JPRS ID: 9283 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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H'OR OFF1C'IA1. USF. (1N1.1'
JPRS L/9283 r
3 S~ptember 1980
~
USSR Re ort
p
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 18/80~
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JPRS L/9283
3 September 1.9 80
USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOLTO 18/80 )
_ CONTENTS
INTERNGTIONAL
Book on CIA Anti-Soviet Operatians
(Ts RU PROTIV SSSR, 1979) 1
Ernst Genri on U.S.-(~iinese Collaboration
(Ernst Genri; VOPROSY ISTORII, Jun SO) ...............o.. 9
Diplomacy of Latin American Countries Analyzed
(NOV~YE TENDENTSII V DIPLOMATII LATINOAMERIKANSKIKH
STRAN, 1979) 27
NATIONAL
History of Research on Soviet Nationality Relations
(OSNOVNYYE NAPRAVLENIYA IZU(~iENIYA NATSIONAL'NYKH
OZidOSHENIY V SSSR, 1979) 37
REGIONAL
So~iet Baltic Republics-Problems in Social Structure
(PROBLEMY SOTSIAL'NOY STRUKTURY RESPUBLIK SOVETSKOY
PRIBALTIKI, 1978) 42
Shortage of Qualified Personnel Reported _
(RATIYANS'KE LITERATUR07NAVSTVO, Jul 80) 46
- i
_ Deficiencies Noted in Ukrainian Literary Studies
(Ya. Hoyan; RADYANS'KA UKRAYINA, 26 Jul 80) 49
- a - [III - U5SR - 35 FOUO]
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Emigre Jo~arnal on Results of Surveys on Reli.g~ous Atti.tudes
in Leningrad
(POSEV, Jun 80) 52
_ Review of New Novel by Oles' Honchar
(M. R. Naqenko; RADYANS'KE LTTERATUROZNAVSTVO, Jul 80). 55
i
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FUI: UHFICIAL USt? ~1N1,1'
INTERNATIONAL
BOOK ON CIA ANTI-SOVIET OPERATIONS
Moscow TsRU PROTIV SSSR (The CIA Against the USSR) in Russian 1979 signed
to press 28 Dec 79 pp :i-10, 279, 287, 288 ~
[Annotation, Table of Contents, Introduction and chapter excerpts from the
book by N. N. Yakovlev, Molodaya Gvardiya, 200,000 copies, 288 pages]
[TextJ Tl~e book by the well-known Soviet historian, Prof N. N. Yakovlev,
relates the subversive activities of the CIA against the Soviet Union.�
The ideological area is the focus of concern. For the first time docu- -
ments are describe3 showing the history of the CIA from the moment of its
founding in 1947, and the place of the CIA in the system of the U.S. state
bodies. The book is full of vivid interesting facts which are little
known to a broad range of reader s.
Contents
Page
[Introduction] A Necessary Exp lanation .~Pp.3;10). . . . . . . . . . 3 ,
[Chapter 1] The War After the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
[Chapter 2) From the OSS to the CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
[Chapter 3] The CIA: Equipment, Computers, Personnel. 110
[Chapter 4] The CIA: On the "Psychological Warfare" Battlefields. . 178
[Chapter 5] Results? . . . . . . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
- [Introduction] A Necessary Explanation
The attempt at an objective analysis of the modern Western special ~er-
vices encounters great difficulties. The researcher and narrator must
make his way through a maze, he is often led into a blind alley, and some-
times literally sees pitfalls. These difficulties are both of a conceptual
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nature and also related to the search for and selection of facts. Although
the reviewed subject undoubtedly exists independently, and at times has its
own motivating forces, the work of the special services is ultimately noth-
ing more than a continuation of the policy of the corresponding governments
by other means. However, in many instances this work is of such a nature =
that these governments officially and apparent~y convincingly disavow. For ~
this very same reason, even forgetting the understandable secrecy, one
feels a lack of facts which, as is known, is the very air of the researcher.
It is like trying to catch your breath. Rather it is like breathing the
fumes of a poisoned atmosphere for probably in no other sphere of state ac-
tivities in the West is disinformation so often resorted to.
But it is imperative to investigate this sphere. It is complet~ly impos-
sible to understand the present-day world without considering the activi-
ties of the special services, in the given instance the U.S. CIA as these
activities have involved all mankind. This is no exaggeration.
The father of American espionage (yes, yes, this sector has grown up so
much that it has acquired fathers), A. Dulles, energetically ended the ~
work of his life "The Craft of Intelligence" with: "The military threat
in the nuclear missile age is well understood, and we rightly spend bil-
lions of dollars to offset it. This should be our attitude to all the as-
pects of the secret war.... The last thing we should do is to place fet-
ters on our intelliger..ce. Its iunctions of defense and information are
essential in the age of exceptional and constant danger."1 There is much
worthy of note in this reasoning both as an indication of the value of in-
telligence (no less than the intercontinental missiles and the thermo-
nuclear bombs) as well as the semantic import of what was said. _
A knowledgeable person who in the past was the main liaison officer for
the pentagon with the CIA, F. Prouty, in a rare moment of truth in the
middle of the 1970's at the end of Vietnam and on the threshold of Water-
gate, wrote precisely about these words of A. Dulles: "The concluding,
final notion of the book by the old boss is the best example of how the
intelligence community feels it necessary to live in the nuclear age.
They want us to have the most expensive and developed intelligence system
which has the capability of automatically parrying everything that seems
a threat to them. Although Allen Dulles did no~ say this in his book,
his concept of intelligence would provide: 10 percent conventional in-
telligence and 90 percent secret subversive activities. In other words,
we should, in the notion of Dulles, be busy around-the-clock throughout
the world, countering 'all aspects of the secret war. By this he implies
interference into the internal affairs of other countries regardless of
whether they know of or permit this. The United States has been engaging
precisely in this in an ever-increasing degree starting from the interven-
tion in Berlin and Iran in the 1940's. The culmination point of this way
of action was the terrible catastrophe in Vietnam, where the question be-
gan with a major operation by intelligence forces, and then entered the
stage of secret subversive activities, inevitably leading to outright war-
fare in the Johnson era."2
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It is easy to see why such clear thoughts had come t~ F. Prouty. He was
writing in 1973, when the United States with dissatisfaction was estimat-
ing the costs of the war in Vietnam. Different estimates were given, and
having analyzed them, R. Sig�ord (in an unpublished dissertation "The
Rhetoric of the Vietnam War: Presidents Johnson and Nixon," written at
the University of Minnesota during the year the book by F. Prouty was pub-
- lished) concluded: "No matter how the estimates are tallied the direct
and indirect cost of the war in Vietnam for the United States in dollars
and cents was approximately 350 billion dollars."3 Expensive! Of course, -
as befits the ultrapragmatic United States, *_he human~lives, and above all
the Vietnamese, are not counted.
In 1978, when the shock was over, the former CIA Director W. Colby calmly _
explained that in the 1970's, the expenditures on the CIA subversive ac-
tivities "had rapidly declined. The CIA has cut its expenditures on polit-
ical and paramilitary operations to sucii a degree that expenditures on
` subversive activities which had burdened down the CIA budget and had taken
~ up over 50 percent of it in the 1950's and 1960's had declined to less
than 5 percent." What, a reduction of expenditures on these purposes?
Certainly not. Expenditures on subversive activities had simply begun to
be accounted for in other items. No less a person than W. Colby himself
pointed out how the CIA had reached such a state: "The expenditures for
virtually all political and paramilitary operations...were assumed by the
Pentagon," while "financing, for example, for Radio Free Europe, Radio
Liberty and Fund of Asia is determined by the State Department and Con-
gress."4 A1,1 of this was also described by W. Colby in his life's work
"Honorable Men. My Life in the CIA" his wordy and poorly written memoirs.
For the title he used a statement by a peer, his predecessor in the posi-
' tion of CIA Director R. He1ms who at the beginning of the 1970's publicly
' assured those who doubted the virtues of the department: "You should
trust us. We are honorable men." It happened that a very short time lat-
ter Helms was indicted by the legislative body, the Congress, for perjury,
and for which an ordinary American would be held firmly and for a long
time in prison. But the leaders of the CIA are a caste of untouchables
for the laws of the overseas "democracy." When Helms was still summoned
to court, his lawyer and he argued decisively against punishment, for "it
would leave a scar for all his life." The court accepted the request, _
having fined Helms in Ncvember 1977 for a sum of $Z000 on surprising _
grounds. Instead of the grounds of "perjury," it created a misdemeanor
not provided for by the criminal code, na~ely a reticence to give "com-
plete, exhaustive and accurate evidence" to Congress.
As was maliciously pointed out by the magazine NATION on 19 November 1977,
in the person of Helms the authorities were protecting themselves, for if
he had so desired at the unheld "trial the former CIA director could have
provi~ed an enormous pile of dirty laundry for legal washing. Among other
thing:a, the bespotted shirts of Henry Kissinger cculd have been held up
for universal review." Released from ths courtroom with just a symbolic
penalty of an accomplice, Helms, the magazine continued, "struck up a
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conversation with journalists, and that 'scar' was miraculously transform-
ed into a'badge of hunor' or even a'banner' won oy a cunning lawyer."S
For the CIA it is nothing less than a question or honor to successfully
repel attacks and to understand the essence of the governmental system in
the United States, from wherever they may arise. Aside from all else, it
exists for this. But we are digressing.
There is no more profound misapprehension than to present the CIA as just
an intelligence and counterintelligence body. No matter what corrections
Colby would try to make, the correct propo;:tion would be the one given by
F. Prouty in referring to the auth~rity of A. Dulles. Intelligence in the
direct sen~e probably comprises 10 percent or a little more than the con-
cerns of the CIA. If. this were not the case, then there would have been
no reason at all to set up the CIA. In the United States, as we will see
below, t::ere are more than enough intelligence agencies, and according to
rough estimates, there are about 10. G. Kennan, a politica'~ thinker by
calling, a diplomat, and as a second job an intelligence a,s~,ent, quite
rightly pointed out in his book "The Cloud of Danger. Current Realities
of American Foreign Policy" (1977): "Intelligence per se has been a nor-
mal function of states long before the rise of the Soviet Union or the
United States, and it is the purest utopia to hope for its complEte dis-
appearance. E~ut everything should have its limits." What are they? "I
myself have witnessed," writes Kennan, "how the AmErican intelligenca
authorities time after time carried out or endeavored to carry out opera-
tions which not only directly undermined Soviet-American diplomatic rela-
tions, but the very possibilities of achieving better mutual understanding
between the two governments."6 This is but a mere shadow of what must b e
stated on the question of the policy carried out by Washington through the
CIA.
= This, of course, is not just intelligence. The CIA has been entrusted with
the job of conducting so-called "psychological warfare," and conditionally
90 percent of the resources of the giant department goes for this. "Psy-
chological warfare" in the official manuals of American intelligence is
defined as follows: Coordination and use of all means, including moral -
and physical (including military operations by the regular army, but uti-
lizing their psychological results) by which the enemy's will for victory
is destroyed, and its political and economic possibilities for this are
undermined; the enemy is deprived of the support, aid and syu-~pathy of its
allies and neutrals or is prevented from receiving such support, aid or
sympathy; the will to victory of our own people and their allies is main-
tained or increased; the support, aid and sympathy of neutrals is main-
tained and increased."~
The listed methods of "psychological warfare" are tantamount to the at-
tempts to undermine the state system of a state selected as its target,
and ultimately overthrow it. Espi~nage is the product and subsidiary of
this aim. The brunt of the "psychological warfare" which is conducted by
- the CIA is aimed against the Soviet Union. This has been the purpose of _
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the creat?.on and exister.ce of the CIA, an organization which has no prece-
dent in the entire history of organized human society.
In the broad sense, the CIA is one of the most important and probably the
sharpest instrument of the U.S. ruling elite for reforging the world in
thz American model and institutin~ orders to Washington's liking in it.
Regardless of the tone and coloring of the off icial rhetoric of the orators
in the republic lying across the Atlantic, the dominant American political
tradition is intolerance. This goes back to those times when the Pilgrim
Fathers who found the Old World not to their liking set sail across the
ocean to build a stat~ in accord with their own views. Even then a narrow
viewpoint had formed of either "us" or "them." A thoughtful observer in
our times will easily realize that in using the words of political plural- .
ism, the American statesmen do not tolerate this in practice, resp~ecting
only the form of government existing in the United States as the only pos-
sible one and one superior in all regards. Hence from reasor.s rooted in
this American political tradi~ion there is an inevitable permanen~ conflict
between the United States and the rest of the world. The functional role
of the CIA is to do everything to resolve this conflict in favor of the
L'nited States.
, This is an intolerance of everything, both outside the land of the magnifi-
cent "democracy" as well as inside it. In truth the views of narrow sec- `
tarians. What proceeds from the White House is respected as wisdom ulti-
mately. There is no reason to go far into the past, as recent examples
will d~. President L. Johnson established the following as the criterion
of the fitness of candidates for higher state positions: "I require not
general loyalty. I need a loyalty where they will kiss my ass in full
daylight and exclaim it smells like a rose."t3 Tn'ell and good, but what
about the mass information media and the notorious press? Certainly they
are of a different opinion! Yes, they may write what they want, only the
highest honor for an American ~ournalist is to be in with the presidential
inner circle, and t.here, as was noted with repugnance by a newspaperman
not among the elect, "My God, just look how types like Meyers (W. Meyers,
, the representative of the Associated Press) and Sem~le (W. Semple from the '
NEW YORK TIMES) crawl on their bellies and kiss the ass of Ron Zigler (the
White House press secretary under Nixon)."9 Whatever one might say, "~sy- -
chological warfare" is also directed ~.nside the nation in the interests of
establishing extreme conformism.
~ It has been stat~d that in the United States they have written and are
- writing about the CIA and have even "investigated" the activities of tlie
agency. Let us take a look!
By now the extensive "plumbing" of the American state system has rlmost
completely swallowed up the emotional wave of dissatisfaction which in tile -
middle of the 1970's in the United States produced various "investigations"
of the special services. At present, when even the foam from this wave
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has been dissipated in the bottomless sewers of "democracy," without any
problem one can spot the solid residues carried by it to the surface from
the administrative pipelines of th~ CIA, FBI and Co. One is immediately
struck by the phenomenon that the "investigators" put their hands not on
- what they wanted or on what was in temptation's way, but rathEr basically
were given only those facts which the state leadership and special services
considered possible for release. These were a mixed bag, some of f~righten-
ing nature, but inevitably passed through the seive of careful political
censorship.
This quarry was also the subject of an unprecedented hunt organized not
only by the American but also by the Western mass information media. Now
within the permitted limits Americans know of and are sufficiently indig-
nant over the carefully selected information which has now become public
knowledge of the functioning of the punitive systen in the United States
and American intelligence, and the attempts using human guinea pigs to
control their behavior. The proper frightening words were said to condemn
the unworth;~ practice, but one might ask what is the real functional role
of this entire campaign ultimately in limits which have been set from
above? It would not be an exaggeration to say that a rather detailed re-
view (but with ominous reservations) of the efforts to control the mind
is an essential part of the work to establish this contr.ol on the broadest
- scale. At least dissidents in the United States are warned by this of
what awaits them. However the general purpose of all this is much broad-
er, that is, to intimidate the world, having shown who is guarding the
class rule by capital. And particularly outside the borders of the over-
seas "democracy."
The American magazine which selected PROGRESSIVE as its title and voices -
- judgments worthy of the t~tle has commented on the "investigations" organ-
ized on Capitol Hill: "The reports on them underwent rigid censorship.
The Senate committee was rather frank about the legal violations and ex-
cesses of the FBI, but was almost flattering in some of i~s assessments
of the CIA.... 'The best thing in this is that it is over,' said the
senator from Tennessee H. Baker on the question of the 15-month investiga-
tion, when the great moment of its completion had arrived. 'We have
finished and we have conducted the investigation without causing any dam-
age or any harm to the corresponding agencies'."10 How is this harm, it
is more like advertising! And for a very frightening property primarily
for the Americans themselves who are perfectly aware of what awaits those
who do not obey "law and order."
~In th.e much-praised civilization, a circumspect subject seeks his niche
in spiritual escapism, and some even endeavor to flee from the beautifui
country. An instructive example of this is the thousand Americans called
a sect who in the 1970's took shelter in the jungles of Guya?:a. And the
reasons for the fate of the unhappy people in the maze of the tropical _
forests are obvious: they were endeavoring to gain freedom. While some
may have suffered from a distorted notion of the pricele~s blessings and -
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had fallen under the sway of the religious fanatic and urystic J. Jones, _
certainly not all of them did. Without having committed an~? crimes or
misdeeds, they felt the hot clutches of the special services which had
reached them in the jungles. For the zealots of American "democracy,"
the collective protest by leaving the United States was already a"con- -
spiracy" with all the ensuing consequences. As a result there was the
real prospect of again ending up in the clutches of "law and order," and .
virtually everyone preferred to end his life in November 1978. These were
the next victims of "psychological warfare."
The subversive activities of the CIA are carried out in many directions.
In our times, in all probability, without abandoning other means, the CIA
is making a special effort in the area of ideology vis-a-vis the USSR and
the other soc ialist countries. The choice for focusing attention on this
aspect of "psychological warfare" was made for a number of reasons which -
in part do no t depend upon the will of the agency leadership. Why? It
would be worth our while to investigate.
