JPRS ID: 9277 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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I~'l?k ()1~'1~1< 1,11, litil~: ()Nl.ti
JPRS L/9277 ~y~ -
28 August 1980 _
West Euro ~ Re ort -
p p -
(FOUO 37/80)
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JPRS L/9277
28 August 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT ~
(FOUO 37/80)
CONTENTS
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
FRANCE
Nuclear Defense, Deterrence Study Concluded
(Pierre Hautefeuille; STRATEGIQUE, Apr-Jun $0) 1
- 'Strategic Cruise Missile' Under Consideration
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 12 Jul 80) 21
M-4 Missile Readied for Uae by 1985
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 12 Jul 80) 26
SSBS-S3 MissilPs Now Operational on Albion Platesu
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 12 Jul 80) 38
Use of SX Mobile Missile Outlined
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 12 Jul 80) 42
COUNTRY ~ECTION
BELGIUM
Belgian Attitude Toward Arms Sales Considere~3 Hypocritical
(POURQUOI PAS?, 12 Jun 80) 44
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
NUCLEAR DEFENSE, DETERRENCE STUDY CONCLUDED
Paris STRATEGIQUE in French Apr-Jun 80 No 6 pp 23-44
~Article by Gen Pierre Hautefeuille: "Nuclear Defense and Deterrence Study
(Conclusion)"; passages enclosed in slantlines are printed in italics~
~Text~ The first part of this article appeared in
STRATEGIQUE No 5.
Chapter II: Nuclear Defense and Deterrence for a Medium Power
Having reached this stage of our remarks, perhaps it would be well to sum
up what has gone before.
We started with several too commonly accepted mythic notions~ pitted them
against reasoned arguments, and concluded that:
--There is neither incompatibility nor antithesis, but on the contrary
a direct and close complementa~ity, between deterrence and defense, in
that every deterrence is of necessity based on a defense (or a veigeance)
capable of being carried out with a reasonable chance of success, S and in
that, inversely, every system of effective defense can serve as the basic
structure in the quest for a:deter~ent capability;
--There is no reason whatever to limit nuclear defense/deterrence coverage
t~ the nation's mainland. Recourse to such coverage is justified a priori
wherever important ("major") interests are involved that cannot be pro-
tected adequately by other means (conventional weapons, economic pres~ures
.
Now then, France, like the other Western European countries, has for many
decades had interests that are outside "the Hexagon" ~French colloquialism
- meaning French mainland~ but nonetheless genuinely vital to it--since an
enemy, by bearing down upon those interests, could cause the death of -
millions of Frenchmen--and that it cannot be sure of being able to defend
by conventional means against all potential threats; the most obvious case
is that of its energy sources.
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--There is no such thing as an absolute, all-purpose "Deterrence"; it is
only in the most abstract sense that one can speak of deterrence, or of
defense, without relating them to the highly specific threats they are
meant to counter.
It is of course possible that the same defensive or deterrent weapon will
be valid against several different threats; but it will never be valid
against all. To deal with different potential threats, it is therefore
necessary, as a general rule, to provide several "defer?se/deterrent"
capabilities, and to base them on separate and distinct weapons to the
extent that the different threats could materialize simultaneously or
successively. '
Referring again to the case of France oppo~ed by a b~g power, the threats
to be anticipated would be, on the one hand, that of a massive nuclear
strike against our country and, on the other hand, those of the convention- '
' al attacks that could be directed against our territory, or against one or
another o� our "vital" or simply "major" interests abroad, as for example
our energy supply sources.
Against the first of these, we have accepted the fact that~for us there is
ao conceivable "defense" (in the strict sense of the term), but only a
highly credible potential for "~engeance," on which, provided it is backed
by nuclear weapons in sufficient numbers and of suitable quality, a sound
deterrence can be built.
This vengeance would consist of massive reprisals using the totality of our
second strike arsenal.
This is the only case in which the "all or nothing" doctrine could be
justified by a medium power.
Against conventional threats, a defense/deterrent capability, to avoid
- passing as an absurdity, must bp based on other means, which clearly cannot
be other than:
--aleo conventional, or
--tactical nuclear ("counterforce"),~or
--strategic nuclear (counter-city), but in the form of limited and progres-
sive strikes.
The conventional solution is applicak~le to all cases of aggression in which
the stakes for the enemy would be small enough to justify on his part no
more than the engagement (and potential loss) of "pinpoint strike" forces
against our conventional forces.
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Beyond this threshold, the conventional solution would be foredoomed to
failure; no choice other than that between the tactical nuclear and the
graduated counter-city response would remain open.
We have categorically ruled out the tactical nuclear choice in case of a
de~ensive war in Western Europe; we do not recognize it as a valid choice
except at sea, possibly in space or possibly even in sparsely populated
zones. ~
We have on the other hand concluded that the graduated counter-city
option need not represent the danger of extreme escalation that is all ~
too often associated with it, but that /in certain cases/ it could
represent an e�fective defense/deterrent means, the only one left to a
, medium power to resort to if its conventional forces prove insufficient
- to repulse an aggression.
It now remains to define what these cases might be.
We set forth the rudimentary elements of the answer to this question when
we wrote that a medium power's graduated nuclear initiative, intervening
under general conditions that had beeu clearly stipulated, could induce a
big power to desist �rom its aggression on one condition: that the mec]ium
power's residual second strike capability following its initial strike be
sufficient to offset the /global/ value the big poker attributes /at that
point/ to the stakes in the conflict, in other words, the sum of the
initial political value of this stakes and its agitable supplements.
One way (the most current one) of apprnaching our problem consists of
asking: At what point could this be so? What are the /chances/ of this
condition being fulfilled?
To a question phrased in these term$, only a fortune-teller has the answer.
What must in fact be determined is how one must set about it--to what means,
to what procedures he must resort--to ensure that it will be so?
To proceed with the solution to this problem, let us examine the express ion
of this inequality, which brings together most of its givens:
Residual nuclear capability ~ Big power's political evaluation
of the medium power of stakes
+ Vengeance + Prestige
~greater
than~
Can deterrence succeed if this inequality is satisfied? How can it be
satisfied?
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_ It leaps to the eye that, of the four terms comprising this inequality,
there is one on which the medium power can exert no control action ~~hat-
ever: the "big power's political evaluation oi the stakes." We will there-
fore say nothing here in that regard except that the medium power must
nevertheless not fail to take it constantly into account in its analysis of
the situation, and must therefore strive to assess and constantly update .
its estimate of this factor as accurately as possible.
The medium power can, on the other hand, bring action to bear upon the
other three f~ctors in ways that we will now analyze.
1. Residual Nuclear Capability of the Medium Power
Mathematically speaking, the greater this capability the more easily this
inequality will~be satisfi~~d.
It must therefore be augmented.
A priori, there are two ways to do this:
--First of all, the medium power can enhance its initial nuclear capabil-
ity, meaning the capability with which it would enter the conflict.
--Secondly, it can reduce the scale of i.ts initial strikes to reduce the
demands made by these on its starting capability.
We will not expand upon the second of these ways for the moment, except to
say that our examination of the "vengeance" and "prestige" factors will
lead to fully convergent conclusions.
Let. us however examine the first way, on which one miqht at first glance
be tempted to rely entirely, but whose practical limitations one rapidly
perceives from thre~e different viewpoints. ~ �
The first of these is financial: NucZear weapens, their delivery systems
and their "environment" e;:e costly, and the resources that must be alloca- .
ted to them are necessarily a tradeof~~at�the expense of the~national -
economy .
The second is humar:itarian: An increase in strike capability must be
commensurate with its assumed euentual use: It stands to reason that it _
must produce greater damage to the enemy. Now then, while it is a precept _
of~war that sufficient violence must be inflicted upon the enemy to ensure
the imposition of one's will, it is also proper that this violence be
limited strictly to the indispensable...
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The third viewpoint is still humanitarian but, this time, centered on self-
interest, in that it is based on the friendl.y losses and damages that could
~ result from an eventual nuclear battle involving an escalation of weapons.
, These (potential or real) friendly damages would be a function of those
inflictable or inflicted upon the enemy, with a coefficient of proportion-
ality between one and the other ti~at~ would depend on the adroitness with
whicr the medium power conducted its operations and the extent to which it
succeeded (or. could expe..t to succeed) in moderating the enemy's "agitable"
reactions; under the best of circumstances, one should not anticipate this
coefficient to be less than 1.5.
