JPRS ID: 9285 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
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• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 67
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~oR oF�F~ciA~, usF oN~.v
JPRS L/9285
4 September 1980
Sub-Sa~aran Africa Re ort
~
FOUO N~o. 6$8
FBI$ ~'OREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained. -
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JPRS L/9285
4 September 1.9 80
SUB-SAI{ARAN AFRI CA REPURT
FOUO No. 688
CONTENTS -
INTER-AFRIC~'N AFFAIRS
Details of Senegaleae-Libyan Rupture Given
- (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 Jul 80) 1
Superpowers Vie for Control of Indian Ocean
(Elie Ramaro; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 2] Jul 80) 3
CHAD
Briefs
New Periodical 7 "
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
President Discusses Recent Economic Measures -
(JEtINE AFRIQUE, 30 Jul 80) 8
MOZAMBIQUE
Review of Port Facilities, Modernization Need Stressed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS, 1 Aug 80)........ 12
- NIGER
Chamber of Commerce's 1980 Budget _
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS, 18 Jul 80)......, 14
CCCE Loans Authorized by Ministers` Council
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jul 80)....... ~.5
~
~ REUNION -
Briefs
Sugar Planters' Strike Ended 16
- a- ~:LYI - NE & A- 120 FOUn]
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~
- SENEGAI.
Promotion of Industrial Exports Announced
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET 1~DITERRANEENS, 18 Jul 80)....... 17
Population Subject to 'Profound' Discontent
(Gi~ette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 21 Jul-3 Aug 80)..��������� 19
Drought in 1980 Expected To Be as Serious as in 1979
(MARCEES TROPICALTX ET MEDITEItRANEENS, 18 Jul 80) . . . . . . . 25
Briefs
Petroleum Purchase Loan 27
Senegal-Kuwait Investment Bank 27
ZAIRE
Economic, Financial Situation for First Half of 1980 Assessed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS, 25 Jul, 1 Aug 80) 28
-b-
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
~ J ,
DETAILS OF SENEGALESE-LIBYAN RUPTURE GIVEN
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1F Jul 80 p 6 _
[Article by A. D.: "SenegaL-Libya: Wny the Fire Burns"]
[Text] When the discussion of the Chad affair began on 4 July in
~ Freetown, Goukouni Weddeye asked that the problems in his country not be -
used once again as an alibi for settling accounts entirely alien to the
matter.
Deaf to this appeal to good sense, both Senegalese and Libyans have pur-
sued a polemic publicly launched there on 1 July, at the very opening of
the summit meeting, when the delegation from Tripoli announced the
- suspension of diplomatic relations with Senegal, arguing that this
country is still "under colonial domination." The truth is much more
. complex. On 4 June, Senegalese Minister of Foreign Affairs Moustapha
Niasse announced to the parlia~ent in his country the eminent closing of
23 embassies and consulates, 10 of them in Africa, for reasons of
austerity. The embassy in Tripoli was among them, and the Libyans were
' discreetly asked to do the same in Dakar.
On 10 June, a message from Tripoli urged retaining the embassy. Mr
Niasse refused categorically, because this embassy is a"nest of anti-
governmental maneuvers," because Tripoli shelters opponents, including _
"the Ayatollah of Kaolak," Ahmed Khalifa Niasse, and Qadhdhafi's govern-
menr "is holding 27 Senegalese citizens as hostages on Libyan soil."
Some weeks ago, about !+0 people, including some Gambians and Mauritanians,
� were about to leave for Libya on board a Liberia Airlines plane, equipped
with contracts in good and proper farm for work in construction. At
least this is what their Libyan recruiter told them. Now they were .
dispatchad pure and simple to the military camps to scaell "the African '
liberation armies" there.
Twenty-seven of them succeeded in escaping the surveillance of their
guards and took refuge in their embassy in Tripoli, which is now under
military seige. In the OAU, President Senghor gave assurance that if
the Libyan government did not allcw these 27 Senega?ese to depart, he
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would take the ma[ter to the Security Council of the UN and the Inter-
national Red Cross. The Libyans retorted that these "workers are in
breach of contract," without taking the trouble to prove that a
Kalashnikov is a rather unusual tool for construction workers.
In any case a violent verbal set-to ensued. Libyan Secretary of Foreign
Affairs 'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki referred to writings by Seng.hor of
a"colonialist nature" dating back to 1948, and Moustapha Niasse counter-
attacked by reminding him of his trip to Dakar some months prior to
Qadhdhafi's coup d'etat on 1 September 1969, when he was the bearer of a
message from King Idriss Senoussi, and never ceased to sing the praises
of the sovereign to Senghor.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
SUPERPOWERS VIE FOR CONTROL OF INDIAN OCEAN
~
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 21 Jul 80 pp 20-21
[Article by Elie Rama.ro: "The New War of Nerves"]
[Text] In a few months' period the Western powers
:?ave tried to "lock" the Indian Ocean, to the point
of triggering a reaction among those living around
it. . . .
Diego Garcia., formerly under the jurisdiction of Mauritius, ceded to
Great Britain in exchange for a promise of independence without a
- referendum for the island, and receded by London to the Americans as of
1970, has finally become "operational." The works carried out for the
past S years on this isolated atoll in the very heart of the Indian
` Ocean had turned it into a dream base and an ideal observation center;
however, it }acked both the facilities and the manpower to become
"offensive." Using as a pretext the entry of Soviet troops in Afg~anistan,
~ the Pentagon--the seat of the general staff of the American joint armed
forces--was able, in a few months, to make it the heart of its military
deployment in the Indian Ocean.
The "Task Force"
Since last March a special marines force of 1,800 men, aboard several -
troop assault ships, periodically puts into port in Diego Garcia; the
first B~2--the "flying fortresses" powered by eight engines--have been
able to land, in transit, whereas the 4,000-meters-long runway, patiently
built on this minute island (27 sq~iare kilometers) had been used, so
far, only by a small "squadron of P3 Orion observation and electronic
monitoring planes." Furthermore, the "Dixie," the base support ship for
American navy destroyers in the Indian Ocean, is based here. It has
- recently been joined by a 20,000 ton ship specializing in submarine
support, the "AS 36 L.Y. Spear."
_ Completing this logistic fleet are four roll-on/roll-off ships (co~tainer
ships loaded by rolling forward and sidewise), two bulk freighters and
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two oil tankers have currently dropped anch~r a~ the ar.oll. They will
be used to supply r.he fast intervention force currently being raised in
the United States under the command of Marine General Paul Kelley.
The preparations concerning this new special "force" whose purpose will
be to rapidly intervene in "hot points" such as the Indian Ocean or the
- Middle East, are rapidly underway. As planned, President Carter succeeded
in allocating most of the 1981 budget to the navy, 31.3 percent of the
entire military budget: This appropriation will go to the 534,000 navy
- personnel and 185,000 ~nen for the intervention corps of. the marine corps.
- From the 1980 budget the American armed forces had already acquired a
total of eight very fast container ships, believed by their current
civilian owners to be tao expens~ve foll~wi.ng the increase in petroleum -
, prices. Each of them displaces 27,000 tons and has a 33 know speed.
AlI of them will be stat:'~~~d in Diego Garcia to support the "amphibious
force" of 10,000 men the raising of which was decided by President
Carter on an urgent basis.
The 1981-1985 five-year plan also calls for the building of 14 specialized
transports of the T.AKX type, whose overall cost will be $1.4 billion.
The purpose of these ships will be to "prelocate" materials and supplies
- in some areas, with priority given to the Indian Ocean, to be used, if
necessary, by the airborne elements of General Kelley's "Rapid Deployment
Joint Task Force" which will total 110,000 men. The first T.AKX will
be launched in 1983.
The sum total of facilities deployed around Diego Garcia are being
gr.adually established with the American navy currently stationed in the
Indian Ocean, specifically in the area of the Gulf. The "Nimitz" and
"Coral Sea" aircraft carriers, which are the choice morsels of this
fleet of 30 ships, were replaced last May by the'~isenhower" and _
"Constellation" aircraft carriers. The latter is at home in the Indian
Ocean which ir. has frequently visited since 1970.3
The "Fif th Fleet"
The crews of the "Nimitz" and "Coral Sea," stationed in the area since
_ last November and J3nuary, had overstayed the 100 days usually observed
for ovPrseas stretches wi*_hout putting to port adopted by the American
navy. In the case of the "Nimitz," the maximum length of 6 months for a
_ mission away from the home base had equally been exceeded.
