JPRS ID: 9297 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030017-7
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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 17
• Content Type: REPORTS

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i~c~k c~t~F~i~~i:~i, i ~~H: c~ti~i.~~
JPRS L/9297
11 September 1980
Latin America Re ort
_ p _
(FOUO 18/80)
~BIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JP RS L/ 9 2 9 7
11 September 1.980
LATIN AMERICA REPORT
t~ouo ~s/so) -
CONTENTS
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
Cuban Delegate Affirms No Break in Venezuela Relations
(PRELA, 26 Aug 80) 1
ARGENTINA
New Bolivian Regime, Nation's Current Evente Diacussed
(Sergio Ceron; LA OPINION, 10 Aug 80) 4
Impact of Peronist Participation in Political Dialog Analyzed
(Eduardo J. Paredea; LA OPINION, 10 Aug 80) 9
Iaraeli Minieter of Coamaerce on Objectives of Recent Visit
(Gideon Patt Interview; CONVICCION, 30 Jul 80) 14
BARBADOS
- 'Carrington Vi.sit Seen as Move To Increase Trade
(Hubert Williams; FRELA, 12 Aug 80) 18
CUBA
Huber Matos Plans Long-Term Counterrevolution
To Overthrow Castro
(Huber Matos Interview; CAMBIO 16, 13 Jul 80) 20
Raul RoaSends Message to Antinuclear Congresa
_ (PRELA, 3 Aug 80) 25
NICARAGUA -
' Briefa
Break With Bolivia 26
- a - [III - LA - 144 FOUO]
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PERU
Police Arrest Leftist Terroriats in Ayacucho
(PRELA, 5 Aug 80) 27
Naming of Ex-ITT Executive to Co~nunications Poat Queationed
(PRELA, 22 Aug 80) 28
VENEZUELA
Dorticos Extols Cuba's Experience on Crime
(Sergio Medina; PRELA, 27 Aug 80) 29
Briefa
Coffee-Deficit 31
Textile Workers' Strike Continuea 31
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ARGENTINA
NEW BOZIVIAN REGIME, NATI01~'S CURRENT EVENTS DISCUSSED
Buenos Aires LA 0~'INION in Spanish 10 Aug 80 p 12
[Article by Sergi:. Ceron ] ~
[TextJ T~ may seem daring or indiscreet. At the present time, saying that
the r~rgentine Government looks fawrably on that of Bolivia represents a
rowing against the tide. It would be far less risky to proclaim, as Ted
Kennedy did, that it is necessary +:o be agreeable toward Cuba or Nicaragua
if, zt the same time, a group of i~~litiatives is added to pressure Chile, E1
Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti. ,
On Tuesday, in Cordoba, Jorge Rafael Videla confronted the predictable wrath
of those who think t:~at there are no enemies am~ng the left, and that they
lie unfailingly with the right.
This Manichaeism that has infected the world denounces the military govern-
ments which annihilated the subversion in the Southern Cone as intolerable,
but hastens to appear pragmatic, and even cordial, when it 3ustifies dialog
with Fidel Castro or puts up with the pathological irascibiZity of the Aya-
tollah Khomeini.
_ The Demo cratic Party platform, although maintaining the intolerance toward
the mtlitary governments of Latin America, has taken a step to the right of
the senator from Massachusetts in citing the danger of Russian and Cuban
interven tion in the continent. Nevertheless, there is still a noteworthy
absence of flexibility in the analysis of the situation, to the point where
it does not hesitate to put the Argentine military regime and the Haitian
r.yranny in the same category. There is even a marked difference between
the governmente of Argentina, Chile, E1 Salvador and Guatemala which the
Democrats do not perceive.
' But despi te this reality that is well known to our diplomats, the chief exe-
_ cutive did not vacillate in proclaiming Buenos Aires'rapprochement with the
military government of La Paz. However, he did not do so with a display of
defiant arrogance, but rather by explaining the Argentine reaction to a
fait accompli, and the reason that the national interests advised taking a
certain direction in dealing with external affairs.
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In the first place, as Videla reiterated with the same candor as in his pre-
vious admission, the Argentine state did not foster the change of government
in Bolivia, nor give any advice on how to carry out the military movement,
Coups (he remarked sensibly) are not made according to prescription, nor are
there advisable methods for exporting.
Before the seizure of power by the Araued Forces in Bolivia, Argentina was
offered two options: The first, which Videla described as "formally correct,"
was the acceptance of a government resulting from elections, that is, the
government of Hernan Siles Suazo, which was dangerously threatening to slide
toward the left, not only because of the candidate's ideological leanings,
but also because of the force of the soeioeconomic situation in which the
high plateau nation was submerged. The occurrence of a process similar to
the one experienced by Argentina between 1973 and 1976, which was quite pos-
sible in view of the dynamics of Bolivian political activity, was a high-
` grade risk for the military government. One could already foresee the out-
break of a leftist campaign, with heavily Marxist ovartones, which would put
on the northern border a focal point for attacking the life style selected
by the Argentine people and for con:s~,antly c~allenging the Buenos Aires gov-
ernment. Furthermore, it would be impossible to deny the possibility that,
on the streets of La Paz, on an occasion similar to the marking of the first
anniversary of the Sandinist government of Nicaragua, the top-ranking leaders
og the Argentine guerrillas might be observed m~rching on parade.