- Whate~er may be the value of that coefficient, "friendly" damage, if the
dei.ense is not to be stripped of all political significance, must not
exc~~ed the value assigned by the medium power to the stakes in the con-
flict; under these conditions, it would be useless for the medium power to `
' ha:�e an assured strike capability greater than two-thirds this value of _
the stakes. -
It is this lir~it, calculated assuming the most dangerous threat and
embodying a substantial margin of sec:rity, that must be used by the
medium power to determine, in peacetime, the strike~capability required
by its strategic forces. ~
Once the crisis or the conflict had begun, the me~ium power could no longer
expect to increase its strike capability; it could only seek to exploit its
existing capability to the utmost; the only possibilities remaining to iY.
then for short-term maneuvering to maintain or restore the basic inequali`y
- would be:
- --on the one hand, as we have already said and as we will subsequently i
discuss further, to limit to the bare minimum its initial strikes;
--on the other hand and above all (and when, of course, the strike capabil-
ities available to it are su~erabundant), to moderate to the maximum the
enemy's "vengeance".and "prestige" reactions.
It is this particular aspect of the short-term deterrence maneuver that.we
must now examine.
2. Vengeance
Clearly, a diminution of the "vengeance" factor would cantril.~ute to the
resolution of our inequality.
We will a~~sume this "vengeance" factor to be proportional to the losses and
damages inflicted on the big power by the medium power's nuclear initiative
and will therefore take as an axiom the ~~d tn red~zce these losses and
damages to a minimum.
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These two terms will of course include their physical and material dimen-
sions, but also a larger one: the destruction of a city of artistic
interest, even though sparsely populated, that o� a national shrine being
as deeply resented as would be that of a densely populated urban center.
But here also there is a limit: that beyond which this reduction would _
compromise the assigned object of the nuclear initiative.
Let us try then to define this object Precisely, and for this purpose let
us refer to the situation study undertaken earlier in this discussion;
under the terms of this study, the medium power should not resort to its
nuclear defense capability except in the case that:
--Its strategic nuclear capability surpasses the "value of the stakes for
the big power";
--The big power has been completely informed of the medium power's inten-
tions but has deemed it incapable of resorting to /this particular/ form
of defense, basing this conclusion on an awareness of real problems, no
doubt, the maqnitude of which it has misjudged to the point of attributing
to them a"blocking" effect on tr,~ medium power's freedom of nuclear
a~tioti; and the latter has tried in vain until then to persuade the big
power of its error through warnings, notifications, then preparations and
concrete alert measures carried out successfully despite the latter's
"difficulties."
The medium power's nucl~ar initiative under these conditions would have as
its sole reason for being to bring before the big power, which the fore-
going warnings have failed to convince, hard eviden~:,e this time of the
medium power's freedom of nuclear action; the combininq of the threat of
~ the "intolerable," which is kept hanging over the head of the big ioower,
and the evidence that the medium power could effectively strike the latter
should produce the deterrent effect being sought. -
What must be carefully noted, however, is that the convincing value of this
sequence would derive essentially from the initial launch as such (or its
repetition); from the mere fact, that is, of its having been carried out
despite the problems, and not from the damage it may have inflicted.
The essential thing at this stage would be to Taunch, and there is no
reason whatever, from the strict viewpoint of ttie purpose of this initial
launch, why its material effec:ts should not be kept minimal: on the con- _
trary, such minimization would respond at one and the.same time to the
desire to limit the "vengeance" effect and to the desire to keep the ini-
tial demands on the medium power's nurlear capability as small as
possible.
This systematic reduction must be adhered to as a cardinal rule. ~
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As actually carried out, therefore, the medium power's nuclear initiative
could take the form of a single, low-destructive-powered launch, a"blank"
launching of sorts, in other words, one intended to produce very reduced
damage ~r none: for example, over ~ little- or non-inhabited region, or a
virtually deserted coastal waters zone.
Could the damage to be inflicted on the enemy by the initial laun~~h be
still further reduced?
The idea. has in fact been around for some time that a medium power could
take its initiative in the form of a strike over its own territory or that
~ of an ally.
, This would certainly be satisfactory from the viewpoint of the "vengeance
effect," in that it would inflict neither losses nor civilian damage on the
enemy, and would avoid violating his national space. It has thus, from
this standpoint, attracted several analysts, giving rise among them to
theories on the "deterrent" value of more or less systematic and more or
~ less massive use of tactical nuclear weapons.
` It is much less attractive from the :tandpoint of the ultimate pu~pose of
the i.nitial launch, whi.~h is, we repeat, to furnish proof of the medium
power's determination to escalate, if r~ccessary, to the strategic nuclear
level; a"tactical" launch wou~d in itself actually not constitute such
proof. It would at best lend itself to uncertainties, since it could be
interpreted either as a step toward the strategic level, and thereby as a
sian~? (and not as evidence) of the medium power's determination to escal-
ate to that level, or as /the start of a tactical nuclear battle/, which,
as we have seen, the big power need not fear, since it is in a position to
sustain such a battle for a much longer time than the medium power.
The latter interpretation would tend to prevail as long as certain opinions
on the "deterrent" value of a conventional engagement with massive tactical
nuclear support remained current--opinions that are in fact based more
_ often than not on a lack of sufficient thought, on an exaggerated evalua-
tion of the risks of a strategic initiat~ve, and on the fear of facing up
to them.
J We therefore will not d~scard a priori the solution of a"tactical" nuclear
initiative,16 but on the express condition that it incorporate appropriate
measures to ensure correct "readability" o� the "message" it intends to
convey: the verbal communications (by telephone hotline or otherwise) that
would precede or accompany the launch must be absolutely clear and precise;
- but it is the for;nalities of the initiative that must leave no room for any
possible misunderstanding; to this effect, the following two rules, among
others, should be~ obseYved:
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--A tactical nu~:lear initiative should involve a launch of not more than
one weapon and should avoid destructive or neutralizing effects upon the
enemy forces, so as to minimize the chances of being interpreted as the
"start of a counterforces battle."
--In the event that the big power, despite this precaution, committed such
an interpretative error, in no case should the launch be repeated in the
same form; the second strike must be in the enemy's national space.
3. Prestige
Let us now consider the prestige factor.
Here again, the resolui.ion of our basic inequality requires that attacks on
the prestige of the big power be minimized, so as to minimize the "supple-
mentary stakes" they would generate.
Proceeding in the manner just described in respect to the vengeance factor
would clearly contribute to the accomplishment of this aim; it is self-
evident that limiting the "losses and damage" inflicted on the big power as
a means of reducing the "vengeance" effect would at the same time reduce
attacks on the big power's prestige; in sum, two~birds would be killed
with one stone.
Another possibility is also open to the medium power: that of c:hoosing
wittingly the timing of its nuclear initiative, considering that the less
the big power had advanced in its aggression, and the less substantial the
gains it had aahieved by then and would have to give up (at least in part),
the less the big power's prestige would be threatened by the latter's
being constrained to desist from its aggxession before having fully
achieved its aims.
For the medium power seeking to reduce the "prestige" factor, this con-.
sideration provides an opening argument in favor of a"preemptive" strat-
egy--a "preemptive nuclear strategy" to be precise, in other words, a
nuclear initiative taken at the earliest inceptive stage of an aggression.
But the inherent limitations on the effectiveness of these two c~tegories
_ of ineasures are rapidly reached: valid though they are to a certain point,
they become impotent beyond it. In effect, all of the precautions and
carefully worked out steps taken by the medium power, together, could not
change the essential fact that what would be involved for the big power
would be the abandonment of a plan, a necessarily important one since it
had justified on its part a resort to war, and, what is worse, having to
do it under pressure from a weaker power than itself. In th~ fact alone,
in the very principle, of this abandonment, there would be, for the big
power, a lowering of its prestige, a loss of face that, despite a1T efforts
to "reduce" and "compress" this effect, could not be minimized below the
threshold of the unacceptable.
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Those who doubt the chances of success of a graduated nuclear initiative
by a medium po~ver find in this a strong argument, strong enough to have led
_ some analysts to conclude that the big power could never bow to such condi-
tions, and that any strategic nuclear initiative by the medium power,
howsoever "graduated," would ineluctably bring about, by way of reaction,
the latter's complete destruction. And this, in turn, has led some to
advocate an "all or nothing" initiative (If lose we must, no matter what ~e
do, why not choose the most frightening outcome? Perhaps it will frighten
the enemy as well...), and others to reject categorically a defense mode
that could, under these conditions, be nothing other than suicidal.
This brings us to the heart of the problem. If a big power could indeed
never agree to give in to a med~.um power, tY,en no other position is possi-
ble, and the argument for the concept of a medium power's nuclear "defense/
deterrent" capability against a big power crumbles in its entirety. At this
point then, as we have said above, the method of "compressions" and "reduc-
tions" becomes impotent... -
Then what?
