JPRS ID: 9270 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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~PRS L/9270
- 26 August 1980
USSR Re ort ~
p
MILITARY AFFAIRS
_ C~OUO 15i�0~
FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9270 -
26 August 1980
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 15/80) ~
CONTENTS PAGE
Book Excerpts: Soviet ViPws on U.S. Military Preparations
(V. V. Borisov; OPASNAYA STAVKA: NAUCHNO-TEKfINICHESKAYA
REVOI,YUTSIYA I VOYENNYYE PRIGOTOVLENIYA SShA, 1979) 1
Book Excerpts: Optimizing Artillery Fire Support
(Ye. V. Izvekov, B. A. Kaplunov; OPTIlKIZATSIYA SREDSTV
OBESPECHENIYA STREZ'BY ARTII,I,ERII, 1979) 9
Book Excerpts: History of Soviet Border Guards
�(P..A..Ivanchishin, ~t al~:;- CHASO~YYE SOVETSRIKH
GRAN~'~S, KRATKIY OCHERK I3TORSI~POCrRANICHNYKH
VOYSK SSSR, 1979) .......................................0 19
Book Excerpts: Effectiveness ~f Target Detection
(V. A. Gorbunov; EFFEKTIVNOST~ OBNARUZHENIYA TSEI,EY, 1980) 31
Book Excerpts: Indoctrination on Military Traditions
(I. N. Petrov; TRADITSII--V STROYU, 1980)................. 47
Book Excerpts: Artillery in Battles and Operations
(G. Ye. Peredel~skiy;~ARTIIS~ERIYA V BOYU I OPERATSII, 1980) 50
Soviet Strategy: F`rench Research Group Overview
(STRATEGIQUE, Apr-Jun 80) 64
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO]
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BOOK EXCEIZPTS: SOVIET VI~WS ON U.S. MILITARY PREPARATIONS
Moscow OPASNAYA STAVKA: NAUCHNO-TEKfIl~1ICHESKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA I VOYENNYYE
PRIGOTOVLENIYA SShA in Russian 1979 signed to press 22 May 79 pp 1-2, 200,
5-8, 196-199
[Annotation, Table of Contents, Introductior and Conclusion of book by
V. V. Borisov]
[Excerpts] Title Page: '
Title: OPASNAYA STAVKA: NAUCHNO-TEKHNICHESKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA I
VOYENNYYE PRIGOTOVLENIYA SShA (A Dangerous Stake: The
Scientific-Technological Revolution and U.S. Military
Preparations)
Publisher: Voyenizdat
Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1979
Signed to Press Date: 22 May 1979
Number of Copies Published: 40,000 -
Number of Pages: 200
- Brief Description:
Employing considerable factual material, the author of this book displays
U.S. imperialism in the period of the scientific and technological revo-
lution, the influence of this revolution on development of the U.S. mili-
tary-industrial complex and armed forces, utilization of the myth of the
"Soviet threat" to swell military budgets and escalate the arms race, and
intensification of ideological preparations for another war. This book will
be of interest to the general military and civilian reader.
Table of Contents
Introduction 5
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Chapter 1. U.S. Imperialism in the Era of zhe Scientific and !
,
Technological Revolution 9 ~
Hopes and Reality i
Under the Mask of "Global Obligations" 19 ~
Chapter 2. Influence of the Scientific and Technological Revolu- I
tion on U.S. Military Preparations 30 ~
Radical Revolution in Productive Resources ~
Refornis in Military Affairs 36 ~
~
Chapter 3. Development of a System of Management of Military ~
Preparations 51 '
Changes in Organizational Structure ~
New Methods: Claims and Facts 67 i
~
Chapter 4. "Permanent" War Economy 76 I
- New Ph~nomena and New Conflicts
The Military-Industrial Complex 88 ,
Offensive in the Arms Market 99 ~
Chapter 5. Reorganization of the War Machine 108
Counting on Technological Superiority ~
~ Aggravation of the Cadre Problem 124
Rearming the Military 138
Modernization of the Navy 144
- Building Up Sea Power 156
_ Chapter 6. Ideological Preparations for War 167
Propaganda Machine of the Military-Industrial Complex
"Threat" and Military Budget 175
Chapter 7. A Race Which Cannot Be Won 182
The Burden of Military Might
- Against the Pentagon's Plans 188
Conclusion 196
Introduction
The contemporary revolution in science and technology is a gigantic global
process which is affecting in one way or another the entire population of
the earth, but it is occurring particularly intensively in the industriaily
most highly-developed countries both socialist and capitalist. First
and foremost a radical revolution in the productive resources of society,
- this revolution as a process is profot:.zdly social in nature and one of the
most important factors in development of ~the contemporary society as a `
whole.
