergency aid. On
16 July 1980 Prime Minister Abdou Diouf emplaned for Paris. His mission: to
negotiate aid from France to repay the debts of the government and the govern-
ment-owned sector, owed to the Senegalese ~rivate sector--mainly the banks.
On his departure from Dakar, Abdou Diouf, flanked by his ministers of Finance,
Ousmar.e Seck, and Planning, Louis Alexandrenne, was not very optimistic. He
knew the reserved French technocrats, who balk at President Giscard d'Estaing's
prodigalit y.
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Mr Diouf nevertheless hopes (and his hopes are high) to obtain 15,000,OOO,U00
CFA francs in aid, which could be rounded by a second section of another
_ 15,000,000,000 in several months. Thz result exceeds his hopes: at the per-
sonal intervention of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, th~ French government is
granting 21,500,000,000 CFA francs.
Of that total, 4,000,000,000 is granted as discounted loans--payble in 15 years r
with a five-year grace period--at a rate of 7.5 percent; 7,500,000,000 CFA
francs are being advanced by the French Treasury out of the 1981 Stabex px~o-
gram--a mechanism provided for by the Lome Convention between the EEC ana the
African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (the ACP)--; finally, 10,000,000,000
will be given as guaranteed loans, but not discounted (the rate of interest
therefore is 12.5 percent).
The allocations will be divided between payment of domestic debts
(11,500,000,000 CFA frar.cs to be payed imarediately) and the r~floating of
Investment Bank funds (10, 000, 000, 000) .
A Good Debtor
"This is the first time," Ousmane Seck told us,"that Senegal is the beneficiary
- of such a significant transfer at one single time." In fact, the Senegalese
themselves profess themselves surprised at the promptness with which France
has flown to the aid of their economy.
There are three reasons.
The first is Senegal's excellent credibility in international financial cir-
cles. The national foreign debt, 300,000,000,000 CFA francs, is heavy, but
it has always been paid. This despite unbridles recourse to foreign loans
after 1973, at the time when the excellent phosphates run had made Senegal
"think too big." Thus, ~he servicing of the debt has been multiplies by 10
in 7 years: 3,000,000,000 CFA francs in 1973, in the 1979-1980 budget it re-
presents some 30,600,000,000, or 30 percent of export revenue, which is enor-
mous; but Senegal has ma.de it a point of honor never to default on its com-
mitments. Some friendly countries had even advised Senegalese leaders to "do
what everyone else does," that is to say, to ask that their debts be erased;
but Senghor has not yet resigned himself to that. The very most he is dis-
posed to do is to request that the repayment deadlines be reset. Relations
between Paris and Dakar must have been purely "business," for the French
leaders to have lent to such a bood debtor without batting an eye.
After Senghor--
There is anotner reason for France's gesture, more sentimental and political:
the personality and orientation of Leopold Sedar Senghor. In Paris they are
sta.ll as determined as ever to support the Senghorian regime. Senegalese
diplomacy fits~� p~rfectly into the French concerri for remaining the "arm" of
the West in A�rica. By receiving the American vice president, Walter Mondale,
in late July, Mr Senghor confirmed it again: Seneg~l is worried about the
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thrust of the US5R and CuUa in Africa. And the Western strategy for facing
it is well known: let France do it. France therefore wanted to show
Leopold Sedar Senghor that it can fly to his aid at any moment, on the mili-
tary level (the French military base at Ouakam is ~here "for that purpose
as on the econo~r.ic level. The crisis Sene~al is going through has been gravc
- enough to make Mr Giscard d'Estaing react very c{uickly and sweep away the
reluctance of his exper~ts.
According to highly placed leaders in llakar, if the crisis were to last any
longer the social situation could become untenable: businesses would close
= their doors and the unemployed would take to the streets; the purchasing power
of the wage-earners, despite salary increases, would not be enough to keep up
with exploding prices (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1015); the peasants would be get-
ting even less to eat; and democratic openness would quickly give way to
aimlessness. Which would sweep away President Senghor's regime, a prospect
that France is not at all ready to resign itself to. "I dare not think
what will happen to Senegal after Senghor," a:iighly placed official in the
- Quai d'Orsay said to us. .
ri.zt Senghor is not immortal. He has even prepared for his succession. And
France, in rushing to Senegal's bedside, was trying to tell him that it en-
dorsed his choice. It was not Senghor who negotiated the request for aid in
Paris. It was his prime ministex, Abdou Diouf, the constitutional heir ap-
parent. That man whom Senghor himself calls "too reserved" passed his exam-
ination: he obtained from France more than he had come to ask for.