~ So far, t,.~.ase forces have never been engaged in combat, except for the
helicopter units drafted for the aborted April raid in Iran. Therefore,
it is a question of an'essentially deterrant deployment aimed at feeding ~
the "war of nerves" between the great powers, protect Western petroleum
supplies, and restore the faith of the local allies of the United States
confounded after the Iranian revolution and the entry of Soviet troops '
in Afgiianistan.
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Vance's efforts, followed by those of Brown, his successor at the Deparr-
~ ment of State, to obtain the right to use F~ases on the wesrern side of
the Indian Ocean, are in effect beginning to yield results. The Sultanate
of Oman, which hardly refuses anything to its American protector,
_ officially announced, on 5 June, that it was granting "military facili-
ties" to the United States. Therefore, on the level of military coopera-
tion with Oman, the United States will enjoy the same status as Great
Britain, the traditional supplier of the Oman armed forces which London
also supplies with command personnel and technicians.
An agreement in principle was equally signed last 26 June with the
Kenyan government headed by Arap Moi: In exchange foz ~:conomic aid -
Kenya allows American troops to use, if necessary, the port of Mombasa
and several airports, including that of Nairobi.
The Pentagon would also like to have access to the base installations of
Berbera where, until 1978, the Soviets had major facilities. However,
- so far the Siad Barre has tried to decline the American proposals even
though it is not, itself, in a position of strength in the area. In the
- past few months U. S. Navy frigates have frequently dropped anchor at
- Djibouti, where the French army is firmly settled--4,000 men on land and
several war ships permanently put into port.
The system of "locking" the Indian Ocean is completed by the Ankara-
Cairo-Ryad axis, three countries in which the American armed forces have
an entry. Let us also add, to the south, the role played, for its own
sake but also for that of the "Christian and free West," by the South
African racist regime. The Pretoria leaders believe their country to be
a natural sentry on the "petroleum road." In the eastern part of the
Indian Ocean the American war chiefs enjoy the unconditional support of
Australia which is planning to grant them on a permanent basis the
Cockburn Sound Base and which would like to participate more actively in
the "joint" defense of the Indian Ocean.
Whereas Indonesia and the Phillipines present no obstacles to President
Carter's deployment plans, such is not the case with India where, ever
- since Indira Ghandi came back to power, "n~utralism" has once again �
become the order of the day. Fearing that the Soviet Union may regain
in this huge country the main role which had been its several years ago,
decided to "forget" the fact that Mrs Ghandi is not criticizing the
_ Soviet Union on the subject of Afghanistan: Therefore, in the near
future India will receive from the United States the enriched uranium it
has asked. It seems understood by the Department of State that in the
future Amezican diplomacy will avoid taking too deliberately the side of
Pakistan.
"Zone of Peace"
For some 10 years the countries bordering the Indian Ocean had already
been worrying about the growing "militarizati~~n" of the Indian Ocean.
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They l~terally panicked by the new deployment of forces nuted chese pas~
few months. That is whar triggered the internat i onal conference of the
' Organization of Solidariryo uf African and Asian P eoples (OSAAP), which
met from 23 to 25 May in Colombo (Sri Lanka), to launch a new appeal for
the resumption of negotiations between the Unite d States and the Soviet
Union leading to a gradual lowering of the level of navies and the
dismantling of Eoreign bases in countries bordering tY~e Indian Ocean.
Ft~rthermore, the OSAAP proclaimed 1981 the "inte rnational year for the
struggle to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peac e."
A similar concern motivated Didier Ratsiraka, the he~d of the Malagasy ~
state, when he suggested, in this periodical, first, and subsequently
in the course of a public speech delivered on th e occasion of the fifth
anniversary of the Malagasy revolution, that a b ig meeting be held in
Antananarivo in 1981 or 1982 on the topic of "The Indian Ocean, a Zone -
of Peace," to be attended, naturally, by the countries bordering the
ocean, but also by the USSR, China, the 1Jnited S tates, Japan, and the `
members of the European Community, as well as th e big international
organizations such as the movement of nonalined countries. _
The initiative of the Malagasy president, suppor ted, in particular, by
the progressive regimes of East Africa (Mozambiq ue, Tanzania, Seychelles),
could be echoed by the United Nations where the Special Committee on the
Indian Ocean is also preparing a conference in S ri Lanka, in 1981, also
focused on the demilitarization of this new storrny area. -
FOOTNOTES
1. See Michael Klare, "New Military Options" AFRIQUE-A5IE, No 215, and
Elie Ramaro, "Diego Garcia, The Eye of the P er~tagon, AFRIQUE-ASIE,
.No 210.
2. Which hauls bulk goods. _
3. See Elie Ramaro, "T_he Falcons Coming From th e Sea," AFRIQUE-ASIE,
No 202.
4. See ArRIQUE-ASIE No 216.
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y CHAD
~
- BRIEFS
NEW PERIODICAL--The first issue of SALAM ("peace"), a bi-monthly periodical
published by the Joint Action Front (FAC) presided over by Mr Mahamat Abba
Said minister of the interior, appeared at the beginning.of July in Ud~amena.
~ Selling at 75 CFA fr.ancs per issue, the newspaper, which is written in
~ French and Arabic, otates that its principal objectives are "to make an
eff ective contribution building the nation on the poli.tical, economic and
social level" and "to assure an independent Chadian cultural entity."
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~'RRANEENS in F~cench 18 Jul 80 p "
1803] 9174
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
PRESIDENT DISCUSSES RECENT ECONOMIC MEASURES .
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jul 80 pp 67-69
[Unattributed article: "A Regained Freedom"] ~
[Text] Who is Lt-Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema, president of the Supreme ~
Military Council (SMC)? When he is asked to introduce himself, he avoids ~
anything which might be of a personal nature and passes on to the subject,
a much safer one, of describing the SMC, "a governmental body in the mili- ~
tary sphere." He devotes every Sunday morning to sports and has declined
to move out of his regular home and into the Presidential Palace.
- But this is not a side of his personality which the president allows to
be seen. Is this due to shyness? That is what people say and it is pro-
bably true. As soon as he arrives somewhexe he has never been before,
such as a television studio or the building site cf the future power sta-
tion of Malobo, the lieutenant colonel quickly examines his surroundings,
- though he is only going to be there for a short while, but his smiling
eyes turn into an inscrutable mask as soon as he realizes that he is being
observed. But then, the military context undoubtedly c~mes into play:
the SMC is a collective leadership and Teodoro Obiang does not want to
overshadow his peers, the officers of. the Equatorial Guinean Army. If he
mentions the part which he played in the overthrow of the dictator, it is
only to better explain the reasons for the present military government.
What concerns would public opinion is what led the SMC to take over the
responsibility of the government in Equatorial Guinea. The country lived ~
for 11 years under a dictatorial regime and endured the worst afflictions
ever known in a central African country. We, the military, were going to
be known as paid accomplices in all these destructive actions of the regimP. a
This is why, on the morning of 3 August 1979, I met with several fellow
officers and IVCO's. I showed to them the dramatic situation which our
country was facing and proposed to them to follow a new course. The change
was in no way motivated by ambition. We did not seek power. We wanted to
take over the govnrnment to save our peogle and give back to them the demo-
cratic freedoms that every nation demands. We had to take the initiative
because the mission of the army is to def end that legitimate right."
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What was this dramatic situation? "One can start by mentioning the na-
tion's central administration. The country no longer had an administra-
tion. Not a single office, not a single ministry was functioning. And -
no country can be run without an administration. One can also mention
the subject of health: the hospitals had been aband oned, epidemic o~it-
breaks went uncdntrolled and child mo~tality was at its peak."
The people were also suffering in the sphere of education which had dis-
appeared in the country: not a single establishment, not a singla college
was functioning. Children were only taught some kind of reeitation de-
nouncing international organizations, foreign countries and human rights.
There were no additional infrastructures, no development plan for the
guidance and advancement of the country. Finally as regards the way of
life and the social system, the previous goverr.ment did not recognize
even the most fundamental rights. The jails were ov erflowing with prison-
ers who had not been brought to trial: many Guinean s went to prison and
never came out agaiz while many others chose to escape to another country
while they could."
Afr.er this sad presentation of a legacy of ruins and poverty, what is the
first evaluation of the new government's a.ctions? "There cannot be a com-
plete evaluation. During its first 12 months of activity, the SMC has
succeeded in restaring freedom. The system of oppression has come to an
end ar.d the situation in the country is back to normal. In the sphere of
health, we have managed to control all the epidemics raging under the prev-
ious regime. We have also restored the administration: all ministerial
- departments are back in operation."