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At the same ti.me there are many specific features in the developing sci-
entific and technological revolution. It cannot evolve by itself, in a
"social vacuum," beyond the framework of concrete production relations. It
~ does not, however, directly affect the form of ownership of the means of
production, which comprises the basis of production relations. But it is
precisely the characte~ of production relations snd the nature of the so-
cietal system which determine the orientation and modes of utilization of
scientific and technological advances.
There are many similar features in its development both in the socialist
countries and in the capitalist world, traits wltlch are connected first
and foremost with concrete scientific and technological achievenents.
Cybernetics, electronics, and nuclear power engineering, for example,
which have become symbols of the contenpo-rary revolution in science and
technology, have been developing rapidly in recent decades in both socialist
and capitalist countries. Qne should not lose sight of the fact, however,
that the very origination and development of these and other new branches of
science were dictated by new and greatly increased requirements of society
in management and control, automation of production, and energy requirements.
Much more important is the question of root differences in the thrust and
direction of scientific and technological progress and the principles of
its utilization in nations with differing social systems. The question of
its thrust and directi;.a has become exceptionally important in our time,
since the contemporary scientific and technological revolution is one of the
main "bridges" joining the prese:~t with the future. And n~t only the fate
of the people presently inhabitfng the earth but also the fate of future
generations to a significant degree depends on resclution of this question.
In socialist countries scientific and technological progress is utilized
for the benefit of all of society, while in the capitalist world scientific
advances become a means with the aid of which the dominant exploiter
classes endeavor to preserve and consolidate their position both domestical-
ly and in the international arena.
The contemporary scientific and technological revolution has become one of
the main areas of historical competition between capitalism and socialism.
Its influence on the development of military affairs is enormous. But this
revolution as such did not produee new weapons of unprecedented power. The
moribund capitalist system, which is attempting to prolong its existence
with the aid of military force, is to blame for the fact that the greatest
scientific and technological advances of our time have been embodied in
nucie~r missile weapons and other highly-effective weaponry rather than in
devices which make people's lives easier and better.
Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted that "aggressive circles in the capitalist
world are responding with feverish military preparations to their defeats
' in social battles, to the loss of colonial possessions, to the departure of
more and more countries from capitalism, to the successes of world socialism
- and growth of the influence of Communist parties in bourgeois countries.
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riilitary budgets are suaring, new weapons are being developed, military
bases are being built, and.shows of military force are being undertaken. ~
Relying on this 'position of strength,' imperialism hopes to preserve the
capabiZity to coimnand other countries and peoples, a capability which is
slipping out of its hands."*
Utilization of scientific and technological advances in providing armed
�orces with n2w weapons, the most powerful and imagination-staggering of
which was the atomic bomb, was interpretc_d by U.S. ruling classes in
their own way. Placing their hopes on U.S. scientific, technological and
industrial superiority, in the postwar period U.S. leaders counted on miYi-
tary might, based on the latest advances in science and technology. A
real "addiction" to military might spread among U.S, ruling circles, an ad- -
diction which, just as a drug addiction, engendered many illusions. U.S.
leaders figured that by extensively utilizing the latest scientific and
technological advances for military purposes, they would acquire "new"
military might as a means of establisning worldwide hegemony. ;
This policy perfectly corresponded to the interests of the U.S. monopolies, ~
which had done extraordinarily profitable business on military contracts
ciuring World War II. This unity of interests of the ruling circles and
monopolies producing weapons and military hardware became one of the most
important factors dictating the genesis and development of Che military-
industrial complex, as well as an arms race on an unprecedented scale,
which has continued in the period of international d~tente. i
WhilA giving lip service to a call for d~r_ente and undertaking certain ~
steps in that direction, under the pressure of the conditions which have ~
objectively developed in the world, U.S. ruling circles continue at the
same time rapidly building up military strength. Direct U.S. military ~
expenditures for the entire World War II, according to official U.S.