The second option was not contingent on the desires of the Plate government,
but rather on the vicissitudes of political activity in Bolivia. It material-
ized with the coup d'etat headed.by Gen Luis Garcia Meza. Obviously (it
could not be otherwise), it was received with relief at the Casa Rosada, be-
cause it decompressed a sensitive area of the country's foreign policy. As
a result, the implementation of the Estrada doctrine of noninterference in
the internal affairs of nations and of automatic recognition for governments
controlling the national territory was decided upon, not only in adherence
to an international legal traditioii, but also with real satisfaction.
Moreover, Videla took the liberty of advancing a few steps when he did not
reject the notioa (in this case, tantamount to announcing) that the govern-
ment might contribute food and credit "so that the Bolivian people will be
able to overcome thei: difficulties again."
To be sure, this decision might evoke the adverse reaction of those who are
usually motivated by ideological reflexes in politics. The gesture of recog-
nizing a government of the Bolivian military, who first made the elections
possible and later obliterated them with a blow of the hand upon the victory
of a candidate whom they considered unacceptabie, is not appealing. At
least they did not want to give Siles Suazo a chance to show that he was as
inflexible and Manichaean as his enemies and that, lacking a sense of reali-
ty, he would lead the country into a blind alley.
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In the long run, however, nations must be guided in their actions by their
permanent interests, 3nd not be circumstantial reactions of sympathy. The
friendship or mere p roximity of Hernan Siles Suazo could be asaociated with
"dangerous relations" for an Argentina heading toward democratization, but
still ruled by a military governmer~t. Luis farcia Meza offers a grimmer and
less likable countenance to a large percentage of Argantine3, but he ia an
infinitely slighter political,risk.
For the present, in the message that was read on 6 August, tr~e high plateau
country's chief executive announced the Armed Forces' commitment to restore
democracy during the course of a.process which could last 10 years.
- Whether Garcia Meza'sstatement is a pretext or sincere, tne fact is that it
cancels in part the negative impression created by previous statements to
the effect that he would remain in p~wer for 20 years.
The Argentine position is not easy, inasmuch as it is at odds with the decla-
ration issued in late July by the Organization of American States which, for
the first time in its history, deplored a coup d'etat in one of its member
nations. A total of 16 nations voted in favor of the motion for censure,
_ four (including Argentina) abstained and only three voted against it.
The latter seven countries placed emphasis on the traditional principle of
non-intervention in the internal affairs of nations established in Article
18 of the OAS charter. The latter states, verbatim: "No state or group of
states has a right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for whatever reason,
in the internal or external affairs of any other. The foregoing principle
excludes not only a~ed force, but also any other type of ineddling or ten-
dency interfering in the personality of the state, or in the political, eco-
nomic and cultural elements which comprise it."
On Saturday, 2 August, the Argentine representati,~a to the OAS, Raul Quijano,
announced that certain countries were considering recognition of the Bolivian
military regime in the near future, although he did not think that this would
occur on a mass scale.
Meanwhile, the Argentine Government is s*_riving to maintain a policy of
friendship and cooperation with the group of Andean nations which is, para-
doxically, the main force opposing the La Paz regime.
On S August, the minister of foreign relations issuel a cormnunique reporting
that he had taken cognizance of the declaratic.~n ma:ie by the presidents of
those nations in Lima on 29 July. In it, the Andean chief executives empha-
size "in particular, the strong channels for dialog and agreement that have
been opened with Argentina and Brazil in the Latin American area, and their
favorable prospects for regional integration and cooperation." And, insofar
as our country is concerned, they add: "In this connection, we express our
desire to promote action aimed at signing an agreement for cooperation and -
_ development between the Andean Group and Argentina, within the context of
- the new system of regional integration."
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Argentina has, from the outset, voiced approval for a policy of subcontinent-
al integration, wherein it has assumed a vanguard role. The complementary
status of its economy with those of the Andean Pact nations, and the possibi-
lity of transferring in termediate industrial technology required by those
markets and of importing minerals and raw materials that they do not produce,
indicate the importance of that integration, which would help to foster mutu-
al development. The Andean Pact market, numbering 70 million people, with
its gradual but constan t economic progress, is a desirable target for the
natiunal economy, provi ded the current obstacles to an exporting policy are
surmounted.
On another subject, the British minister of trade, Cecil Parkinson, has been
a guest in Buenos Aires since last Tuesday. Old Albion, after having direct-
ed its post-war energy toward the Co~nonwealth and Africa, and subsequently -
toward the European Economic Community, now realizes that it has unfortunate-
ly neglected its tradi tio~al relations with Latin America. The beneficiary _
of the decadence of the Spanish ~mpire, and promoter of the independence of
the former Hispanic colonies, Great Britain exploited its ties with the sub-
continent to provide raw materials for its industries, which in turn had an '
avid market for their p r~ducts. -
The worldwide recession has forced the industrial powers to open new markets
for their exports; and the pressure fram the internal crisis has made London
turn its glance toward its old Latin American relations. Arger.tina repre-
sents one of the most highly esteemed target5 in the region. Hence the hope
expressed by Parkinson, upon arriving at Ezeiza, to the effect that "the next
few years will mark the beginning of a more dynamic period in our relations
as countries, with major commercial exchanges."