Then, however, a way out is open... or rather could be opened in certain
cases and under certain conditions: specifically and paradoxically, in
circumstances wherein the "prestige" obstacle had resisted all efforts to
whittle it down and had proven impenetrable frontally, but wherein it would
be possible to duck the issue, to get around it, by simply faking the
significance of the facts in regard to whether or not they conform to the
, big power's intentions; in other word's, by giving to the latter's failure
' the appearances of a success.
Things would certainly not just happen this way on their own; the game,
especially for the medium power, would be incre~3ibly difficult to play
_ out; but it would provide the sole chance of success, a~eal and bona fide
chance (and we insist on this point), as long as the big power maintained
for its part ar, adequate semblance of rationality in its behavior.
This wovld require that the two antagonists remain lucidly aware enough of
the dangers of an escalation and of their common interest in avoiding it
to feel compelled to seize and not relinquish again their opportunity in
this respect: They would in this case have to agree to adopt and play out
a scenario that, starting with the medium power's nuclear initiative, would
" lead to a cease of hostilities that would be made to appear to public
opinion as if it had been decided by the big power after having won a�
victory. `
By the very nature of things, this scenario would no~ seek to alter.the
facts, which are in any case hard to hide or disguise, especially in a free
society, but rather their interpretation; in fact, it would be, above all,
_ the big power's initial intentions and its war objectives that would have
to be disquised in such a way as to be able to affirm that the first were
carried out and the second achieved.
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But the margin available for lying woul.d not be very large; to fulfill its
assigned role, in other words, to be believed, the scenario must be veri-
~ similar and must th~refor.e display at least a minimum of interior and
exterior logic.
First, the i~,terior logic: To be seen as the winner, the big power must
come out of it with gains, the inevitable counterpart of which are equiva-
lent sacrif ices by the medium power. -
The medium power mus~ make concessions, lesser ones of course than those -
its aggressor had originally planned to impose on it, but nevertheless
_ enough i~ clothe the scenario's "war aims" in consistency and pla~asi-
bility.
- The medium powei must, in particular, resign itself to letting the big
power have the "last word" of the operations: "conventional" military
operations, of course, where the latter has preferred or had to refuse
altogether to do battle at that level; /but, above all, nuclear operations:
the medium power must, to remove all doubt, agree to suffer the last strike _
in the conflict/; it must moreover agree that this last strike (the only
one if things have gonE well, but perhaps also the second, third...) will -
be more destructive than its own to which the latter is responding.
/hiore generally, the medium power could ^~t succeed in winning t?~e war
unless it agreed to appear to have lost it/.
Not, however, in any manner whatever: The medium power would, at the same
time that it effected its initial strike and mac]e its initial offer of a `
- scenario to the big power, stipulate the maximum limits it was prepared to
accept in the latter's reprisal, beyond which it would escalate one step -
(and only one step at a time) .
This outline provides same idea of how delicate the negotiation of such
an agreement would be.
Then, the exterior logic: The scenario must ".hang toc}ether" as consistently -
as possible w ith the events that have preceded it, or at least with those
known to the general public: the policy that was being followed by the
enemy, the preliminaries to the conflict, the unfolding of prior opera-
tions... _
Besides, it must not contain too blatant contradictions with the ideologies
- and doctrines of the antagonists, nor with their previous statements of
intentions, especially those of the big power... -
For those who must create the scenar. io, the task, as can be seen, would
~e a difficult one. ,
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FOF OFFTCiAI, IiSE ~1NLY
It would be made all the more difficult by the fact that each hour, each
day that passed would add to its complications, in that they would be
opening further opportunities for new ~eclarations and ir.tentions by the
big power that would correspondingly and progressively reduce the medium
power's margin for maneuver.
- The facts themselves, for their part, wo~ld also be giveaways: military
operations, the weapons used in them, their objectives, their development,
the political measures that accom~anied them--these would all be, even in
the absence of accompanying statements, so many indications of the real
objectives and would rer~der the camouflaging of the latter all the more
difficult.
- There is in this, for the medium power, a second argument, much more
pressing than the first one we have cited, for a"preemptive" nuclear
strategy.
Discreetness Would be the remaining condition for the success of the opera-
tion: the smallest "leak" revealing the artificial character of the scen-
ario would ruin its credibility in one fell swoop and, by sealing off to
the adversaries the ~scape route the; thought they had found, could force
them to resume their nuclear escalation to the catastrophic summits that
are well known to all.
We do not claim to have exhausted the subject through these few comments;
we feel, however, that we now have at our disposal a sufficiency, in
number and substantiveness, of mooring points on which ta advance, basing
our approach on them, our concepts of the main outlines that could serve to
shape~"concretely" a medium power's defense/deterrent capability against
a big power.
The first thing to be said in this regard is that this defense/deterrent
capability would include /two dietinct facets/, the first of which would
be designed to address the threat of a//massive strategic strike ~printed
in boldface~//, in which the big power would take the initiative either
at the start of the conflict or at any moment thereafter, and the second
of which would address the forms of aggression that could be anticipated
under the assumed situational conditions we have been considering, namely,
a//conventional aggression that would outclass the capabilities of our
conventional defenses ~printed in boldface~//, or a//tactical nuclear
aggression ~printed in boldface~//. These two facets of defence/deter-
rence, which we will label A and B respectively in the part of our dis-
- cussion that follows below, would involve recourses to different modes
of action, and necessarily, therefore, to weapons that would also differ
in one facet from the other.
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Defense/Deterrence Against a Crushing Strategic Strike: Defense/Deterrent 'A'
This would consist of a massive strategic strike using all the weapons at
our disposal in retaliation against the enemy's crushing strike.
It would be a vengeance, as we have heretotore said, and not a defense
strictly speaking. It nevertheless remains possible, however, and even
relatively easy by reason of the credibility of such a reaction, to build
upon it a viable deterrent. But, unlike defense/deterrent B, it would be
- merely a preventive deterrent.
This vengeance/deterrent capability rests on the permanent availability
af a second strike capability at least equal to the maximum value the big
power could attach to the stakes in all the foreseeable hypotheses of
conflict, augmented by its possible "vengeance" and "prestige" supplements.
This strike capability would be dedicated to this one and only mission of
reprisals, and would in no case be used for defense B, even if the latter
must be committed in full; defense/deterrent A must conserve its deterrent
effectiveness to the last instant of conflict and even beyond it, and must,
- in particular, prevent the big power from "wrapping up" /at any time/
nuclear exchange B, which the medium power had initiated.
Defense/deterrent A, in fact, besides thp protection it provides against
a big power massive nuclear initiative, would act also as a/protective
umbrella over defense/deterrent B, enabling the medium power to place the
latter in operation without excessive risk, conferring on~it at the samp _
time a certain credibility and thereby ensuring its deterrent ef.fect.
Its essential role in the medium power's overall. defense/deterrent system,
of which it is the backbone, justifies its being called the "principal
defense/deterrent."
Defense/Deterrence Against a Conventional (or Tactical Nuclear) Aggression:
Defense/Deterrent 'B'
Carried out, to the end if need be, under the protection of the prinoipal
defense/deterrent, defense/deterrent B is built on strategic strike weapons
of the same capacity as the preceding ones but necessarily distinct from
them for two reasons.
First, precisely because defense B should be able to be put and kept in
operation to the very end without ever having to do without the protection -
of the principal defense/deterrent system and therefore without tapping
the latt~r's firing capacity.
And secondly, because nuclear fir,e~direction and control would be different
in the two cases, involving different technical characteristics and per-
formances for their respective weapons and delivery systems: whereas for
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the massive strike by the principal defense/deterrent, in the main, a
saturation strike over the enemy defenses may be counted on to pierce them
and reach its objectives, it is not the same for defense/deterrent B, which
- launches an initial "blank" (or "tactical") strike, followed if necessary
. by other progressively "heavier" strikes, but with constant attention to
limiting damage to the indispensable minimum needed to establish the credi-
bility of the threat.18 Under these conditions, it would definitely not
be a matter of launching 3, 4 or 5 strikes to ensure that at least one
- reaches the target; the risk of having them all arrive and multiply by such
factor the retaliation that must be absorbed in return would be unaccept-
able. ~nly the most modern and most sophisticated weapons would be
assigned to defense/deterrent 8,19
We will not go into extensive detail on the total "environment" required
by the nuclear portion of the defense/deterrent apparatus to enable it to
carry out its function: information, communications, security, etc...