It would be r undamentally wrong to represent the United States as a coun- -
try where the forces of darkness are in unch~llenged control. There ~re
~ people there who realistically view the situation in the world and are in
favor of good relations with the USSR. They make no secret of their con-
victions. The strategists of "psychological warfare" are endeavoring to
undermine the influence of these circles which is tangible, in focusing
efforts in the ideological sphere.
Let us endeavor to take up precisely this aspect in the activities of the
CIA. It is completely impossible to fully disengage it from the overall
picture of the subversive activities carried out by the Western special
services, and for this reason other questions will inevitably be touched
upon.
The first of these is why the CIA was set up in 1947. Neither sooner nor
later. And how this can be traced from the American sources which have
generally been used for the writing of this book.
FOOTNOTES
1. A. Dulles, "The Craft of Intelligence," New York, 1963, p 264.
2. F. Prouty, "The Secret Team. The CIA and Its Allies in Controk of the
United States and the World," Englewood Cliffs, 1973, pp 66-67.
3. R. Sigford, "The Rhetoric of the Vietnam War: Presidents Johnson and
Nixon," University of Miiinesota, Ph.D., 1973, p 193.
4. W. Colby and P. Forbath, "Honorable Men. My Life in the CIA," New
_ York, 1978, pp 300-301.
7�
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5. THE NATION, 19 November 1977, p 514.
6. G. Kenna, "The Cloud of Danger. Current Realities of American Foreign
Policy," Boston, 1977, pp 212, 210. r
7. "War Report of the Office of Strategic Services," Washington, 1949,
p 99.
8. D. Halberstam, "The Best and the Brightest," New York, 1973, p 526.
9. H. Thompson, "Fear and Loathing: On the Campaign Trail '72," New
York, 1973, pp 403-404.
10. "The Intelligence Investigations: Congress Cops Out," THE PROGRESSIVE,
Juiy i976, PP i6-i~.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Molodaya gvardiya", 1980
10272
CSO: 1800 -
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~ INTERNATIONAL
- ERNST GIIVRI ON U.S.-CHINESE COLLABORA.TI~N
Moscow VOPROGY ISTQRII in Russian No 6, Jun 80 pp 100-111
[Article by Ernst Genr~: "Bei~jing--Washington"]
[Text] Many co~nentators in the capitalist countries have viewed the
= rapprochement between Bei~ing and Washington almost as an "epoch-making"
event which in the future should alter the entire international situation.
In December of 1978, when the United States took the decision to establish
diplomatic relations with the PRC, the influential West German mag~.zine
DER SPIEGEL wrote: "The alliance between America and China, regardless of
all the phrases accompanying it, represer~ts a classic 'coup in the system
of alliances,' a coup in the balance of forces which has existed hitherto-
fore and comparable with the end of hostility between the Hapsburgs and
the Bourbons in the middle of the 18th century or t:~e animosity between
England and Russia at the beginning of the 20th century." The chairman of
the CCP Central Committee, Hua Guofeng, stated at a press conference on
- this question that it was an issue of an "historic turn."1 The chief or-
ganizer of the deal on the Chinese side, the deputy chairman of the CCP
Central Committee and deputy premier of the PRC State Council, Deng
Xiaoping, is depicted in many organs of the Western press as almost some-
- thing like a modern-day Talleyrand or Bismaxck.
At the same time, in the capitalist world the question is often asked of
precisely what encouraged the U.S. administration and the government in
Bei~ing at the end of 1978 to move openly towaxd one another? The opinion
has been voiced that this deal is the handiwork of the present Chinese
leadership which in 1976 replaced the "Gang of Four" which was close to
Mao Zedong. At the same time, there is nothing unexpected in the agree-
ment between the PRC and the United States. It cannot be considered that
the rapprochement between these states started only in the 197ots. The
roots of the deal go much deeper, to the middle of tfie 19~+O~s, when the
Maoist headquarters were in Yenan, the center of the Special Shaanxi--
Gansu--Ningxia Region.
The mutual attraction of the two sides was clearly apparent even then. It
took almost three and a half decades to bring things to an end, but the
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basic incentives of the partners were the same in the 1940's, in essence,
as they are now. Both the Maoists and the United States proceeded pri-
marily from their covert anti-Soviet and expansionist plans. And the con-
tacts were established regardless of the fact that at that time the United
States officially was most closely linked to the Chinese government of
Chiang Kai-shek which was in Zhongqing [Chungking] and hostile to Yanan.
On 22 July 194~+, an American mi~sion arrived in Yenan ~d it was met at the
airport by a band and the leadership of the CCP headed by Mao Zedong. The
mission included the political advisors of Gen J. Stilwell, the commander
of the American armed forces in China, Burma and India, and the senior
staff officers of the U.S. military attache in Zhongqing. The talks start-
ed immediately.
P. P. Vladimirov who at that time was in Yenan and had an opportunity to
watch events at the Maoist headquarters wrote in his diary after a night-
time conversation with Mao Zedong that the chairman of the CCP Centr~l Com-
mittee now intended to basicall.y side with the United States and EYigland
and was counting on the fears of America and Great Britain vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. "And this fear should, in his opinion, force these states'
into a slow but sure rapprochement with the Special Region. Mao Zedong "
and his supporters clearly proposed to blaclflnail the A11ies with the myth
of the aggressiveness of the USSR which supposedly was drea.ming of absorb-
ing China (particularly Manchuria).... The chairman of the CCP Central
Committee not only intended to receive arms and drive out Chiang Kai-shek,
but also...exclude any effective involvement of the USSR in settling the
Far East ~2oblem. And generally to neutraii:ze any diplomatic efforts of
the USSR.
The American mission remained almost 2 months in Yenan. In August 19~+~+,
accorda.ng to Vladimirov's notes, Mao Zedong told him "We are thinking of
changing the name of our party. To call it not 'Communist,' but rather
something else. Then a better situation will exist for the Special Region,
particularly among the Americans.i3 It was not a question of a merely for-
mal change of the name. Mao let the Americans understand directly that the
party headed by him no longer needed to be considered Marxist-Leninist, and
that he agreed to turn it into one that was bourgeois-nationalistic in '
spirit.
On 23 August 194~+, the member of the American mission, the intelligence-
agent diplomat J. Service, spoke with.the chairman of the CCP Central Com-
mittee. As Service stated, Mao said: "Chinese and American interests are
very similar and compliment each other. They agree with one another eco- _
nomically and politically. We can and should cooperate.... America does
not need to fear that we will not cooperate. We should cooperate and we
need P~nerican aid. That is why it is so importar.t for us to know what you,
the Americans, are thinking and planning. We cannot take the risk of caus-
ing your dissatisfaction, and we cannot take the risk of any clash with
y ouu.i4 This was said by Mao Zedong 36 years ago, when in his dealings with
Moscow and in public speeches he took great pains to show his unswerving
friendship with the USSR.
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At that time Service telegraphed Washi.ngton from Yenan: "Pi'oceeding from
very practical motives, the comtnunists are not counting on Soviet Russia
being able to play a ma~or role in China."5 At the end of September,
Vladimirov commented: "Mao Zedong considers the Soviet Union too bled
white by the struggle against Nazi Germany...and for this reason is r_ot
going to burden himself.... For him the chances with the Americans axe
much more preferential, and he is earnestly forcing a partnership on them.
For Mao it is indisputable that at present the fate of the Far East and
China is bei:~g d.termined. And the chief arbiter is thE i}nited States
alone!... Even I(and I have seen enough here!) have been struck by how
' far he has gone in his promises, guarantees, assurances and candor border-
ing on treachery."6
Contacts continue between the Maoists and the Americans. On 5 October 194~+,
a new group of Americans arrived in Yenan headed by the U.S. military at-
tache in China, Col M. Depaas and the emissary of American intelligence,
the "surgeon" D. Armstrong. 'They also were met at the airfield by Mao
Zedong a.nd Zhou Enlai. Finally, on 7 November, the personal representative
of the U.S. President and the former minister of defense, Gen P. J. Hurley,
showed up at Mao's headquarters. "T'ne purpose of the Hurley mission," com-
mented Vladimirov, "was not merely to impel the S~ecial Region to begin
active operations against the Japanese, but rather to drive a wedge between
the CCP leadership and Moscow."~
A draft agreement was signed by both parties. The contents of the talks
' became known to Vladimirov.8 "The authentic texts will scarcely ~ee the
light of day," he commented. "Everything has been spelled out there. The
chairman of the CCP Central Committee has offered America an alliance, an
unshakable alliance, he has guaranteed the independence of Yenan from the
political course of Moscow, and so forth..... For weapons and an alliance
with the United States, Mao Zedong has guaranteed to re,ject the ~ties with
Moscow.' On 14 November, Hurley informed Mao of his 'profound satisfaction
with the results of the talks' which had been characterized by a~brilliant
spirit of cooperation.' He advanced the hope that this spirit would be
strengthened after the victory over Japan, and expressed gratitude to Mao
for his 'wise letter' to the U.S. President in which he hoped to realize
the dream that after the war 'the two great nations (Chinese and American)
would always move forward shoulder to shoulder in building peace throughout
the world'."9
The notes quoted here by P. P. Vladimirov are affirmed by the actual materi-
a1 from the American side.l~ The Amerfcan ,journalist T. White who was in
Yenan in the summer of 194~+ and at that time was a representative of the
Luce press organization, wrote that he had participated in "the great plan
of testing out the possibilities of an alliance between America and the
Chinese coiranunists." For this purpose he held talks with his "old friend"
Zhou Enlai. White added that when the China-born American diplomat J. P.
Davis in meetings with Mao and Zhou "studied the possibility of military
cooperation and an alliance...Yenan at.that moment embraced us as allies
and friends," White went on to re].ate that in 1945 Zhou Enlai "through
lI
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friends in th~ American embassy was seeking permission to fly to the Unitid
States to mee'; with Franklin Roosevelt ar d explain to him the revolution
_ (in China.--E.G.).
These were the plans of the Maoists in 191+4 and 19~+5� At that time they
di.d everything "to establish for them (the Americans.--E.G.) the correct-
ness and necessity of an alliance," convincing them "of the complete na-
tional independence of the CCP," in l.etting them understand in every pos-
sible way that "the isolation of the USSR in the Far East meets not only
American interests."12 Nevertheless, tne hopes of the Maoists at that time
did not come true, but not due to their fault, but rather obviously as a
result of the feaxs of the U.S. President F. Roosevelt. Regardless of
all their promises, the White House and State Department still could not
believe that Mao Zedong was seriously ready to abandon communist ideas and
switch over to the Western ca.mp. At that ti:me this seemed improbable even
to the overseas politicians.
Ultimately it was decided in Washington that the risk of a political and
military alliance with Yenan was too great and it was preferable to con-
tinue betting on Chiang Kai-shek. According to the data of the same White,
the influence of the extreme reactionary J. McCarthy could also be felt.
The American authorities restricted themselves to a statement that the -
weapons supplied by them to the Chiang Kai-shek axmy were to be used only
to fight against Japan. "But still," Vladimirov wrote, "Mao Zedong did
not exclude circumstances under which the White House could alter its atti-
tude toward the`'~Special Region.i13 ~'he CCP leadership was hoping that
among the Americans there would be persons "with sober views'~ and that they
also would be found in the higher U.S. administration. The final decision
was deferred in Washington, but the "Chinese caxd" continued to be kept in
reserve. The duality of U.S. policy in China remained in force. And they
also were waiting in Bei~ing.
Moscow knew much of what was being done in Yenan� But, proceeding from the
realities of waxtime international relations, and in paxticulax the rela-
tions of the USSR with the United States, caution was observed. Mao Zedong
was in no way trusted. The presence of currents within the CCP was a.lso
taken into account. The party was not homogeneous, and its leaders and
functionaries held different positions. In 1944, Mao Zedong had still not
been able to completely suppress the opposition and subordinate the party
to his sole power. In the USSR hope had not b~en lost that the healthy
elements within the CCP could promptly prevent the treachery of the Maoist
clique and bring China to a truly socialist path.
The course of the Maoist group which was characterized by secret plans was
also felt after the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung army by the Soviet
troops and by the creation of the chief"basis of the Chinese revolution in
Manchuria with Soviet aid. Mao Zedong who in 1947 had escaped from yenan
- which had been captured by tlie Kuomintang did not.agree with the group of
Soviet representatives in Manchuria which was providing the day-to-day
contacts with the CCP. They advised.acquiring significant forces before `
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going over to a drive to the south and to properly prepare the People's
- Liberation Army (PLA) for such a campaign, having ensured a rapid victory
for it. But Mao wanted the Soviet troops to begin the offensive outside
of Manchuria into the territory of North China.I4
Certainly at that time Mao could not count on direct support in Washington,
particularly as support was still being given to Chiang Kai-shek. As is
known, Mao Zedong in those days was known to voice such statements as it
would be better if China did not have diplomatic relations either with the
USSR or the United States.ls It was cleax that in a concealed form an ac-
~ cent was being put on the disengaging of the Maoists from the USSR which
had been the sole and natural ally of the Chinese revolution. Obviously
the "American card" which had been kept in the hand since 194~+ was to be -
played later. As it turned out, this was done by Mao Zedong 5 years later.
In 1949, when the PLA equipped by the weapons which had been turned over by
the USSR from the crushed Japanese aru~y began to crush the Chiang Kai-shek
troops and Mao had been established in Bei~ing, the secret attempts to come
to terms with the United States were resumed. Upon instructions of Mao
Zedong, this time the initiator was Zhou Enlai who was appointed to the
position of the PRC minister of foreign affairs. From documents which were
declassified by the U.S. State Department in August 1978, it can be seen
that in 1949 Zhou Enlai in a strictly confidential manner turned to the
United States with a request to help China conduct a policy "independent
of the West and the Soviet Union." Having established contact with Ameri-
can representatives in Bei~ing, he requested that his message be turned
over to the highest American officials. Here he categorically demanded
that his name not be mentioned, warning that otherwise "he, of course, -
would deny this message in the most decisive manner."
In this note Zhou Enlai also recommended that the Americans proceed from
the view that "China still is not a capit~.list nation, and if the policy
of Mao Zedong is carried out correctly, it will not become a communist
nation for a long time to come."16 In other words, the same bait was
thrown to the Americans as in 19~+4, that is, the abandoning of communist
principles by the Maoists. To the amazement of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai,
the deal fe11 through this time. According to official American data, the
proposal of the Chinese caused debates in the State Department but "finally
was re,jected." Under President H. Truman the White House obviously felt
that for U.S. interests it was much safer to rely on the secure U.S. posi-
tions in Japan and Taiwan than to carry out a risky game with Bei~ing.
The armed U.S. intervention which started subsequently in Korea finally
assured the dominance oF this viewpoint in Washington. As is known, the
co~nander of the American Armed Forces in the Far East, D. MacArthur, pro-
posed to the U.S. goverru,~ent that Manchuria be bombed. Things went so fax
that the U.S. Secretary of State J. Du11es, in meeting Zhou Enlai in 195~+
at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference on Indochina, even refused to
shake hands.l~ Bei~ing swallowed the insult. Over the following 10 years,
~3
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Beijing and Washington were apparently irreconcilable enemies. But this
was only an appearance. In deep secrecy, a new stage was already being
planned in Sino-American relations.
It is not difficult to understand the reasons for the unrestrained desire
of Bei,jing to come to terms with the United States. For Mao Zedong and
the people around him, it was not merely a question of splitting the United
States away from Chiang Kai-shek. And not even to drive a wedge in the
relations between the PRC and the USSR, to suppress the internationslists
in tne CCP, and thereby strengthen their dictatorship in it. ror Mao the
main thing was to prepare ahead of time for a policy aimed at establishing
the hegemony of China to the south, north and west. This was primarily the
essence of his secret adventuristic plans. As was subsequently substanti-
ated, the basic directions for the expansioni.stic policy in Asia were set
by Mao several years before World War II, probably soon after his promotion
to the post of the CCP leader at an enlarged meeting of tne Politburo of
the CCP Central Committee in Zunyi in 1935 and the start of his conflict
with the Comintern. ~ren at that time, Mao Zedong, in talks with the
American journalist E. Snow, spoke of cla~ms on the Mongolian People's
Republic and the hopes for the "return" to China of Korea, Indochina, Burma
and other Asian countries.
In Yenan they considered that the USSR would not tolerate the hegemony of
any power in Asia, and for this reason began to look for a suitable ally
against the USSR. Hence the siding of the Maoists with the United States
in spite of the then constant assurances of Mao and his supporters of their
loyalty to the Soviet Union and the world communist movement, ard in spite
of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual aid signed
on 14 February 1950. When in 1944, Mao had held talks in Yenan ~-th Col D.
Barret, Gen Hurley and other envoys from Washington, he was clearly pro-
ceeding from his own plans for a great emp~.~e. Fqually obvious were the
motives which even then caused Washington to think about building bridges
to the Maoists. The economic, political and strategic interests of the
overseas imperialists were forcing them this wa,y.