The British minister is convinced that Great Britain can offer much to Argen-
tina, especially in the field of advanced technology, such as that related to
energy, communications, transportation and mining. However, Parkinson's state-
mei?ts contain an almos t obsessive recurrence of the topic of energy. Qn seve-
ral occasions he stres sed the fact that his coimtry has the best experts and
resources in the world for the development of petroleum and energy resources ,
of all kinds. The gaze of the British is fixed on the basin ad3oining the
Malvinas Islands, where one of the most promising petroleum deposits in the
world is located. But the British, who know something about politics, are
clearly aware that th e only way in which they can develop this basin is
through an agreement with Argentina. And they also surmise that such an
agreement entails reco gnition of Argentine sovereignty over the unredeemed !
archipelago. The worl d's dynamics, with the progress made in decolonization,
have, with the passage of time, weakened the position of London, which will
eventually have to yie ld to the legitimate right demonstrated by Argentina
to recover its islands. Hence, it is a matter of "timing," something which
the British are e~er ts in handling. In brief, Great Britain is attempting
to negotiate the transfer of the Malvinas through an association with Argen- ~
tina in the developmen t of the resources in the nearby waters: petroleum, and
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"krill" as well. We must not allow ourselves to be swayed by obstinacy; i_f
negotiations of that type suit the interests of Argentina, inasmuch as we
shall have to seek the aid of foreign technology in order to undertake such
activities, we must not succ~b to scruples of a sanctimonious nature. The
goal is to regain the Malvi.nas and to develop our resources as soon as pos-
sible. If that goal can be attained witraout bloodshed, all the better. If
not, we shall have to wait until the power relr.tionship on the political or
military level is in our favor, in order to attain it. In the meantime, we
should not turn down the negotiations a prfori, if they are worthy, and not
detrimental to the economic interests of the republic.
There is some good news. The feasibility studies on the construction of the
gas pipeline to Uruguay and the eventual supply of the fluid to the fraternal
nation are entering their final phase. And we use the term "fraternal" with-
out easily resorting to the Latin American rhetoric which has prom~,ted us to
mention as such even countries with which we have had a history of confronta-
tions and discord. If we h~ve a fraternal cotm try, it is the Oriental Repub-
_ lic of Uruguay; so much so that many of us think that we constitute a single
River Plate nation, organized into two sovereign states. This 3uridical real-
ity is incontrovertible and, at least for the time being, not sub~ect to
change. But, why is a change necessary when, deapite the legal borders,events
are uniting Argentines and Uruguapans increasingly?
Uruguay is the top priority in the national geopolitics; because everything
unites us with the Banda Oriental: history, blood, culture and interests. -
What else? The forthc~ming creation of a common.market between the two na-
- tions, which is currently being arranged, and the possible fueling of Uru-
guay's industries with the gas originating in Argen tina's geological depths,
are two new reflections of a chain of events strengthening the old ties of
the past, with a view toward the future.
Copyright: LA OPINION, 1980
2909
CSO: 3010
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ARGENTINA
IMPACT OF PERONIST PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL DIALOG ANALYZED
Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 10 Aug 80 p 13
[Article by Eduardo J. Paredes: "Checkmate for B~ttel, Stalemate With Matera
and Suspended Game With Robledo"]
[Text] Within a few days, the political dialog arranged by the government ,
through the Ministry of Interior will embark upon an area of particular
concern to the small politicized world. If there are no intervening person-
- al problems which would necessitate a change in schedule, on Tuesday, 19 _
August, the Peronist leaders Raul Matera, Alberto Iturbe, Enrique Osella
Munoz, Rodolfo Tedera del Franco and Delia D. de Parodi will enter Gen Albano ~
Eduardo Harguindeguy's office. The last-mentioned in the group is a member
of the board of directors of the Justicialist Doctrinal Reaffirmation Move-
ment, an internal branch of the Peronist movement reluctantly accepted by the _
verticalist sector which (os tensibly) controls the party's National Co~uncil
and its National Congress. ,
_ It must be admitted that Harguindeguy and his advisers have, with this invi-
tation, shown more political acumen than they are given credit for by the -
more skeptical analysts. After the diatribes of the ac~ing vice president
of the Peronist presidency, notary Deolindo Bittel, especially those relating
- to the issue of human rights when the commission assigned to that area from
the Organization of Ame rican States was in the country, the government could
have refused to invite him to the dialog. The boundary between Bittel's role
as an opponent and that of an enemy of th e process lies in an indefinite area.
Bittel is more than an opponent. His political preachings point to the col-
lapse of the process, wiehout regard for what happens.
Behind Bittel there are three qualifie d Peronist leaders who do no t share the
- verticalist phobia of the Chaco notary, hut who. do not want to split the par-
_ ty: Angel Robledo, Eloy Camus and Italo Luder. Any one of the three could
have 3erved perfectly as a spokesman with the minister. Preliminary feelers
indicated that they could not accept the invitation wi.thout causing a divisive
snub to Bittel. And this is understandable insofar as .they are cnncerned.
If the process asks the Peronists for a change of attitude that will make it a '
party which abides by the rules of rhe game, it would be rather unreasonable =
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- to request that their leaders begin by disowning their last authorities,
even though they rcight suspect that the latter should voluntarily accept
the benefits of political rettrement.
, Furthermore, the Interior Miniatry could not choose as a guest a sentimental
- Peronist completely dissociated from Ju~ticialiat political activity, who
would not offer any representative etatua much less a political mentality
in line with the party which was in the majority until 1973.
On the contrary, the invitation was conveyed to an internal Peronist group
which, although it was strictly cut off fram the party management by the
Lopez-Registas, never had Isabel's blessing and was constantly repulsed by
the "surrounding" element, is part of the truly orthodox former leadership
of the movement, at least iasofar as Iturbe and Delia Parodi are concerned.