There is a point, however, that appears to need stressing, because its
importance is too frequently underestimated and because its aspects
under one facet of defense/deterrence are not the same as under the other.
It concerns civil defense, particul4rly as regards measures for protect-
ing civilian populations and property from the effects of nuclear explo-
sions, and for rendering first aid and help thereafter.
Ordinarily, it is considered that such measures, at least on the scale on
' which they could reasonably be undertaken, would at best be ridiculously
ineffective.
Unfortunately, it must be agreed that this would be true, or nearly so,
in the event nuclear war took the "all or nothing" form all too frequently
ascribed to it. This is the form in which the principal defense would
have to intervene. And as long as the resources dedicated to defense
remain of the same order of magnitude as they are today it appears impos-
sible to provide effective measures against such an eventuality, and use-
less therefore to take them into account in determining the missions and
equipping of civil defense.
But it is an entirely different matter under defense/deterrent B, where _
the limited character of nuclear strikes would, on the contrary, permit
an assured effectiveness without prohibitive expenditures: Action in this
domain should involve essentially the provision of anti-fallout shelters
(much less costly than anti-blast shelters) and the organization of
numerous and well-equipped first-aid columns.20
.
Very wrongly, an anti-deterrent effect is sometimes ascribed to such -
measures, arguing that they would reflect a lack of confidence in the
chances of success of deterrence.
This viewpoint is illogical and dangerous.
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How can we expect to make the enemy believe we are determined to resort,
if need be, to nuclear defense~ if we do not at the same time prepare to _
receive the retaliating response that is sure to follow? Eiow better, on
the contrary, to demonstrate the serious intent and the gravity of our
deterrent threat, and ensure its credibility, than by openly preparing
ourselves to suffer all the consequences of putting it into operation? _
No. Civil defense, to the extent that it is reasonably possible to provide
it with a minimum effectiveness,as is the case under defense/deterrent B,
is the indispensable complement of the strike force. -
If only because of its nuclear weapons and their sophisticated delivery
systems, together with its obligatory civil defense support, defense/
deterrent B is far more cumbersome and complex on the whole than the
- principal defense/deterrent.21
Is this to say that, strictly speaking, defense/deterrent B can be c3one
without?
Certainly not, and the term "principal" we~.have used to label the one does
not in any way signify that the other is but an accessory; both are in fact
equally indispensable and indissociable one from the other: Providing
defense/deterrent A alone will of course counter the threat of sudden mass
destruction, but it leaves the door wide open to conventional aggression.
Disregarding the principal deterrent, on the other hand, and settling for
defense B, deprives the latter of fts "protective umbrella" without which
it loses all its effectiveness.
France cannot afford to do without one or the other.
Chapter III: How to Ensure the Rationality of the Aggressor's Behavior
Our final chapter presents some general considerations that we deem
essential to the conceiving and conducting of defense/deterrence. The
- importance of these two aspects will be easier to grasp now that the con-
crete bases underlying them are known. They have an important bearing on
the rationality of the big power's behavior and on the means of ensuring
that rationality.
Rationality of Big Power's Behavior
The maintenance of a sufficient degrce of rationality in the behavior of
the big power would, as we have said, be one of the requisites for the
success of a limited nuclear initiative by the medium power; we have there-
fore insisted on the care with which the latter should avoid not only
provoking the big power to ~.he point of irrationality but also qiving rise
to any but the least possible "emotional supplements to the stakes" from
the latter's viewpoint.
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Our readers will agree without our further arguing the point, we hope, that
this concern should manifest itself well before the nuclear initiative is
actually undertaken, even before the start of the hostilities, and in fact
from the opening of the crisis: From that moment onward, the talks with
the enemy, and the military operations that follow, conventional or nuclear
and.assuming they do, should be conducted, as regards form as well as con-
tent, in a"style" combining extreme firmness with a respect for the other's
dignity that will not stop short of courtesy.22
The proper balance between these two, necessarily a precarious one, cannot
be found and maintained without an "in-depth" knowledge of the enemy: of
its people, of course, but also of its leaders, and of the inner moving
forces to which the behavior of one and the other of these will respond.23
It is to be noted in passing that, within these terms of reference, the
military operations involved, conventional and nuclear, as well as the alert
measures and military warnings that would have preceded them, could be ~
considered, together with the concomitant steps taken in the diplomatic,
- economic and other domains, as elements of a genuine 'dialog' between the
two antagonist countries--a dialog the conduct of which would be on both
sides an undissociable whole under a;ingle and consequently politica]ly
responsible head.24
But let us get back to the problem of the rationality of the big power's
behavior to state that all the precautions taken in a crisis situation, and
subsequently in a state of war, to preserve rationality, could be in vain
if they are not preceded by acti:on of a totally dif�erent nature but con-
vergent on the same objective. Goinq from the conditional to the indica-
tive, we assert that it is in time of peace, before the start of any crisis
--now, in sum--that this action can and must be taken: We refer to the
intellectual work of analyzing our defense problems that is needed to work
out and periodically revise our own doctrines and concepts in this realm,
but that also cannot fail to influence those of the potential enemy and to
thus determine, in advance and to a certain extent at.~he very least, the ~
more or less rational manner in which, should the moment arrive, he would
conduct his own operations.
Let us take a closer look at how this influence can in fact be brought to
bear, first on the friendly, then on the enemy, viewpoints.
The necessary theoretical analysis must take as basic data, on the one han~?
the conceivable threats and the objectives assigned to the defense to
counter them, and on the other hand the means in terms of inen, weapons and
materiel of all kinds, and the effects that can be expected to result fram
putting them into operation; it must rely as much as possible on past
experience, but where this is lacking it must substitute a logical and
patient etfort of the imagination; the 1.atter is very largely the case in
nuclear defense/deterrence today, the study of which cannot benefit from
any valid precedent whatever.
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f~Ok OI~I~iCIAI, ff5f~. ONI.Y
~~n the "conduct of war" level (as on all the others), the responsibility
for this analysis devolves upon those who would also bear the responsibil-
ity for the acti~n, namely, the political leadership at the highest
echelon.
- They cannot be expected, however, to accomplish the task all by themselves,
compelled as they are to divide their attention among many resvonsibili-
ties. They must therefore fall back,.for a portion of it, on s~ecialists
and theoreticians, who may either be advisers within their own organization
or independent researchers, and, through critical analysis, selection and
= synthesis of the results of the work done by such specialists and theore-
ticians, form their own personal opinions. Official positions must ensue
from the latter.
The influence of the specialists and the theoreticians is therefore not
necessarily determinant of the content of the concepts and doctrines of
their respective countries, but it is nonetheless of consequence. Gener-
ally speaking, it may be said that the newer and more complex the problems,
as is the case today of those posed by nuclear defense/deterrence, the
greater is the specialists' and theoreticians' influence.
These concepts and doctrines of defense, its intellectual bases, determine
in turn the material anc7 human resources that must be allocated to it, but
also the practical use that will be made cf them in a potential conflict,
at least in its early stages.
As regards r.esources, there can be no question of this: The armed forces,
the civil defense bodies, their weapons and equipment, their organization,
their modes of action, their training... are all strictly a function of the
concepts governing their use.
At the opening stage of the conflict, the conduct of initial operations
is also governed by these concepts, for two reasons at least:
--Firstly, becaus~ the armed forces and civilian bodies, equipped, trained,
and supplied as they~are for a~specifi:ed.type of action, can only be fitted
for operations of another type at the cost of a conversion for which events
do not allow enough time.
--Secondly, it is no lonqer the time for working out or improving concepts,
but rather for applying them. The problems of defense/deterrence are
complex; in time of peace, in the quieti~of the:studies environment, it
takes months, years, indeed decades, to grasp them in their entirety. In
a time of crisis or during the early stages o� a~conflict, the effects of
fatigue and the weight of the responsibilities involved add to the nervous
tension, timeframes shorten dramatically, and i,~:can hardly be expected of
leadership to do other than implement the schemes worked out in time of =
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roK c~r�r�ic.~n~, usi: ~~N?,Y
peace.25 It is only aft~r several days, more often weeks or months, if
there is still time, that it becomes possible to pause for thinking, taking
stock, and refining doctrine and concepts by way of minor retouchings or
major revisions that experience, finaly acquired and no doubt dearly paid
for, has shown to be necessary.
The importance of doctrinal thought in tirr:~ of peace--for the country, for ~
the preparation of its defense and ~f the putting into action of that
defense, for its success or its defeat... --istclear. Our doctrinal
thought proved faulty in 1870, in 1914, in 1940... ; it would be disastrous
~ were it to prove so once again.