Such French largesse is significant. Tomorrow, when Leopold Sedar Senghor
has retired, his successor, Abdou Diouf--a "good choice," Giscard d'Estaing
would say--will always be able to count on France's support.
Ulterior Motive
When all is said and done Abdou Diouf's mission served as a test for both par-
ties. In addressing himself only to France (a:id to Saudi Arabia, for
$100, 000,000 in aid) , Senglior was anxious to demonstrate that, ~faithful to his
friends, he turns first to his old friends before looking for new allies.
In granting more than was asked, Giscard wanted to show that he, also faith-
ful, can do anything to save his friends. Probably not without so:ne ulterior
motive. As the first to aid Senegal, France checkmates the oil-prouucing coun-
tries that would like very much to have privileged relations with such a
heavily Islamic state. But, for the moment, while Dakar spends 50,000,00O,OOQ
CFA francs per year to import its oil, the aid from the Arab countries scarcely
exceeds a total flow of 2,000,000,000 CFA francs.
.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980
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SENEGAL
EFFECTS OF DROUGHT PERSIST DESPITE RAINS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 191.5
~
Report: "The Rainy Season: The Rain, Finally"]
[Text] Finally, on 27 July, it rained over Dakar and Senegal,to the
greatest possible satisfaction of the Senegalese who had been waiting for
we~eks for the rainy season to begin. Panic was beg inning to show up in
the face of the persistent drought which has alrea dy decimated cattle and
sheep herds and were suggesting famine.
� The infrequent rains which had fallen over the past 2 months in the south
had been unable, so far, to promote the germination of the crops and it
was feared that the 1980 harvest would be even more catastrophical than
that of the preceding 2 years. Rain has been stea dily falling starting
with 26 July in the south and the 27th in the rest of the country. The
meteorological services are confident that this "good" weather will remain
in the days to come.
The Senegalese herds are hungry and sick, noted LE SOLEIL, the Dakar
daily, in its 26 July issue. A number of infectiou s disease centers may
be found virtually everywhere and 164,000 head of c attle have died in the
territory. In the areas of Djoloff and the river a lone 75,000 sheep and
goats have died of hunger. All in all, nearly 500,000 head are threatened
and need food. The livestock breeders are looking for bits and pieces i.n
the barren bush. Feeding from the air is the last hope for surviving a
particularly long dry spell.
' In Sine-Saloum, the millet has sprouted only in some pockets of Nioro
department; the other areas are barren. There is a feed shortage in
_ Diourbel which needs 8,000 tons of millet to save t he situation. For the
past four years this has been the worst rainy season in Casamance. A
substantial share of the rural population has become undernourished. The
cattle are suffering from physiological deprivation s and their mortality
rate is very high.
Never before has the threat of a famine, today knocking at the door of the
rural world, been so serious. Agriculture, which seems strongly
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compromised this season, accounts for. 35 percent o� the gross internal
product and for one-third of Senegal's exports. The high mortaLity of
the herds will heavily affect the consumption centers whose only source
of food is the co~ntryside.
"9ince international aid is neither quick nor consistent with our needs~"
added LE SOLEIL, "we must begin by relying on oursel.ves. Whereas our
food requirements total 118,000 tons, international aid to our country is
limited (received and planned) to less than 50,000 tons. The grain
reserves of the villages have been exhausted. Millet, which has vanished
from the markets, is sold by some speculaeors for 100 francs per kilo-
gram. . . .
"Therefore, humans and animals must be given food and water if they are
to face a difficult period which will certainly be the longest in our 20
years of independence. It becomes necessary to revise our farm policy,
to change our agricultural poliCical fabric, preceded by changing our.
industrial system, and t~ develop new properly equipped production
~ centers. . . .
"The end of the rainy season could result for the state in a loss oE
several billion CFA francs used to purchase seeds and subsidize ferti-
lizers. It may also increase the indebtedness of the rural area, assessed
' currently at almost 7 billion francs. Millions of peasants and breeders
are threatened.
"Our country is being severely tried by a persistent drought which could
threaten the abandonment of a number of plans whose vitality depends on
agriculture. This applies to the administrative reform, the successful
collection of rural taxes, and the restructuring of cooperatives based on
agricultural production."