Finances and Manpower
"As far as education is concerned, all children are now receiving an ade-
quate education. I am sure that in a year's time we will have some uni-
verisity applicants." '
In the economic sphere, the SMC must correct a diff icult situation. This
is why we had to adopt several measures in July 1980 and these measures
are in line with our first program to Iiberalize commerce. Right now, -
commerce is comPletely free. Our currency's tiew parity can stimulate the
agriculture and encourage investors to pa:ticipate in our national recon-
struction. Our national currency is affected by a sort of relative infla-
tion. The constant lack of basic commodities has resulted in a sharp in- -
crease of prices and there is a black market with very high rates of ex-
change which reduces the value of our currency. During the first 10 months
' we tried to solve this difficult problem. We were not successful and have
had to devalue our currency to curtail this illegal rate of exchange.
_ The ind~sstrial aspect is a very important one for all the African and Third
World countries. ~s long as the Third World d~es n~t have an industri.ali-
zation program, there can be no solution to the prob lem of self-sufficiency
in essential commodities. The lack of industrialization in African '
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countries and their failure to process their natural resources are one
of the reasons why their economic situation remains unchanged. Equator-
ial Guinea wants to process its natural resources and is already seeking
the means to finance that sector."
_ Aad what about the agriculture? That basic sector of the Equatorial
Guinean economy shows no sign of activity. "We have offered a vast pro-
gram t~ encourage the agricultural sector. First, the wages of agricul-
tural workers and the pri~es of export goods--coffee and cocoa--have -
been raised. At the same time, we have given facilities to the farmers
and plantation werkers to help them purchase the equipment needed to im-
- prove their installations and daily lives.
The fact is that there is an absolute lack of manpower in Equatorial
Guinea: the Guineans are small landowners and are not used to working
in somebody else's plantation. Qne cannot say that the people do not
work. They do but they prefer to work for themselves, each man taking
care of his small crops."
To Meet the Most Pressing Problems
"The basic difficulty lies in the fact that from the beginning we decided
to give the plantations back to tk?eir former owners. To this effect, a
decree was issued in Novzmber 1979. None of the owners fulfilled the min-
- or conditions which had been set. One of these conditions was that they
contribute some capital to be invested and used to improve their installa-
tions. These gentlemen came but not one of them deposited any money in -
the banks of Equatorial Guinea. The SMC government came across: it
granted loans to the former plantation owners despite the fact that they
had not done as asked. Our program also had plans to group small farn?ers
' into cooperatives and in that framework to encourage them granting them
credit and even facilities to obtain consumer goods.
Much remains to be done. Very few of the former landowners have returned.
Many would like to do so but they are having economic difficulties and
cannot return because they do not have the money. Besides, in order to
revive the agricultural sector we must import a labor force as we did in
the past. We are going to enter into negotiations with the Nigerian Gov-
ernment and we will be sending delegations to other countrie4. We have
had contacts with Burundi and Mali and will do the same with other coun-
tries soon."
Equatorial Guinea must still meet its most pressing problems. Gradually,
it will also deal with other matters.
For the time being, the SMC government does not want to get too involved
in international questions ~11 the more so because this often leads to
interference in the domestic problems of other states. This is still our
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policy. However, there are some basic questions which must be discussed
by all the OAU countries and I think that we will adopt the same position
as the other African states. In the f ield of domestic policy, we shall
persevere in our efforts to bring about fast changes to achieve the econ-
omic, political and social recovery of the Equatorian Guinean people."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1980
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MOZANIBIQUE
REVIEW OF PORT FACILITIES, MODERNIZATION NEED STRESSED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1935
[ExcerptsJ Since the Lusaka economic summit, we have discussed on several
occasions the problems relating to transit through Mozambique ports and
railroad of the goods traffic of the completely hemmed in neighboring
countries. Only Mozambique can offer to the countries without coast to
- develop their commercial traffic.
Indeed in the west, the Benguela railroad, paralyzed by the civil war in
- the Angolan territory, has not permitted since 1975, the export of copper
from Zambia and Zaire, from the port of Lobito, on the Atlantic.
To the east, on the Indian Ocean, the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam re-
presents a bottleneck for the Tazara, the railroad built by China for
Zambia and Tanzania. Moreover, since its inauguratj.on in 1975, the
Tazara has been undergoing a number of difficulties which have presented
it from achieving so far, its initial objective of carrying 2 million tons
- per year. _
Mozambique offers three ports to its neighbors without coast. That of
Maputo, at the southern end of the country, with its twin, Matola, spe-
cializing in oil and minerals, offers the best possibilities of expan-
sion. It now operates at only half its capacity: that is, 9 million
tons per year (of which nine-tenths are goods in transit to South Africa).
Its record had been 12 million tons in 1972 and specialists estimate that
it could reach 18 million tons per year.
Although there is a railroad between the interior and Mozambique, in the
valley of the Limpopo river, it has not been used for years, and was
seriously damaged by the Rhodesian raids, before the independence of Zim-
babwe.
The director of ports'and railroads of Mozambique recently affirmed that
the destroyed installations had been repaired south of the border, but
prudently added that the railroad could only be opened early next year,
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after its ~estcration on the Zimbabwe territory. But according to the
observers, the track which was not used for several years, also needs
modernizaton. -
In the north of the country, Mozambique has an excellent deep water port,
Nacale, but its capacity is very small.
In the center, the port of Beira, 300 km away from Zimbabwe, to which it
is connected by railroad, seems to be the ideal means of access for this
country, and for Zambia and southern Zaire. Unfortunately, the want of
maintenance caused its access channeZ, about 20 km long, to have its
, depth reduced f rom 10 to only 5 m~ters.
- This means that r_onsiderab le dredging work mus t be carried out to permit -
~ access to the port of Beira of the 20,000 ton ships it used to received,
and before contemplating the berthing of super oil tankers, as foreseen
by the Mozambique authorities. Beira is indeed the starting point of
the oil duct which used to supply Rhodesia wi~h oil before th e unilateral
declaration of independence of 1965, and the sanctions imposed against
th e Salisbury regime. The port and railroad infrastructure of Mozambique =
requires considerable investments in order that this country may guarantee
a significant increase of the transit from neighboring countries. While
the iatter, who are members of the Lome agreement, may hope for consider-
ab le help from the European Community, Maputo which refused to sign the
agreement, will have to find other funding sources.
~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
90 i8
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NIGER
CHAI~ER OF CObIlKERCE `S 1980 BUDGET
- Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1798
[Article: "Niger Chamber of Commerce: Budget of 113.5 Million CFA for 1980"]
[Text] The proceedings of the annual general meeting of the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, Agriculture znd Crafts of Niger ended at Maradi on
9 July.
The 1980 draft budget was drawn up with total receipts and expenditures of
r 113.51 million CFA. This is an in.crease of 7.32 percent over the 1979 budget.
The government's contractual share was set at a little more than 13 million
CFA.
The Chamber of Commerce intends to establish a new basis for computing
membership fees. 1'he division th;~t includes industry, import-export, bank
and insurance companies, transit and transport, having a turnover greater
than S00 million CFA will pay a fee of 400,000 CFA francs. Wholesalers and ,
the equivalent having a turnover greater than 100 million will pay 200,000
CFA francs.~ Shippers having less than 10 trucks and small wholesalers with
a turnover greatea- than 20 million and less than or equal to 100 million will
have to pay 20,000 CFA fr~ncs. Retailere and other small businesses will pay
5,000 CFA francs.
With this system which will be applied in 1981, the annual total of inember-
ship f ees wi11 increase to 74.82 million CFA.
In 1979, Ch~amber of Commerce raceipts experienced a net increase compared
to previous budgets. However, the proceeds from some taxes Ziave not met
expectations. Particularly the tax on transactions which waFi expected to
be 40 million and which produced only 19 million CFA, or one-tliird of the
anticipated amount. Moreover, it was found that the financial contribution -
~ of national companies computed according to a pr2diction of 190 millions,
produced only 56 million CFA.