_ Added to them is a talented man (Tecera del Franco), who played an important
- role during the neo-Peronist "entente" between politicians and trade union-
_ ists from 1963 to 1965; as well as a practical politician (Osella l~funaz),
_ who restored the ar.tiver~icalism in the last Peronist legislative group in
the lower chamber; and Dr Ra.u1 Matera, a Peronist with a hwnanist, Christian ~
quality, who never had the definitive coronation as a"caudillo," but who has
a feature which very few Justicialists possess: he is a posaible candidate. -
Who Are They?
Before analyzing what this contact between fi.ve of the Peronists' most pro-
minent members and the political minister of the military government will
mean to P~ronism, it behooves us to make a brief review of the current ideo-
logical status of those who were invited.
In addition to being gifted by nature so that his prodigious fingers can re-
move a brain clot without contributing to the economic progress of business
firms engaged in funeral servic~s, Raul Matera is sufficiently egocentric
to want to be president of the nation, and sufficiently intelligent to sus-
pect that this is not easy. The neurosurgeon stopped believing in Peron for
as long as Peron had stopped believing in him; but he is absolutely sincere
when he says that he believes in the Justicialist doctrine as the historical
starting point for a social revolution aimed at raisi~g the standard of the
individual on the 'uasis af a political system with liberty and strong social
justice. Matera has a sense of p.ractical~Jr.~ ti~ial.ism,.rather than mental
~ Justicialism. In addition, he is a sincere advocate of agreement with re-
gard to the progressive parties and the military government. It should be
recalled that, some time ago, Matera called for a civilian-military conver-
gence on a common program, to which he added the CEiurch as an essential par-
tic~.pant.
- Iturbe is a very special case: A person with political shrewdness, which has
become brilliant, at the same time he has been careful about his personal ,
image and h:Ls convictions, despite many attempts by Peron himself (whose
"personal representative" he was) to associate_him with partieu~ar areas,
_ which he has no reason to regret. He became knowledgeable about the inter-
nal life of the Peronist movement to the same extent as (or perhaps more so
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than) the caudillo himself; which could have proved fatal....But, when his
quarter of an hour of private meeting with the exiled leader was over, he
was content with a role of political mentor in orthodox circles that were
not outdated. The polttician from Ju~uy was clever enought to keep his dis-
tar_ce from the moods of Peron, without thereby abandoning Peronism, a strate-
gy which kept him safe from the cruel buffoonery which accompanied the end
of the one who had been constitutional president three times. Iturbe hae
told many Peronist leaders that "it is preferable to have a party with fewer
votes than with more Marxists and Nazis," in what has been interpreted as a
- stand in favor of an orthodox, principled party organization, with its lead- -
- ership simultaneously renewed, rather than the chaotic movement-oriented
method whereby one always reaches the Government Residence, asking the next
day what the devil to do....
Dr Tecera del Franco is a victim of generation. Many of his age yielded to ~
Per~nism because taey were left of the conservatives and right of the social-
ists. He is an intellectual, a person who would stand out in the right wing
of the labor movement; but, in order to do so, he would have to go ta Eng- .
~ land. When neo-Peronism developed,through the Popular Union, Tece~a del
Franco was prominent among a group of political and trade union leaders who
were beginning to like Justicialist political control without having to wait
- for the primer every day from Madrid. And, when Peronism became imbued with
Marxism, through the "special training," his nob3~E Co.untenance put up with
the bombarding of rotten eggs with which the Peronist University Youth (a
collateral group active in the university areas) received those who re~ected
vio~.ence as a political method and the ideological perversion of Peronis;,1. -
He had sufficient dignity to clean his coat and leave that university, which
had become converted into a guerrilla training camp. Reviled by the left,
and detested by the mediocre verticalist group, he went discreetly into win-
ter quarters. Today, he is a politician who has solemnly buried the Argentina
of 1945, and who is confident of an economic development with social justice
and effective educational progress. As Borges migh t say, he has committed -
the worst of sins that anyone could commit, at least in the Peronist move-
~ ment: He tried to make use of his own political thinking.
Within the group in question, Osella Munoz, from Santa Fe, is the politician
with uninterrupted activity despite the ideological vicissitudes of his par-
ty. Very much admired by trade union sectors, he led the antiverticalist
movement in the Chamber of Deputies during the heyday of Lopez Rega, some-
thing which could have brought him excommunication from the party or a bullet
in the head. Fortunately, nothing of the sort happened. Just as Tecera del
granco is one of the Peronists who seem like conservatives expelled for
speaking ill. of Roca, Osella seems like a radical expelled for speaking ill
of Alvear. In the last parlaimentary bloc, he was unquestionably one of the
best Peronist legislators, To the verticalists, he is a hard bone to chew,
but one for whom they cannot find any reason to crucify. When Justicialism
has to become organized as a party, Osella could prove very useful in per-
forming the miracle of making the Peronists like internal democracy.
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- In the case of Delia de Parodi, there may be some confusion concerning a party
such as the Peronist. Possibly because she reached political maLurity in ex-
cellent mental and physical condition, she is a leader withaut a complex
about a"women's branch," that kind of grotesque "spray" militarization which
converted the civil rights of Argentine women (an indisputable achievement of
Peron ism) into a dressed up version of the Gestapo. It should not be thought
that Mrs Parodi has reneged on historical Peronism. On the contrary, she still
has a deep admiration for what she describes as the intuitive revolutionary
spirit of Eva Peron. But she has proven sufficiently intelligent to realize -
which aspects of Peronism have finally gone down in history, and what the
inevitable path of the movement's progress is. Her internal experience has
followed a course parallel to that of Iturbe. And it must be admitted that,
in the tragic years of the internal struggles of Peronism, she refused to
choose between flatterers and divisionists. Of the five who have been invit-
ed to th~ dialog, Delia Parodi is the one who stands most to the left regard-
ing the ideological concept oF Justicialism, imbued with the most blatant
guidelines from the party lexicon concerning social ju~tice. Among Argentine
women politicians (who are not too numerous) she has won a place by dint of
errors, experience and considerable grief. If things did not go better for ~
her, it was perhaps because she was convinced that loyalty and obsequiousness
- were not synonymous.