The Senegalese government has drafted a program for the delivery of hard-
ship food which would make it possible to feed the population until the
next crop and provide seeds to compensate for the sowing of crops which
could not germinate for lack of sufficient rain.
The state has also launched a"cattle salvage" operation by supplying
feed for the animals at the symbolic price of 10 CFA fr.ancs the kilogram.
The situation is as severe in livestock breeding, fox� the drought had
long eliminated the meager pasture areas on wt~ich cattle and sheep
subsist.
Recently a case was cited in the Diourbel arc:a of peasants who, having
exhausted all other sources of feed for their cattle, were feeding the~n
the thatch from their roofs. There has also been a strong increase in
cattle mortality from thirst. G`r else, tortured by hunger, the cattle
would eat anything they could find, including bits of plastic, r.esulting
in lethal gastric complications.
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Finally, the droughC is threatening the reforrestation campaign launched
by the state: The seedlings, even though low water consumers, lacked ev~n
the minimum of their required moisture to get started and perished soon
afterwards.
The struggle against the drought is the priority target of the Senp~al.ese
government. However, major reforrestation and irrigation programs (the
building of dams and the drilling of deep wells) can yield results only
on a medium or long-term basis. In order to face the immediate conse-
quences of the severe precipi~ation shortage, the government must apply
prompt measures.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
. 5157
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SENEGAL
~ FAD-FINANCED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Paris MA~:CHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1971
[Text] The International Fund for Agricultural Development (FAD) has
agreed to finance 75.44 percent of a rural development pro~ect the overall
cost of which is estimated at 5.256 billion CFA francs. The goal of the
operation, which involves the department of Mbour and the region of Louga,
is to improve farm production, basically food crops, but also living con-
ditions in *_he rura2 sector.
The implementation of the project has been entrusted to the Farm Develop-
ment and Popularization Company (SODEVA). The government of Senegal and
the cooperatives are contributing 21.80 percent and 3.26 percent, re-
spectively, to the financing.
In a 5-year period, the goal is to cover some 910 sections, each section
containing 20 farm operations on an average. This means 18,200 operations
involvinf; 130,000 persons, 30 percent of the farmers in the project zone.
In addition to the provision of credit for increasing the productivity of
local operations, the project calls for the installation of 40 water taps,
the planting of 800 hectares in 1oca1 timber (for heating and construction),
the provision of 166 mills and 66 threshers for millet, and 133 peanut
shaker-windrowers, as well as the tools for rural craftsmen for the main-
tenance of all this collective equipment. It will also involve the reduction
of the nimmber of cooperatives in the zone from 225 to 106, and the building
of 106 shop��off"ices and 52 silos for the storage of the surplus of market-
able millet. Twenty-nine trucks will make it possible to strengthen the
reorganized cooperatives so that thay can cope with their new activities.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980
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SENEGAL
DAKAR-MARINE FLOATING DOCK TO BEGIN OPERATING EARLY OCTOBER ~
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1980
[Text] As we reported in our issue No 1809 dated 11 July (p 1740), the
Dakar-Marine floating dock reached Dakar during the night of 4-5 July,
towed from Norway in record time by powerful 22,000-horsepower tug
Smit-London.
The dock is now moored at the new wet repair wharf of Dakar-Marine (where
the photograph we carry on the cove~ page was taken). This wharf was
recently completed and the building of the workshops and office~ of Dakar-
Marine there will be finished soon.
In view ~f the importance of the completion of the Dakar-Marine pro~ect for
Senegal, we have reported ~n a nwnber of occasions in these recent months
on the progress made in the work (see our issues 1792 dated 14 March,
1807 dated 27 June and 1809 dated 11 June, section on Senegal).
~ At a time when Senegal is experiencing serious economic and financial
difficulties, due in part to the international crisis, to an ever-heavier
oil bill and to continuing drought, it would be well to stress that the
commissioning of the dock and the supplementary Dakar-Marine workshops in
October may, through its secondary effects, contribute to re-launching a
number of Senegalese induatrial and commercial sectors.
The Dakar-Marine project is the work, for the most part, of Minister of
Industrial Development and Crafts Cheikh Amidou Kane, and Mr Faly Ba,
president and general director, assisted on the financial, technical,
organizational and maintenance levels by Cecotrat, a French engineering
company headed by Mr Tien Phuc.