figui~~s, totaled 224 billion dollars, while the military budget five-year
plan for the 19$0-1984 fiscal years specifies expenditure of approximately '
835 billion dollars. The United States has spent the astronomical sum of ;
1.5 trillion dollars for military purposes in the 30 years since the war. i
In the latter hal~ of the 1970's the U.S. military budget swelled beyond ~
the 10a billion dollar mark. In the 1979 fiscal year it approached 130 ~
billion dollars, which means that at the present time the principal
capitalist country spends more than 35G million dollars every day for mili- ~
tary purposes. The Pentagori requested 138.2 billion dollars for the 1980 ;
fiscal year.
In this book an attempt is made to show from the position of Marxist- '
Leninist theory and on the basis of analysis of concrete facts how the ~
United SCates is utilizing the current scientific and technological -
revolution for military preparations, what processes are developing in the ;
* L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following a Leninist j
Path. Speeches and Articles], V~1 6, Moscow, 1978, pp 168-169. ~
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military economy and armed forces under the influence of this revolution,
and the consequences to which the buildup of U.S. military might is lead-
ing. The military preparations of an imperialist state constitute an
extensive system of economic, political, ideological, military proper and
certain other auxiliary measures conducted by state monopoly capital for
the purpose of building up the military might essential to carry out ag- '
gression or political blackmail in the international arena.
It is quite obvious that in a book of limited size it is impossible fully
to examine the entire range of questions pertaining to this topic. There-
fore the author limits himself to d~scussion of only certain trends, which
in his opinion are the most important. One should also note that in many
cases it is pracrically impossible to isolate in "pure" form the influence
of scientific and technological progress on military preparations, since
the development of science and technology is inseparably linked with the
economy, politics and other aspects of societal development. Therefore,
in analyzing certain phenomena and processes, the author endeavors to
show that they have been influenceci not only by scientific and technological
progress but by other factors as we11.
Studies by Soviet and foreign military experts, economists and historians,
mat~rials published in the foreign press, as well as published official
documents of the U.S. Department of Defense and several other government
agencies served as the principal sources in pr~paring tk~is book.
Tn connection with the fact that the majority of the factual data were
borrowed from Western sources, including the U.S. press, one should
approach fihem cri.tically since, as we knc~~a, facts and figures appearing in
foreign publications are frequenLly distorted for the sake of sensational-
ism, publicity and other considerations. At the same time one can assume
that on the whole the factual data containe4 in this book illustrate to _
a sufficient degree certain general trends.
Canclusion
The en*.ire postwar history of the Un~.ted States has been dominated by the
arms race, unceasing quest for a"superweapon," and the attempt to achieve
military superiority over world socialism. Having amassed a vast arsenal
of tools of destruction of unprecedented force, American imperialism, to-
gether ~ith its aggressive NATO bloc partnecs, is pushing military prepara-
tions at a feverish pace, attempting to utilize to a maximum degree the
latest sctenfific and technolog~~al advances for military purposes.
The hopes of U.S. imperialist circlzs and their :~ilitary-political bloc
partners to secure military superiority over the socialist world, however,
have proven unattaiiLable. They have proven unattainable primarily because ~
3.n our era the balance of class forces in the world arena has tipped final-
ly and irreversibly in favor of socialism. The increased military and
economic inight of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community
blocks the path of the aggressive schemes of imperialism. The international
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Communis~ and work~r movement, the forces of national liberation, non-
aligned nations, and millions upon millions of persons fighting for
demo rracy, social pro~ ess and peace in all countries are vigorously oppos-
ing the aracs race and }he threat of another war.
USSR Nu.nister o~ Defense Mar SU U. F. Ustinov~, member of the CPSU Central
Committee Politburo, stated quite emphatically: "U.S. militarist circles
have not yet given up their attempts t~ achieve military superiority over
- the USSR by developing new mass destruction weapons. History has
, demonstrated time arid again the futility of such calculations, and in
practice the devel.opmen~ of new .:eapons has not ~trengthened the security
of ~he United States. Those who are counting on achieving military _
superiority over the Soviet Union with the aid of such weapons should bear
in mind that the economy, science and technology in our country are today
at such a high level that we are capable of building in extremely short
_ order any weapon on which the enemies of peace would place their cards.