And What About Verticalism?
At the present time, the Peroaist contribution to the analysis of the politi-
cal bases of the process will not be a bouquet of flowers. But no one could
believe that the dialog of 19 August will fail to be of fundamental impor-
tance ico the difficult internal movements of Peronism during this period
preceding that of the most spectacular decisions.
It may be anticipated that notary Bitt~l will]~unch forth in an attack against
the Reaffirmation Group, in search of a party sanction, but he will clash with
the easy-going strategy of Camus from San Juan, who controls the congress mem-
bers who must decide when a case should be tux-ned.over to the Court of Dis-
cipline, a tool with which the verticalists frightens those who refuse to
yield unwillingl3*.
But for those who are now following, with considerable patience, this forced _
reign without a kingdom of Bittel, as in the case of Luder, Camus and Roble-
do, the entry of the indeget~dent~ qui~ntet. into the Government Reaidence will
be a positive experience. In the first place, for a public which does not
know and is not interested :in~.knnu3.ng about internal struggles and personal
contemptibility, the episode will be convert~d into a Peronist presence in
the incipient context of openness toward the institutional realm. Secondly,
Robledo has assumed responsibility for maintaining channels of coimmunication -
with varioug party sectors, intelligently taking ~:are not.to isolate Bittel
- in uncomfortable positions. In that respect, the opinions of Matera and com- '
pany expressed to the military government will be of use to him for future
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strategies. Thirdly, Robledo realizes that this process is not like previous
de facto situations, and that Peronj.sm will have to operate as a democratic
party whether Bittel likes it or not.
In the meantime, there are politicians who, after this iavitation, will con-
sider it more than likely that other similar ones will be tendered to Peron-
ist sectors of the so-called intermediate generation, advancing resolutely
on behalf of an orthodoxy imbued with renewal.
Meanwhile, General Harguindeguy has no reason to envy Korchnoy for anything:
After 19 August, he will do the suspending in a f~vorable position, without
any need to kick the chessboard....With a single move, he will checkmate
Bittel, offer Robledo suspension and reach an honorable stalemate with Matera.
And, as for the claim that Peronism has difficulty with chess....it has all
the pawns....
Copyright: LA OPINION, 1980
- 2909 �
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ARGENTINA
ISRAELI MINISTER OF COMMERCE ON OBJECTIVES OF RECENT VISIT
- Buenos Air~s CONVICCION in Spanish 30 Jul 80 p 24
[Interview with the Israeli minister of induatry, commerce and tourism,
Gideon Patt; date and place not given]
[Text] Gideon Patt, /+7, ie coming to Argentina.
In this exclusive interview with TIEMPO of Tel
Aviv, the minister of industry, co~nerce and
tourism discuRses the reasons for his visit and
the importance ilf growing trade between Israel
and the countries of South America.
~ [Questior.] Is thia your first visit to Argenti.na?
7
[Answerj To Argentir.3, yes. I will be going there to take part in
the Joi.nt Economic Commisaion talks and to return the viait to Israel
about a year ago by the Argentine delegation, wher~ Undersecretary
of Internatioaal Commerce Dumas came.
[Question] How are relations between Argentina and Israel?
[Anawer] We have had very good relations for many years and.we
sincerely appreciate them. We are, of course, interested in maintaining .
and further developing economic relations as ~aell. We buy about $100
million worth of goods a year from Argentina, and most of it, of -
course, is meat and fish. We sold Argentina $17 million worth of goods .
last year, and I hope that thia figure increases somewhat this year. '
We want to narrow the gap as much as possible and we want to take ~
- look at the possibility of buying gooda other than meat, which for
now represents two-thirds of Argentina's sales to us.
Therefore, on this occasion, when both of us ministers will chair the
commission, I will study the possibilities in both directions:
expanding both our purchases and our salea. I am also interested in
securing cooperation in research and development.
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I will ask the ArgFntines to offer me other products, raw materials
perhaps, altho~�gh it 's hard for me to tell now what they might want
to sell. I wi?1 ask only that the increase in trade be mutual. For
a~r pazt, we will try harder to bring up the iesue of women's wear.
I will try to booat our sales of corrplex machinery, medical equipment ,
for example. I will also submit a long list of items, in the hope
that rhey will be interested.in them.
I am also interested in working out an exchange of delegations of
industrialiats.
We buy raw materials all over the world. It depends on what Argentina
has to offer us. I cannot demand that thEy sell me certain products,
and pre~isely because of the friendly relations between our countries,
I cannot demand that they buy Israeli goods without opening the
door wider to their exports to us.
[Queation] Might the increase in trade with Argentina bring aboLt an
improvement in Zim transpor.tation servicea to South America?
(Anawer] A country's maritime shipping lines depend on the extent of
its trade. If trade increases, I will insist that additional vessels
from our national transportation line head for Argentina. If not,
we cannot require the ships to cnntinue their crossings at only half-
capacity. The viai~ by the Argentine Government delegation last year
boosted o~ir trade a great deal.