Among the American monopolies, even from the beginning of our cer.tury, a
definite delimitation could be observed in terms of the main area of their
activities. A significant portion of the large businessmen was interested
primarily in expanding in Western Europe, Latin America, and later also in
the Near East and Africa. Another very influential grouping of large
business, in particular in the U.S. Far West, preferred to channel its
capital investments and hence its expansionistic drives chiefly toward
Eastern Asia and the Pacific. Their plans were based on the fact that in-
vestments in these regions, due to the vastness and the "youth" of the
- local maxkets, the cheapness of the labor force and the abundance of un-
touched natural riches, should bring a significantly higher profit.
The "Pacific" school of American imperialists had prepared for decades for
ex~ensive expansion in Asia. Even at the beginning of t~e 1900's, their
ardent supporter, the U.S. President T. Roosevelt, stated: "The geographic
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position of America on the Pacific is such that in the Future it will pro-
vide our world domination in its water~, if we use this situation with
sufficient decisiveness."18 Another time he emphasized: "I feel that in
the future history to a greater degree will be determined by our position
on the Pacific facing China than by our position on tne Atlantic facing
E~zrope . " 19
_ The progratn of "facing Asia" was also supported by a small portion of the
American military, and particularly among the higher naval officers, and
du~ing the years of World War II also the generals who had fought in the
Pacific area. In these circles, the main ene~}r was initially seen to be
Japan, and later the USSR. During the war years, the gi�ren grouping had
as members such prominent figures as the above-mentioned generals, D.
MacArthur and J. Stilwell, the chief of the U.S. A_~-my General Staff, and ~
subsequently Secretary of State Gen G. Marshal~, the commander of the Amer-
ican troops in China and the chief of staff of Chiang Kai-shek Gen A.
Wiedemeyer, and others. This group of extreme militaxists considered the -
main goal of American policy at that time in the Paci�ic zone to be not
only a victory over Japan, but also the establishing of American control
over China. The threads from it stretched to the State Department and to
the persons around President Truman.
The lar~e monopolies comprised the actual core of these forces. Prior to
World War I, they had even attempted to turn China into an American feif,
driving out the European imperialist competitors there. In 1905, T. Roose-
velt proposed that after the Russo-Japanese War, Manchuria be turned over
formally to China, but in fact putting it "under the leadership of the
Powers." Of course, American leadership was meant. The same thing was pro-
posed for the Chinese Eastern Railroad.Z~ Behind this proposal was a grandi-
ose financial plan. The railroad magnate E. Harriman who had participated
in paying for the expenses of the election campaign of T. Roosevelt pro-
posed creating a gigantic around-the-world railroad and seaway which would
cut across America, Asia, Europe and the two oceans. It was clear tha.t
the same plan for establishing American domination over China underlay the
Harriman plan.
Because of Japanese resistance, the plans were not carried out at that
time.21 However, the idea of an actual, although concealed seizing of
China by the United States and thus the creation of a great American Pacific
- . empire continued to ferment in the minds of the overseas monopolists, gen-
erals and politicians who were convinced that ir. this manner the United
States could achieve world hegemony. The financial support for these
circles was the California Eank of
America, the largest bank in the capital-
ist world which even at the end of the 1940's began to open up its branches
in various Asian countries and invest large amounts of capital there.22
Even previously, the same forces had undertaken a significant political
step. The Americans came to the support of Chiang Kai-shek who had
~urped power in China. The Chinese government and axmy were put under the
supervision of American advisors. It was assumed that subsequently Ameri-
can influence would be further strengthened and China would fall under full
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U.S. dependence. In addition to Japan, the chief enemy of the United
States was now considered to be the USSR which had established fraternal
- ties witr the cormnunist movement in China. This is why, when 3 years
after the entry of Japan into World War II, the Maoist leadership in Yenan
turned to the United States with a proposal to conclude an alliance, Wash-
ington laas immediately interested. Certainly there was an opportunity to
achieve the old plans by a completely unexpected means.
It is difficult to understand present U.S. policy vis-a-vis China without
_ considering the economic and strategic interests of the "Pacific" school
of American imperialists. In September 194~+, :iervice asked Mao Zedong ~
"on what political and economic bases would it be possible for American
capital to be invested ir_ China" and how he would consider the idea of
"leadership by the Americans (or their participation in such leadershi.p)
over Iarge industrial complexes." At that time Service came to the con-
, n
clus~on that the CGP leadership was a completely snitable partner" for the
~ United States.23 ~'ighteen months later, on 1 February 1946, being in
Beijing as t-he personal representative of Truman, Gen Marshall transmitted
to Washington the contents of his talk with Zhou Enlai. The viey*point of
this Maoist politician was formula;ed by Marshall in the following manner:
"When we (the Chinese.--E.G.) say that we should follow a different path
(that is, away from the USSR and toward the United States.--E.G.), we Yiave
in mind that we want to adopt the American model of democracy tznd science,
and we desire above a11 to carry out agrarian reforms, industrialization
and the development of the individual in our country, in order that we can
build an independent, free and successfully functioning China."24 The
Americans were amazed heaxing such assertions.
"In these talks," co~nented Vladimirov, circumstances which were new to me were
revealed.The Americans did not doubt the feasibility of a solid alliance
with Mao Zedong. They even were not concerned by the Communist Party as
the leading force in the Special Region, and possibly even for the future
China. It was extremely important for them that the CCP be "independent
and fr~e of Moscow." This already presupposed definite nationalistic as-
pects.in the CCP policy. In a word, 'nationalistic socialism' in the
Special Region or in China was to the liking of Washington.... Character-
istically here these desires were not rebuffed. Horsetrading was underway.
The whole question was one of price."25 Extreme nationalism under the
guise of corrununism, on the one hand, and the economic a.nd strategic imper- _
ialism under the cover of "democracy," on the other.... Both sides had
begun to understand each other well.
Nevertheless, immediately after World War II the United States decided not
to accept the enticing proposals of the Maoists. A particular setback was
the Korean War started in 1.950, when the American interventionists began to
threaten China as well. Only several years later were ties resumed between
the Maoists and American diplomacy, and again in even deeper secrecy. The
increasing anti-Soviet policy of D. Eisenhower and Dulles caused Washington
to finally take Beijing seriously. This was impatiently awaited on the
other side. N;ao Zedong was preparing for an open break with the USSR and
~ 16 ~
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the international communist movement, Having stated on 1~+ November 1957
- at a conference of representat?.ves of communist and workers parties in
Moscow that it was esseMtial t~ set a policy of a new world war, even if
one-half of mankind would perish in it,26 the Maoist leader began to move
toward an alliance with the United States even more actively than in the
war years.
The new contacts between Beijing and Washington started when the Maoists
were trying to receive maximum economic aid from the USSR. As is known,
after the wax the USSR granted the PRC easy credits for a total of around
2 billion rubles, it helped China in building more than 250 large indus-
trial enterprises which became the backbone of Chinese industry, and turned
over gratis 24,000 sets of scientific and technical specifications valued
at many billions of dollars.27 None of this prevented the Maoist politi-
cians from continuing to seek a deal with the United States behind the back
of the USSR and precisely against it, as well as against the other Asian
peoples. The carrying out of the plan dreamed up in Bei,jing of creating
a Chinese superpower in Asia by that time had already started in practice.
Direct contacts with the United States were resumed in 1955� Meetings be-
tween the Chinese and U.S. ambassadors were held in Geneva and later in
Prague and Warsaw. On the Chinese side, again the condition was imposed of
keeping the content of the talks the strictest secret. Publically the
Maoist leaders continued to attack American imperialism and stress the fact
of Chinese friendship with the USSR. In speaking on 8 September 1958 at a
session of the PRC Supreme State Council, Mao Zedong stated: "If the monop-
olistic clique of America continues to carry out its policy of aggression
and war, inevitably the day will come when the peoples of the entire world
will pass a death sentence against it and carry it out.i28 In the same
year at a conference in Chengdu, he said: "We must be friendly with the
- USSR and with all the People's Democracies, with the communist parties and
working class of different nations, we must work for internationalism, and
learn what is positive from the USSR and other countries."29
The double-dealing game, the same as was at one time practiced by the
Chinese mandarins, was not interrupted for a single day. Maoist diplomacy
was directed by Zhou Enlai who was clearly specialized in intrigues with
~ the West. P. P. Vladimirov, even during the war years, commented that Zhou
"keeps to the Americans like an old acquaintance" and that "precisely he is
prep~,ring all the most crucial foreign policy actions" during the talks.30
Mao Zedong at this time preferred to keep in the shadows obviously endeavor-
ing to keep the alibi of the "communist" ideologue for himself. And the
more the nationalistic and empire-building moods developed in the Maoist
upper clique, the more its plans counted on an alliance with the United
States. The one was inseparably linked with the other. The Americans were
amazed how steadily a bridge was being built toward them from the other
side. Nevertheless years were to pass before the concluding of a deal be-
tween the PRC and the United States.
,17 .
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Among the problems discussed at the talks were, for example, the question
of the war in Vietnsm and control over atomic weapons. Mutual understand- ~
ing was reached on the issue that in response to a guarantee for Chinese
inviolability by the U.S. armed forces, China would not undertake broad in- -
tervention in the Indochinese war. Washington, in turn, promised not to
support the Taiwan puppet Chiang Kai-shek, if he decided upon armed actions
against Mainland China.31 In other words, careful preliminary preparations
were underway for a genera.l dea1. The interests of the parties and the
possibilities of their coinciding or drawing together were discuased in all
detail.
On l~+ January 1962, the former U.S. President Eisenhower, under whose aegis
the talks Y~ad been carried out, in commenting on the deterioration of re-
lations between the PRC and the USSR, openly stated: "We are pleased by
the development of these differences."
In instructions to the American embassies, the White House pointed out:
"Although the United States cannot do anything to deepen this split (here
Eisenhower was not saying what he thought.--E.G.), we should at least
avoid steps which could contribute to the eliminating of it."32 Literally
the same notion was repeated by Senator H. Jackson. "The central problem
which we must keep in mind that we should do nothing which could bring the -
Russians and the ^hinese closer together.... The most valuable thing we
have is the split between the Soviet Union and Red China."33 This was the
voice of the American military-industrial complex with Jackson being con-
sidered the leading representative of it in the Senate. Subsequently the
ideas of H. Kissinger came down precisely to this same formula.
On i3 December 1963, now under President J. Kennedy, the assistant U.S.
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, R. Hilsman, made a statement
on the readiness of the United States to keep "doors open" for talks with
the PRC on improving relations. Here it was stressed that the U.S. govern-
ment was fully determined to keep these doors open, since such a develop- _
ment of events "could be for the good of our country." On this question
the NEW YORK TIMES on 1C December 1.973 commented: "This statement has not
altered policy, but it has changed the position of Washington." In the
following year, President L. Johnson received an in~vitation from Bei~ing
to visit China. Later the Secretary of State D. Rusk in one of his speech-
es let it be known that talks with China were of much greater significance
than might be assumed from their coverage in the press. On the other side,
in speaking with members of the Japanese Diet, the PRC Minister of Foreign
Affairs Chen Yi emphasized that China would long ago have broken off talks
with the United States if they were not considered useful.34 This was
said regardless of the fact that the armed intervention by the United
States was already occurring in Vietnarn.35 The interruption in the Sino-
American talks made at that time by Beijing for purely tactical considera-
tions did not have any particular consequences.
- On 12 July 1966, President Johnson, in speaking before the council of
school graduates, laid out a new "Asian" doctrine of the United States.
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He emphasized that Asia, and in particular its southeastern part, was a
"sphere of U.S. interests," and that the country would use Americe.n mili-
_ tary might there in the future. Thus, Johnson's "Pacific" doctrine in -
essence differed little from the doctrine (of the same name) of T. Roose-
_ velt which had been proclaimed at the be~inning of the 1900's. In the
same speech, Johnson came out for "a truce between the states (the United
States and PRC.--E.G.) which call themselves enemies," and for creating
in the Pacific basin and in Asia, under U.S, aegis "an international com-
munity of law and order," in which "Mainland China" was also invited to
~ participate.36 Characteristical ly precisely during the same days a rabid
anti-Soviet campaign ~~as organized in China, and this reached the point of
mass outrages in front of the building of the Soviet embassy in Beijing.37
- Clearl,y neither event was an accident.
At the end of 1966, in Washingt on at the State Department a special consul-
tative ~omraission was set up on Chinese problems. It included such promi-
nent American sinologists as D. Barnett, one-time deputy assistant secretary
of state, and F. Straus the former U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia who had
lived 11 years in China and had repeatedly met with Zhou Enlai.38
In the 1960's the entire reactionary camp in the United States had already
converged on the idea of the importance of a rapprochement with China, if
one disregards the "Taiwan lobby" which had been bought off by Chiang Kai-
shek. But the influence of this lobby which at one time was very signifi-
cant in Washington F!&S steadily declining. The former American Ambassador
to Japan, E. Reischauer, wrote: "If representation oF the two Chinas is
_ impossible, then we should recognize that the loss by Taiwan of its seat
in the United Nations, in a11 probability, is less harmful to American
. general interests than the continuation of our veto against Beijing." TYie
sa.me Reischauer made the proposal of removing American nuclear weapons ~
from the island of Okinawa, and thereby clear the path for further talks
with Beijing.39 The special assistant of President Johnson, B. D. Moyers,
called for the abandoning of the "rhetoric" which had accompanied the dis-
cussion of China in the United States, and assuming a"correct position"
for the purpose of reaching agreement with Bei~jing.40
In a secret document sent out in February 1967 to the American overseas
information centers, it was stat ed that for the United States it was desir-
able that "Mao and his group still remain in power," since "their ma,in ef-
forts were directed against the USSR," Here it was also pointed out that
if the future ruler of China (obviously, after the death of Mao.--E.G.) be-
gan to direct his main efforts against the USSR," then he could count on
_ the tacit support of the United States.41 In January 1968, President
Johnson announced the intention of the government to discuss the question
of delivering food to China and the relations of the United States and PRC
in the cultural and educational area. The Deputy Secretary of State N,
Katzenbach let it be known that certain questions raised by the PRC and the
United States back in 1955-1956 could now encounter a more energetic ap-
proach from the United States.
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Was:~in~ton was now ready to make concessions. irlhy? Obviously because
Beijing by that time had been able to convince the United States of its
anti-Soviet ideas and plans. j+Rzen in March 1969, the Maoists organized an
armed clash in the region of ~he Ussuri River and somewhat later announced
their claims to 1.5 million m' of t~rritory in Eastern Siberia and the
Soviet Far East, this gave k'ashington a decisive push to come to terms with
Bei~ing. Precisely fx�om that time, the U.S. President R. Nixon, the Secre-
tary of State W. Rogers and ather prominent American officials began to
snea.k more and more frequently of the U.S. desire to improve relations with
the PRC. The trade restrictions on Chiria were eased, and the permanent
alert of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Strait of Taiwan was canceled.
These were major decisions which could bode for much. The Americari-
Chinese talks soon produced concrete results. At the Plenum of the CCP
Centi�a1 Committee in August 1970, certain data on these talks were,made
public for the first time. Then the fundamental change under way in the
foreign policy course of China toward a rapprochement with the United
States was also announced.42 In April 1971, Zhou Enlai, had a meeting with
American athletes in Beijing, emphasized that it was a question of a"new
page in Sino-American relations.i43 In October of the same year, the
assistant of President Nixon on Nationa.l Security Affairs, Kissinger, sud-
denly appeared in the PRC capital. He announced that China was an "im-
portant ball in the game of forces on the arena of world politics."44
On 21 February 1972, Nixon accompanied by Kissinger and Rogers arrived in
Beijing.45 This visit which was held, regardless of the absence of diplo-
matic relations between the two countries, excited the Western press. Only
now did the capitalist world truly understand the importance of those talks
which had been underway for years between the PRC and the United States.
Nixon was received by Mao Zedong, and at a banquet in Shanghai announced:
"At present our two peoples hold in their hands th~ future of the entire -
world.~~`~6 TJo other American president had made such a statement about re-
lations with another state. At a banquet in Bei~ing, Nixon, in replying
to Zhou Enlai, stated: "What we are doing here should change the world.
We have been brought together b,y the fact that we have common interests
which exceed all differences.i47 The talks which had been resumed in 1971
by Zhou Enlai this time were held in secret. Journalists estimated that -
during the time that the U.S. President was in China, he met a total of ~+0
hours with Zhou Enlai.48 It was pointed out that the Chinese side did not -
feel it necessary to condemn American aggression in Vietnam which was grow-
in~ stronger at that time. Kissinger returned from Bei,jing convinced that
the Sino-American talks were worth the effort. Diplomatic relations be-
tween the United States and the PRC were still not established then. Ob-
viously the United States at that time was still not ready to go rather
far in meeting the Maoists. Further steps were dem~.nded from Bei~ing, and -
these were taken.
The year 1972, the month of July. A new American visit to Bei~ing, and
this time by the leader of the Republican Party in Congress, the future U.S.