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980
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SENEGAL
BRIEFS
IR~N ORE EXPLOITATION--The 24 July Interministerial Council, chaired by
~Leopold Sedar Senghor, the Senegalese chief of state, discussed a plan
- for the mining of iron ore in Faleme (Miferso). The council emphasized
the need to conduct over the next few months feasibility studies and to
- optimize the plan. The overall investments preceding the mining are
assessed at 215 billion CFA. The plan calls for the r_reation of a mining
center with social infrastructures employing 1,800 people; the laying of
railroad tracks (1,500 jobs) to haul the output of 12 million tons of
minPrals per year; the building of a port (350 jobs) for the docking of
ore carriers to haul the output to Europe. The implementation of the
various infrastructures will open 3,950 new jobs 7 to 10 years from now.
Miferso, the company in charge of mining the iron deposits in eastern
Senegal, whose reserves are estimated at 450 million tons, includes the
Senegal, the BRGM (Bureau for Geological and Mining Research, a French
agency), and the Krupp (FRG) and Kanematzu (Japan) companies. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1,915]
� 5157
FRANCE DONATES MAIZE--Following the trip to Paris of Abdou Diouf,
Senegalese prime minister, an agreement on a gift of 5,000 tons of corn
by France to Senegal was signed by Philippe Lagayette, inspector of
finance, representing the French government, and Amadou Cisse, on behalf
of the Senegalese government. Deliveries will begin as of 18 August 1980.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80
p 1,915] 5157
NETHERLANDS WHEAT DONATION--A shipment of 3,400 tons of wheat valued at
200 million CFA francs was presented to Senegal by the Dutch government on ;
1 Augu~t. Ceremonies took place in the Socopao stores with the Dutch
charge d'affaires in Senegal, Mr W. Joris Witkam, and Mr Souleymane Ndiaye,
commissioner for food aid, participating. This gift will make possible the
purchase of millet for free distribution in the regions which have suf-
fered disasters and will lighten the burden of the Senegalese people.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80
P i9~i~ si5~
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SIERRA LEONE
NEW BADEA LOAN FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT GRANTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1920
[Report: "New BADEA Loai: for Agricultural Development"]
[Text] On 26 June the Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA)
approved a loan of $8.5 million to Sierra Leone for the financing of an
overall agricultural development plan.
Agriculture is in a state af full development in Sierra Leone. Its con-
tri~iution to the GNP rose from 29.9 percent in 1970-1971 to 39.9 percent
in 1976-1977. In 1977 agricultural exports were slightly below 46 per-
cent of total exports in terms of value. Adding the fact that the basic
sector accounts for 75 percent of the active population of the country,
we can see not only the current role of agriculture in the economy but
its potential as well.
The current project which covers a heavily populated area in the eastern
part of the country totaling 16,000 square kilometers is focused on the
following activities: development of agriculture and rice, corn, and
manioc for domestic consumption and coffee, cocoa, and cocoa nuts for -
export; organization of support agricultural services such as bank loans '
(intrants), vocational training, research and dissemination of cultivation
techniques; and civil engi.neering projects including the building of
personnel housing.
The recent Loan granted by BADEA raises the total to $17.1 million (of
which $5 million for the production of energy and $3.6 million as urgent
aid) for the financial assistance granted to the country. The bank also
accounts for 42.9 percent of total Arab aid to Sierra Leone or $39.8
million.
The loan, repayable over 15 years, with a five year grace period and at "
5 percent annual interest, will finance 3~ percent of the total cost of
the project assessed at $24 million. The pro~ects will benefit from other
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assistance as follows: AID, $12 million; PNUD, $1 million; ~nd Sierr.a
Leone governmenr_, $2.5 million.
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
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SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCES DESERTER DESCRIBES EXPERIENCES
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Jul 80 p 36
[Interview with Janie Jacobs, date and place not given]
[Excerpts] Janie Jacobs, 28, did not impress me very much when I saw him
for the first time, sitting at a table with a glass of Carlsberg beer and
a plate of fried sausages in a Zurich cafe. It was exactly 7 months ago.
Wearing a false moustache and dark glasses he had sneaked away from his
South African Defense Forces (SADF~ barracks 15 days earlier, to board a
- Swissair plane using false papers at Ian Smuts Airport in Johannesburg. An
Afrikaner and a deserter, he was afraid. "I can tell you nothing now. But
I will come to see you one day. Until then, forget me."