Finally, the Chamber of Commerce intends tc provide itself with real estate '
valued at nearly 800 million CFA francs and an institute for training fore- -
i men.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
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L'Vl\ V1'L'll~l[1L UJL' V17L1
, NIGER
CCCE LOANS AUTHORIZED BY MINISTERS~ COUNCIL
: Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French ].8 Jul 80 p 1798 ~
[Article: "Proceedings of the Ministers' Council Loans of 7.76 Billion CFA
F~om the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation"J _
[Text] On 10 July, the Nigerien Ministers' Council adopted f ive draft orders
authorizing the President of the Supreme Military Council~ chief of state
of Niger, Col Seyni Kountche, to acquire seven loans from the Central Fund -
for Economic Cooperation (CCCE): two for 22.75 million CPA each, one for
12 million, one for 2.67 nillion, two loans for 40 and 55 million CFA and
another for 200,000 CFA, or a total of 155.37 million CF~, (or 7.76 b311ion =
CFA) .
Remember that on 15 I~Iay (see MTM of 30 May p 1267) the ministers' council
already authorized the Chief of state to arrange for two loans, one for
8.8 ~illion CFA and the other for 140 million (or a total of 7.44 billion
CFA) from the CCCE. Remember too, that the total cost of the Nigerien 5-
year plan for 1979-1983 will be 730.22 billion CFA, 384,49 billion of which
wa.ll be payable by the public sector.
~ In additioa, the council adopted two other draft orders, one offering the
- guara.ntee of the Republic of Niger for a loan from the Central Agricultural
- Credit Bank of Niger to a pool of banks of which the National Agricultural
Credit Bank c~f Pa?-is is the leader; and the other regarding the first amend-
ment o� order No 79-27 of 20 September 1975 concerning the Finance law for
_ f iscal year 1380.
COPYRIGHT: ltene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
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REUNION
BRIEFS
SUGAR PLANTE~S' STRIKE ENDID--Reunionese sugarcane planters returned to
~ work on 7 August, ending their strike which had paralyzed the island's
sugar industry since 24 July. They received only partial satisfaction of
their demands, however; the price per ton of sugarcane was increased
to 198.05 francs [they had demanded 200 francs--the set price for 1980 was
174.45 francsJ; yet unresolved is the method of calculating the sugar con-
tent percentage (richesae). [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 15 Aug 80 p 2048] ,
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J . . . . . . . . .
- i�~n VfflVltll~ u~G v1vLi
~
SENEGAL
PROMUTION OF INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS ANNOUNCED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER~tANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p-1794
[Article: "Ttao Billion CFA to Promote Senegalese Industrial Exports"J
' [Text] On 11 July, the Dakar Chamber of Com~erce hosted an informational
meeting organized under the aegis of the ministries of Commerce and of
Finance and Economic Affairs for the purpose of explaining to Senegalese
, businessmen, the mechanisms of government export subsidies, for which we
announced the next implementation in our 27 June issue (p 1624). -
_ ,
During the meeting, Mr ldrissa Thiam, director of "overall business forcast,"
announced to the businessmen who are in~ereated in the export trade, that
under regulations which will become effective during the month of July, a
subsidy will be granted to them for their export operations. The proposed
rate is 10 percf:~:~:, and will be computed on the basis of the FOB value of -
the exports. -
The Senegalese Government has decided to test the products to be subsidized
during the year 1980 before making the practice general in fiscal year
1982-1983. For this year, five groups of pilot products have been selected:
agricultural equipment, fertilizera, textiles (including raw cotton, knitted
goods and ready-to-wear), footwear and canned f ish. Th~se five products
represent approximately one-third of Senegal's traditional exports and 15
- percent of its total exports. The subsidies planned for these products will
cost the Senegalese Government 2 billion CFA for fiscal year 1980-1981. .
Finaily, we should point out tY~at these subsidies will be made without
discrimination regarding their COitR~ry of destination. Qn the other hand,
products that benefit under the CEAO from the regional cooperation tax wilJ. .
, not be included, because the Senegalese Government is already contributing
assistance to thes~ exports within the Community through its ~articipation
in FOSIDEC [expansion unknown].
- r!r Thiam then investigated the status of Senegal's b~lance of trade. He
found that the deficit continues to increase. From 84 billion CFA in 1978,
it will be 109 billion this year. This is the result of the sharp increase
in imports and of broad fluctuations in exports.
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~ Mr Thiam added that tha in~reasP in imports is related to e:everal factors. -
There is the development of drnnestic production (capital goods and inter-
mediate goods advancing considerably among total imports). There is also
the importation of food products and manufactured consumer goods which
have increased in price due to inflation. And f inally, there is the energy -
crisis which has caused an increase in "our oil bi?1 from 5 billion in 1973
to more tran 50 billion in 1980."
This situatj.on has not been offset by exports, which were reduced by the _
recurrent drou~ht. Mr Thian~ pointed out that exports ha.ve increased from
99.1 billion CFA in 1975 to 104 billion this year, af ter a maximum of 152.9
billion in 1977 and a mi~iimum of 89 billion the following year. To the _
drought must be added the decline in phosphate prices in 1975 and 1980 and
the drop in the oil-seeds market beginning in 1978. However, peanut pro-
ducts and phosphates represented 63 percent of the total Senegalese exports
for 1975 and 1977. ~
~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1980
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L'VA VCllVlt~l+ UJG V?`ILl
SFIVEGAL
POPULATION SUBJECT TO ~PROFOUND' DISCONTENT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 21 Jul - 3 Au~ 80 pp 5~-53
_ ~rticle by Ginette Cot: "The Peanuts of Wrath"
?
~ex~ No Speeches Can. Shrug Off the Essential Demands of a `
Peasant-ry in Despair. ,
"We are tired. We are exhausted. We are sick at heart from seeing the
country fa~.l to ruin and from thinkin~ of our childrens' future. We have
_ nothing, and we are more and more under pressure. Our sons do not have the
means of staxting a family. The villages are losing their young workers.
Our children are forced to leave for Dakar or ~o farther away, abroad~ in
- search of a hypothetical job. Regions are dying out. This speech, -
repeated a thousandfold in almost identical terms, can be heasd throughout
Senegal from Saint Louis to Ziguinchor, from Kaclack to I,ouga, in villages
of the Sine-Saloumen and the Diourbel as in those of the Thi es region.
So speak mothers, peasants, small tradesmen, workers, middle-level managers,
and teachers. They reflect in summary--"for," they say, "it would take days
and nights to tell our misfortunes"--the immense lassitude, indeed hopeless-
ness, felt today by the vast majorit;~ of the population.
' "If it were easy to die, we would let ourselves die." The f orsaken in the
Sene~alese countryside even say that, as for example in the Diourbel region.
For the rural people~ crushed by debt and bled white by exploitation~ the
cup of misery runs over. If the last ~rowin~ sea.son was disastrous (pro-
duction of peanuts, the country's principal crop~ barely re~cning 450,000
tons comi~.ared to 900,000 in '1978-79), the next even now bid~< fair to be
catastrophic~ even without assuming possible natural calamit ies such as
drought or locusts. Seed stock has been squandered, and in this beginning
rainy season a great many farmers have not received their se ecl quota (100 kg
for men, 50 for women). "There is not a peanut seed left in the village," ~
noted the farmers of Sagatta, in Kebemer district, last May.
"Not having been supplied, several SECCO ~xpansion unknow~ cooperatives
gave money instead of seed: 4,500 CFA Fr when a quintal of peanuts costs
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6,000 Fr and none can be found. Many farmers here are left with empty
sacks. The government c~oes not control the real seed stock situation.
What will we do? Are we to twiddle our thumbs? How will we live? Are we
to die of hunger? N ever before have we known so hard a situation.
The situation of Sa~atta village is not, alasS an isolated one, but rather
a typical example. Complaints spread everywhere, and everywhere the eeed
problem is acute. For not only are supplies insufficient to meet needs,
_ but farmers continue to be victims of all sorts of harassment. For them
ONCAD IJatior_al Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Developmen~--
wY:ose outright aboli.ti.on is called for by the opposition--has long been
nothing but an instrument of rural exploitation. Yet officially--and fol-
lowing suggestions by the IMF, which recommended measures designed tc give
a new impulse to peanut growing though Senegalese farmers see less and less
advantage in it--the government had given orders, for this growing season,
to distribute seed without any preconditions.
'T1o Seed"
But in practice things happened quite differently. No matter where, and in
order to cow declared opponents, particularly Senegalese Democratic Party
- ~PDS] militants, or else to recover money "in the face of the total bank-
ruptcy of public finances, 'they' stop at nothing to extract money from
those most in want," as it is explained in Senegal. Prefects and subpre-
fects, cooperative and ONCAD agents "invent quite another law." In many
places, and as in past years, farmers met with an adamant refusal: "No seed
unless you pay back taxes."