President J. Ford. His statement upon returning to Washington was: "They
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- (the highly placed Chinese leaders.--E.G.) do not want the United States to
leave the zone of the Pacific or any other region of the world. They feel
that our presence is a guarantee of peace and stability- and that the de-
parture of the United States would lead to the outbreak of instability
- throughout the world.i49 At the same time the very large American Boeing
military concern which had ties with Senator H. Jackson received a license ~
to deliver the Boeing 707 jet aircraft to China. Also at that time a
license was gi~;en to another leading military corporation McDonnell-
Douglas for delivering the DC-10 aircraft to China.50 The American
military-industrial complex directly became involved in the deal, counting
on the Chinese market in the future. This was also reflected in the ques-
tion of the arms race. The U.S. representative at the Geneva disaxmament
co~ittee J. Martin, in speaking at a press conference on 26 October 1972,
stated that the United States and the PRC had actually arrived at the same
position vis-a.-vis the convening of a world disarmament conference, al-.
though they started from different premises,51
The year 1973, the month of March. Huang Zhen, the Chinese ambassador to
France, was appointed the leader of the PRC liaison group in Washington,
and the prominent career diplomat and former U.S. ambassador to France,
England and the FRG, D. Bruce, became the leader of the American liaison
group. At that time the Chinese representative at the International Con-
ference on Vietnam stated that the PRC desired "to move Forward at full
speed to closer cooperation with Washington," and was not interested in
meeting with representatives of the Etiiropean socialist countries, since "we
speak different languages from them."52
The year 197~+, the month of July. Having returned from a trip to Bei~ing,
Senator Jackson admitted that he had discovered a"coincidence of interests
(of the United States and China.--E.G.) in many areas," and an understand-
ing in Beijing of "the importance of preserving NATO." During his talks,
"in no instance did ideology prevent a clear exchange of opinions."53 -
The year 1975, the month of April.The leader of the Republican Party (then in
power) in the House of Representatives, J. Rhodes, upon returning from China an-
nounced that the Chinese leaders, in the course of the meetings, spoke
very little about the situation in Southeast Asia, but on the other hand
were in favor of supporting NATO and the continuation of the presence of
American troops in Western Europe.54
The NEW YORK TIMES on 3 April 1975, wrote that China was showing an "obses-
sion," in the statements against the policy of detente. Highly placed
American guests continued to visit China. Washington was testing the mood
in Bei,jing and receiving one assurance of friendship and loyalty after
another. The U.S. President J. Ford, following the example of his prede-
cessor Nixon, made a personal visit to Bei~ing in December 1975 a.nd met
Mao Zedong. In a speech at his reception, Deng Xiaoping stated that Europe
represented the "strategic center of the clash" which "inevitably would
lead to a new world war," and he called for the ~oining of "all forces"
against the Soviet Union.55 It was unambiguously hinted that in the event
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of a clash between the United States and the USSR, China wou~.d help the
Americans. The WASHINGTON POST at that time wrote that China was tne best
assistant of the United States on the world scene. Regardless of its
rhetoric, it was acting to strengthen tlle American presence in South Korea
and ,Japan, the Philippines and in Thailand; it was restrainin~ North Korea
and North Vietna.m; from time to time it was also helping in the United
_ Nations.
The same thing was affirmed by the American specialist on Chinese affairs,
S. Spector. In the summer of 1.976, he visited the PRC, and drew the fol-
lowing impression from his trip. The Bei~jing leadership was insisting on
the maintaining of an American presence in Asia, it was in favor of an in- -
crease in the U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocea.n, and expressed disap-
pointment over the U.S. defeat in Vietnam.
In August 1977, now under President J. Carter, the U.S. Secretary of State
C. Vance stated, after meeting Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping in Bei~in~,
that "a very serious exchange of opinions on many questions, both global
and bila.teral," had been held, and the Washington administration viewed the
establishing of ties with China as one of its central tasks.56 In speaking
on television, Senator Jackson proposed that large batches of American
weapons be delivered immediately to China, and a"more reliable defense"
created in the PRC.57
On 18 May 1978, the NEW YORK TIMES wrote on the question of the talks which
had been conducted in Beijing by the presidential assistant on national -
security questions Z. Brzezinski, that he, like no other of the American
officials is interested in a clash between China and the Soviet Union."
In October of the same year, the American Secretary of Energy and the for- _
mer CIA Director J. Schlesinger arrived in the capital of the PRC, as well
as the prominent CIA specialist on China G. Lilly.58 Finally, on 15 Decem-
ber 1978, a Sino-American agreement was concluded on the establishing of
diplomatic relations. Two days before this, Deng Xiaoping, in an inter.view
with the American journalists Novak and Evans, celebrated the concluding of
an "alliance against the polar bear."59 In essence, Deng merely repeated
what Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had been assuring the Americans since 194~+,60
What are the prospects of the Sino-American "alliance"? Who ultimately
will gain in the deal between these forces? At present, the balance is
clearly on the side of the United States. Although the Americans at times
make certain enticements to Beijing, the Maoists are making more substan-
Lial concessions, foregoing the national interests of China. An example of
this would be the fate of Taiwan which after all the "warm" Sino-American
meetings, actually remains a U.S, outpost off the very shores of the PRC.
Recently Deng Xiaoping let it be known that this politically and strategi-
cally important island, where the Chiang Kai-shek forces still maintain
their base, had been surrendered to the United States. It can be asserted
that Taiwan is to be turned into something akin to an American semidominion.
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But certainly it is not merely a question of Taiwa.n. The Chinese have also
made other concessions to the United States, including in the economic
area. The serious contradictions which exist between the PRC and the
United States after the diplomatic deal between Bei3ing and Washington are
not disappearing~. They are merely moving deeper into their relations.
One has merely to recall the obvious clash of the long-range U.S. and
Chinese interests in the region of the Pacific, where the Americans are
acting together with Japan and where the Maoists also have their plans. ~
Even the region of the Indian Ocean, where the United States and China are
presently ,jointly hatching intrigues against the peoples of the East and
against the US5R, sooner or later can become a question of disputes between
them.
Undoubtedly the American imperialists in the future will do everything to
direct PRC policy along their own lines. But the Maoists, in turn, axe
counting on settling scores with the Unit ed States in the future. With
good reason the head of the department of the CCP Central Committee and
later the Politburo member and deputy premier of the PRC State Cour.cil,
Geng Biao, on 21+ August 1g76, in speaking before the students of the
Bei,jing diplomatic academy and in talk'ing about the "two superpowers,"
stated: "In order to survi~re we should first of all side with one to be
victorious over the other.... At the ~iven moment, let th~ United States _
protect...the shores of the East China Sea so that we can concentrate
greater forces to offset the northern power.... When we feel that the time
has come, we will tell Uncle Sam: 'Be so kind as to pack up'."61 In other
words, the double-dealing game is being played by both sides. Each is hop-
ing to win out over the other.
The main thing is that both the American imperialists and the Chinese
nationalists are dreaming of world hegemony. In coming to terms wit h one
another, neither for a minute is forgetting his own and in some places
overlapping aims. But to endeavor to achieve world domination in our era
means to come into an irresolvable conflict with life itself. History has
already shown this once and for all. As for the i~unediate results of the
deal between Washington and Bei~ing for the present, one thing is cleax.
In striving for world hegemony, China has presently become the defacto
junior partner of the United States. And everything points to a continua-
tion of this in the immediate future. Bei~ ing itself has set out on this
path.
FOOTNOTES
1DER SPIEGEL 25 December 1978, p 80.
2P. P. Vladimirov, "Osobyy Rayon Kitaya 19~+2-1+5" [The Special Region of
China 19~+2-191+5 Moscow, 1973, pp 302-303 .
3Ibid. , p 315.
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4NEW YORKER, Januaxy 1972�
SDER SPIEGEL, 25 December 1978, p 86.
6P. P. Vladimirov, op. cit., pp 34g-35~, 351, 352�
- ~Ibid., pp 373, 377.
~Ibid., pp 403, 5~5.
9Ibid., pp 489, 505, 378-379�
lOFor more detail on this see A. M. Dubinskiy, "The Talks of the U.S. 'Allied .
Group of Observers' with the CCP Leadership," VOPROSY ISTORII, No l, 1979�
11Th. H. White, "In Search of History," New York, 1978, pp 181, 182, 122.
' 12P. P. Vladimirov, op. cit., pp 396, ~+22.
13Ibid., p 475�
140. Borisov, "Sovetskiy Soyuz i Man'chzhurskaya Revolyutsionnaya Baza.
1945-~949" [The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base. 19~5-
1.949], Moscow, 1975, p 1.07. ~
15p, B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, "Sovetsko-Kitayskiye Otnosheniya. 19~+5-
1970" [Soviet-Chinese Relations. 1.945-1.97oJ, Moscow, 1972, p 42.
16pRp,VDA, 15 August 1978.
17Th. H. White, op. cit., p 122.
18S. Nea,ring and J. Freeman, "Dollar Diplomacy," New York, 1.926, pp 39-~+0.
- 19A. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1.go6," New York, 1928,
p 406.
20T. Dennett, "Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese ?~ar," New York, 1925, p 157�
21P. P. Sevost'yar:~ov, "Ekspansionistskaya Politika SShA na Dal'nem Vostoke
- (v Kitave i Kore;~,re v 1909-1911 gg.)" [The U.S. Fxpansionist Policy in the
F~,r East (in China and Korea in 1909-1911)], Moscow, 1.958, p 20.
Z2M. and B. James, "Biography of a Bank," New York, 195~+, p~+80. ,
23P. P. Vladimirov, op. cit., pp 335, 339.
2`+DER SPIEGEL, 25 December 1978, p 86.
~ . 24. . -
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- 25P. P. Vladimirov, op. cit., p 370.
26"0 Chem Umalchivayut v Pekine" [What Bei~ing Does Not Mention], Moscow,
1972, P 32.
27PRAVDA, 1 October 1974.
- 28"0 Chem Umalchivayut v Pekine," p 2'~.
29Ibid., p 26.
30p, p, Vladimirov, op, cit., pp 327, 533.
31K. T. Young, "Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: the U.S. Experi-
ence, 1953-1967," New York, 1968, p 461.
32Quoted in: M. S. Kapitsa, "HIVR: Dva Desyatiletiya--Dve Politiki" [The PRC:
Two Decades--Two Policies], Moscow, 1969, p 197.
33Ibid., pp 346-347.
34~~Vneshnyaya Politika KNR. 0 Sushchnosti Vneshnepoliticheskogo Kursa -
So~rremennogo Kitayskogo Rukovodstva" [The PRC Foreign Policy. On the
Essence of the Foreign Policy Course of the Present-Day Chinese Leader-
ship], Moscow, 1g71, p 169.
350ne of the American senators stated at that time: "Clearly the support
for Hanoi by Bei~ing was predominantly support more in words." Another
senator commented that persons were wrong who considered China the chief
_ enemy of the United States. "Russia and not China," he continued, "is the -
main supplier of weapons to North Vietna.m" (quoted in A. Bovin and L.
Delyusin, "Politicheskiy Krizis v Kitaye" [The Political Crisis in China],
Moscow, 1968, p 170),
36~~Four Essentials for Peace in Asia. Address by President Johnson,"
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 1 August 1966, pp 158-162.
37Ye. Yu. Bogush, "Maoiz~. i Politika Raskola v Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'nom
Dvizhenii" [Maoism and the Policy of Splitting in the National Liberation
Movement], Moscow, 1969, pp 10~-105.
385. Sergeychuk, "SShA i Kitay (Politika SShA v Otnoshenii Kitaya 19~+8-
1968)" [The United States and China (U.S. Policy Vis-a-vis China, 1948-
1968)], Moscow, 1969, p 162. -
39~~Vneshnyaya Politika KNR," pp 159, 160.
4UM. S. Kapitsa, op. cit., p 3~+7.
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41~IBUNE (Sri Lanka), 19 May 1968.
42"'I'hirty Years of the PRC," PROBLE~C DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, No 3, 1979, P 19.
43THE ECONOMIST, ]_7 April 1971; see also "Vneshnyaya Politika KNR," pp 170-
171; "Vneshnyaya Politika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya Kitayskoy Narodnoy
Respubliki" [Foreign Policy and International Relations of the People's
Republ.ic of China] , Moscow, 1971+, pp 21+9-255.
44DER SPIEGEL, 25 December 1978, p 87.
45Let us recall that Nixon's political career staxted in California, the _
center of the "Pacific" school of American imperialists.
46LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 8 March 1972.
47PRAVDA, 23 February 1972.
48SVOBODNE SLOVO, 28 February 1972.
49pgAVDA, 10 July 1972.
50pRp,VDA, l~+ and 22 July 1972.
51pg~~A, 27 October 1972.
52PRAVDA, 9 July 197~+.
53Ibid.
54p~~A, 13 April 1975. ~
- 5 SPRAVDA , 3 Jtaly 197 5�
56pRAVDA, 27 August 1977.
S~PRAVDA, 1~+ September 1977.
58PRAVDA, 31 October 1978.
S9DER SPIEGEL, 25 December 1978, p 85.
60Deng Xiaoping at one time was the closest friend of Zhou Enlai, and is
presently considered his faithful follower. Zhou himself for decades
tried to bring beijing closer to Washington. In White's words, Zhou even
convinced Niao to act precisely in this direction. If the "bridge" between
- the PRC and the United States remains sta.nding, this will be the "greatest -
accomplishment of Zhou in the interests of both peoples" (Th. H. White,
op. cit., p 122).
61~~Heading for Chaos and War," Moscow, 1978, pp 51.-52.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo PRAZ'DA, VOPROSY ISTORII, 1980
io272 26 -
cso : 1800
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FOR OFrI(:TAL USF. OM.Y
INTERNATIONAL
DIPLOMACY OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES ANALYZED
Moscow NOVYYE TENDENTSII V DIPLOMATII LATINOAMERIKANSKIKH STRAN (New
Tendencies in the Diplomacy of the Lati.n American Countries) in Russian
1979 signed to press 16 Mar 79 pp 1-12, 149-150, 151, 152
/-Annotation, table of contents, i.ntxoduction and conclusion from book
by A.I. Kedrov, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 6,000 copies, 152 pages7
/Text7 This monograph contains an analysis, which is based on rich
factual materia]., of the appearance of independent, anti-imperialistic
tendencies in the diplomacy of a.number of Latin American countries
and of the influence of these tendencies on the state of international
_ relations and the activities of the Latin American cotmtries in the
w~rld arena. It shows how the devel~pme~it of these tendencies, which
are strongly influenced by the policies of the socialist countries,
aggravates the crisis of the military-diplomatic bloc created by
the USA in the Western hemisphere and contributes to the gradual
application of the principles of peaceful coexistence of states to
the practice of inter-American relations.
It is intended for specialists i.n international affairs, instructors
and students in W2's specializing i.n the humanities and for a broad
range of readers.
Contents p~e
Introduction 3
Chapter 1 Characteristic Features of,,the D i~lomacy of.,.the
.
Latin American Countries..,....o 13
Chapter 2 The Temporary Victory of "Bloc Di~lomacy" and the,..,,
First Attempts to Depart From It...........~,~,,..o.. 36
Chapter 3 The Strengtheni.ng of the Anti-Imperialist Line in the
Diplomacy of the Latin American Countries....o,oo..,, 55
Chapter 4 Joint Actions by the Latin American Countries for
= Purposes of Protecting their Economic Interests o... 98
27 ~
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Chapter 5 The Increase i.n the Tendency of the Latin American
States to Conduct an Independent Policy in the I nter-
American and World Arenaooa.oo.ooo..o..o..�.�o�����ooo~o~� 112
Conclusion o~~oo~~~oa~~o~o~oooooa~ooooooo~o~o~ooo~ooo~a~~~~o~~~o� ~.51
Introduction
In recent years the struggle of the populax masses in the Latin American
countries for total national liberation and the consolidation of
- sovereignCy has acquired increasing scope. A characteristic. feature
of this struggle at the given stage is that it is carried '
over with increasing frequency into the area of international relations,
into the area of diplomacy.
In particular,it is worth noting that the governments of a number of
Latin American countries which have started to carrp out socio-economic
transformations and to conduct a policy to liberate .their countries
frora the dominance of the i.mperialist monapolies are making broad
use of diplomacy to ensure successful advancement toward these goals.
As a result, the role of the Latin American countries in the interna-
tional arena has increased;their ties with the USSR and the other
socialist countries, as well as their cooperation with the developing
countries of Asia and Africa, have expanded.
These positive shifts in Latin America have become possible thanks
to the interaction of a number of global, regional and domestic
factors, thE most prominent of which are the fundamental changes
i.n the alignment of class forces in the world arena in favor of
socialism, which is exertino an ever deeper i.nfluence on the course of
world events; the rise of the national-liberation struggle and the
successes of the progressive, anti-imperialist forces in Asia and
Africa; the victory of the revolution i.n Cuba, which has led to a
significant strengthening of the anti-imperialist struggle in the
Western hemisphere; and the aggravation of the conflicts between
the Latin American countries and the USA. The persisCent efforts
of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist alliance led
� to the turn away from the Cold War and.toward the relaxation of
international tension and this,as well as the tendency, which has
developed in the world, toward the further easing of tension, toward
normalization and the development of inter-government ties on
the basis of equal rights and mutual advantage, have created favorable
conditions for the further struggle of the developi.ng countries,
including those of Latin America, a struggle which supports the
application to international relations of the principles of sovereign
equality and noninterference in internal aff airs. They have
increased their aspiration "toward the strengthening of political and
economic independence,"I which L.I. Brezhnev talked about in the
CPSU Central Commi~tee report to the 25th party congress.