'rhe Soviet Union has stated time and again that we ha-~Q no wish to proceed
along such a road. Precisely for this reason the Soviet Union proposed to -
the United States a mutual agreement to refrain fY�c?m developing new weapons
and weapons systems. "1
The Soviet Union is working vigorously to a~ert another war. The program
of further campaign for peace and international cooperation, for freedom
and independence of peoplas adopted at the 25th CPSU Congress spells out
c~ncrete measures to bring a halt to the arms race and reduce existing -
arsenals of weaponry. Tr.e policy of the Soviet State aims at covering all
channels of the arms race, that is, on the one hand bringing stockpiling
to an end, and then proceeding to reduce existing arms, and on the other
- hand to prevent the development of new, as yet undeveloped but potential
weapons.
CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman
~ ~f th~ Presidium of 'JSSR Supreme Soviet, particularly emphasized the
imp ortance of nations, and particularly maj.or powers, reaching an agree-
ment to ban the development of new mass destruction weapons and delivery
systems.
J "The level of modern science and technology is such," stated Comrade L. I.
Brezhnev, "that there is arising the serious danger of development of an
= even more fearsome we~pon than nuclear arms. The wisdom and con- _
= science of mankind dictdte the necessity of placing an insuperable barrier
in the path of development of such a weapon."2
Waging a consistent struggle for peace and for an end to the arms ra~e,
the Soviet Union at the same time sees effectively to its own defense,
firmly adhering to Lenin's instructions that "we should acr~mpany our~~3
steps toward peace by stepping up our entire military preparedness....
The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, equipped with the most modern weapons
and military hardware, are not only a reliable def~nder of the socialist
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homeland and the achievements of socialism and communism but also a power-
ful factor in the security of peoples, a factor in preventing another war.
In view of the growing military preparations of the imperialist nations,
the Soviet Union is doing everything necessary to strengthen its defense
capability, but Soviet leaders have stressed time and again t~aat the Soviet
Union does not and will not seek military superiority over the other side.
In recent years the situation in the international arena has become in-
creasin;ly more complex. Alarmed by the process of d~tente, which has
become the leading trend in today's world, imperialist circles have
stepped up their activities~ The militarist forces encouraged by them,
particularly the U.S. military-industrial complex, are escalating the arms
race, attempting to halt d~tente and to turn the world back to the dark
times of "cold war." Endeavoring to utilize to a maxi~ degree for mili-
tary purposes the la~est achievements of science and technology and taking
new leaps forward in the arms race, they entertain hopes that some "tech-
nological breakthrough" will place a new "miracle weapon" in their hands
and wi11 sec~re for them military superiority over the socialist counr_ries.
- As is persuasivelyshown by the entire course of contemporary world
development, these hopes are patently in vain, but seeking military and
military-technological superiority is a dangerous game, and a policy which
_ aims at developing more and more new weapons is a course which is highly
_ dangerous for all mankind.
Western reactionary circles essentially encouraged the Chinese hegemonists,
who initiated at the beginning of 1979 an aggressive criminal war against
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In spite of protests by the world com-
munity, they are continui.ng to develop plans to se11 modern weapons and
- military equipment to the Chinese aggressors.
Firmly confident in its strength, the Soviet Union, guided by the resolu-
tions of the 25th CPSU Congress, continuea.even in today's complicated
international situation persistently seeking, together with its friends
and allies, a deepening of the process of d~tente and broadening of peace-
ful, mutually benefic3al cooperation among nations, and particularly an
end to the arms race and a shift to disarmament.
The deep-lying laws governing and patterns of the scientific and tecln-
nological revolution are in conformity with such policy. Within the
mechanism of scientific and technological progress there are no elements
which would make its utilization for military purposes inevitable. Develop-
ment of science and technology can be cantrolled and managed. There does
not exist a"demon technology," ~ust as there does not exist a fatal in-
~vitability of another world war. Plana hatched by imperialist forces to "
utilize the latest ~cientiFic and technological advances for the mass
destruction of human lives are in conflict with the very essence of sci-
ence and technology, which embody the greatest achievements of the human
intellect and which have become in our time ~ne of the most powerful factors
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of societal development. The root interests of mankind demand that every-
thing be .done to ensure that the development of science and technology be
utilized solely for peacsful purposes, to ensure economic and social
progress in every country in the world.