What is less clear, and what we wish to come to now, is that the influence
of theoretical thought makes itself felt not only in its own country but
also among that country's allies and potential enemies. In this domain,
as in all fields of scientific thought, there is a.far-reaching~extent of ~
osmotic phenomena that is first df aIl inherent, of course, in the density
of the modern international relations system, but that is especially marked
where problems are concerned that are as new and complex as those being
posed by nuclear defense/deterrence, to which, 30 years after their initial -
appearance, truly satisfactory responses have no t yet been found. Big and
medium alike, the member powers of the atomic club are therefore all eyes
and ears for any thoughts arising.on the subject abroad as well as at home.
Theoretical thought therefore determines, to a certain extent we repeat,
not only the concepts and beha~ior of a nation's own leaders but also those
of their potential adversaries.
Theories and doctrines in this domain constitute to a certain extent what
are called "self-fulfilling theses," in that they find confirmation in -
history wher.ever men who "create" events, on one grounds or another, and _
who, rightly or wrongly, render them creditable, behave in accordance with
what those theories and doctrines present as norms, rules, laws, or... a
sense of history.
This is the case of, among others, the theory of the ineluctable "escala-
tion to extremes," an~? ~f the "all or nothing" concept that derives from
the latter. We have referred to these as absurd irrational myths under the
conditions we have set forth; this does not mean, however, that these myths
could not be transposed into the realm of facts if political leaders were �
to consider them norms of history and accept them, in the moment ~f
decision, as their rule of~action.
Should this be our case the day we find ourselves in the position of havin9
to resort to our current nuclear defense/deterrent system against a big -
power, our chances of doing so without unleashing a cataclysm would be
virtually nil.
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~ In a more moderate manner of speaking, the probability that the big power _
would react to a graduated initiative by the medium power by crushing the
lattex would be proportional to the measure of faith the latter's leaders
hsd placed in the myth.
Inversely, the chances for a medium power to "retrieve" at an acceptable
price the monumental error a big power that, not having believed in the
medium power's determination to defend itself by nuclear means, had
launched a conventional aggression against the Iatter, would be all the
more favorable the more the rational manner of countering it (the manner we
~ have discussed or others yet to be proposed...) had been widely debated,
analyzed, assimilated beginning in peacetime by the leaders of the co-
interested countries.26
The conclusions to be drawn are clear.
The validity of a defense/deterrent system depends upon the sacrifices the
citizens will undergo for it: sacrifices in money, time, discomforts and
sufierings, and perhaps some day in blood. It depends also upon the amount
of work put into the thinking in depth that alone can bring these sacri-
fices to fruition and deflect efforts leading to sterile dead ends. Doc-
trinal research on defense must be encouraged; it must be especially
encouraged among the medium powers, whose problems are the more arduous,
since they would be in the position of t~~ weaker confronting the stronger,
and since they therefore could not expect to succeed unless they can
compensate their inferiorities by a surplus of resolve, certainly, but also
by an appropriate measure of intelligence.
But it must be encouraged with discernment: This means unveiling and dis-
pelling the myths that, were their audience to be further� enlarged, would
whittle down dangerously the chances that, to us medium powers confronting
- bigger ones, have been opened up by nuclear weapons and their delivery
systems.
It is to this that we are trying hard now to contribute.
FOOTNOTES
15. and considered to be so by the enemy. Theoretically, this second
condition is moreover the sole indispensable one...
16. We use this term "tactical" only because the launch would be effected
using a weapon that is today being called "tactical." In fact, however,
- the operation would be 100 percent strategic.
17. These concessions could be made immediately operative. They could also
be deferred in time, and so lend themselves to further discreet manipu-
lations that would reduce their effects.
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18. The likeness of this sequence to the longstanding conventional
mechanism of warning shots is self--evident.
19. This would not prec~ude plann~ng for their participation in the princi-
pal vengeance if unfortunately it became necessary to resort to it...
20. Natural catastrophes would render these columns productive in peacetime
while providing training for them.
21. The psychological and moralp problems that bringing it into action -
would pose would also be much more difficult to resolve, above all
sin~e it would devolve upon the medium power to take the nuclear
initiative.
22. This is neither Utopian not an idle dream: True soldiers know the mean-
ing of respect for the enemy.
23. Motivations that cannot be adequately understood by way of official
. ideology alone, not by a long way...
~ 24. More gener.ally speaking, the conduct of a taunch (or of an operation)
must be entrusted to those who are in a position to observe its results -
and make the necessary adjustments to strike the target or produce the
assigned effect.
//If the desired effect is to be on the enemy's armed forces, i is to -
the military ~printed in boldface~// that the mission of conducting
the launch or the operation must be entrusted.
In the case in point, it would obviously be a political responsibility,
- since it is the political leaders who, situated as they are at the
point of convergence of the political and military information flows,
would be in the best position to judge whether or not the "message"
delivered by the nuclear launch had been understood,, and hence whether
it aould be necessary to amplify on it or to repeat it. Thus, the
- political leadership must bear the responsibility not only for the ~
/initiative/ but also for the /conduct/ of nuclear fire.
25. Any more than one can expect of a young officer, or of a y~ung soldier,
in their first combat action, other than the entry znto action of the
mechanisms they acquired in training.
26. It could be argued that the nuclear defense/deterrent we are advocating
here is itself but a self-fulfilling thesis. And wi~h good reason.
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It offers nonetheless, over the myths we have been denouncing, the
twofold advantage of, on the one hand, being logically coherent and of,
on the other hand, preserving the concept of the medium power's defense
against the big power.
COPYRIGHT: 1980, Strategique
9399
CSO: 3100
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
'STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE' UNDER CONSIDERATION
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 12 Jul 80 pp 79~80
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "France Is Studying a Strategic 'Cruise Mis-
sile"']
[Text] The cruise missile is presently a possib ility--one that has been ex-
amined in parallel with the SX strategic ballistic missile--for the mobile
"new component" of the FNE [Strategic Nuclear Force]: a component which the
president of the republic recently reierred to the study of.i
The idea of the cruise missile is not new in France.2 Proposals were con-
ceived, then abandoned, in the past, when a"long-range air-to-ground mis-
sile" for the Strategic Nuclear Force was the question.
The cruise missile can be defined as "a long-range missile flying at very
- low altitude and propelled by a turbojet."
Since the German V-1--propelled by a pulsejet--of the last World War, vari-
- ous missiles can be likened to the cruise missile--in particular, the Otomat
(Franco-Italian), Hargoon (American) and Kangaroo (Soviet) missiles; their
range is in the hundreds of kilometers at most.
The new fact about the American cruiese missiles in recent years is the use
of them as a strategic weapon, with nuclear payload and with ranges of sev-
eral thousand kilometers.
- The interest of the strategic cruise missile lie s in the fact that its tra-
jectory is very different from that of the conventional strategic missiles,
which have essentially a ballistic trajectory, peaking at very high altitude
in space, whereas the cruise missile flies at very low altitude, hugging the
relief of the terrain in order to conceal itself.
1. Press conference of 26 June.
2. REWE DE DEFENSE NATIONALE.
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~ The United States has thus viewed the cruise missile as an attractive choice
for complementing a panoply of armaments in the strategic ballistic missiles
category. Today, thanks to the progress achieved in the last 20 years in
t:~e technologies of computers, guidance and propulsion, the long-range aero-
bic missiles can be "light, precise missiles with low vulnerability," ac-
cording to the technicians.
The launching of strategic cruise missile pr.ograms in rhe United States is
doubtlessly related to political considerations, but also to the fact that
use could be made of two especially decisive estabtished techniques: on the _
one hand, the process of adjustment of an inertial system by a terrain-
correlation device that compares the topography recognized by the missile as
it flies over certain characteristic zones with the tapography furnished to
it at the start; and on the other hand, the perfecti.ng of small double-flux
turbojets, of low specific consumption, with appropriate fuels (fuels of
high density and of the same mass heating power as kerosene).
This being the case, the point thar remains most controversial is that of
the vulnerability of the cruise missile or its penetration of conventional
or specialized antiaircraft defenses.
Last year, the L'nited States carried out a vast full-scale war game, with
its own defenses, to test the penetration capacity of its cruise missiles
against various antiaircraft defenses. The results of the ev~eriment have
obviously remained secret.
But even if these results were known, they would not be directly transpos-
able to the case of the French cruise missile.
The proposed French cruise missile fits into a different context: the French
missile is a strategic anticity missile, while the American missile, wirh
its antiforces objective, requires greater precision of impact. Further-
more, the United States--it has the means for this--can deploy several
thousand cruise missiles, fired from B-52 bombers, submarines, surface ves-
~ sels or ground batteries, in an omnidirectional attack against the USSR.