28:
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At the present time the aspiration toward economic and political
independence is manifested not by individual countries of the continents it
is a policy which is characteristic of many Latin American coun~:ries
acting in a coordi.nated mannero This exerts a serious influence on
the state of inter-American relations, on the relations of the Latin
American countries with the USA and the other imperialist powers, on
the strengthening of ties with the developing countries of Asia and
Africa, and on the determi.nation of independent positions of the cont3.-
nent's countries with regard to the basic international questions, The
tendencies toward the conduct of a sovereign foreign policy expand
the opportunities for the further development of cooperation between
the Latin American states on the one hand and the USSR and the other
socialist alliance countries on the other hand.
The development of these tendencies i.n I.ati.n America caused a
crisis of imperialist "bloc diplomacy," on which the United States
had counted for many years in order to preserve and strengthen the
dominance of American imperialism in this part of the globe,
The forces of i.nternational and internal reaction are currently doing
everything in their pcwer to hamper the conduct of an independent
foreign policy and diplomacy by the Latin American countries. However,
the tendencies toward the assertion of an independent line in relations
with other states are growing stronger thanks to the broad democratic
forces i.n the continent's countries, which are fighting ever more
decisively to strengthen these tendencies, as well as to the support
which they receive from the socialist nations and from the progressive
regimes in Africa and Asia.
The present monograph is devoted to a study of the present-day dip lomacy
of the Latin American countries, and primarily of the tendencies
~oward the conduct of an independent line, a tendency which began
to be manifested in the early sixties i.n the diplomatic activities
of these countries.
Thus the discussion in this work will concern primarily the official
activities of the governments, which express the views and interests
of the patriotically inclined forces wi.th regard to the implementation
- of the basic goals of their foreign policy, goals which consist of
persistently and efficiently contributi.ng to the consolidation of
the sovereignty and economic indep endence of their countries. In
this regard, particular attention will be devoted to the so-called
- diplomacy of economic development, that is,to the solution of a number
of the economic problems of the Latin American countries by means
of diplomacy. In view of the great economic dependence, which the
_ countries of this region still have on foreign monopoly capital, and
of the enormous economic difficulties which they are experiencing,
the La~in American countries attribute particulaxly great significance
to the "diplomacy of economic development" (in a number of these cotm-
tries it has been officially declared, for example, that the mai.n task of
their diplomatic service lies in the search for new overseas markets for
sales and the promotion of foreign trade in general~.
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In addition to the analysis of the diplomatic activities of the progressive
_ regimes, this work contains an examination of the characteristics of the
diplomacy of the bourgeois-reformist governments which are in power in a
number of Latin American countries, as well as the nature of the diplomacy
of the reactionary regimes, and their attempts to weaken progressive
movements on the continent.
As for the time frame of the study, it encompasses the period beginning in
the late fifties, i.e., from the victory of the Cuban revolution up to the , �
present day, inasmuch as it is in this period that the tendency toward in-
dependence in the diplomacy of many Lati.n American countries has manifested
itself most clearly.
An investigation of the new tendencies in the diplomacy of the Latin Ameri-
can countries has all the more significance in that these tendencies, like
all the foreign policy activities of the countries in this region, attract
the concentrated attention of politicians and scholars in the capitalist
countries; they are becoming the object of widespread study and analysis.
In this regard, certain prominent statesmen, politicians and scholars in
the USA and other western countries are attempting to distort the essence
of these tendencies or to completely ignore them.
Western authors frequently attempt to view the emergence of these tendencies
in isolation from the social development and political conditions which
have been established in a given country; they attempt to represent them
as a simple consequence of the rapid but uneven economic development of
the Latin Americ~ countries in the postwar years ('the achievement of the _
~
age of majority ) or as the manifestation of traditional nationalism in
these countries and the long-standing mistrust of their "rich and powerful
northern neighbor," caused by the "previous interventionist policy of the
USA in relation to Latin America, as a reaction to mistaken, infl.exible
policies of past U.S. governments, or as a mutual "misunderstanding" which
ha s taken root, etc. 2
At the same time a number of UoS, government figures and historians attempt
to mini.mize in general the significance of Latin America in the political
life of the present-day world and to downplay the role of the diplomacy
of the Latin American countries in international relations.3
The facts, however, say the opposite: the role of the Latin Americ,an coun~
tries in world economics and politics is already significant now; it is
invariably growing and wi11 continue to grow in the future, This is recog-
nized by government officials and representatives of big business in the
West. For example, according to Paul Martin, Canada's former secretary of
state, the main argument that convinces him that "Canada must develop clo-
ser relations with Latin America is the prospect for the development of _
this continent; before the end of this century Latin America will become -
one of the most inFluential regions of the world."4 The president of Italy,
Giuseppe Saragat, went even further in his evaluation of the prospects for
the development o� Latin America. Upon returning from a trip to South Amer-
ica in 1965, he stated that "the future not only of Europe but o� the
whole world" depends on its developmento5 George Bolton, board chairman
of the Bank of London and South America, wrote with regard to the Latin
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American countries that "by the end of the century this comparatively little-
known group of countries, which does not now receive the necessary atten-
tion, wi11 acquire political wei,ght and economic might which Europe will
envy."6
The great and ever growing significance of Latin America is also recognized
_ by the USA. In 1971, Orville Freeman, who was then the U.S, secretary of
agriculture, noted, for example, that Latin America, with a population
expected to reach 600 million and gross annual production expected to reach
$300 billion by the end of the'century "is too big a market to i.gnore."~
A committee composed of prominent representatives of U.S. business and
scientific circles and headed by Saul Linowitz, former U.So representative
to the OAS, studies the status of relations between the USA and Latin
America and periodically publishes the results of their investigations;
in its December 1976 report, the committee came to the following conclu-
- sions about the role of Latin America in the contemporary worlds "With
time the significance of the Latin American countries will inevitably in-
crease. A number of of the leading Latin American co~mtr ias which are
among the most powerful and successful countries of the Third World will
exert a significant influence on the development of the international eco-
nomie order... The Latin American countries will be able to i.nfluence to
a large degree the state of international trade; they will play a central
role in the solution of the food problem on a worldwide scale..,"8
These conclusions arise directly from the experience of American monopoly
capitalo It is well known that the United States accounts for about 40 per-
_ cent of the trade by the Latin American countries and this trade brings the -
_ United States from $500 to $900 million in income per year. Direct private
American capital investxnent in the Latin American countries reached $15
billion in 1970, amounted to 60 percent of all foreign capital i.nvestment
in this region and brought in net income of $1.5 billion per year,9 In
subsequent years this interest has increased even more. In 1973 private
American capital investment reached $16.4 billion, while in 1975 it amounted
to $22.2 billion. The U.S. monopolies appropriate one-fifth of the gross
national product of this region and one-third of its income from export.
The total amount of resources which thep pump out of Latin America greatly
exceeds the influx of new investmentsolo It is extremely revealing that
Latin America remains a very important source of income for the American
monopolies; they obtain here 45 percent of their profits from overseas
activities.ll
The significance of Latin America as the main source of many raw ma,terial
and agricultural products for the USA has grown wi.th the current raw mater-
ial crisis. The Latin American countries account for the following per
centages of total American imports of specific itemss 99 percent of the
tin concentrate, 96 percent of the ba~cite, 34 percent of crude petroleum
and more than 80 percent of petroleum products, 7I percent of the beryllium;
47 percent of the copper, 37 percent of the antimony, 35 percent of the
zinc, 35 percent of the iron ore, 33 percent of lead and manganese, 17 per-
cent of the mercury,~:, 14 percent of tungsten, as well as 100 percent
- of the bananas, 68 percent of the coffe and 57 percent of the sugar, etc.12
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Thus, the significant role of the Latin American cotmtries in the world -
economy and politics is not a cause for doubt. However~ the U.So press
periodically contains materials which assert that Latin America is
supposedly not of substantial significance in the world economy and
world politics, as a result of which .the interests of American diplomacy
in this region are limited. The position of Nixon~ who carried out
the so-called policy of benign neglect, is cited as an
example of the�secondary role which Latin America supposedly plays
in UoS. policy.
It is perfectly obvious that claims of this kind, like U.S, government
policy itself at certain periods, has been designed primarily to mask the
true interests of the USA in Latin America, to cover up the actual
goals of American diplomatic activity in this region and its scale,
to draw away, if only for a little while, the attention of the Latin
American and world community. And, clearly, it i.s_no accident that
American politicians, scholars and jo~nalists have been persis~ent in
their efforts to disseminate various versions of the idea about the
"limited i.nterests" of American diplomacy in the Latin American countries
at precisely the time when American state organs and private corporations
had begun to develop furiously their activities to organize a conspiracy
against Popular Unity i.n Chile and to "destabilize" the situations in
other Latin American coimtries which had begun to implement a policy
, independent of the USA.
The situation in Lati.n America, the foreign policy of the countries
in this region, and especially the new tendencies in their diplomacy
attract as well the concentrated attention of the leading capitalist
countries of Western Europe and Japan; they view the Lati.n American
countries as markets and capital investment spheres important for
themselves, and they attribute great significance to the strengthening
of th~ir political influence in these countries, which.leads to the
exacerbation of imperialist conflicts i.n Latin America. The USA
and the other imperialist powers attempt to actively drive a wedge
in~o the tense struggle which is being carried out between the
progressive and reactionary forces in many Latin American countries
on the issue of the direction which their diplomatic activities should
takea As a result, the situation in these countries is becomi.ng more
acute and complex, and it is essential to take this into account when
studying the characteristics of diplomacy of the i.ndividual Latin
- American countries and groups of countries on this continent,
Although all the states of this region should be included in the
category of developing cotmtries which follow the capitalist path
(socialist Cuba is naturally an exception~), their domestic and
foreign policy and, correspondingly, their diplomatic activities are
extreme?y T~aried, inasmuch as they depend on the forces which are .
Y
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in power and which support them at a given moment i.n each country. The
spectrum of political forces which participate in the management of
the Latin American countries is extremely broad, It includes the
large landoi,mers; whose interests have been intertwi.ned for a
long time with the i.nterests of the imperialist monopolies, foreign and
domestic banks; the monopolistic bourgeoisie, the upper and middle
national bourgeoisie; the numerous strata of the urban and rural
petty bourgeois ie; military circles, one paxt of which is closely
linked to the oligarchy and imperialism or the national bourgeoisie
and another party, which is patriotically inclined, which represents
mainly the interests of the petty bourgeoisie and, to a certain degree,
the interests of the broad popular masses.
The reactionary oligarchical regimes i.n the countries of this region
conduct an anti-popular, pro-American diplomatic course; the patriotic
governments adhere to an independent anti-imperialist line. There
are elements of both courses in the diplomacy of the remaining countries.
Other factors also play a large role in the formation of the diplomatic
course followed by the Lati.n American countries. A politically
mature working class, led by experienced commimist parties, is a
powerful political force in these coimtries, a force which exerts
a significant infl.uence on all their activities, including diplomatic
activities. The peasan.t movement, which has an anti-oligarchical and
anti-imperialist trend has also acquired a large scale. More or less
consistent actions in defense of economic and political independence
are undertaken by radical urban strata of the petty bourgeoisie,
and by certain circles of the reformist and nationalistically inclined
bourgeoisie.
Under the pressure of the progressive forces, and in view of the
exacerbation of the objective conflicts between the policy of imperialism
and the state interests of any given country, even some of the.reactionary
Lati~_ American regimes have_ been forced at times to take ~an i.r~.c~ependent
position on foreign policy issues~ a position which diffexs from
the position of the imperialistic powers.
The revolution in Cuba continues to exert a great influence on all
progressive changes in Latin America; the revolution has become an
irreversible social factor of Latin American reality.
However, it should be taken into account that the duplicityof the
nationaJ. bourgeoisie, the interference of the i.mperialist powers in ~tihe
interria;tiorial. affairs of the Latin American cotmtries, the private
military coups and the general instability of the internal political
situation lead to the frequently observed inconsistency and vacillation
in the diplomacy of the governments which adhere to a progressive
orientation. -
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Nonetheless, the main factor, which in the end determines the interna-
tional activities of the countries of the continent in general,
lies in the irreconcilable and the ever worsening conflicts_between
their national interests and the interests of imperial ism, and this
inevitably leads to the growth of tendencies toward independence
in their diplomacyo Despite the furious opposition of imperialism
and its allies in Latin America, these tendencies are gathering
strength as the Latin American countries become more and more convinced _
that independent diplomacy serves to protect their national interes~s.
Speaking at the 33d session of Lhe UN General Assembly, A.A. Gromyko,
member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of
;Foreign Affairs, evaluated the role and position of the Latin America
countries in international life, saying: "Let us turn to one more
continent--Latin America. Its role i.n world affairs is growing --and
this is especially noteworthy--the Latin American countries are. _
attempting to an ever greater degree to speak with an independent ,
voice. Correspondingly, there are expanding opportuniti es for -
cooperation with these countries and the states of other parts of
the world. This is a positive and important factor in international
life. "14
The process by which the new tendencies in the diplomacy of the Latin
American countries are strengthened was unleashed against a background
of historically conditioned features of the diplomacy of the Latin
American countries, features which have left their own noticeable
imprint on this process. For this reason the analysis ~hich this work
provides of ~he development of these tendencies is preceded
by an examination of the specific features common to Latin American
diplomacy as well as of the features characteristic of the diplomacy
of individ ual countries in this region because it is i.mpossible
without consideration of these features to correctly understand
either present-day Lati.n America.n diplomacy or the new tendencies which
axe now developing in the diplomacy of many Latin American countries,
increasing their role and that of the cantinent in general in all _
international life.
Conclusion
From what_has been said above, it is possible to conclude that with
the relax ation of international tension, which has become possible thanks
to the consistent, peace-lovirig policy of the USSR, the strengthening
of the national-liberation movemznt in Latin America axici the coming to
power in a number of Latin American countries of governments which
adhere to an anti-imperialist course have ~esulted in progressive
changes noted in Latin American diplomacy 'and caused a crisis of
imperialist "bloc diplomacy," which was first asserted in the post-
war years in Latin Americao
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And despite the fact ~hat a large number of countries on this continent
are still dependent on the USA, and although extremely reactionary
pro-i.mperialist reg imes continue to exist in Latin America, progressive
features characteristic of the diplomacy of a majority of the developing
countries of other regions of the world are comi.ng through more and more
clearly in the diplomatic activities of many Latin American countries.
This process, which reflects the objective demands of .the national
development of the Latin American countries, the increased influence
of the anti-i.mperialist forces in these countries and the realities ~
of present-day international'life, will undoubtedly be developed,
although with the difficulties and complications which are inevitable
under the circumstances of Latin America.
The growth of the tendencies toward independence in the diplomacy ~
of the Western hemisphere countries is reflected more and more
strongly in the situation i.n the OAS and throughout the entire
inter-American system, and it is accompanied by an increased level
of participation by the Latin American countries in the world arena.
In a report to the 25th CPSU Congress, L.I. Brezhnev talked with
exhaustive clarity about the USSR's relation to this process:
"We support the aspiration of these countries for the consolidation of
their political and economic independence, and we welcome their
increased role in i.nternational life, "15
These words reflect the firm confidence of the Soviet Union that in a
situation of detente the future of i.nter-American relations will
be found in a new, indeper~dent foreign policy and diplomacy founded on
principles of peaceful coexistence and that the countries of Latin
America, which have embarked on a path of anti-imperialist struggle, will
have every opportunity to persistently and consistently carry out
this line, to develop comprehensive cooperation with the socialist
alliance and with the progressive anti-imperialist regimes of o ther
conti.nents, to apply forever these principles to the practice of
- inter-American rel ations and to make impossible a return to pro-
imperialist "bloc diplomacy," which is alien to their interests. -
FOOTNOTES `
1. "Materialy 3IXV s"yezda KPSS" ~aterials of the 25th CPSU Congress7~
Moscow,�1976~ p 21. ~
- 2. See, for example., "Statement by the Honorable Henry A,_Kissinger; .
Secr~tary of State, before the House Inte~national Relations Committee
on Latin America, . Western Europe, Africa. June,,,17, 1976;" Department
of S~ate,,,press release.,. June 17~ 1976, No 306; G. Peterson. "Latin
America. Benign,,,Neglect_ is Not Enough," FOREIGN AF~'A~RS, Apri1, 1973,
pp 598-607; Col._Blasier._ "The Hovering Gian~. U.S. Responses to ,
Revolutionary C hange in Latin America." Pittsburgh, 1976; pp 249-258.
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3. See, for exampl.e, Do Bronheimo "Relations Be~Cween the United States
and Latin America," INTERNATIONAL ~1FFAIRS, Ju1y 1970, p 505;
WASHINGTON POST, September 9, 1971.
4. Citation according to ExTERNAL AFFAIRS, Ottawa, July 1967, p 266.
5. Citation according to CORRIERE DII~LA SERA, Milan, September 15, 1965, _
p 1.
6. Cita~Cion according to THE ECONOMIST, Ma~hlS, 1969, p 82.
7. Citation accordin~ to ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS WEEI~,Y NEWS LETTER,
May 31, 1971, p 2.