_ The CPSU Central Ca~ittee decree entitled "On Further Improvement of
Ideological and Political Indoctrinat~on Work" states that it is essential
resolutely to expose the i.mperi~list advocates of '~old war;' aggravation of
inteinational tension and the arms race, which threateas to push the
world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. It is our duty to place in
opposition to the subvPrsive political and ideological activities of the
class enemy and his vicious slande.r against sucialism unswerving solidarity,
powerful ideological unity within our ranks, deep ~onvictian and political
_ vigilance on the part of each and every Soviet citizen, and his readiness
and wiliingness to defend the hom~land and the revolutionary achievements
of socialism.
FOOTNOTES
1. D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'l" [Selected Speeches and
Articles], Moscow, 1979, page 319.
2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following a Leninist Path], Vol 5,
rioscow, 1976, page 320.
3. V. I. Lenir:, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete WorksJ, Vol 40, page 248.
COPYRIGHi: Voyenizdat, 1979
3024
CSO; 1801
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BOOK EXCERPTS: OPTIMIZING ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT
Moscow OPTIMIZATSIYA SRIDSTV OBESPECHENIYA STREL'Bi ARTILLERII in Russian
- 1979 signed to press 27 Ju1 79 pp 1-2, 111-112, 3-4, 5-10, 108-110.
[Annotation, Table of Contents, Introduction, excerpts from Chapter 1, ,
Conclusion, and Bibliography of book by Ye. V. Izvekov and B. A. Kaplunov]
[Excerpts] Tit1e Page:
Title: OPTIrIIZATSIYA SREDSTV OBESPECHENIYA STREL'BY ARTILLERII
(Optimizing Means of Artillery Fire Support)
, Publisher: Voyenizdat
Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1979
~ Si~ned t~ Presy Date: 27 July 1979
Number of Copes Published: 8,000
Number of Pages: 112
_ Brief Description:
~ Further increase in effectiveness of employment of artillery is closely
' linked with the development of highly-effective means of artillery fire
support.
~ The authors examine the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of
means ensuring a specified artillery effectiveness with minimum expendi-
tures of manpower and resources, as well as the specific features of op-
timization of ineans of topogeodetic, meteorological and ballistic support
and organic artillery reconnaissance and observation means. Methods of ~
optimizin.g capabilities and examples of solving specific problems are
given.
This book is intended for officers, scientific research institute and
- design office personnel interested in problems of efficient utilization of -
- modern artillery.