"When you come to SECCO to take delivery of your seed quota, the profiteers
are there with their sacks, ready to do business with the debtor farmers,"
explains a former O1~TCAD official. "And you can imagine what happens. To
settle their debts the far:~ers sell to the profiteers, below the market
price, a portion of the seed they were preparing to sow, and leave with a
sack two-thirds empty. Sme11 wonder, under these conditions, that
peanut production and seed stocks in barns fall away to nothing.
In a letter of 28 May to the Minister of Rural Development, a leading citi-
zen of Thilmakha rural community in Thies re$ion had cause to complain of
irregularities committed by the president of his village cooperative. He
cited a list of eight members, himself included, who did not receive seed,
on the pretext that they had not paid their taxes. As for the author'of
the letter, he had been asked to pay 6 percent in kind--the rate set last
year by the government--not only for arrears in prior years but also as
tax for the current year 197g-80. Thus nearly a third of his quota would
have been withheld. Thilmakhia farmers also complain that agricultural
equipment and fertilizers which were to be distributed by the cooperative
were diverted elsewhere "in the greatest confusion." There again, similar
cases are innumerable.
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~ Tne Sun and the Sliadows
The situation in the Sene~alese countryside is today so catastrophic, arid
the discontent of the peasantry so great--with their indebtedness estimated
in official iigures of 3'I DeceMber at 550,000 tons of peanuts or 20 billion
- CFA Fr--that the oovernment newspaper itself was alarmed. Thus in i'.-s 18
June issue LE SOLEIL published a front-page article which somewhat con~ra-
dicts the relative optimism expressed by +he Ministry of Rural Development.
Recalling that the same minister on 3 May had declared himself convinced
that "if the rains are on our side, the recovery of our agricultural econ-
omy will finally be under way,~' LE SOLEIL noted that: "the 1980-81 crop
year will, alas! suffer from errors in its preparation. Seed and fertil-
izers were not on hand in all zones in time for the first rains. In Louga
region, farm~r victims of errors and omissions await 69 tons of seed. In
Thies department a shortage of 245 tons and a faulty distribution of seed
were noted. At Diourbel, farmers declared themselves deliberately
'omitted' and demanded seed. Fertilizer and fungicide requirements are not
fully met.
"In Sine-Saloumen region, where half the peanut production is harvested,
the distributior_ rate for seed stock, as of 26 May, was 88.53 percent. As
for f ertilizers, only 8,']73 tons out of stated requirements f or 14,163 tons
were delivered. Of requests f or 620 tons of urea, no receipts are recorded.
In other regions the same difficulties exist. Once again, con-
ceptions and directives ha.ve suffered from faulty application in practice, -
of which one co.-~sequence, even where rains were timely, will be a drop in
production."
Though the Minister of Rura1 Development, advised by ONCAD, "of which cer-
tain officials are at the root of present problems," minimizes the gravity
of the situation, he had to recognize nevertheless that "diff iculties con-
cerning seed may result from the attitude of certain administrative author-
i~ties sai3 to have linked seed distribution to tax payments, or failed to
observe priorities granted b.y directives to prompt taxpayers." But the
_ real sittxation, as noted by ~.E SOLEIL, appears quite different: "In one re-
gion the administrative authority and ONCAD reported~y refused 200 tons of
seed made available to them to satisfy possible needs, while farmers who
had not received seed stormed the offices of the district chief."
Ii can well be imagined, under these conditions, that it will hardly be pos-
sible to convince the farmers that only delays, or the behavior of certain
officials, or even mistakes, are at the root of a disaster whose extent has
led the caliph of the P4ourides (one of the lar~est religious brotherhoods
of Senegal) to come and present the grievances of the rural world to Presi-
dent Senghor:
"The farmers are tired. ihey count on you for an end to their ordeals, for
they have confidence in you. But I ask you, in their name, to renounce
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all that does not conform to their interests." So declared Caliph Serigne
Abdul Ahad Mbacke during a conversation with the head of state reported by
LE SOLEII, of 23 June. As his interlocutor was noti.ng the various initia-
tives taken by the government, and the program for building 13 dams by the
year 2020, the caliph remarked that "40 years is a long time. The farmers
need to eat and drink, and they are counting on you." Finally, raising
the problem of faulty distribution of seed, the caliph expressed his feel-
ing--no doubt widely shared--that "seed was used for other purposes.~~
It is not uncommon, while traveling through Senegal, t~ hear the terrible
reflection that "we are still worse off than in colonial days," or "better
the circle commander than those responsible today."
One would like to thin~ that memory plays strange tricks, and that the
"old folks" cherish embellished recollections of their bygone youth. One
could think, too, that disappointment has been too strong for all those--
and they were the majority--who r.ad faith in the UPS ~enegalese Progres-
sive Unio~, now become the PS ~ocialist Part~. But the young are also
bitter. And the impression which dominates and asserts itself is that the
structure is cracking everywhere, that misery and destitut~on are spread-
ing and worsening year by year and day by day.
Club or Ghetto?
"The country's few industries are almost all located in the area of Dakar
and Cap Vert province, which is but a very small part of its territory,"
as is constantly remarked. "The rest of the country has been forsaken and
is falling into disuse. Even wh~n a project is started, does it profit the
- peop.le of the area concerned?" In Casamance, more than ever cut off, where
high school student anger burst out last January at Ziguinchor~ and where
mangoes, though plentiful in the region, rot on the trees for lack of a mas-
ket or processing plants, who benefits from the tourist facilities created?
- In any case, apparently not the villagers of Diembering rural community,
_ which adjoins the magnificent Club Mediterranee built in 1973 bordering
Cape Skirring.
"In 1974 the club hired 60 percent of our young people. But beginning in
1977-78 they were discharged. T oday, out of 400 club employees, oiily 12
are from here." It is true that Diembering rura7. community has gone over
to the Senegalese Democratic Party ~PD~ of Maitre Wade, and that no retal- ~
iatory measures are spared in attempts to intimidate people. "Formerly,
women also grew vegetables for the club. Now, by order of the prefect, the
club refuses all contact with us, and suppl.ies itself directly by special
plane f rom Dakar
But~ in Thies re~ion, the villages near the Taiba phosphate works are no �
better satisfied. "For us, lif e has in no way changed," say their inhab-
itants. '~Look, here are electric cables and water mains. But our women
still go to wells for water, nor have we benefited from the facilities
built on the project to electrify the village."
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Tn tkle Sahelian region villa~e water supply remains a colossal task. Thus
for example at Darou Mousty, in the Diourbel, there is but a single well
within a 20 km perimeter. "People must often go as far as Touba, 28 km
from here, with a horse-drawn cart--our only means of transportation--to
supply themselves with water." Also in the Diourbel, at Bambey, where PDS
millitants say, as indeed they do everywhere, that they are ready to sacri-
fice even their lives to prevent a repetition of the '1978 e7.ection fraud,
and where they note that "nothing has changed since colonial times," it is -
perhaps still worse. "We can never again live together here. Our wives
n~ust spend the night around the well to supply our homes with water, since
the well flows only then."
Everywhere one hears of the difficulty of survival--for to get by from day
to da.y has become a real tour de force--of galloping inflation, of ever
rising prices, with sugar at 260 CFA Fr per kg, rice at 90 Fr, and oil at
225 Fr per liter, wkiile peanuts are bought from faxmers icr only 40 Fr per
kg. The 4.50 Fr increase approved by the government is not in fact to take
effect until 1981. Moreover, it is pointed out, the grower will then ben-
efit from an increase of only 50 centimes, since the 4 Fr balance is report-
edly to be withheld to reduce b~.ck debts.
Though Senegalese farmers have no need for calculations to feel in their
bones the decline in their living standard, these two examples give an idea
of the deterioration of thezr situation. In the same period--1960 to date--
when the price of oi1 rose from 70 CFA Fr per liter to 260, the price paid
to peanut growers rose from '19.50 to 45.50 CFA Fr for the forthcomin~ crop.
But whereas in 1960 the cost of a seeder equalled the price for one quintal
of peanuts, it correspond~ today to that for 9 quintals!
Bllt there are many other problems which recur as a leitmotiv in conversa-
tions, especially those concerning health and schools, which are pa.rticu-
larly taken to heart ~ "There ~.re no medicines in the dispensaries," which
moreoJer are themselves terribly insufficient, it is repeated everywhere.