~
Y-~ ~ ~
a~cl~cir~~~~,--+_-=
. ,3`'
Very-low-altitude flight of a French cruise missile
France cannot commit itself to such quantities; rather, it can consider sev=
eral hundred cruise missiles. These missiles should be very well-protected
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23
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The French Cruise Missile
The cruise-missile studies presently bein& carried out by Aerospatiale
(DSBS [expansion unknown]) anc~ MATRA [General Mechanics-Aviation-Traction
Co], for the DTE [Missiles Technology Directorate], concern a strategic mis-
_ sile capable of traveling several thousand kilometers at low altitude and
carrying a thermonuclear charge.
The precision of impact required of the French cruise missile wouid be of
the same order of magnitude as that of the ballistic missiles, since both of
these st:ategic weapons contribute to the strategy of deterrence in an anti-
cities perspective; but the cru ise missile's navigation system is by nature _
capable of greater precision of impact.
Because of i.ts low mass, the~ cruise missile could be adapted to many types
of deployment: trucks, surfa~ce vessels and--why not?--submarines, etc.
Subsonic Missile
The French cruise missile wauld be, like its American counter.part, a sub-
sonic missile designed to fly at Mach 0.7-0.8, which represents several
hours of flight to reach a target that a ballistic missile would reach in a _
fraction of an hour.
This aerobic missile would be propelled cruising flight by a small turbo-
jet with low specific consumption. The French cruise missile would use an
altimetric-correlation and terrsin-tracking navigation device that would
provide for both periodic adjustment of the inertial plant and flight at
very low altitude.
The architecture of the cruise missiles being co~zsidered by Aerospatiale and
MATRA resembles that of the U.S. cruise missiles: fusiform body of small di-
ameter and long length housing the equipment, the payload, the turbojet and
- the fuel, with wings and with aerodynamic control surfaces deployable in
flight.
The French projects are conceived to have low drag and high maneuverability
(very high load factor). The ground-to-ground versions are equipped with a
solid-fuel booster, which is eliminated on the air-to-ground versions. The
two builders propose the same cruising motor (turbojet) furning heavy fuel.
They both equip their :nissile with an inerCial navigation system with in-
flight adjustment by terrain correlation.
The precise configuration of the cruise missiles depends on the mission and
. the range required, and it is also a function of the mode of deployment. To
give a few orders of magnitude, we can cite, by way of example, the follow-
ing figures for a missile fired from the ground.
Depending on the version, the missile measures 6 to 7 meters long, 0.6 to
0.7 meter in diameter., and 3 to 4 meters of wing span. Its wings are de-
24
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F~k O~FTCIAI. US~ ONLY
ployable in flight after launching, and it is stored with its fuel, in "full
shot" form, in a transport and launching container. The total unit weighs
~ on the order of 2 tons, including about 250 kilos for the container and 200
kilos for the acceleration motor (booster); this accelerator provides for
the initial launching phase. Cruising flight uses a turbojet that consumes
about 1 ton of kerosene-type chemical fuel that may 1~�:r be replaced by a
"heavy" fuel.
COPYRIGHT: A. C. 1980
11267
- CSO: 3100
25 -
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
M-4 MISSILE READIED FOR USE BY 1985
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 12 Jul 80 pp 69, 71-75
[Article by Pierre Langereux: First French Multiple-Warhead Missile, the
g
'M-4," Will Go xnto Service in�1985 on the New SNLE (Missile-Launchin Nu-
clear Submarine) the 'Inflexible
[Text] The M-4 multiple-warhead MSBS [Sea-to-Ground Strategic Ballistic
Missile) marks the advent of a new generation of MSBS's and strategic bal-
listic weapons which the French government had decided, in December 1972, to
build.
The M-4 will improve our nuclear armamen~ considerably when it goes into
service ia 1985, on the sixth SNL~', the "Inflexible," the first SNLE of the _
second generation of the FOST [Strategic Naval Force], presently under con-
struction.
The M-4, development of which was launched in 1975 by the DTEN [Technical
Department for Missiles] of the General Delegation for Armament of the Min-
istry of Defense, will in effect be a fourth-generation MSBS with perform-
ance characteristics distinctly improved in range (more than 4,000 km), in
precision, in penetration capacity ~six thermonuclear warheads)1 and in _
"hardening" against attack from nuclear antimissile missiles.
The new French MSBS will thus be at the level of the best American achieve- -
ments in the field of strategic ballistic missiles fired from submarines,
except for the new Trident 1 missile.
To achieve this result, the DTEN, the CEA [Atomic Energy Commission]-DAM
[expansion unknawn] and the industrial prime contractors--Aerospatiale and
G2P (SEP [European Propellant Co]-SNPE [National Powder and Explosives Com-
pany])--have had to work technical wonders, both at the level of the vector
(progulsion, structures, equipment, computer logic, etc) and at the level of
the nuclear warheads (miniaturization).
Six Thermonuclear Warheads
The M-4 is the first French strategic ballistic missile with multiple war-
heads; the preceding MSBS and SSBS [Ground-to-Ground Strategic Ballistic]
missiles had--and still have--a single head.
26
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~c~x ~~rrr,tnt. us~ c~tvi,v
~ii~ . I
I
. , ~ I
I~~ J. .
i .
! F~ ~ ,
, ~ ~
~ ' '�Y +
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e
~ ~ 1 ~
` � ~.u.
.:i
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'^r .2. l ~e+ ~~e'~~:.~$ ,r, a~_ . _
Propellant grain of the 401
The M-4, in fact, has six thermonuclear warheads,l with a unit power of
about 150 kT,2 "hardened" against the effects of nuclear antimissile mis-
siles and installed in nose cones of very high reentry-from-atmosphere
speeds. They are multiple warheads with individualized trajectories and are
deployed toward the target in clusters.
Penetration by the warheads of the M-4 is ensured both by their number and
by the process of nose-cone spacing, as well as by the "hardening" of the
nose cones against the effects of nuclear antimissile weapons that may be
encountered during the ballistic phase and the final reentry phase.
The M-4 missile itself is likewise hardened against the effects of an ex-
plosion during the propulsion phase of flight.
The hardening of the M-4 missile against the effects of nuclear explosions
is achieved by specific measures affecting most of the component parts of
the vector and of the warheads: structures, wiring, connectors, electronic
components and circuits, equipment, computer flight program, etc.
Protection of the SNLE's
The M-4 will also make it possible to increase the launching depth and the
rate of fire of the SNLE's, as well as their patrol-zone range, which will
strengthen their invulnerability.
27
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r�~~~: ~~c~r�i~:i:~t. u:,t~. ~~yt.l~
The M-G's will be able to be launched from a greater submerged depth because
the missile is designed to be ignited under water, a little after it leaves
the SNLE's launching tube, whereas the previous MSBS's were fired only upon
reaching the surface.
The launching time for a salvo will be reduced as compared with the M-20,
which strengthens the effectiveness of the SNLE-MSBS weapon system.
This improvement is achieved by means of the new "explosive flooding" sys- _
tem, which will thus be used for the first time in France on the SNLE's
armed with the M-4. This system essentially produces steam and makes it
possible to fill the SNLE's launching tube more rapidly with 35 tons of wa-
ter to replace the missile, so as to rebalance the submarine before the next
firing. This explosive-flooding system, built by the DTCN on the basis of a
preliminary study by the LRBA [Ballistic -and Aerodynamic Research Labora-
tory], has already been tested on many occasions, with launchings of dummy
M-4's from a submerged caisson in the Toulon roadstead and from the experi-
mental submarine "Gymnote."
Three-Stage Missile
The M-4 is the first French strategic ballistic missile in three stages--and
even four if one considers the device for "spacing" the nuclear warheads in
flight. All the prec.eding French missiles--MSBS and SSBS--were, and still
are--two-stage only.
- The first two stages of the M-4--401 and 402--are arranged in conventional
manner, while the motor of the third stage--403--is integrated in a set -
called "CPE" (case-propulsion-spacing). With the six nuclear warheads under
the cover, the CPE set constitutes the "top" of the M-4. This configuration
has been dictated by the perforinance-characteristics conditions required of
the M-4 in terms of range and nuclear-charge carrying capacity.