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:tntroduction 3
1. Genera~ Requi�rements cn Means of Artillery Fire Support and
Specific Features of Their Optimization 5
1.1. General Requirements on Artillery Fire Support Means 5
- 1.2. Specific Features o~ Optimizat3on of Means of Artil-
lery Fire Support 11
1.3. Evaluation of Existing ~iethods of Determining�Re-.
quiretaents on Accuracy of Means of Artillery Fire
~upport 23
2. Theoretical Principles of Optimization of Artillery Fire
Support 26
2.1. Solving Optimization Problems Without Full Expansion
of the Function of Efficiency
2.2. Deriving an Expression for a Criterion of Military-
Economic Evaluation of Means of Artillery Fire Sup-
port 29
2.3. Deriving a Relation for the Value Function of
Means of Artillery Fire Support 33
2.4. The Problem of Determining the Function Ci=f(~'i;Ei) 38
_ 3. Methods of Determining Input Data for Optimization of
Means of Artillery Fire Support 43
3.1. Means of Artillery Fire Support Operating Time and
Simplified Models of Combat Operations of Artillery
Subunits
3.2. Decrease in ~fficiency of Performance of Missions
by ArtillFry Due to Incomplete Utilization of Its
Combat Capabtlities (K.Cx) 48
3.3. Deriving a Relation For Function K.~II Without Con- '
sidering Function L~ (X~) 55 ~
3.4. Decr.ease in Probability of Hitting Moving Targets 59
= 3.5. Deriving llependence of Effectiveness o� Artillery
Fire on Errors by Means of Artillery Fire Support 64
4. Solving Some Problems of Optimization of Means of Artillery
Fire Suppo�rt 77
4.1. Determa.nation of Optimal Demands on i Means of
Artillery Fi.xe Support ~
4.2. Comparison of Several Variants of i Means of�Artil- ;
_ lery Fire Support `
81 s
4.3. Determination of a Reasonable Quantity of Means of '
Ar~illery Fire Support 86 '
4.4. Military-Economic Evaluation of Means of Artillery
_ Fire Support Taking Into Account Their Adaptability
to Conditions of Combat Operations 95 '
4.5. Optimization of Demands on In3tial Geodetic Base {
and Equipment for Determining Coordinate Increments 99 i
4.6. Features of Optimization of Means of Artillery Fire
Support Taking Account of Their Reliability 103 `
BiUliography 110 3
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Introduction
CombaC operations of Ground Forces equipped with high cross-countrq per-
formance ir~fantry armored vehicles with potent armament and large num-
bers of tanks are impossible raithout close support liy modern artillery.
Modern selt-propelled guns and mort~rs and rocket-carrying combat vehicles
possess excellent grouping performance, long range of fire, and powerful
ammunition.
Moderii artillery is capable of the following, under any combat situation
- conditions: destroying hostile offensive nuclear weapons and artillery;
hitting enemy infantry, tanks and weapons in strong points, at points of
concentration, in march columns and on lines of deployment for engagement;
of suppressing, damaging and destroqing troop command and control facili-
ties, radio electronic and radar facilitiea; of fiitting installations in
the immediate rear areas, air defense and army aviation targets; of
demol:ish-In~g de.fensve warks, breaching obstacles, laying smoke screens, and
illuminating terrain at night. Finally, $rt311ery is an indispensible
weapon for gaining fire superiority over the adversary during the conduct
of combat operations without employment of nuclear weapons, a~i d especially
- under conditions of limited (local) wars.
Improvement of. the efficiency of artillery involves not only development
of weapons (guns, mortars, rocket-carrying combat vehicles and various
types of ammunition for them) but also continuous and constant improvement
- and development of ineans of artillery fire support.
These means usually include the following:
artillery reconnaissance and observation; .
topogeodetic support;
meteorological support;
ballistic support;
means of technical preparation;
means of preparation of initial firing data.
Elabor.ation and adoption of h3ghly-effective means of support constitute
one of the conditions for further increasing the combat capabilities of
artillery.
In this book methods of optimizing means of artillery fire support are
presented, means which wi11 help efficiently distr~.bute allocations between
artillery and means of artillery fire support.
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Ttiis book cun~ists of four sections. ;
Section 1 examines the general requirements on means of arCillery fire sup- {
port and the specific features of their optimization for each type of ineans
of sup�port. `
Section 2 preseuts the theoretical principles of optimization of ineans of {
art:Lllery fire support. '
Section 3 presents methods of determining input data for optimizing means
o:E artillery fire support, derives relations for determining the influence
oL time and precision of support on effectiveness of combat employment of ;
art:illery.
Section 4 contains the solution to several problems of optimization of
.
means of artilleiy fire support. The examples presented are of a purely
illustrative nature.
This book is intended for officer personnel of military units, staffs, ;
scientific research organizations, military educational institutions,
as:~well as for engineers in the defense industry.and at appropriate
educational institutions.
;
The authors wou:ld like to express thanks to professors P. P. Vyazovskiy, 'Y
D. M, Komarov, and Yu. V. Chuyev, whose valuable suggestions were very
helpful in preparing this book, as we11 as to B. N. Denisov, who was kind
enough to contribute the material utilized in writing Section 1.
1. General Requirements on Means of Artillery Fire Support
and Specific Features of Their Optimization
"l.l. General Requirements on Artillery Fire Support Means
Ef~ective employment of artillery in a modern combat engagement is in- ;
conceivable without appropriate means of artillery fire support. As we
know, the effectiveness of combat employment of modern artillery depends
not on.ly on the performance charactAristics of the artillery systems
themselves, the destructive force of their ammunition, and the effective-
ness of the enemy's countermeasures, but also on the time and accuracy
characteristics of the means of artillery fire support (Figure 1) [figure
not reproduced].