8. "The ~United States and Latin America; Next Steps. A Second.
Report by the Commission on United States=-Lati.n American Relations.
December 20, 1976;'New York, 1976; p 3.
9. W. Rogers. "Foreign Investrnent in Latin America: Past Policies and
F~ture Trends," JOURNAL OF,,,INTERNATIONAL LAW,. Virgi.nia, No 2, 1970;
U.S. Department of Commerceo SLgtVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS., October
1970, p 31; Ibid;., October 1971, p 28; Po Roper. "Investment in
Lati.n America;'L., 1970, pp 7-8; COMMERCE TODAY, New York, March
8, 1971, p 35.
I0. KOMMUNIST, No Y2, 1978, p 109,
11. "Multinational Corporations i.n Brazil and Mexico. Structural Sources
of Ecnnomic and Noneconomic Power," Washington, 1975, p 11.
12. LATIN AMIItICA ECONOMIC REPORT, L., January 24, 1975~ p 15; THE DEPART-
MENT OF STATE BULLETIN, May 3, 1976, p 587; 'IHE JOURNAL OF POLITICS
Gainesville, February, I976, p 7.
13. The diplomacy of socialist Cuba is not considered in the present work,
14. Citation according to PRAVDA, September 27, 1978.
15. "Materialy ~CV s"yezda KPSS" ~aterials of the 25th CPSU Congress7,
p 21.
COPYRIGHT: "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1979
8 543
CSO: 1800
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r
NATIONAL
HISTORY OF RESEARCH ON SOVIET NATIONALITY RELATIONS
Moscow OSNOVNYYE NAPRAVLENIYA IZUCHENIYA NATSIONAL'NYKH OTNOSHENIY V SSSR
(Main Directions in the Study of Nationality Relations in the USSR) in Rus-
sian 1979 signed to press 20 Sep 79 p 4, 5-8, 319
[Summary, foreword and table of contents from book edited by M. I. Kulichenko,
Izdatel'stvo Nauka]
[Text] This work gives a generalized cl-.aracterization of the basic stages
and directions taken in the study of nationality relations in the Soviet
Union. Special attenti.on is devoted to the treatments of the historical
problems of a new historical entity--the concept of the Soviet peo-
ple; it deals with the historiography of economic, governmental-Iegal, lin-
- guistic and a number of other aspects of nationality relations. An integrated
historiographic analysis of the main accomplishments of Soviet science with
respect to individual aspects of nationality relations makes it possible to
focus the attention of scholars on urgent qu ~stions still unresolved in the
area of nationality problems.
Foreword
The new Cons ~itution of the USSR--the Basic Law of the Soviet land--estab-
lishes in l.egislation the foremost achievement of mankind in social progress -
in our time--the construction in the USSR of a mature socialist society.
Playing an enormous role in socialism's attainment of this eminence has been
the most fundamenta~ progress which has been achieved in the development of
and in the mutual relations bet~,aeen the nations and peoples inhabiting our
country. The essent~al nature of this progress consists in the following:
on the basis of Max�xisr-Leninist science, the Soviet Union has resolved the
nationality problem for the f irst time in history under the leadership of
_ the Communist Party created by the great Lenin; there has been produced an
unprecedented general flowering, impossible under capitalism, of all our
nations and peoples, whose con.tribution to the treasure house of world
civilization continues to grow; fundamental changes have occurred in the
mutual relations between the peoples and the great process of drawing them
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together is under way; proletarian socialist internationalism has become the
norm governing the consciousness and activities of working people of all the
nationalities; a new historical community of human beings--the Soviet peo-
ple--has emerged on the basis of a continuous strengthening of the ties
between the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and national intelligentsia -
and of the friendship and international unity of all nations and peoples.
The 25th Congress of the CPSU set Soviet science the tasks of continuously _
generalizing the historical experience our party and people have accumulated
in the building of socialism and communism and of thoroughly analyzing the
laws governing the development of Soviet society, particularly the processes
and trends associated with the strengthening of a mature socialism and its
gradual development into communism.l Soviet scholars, declared Comrade L. I.
Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in a speech during
ceremonies marking the 250tY? anniversary of the Academy of Sciences of the
USSR, "are called upon to help the party find the best possible solutions
to such historical problems as the progressive elimination of class distinc-
tions and the establishment in our society of complete social uniformity,
further evolution of the party's Leninist nationality policy and the strength-
ening of the unity of the entire Soviet people."2
The application of historiographic analysis to the effort of organizing and
thoroughly mastering the fund of knowledge already amassed concerning Fre-
vious stages in the development of Soviet society, ?~cluding knowledge of
scholarly achievements in the study of problems associated with national
development and nationality relations is one of the most important means of
accomplishing the tasks ahead of Soviet historical science~ Such analysis
makes it possible to summarize what has been done, to idantify "bottlenecks"
and problems still unresolved in our researches, to direct the efforts of
our specialists tpward further study of those aspects of the problem most
urgently requiring attention, to establish the need for new studies on the
- part of scholars of various specialties and, to a certain extent, even to
- coordinate their joint efforts in the study of the national and international _
processes associated with the development of Soviet society.
It should be pointed out that Soviet historiography, the science of histor-
ical science, has made a considerable stride forward in its development over
recent decades. Of special vulue have been early advances in the treatment
of general problems in the theory, methodology and historiography of the
Soviet Union and of world history in general.3 Considerable experience has
also been accumulated in the study of individual problems in the historiog-
raphy on Soviet society.4 It must be said, however, that historiographic
analysis of speciaYists' treatment of the experience accumulated in imple-
menting the Leninist nationality policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet
state, the resolution of the nationality problem, the flowering and the
bringing together of the nations and of the development of the friendship
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of the peoples and the strengthening of the international unity of the So-
viet people as a new historical co~nunity of human beings still f ails to
measure up to the increased demands placed upon the development of Soviet
his~orical science and for enlarging its role in insuring the progress of
Soviet society.
Guided by the fact that historiographic mastery of the scientific advances
which have been made in this area, as well as further methodological treat-
ment of the problems involved, can make a great contribution to more thor-
ough research on the national and international processes under way within
the Soviet Union as well as throughout the world, the Scientific Council on
~ Nationality ProbZems of the Social Sciences Section of the Presidium of the
Academy of Sciences of the USSR is undertaking the publication of a series
of monographs dealing with the general prob].em of "Nationality Relations in
the Present Epoch."
The first volume offered for the readers' attention contains scholarly pa-
pers discussed during meetings of the Council on Nationality Problems in
connection with the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Great October
Socialist Revolution and the birth of the multinational Soviet state. It
has been proposed in coming volumes to publish other monographs in this
series dealing with nationality problems in foreign countries, nationality
problems in the union republics, with problems of national culture and with
other aspects of nationality relations of timely interest.
The following authors contributed to the monograph: Academician Yu. V.
Bromley - Foreword; Main Phases and Directions in the Study of Nationality
Relations in the USSR; M. I. Kulichenko - Treatment of the Problem of the
New Historical Community in Soviet Historiography; E. A. Bagramov - Nation-
ality Relations and International Ed>>cation (Problems in Methodology and
- Historiography); E. V. Tadevosyan - Problems in the Soviet Historiography
of National-State Building in the USSR; M. N. Rosenko - Problems in the -
Ec~nomic Development of Socialisfi Nations; M. N. Guboglo - Historiographic
Problems of Bilingualism; Yu. D. Desheriyev - Study of Sociolinguistic
Problems Associated with the Development of Nationality Relations (Some
Problems in Methodology and Historiography); L. N. Terent'yeva and M. Ya.
Ustinova - International Marriages and Their Role in Ethnic Processes in the
USSR (An Outline of the Historiography); L. M. Drobizheva - Specific Socio-
logical Study of Nations and Nationality Pelations; I. S. Gurvich - Some
Problems in the Historiography of the National Development of the Peoples of
the Far North in the Soviet Period; V. P. Sherstobitov - M~in Directions in
Research on Nationality Relations by Scholars of the Soviet Republics. _
FOOTNOTES
1. XXV s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenogr. otchet
[Stenographic Record of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the
� Soviet Union], Moscow, 1976, vol 1, p 98.
39
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rvw vrrl~.lcw USC UlvLi
2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursam: Rechi i stat'i" [On a Leninist
Course: Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1976, vol 5, p 367.
3. See: "Metodologicheskiye i istoriograficheskiye voprosy istoricheskoy
nauki" [Methodological and Historiographical Problems in Historical
Science], Tomsk, 1963-1972, Nos 1-8; M. V. Nechkina, "The History of.
History: (Some Methodological Problems in the History of Historical
Science) in the book "Istoriya i istoriki" [History and Historians],
~Moscow, 1965; V. V. Ivanov, "Sootnosheniye istorii i sovremennosti kak
metodologicheskaya problema" [The Relationship Between History and the
Present as a Problem in Methodology], Moscow, 1973; A. A. Karalyuk,
' "Nekotoryye voprosy metodologii istoriograficheskogo issledovaniya
istorii KPSS" [Some Problems in the Methodology of Historiographic
Research on the History of the CPSU], Moscow, 1973; "Problemy istorii
- i metodologii nauchnogo poznaniya" [Problems in History and in the
Methodology of Scientific Knowledge], Moscow, 1974; "Razvitiye sovetskoy
istoricheskoy nauki, 1970-1974" [The Development of Soviet Historical
Science, 1970-1974], Moscow, 1974; A. A. D'yakov, "Metodologiya istorii
v proshlom i nastoyashchem" [Historical Methodology Past and Present],
Moscow, 1974; N. N. Maslov and Z. V. Stepanov, "Ocherki istochnikove-
deniya i istoriografii istorii KPSS" [Essays on Source Study arid the
Historiography of the History of the CPSUJ, Leningrad, 1974; "Problemy
_ obshchestvennoy mysli i istoriografii [Problems in Social Thought and
HistoriographyJ, Moscow, 1976 among other works.
4. See: "Voprosy istoriografii rabochego klassa SSSR" (Problems in the
Historiography of the Working Class of the USSR], Moscow, 1970; L. M.
Zak, V. S. Lel'chuk and V. I. Pogu3in, "Stroitel'stvo sotsializma v -
SSSR: Istoriograficheskiy ocherk" [Building Socialism in the USSR: An
Historiographic Essay], Moscow, 1971; "V. I. Lenin i resheniye agrarno-
krest'yanskogo voprosa v SSSR" [V. I. Lenin and the Resolution of the
Agrarian-Peasant Question in the USSR], Moscow, 1971; V. P. Danilov,
"Problems in the History of the Soviet Village, 1946-1970: An Outline
of the Historiography" in the book "Razvitiye sel'skogo khozyaystva _
SSSR v poslevoyennyye gody (1946-1970 gg.)" [Postwar Agricultural
Development in the USSR, 1946-1970], Moscow, 1972; I. Ye. Vorozheykin,
"Ocherk istoriografii rabochego klassa SSSR" [An Outline of the Histor-
iography of the Working Class of the USSRj, Moscow, 1975; V. S. Lel'chuk,
"Sotsialisticheskaya industrializatsiya SSSR i eye osvescheniye v
sovetskoy istoriografii" [Socialist Industrialization in the USSR and
its Treatment in Soviet Historiography], Moscow, 1976; V. I. Kas'yanenko,
"Razvitnoy Socialism: Istoriografiya i metodologiya problemy" [Developed
Socialism: The Historiography and the Methodology of the Problem],
Moscow, 1976 among other works.
40
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Table of Contents
Foreword 5
Main Phases and Directions in the Study of Nationality Relations in
the USSR . 9
Treatment of the Problem of the New Historical Community in Soviet
Historiography 29
Nationality Relations and Internationalist Education (Problems in
Methodology and Historiography) 84
~ Probl~ms in the Soviet Historiography of National-State Building
in the USSR 100 .
Problems in the Economic Development of Socialist Nations 126
Historiographic Problems of~Bilingualism 153
Study of Sociolinguistic Problems Associ-ated with the Development of
Nationality Relations (Some Problems in Methodology and
Historiography) 199
Inter-national Marriages and Their Role in Ethnic Processes in the
USSR (An Qutline of the Historiography) 216
Specific Sociological Study of Nations and Nationality Relations 246
Some Problems in the Historiography of the National Development of
the Peoples of the Far North in the Soviet Period 277
Main Directions of Research on Nationality Relations by Scholars of
the Soviet Republics 303
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1979.
0699
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RE GI ONAL
SOVIET BAI;TIC REPUBLICS-PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE
Tallinn pROBLEMY SOTSIAL'NOY STRUKTURY RE~SPUBLIK SOVETSKOY
PRIBALTIKI in Russian 1978 signed to press 23 Oct 78 pp 5-6,
247
[Introduction and table of contents from a book edited by
Doctor of Historical Sciences R. N. Pullat]
[Text] The rise of Soviet historical studies under conditions
of socialist development is characterized by an increasing in-
terest in the problems of the sacial structure of Soviet soci-
ety, as has already been reflected in many general works.
One of the most important problems placed before Soviet social-
o~.ogists by the 25th CPSU Congress is the study of problems re-
lating to the period of socialist develovment and, in particu-
lar, the change in 'che social structure.*
In this regard, the present collection of articles, "Problems
of the Social. Structure of the Soviet Baltic Republics,"
acquires a special urgency. It illuminates the colossal
changes that occurred in the social .structure of the peoples of
the three Baltic republics and the formation and development of
- the Soviet working class, kolkhoz peasantry, and the intelli-
gentsia.
In analyzing the formation of the social structure of a devel-
oping socialist society, one should note that thi.s process oc-
curred much faster in Lithuania, Latvia, and ~stonia than in
= the republics where Soviet power was established much earlier.
The reason is that the Baltic Soviet republics, in carrying out
*L. I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom (Lenin's Course), Vol. 5,
p. 531.
42
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a socialist revolution and in constructing soci.alism and com-
munism, have relied and still rely on the~ r~ch experience al-
ready acquired by the other fraternal republics of the USSR,
which have constantly provided all-encompassing and disin-
terested help and suppozt.
In Article 70 of the Constitution (Fundamental Law) o� the Un-
ion of Soviet Socialist Republics it is written: "The USSR em-
bodies the state unity of the Soviet people and unites all na-
tions and peoples in the goal of the ~oint construction of com-
munism."* ~
_ Summing up the historical path followed by our country, L. I.
Brezhnev emphasized: "The chief goal that animated our people
for the forty or so years since the previous Soviet Constitu-
tion went into effect is the construction of a developed so-
cialist society and the formation of the first government in
the world composed of all the people."**
The disinterested mutual help of the peoples of our country and
the mutual enrichment of their spiritual life, which are based
~ on the high Leninist principles of interna~:ionalism, provide a
solid foundation for the blossoming of all the fraternal re-
publics cf the Soviet Unian. This is confirmed by the material
in the present collection, which reflects the great transfor-
mations occurring ~uring the years of Soviet power in the So-
viet Baltic republics, thanks to the fraternal solidarity, co-
operation, and mutual help of all the peoples of our multi-
national Motherland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
and due to the formation of a new international society, the
Soviet people. _
The scientific value of this collection results from the fact
that it is the joint work of historians and sociologists.
Combining hist.orical and sociological materials allows us to
uncover new aspects of the internal development of a mature so-
cialist society, and it aids the study of the laws governing
the transition from socialism to communism. In the compara=
tive historical sense, the authors' collective illuminates a
number o.f important problems of the formation of the social
structure in the Soviet Baltic republics.
*Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Un~on of Soviet Soc3a1-
- ist Republics, Moscow, 1977, p. 26.
**L. I. Brezhnev. "Historical boundary on the path to commu-
nism," PROBL. MIRA.SOTS., No. 12, 3-10, 1977.
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The present collection of articles is the first of three, coor-
dinated, scienti~ic studies planned by the Academies of Scien-
ces of the Li.thuani,an~ Latvian, and Eston~.an SSR on the pro-
blem: "Laws Governin$ the Construct~.on of Socialism and Commu-
nism in the Soviet Baltic Republics as Part of the USSR." The
main responsibility for the pxesent collection.rests with the
Institute o~ History of the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian
- SSR and, in parti.cular, the section on the history of the so-
cialist period at this institute.
The collection is divided into ~our parts: the first contains
articles on the social structure as a whole; the second covers
the development�of the Soviet working class in the Baltic re-
publics; the third considers the formation and structure of the
kolkhoz peasantry; the fourth discusses the emergence of a so-
cialist intelligentsia and the problems related to its devel-
opment.
The articles in the collection cover the following basic to-
pics: the leading role of the CPSU in the formation of the so-
cial structure of the Soviet Baltic republics during the period
of socialist development, the post-war development of the work-
- ing class, and the development of the kolkh~oz peasantry in the
republics and the intelligentsia.
The collectiom reflects the trends in research that have .
appeared and developed in the republics and gives some results
regarding the main questions concerning the social stsucture of
a socialist society.
The collection illuminates important aspects of the development
of the social structure in the Soviet Baltic republics as a
whole and its individual elements during socialist and commu-
nist construction.
The published research provides new material to expose the
groundlessness of bourgeois-nationionistic conceptions of the
F1est German "Ostforschung" atid reactionary emigrants regarding
the "exceptional" nature of the Baltic peoples and their
"apartness" from the Russian and other peoples in the USSR.