The flight of the M-4's warheads lasts about 20 minutes. the missile's
three propulsive stages function in succesaion: the 401 first stage, ignited
under water, burns for about 60 seconds with a thrust of 90 tons; the 402
second stage runs for 75 seconds with thrust of 30 tons, and the 403 third
stage delivers a thrust on the order of 10 tons for 45 seconds. This is a
total of about 3 minutes of propulsion phase, followed by a ballistic phase
during which the warheads reach a peak altitude of about 800 km, for a range
of more than 4,000 km.
During propulsed flight, firing of the motor is what causes the separation
of the stages, after the interstage skirt is first separated by a detonating
fuse. This technique permits rapid separation without important angular
disturbances, but it is very stressful fo.r the missile--especially for the
bottoms of the motors, which are subjected to high thermal fluxes. There is
no "thrust-arrest device" (DAP) on the M-4, each stage of which recovers
from the previous one's dissipation.
28
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During tl~is phase of flight, the M-4's inertial guidance system determines
the missile's position and calculates the trajectory variances that will be
corrected by the three-axis piloting system, with activation of the princi-
pal nozzles (pitch and yaw control) or hot-gas jets (for roll control).
The M-4's guidance system is composed essentially of a three-axis inertial
plant (SAGEM [General Electricity and Mechanics Applications Co]) whose data
are processed by a digital computer (EMD [~farcel Dassault Electronics]- -
SAGEM) which sends the piloting orders to a command unit (SFENA [French Air
Navigation Equipment Co]) and the ignition orders to the central orders
units (Crouzet and MATRA [General Mechanics-Aviation-Traction Co]). The
M-4's inertial plant is alined at the start, on the basis of the data from
one of the inertial plants of the SNLE.
_ Spacing of the Warheads
The essential novelty in the M-4's flight is obviously the terminal phase of
the spacing of the nuclear warheads, which occurs after the functioning of
the third stage. During this entire spacing phase, the evolutions of the
upper part of the M-4 are commanded and monitored by the guidance computer
in order to have complete control over the precision of each of the trajec-
tories of the warheads, which are reltased and dropped by pyrotechnic de-
vices.
The spacing of the warheads thus effected along the CPE's trajectory is cal-
culated carefully so as to give the maximum chance of penetration against an
ABM [antiballistic missile] defense system; the M-4's spacing system is de-
' signed to position the warheads in such a way that explosion of an antimis-
sile nuclear weapon will not destroy more than one warhead at a time.
The technique was chosen for its simplicity, after a detailed DTEN study of
the various possible systems (16 variants were studied).
The deployment of the M-4's warheads was developed by Aerospatiale with
tower-drop tests in Aquitaine and by ONERA [National Office for Aerospace
Studies and Research] at Palaiseau in a vacuum chamber with simulation of ,
weightlessness. The technique has already been validated in full scale, in
1978, by a program of spacing studies involving launchings done with M-20
engines.
Furthermore, the reentry bodies have been perfected by numerous wind-tunnel
tests at ONERA (Mach-10 wind tunnel) and at the LRBA (Mach-16 wind tunnel),
as well as with tests in the LRBA's "hyperballistic tunnel" at Vernon
(Eure). This tunnel serves in particular for studying the behavior of the
nose cones at the time of atmosphere reentry at hyp~rsonic speeds. In ad-
dition, M-4 nose cone reentry tests were successfully carried out in 1979
with the aid of M-20 missiles adapted for this mission.
29
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r�ox orFi.cr.nL us~: oNi,Y
35-Ton Missile .
The M-4 is a missile of design that is entirely new--in France--and that
does not use any of the component parts of the preceding MSBS's.
This entails a complete change of the equipment for servicing the M-4,
whereas the M-20 had to some extent used the same manuiacturing, testing,
controi and use equipment and methods as for the preceding MSBS's (M-1 and
M-2). The facilities at Ile Longue, the base of the SNLE's, have also had
to be entirely remodeled so as to be able to use the M-20 and the M-4 simul-
taneously in the 1980's. _
The general architecture of the ri-4 has been conditioned by the various op-
erational innovations that had to be done without extensive modification of
the SNLE's (volume of the launching tubes), so as to permit reuse of the ex- ,
isting submarines. This criterion in effect fixed the maximum mass of the
missile (for the centering of the SNLE's), its height and its diameter (lim-
_ ited by the launching tube), as well as the staging of the engines.
The principal modification of the submarines' tubes consisted in using the
s~ace between the "inside tube" in contact with the missile and the "outside
tube" which forms part of the "thick hull" of the SNLE--that is, putting
these two tubes closer together. This made it possible to make the M-4's
dia:neter 1.93 m, as against 1.5 m for all the preceding French missiles
(MSBS's and SSBS's). For height, the ava~.lable space was increased downward
slightly be modification of the system for suspension of the missiles. The
M-4 is thus a little longer than the M-20.
New Engine Structures
These various improvements have thus made it possible to increase the total
mass of the M-4 spectacularly; its mass is 35 tons, including 30 tons of
solid fuel, or practically double that of the M-20.
= The 401 first stage weighs 22.5 tons, including more than 20 tons of solid
fuel. Its metal structure is fabricated by SNECMA [National Aircraft Engine
Design and Construction Co~ at Gennevilliers.
This is the biggest solid-fuel engine used in France to date. The "902" of
- the SSBS's carries--only--16 tons of solid fuel. But the SNPE had already,
in 1965, constructed an experimental charge of 27 tons of solid fuel.
The 402 second stage weighs 8.8 tons. The first experimental missiles will
have an engine of fiberglass structure built by Aerospatiale Aquitaine, by
the technique previously used for the Rita 1 and 2 engines of the MSBS's and
SSBS's, which were the first "roving" structures used in France. The fol-
lowing missiles will have a 402-engine structure of synthetic fibers of the
same resistance as the fiberglass structure but lighter.
30
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The 403 engine of the third stage also has a structure of spun synthetic
fibers; it has been designed by the Societe Fibre et Mica [Fiber and Mica
Co] (CEM [Electromechanical Equipment Coj group) in cooperation with the
SEP.
The CPE group weighs more than 2 tons with the 403 engine, the spacing de-
vicea and the equipment for guidance and piloting and for separation (hy-
draulic generator, gyrometric unit, inertial plant, guidance computzr, com-
mand unit, fuel supply, batteries, etc). The aluminum-alloy structure of
the CPE group is assembled by Aerospatiale (Cannes), which is responsible
for the supplying, integration and testing of the CPE group, including the
tests of the M-4's guidance-piloting system, in which the LRBA is also par-
ticipating.
In addition to all this equipment there are the telemetry, trajectography -
and remote-control destruction systems necessary for the safety of the
laun%�hing �range (CEL [Landes Testing Center]) during the flight tests.
Butalane Solid Fuel
All of the M-4's engines use Butalane solid fuel a composite solid propel-
lant with aluminum-charged polybutadiene binder,~ which is being used for
the first time in the French ballistic missiles.
The Butalane fuel, developed by the SNPE, is of distinctly higher perform-
ance than the Isolane hitherto used on the MSBS and SSBS missiles. It makes
iC possible to achieve performance characteristics superior to those of Iso-
lane in specific impulse and in density. Butalane also makes it possible to
improvc the rate of engine charging (which has an effect on performance
characteristics), for the mechanical properties of the Butalane charges of
the M-4--behavior in storage and in firing, sticking--are superior to those
of the fuels used previously. Thus it has been possible to lengthen the
lifetime of the M-4's engines (to more than 10 years).
The composition and form of the solid-fuel charges of the M-4 vary from en-
gine to engine. The 401 of the first stage has a~bicomposition charge with
star-shaped central channel, as was the case with the engines of the M-20
(904) and of the SSBS's (902). The 402 and 403 engines, on the other hand,
are monocomposition charges, because of the "roving" structures, with a cen-
tral channel of milled revolution profile so as to obtain the law of thrust
desired.
All the engines of the M-4 also use a new "liner" for the connection between
the fuel grain and the engine structure, which is coated with an intesnal
thermal protection of low specific mass.
Flexible Propelling Nozzles
Each of the M-4's engines is equipped with a single "flexible-joint" propel-
ling nozzle developed by the SEP (Bordeaux).
31
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r~�t (1}~l~ ic:i ni, u~r, ~~Ni,v
~
Control of the vector thrust in yaw and pitch of the engines [as published]
of the M-4 is done by rotation of the "flexible propelling nozz?e" around a :
i
~ spherical swivel joint composed of altern3ting lainraccordancerwithrtheexi- ,
bility) and of inetal armatu~h~ust~bearingtadeveloped by the SEP in 1970 and
principle of the "flexible
already applied in other fields (helicopter rotor thrust bearings for Aero-
spatiale, offshore applications, etc).