I saw him again in Paris. He talked to me about this army, one of the most
secret in the world.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Eight months ago you were a noncommissioned officer in the
South African army. And then suddenly you made the great leap. DeserCion.
Why? For political reasons?
Janie Jacobs: No, not at all. I have nothing against apartheid. Of course.
I think that some aspects of the system should be improved. But I am not a
liberal. My desertion was because I love a half-caste from the Cape, and
in South Africa this type of love is forbidden. I made my escape and I am
preparing for hers.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: How did you come to go into the military?
Janie Jacobs: I am from Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State. My father
was a doctor. We had a large villa and four very devoted black servants.
I learned later, when I was in the army, that one of them was a member of
the ANC and I went myself to arrest him. This was in 1976, at the time of
the Soweto affair. I feel a little uneasy about it now, because he was
tortured by the BOSS (secret service). Then he disappeared. But he was a
terrorist. My military calling? In old Afrikaner families, it is tradi-
tional that one of the children become a soldier. But there is something
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else. In 1960, at the time of the Sharpeville uprising, I was 8 years old,
and i found my puppy with his throat cut, A note had been left with his
body: "After the dogs, it will be the masters' turn." It was that day that
I decided to become a soldier to get my revenge,
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Also, it is in the Orange Free State that the whites are
the most conservative, the most racist.
Janie Jacobs: That is true. There are real fanatics there. When Mugabe
won in the elections in Zimbabwe, the teachers taught the white primary
school children a song to the t une of "Singing in the Rain." "We hate
Mugabe, we hate the terrorists, we wi11 kill them!"
Black as Night
JEUNE AFRIQUE: How is the white South African army organized?
Janie Jacobs: It is forbidden to speak about it. The a rmy is a kind of
pyramid which takes you at birth and only abandons you when you die.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: I suppose there are schools and specialized camps.
Janie Jacobs: Of course. For the land army, the Upington camp near the
Kalahari Desert, where one trains awhile before being sent to Namibia, and
the supersecret Dani Theron combat school, where one is trained in chemical
warfare, are the hardest.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: What about the blacks?
Janie Jacobs: They are beginning to integrate them in separate units in
which only volunteers carefully screened are accepted. They have their
own barracks, on the Cape for the half-castes, in Johannesburg (Lenz base)
for the blacks, in Durban for the Indians. But they are mistrusted: they
train with old rifles and do not have a~cess to the air bases. They are
paid 40 percent less than we are.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: How much is that?
Janie Jacobs: About 240 rands (1,300 French francs or 65,000 CFA francs)
per month.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Do you receive political training during the 2 years of
active service?
Not for Pleasure
Janie Jacobs: Let us say political-military. We are given a little book _
entitled "Communism and Terrorism in Southern Africa" by a certain
Metrowich. Professors from the faculty of military sciences aC the
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University of Stellenbosch sometimes come to lecture in the barracks. Until
1975, all of the training was based on the fact that the potential enemy
was black, a guerrilla fighter and a communist. Later, there were Cubans
and East Germans in Angola. Then it was necessary to change certain pas-
sages, such as that which said that our enemy was naturally invisible at
night because he was black.
Mutinies
JEUNE AFRIQUE: What were the months of service on the Angolan frontier
like?
Janie Jacobs: It was horribly boring. The young recruits drink and there
are fights. When a terrorist gets punched up, no one is worried. But some-
times a kind of mutiny occurs. And then watch out! They lock you up for
we~aks in dark cells. One could go crazy. Myself, I had this experience
because I insulted a superior who ordered me up to the front during a raid
in Angola early in 1978. I did a 3-moath stretch in Grootfontein, there
where Savimbi's UNITA guerrilla fighters are trained. But those who rebel
for pol:itical reasons are locked up in Voortrekkerhootze, near Pretoxia.
There it is hell.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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SOUTH AFRICA
COAL EXPORTS TO EEC COUNTRIES DISCUSSED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1642
[Text] In response to written question No 1628/79 from European
Parlianentarian Colla concerning EEC-nation imports of South African pro-
ducts, Mr Haferkamp, speaking on behalf of the EEC, stressed the advanCages
involved in the imports of South African coal in his response dated
5 June 1980.
He wrote in fact that "the commission can state that Community imports of
coaZ ranged from 1.185 million tons in 1974 to 10.682 million tons in 1978.