Director of the Institute of
History of the USSR of the Secretary of the CC of
- Academy of Sciences, USSR the Estonian C~
Academician A. L. Narochnitskiy V. I. Vyalyas
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TABI~E OF CONT~NTS
Foreword 5
I
L. D. Shi~shov. Leading role o~ CPSU in the format~on of
the social structure of the Soviet Baltic revublics
durin$ the development o� socialism. 7
R. N. Pullat. Dynamics of the social structure in the
Soviet Baltic republics during the development of
socialism 28
G. A. ShBdzhyus. Changes in the social-class structure
of Lithuania during the transition period from
capitalism to socialism 58
E. E. Rannik. Social dispkacements of workers in the
Estonian SSR as a factor in the development of the
~ ' social structure (1968-1977) 84
II
K. K. Kala and Kh. 0. Roots. Developnent of the working
class in Soviet Estonia (1945-1975) 91
i1. I. Ragayshene. Quantitative and qualitative changes
in the structure of the working class in the Lith-
uanian SSR (1959-1970) 111
R. R. Xuursoo. On the formation of cadres of construc-
tion workers in Soviet Estonia (1945-1955) 119
D. I. Vseviov and E. A. Marandi. Formation of worker
cadres in the town3 of Kokhtla-Yarve and Narva -
(1944-1958) 135
III
P. K. Arlauskas. Changes in the social structure of "
kolkhoz members in the lithuanian SSR (1952-1958) 146
M. E. Rubin. Formation of machine operator cadres and ,
the social-economic results of this process in the
_ Estonian SSR {1944-1958) 157
E. E. Murniyek. Dynamics of the social structure of
the kolkhoz peasantry in the Latvian SSR 169
IV
M. Ye. Ashmanis. Structu~al changes in the intelligen-
tsia in Soviet Latvia 189
K. A. Martinson. On the formation of a scientific
intelligentsia in Soviet Estonia 203
I. G. Talberga. Characteristics of the social-
professional structure of scientists in Soviet
Latvia (1946-1970) 218
M. A. Krikk. Sources filling the ranks of the technical
intelligentsia in the Estonian SSR (1959-1975) 234
information on authors 245-246
COPYRIGHT: Akademiya Nauk Estonskoy SSR, 1978
~ 45
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I~Uh !)!~'r!CIAL USii UNLY
- REGIONAL
,
SHORTAGE OF QUALIFIED PERSONN~L REPORTED
Kiev RADYATd.S'!C~ ZIT~RATUROZNAVSTVO in Ukrainian No 7, Jul 80
pp 92-93 "
LExcErptg7 An ~~xtended conference of the office of scientific
council was neld on the prob~.em of "Normal development of
world literature in the present-day period", at which time
the followir;g issues were discussed: "Preparing personnel
with better ~~ualifications in literary studies in the Ukrainian
SSR" and "On coordinating literary research in the Ukrainian
SSP,: some results of the five-year plan and goals for
~9g~_~9g5"� In addition to office m2mbers, representatives
from Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Donetsk and Odessa
universities and a number of pedagogical institutes also
attended the conference.
S. A. Kryzhanivs'kyy read a"Memorandum on preparing better
qualified literary studies personnel in tYie Ukrainian SSR"
put together by members of the commission of the scientific
problem council. He stressed that the most urgent problem
novr is the issue o f systematic prep~ration of experts in
literary studies in all disciplines, beginning with theory
of literature throu~;h bibliography and scientific information.
Starting out with a number of facts which testify to an
inadequate number of literary experts with higher qualifica-
tions, especially in higher educational establishments,
the scientific pr�oblem council stresses the need to provide
more intensive pre F~raiion of literary studies experts through
post-graduate stu d~es and also current improvement through
a syste;n of seminars, schools, probationary periods, etc.
It recommends more active work~with youth, its direction
towards a creative utilization of acquired knowledge, an
~aicouragement of t hose pedagogues who care about raising
a scholarly new ge neration.
46
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~~oK c~r~~1CIAL usi. ~N~.r
- Tne scientific problem council, as stated in t;he "Memorandum..."
calls to mind also the need for moral and material stimulation
of literary research with the thought that the university
lecturer shou].d be just as interested in scholarly research
as in pedagogical work. Those who are interested in this work
an d who provide concrete results in monographs, col lections
and in periodicals should be rewarded in prestige; more effort
should bs directed to textbook, manual, and seminar preparation
inc luding the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences system, which would
ai d in revising according to contemporary scholarship lectures
in literature presented in higher educational institutions
an d secondary schools. In the council members' opinion the
scholarly prognc~sis for literary research should be systema-
tized, for periodicals a systematic generalization of the
acc omplished, a determination of directions for th e most
pro mising and urgent, dictated by the interests of communist
edu cation of ~;he Soviet individual, the builder of a new
society.
Th e following spoke out on issues raised in the "Memorandum":
D.V. Zatons'kyy, M.S. Hrytsay, Z.S. Holubyeva, N.Ye. Krutikova,
V.O. Ulasenko, A.V. Kulinych, H.D. Verves, V.L. Mykytas' an d
H.A. Vyazovs'kyy. h7embers of the office of scientific problem
council and high er institution lecturers unanimously recogni.zed
the importance and timeliness of the personnel issu e. They
supported the basic principles of the "Memorandum" and also
provided a series of propositions directed at improvemen.ts
~ in the preparation of better qualified personnel in literary
stu dies.
~ Th e head of the scientific problem council, the director of
the Institute of Literature imeni T.~-I. Shevchenko of the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, corresponding member of the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, I.O. Dzeverin summarized the
discussion and suggested discussing the "Memorandum~about
pre paring personnel with higher qualifications in 1 iterary
studies in the Ukrainian SSR" in university departments in
order to obtain additional suggestions and factual material.
A report on "The coordination of literary studies research in
the Ukrainian SSR: some results of the five-year plan and -
goals for 1981-~ g85" was given by the scientific secretary
of the scientific council H.M. Syvokin'. He noted that the
dev elopment of Ukrainian Soviet literary studies has markedly
int ens:ified in recent times and this places additional tasks
before the scientific problem council. It should more
act ively coordinate the efforts of literary experts, directing
47
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i~~~: c~H�~lc i n~. ~rtir ~~Ni..Y
them to the solution of the most important, truly fundamental
p:oblems, to provide for all branches of scholarly research
wor~c, an all-around development of Marxist-Leninist teaching
about literature.
COPYP,IGHT: Vydavnytstvo "Naukova dumka", "Radyans'ke
literaturoznavstvo"~1980
9443
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rc~tt ~,t~ricini, t,;;r. c~Ni,Y
REGIONAL
DEFICIENCIES NOTED IN UKRAINIAN LITERARY STUDIES
Kiev RADYANS'KA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 26 Jul 80 p 3 _
LArticle by Ya. Hoyan: "Th Fighter's Position; An Open
Party Meeting of Kiev Writers"~
Text/ Almost five decades have passed since that November
day when ~PRAVDA' printed in U ainian Pavlo Tychyna's poem
"Partiya Vede" LThe Party Leac~. This work rang out to the
whole world from the pages of the great paper founded by
Lenin as a credo of the poet, the bard of a new age, as the
voice of all the artistic intelligentsia of the young Land of
Soviets, as a ballad of the people. The powerful cry "The
Party Leads" born in a poet's heart was taken up in the early
1930ties in the melodious poetic verse as a passion of t!~P
"bolshevik era", as a flag, as the truth of our life, the ~
unity of people and ~arty. This cry is always with u s,
the people carry it as sacred through history, becaus~ the
people know: Victory lies with th e party:
The open meeting of the communist writers of Kiev, the largest
party organization of creative intelligentsia in the republic,
was conducted in a sp~rit of unity with party and people,
a spirit of responsibility to the profession of master of
words in Soviet literature and party principles. Capital
writers discussed their tasks which came about as a result of
the June (1980) CC CPSU Plenum and the goals expresse d in the
speech by L. I. Brezhnev; they talked movingly abou t the
significant, world-important event, the Z6st party congress.
To come to the party congress with a personal gift of labor,
strictly evaluating the achieved, exposing in spoken and
written word the real life and problems of the times, to live
as a political fighter this was the main thought of the -
speech by party committee secretary Borys Oliynyk and other
writers.
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The ~~arty organization of Kiev writers accomplished much in
the period after the 25th CPSU Congress. In the last two
_ years the republic's writers held 45,000 conferences, speeches
and discussions on the decisions of the party congress. I,ast
year, in Kiev only there were more than 100 conference~
devotgd to the books by L I. BreZ~ hr_ev "Mala Zemly " LSmall
'rJorl~/, "Vidrodzhennya" ~ebir th/, and "Tsilyr_a" ~irgin
Soil/. A series of important literary evenings were organi2ed
honoring the 325th anniversary of the unification of Ukraine
with Russia, Lenin's anniversary and the 35th anniversary of
the Great Victory. Forms and methods of patronage, the
creative contacts ~rith workers in towns and vil'lages are being
improved.
P~Ieeting participants Konstyantyn Kudiyevs'kyy, Petro Perebyynis,
I,yubomyr Dmyterko, Volodymyr Kolomiyets' , Borys Rohoza and
Viktor Blyznets' noted also that internal party work yields
interesting experience and this experience should be improved
and extended. It is the preparation of young, talented,
ideologically mature writers for party membership, their .
creative reports in party committee meetings and party
organization tiA~orkshops, and a7.so the activation of party
group work and an im~provement of the creative atmosphere in
the editorial offices of LITERATURNA UKRAYINA and the
publishing house "~adyans'kyy Pys'mennyk", joint meetings
with party organizations of other creative collectives in
town.
Along with this, the communists persistently asked questions
about an increased party committee control of the activities
of party organizations, about adherence to statute require-
ments and the fulfillment of party directives by communists,
and the work of problem-theoretical seminars and political
instruction of party members where there are quite a few
shortcomings. Party work is creative work, yet formalism
survives in some party organizations. In particular, after
serious party committee criticism, the party organization of
- the publishing house "Radyans'kyy py s'mennyk" (comrade P.D.
i~lorhayenko, secretary) is reorganizing its activities rather
slowly. There are shortcomings in the work of the initial
party organizations of the pericdical RADUHA' (secretary
comrade O.P. Rohotchenko) and of playwrights (comrade H.D.
I'lotkin, secretary). Of course, a clearly or~anized control -
of their decision fulfillment would help the party committee
determine these shortcomings early and question the guilty.
Both the speech and other talks stressed the need to strength-
en the party influenc~~ on the level of literary criticism.
~ 50 -
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l~Oh OFi~ TCTAL Ii5}: ONI.Y
i:iev's masters of the rvord speaking openly about work -
_ achievernents and shortcomings, ~hought about the future, about
their place in the national preparations in honor of the party
congress.
Uur hearts are attuned to the events in the world, said Leor.~.d `
I~;ovychenko in nis speech; American imperialism is straining
international relations, it is playing with the fate of man-
~ kind. '+Je strongly approve the external party and government
politics which are constructive and peaceful. ~Ve must t
- actively look for our place ir~ line, hardening our political -
diligence and spiritual mobilization in order to s ay our
true word in literature and publicism. We need a political
novel, a po~itical play and a political poem. Poetry is the
fortress of the national soul, it along with all literature
must become a powerful weapon of the people against the
instigat~r~ of war.
Ulcraine's writers along with all the people are preparing
a worthy greating for the Z6st party c~ngress. Their creati-
_ vity, and work with people is filled with the poetic cry:
- "The Party Leads" which was heard recently at the communist
meeting.
The secretary of the ~iev city committee of the Communist
Farty of the Ukraine, T.V. Hlavak, appeared before and
participated in the meeting work.
9443
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(
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REGIOAIAL
EMIGRE JOURNAL ON RESULTS OF SURVEYS 0~11 RBLIGIOUS ATTITUDES IPI LENINGRAD
Fraakfurt POSEV in Russiaa Jua SO p 13
[Article by O.V.~ Leniagrad~ 1980; "Nonbelief Loees Support in the Coui?try"] ~
[TextJ We publish belaw secret data from tw~ aociolo~-
ical surveys conducted a~nong a special category of peo-
ple--nonbelievers. Nevertbeless, the resultr? of these ~
surveqa provide us for the first time With coucrete fi~
urea confirming the grawth of belief in the cocaatry,
since changes among naabelievers are aalq a ref lectio~a
' of more active spiritual proceasea amang th~ believing
portian of the population of the USSR.
Zhe CPSU leadership ie extremely dieturbed over the rise of religic~n in ouz
countrq. Sociologists consequeatly were assigned the taek of determining _
the sourcea of r~ligi.ositq and the reasons for ita indestructibility.
For this end, ther.o was caaducted in 1971, and duplicated in 1979, a surveq
of several thausend workers in I.eningrad for the purpose of studyiag the
state sad dyaamics of the attitude of workers teward religian. Only those
were surveyed who conaidered themselves nonbelievers. They comprise the
great ma~ority of the worki~g class, but far from all of this ma~ority are
coavinced atheists. "Superficially aonbelieviag people" frequentlq come to
religioa.
Some of the concrete data obtained in the proceae of innestigatioa are
interesting. Thus, it was revealed that the level of information of nonbe-
lievers coacex~ing religiaa ie vary low. Only 3.5 percent conaider them-
aelves competent in religious queations. Fifty-six percent haaeatly admitted
that if theq had to talk~ with beliavcrs on religion theq would not know
what to talk about.
In the proposed survey of noabelievers, a question was included amomg othere
~vn the role of the Church in social life. Various points of vie~ wer~e +~ro-
- vided as choicea. In 1971 Marxist positions were shared by 27 perceat of
those surveyed, while in 1979 the figure was 10 perceat. People with wlgar
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antireligious views ("all popes are f rauds" aad the like) in 1971 consti-
tuted 17 percent end in 1979--4 perce::t. The reductioz? of this cantingent
is coanected with old men, who had been eduested bq the League of Militant
- Atheiste in the 1920e-19308~ going on penaiaa. In 1971, religion was as-
sesaed positively by 11 percent aad in 1979 by 19 percent. Peraons a8sert-
ing that they had not thought about thes~ queations aad in thie wa~y ~zere
k~pt out of the selectioa, in 1971 comprised 34 percent and in 1979--k9 per-
cent. Similar answers were given to a comparab le surneq an the role of
religion in the field of culture.
One of the questia~s for nonbelievers propoaed th at they explain the reasaas
for their aonbelief. Thirty-nine percent of thoae questioned in 1971 and 20
percent of those in 1979 explained it oa the basis of Mar~dst philoeophy.
In 1971, eleven percent aad in 1979 twentq-nine percent co'ild not provid~ aa
explaaation. The rest either gave very nafve eaplanations or rafrained from _
aaswering.
On the basis of all the answers to the questioas of the surney, the socio-
logia te divided nonbelievers into several groups. Nonbelievers with a"sci-
entific autlook," that is, actual atheiste, in 1971 comprised 30.3 percent
andisi1979--29.6 percent. Nonbelievere with vulgar atheiatic viewa ia 1971
numbered 19.4 perceat and in 1979--10.1 percent. "St~reotype" no~nbelievera
numbered 37 percent in 19~1 aad 43 percent in 1979.
In addition to thoae who considered themselves nonbelievers, the survey al-
so revealed those who fouad it difficult ia f~Et@YID~D.ing to which category _
they beloaged--to believere or to nanbelievers. ~uch numbend 7.4 percent
among those questianed in 1971 ead 8.8 percent 197~. _
A comparab le investigaxion, but on a smaller scala, was caaducted among the -
- Leniagrad intelligentsia; the results were aimilar.
Since 1963, Leningrad sociologiste have been studying b aptisms. In 1964,
26 percent of all newborn infants were baptized; by 1971 this figure had
fallea to 19.2 percent, but in 1919 it again reached the 1~64 level. Curi-
ously, 3.1 percent of b aptized children are children of f amilies of CPSU
memb ers .
Deapite the intensive atheistlc treatment, rank-and-file people regard re-~
ligioa with respect. Thirty percent of people with higher education con-
demn baptis~n end aaly 6 percent with primsrq education do so. Ameng non-
party people, 13 percent condemzi baptism, CPSU meaobers--34 percent (this _
meane that 66 gercent of the communiets do not disparage the religious Sac-
ramenta. If only Lenin knew...).
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Investigations of rites also shawed that Easter is celebrated by 38 percent -
of Leningraders and Whitaun--33 perceat.
The data obtained by the sociologiats illustrated the process of the de-
ideologization of Soviet society. The consciousness of the ordinary man ia
being f reed of Marxiet-Leninist encrustations. What then ie filling the
vacuum thus f ormed?
769 7
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I
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REGIONAL
REVIE~N OF NEW NOVEL BY OLES~ HONCHAR
Kiev P,ADYANS'KE LIT~RATUROZNAVSTVO in Ukrainian No 7,Ju1 80
PP 18-30
~ LReview by ,~,I~., K. Nayenko: "The Star of Memory and Human
Solidarity!'/
~xcerpt~7 It seemed that at the end of 1970's and
beginning 1980's researchers into Oles' Fi~onchar's creativity
would still be deliberating his recently published six-volume
edition, but within half a year the authQr presente the
readers with a new novel "Tvoya Zorya" L"Your Star!'~(VI'I'CHYZNA,
1980, NQ ~-2), and thus we must re-examine our ideas ~bout
Honcha,~/. The publication of a new work by Oles' Honchar
is quite a normal occurrence because the artist has now
attained the next phase on his artistic path and "Tvoya Zorya"
is the result. The novel testifies to further a tistic
creativity acceleration of the "PraporonQStsi" "Flag Bearers!'7
author, a period of his starry flowering and intensive
artistic honey yield.