[Question] From a political standpoint, is Israel perhgps deeply
aware of the importance uf relationa with the countries of Latin
America?
[Answer] Y~u are right. That is why I was asked to leave a week
early for Argentina and stop aff in Peru for the inauguration. I
will also be in Uruguay and possibly Brazil. We see the continent of
South America as an ezormous market, and I am saying this as
minister of industry. This is an enormous market that we ::ave not
yet even begun to tap. But in addition to all this, the cor.tinert is '
growing in international political importance and in recent years has
been taking a more indepedent stand, demcnstrating great power with
its combined votea in international forur~s and a great deal of
influence on the 'Third World.
[Question] How does Argentina atand in Israel's trade with Latin
America?
[Answer) It accounted for 6.5 percen.*, in 1977 and 22 percent in 1978;
it was 21.6 percent in 1979. As a percentage it looks like a lot,
but in absolute figures it comes to about $17 million.
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- The biggest category of Iaraeli exporta to Argentina is chemicals. But
this is not the category that I will be trying to develop on tnis trip.
[Question~ When you apeak of industrial coaperation, are you
referring to the sale of know-how or the creation ot joint plants?
[Answer] I am referring to three different aspects: research and
development as a whole, sales of know-how and the creation of joint
plants. The latter could be reciprocal; Argentina and Israel could
undertake joint production activitiea inasmuch as we are, of course,
close to the EEC.
- [Question] Ia the intention to put theae industries up in Argentina
or Israel?
[Answer] That depends on the requirements. I, of course, would like
to see more Argentine investmeat in our country, but naturally this
is closely related to the product and the manufacturing conditions.
It could turn out that it would be a good idea to produce part of a
given item in Argentina and to finish it off in Israel, or vice-verea.
We would have to take a close look at this for each product.
The aim of the talks is to forge ahead. It is not enough that we F
buy meat from Argentina, and I am not that certain that this ia what
Buenos Ai:es would like to sell at the moment.
[Question] You will be repreaenting the country with the world's
worst inflation in a country that recently lost tht~t crown. Would you
be interested in studying the economic measures whereby the Argentine
Gevernment succeeded in cutting its inflation rate?
(Answer] We are trying to study this issue all over the world. For
example, there was 120 percent inflation in Argentina while the value
of the dollar roae only 50 percent,~and thia became a deciaive factor
for exports. In contrast, we more or less index the dollar to our
inflation rate. That ia why we are now the inflation champs, and this
ia not a title to be proud of. If we had kept the dollar at 50
percent of the inflati~n rate, we would not have h$d 120 percent
inflation either. We are paying a~;ery high price for developing our
exports, and along with this we have a very serious balance of _
payments problem and we have to constantly make sure that we have
enough money to buy raw materials such as oil, for which we will pay
2.25 billion this year. Exports are the only way that we can obtain -
~hese reaerves.
_ If we had seen to it that the dollar did not rise along with the index,
I think that our inflation rate would be at least 30 or 40 percent
lower.
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[Question] Nevertheless, last month new restrictione on exporters
were announce3, reducing credit and booeting the intereat rate.
- [Anewer) I think that ~hose regulationA are of minor importance, and
that is why I did not oppose them. The initial proposals were much
more drastic and could have seri~usly jeopardized our exports, and I
opposed them. What resulted now is unquestionably favorable to
exports. A slight increase in the coat of lire or a slight decrease
in liquidity will not hurt exports, and if profits drop, it will only
be bq one or one and a half percent. Any more could have jeopardized
increased exports.
- [Question] What is the extent of tourism between Argentina and
Israel?
(Anawer] There is very little. You have to keep in mind that great
distances are involved. I will try to atimulate tourism from there,
but I honestly do not think that much can be accomplished. Vacationing
Argentines have available the enormous continent of South America,
where there is a great deal to see. Moreov~r, there are no direct
flights.
[Question] Is there any chance that E1-/,~1 will insugurate a route to
South America, perhaps to Brazil, Arger:tina and Chile?
[Answer~ If I knew that this would increase tourism from South
America to Israel, I would support such a route. An international
agreement is needed for this, of courae. I will not take up this
issue, on this visit at least.
COPYRIGHT: CONVICCION and TIEMPO (Tel Aviv), 1980
8743
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FUR UFFICI'AI~ itSr l)N1.Y
CUBA
HUBER MATOS PLANS LONC~TERM COUNTERREVOLUTION TO OVERTHROW CASTRO
Madrid CANBIO lb in Spanish 13 Jul pp 62-63
[Interview with Huber Matos by Miguel Ramos in Paris; date not givenJ
[Text] Huber Matos, the major who helped Fidel Castro
bring about the revolution in Cuba, in exile after 20 -
years in prison, wants now to organize a new revolution -
against the regime which betrayed him.
Ae still wears his major's star in his lapel. He has worn it whenever he
has been able to do so, because, in spite of having spent 20 years in pri- _
son, Huber Matos, comrade-in-arms of Fidel Castro during the revolution,
has not lost his hope of making Cuba "an independent and democratic _
country, although it might have to take up arms again." Released on
21 October 1979, he is attempting now to reunite the anti-Castro elements
scattered in exile. With his permanent headquarters in Miami and sur-
rounded by 10 bodyguards--he prefers to call them "brothers-in-arms"
because, among obher reasons, he does not pay them to protect him--Matos
is now traveling through Europe, and at the end of this month he will go
to Spain, after having visited France and Eng~and. In Paris he spoke with
;Ltguel Ramos of CAMBIO 16 before continuing his journey to Spain.