The greater part of these imports were made by member nations whose
" electrical production companies have a substantial program for converting
oil power plants to coal. For security reasons, these companies are
maintaining substantial fuel stocks. Such stocks represent a normal oger-
ational precaution.
"The price of South African seam coal is attractive for a number of reasons.
These include favorable geological conditions and the existence in
Richard's Bay of a port at which very large ore vessels can be loaded.
Although South African coal is i~~ competition with that produced in the
Community, no dumping charge has been made by the Community producers. Con-
sistent with current commercial practices, the differences in thermal value
and quality are reflected in the prices of South African coal. The
commission is not aware of any exchange operations between South African
coal imported into t'ne Netherlands and the oil products exported from Rotter-
dam to South Africa. The total oil product exports of the Community to South
Africa came to 77,000 tons in 1978 and 16,500 tons in the first half of 1979.
The corresponding figures for the Netherlands are 17,000 and 2,lOQ tons."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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SOUTH AFRICA
BRIEFS
TRADE WITH FRANCE--The development of trade exchange between France and
South Africa was contemplated by a Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(CCIP) mission which has returned to France fc~llowing a 12-day visit to
South Africa. During a press conference held in Johannesburg on 22 July,
the head of the delegation and president of the CCIP, Mr Jean Theves,
stated that he was "very satisfied" with the talks he had had in the course
of this trip, the main goal of which was for the members of the delegation
to famtliarize themselves with the local "economic reality," about which,
Mr Theves said, little is known in ?rer.ch business circles. The president
of the GCIP also noted that, according to official estimates, South Africa
should see a development in 1980 of about 6 percent in its gross national
product, and French exporters should derive benefit from this "very favor-
able" economic situation. Mr Theves also stated ttiat French industrialists
should find "solvent clients" today and that South Africa is exactly that.
- Mr Theves mentioned the substantial inequality in the trade balance between
Paris and Pretoria (more than 1.5 billion French francs in favor of South
Africa in 1979), but he noted that this was basically due to the rapid in-
~rease in French purchases of South African coal because of the energy
crisis. The president of the CCIP said he was confident that this balance
will correct itself in the future, without however being willing to mention
a date in this connection. [Text) [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
RANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1933] 5157
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TANZANIA
PROBLEMS DELAY TRANSFER OF CAPITAL TO DODOMA
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 8G p 1984
[Text] The economic difficulties Tanzania is experiencing are hindering
the work of expansion for the new capital, Dodoma, the AFP reports in an
"overview" giving a current evaluation of this ;~ituation.
The decision to transfer the seat of the government to this little town
in the center of the country was made in 1973. What was wanted was to
avoid the unbalanced growth of Dar es �Salaam, which has almost 1 million
inhabitants. The cost of the operation was estimated at that time at
3.7 billion shillings (about $530 million), spread over 10 years, with an
increase in the populatior. ~f Dodoma from 35,000 to 170,000 persons. But
the cumulative effects of a number of periods of drought, rising energy
prices and the cost of the war in Uganda have seriously affected Tanzania,
which has not had a balanced regular budget for two years.
The next food harvest is not expected to exceed 70 percent of that last
year, while 50 percent of the export income is absorbed by the oil bill
and 10 percent by the foreign debt service.
Thus it is not surprisin; that less than a third of the budget planned for
the new capital has in fact been spent, and only the departments of the
prime minister and the party are in operation in Dodoma, which still has
- only 80,000 inhabitants. The work is continuing however and
President Nyerere recently approved the detailed plan for the urban center,
which will include some 20 ministries, hut also commercial buildings in
order to avoid the creation of an administrative ghetto. Pedestrian traffic
will have priority there, and the bu3ldings will be built on zhe scale of
a country with limited resources. None will have more than three floors,
thus avoiding the need for electricity-hungry elevators, and they will
be ventilated naturally, avoiding the need for air conditioning.
Dodoma, at an altitude of 1,115 meters on the central plateau, enjoys a
dry and relatively cool climate. However, the semi-aridity of the region
poses a problem in supplying the complex with water, which must be brought
from ever-greater distances. Paradoxically, in the rainy season drainage
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is a problem and the installation of the sewabe network was one of the
first infrastructure projects to be carried out.