This first application of the SEP flexible thrus~sSbblelto replaceMthesmech-
listic-missile propelling nozzles has made it p
anical systems involving four angled propelling nozzlesellin rnozzle(withall
bearings) and the fluid systems involving a single recedin missiles. 'M'?1g _
injection of freon ~stored under pressure) of the p 8
has made it possible to reduce considerably the mass and bulk of the Y~o ul-
pitch piloting devices. The flexible propelling nozzle of the three p p
sion stages is tightlessnvolumesdbetween the stageseand thelmasses~lost with
as to reduce the usel
the interstage skirts.
The M-4's flexible propelling nozzles made by the SEP (Bordeaux) u eraturehe
"hot parts (nozzle necks), which are eroded by the very-high-temp
(3,000� C)',combustion gases, mainly multidirectional carbon-carbon composite
materials. The mechanical properties and wear resistance of the multcdisec-
tional carbon-carbon materials are very superior to tha~~s�ofttheppropelling
talline graphite materials used previousl~�. For the p
nozzles of the 401 and 402 engines that are les~ahhiteafabrgcnbaseZareSUSed.
whose dimensions are impressive, materials of g p
The propelling nozzle of the 403, which is smaller, is made of a material
that is nondelaminable and that has high resistance to thermal shocks.
Roll control of the missile i~a~o~ectThis~systemflwhichWhastreplacedhthegas
valves supplied by a gas gene
variable-orientation rockets, is far easier to manage.
The advanced development of the M-4's engines is proceeding normally, under
the responsibility of G2P. Thd ofr19771onnthe~testgbenches1ofntheOCAEPEk
place, successfully, at the en near Bordeaux.
[Missiles and Engins Assembly and Testing Center],
- The first bench firing of the 403 engine--also at the CAEPE--was carried out
in 1978.
The M-4 engines' qualification tests with altitude simulation, which began "
- in 1979, wiil be completed this year. Generally speaking, the testing of
the M-4's engines is more complete (benarticular)nand morerdetailedl(more
operating pressure and temperature in p
~ than 300 measurements) than those to which the engines of the previous pro-
~ grams iaere subjected.
32
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33
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
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34
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M-4 to Go into Operational Service in 1985
It is planned for the sixth SNLE, the "Inflexible," with its 16 M-4 mul-
tiple-warhead missiles, to go on active duty in the FOST in 1985, the date
set by the government in 1974.
This first submarine armed with M-4 missiles will then carry by itself more
thermonuclear weapons than all five of the present SNLE's.
Subsequently, the M-4's will replace the M-20's on the first-generation
SNLE's in service.
The minister of defense, Yvon Bourges, announced recently that three or even
- four of these SNLE's could be on sea patrol simultaneously.
CIMSA and the Strategic Nuclear Systems -
The Military Division of the European Electronic Automation Company (CAE),
which subsequently belonged to the International Data-Processing Company, be-
coming in 1977 the Military, Space and Aeronautics Data-Processing Company
(CIMSA), a subsidiary of Thomson-CSF [General Radio Company], has been par-
ticipating extensively since 1963 in the design and construction of the .
strategic systems of the Deterrent Force.
Chosen in 1963 to develop the computerized system for monitoring and launch-
ing of the MSBS, and then of the SSBS, this unit has devoted several hundred
engineers and technicians to these studies, which were unparalleled in France
at the time. They led first to automated systems making it possible to test
the first missiles at the Landes Testing Center and on board the experiment-
al submarine "Gymnote."
Some operational equipment available from 1970 on was installed on the five
missile-launching nuclear submarines and in the Albion Plateau silus. -
The role of these systems is to monitor the a~.ailability of the missiles and
to command their launching at targets automatically.
Since 1976, CIMSA has also participated in development of the new genera-
tions of strategic missiles by supplying the computer equipment of the
= SSBS-3 (T 1600 computer) and the data-processing systems for the MSBS-M4
that will be installed on the "Inflexible" and then on the remodeled earlier
submarines.
The computer system for monitoring and launching of the Pluton tactical mis-
sile has also been built and supplied by CIMSA.
The SMA Is Participating in the M-4
The company SMA [expansion unknown) Val Notre-Dame at Argenteuil designs and
builds auxiliary equipment for civilian and military applications (space,
aeronautics, naval), such as test benches for motors and jet engines, mis-
sile-integrstion benches, munition-handling installations, etc.
35
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FOR OFFTCTAT. i1Sl: (1NT,Y
~C
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not want to dirty
his hands in face of the urgent need to keep the British factories going."
Most Western nations presently have an organization for sales of war
materiel-ILN (organ for negotiations on international logistics) in the _
United States; DMA (ministerial delegation for armanent) and DIA (director-
ate of international affairs) in France. These offices, almost dispen-
saries really, aim less at regulating than at stimulating arms exports.
Already, the private companies are furiously battling head to head with
the competition. They do not hesitate to pour out bribes, to grease
_ ,handsomely the palms of intermediaries, to corrupt, to weave intrigues -
(remember the Lockheed and Northrop scandals in the Netherlands, Italy,
Japan, Iran,~a~nd Indonesia) in order to cinch a sale of their infernal
products. Here we see them stabbed in the back by their own governments.
The journalist Anthony Sampson, who has broken down the complex mechanisms
of the frenetic bazaar of contemporary arms, says in "The Arms Bazaar"*:
* Hodder and Stoughton-London.
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"Henceforth, the incentives to export arms were much greater, and the -
- governments were no less preoccupied with providing for full em~loy-
- ment of manpower and equilibrium in the balance of payments than the
directors of any private enterprise. Trade union pressures pulled in
the same direction, and just as effectively on members of Congress, as
the concerns of captains of industry. The governments found themselves
hard pressed to increase the volume and value of exports, taking into -
account three factors: the concern of the Treasury to have foreign
currency, the concern to provide for full employment throughout the
territory, and the concern to lower the retail price of armaments by in-
creasing the volume of production."
This cynical willingness to consider arms like any other kind of export
product is a reality in the industrialized nations of the West, in the
communist bloc countries with a fondness for convertible currency, but
also in the neutral governments (Switzerland and Sweden): which balance
the scales of their trade ledgers and their humanitarian ideals by financ-
ing, respectively, the Red Cross and the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI).
The c~eveloped countries and the newly rich oil states are not the only
ones to "fill up" with armaments that are more and more sophisticated,
more and more costly. The Third World too is rushing in�to the ~ms race.
Arms expenses for developing countries surpass the total of budget allo-
cations to education and health. This ~mmoderate hunger for steel is
tragic when it strikes regimes whose people lack food, hospitals,
schools. One single Tomcat costs $20 million. That is the same cost
as 1,000 tractors....
The arms merchant no longer has anything in common with wayward adventur-
ers like Rimbaud or cynical capitalists like Basil Zakaroff. These are _
high ufficials, zealously selling their countries' weapons. They are
decorated and recompensed for sei-vices rendered to the export business.
They find other arguments to justify their filthy deals. For example:
"French arms exports cause 20 times less deaths than automobile exports."
They are merchants of death with clean consciences.
"I am a practicing Catholic," said Hugues de 1'F.stoile, former director
of the French DIA. "I never had any qualms of conscience. In the Bible,
the centurion is never shown in an unfavorable light."
The worthy disciple did not hesitate to reply to criticism from the
French protestant federation about arms sales:
"In Lebanon, France has lost an ordE~: of helicopters... It went to Bell,
the American firm, because its agent in Beirut was the papal nuncio...."
55
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E~~~iz c~ri~ iCl~l, i~~~~; c~Ni.v
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" FN's production lines: everything is perfectly legal....
L~S GE~S ~
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(Cartoon caption:] "People are crazy."
On the Cover: Arms Sales: Hypocritical Belgium p 4--64 arms export
cases blocked by the foreign affairs ministry. After decades of hypocrisy,
it would seem that the political class is feeling some remorse. High time!
In recent and quite painful affairs, would the anesthetized public react?
Breaking all the taboos, Andre Lemoine, Jacques Schepmans, and Jacques
Wiame conducted the investigation of our cannon merchants. The result is
rather stupefying.
56
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~ .
. .
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The Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua: Ohl. See the pretty FAL....
60mm
and
$1mm ~
- mortars
, ~
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PRB also stands for...
The dynamic advertising for PRB, the leader in the mortar domain, in
"Jane's," the worldwide catalog of infantry arms....
57
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~
. "
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,.~[~.y;_J~.v~.~y;~:!:i,.
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The French arms "supermarket" at Satory: some kind of export product.... -
�
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The war in Lebanon: 60,000 dead from light arms and artillery provided
by private and state merchants....
58
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