During one meeting with readers, testifies Dmytro Pavlychko,
Oles' Honchar shared with them his dream to write a novel ~
"about air or about water, about something most indispensable
to man." ~ UVe think that "Tvoya Zorya" is one of the author's
novels about what is indispensable to man, that is about air.
To create an image of it the author made his characters move
rapidly about our planet, penetrating deeply into the mystery
, af flowering and the breathing of primordial nature, into
the mystery of human life and the life of honeybees. As
a result, this air appeared in the novel not only with its
"natural" qualities (clean, gentle, limpid, softl moving,
glassy or the opposite heavy, dirty, poisonous~ but also in
~ ~ a~broader, poetically generalized meaning, as spiritual air
needed by man not only for breathing but for inspiration, for
a bright flowering of his life star high in the heavens of
the present age. In this second meaning the air combines also
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with a spirit of the native land with its morning dew and
ni~htingale songs, the grandeur of helpful work, human
mer~ory, I~eninist life-giving ideas which complete the manifold
beauty of man's spirituality. This beauty, which the novel's
main characters breathed, absorbed and absorb contrasts
continuously in the work with all that disfigured it in the
past and even stains it sometimes to day. The author took the
next important step in depicting an individual of our times, ~
the crown of nature with a poetic-philosophical consideration
of such eternal categories as the sacred love of fatherland,
- international solidarity, a feeling of responsibility for the
fate of the world now and in the future.
Thus the subject matter of "Tvoya Zorya" has a universal, one
could even say planetary character. Events in which the main
characters ~ake part occur in different parts of our planet.
But, and this is essential, the root system of the novel's
leading ideas gets its life-giving fluids and ozone air still
only from one, clearly defined in a local sense, point. As
in many of hiU other works, Ules' Ilonchar remained faithful
to the endl.ess Ukrainian steppe in this book also. Encom-
passing in thoughts and actions humanity's most urgent living
problems, the main characters of "Tvoya Zorya" are spiritually
powerful primarily through their blood ties with the small
village Ternivshchyna (its prototype would probably be found
somewhere in the southern Poltava region or in the Kherson-
i~likolaev area), and through it with our whole fatherland.
In this�way the ideas of patriotism and international solidar- _
i.ty are confirmed in the novel as organically indivisible,
monolithic, as a banner of our age.
'l~he rnain character in the novel, Kyrylo Zabolotnyy, is a
diplomat by profession and, quite naturally, all events in
the story are related to Soviet diplomatic life abroad.
Based on this it might be tempting to discuss the novel along
~vith other works dealing with the "diplomatic" theme, of which -
there appeared about five in Ukrainian literature alone in
the last few years. Discussing prose achievements in ~979
II. Syvokin' stated: The time has, of course, come to write
a special critical study about the Ukrainian "diplomatic"
novels, but he also expressed a fear that it might become -
strictly interprei;ational and illustrative. 2 Actually, not
all those novels with diplomat heroes can be squeezed in
witliin the framework of a"diplomatic" theme. Oles' Honchar's
"Tvoya Zorya" is a good example. This novel "fits" neither
into a"diplomatic" framework nor into any other framework;
it contains num~rous profound ideas which by their content are
equally interestin~ and important for all people. This content
- is founded on a base out of which only the most fundamental
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things in human life evolve, on a base nf spirituality and
morality in the broadest meaning of these words.
Za.bolotnyy, the main character of "Tvoya Zorya"~became
spiritually rich and morally pure thanks to an organic unit~
with his native nation, because all his life he breathed
the ozone air of communist ideas. His life was full of the
same joys and fears within which our fatherland developed
and gretiv stronger in the post-October days.
It is characteristic that not only the main character thinks .
this way in thE novel. Zabolotnyy's "partner" is his con-
temporary and childhood companion, an ecologist by profession,
in whose name the story is told, but most importantly,
Zabolotnyy's living ideals appear to be very acceptable to
a re~resentative of the contemporary youn~ generation, the
student Lida Dudarevych. L"lhen during a trip into the distant
city to s~e a recently di,5covered painting masterpiece
"P~7adonnG under the Apple Tree" (in a review of the novel
the reviewer Strel'byts'~ y groundlessly establishes the
novel's place of action ~ Zabolotnyy asked if their Terniv- _
shchyna childhood could have a special meaning for her, the
girl's reply was not only affirmative, but also enthusiastic.
"I learned so much about people and other things..." she
replies; later her mother describes the girl's feelings
after "the trip to the Niadonna": "You know she is simply
enraptured... She got up early, not tired at all, no touchi-
ness, joyful, gentle... She said she visited a place where
the world seems different, the people seem kinder, no one is
in a hurry... It seemed to me, she said, that I can hear
invisible choirs singing 'Ave Maria' above me and bells
ringing in heaven joyfully the whole day and around me
- orchards in bloom and the sun... Then I went to the steppe,
the blue rains bathed me... So enchanted was the child...".
The development of this idea in the imagery fabric of "Tvoya
Zorya" could be discussed in the process of examining any
of the novel's episodes. Oles' Honchar sho~vs that the
";~iadonna under tne Apple ~ree" is created by life itself from
life itself; she captivated and united in their aspirations
not only Nad'ka's fellow countrymen, but also people who live
- very far from Ternivshchyna. Exhibited in one of the museums
of a vrestern country, the Madonna (although according to
Labolotnyy it may not have been the same Madonna but one very
~ much like her) immediately became a sensation ("Slavic
~donna, a masterpiece by an unknotvn artist, thus wrote the
press") and ~vhen some maniac tore through the painting with -
a knife, all museum workers ("Oh, P~Iadonna: ~Je fell in love
with her") unanimously went on strike. Jointly they expressed
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rox or-r zc inL usr orr~~Y
their prot~st both against inadequate wages, against risin~
price~ and a~ainst the violence of gangsters in the country.
In depictin~ the strike itself the very important ideological
direction of "Tvoya Zorya" is evident in the cause of inter-
national solidarity on the part of Zabolotnyy and his fellow-
travelers with the strikers, and also the theme of the common
- fates of inen in our planet which evolves closely tied to -
the image of I~Tad' ka-t~adonna. Among the strikers, we read
in tne novel, Zabolotnyy noticed a swarthy mulatto woman
tivho seemed to resemble Vynnykivna very much. "In what way?
Pecause she ~vas dark-skinned this mulatto beauty or perhaps
because holding her infant close to her breast she smiles
to us frorn behind the columns just as friendly as the other
did standing under the apple tree when we came to drink at
the well?" There is no direct answer to this question in
_ the novel, but the reader understands that their alikeness
is in the most essential: Vynnykivna and the mulatto beauty
both personify the spirit of motherhood as the fundamental
principle of human existence.
1111 these ima~es which contrast in the novel with images
of Zabolotnyy's childhood and generally with the life of
people in the socialist world enabled Lida to understand
the content of our spiritual values even better, to honestly
declare that stories from the long ago gone by, 'out very
much alive in the memory of Zabolotnyy, life in Ternivshci~}yna
have a special meaning not only for him alone but also for ner,
a represen~Lative of today's younger generation.
This story if noteworthy also because it is directly concerned
with one more problem which is dealt with in the novel the
problem of ~rrar and peace. Actually this problem is found in -
the very first pag~s of the book and is also tied to the fate
of Labolotnyy. As a fighter plane pilot, he spent almost
the ~vhole past war vrith the fascists in the air. His charac~ter
formed itself in battle, in battle he learned to appreciate
the greatest value in life human solidarity, considering
his present work as a diplomat also as a struggle for
solidarity among pcople, for peace, a struggle to prevent u~rar.
The idea of everyone's responsibility for all and everythin~
acquirnd in "Tvoya Zorya" an even more distinct determination
in the course of disclosing those associative ties found in
tr~e images of 1?oman from the steppe and the old negro Frank.
i~ike f;he enchant;er ~~oman Vynnyk, Frank's occupation is also
peac~ful bee keepin~, which seemingly has no relation to the
living climate on the planet nor ~Lo problems of individual
responsibility for all and everything. }3ut that is only a first
impression.
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`I'he artist did think about man, his responsibility for all ~
and everythin~ tivhen he poetized Roman's and rrank's work in
the melodious apiaries, tivhen together with his heroes he
considered the mysterious life of the tireless, harmonious
workers honeybees. There is truly something to think about.
ilere, for exar~ple, is an image in which the bee "Moans from
delight and happiness, forgetting itself in work, creating
honey from nothing". In another place we learn that bees
feed each other when one becomes ill. Still another te11U
that in Eirazil "hybrids" of aggressive bees have been bred
~vhich are dangerous even for people, or about the fact that
even elephants cannot stand jet noise and here Frank's bees
learned to gather honey right at the airport... ~ach of these
ima;es is filled with thoughts about man, how he must toil,
take care of one another and what conclusions should be
drawn from the fact that today there is still so much
aggressiveness in the world, so many harmful things for
human life.
- Une thinks most about all this reading the novel's last `
chapter in which actual bee interference in human life is
- presented wh~an a swarm of bees settled on a traffic
l.ight on a highway and forced all traffic to a stop before it. _
This episode sounded in the novel as a caution, as a peculiar
~varning delivered to man by nature herself. The bees,
states Zab~lotnyy excitedly, by their behavior said to
humanity: "Stay in place, all of you mister-twisters...
Take a breath, look up at the sky, at the bright sun: Think
about essential, fundamental things: That is something to
do: No, they are truly unique creatures, they must be from
sornewhere, we don't know them yet:..."
IIo~rtever, this episode "does not i emain suspended" in the novel
as a mere vrarning: an optimistic perspective is projected
in it at thc same time because the Paralyzed highway traffic
eventually moves. Bui: an Znteresting detail, the traffic
problem is not resolved by representatives of the official
service ~vho ~vere ready to "put into action hoses and wash
the swarm away"~ but by Frank who is callea out especially
for this job. tidith his bare hands (as was done in similar
instances by T;oman from the steppe) he removes the bee family
fr~~m the traffic signal and ths stream of cars gradually
di;;appears. Thus, the future fate of mankind depends first
of all on the actions of man himself: it is in th e hands
of workers like Frank or his distant colleague from the
steppe Ternivshch3lna Roman...
'Phe final cklord of the lesson given to the people by the bees
on the highway sounded truly optimistic. How then should -
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tr.e last line:~ of i:he novel be received in tivhich ~ve learn -
that this op~Limism apparently did not apply to Zabolotnyy
himself? As far as he tivas concerned, the bee swarm did not
simply ~~rarn hirn of danger, but prophesied it in the real sense
of the word. Is there no contrad~ction here? Did not the
author perhaps violate the laws of logic uniting, it ~vould
~eEm, the incompatible an optimistic perspective for the
life of humanity and the tragic death of one of its represen-
tative~'
C~ne cannot reply to these questions affirmatively. `I'he novel's
artistic philosophy remains in complete conformity with the
philos~phy of 1ife. Telling about the death of Zabolotnyy
the author only confirmed the known formula that dialectic
incompatibility lies at the base of reality development.
Pven more: the mysteriousness of the death of the novel's
main character confirms once more that our world is full of
unsolved Mysteries, and the greatest of them is man himself.
Therefore, the author goes considerably further than "artistic
illustration" of generally known philosophical concepts: in
his novel, in addition to other things, there sounded also
a troubl.~d, trembling, multi-voiced question ~'1HY' "Tvoya
7,orya" is perceived not only as a novel-reflection, novel-
reminiscence, novel-confession, but also as a novel-question.
I~zt us review the whole work once more. Its artistic fabric
is similar to a vrheat field over which during sunny-winc~y
vreather tight waves of ripe spikes ripple over and over towards
the horizon. These v~aves are the novel's endless "whys".
':Jhy are thin~s seen in childhood rememb~red throughout a life-
, time`' VJhy does one specific person or event stay in one's
memary? Why is the air of home or native land so sweet`'
'ilhy is fate so bitter to people like Roman or Nad'ka' ~"1hy
is T~ida embarrassed listening to stories of injustice done to
_ nornan' s family? !`~hy do the bees behave so mysteriously''
:':'hy is it that victims of Hiroshima are "honored" in the same
hotel as new dictators from the jungles? ~~Ihy, finally, don't
"firstrate careerisl;s" perish for whom conscience is only an
abstraction, instead of such personalities as Zabolotnyy,
a tireless seeker of the truth (the characl;er of a wild ox),
a spiritual !~tlas, "a human torpedo", the creator of the energy
of good, tivi~th a youthful, f'alcon's gaze? These "whys" could
go on indefir~itely, states Zabolotnyy at one time. The novel
answers only some of them but forc~s one to think about all
of them. It does not calm, does not rock the reader to sleep,
but lifts him up, fills his soul and heart with this ozone
air of which the novel speaks from the first to the last page.
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"Tvoya Lorya" only just began shining in our literature,
it took its first step on the road to the reader. There is
no doubt that this road will be just as happy as in
"Praporonostsi", "Tronka", "Tsyklon" or other works by the
writer. l3ecause this novel is not an ordinary occurrance
in the socialist realism literature, and among Oles' Honchar's
novels it is completely organic, essential and innovative from
many viewpoints. The essence of the innovation will be
perceived by literary critics in time, but some aspects may -
be discuss~d even today.
Thanks to these and other innovative characteristics "Tvoya
Zorya" quite normally possess the leading place among those
Soviet literature work~ which "Inspire contemporaries and
leave to posterity memories of the heart and soul of our
generation, about our time, its troubies and achievements".6
Oles' Honchar's creativity is a brilliant example of how
generously the wealth of our native language may be utilized,
how it may be polished artistically in order to be returned
to the people again. He knows how to find.the right companion-
_ ship for each word so that it may shine with a new brightness
and how to use a new word so that it may easily become part
of the language resources.
Critics talked about the evolution of Oles' Honchar's style
for the first time back in the 1950's. In reviews of
- novels "Ze~,,ya Hude" ~T.,he Earth Resounc~7, "Tavriya" and
"Perekop" LCross-Ditc~i/ we can read that the poetical quality,
excitement so peculiar to "Praporonostsi'.' now give way to
"ordinary" realistic writing, in which the lyric-romaritic
origin (as the foundation of poetical qualities) is expressed
only in the form of insignificant drops. A little later
conclusions were made that the author would inevitably reach
the path of "pure" narrative realism. However, this "prognosis"
did not materialize. But the author's style did not remain
unchanging, it developed continually. The artist's poetic
thinking acquired a deeper meaning: from the externally
effective poetic qualities the author dired.ted himself
- towards internal poetry which has become organi. to his
realistic prose. "speaking of poetic qualities, wrote Oles'
Honchar himself, we mean first of all its high emotional
load, a deep philosophical thought... Poetical qualities should
be evident in the design, the approach to the theme, and all
of life's mate~ial that the author places at the foundation
of Yiis work."
Thus the poetical qualities of a work are already in its
design, in the approach to the theme. The novel "Tvoya Zorya"
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vras also created in a spirit of poetical realism. It is
poetical both in style, in artistic measures, but most
importantly, in design and its realization. In this lies the
similarity of this novel to all previous works by the author,
but at the same time also a difference. Here the poetic
symbolism as further developed by the author carries within
itself a much more powerful charge of artistic generali~ations.
Two years ago Yehor Isayev wrote in a letter to Oles' Honchar: _
"As I know you, you are very people-oriented, a conscientious
mouzhik, an artist in each nerve and each word rootlet. In
this lies the secret of your you h, this same s cret which
beginning with "Znamenostsi" "Praporonostsi" may be widely
- discovered in millions and millions of yo~r wonderful in _
beauty and strength of influence books." These words by the
1g80 Lenin Prize winner may be repeated today in relation to
Oles' Honchar's ne~v work. "Tvoya Zorya" is a novel in each .
"word rootlet", a young novel, powerful in its influence and
filled with the mag:ic of this wonderful beauty of loyalty
which the writer poetizes inspiringly beginning with the
imperishable "~i~Poronostsi". Tt will become, of course, an _
additional link in the complex system of Oles' Honchar's
_ novels which are a ver.y singular artistic model of life in
our restless and majestic age.
FOOTNOTES
1. D. Favlychko. The Gift of Light and Purity. Ukrainian
Language and Literature in School, 1978, No 4, p 24.
2. See "Literaturna Ukrayina", 1980, I'eb 12.
3. See M. Strel'byts'kyy, The Light of a Good Star. "Litera-
turna Ukrayina", i980, Mar 20.
6. Materials of the 25th C~sU Congress. Politvydav Ukrayiny,
~976, p 9~.
g~ 0-, Honchar. Works in six volumes, Dnipro, 1979, 527 pp.
9. From the writer's personal papers.
CUPYRIGHT: Vydavnytstvo "Naukova Dumka", Radyans'ke Litera- _
turoznavstvo, 1980
END
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