Often, as for example at Sagatta, funds are appropriated by the rural com~
munity to equip a dispensary, "but nothing comes." In Lin~uere department
of Louga region, which has become a veritable desert, there are eight med-
_ ical stations lacking medicines, in an area three times the size of Thies
region. ~ntire zones, ?ike Nindy district in Kebemer department (Diourbel), -
have but a single di:pensary. Other examples could be cited indefinitely. ~
A s for the schools, they are totally destitute. "Parents must supply every-
thing. Pupils huddle together 90 to a classroom, 5 to a bench, sharing 1
tex.tbook ameno each 'f0. But then, why do we send our children to school?
4~Jith wrLat prospucts--to become unemployed? `
- To be sure, and as is known, Senegal like other African and tnird world .
� countries is suffering severely from the fu11 brunt of the consequences of
- i;he economic and financial crisis exported by the western wozld. The dete-
rioration of the terms of trade and the growing weight of the oil bill are
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dramatically real facts. Since independence, Senegal has suffered 10 years _
of drought, each of which brought a 35 to 40 percent drop in its peanut pro-
duction. From 1973 to ~g8o, the oil bill rose 10-fold, from 5 to 50 billion.
The fall of world peanut prices and the staggering rise of those for imports
have likewise considerably accelerated the crisis.
Neither the deterioration of the terms of trade nor the droughts, however, ~
Guff~ce to explain the economic and financial stagnation into which the
country is sinking, or the deep discontent prevailing among the population.
So much so that sheer repetition, like a litany, on the air waves and every-
where, of those arguments--to which the Senegalese who hear them now respond
only by an ironical or disillusioned shrug--would in the end minimize that
aspect of things. The fact is that today confidence has vanished. The ef-
fectiveness of the men in the PS, who have been in office for 20 yeaxs, is
no longer believed in. Technocratic speeches are no longer acceptable. a
And the privileged of the regime flaunt an overly provocative luxury. -
"Almost every morning, a new scandal bursts out, involving embezzlement or
_ other misdeeds," says the m2n in the street in Dakar. "But nothing changes:
the greater the misery, the more the privileged of the regime and the rich
parvenus indulge themselves to their hearts' content, as if burning their
last bridges."
Daily and everywhere, rumors run rife concerning millions spent by officials
for such ~'futilities" as baptisms of dolls or kittens, for a marriage or
some other ceremony; and also concerning flights of capital to Europe and
massive purchases of gold jewelry.
In vain does the government announce a recovery plan, a variety of reforms,
~rants in aid or complementary financing, or yet again, as recently, decide
to cut spending by halving the official motor pool and closin$ 20 embassies
and consulates abroad. No one--and perhaps not cven the officials, who no
longer seem to know what to do or which way to turn--still believes in the
possibility of a new staxt by those in power. So much so that everyone
here--including a united opposition--is aware of the dan$er of the situa-
tion, and knows that anythin~ could happen at any moment.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie.
6~ 45
Cso: 4400
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rv~. vra ~~,nL, uo~ Vl'IL1
SENEGAL
7
� DROUGHT IN 1980 EXPECTED TO BE AS SERIOUS AS IN 1979
~ .
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1794
[Article: "Delay of the Rainy Season Causes Sever~e Anxiety"--words published
between slantlines appeared in boldface]
~TextJ The delay of the rainy ~eason and the small amount of rainfall are
causing great anxiety in Senegal according to the 10 July issue of AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE. It is feared that the drought will be as severe in 1980 as
in the preceding year.
The southern part of the country, the Casamance, which is considered the
_ wet region, has recorded only two heavy rainfalls of any importance up to
the present time, although the rainy season usually begins in June, or even
in May. As for the central and northern part of the country, the rain
hasn't even appeared yet.
If this situation continues (and meteorologicai predictions are nat very
optimistic) it cou?d lead to serious disturbances in the /peanut crop/
which controls the entire agricultural economy of Senegal.
I,ast year, the infrequent rains which occurred at the beginning of the rainy
season, but which were followed by a long period of drought until September,
- already made normal sowing impessible and the harvest was very bad, less than
- half that of 1978 and the worst in at least 30 years.
But the drought has also severely affected the /livestock,/ to the point
that leadership of the cattle breeders' association plans to establish a .
"save the cattle" operation for the Casamance and the central part of the
country, in an attemp~ to compensate for the scarcity of grazing sreas in
the pasture lands due to the irregular rainfall.
At the same time, government authorities, in cooperation with various inter-
national aid associations, are doing their best to accelerate programs for
drilling and construction of wells in rural communities.
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In order to bridge the gap before the next harvest, the authorities have also
begun to distribute food supplies in the country, where the peasants are
beginning to sell or to eat the small amount of seed intended forthe next
agricultural growing season. Similarly, many breeders are now selling on
markets in the cities, the sheep which are ordinarily reserved for the
Tabaski, the great Moslem feast (in October this year).
The drought is also evident in Dakar where water cutoffs are predicted for
the month of July due to the sharp drop in the level of Guiers Lake, the
reservoir which supplies the capital. ~
In the rest of the Sahel--with the possible exception of Niger and Upper
Volta, which had the advantage of a little more rainfall--the situation i~
also critical. In Mali, as in Maurita.nia, there are serious delays in the
rainfall. In these countries, where for several years the steady and
implacable advance of the desert, which invcives the disappearance of all
vegetation and the exodus of herds and men, has been r~ported, programs for
control of desertification take priority among all economic activities.
But the efforts of the CILSS (Inter-State Committee to Fight the Drought in
the Sahel) and of the Sahel Club (which includes all of the co~antries
contributing to the OECD) can only achieve intermediate and long-term results,
and are also dependent on methods of financing being obtained without delay.
In the immediate future, a new year of drought could have disastrous conse-
quences on all levels: on river levels, irrigation of crops, feeding of
cattle and survival of populations. And we remember with exr.reme distress -
the year 1972, when the drought took on dramatic proportiona and ieft
thousands of victims, wrile, as in the beginning of summer 1980, Europe was
complaining of an overabundance of rainfall.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1980
9174
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SENEGAL
BRIEFS
PETROLEUM PURCHASE LOAN--The Islamic Development Bank recen~ly approved
loans and credits in the amount of $72.67 million to severai Third Warld
countries, including Senegal. This assistance should help the countries
concerned to buy petroleum or to finance development pro~ects. As far as
Senegal is concerned,it will be the recipient of a loan of 3 billion CFA
tc buy crude oil. [Text] [Paris MAF.CHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 18 Jul 80 p 1794~ 9174
SENEGAL-KUWAIT INVESTMENT BANK--The management committee of the Economic
Groups of Senegal met on 12 July at the Dakar Chamber of Comanerce under -
the chairmanship of al-Hadj Momar Sourang, national president of the GES.
Among other things, the committee took steps to establish the mission of
Senegalese opPrators to Kuwait, from 29 September to 4 October of this
year. The mission will study plans for the Senegal-Kuwait Investment
Company, th~ establishment of which has been proposed by the Kuwaitis. It
would be a merchants' bank with a capita]. fo 500 million CFA, more than -
= izalf of which (51 percent) would be held by Senegalese economic operafo-rs.
Its principal objective would be to guarantee, underwrite and stand surety
for Senegalese operators. It will also finance commercial, industrial and _
� handicraft operations. [Text] ~Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 18 Jul 80 p 1795] 9174
9174
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ZAIRE
ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL SITUATION FGR FIRST HALF OF 1~980 ASSESSED
Paris MARCHrS TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jul, 1 Aug 80
~ [25 Jul 80, pp 1832-1836]
[Text] On 4 February 1980, Gen Mobutu Sese Seko delivered a message to the
nation, speaking before the Executi~e Gouncil meeting in special session. _
~ He did not hesitate to state at the beginning of his address:
"The year 1980 appears to me to be the year of the last chance, deci.sive
for our country we must in~.truth recognize that the path wh~ch we
still have to cover is still iong For 3 years I have worked at
drafting the Mobutu plan which is today in full im~lementation.
(Its success) entails a co~siderable ir.vestment of financial means: th~
results obtained during the last conference held in Brussels in -
November 1979 with al~ of our foreign partners truly gives us ~ustification _
for hope ...(they), as we11 as the IMF, the Wor_ld Bank and the EEC have
given the best of then~selves to aid us in our vast under~taking.