The main "industry" in Dodoma continues to be wine, vines having been culti-
vated in the environs since 1934. The wine has no re;utation outside
_ Tanzania, but the vineyards bring the peasants, who can gather two harvests
a year, using irrigation, a su~stantial income.
- Established in 1910 by German colonizers who made a stop there an the
central railroad from the ocean to Lake Tanganyika, Dodoma offers its
promoters the advantage of being more centrally located ttian Dar ss Salaam,
being situated 500 kilometers to the east of it. They also hope to breathe
new life iiito a region somewhat lagging in its development.
Consequently access roads to the future capital are being improved. A
Brazilian public works enterprise is extending the asphalted road from the
coast which currently goes as far as Morogoro, 250 kilometers to the east.
This stretch is to be completed within 2 years. After that, the sand
track to the north toward Arusha and the Mount Kilimanjaro region will
remain to be asphalted.
The present airport on the edge of the old town has been condemned, because
its iacilities do not meet the needs of a metropolis, even a modest one,
and its runway lies where future residential neighborhoods will be located.
Thus a full study and construction project for a new international-class
airport is needed. This is a burden the more crushing for Tanzania since
it has just commissioned Aeroport de Paris to modernize the Dar es Salaam
facility, with a French credit allocation of 12S mi?.lion francs.
While the presidential residence in Chamwino, some 50 ki~c~meters from
Dodoma, has just been completed, housing there is still inadequate, since
the co~~istruction of the needed facilities must be planned for the same
period as the construction of the public buildings.
At the present rate, it will doubtless be 5 years before a substantial
number of ministries will have moved (6 out of 22) and at least 10 years
before the g~vernment is fully installed in the new capital.
But the determination of the Tanzanian authorities to carry the operation
through to the end has not weakened, and it is a fact that Dodoma will
sooner or later be a reality. At that time, the countries represented in
Tanzania will have to move their embassies from Dar es Salaam to the new
capital. But the diplomats will have plenty of time to plan their move,
~ the AFP concludes, because the diplomatic quarter only exists at present on
the master plan for podoma.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
- 5157
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r0lt OFi'ICfA1, USF. ~NI.Y
TANZANIA
BRIEFS
PRESIDENTIAL, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS SCHEDULED--It has been announced that
the presidential and legislative elections will be held in Tanzania on
26 October. The Tanzanian parliament voted unanimously to nominate the
current presiclent of the republic, Julius Nyerere, and Vice President -
Aboud Jumbe, as the sole candidates in the presidential elections. Presi-
dent Nyerere has headed the state since Tanzania won its indepenaence in
_ 1961. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAN~ENS in French
8 Aug 80 p 1984] 5157
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ZAIRE
BELGIAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION DISCUSSED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 18 Jul 80 p 1806
[Text] The Belgian minister for cooperation and development, Mr Mark
Eyskens, wil.l meet at the end of September in Brussels in a"round table"
with several. Zairean ministere in order to define a new Belgian develop-
ment policy for Che rural aector of Zaire. This decision, taken at a
working session on 14 July in Brussels between the Belgian minister and
'rir Bo-Boliko Longonga, the Zairean prime minister, who was in Belgium
si.nce 11 July on a private visit, "~onstitutes a new stage in Belgian-
Zairean relations," Mr Mark Eyskens said.
The Belgian minister, AFP streases, contemplatee involving Belgian agri-
cultural and social organizations into thia new policy. He also proposes -
to keep up contact with the Commission of the European Community in order
to strengthen coordination of aid coming to Zaire fram the ~EC and Belgian
efforts.
A Belgian-Zairean committee will soon be constituted. This committee
composed of Zairean representativea from the bureau of planning and the
ministry of agriculture, as well as from the Belgian aid mission in Kin-
shasa, will be responaible for producing, before the end of Sept~mber,
an inventory or all activitiea in progress in the rural sector, both
those on government initiative and those from the private sector.