- [Question] How is the overseas Cuban resistance organizect?
[Answer] To begin with, it is divid~d. For some 20 years the Cuban exiles
have been trying to fight Castro in the hope of overthrowing him, and they
have split up into a number of groups, the majority of them already defunct.
Among these groups, some based their hopes on the Americans bringing Castro
down, which is a completely erroneous strategy, without foundation. Others
believed that Castro would simply fall from his own weight. 1'oday there are
still several different groups in existence. The one we are now trying to
form is expected to be a broad-based popular organization with a revolu- `
tionary outlook. As we understand it, we are revolutionaries because we
are fightin~ for the triumph of liberty, justice and national independence,
things which do not exist today in Cuba, because Fidel Castro has completely
compromised our independence, placing it in the hands of the Soviet U~ion.
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r~tt urr t~tew uaG UIVLI
Nor arc we, in addition, at all in agreement with the conditions of the
pre-revolutionary era. That is, we ara working not only to destroy
communism, but also to build a Cuban nation which responds to the needs
of the people. Nor do we have a party mentality. We think the main
thing at this time is to orient the struggle, departing from the premise
that we cannot defeat Castro from exile, but that it is the Cuban people
- who must produce the change on their own soil, in spir.e of the omnipresent
Castro p olitical police, the C~2, which hinders any clandestine movement
on the island. We conceive this in terms of a lor.g-term confrontation?
(Question] An armed confrontation?
[Answer] In the first place, our strategy is one of ideological confronta-
tion, th rough propaganda, to inform the Cuban people about the democratic
_ alternative, t~ explain to them that 21 years of communism have passed and
that the problems, instead of being resolved, are increasing. The youth
are comp letely frustrated--a youth which, in addition, has been trained by
Castro and is the sector of the population which gives him the biggest
headache. We are trying to channel all these malcontents who reject the
system into a popular struggle which will result in an uprising. We know,
for example, that the Armed Forces, through obligatory military service,
are full of people who are against the system, and that is the most vul-
nerable spot in the entire Castro structure: having an army which cannot
be loyal to him in all circumstances.
Advantages Under Batista
[Question] When you speak of an uprising, are you thinking onre again of
the Sierra Maestra?
[Answer] No; for the moment a guerrilla struggle is not possible in Cuba.
[Question] In what respect was the political, social and economic situation
under B atista, which produced a popular uprising, different from that which
is current under Fidel Castro?
[Answer] The differences are great, first of all, because Batista never
terrorizeci the people as Castro is doing today. The Batista government was
one of laws with the support of a huge military apparatus; but it was a
government which had no repressive purge techniques. Castro, on the other
hand, h as raised repression to the category of a science and a technique
with tne advice of Soviets who are in the Ministry of Interior. Also, in
Batista's time there was a free peasant class, while at present all the
peasants must be organized into a national association which controls their
movements.
, [Question] Do you plan, within the limits of its possibilities, to bring
weapons into Cuba through the anti-Castro rebellion?
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[AnswerJ We haven't gotten that far yet. We understand that there is a
first stage, which is one of ideologic.al confrontation, but we do not dis~ -
count the possibility of armed struggle. And even were such a thing
planned, I don't think I should answer that question.
[Question] You have cited Soviet participation in the Cuban Ministry of
Interior. How great do you think the Soviet influence is in your country?
- [Answer] More than the numbers, we are concerned with the scope of Soviet
influence, which reaches into industry, politics, the services, into educa-
tion itself. We Cubans are grieved, we are ashamed, to be repeating what
the Soviet Union says, to be serving as its armed instrument.
[Question] Was the occupation of the embassy by more than 10,000 persons
foreseeable?
[Answer] No. That sudden and massive emigration can be explained by all
the repression to which I previously referred. It is enough to point out
only one thing: that the majority of the refugees were young people, and
_ that is because Castroism, which educates them, suffocates them politically
~ and socially. In the schools the students are obliged to work, to applaud _
Castro, to be stalwart supporters of the system and to do preposterous things
constantly. For example, physicians, in order to receive their license to
~ practice, must climb the highest mountain on the island, Turquino Peak,
five times.
- [Question] Does the presence of Cubans ir~ Africa also annoy the people in
general?
- [Answer] I believe so. It is the Soviet Union, apparently, which defrays
the cost of this Cuban presence in Africa, but there is no doubt that our
people, who have on that continent 40,000 of the 100,000 men who make up
their national army, are paying for part of this war with their own economic
resources. And that is one of the great Cuban tragedies, in the sense that
a people living in poverty must, in addition, pay an army which, in the
f inal analysis, is nothing more than a mercenary force, because it is not
we as Cubans who solve anything in Africa; rather it is the Soviet Union
which solves things and which continues to expand its sphere of influence.
The Wages of Fear
[Question] What is the salary of a Cuban soldier in Africa?
[Answer] There are two kinds of payment: that paid to a person who serves
temporarily and who has preferred to do his military service there, which
is 7 pesos per month; and that given to a military professional identified -
with the political system, which is almost double the minimum sa.lary, or
200 pesos per month.
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_ [Question] Do these soldi~:rs who are sent to Africa enlist as volunteers?
[Answer] Apparently, yes; but the fact is that everyone who refuses to go
to Africa is punished, and depending on the manner of his refusal, he may
even go to jail. Z had jailmates in prison who were there for that reason.