"It would be dishonest moreover to seek to conceal our own errors o!~ manage- .
ment and some of our economic choices which, in fact, I acknowledged at
the proper time." _
After a detai'led exawination of the general situation of the country, the
causes and consequences of tnP "ZairiL: affliction," he said in his speech:
"We need efficient and profitable public r~ervices rich and
nourishing agricult_ure, a flowFzing and confidant youth. We must do honor
to our constitutir,nal motto: Peace, ~ustice, !.abor
Five months later, Gre examined the economic and financial situation of
Zaire as of the end of June, and studied how the program vaunted loud and
clear by tne president of the republic has been realized in fact.
Let us add at the outset that this speech, which was to reflect ~he will -
to "re,ain control" of the country, disappointed political circles in
Zaire a:~d discouraged foreign businessmen.
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Preliminary remarks. Although the profound changes announced j_n the
above-mentioned speech affected almost all sectors, in the following report
we will interest ourselves only in the monetary, financial and economic
sectors taken in thei= br.oadest sense. The analysis of the s~tuation in
these sectors was made very difficult by the rather general dearth of
statistical information or recent and reliable official figures.
~ The Monetary and Financial Situation
Devaluation of the Zaire
The zaire was devalued again by 30 percent on 2?. February 1980.1 Since
that time the ~aire has been worth U.2625 SDR [special drawing rights]
~ (as compared t~ 0.3;5 SDR since the previous devaluation in August 1979).
On 2G February 1980 the average rate for the zaire a~ the Brussels stock
exchange was 9.8170 Belgian francs, while on 27 June the official rate was
9.8021.
This measure was to be accampanied, accordin~ to the sp~kesman for the
J president, by a framework of provisions effecting three basic poix~ts, which
can be su~arized as follows: better supply of c~nsumer goods, rational -
price-fixing and regular distribution of goods, and aanendment of the
16 January 1980 law pertaining to the scheduled tax on income.
~ If to begin with the operation seemed designed to achieve one of its main
goals, the elimination of an "unofficial" rate, it is to be feared at the
present time that a further devaluation may yet prove necessary. In
mid-June, the unaff.~cial rate for the zaire was again, according to
reliable sources, at about 4 Belgian francs.
Inflation. A study of the figures given above will without a doubt be more
eloquent than a lengthy analysis. The In,stitute of Economic and Social
Research (IRLS) of the National University of Zaire (UNAZA), Kinshasa
province, regularly publishes two "indices" which make it possible to
follow the fluctuations in. living costs cios~ly (from month to month).
The first, enti~led the "Weighted Index of Retai?. Prices in Kinshasa �:zops,"
service prices inc~uded, takes the month of June 1960 as a base figure of
100. This index has developed as follows:
- June 1960 100
June 1970 1,172
June 1975 2,680
Dece~aber 1979 29,773
January 1980 30,863
February 1980 29,465
March I980 31,573
April 1980 31,731
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The second, entitled "Index of Current Retail Prices for Consumer Goods
in the Kinshasa Markets," showed the following development (based on the 6
_ figure 100 representing October-December 1964):
- December 19f~4 100
December 1970 325
December 1975 958
- December 1979 1,942
January 1980 9,237
February 1980 9,010
March 1980 9,085
~ April 1980 9,504
Despite occasional fluctuations, the trend in both cases continued upward,
~ seriously eroding the purchasing power oi the working n~asses.
Farther on we will discuss the influence of inflation on the problem of
the wages of manpower in Zaire.
_ The following table will clarify the preceding considerably: -
Recent Development of Exchange Rate
(Number of Zaires per Foreign Currency Unit) ~
(For Columns 1 and lb the Unit of Comparison
Is the Kuta (K), 100th of a Zaire) _
M~RA/dGr
M~rchi ~dy/emmN ~Y Brv+ MiRM N Idri~A M~RAi alfrnd A'msMt~ MircM tiM A'mrMr~
drBrurlN llb~rl !7i f]1 II~
O~rrt I fB 1 FB Ostrs I S Am = Dibt 15 Am = D+rM / 5 Am =
312~79 7.2357A - 1~~ 9-79 ~.OB751 11�79 A.OOZ
4�12~79 7.2551 - 19~10~79 ~.15 12~79 8.002
S~li-19 7.2713 - 11�12 79 ~.00 Z
- 21 12 79 7.205J - 1�80 3.95 2 1B- 1-BO t.0182Z 1� 1�BO 7.502
20�12~79 1.1921 - 25� 1~80 4J0 i 21~ 1�80 2.018BZ 31- 1�BO 5,002
27~12~19 7.1958 - 1 2�BO 1.82 Z 25- 1�BO 2,021~Z 1� 2�BO S.OOI
2~ 1-8~ 7.2288 - IS� 2�80 ~.55 Z 2B� 1�BO 2.OY21Z _
3� 1~80 7.T472 - 3i� i�EO 2.02512 -
25~ t�BO 7.1921 - 7� 2-80 2.0258
29~ t-80 7.1873 - 12- 2�80 I.OY~A ~
- 31~ 1�80 7J9 20 K
29 2�80 10J8 18.18
31� 3�80 9.90 15.38
- 30� 4-80 10.17 18.66
31- 5�80 10.16 24.39 -
15� B�80 -
24~ B~BO 10.19 21,6Y
Key:
1. Regulated Brussels market; ~.ate; 1 Belgian.franc
lb. Brussels free mark:at; 1 Belgian franc
- 2. Zurich market; date; 1 American dolZar
3. Kinshasa official market; date; 1 American dollar
4. Kinshasa free market; date; 1 American dollar
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r�ok ur~r l~i~, US~: UNLY
Note:
1. Official rates established ~y the bankers in a clearing-house
meeting in Brussels.
lb. Rate on the Bruss~els market.~
2. Rates established by the Foreign Com~erce Bank, Geneva branch.
3. Official rates established by the Bank of Zaire, Exchange
Department.
- 4. Personal surveys in Kinshasa.
Sources: Bank of Zaire, ~'CHO DE LE1 BOURSE, NEWSWEEK.
The 1980 Budget .
The approval of the 1980 budget by the Legislative Council, making it
possible for President Mobutu to sign budget law 80-002 dated 22 January,
= was preceded ~y lengthy discussion resulting in numerous amendments.
Current state income for the year 1980 is estir.:ated overall at
2,960,760,000 zaires. Income is estimated at 375.15 million zaires.
' Budget ~redits have been allocated in the amount of 2,937,500,000 zaires _
for curre~it ~xpenditures ~or the year 1980. Expenditures will be paid for
as the corresponding income is received. Where capital expenditures are
concerned, commitment authorizations have been granted in the amount of
1,381,200,000. Payment credit allocations for 1980 come to 373.3 million.
In all, income thus totals 3,3?6,000,000 zaires and expenditures
3,686,000,000, leaving a deficit of 350 million ~'~ich must be made up
from advances by the currency issuing institute. It should be noted that
the 1979 budget called for a deficit of 232 million zaires, a sum
definitely in excess of the goal sought by the IMF for this fiscal period.
The Mobutu Plan and Its Financial Consequences
1) On 18 July 1979, President Mobutu sent a first letter of intention to
the IMF, in which he officially confirmed the main guidelines of the
stabilization plan Zaire planned to follow to obtain the ind;~pensai.~le
financial aid of that body. A first stand-by credit of lJ.d million SDR
was released as a result on 28 August 1979. It was to ra paid out quar-
terly until the end of 198U.
The IMF, which saw as the following month elapsed that Zaire would not
succeed in achieving the goals set for 1979 and that the directives issued -
by its experts were not being observed, revealed understandable displeasure.
At the beginning of 1980, new discussions took pl~:e ir~ Kinshasa with the
Zairian chief of state and the financial authorities of the country. The -
last IMF delegation left Zaire on 9 March. To some extent, this reflected
- the pessimism of the IMF and the Wor1d Bank as to the possibilities of
_ national recovery (an attitude heavily influencing the thinking of the
public and private banks).
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However the IMF gave its agreement, in principle, to the releasing of a
second allocation of stand-by credit, with the requirement that
President Mobutu sign a second letter of intention (the text of which is
not known to us). This letter was signed by the chief of state at the
end of the month of March during the trip he made to Romania. It allevi-
ated the tension which had developed between the IMF and Zaire and made
~ poasible the normal development of the support operation based on the
first stand-by credit allocation (28 August 1979).
It was not, finally, until 28 and 29 May 1980 that the faurth meeting of
the consultative group for Zaire could be held in Paris. The press
statement released on 28 May 1980 set forth, along with some statements of
satisfaction, serious reasons for concern. The press in Zaire as a whole
expressed satisfactl.on with the results obtained It is certain that
the IMF attitude will influence that of the Club of Paris and the Club of
London. -
The numerous suggestions made to the participants as to how to get Zaire
out of its rut hardly conceal the lack of any immediately applicable
pragmatic solution or any statistical data on the financial aid plan.