In other news, the great Belgian-Zairean committee, [in boldface~ which
meets each year to agree on cooperation between the two countries, met
in Brussels from 16 to 18 July in the presence of Mr Charlea Ferdinand
Nothomb and Mr Nguza Karl I-Bond, the foreign ministers, respectively,
of Belgium and Zaire.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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ZAIRE
COFFEE: EXPORT BY AIR FROM GOMA TO MOMBASA
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX LT MEDITERRANEES in French 18 Jul 80 p 1806
[TextJ The Bank of Zaire has sent the Zairean Bank Association the fol-
lowing communication dated 7 June 1980: ~
"W~th the aim of accelerating the removal of coffee in the eastern part
of the country, the Bank of Zaire authorizes air transport for the coffee
concerned from Goma to Mombasa by means of Air Zaire and other transpor-
ters expressly approved by the Institute of Emission [translation unknown],
on the following conditions:
--Shipment costs for aerial shipment cannot exceed 17 Belgian Fr. per
kilo and is to be deposited in a resident or non-resident account in
foreign currency in the transporter's name.
--No usable waste can be exported by airplane.
--The FOB sale price from Zairean airports cannot be less than market
price.
"Banks concerned are responsible to communicate to the Bank of Zaire,
department o� control and statistics, the external payments, the quznti-
ties of coffee removed, by customer, as well as volets [translati~n un-
knownj destined for it after validation."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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ZAIRE
MINIMUM AGRICU'LTURAL PLAN GOALS REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 1 Aug 80 pp 1926-1927
[Text] presented last June to the legislative council, the Minimum Agri-
cultural Plan (PAM) is the first phase of realization of the agricultura7.
component of the "Mobutu Plan." It is led by the department of agricul-
ture and rural development, conjointly with seven other departments.
This plan, estimated to cost 240 million zairea, should reach a million
peasants over an area of 500,000 hec~ares, and involves three commodities:
cassava, corn, and rice. The.goal is production of an additional 250,000
tons of cassava, 10,000 tons of rice, and 22,000 tona of corn. ^the "corn
plan" will be focused in the regions of Shaba, western Kasai, eastern Kasai,
and Bandundu; the "rice plan" in Equatorial, Upper Zaire, Kivu, eastern
Kasai, and Bandundu; and the "cassava plan" in Lower Zaire and Bandundu.
To reduce the constraints making for stagnation or regression in peasant
agriculture, the executive council has decreed a certain number of inea-
sures. Included notably are the release of "counterpart funds" by the
Commissariat General for Planning in order to finance the production of
food commodities, the release of funds from development agreements, the
rearrangement of the peasantry and cooperatives, the transformation of
agricultural pro~ects into mixed companies endowed wiCh private manage-
ment, and the restructuring of INERA [Nazional Institute for Agronomic
Study and Research] to allow it to assume its role. Guidanca for pea-
- sants will be provided by the army and the department of agriculture.
The former's task will be to atruggle against the rural exodus by mobiliz-
ing the young people into field work. The second will furnish the pea-
sants with seed, heavy agricultural implements, light agricultural tools,
and fertilizers.
Support aervices of the Minimum Agricultural Plan should also provide for
~ purchase and commercialization of agricultural proc'ucts, making available
to the farmers products and manufactured articles, and cleaning up the
economic and public health enviroament of the "PAM" zone. An important ~
role has been given to the department of transport and communications,
which must organize for supplying production centers and shipping out
production.
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rvx vrrl~trw u~~ v~~i...
The shipping out of the produce harvested in the first half of 1980 (corn
and rice) is still a pre-condition for launching of PAM. The agricultural
season properly speaking should begin in August or September, preceded by
the dist�~�ibution of agricultural implements and seed.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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ZAIRE
_ BRIE~ ~
ISIRO AIRPORT COMMISSION--The new national airport in Isiro, the capital
of the subregion of Haut-Uele, was commiss~caed on 24 June by State
Commissioner for Transport 2nd Co~unications Mushobekwa Kalimba Wa Katana.
The new airport has a runway 2,500 meters long with 2 safety. extensions o�
60 meters. It can accomadate aircraft of the Boeing 737 or Fokker type
and is equipped with ground lighting Co make landing at night or in fog
possible. [Text~ [Paris MAP,CHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
8 Aug 80 p 1982] 5157
NEW OIL DEPOSITS--The Zaire-Shell-Amoco affiliates recently undertook
exploitation of two deposits, that in Est-Mibale and that in Kinkasi, with
a daily praduction of 1,000 barrels. This association is made up of tlle
Zairep company (30 percent), Shell-Zaire (25 percent) and Amoco Explo-Zaire
(45 percent). The Zairian state has 15 percent of the shares in 2ach of
these companies, while the remaining 85 perc;ent are held respectively by ~
the Petrofina, Shell and Amoco companies. [Text] [Par:is MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1982~ 5157
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