One must take into account, in addition, the awareness which is instilled -
into the youth, who from 15 years of age is considered ready for military
service, to which he will then have to give from 3 to 5 years.
Castro, Lover of Weapons "
[Question] You have been imprisoned longer than any other political prisoner
under the Castro regime. How were your 20 years in prison?
[Answer] During all that time, Castro was trying to kill me slowly, making -
a poor lunatic of ine, constantly causing a psychological instability in me. _
. Sometimes I was physically mistreated without any justification; at other
times, my few books were taken away, ~~and on more than one occasion I was
- thrown into a dark cell where I did not eat for 2 or 3 days. I can tell
you that Castro vented his anger on me in a dreadful way, and history has
shown that he is the guilty party and the traitor, His cooperation with
the USSR is so obvious; I myself had to put up with Soviet military in-
spections while I was in prison.
[QuestionJ What- were those inspections 1~_ke?
[Answer] They were and they still are just short visits, but they respond to
the Soviet technique ,of controlling political prisoners, demeaning their
personalities little by little. They are the ones who decide how the
prisoner is to be tr~ated.
[Question] During all this time that you were imprisoned, did Castro ever
visi~ you?
[Answer] No, never. The last time we saw each other was during one of the _
appearance~ at the trial, in December 1959--a trial which was a real farce.
[Question] How did you meet?
[Answer) It was ~n the Sierra Maestra, when I arrived at the head of an
armed expedition from Costa Rica. He appeared to me at that time to be a
big kid, so happy, so euphoric, examining the weapons we had brought. We
arrived in the mountains with 5'~ns of arms and ammunition, and that man
grabbed one weapon after another and fired wildly into the night, shouting:
"Now we will indeed win the war," and congratulating us on our efforts,
because we had brought, among the 8 of us, 38 rifles, 25 submachine guns,
2 heavy 50-caliber machine guns and other weapons.
[Question] Where did those weapons come from?
. -
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. [Answer] Those weapons were part European and part American and from the
government of Pepe Figueres of Costa Rica.
[Question] After that first encounter, how did the guerrilla friendship
_ between the two of you develop?
[Answer] Except for some moments of disagreement, our relations were very
good, among other reasons because he exaggerates his praise of those men
he considers efficient, as if they were capable of anything. I, for
, example, belonged to that category, and in fact I rose from civilian to
the rank of major in a little over 4 months. At that time I had already
begun to be aware of Fidel Castro's pers~nality: a man who knew guerrilla
strategy, but not organization; who seemed like the French Tartuffe, ap-
, pearin~ before his comrades with a puritan language, giving the impressxon
of being the most honest, the most disinterested, the most devoted to all
human beings; speaking from time to time of Marxism without knowing,
philosophically, what it is and using only force and crushing anything
he felt needed to be crushed.
COPYRIGHT 1979. INFORMACION Y REVISTAS, S.A.
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CUBA
- RAUL ROA SENDS MESSAGE TO ANTINUCLEAR CONGRESS -
PA ~2156 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1631 GMT 3 Aug 80
[Text] Tokyo, 3 Aug (PL)--Raul Ro~ Garcia, rotational president of the
National People's Government Aesembly in Cuba, has sent a message of
greeting to the 1980 World Congress oi Opponents of Nuclear Weapons here.
The congress sessions closed in Tokyo today to move to Hiroshima on 5 and
6 August and to Nagasaki on 8 and 9 August on the 35th anniversary of the
genocide committed by the United States against the two martyred cities in
western Japan.
Some 95 representatives of 26 nations including Cuba, Vietnam, the Soviet
Union, the GDR, 11 international organizations and over 300 Japanese doves,
academic officials, clergymen, trade union leaders and students partici-
pated in the 2 days of sessions at the Nihon Seinen Ken hall here.
Roa's message, which was read during a plenary session of the congress,
congratulat~s the congress for remembering the victims of Hiroshima and _
Nagasaki, keeping the flame of that dreadful drama alive, repudiating
those responsible for the massacre and calling for disarmament, peaceful
coexistence and detente.
The Cuban leader stated that progressive mankind is now struggling and will
continue to struggle to achieve peace for all nations and respect for peace-
ful coexistence and self-determination.
_ The message points out that nations have written many great pages in pur-
suit of their noble longing for independence, progress, ~ustice and devel-
opment, but it adds that many acts of aggression and conspiracies against
- detente and international security occur every day.
Mankind is running the risk of again going to the brink of a thermonuclear
war of unforeseeable consequences to the human race. _
Roa stressed that Hiroshima and Nagasaki are examples of the catastrophic
results of the ambition and treason of those who act exc~usively on behalf
of their interest in power and wealth and forget the suffering that they
inflict on their innocent victims.
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}~t)It UHh IC I AL Util: UNl~1'
NICARAGUA _
BRIEFS
BREAK WITH BOZIVIA--Managua, 6 Aug (ANN)--A Foreign Ministry
- spokesman has said that the break in diplomatic relatious between the
coupist military regime in Bolivia and Nicaragua, announced on Saturday,
does not affect the country's foreign policy because these relations
did not exist. The spokesman said that Julio Molina, Nicaraguan
ambassador to Peru, who wala supposed to be Nicaragua's representative -
to the La Paz government, had not presented his credentials to the .
Bolivian authorities. [Text] ~PA062238 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1815 GMT
6 Aug 80]
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030017-7
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PPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030017-7
STATINTEL
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030017-7
STATINTEL

PPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030017-7
STATINTEL
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030017-7
STATINTEL