The partners of Zaire wanted to impose upon it a new series of tests
before adopting a final position, it was said. A justified maneuver
perhaps, but.a dangerous one without a doubt given the current state of
the economy of Zaire!
2) A meeting of the government and credit bodies called the Club of Paris
w~~s held in the French capital from 10 to 12 December 1979, and a ma~or
s~ries of decisions having to do with the rescheduling of the back debt
of 7.aire was discussed. This Zairian foreign debt was estimated then at
more than $4 billion.
The agreements decide~i upon were not however to be confirmed unless the
implementation~of the Mobutu plan was approved in 1980 by the IMF. Zaire
was among other things to devote a substantial portion of its export income
in 1980 and 1981 to repayment of the $400-million allocation, which had
been the subject oi an earlier rescheduling to which the Club of P~ris
agreed. R
3) Cn 23 April 1980, Zaire announced the signing ir~ Paris of an agreement
refinancing its combined and non-buaranteed bank debt by about 100 private
- banks grouped in the Club of London. Zai.re tuidertook, among other things,
to settle all of the back interest as of 31 January 1980 ($33.�6 million)
and 10 percent of the arrears on the principal ($283 million).
That same day, a first pa;yment order for $65 million was signed by the
state commissioner for finar~ce.
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FUR UFFICLAL USL: UNLY
Demonetization and Exchange of Bills
This operation, ordered by President Mobutu, is one of the sources of
misunderstanding between the IMF and Zaire. It merits our examination for
a moment. On 24 December 1979, the office of the presidency announced the -
withdrawal of 5-- and 10-zaire notes and their replacement with new ones.
The total in circulation was estimated at 2.7 billion zaires, of which
1.3 million was supposedly abroad. As only 1.3 million in new bills was to ;
a~ be put into circulation, it was expected that the holders of sums located t
abroad or in private coffers and imdeclared either to the banks or the ~
treasury would automatically be penalized. Undertaken too soon, without
adequate preparation or respect for the conditions set forth by the IMF, .
this operation rapidly went wrong. It was only possible to place on a
limited markzt the first 300 mil"lion new bills available. With the excep-
tion or Kinshasa, a part of Bas-Zaire and the GECAMINES [General Quarries _
and Mines Company], all of the economic structures in the c~ountry were
dealt a blow.
As of 5 January 1980, the chief of state himself vigorously denounced all
of the serious shortcomings noted in the course of the o~eration. He
found himself obliged to take a whole series of urgent steps designed to
cffset the harmful disadvantages of his initial decision.
And, without a doubt more serious still, the goal sought--deflation and
a campaign against hoarding (because of the decline of the zaire on the ~
- unofficial market) was in no way achieved. It could even be said that in
some cases diametrically opposed results were achieved.2 At the beginning
of Ma~ 1980, the Executive Council further dispatched, at the rate of
S million zaires per region, a total amount of 45 million new zaires to
the interior of the country, clearly demonstrating that it had still not
bPen possible to effect all of the planned exchanges, and that as a
result, the economy was not yeC fully recovered from the shock which had
shaken it (in particular, the o'.isturbance in trade exchange and purchases
of farm products were harshly felt by the people).
In a Zairian econonry which aprirt from its mineral resources is only
functioning now for all practical purposes thanks to international or bi-
lateral foreign aid, the monetary measures of the Zairian governmant have
inspired a feeling of concern.
The Economic Situation
Preliminary remarks. A comparison of the distribution of Zaire's exports _
from 1969 to 1978 (last available statistical data) can provide a good idea
of the extreme fluctuations of the Zairian economy (in percentages of
total exports).
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1968 1976 1977 1~78
Mining producr_~ 52 79 84 83
Including: copper 22 17 22 23
Farm products 30 15 13 14
Industrial and various products 18 6 3 3
Note: Mining products include exports of crude oil (see this category). `
Exports 1976 to 1978
(Value in Thousands of Zaires)
Produib ~ 1~ 1868 197f 1977 1978
AYricol~s : ~ 2 ~ - -
Ton~age da2 612 332 t58 271 355 250 957
Valeun 469t7 t6a6~< 259539 198235
' M~~..~ : ( 3 ~
Tonnaqes . 782 780 1 81 1 1 16 1 712 071 1 511 945 _
Vaieurs . 237 333 654 728 617 077 716 865
~~a~,.e.+.~.: (4)
Tonnages . . . . . . . . . . . 258 385 ~ a5 B97 58 917 44 494
Valeuro 808 7 849 a ~ 66 5 500
o~,,.., : (5 )
Tonnages 15 :45 10 000 8 000 B 000
Valeurs . . . . 13442 tl ~09 31618 10000
ro~r : ( 6 )
Tonnages t 478 823 2 999 169 2 O50 343 t 815 396
Valeurs 298 500 837 900 912 400 930 600
Key:
1. Products
2. Agricultural: tonnage, value -
3. Mining: tonnage, value _
4. Industrial: tonnage, value
- 5. Miscellaneous: tonnage, value
6. Tota1: tonnage, value
Farm prcducts declined substantially. As to industrial and miscellaneous
products, their plunge would be worrisome (it is no more than 6 percent of
what it was in 1978) if the values were not minimal in the extreme.
We have no similar data either for the year 1979 or for the first half of
1980. In view of the situation developing in Zaire, it can be estimated
that the distribution keys will not be vexy different for the first -
6 months of 19~50.
Mining Production -
Since mining production still very largely constitutes the backbone of the
- Zairian economy, more particularly the prodtxction of the GECAMINES (copper
, and cobalt), it seems of great interest to study the development of the
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. prices for the principal mining products and exports. The ~ombined ~
influence of these two factors is in fact of capital importance to the
Zairian balance of payments.
Copper. Copper prices develaped as follows in 1980 (per ton in Belgian ~
francs): 31/1:83,970; 14/2:85,920 (highest figure reached in 1980);
29/2:78,950; 14/3:66,840; 31/3:64,390; 15/4:63,220; 1/5:59,960;
16/5:58,980; 2/6:60,G90; 11/6:56,420; 16/6:55,910 (lowest figure reached
in 1980).
Exports. Copper is exported through Matadi, Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) and ~
South Africa (East London and Durban). The Lob;to route has not yet been
restored. The following are the figures in tons:
Matadi Dar-es-Salaam East London Durban
January 14,638 685 9,986 10,571
February 9,118 0 16,612 5,792
Marcti 14,791 1,425 3,842 3,905
April 18,429 l,?.55 11,449 9,985
May 24,669 1,575 9,255 7,953
_ June Figures Not Yet Available
Production forecasts. The SOZACOM [Zairian Company for the Marketing of
Ores] foresaw production (by GECAMINES) totaling 420,000 tons for 1979 and _
460,000 tons for 1980.
It should be noted that these figures do not include the production of the
Zairian-Japanese company SODIMIZA [Industrial Development and Mining
Company of Zaire], which exports only concentrates via the longer route,
i.e. Durban. Its exports of concentrates come to about 100,000 tons per
year.
Cobalt. The price of this product has not varied since the beginning of
1980. It is sold (price to customer) at 1,620 Belgian francs per kilogram.
It is shipped out by air.
The production exported during the first 5 months of the year came to
4,800 tons of "contained cobalt," while the production expected for the year
is 15,000 tons. Thus the exports for the first 5 months are�shy of this
esttmate.
Cassiterite. Currently there are three companies in Zaire producing
cassiterite. Listed in order of tonnage produced, they are the SOMINKI
[Mining and Industrial Company of Kivu] (79.4 percPnt), ZAIRETAIN
(20.1 percent), and Zairian Mining Enterprises (0.5 percent). (Note:
Percentages calculated on the basis of the last available overall figures,
i.e. those for 1978.)
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For the first few months of 1980, only the SOMINKI could give us a
statistical breakdown. In view of its importance in comparison to the _
total, we feel it would be useful to provide them here.
SOMINKI Shipments 1 January to 18 June 1980
_ (In Tons) d-
Ma� - ~2~ ~3)
(1) c~b~
Von. ~emDaryurmm( GsnNnn WoNnm~h bnt A~on~trd Sou;�ron~ lonl
Jmvhr ~ 4 ~ - - - - - -
M~nd~ 357 - 7 - JA0.0 J70
O~i es 5 - 10.5 - - 10.5 310.5