Theretore in optimizing weapons and military equipment one proceeds from
the position of achieving the desired effectiveness with minimum outlays
(or achieving maximum effectiveness with specified expenditures). In con-
formity with this, the following tasks are accomplished in optimizing means
of artillery fire support:
1. Determination of optimal requirements on accuracy and time
characteristics both of one and of several kinds of ineans of artillery
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fire support applicable to a.n artillery force grouping of one type and
different types.
2. Selection of an efficient (.from a military-economic viewpoint)
variant of ineans of support from several possible variants.
3. Determinatton of a reasonable required quantity of ineans of
support in artillery units and subunits.
4. Determination of optimal requirements on reliability indices
of ineans of support.
5. Determination of reasonable timetables and schedules for
replacement of one model of a means of support with another.
1.1.1. Requirements on Time Characteristics of Means of Artillery Fire
Support
Time expended on artillery fire support measures. (artillery fire support
time), if it causes delay in opening fire, leads to a decrease in effective-
� ness af artillery, due to the following:
incomplete utilization of the artillery's potential to inflict
damage on the adversary;
decrease in probability of hitting moving targets;
increase in probability of the adversary hitting friendly artillery
in its firing positions (OP). .
In determining requirements on artillery fire support time, it is necessary
to take into account the following specific features of the influence of
this factor on effectiveness of employment of artillery.
1. The influence of ab.tillery:tire support time is connected with the
princ3:ples of combat employment of artillery in combat, namely: it depends
on the type of engagement (attack, defense, meeting engagement, etc), the
availability of reconnoitered targets, ammunition, and other factors. In
other words, in the course of combat sometimes fire support measures should
- be carried out as rapidly as posaible, while sometiimes sufficient time will
be allocated for this.
2. The influence of a~tillery fire support time depends on what type of
artillery (regimental, division) is being supported. If the time for
bringing into combat readiness the guns of a given type of artillery is
suffici~ntly large, and the time required to perfoxm fire support measures
is not on a critical path, that is, does not delay initiation of fire,
demands on fire support time can be broadened.
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3. TopogeocleC:i_c suppu;�e ticne depends on the terrain on which the engage-
ment occurs anc?, in parti.cular., on the pr.ese.ice of natural and artificial
conr_ours on tlie ter.rain, th~ presence and quality of an initial g~odetic
base Lur topo~raptiic. survey, as well as on time of year and day.
4. Artillery fire support time dep~uds ,~n the quantity of ineans of suppor~
in artillery units and subunits. Theref~ire opt3.m.ization of time require-
ments shoul.d be perfarmed juintly with optimi2ation of quantity of ineans
of sYipport.
5. The approach to de.termination of requirements on fire support time
clepends on the principles of combat empluyment of ineans of support proper.
, Iri determining requirements on time of determination, for example, firing
pos:ition (observation post) coordinates by self-contained means, two time
characteristics are ex~wiined: instrumezt time, or equipment operatin6 speed,
and f.ull coordinates determination time. The first characteristic should be
specified during equipment design and development, while the second should
be urilized for military assessment of ineans of support.
_ When dete-rmining demands on t:.me cf support with the aid of centralized
radio technical systems (for example, with the aid of radio technical co-
ordinate determination systems such as the U.S. Loran system), two time
characteristics are examined: equipment operating speed, and continuity
(or allowable discreteness) of operation of the system as a whole. These
characteristics are specified when designing equipment.
_ 1.1.2. Requirements on Accuracy of Means of Support
Aggregate firing errors 3re affected by artillery fire support error~ and `
errors in determining target coordinates.
In determining requirements on accuracy of ineans of support, it is neces-
sary to consider:
characteristics and principles of combat employment of a given type
of artillery (natural dispersion, force of ammunition, time and maneuver
characteristics);
errors of other means of support, if an individual type of support
is examined.
1.1.3. Requirements on Reliability of Means of Support
In this case the term reliability, in addition to purely technical reliabil-
ity, includes reliability of result, which is 4efined as an event consist-
ing in the fact that no gross errors were committed (both through the ,
fault of the operator and due to technical causes) in carrying
out artillery fire support measures.
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A qualitative approach to determinatior of requirements on reliability of
means of support can be presented as follows.
Reliability possesses two aspects from a military-economic viewpoint.
If the fact of failure of individual components or an instrument as a whole
is known to us, this leads to an increase in support time in correcting the I
malfunction. In this case determination of requirements on reliability can
be performed according to the method of determining requirements on support
time. Detected failures in turn can be divided into malfunctions which are
, corrected both by crew personnel and at special repair facilities. Such a
division makes it possible to elaborate requirements on repairability of
means of support and to determine requirements in repiacement parts and
special repair facilities.
Another group of failures, the origin of which is not known, is character-
ized by the fact that failures or malfunctions of individual components or -
an entire instrwnent lead to an increase in errors. Determination of re-
quirements on reliability in this case can be performed according to the
method of determining requirements on accuracy. Malfunctions of this group
can also be divided into malfunctions caused by gradual change in equipment
parameters and malfunctions of the gross error type. Gradual decrease in
accuracy of equipment can be elucidated in the process of periodic in-
spection and adjustment procedures.
Malfunctions of the gross error type can be caused by operator errors or
basic defect in equipment design or operating methods. With utilization
of centralized means of support, probability of occurrence of gross errors
a.ncreases. This is due to the fact that centralized systems are highly
complex, and the more users of erroneous information, the greater the ef-
fect of these errors.
Analysis of gross error statistics in operation of already approved
systems and operator work conditions makes it possible to elaborate
reasonable requirements on degree of equipment automation and to specify
an efficient equipment layout which ensures high reliability of result.
1.I.4. Requirements on Other Characteristics of Means of Artillery Fire
Support .
Number of operating personnel and their. qualifications constitute an im-
portant factor in evaluating means of artillery fire support. In a mili-
tary-economic evaluation ~f ineans of fire support, this factor functions
as a limitation and should definitely be taken into account, while in cer-
tain cases it may prove to be decisive in decision-making.
Sometimes it is necessary to decide whether it is necessary to have
se~ate means of support for each kind of artillery or one type of ineans
of support for an entire artillery group. Military-economic analysis makes
it possible to solve the problem of selection of a reasonable and efficient
number of types of ineans of support.
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rrec~~.iencly, especially cJt;en piacing ~,~ans of support on a special mobile
base, ttie ~.~~iestion of eq�i.pmc:nt weight and si.~e is raised. Or course it
is c:;snnr;::~. to requir.e in this case that the vehicle whicn ca:ries the
; ~:c~uipment: p~;;sess cross-c~untry capability which is equ41 to that of
arlillery weapons.
l.:t . S. Qn Cost of ~ieacls of Support
The ~ndeavor to desi.gci and build means of support which are fast aild ac-
r_uraCe E~;-ings c~rtai.n t~chnica'1 difficulties a~-~d in the final analysis
, 1...~ids ~o ~n ~.ncrease -~.~i equipment ccnuplexity, and consequently cost as we11.
Ti,e .iaed to take this circumstance into account is also intensifiud by the
fact ti~;it 1a~=_.~ns or artiL"~ery support are mass items. Therefore in dete~.-
~~ining r~~quirements on means of suppurt it is expedient extensiveZy to
apply methods of military-economic analysis.
E:lc~t~oration of zequiremen~ts on means of support is usually performed in
tlZe a o11o~~iing sequence.
Ini~~aT1y one e7_aborates the general principles of combat employment of
prumising artillery and preliminary operational-tactical requirements on
means of support, talcing account of forecast data on future combat opera-
tions.
'Ihen scientific research is performed for the purpose of determining tech-
nical ways to implement these requirements. This work is completed
with a detailed technical-economic analysis of pbssible variants, the
results of which can be presented in the form of tables or graphs, the
"input" into which will be the characteristics of interest to us (ac-
curacy, speed, reliabilifiy, etc), and the "output" the cost~of the
given variants.
A military-economic analysis is performed taking account of the preliminary
work, in order to determine optimal demands on equipment, organic affilia-
tion of ineans of support, as well as for reasonable and efficient distribu-
tion of allocations between artillery and means of artillery fire support.
~ * *
In this Uook we have examined the specific features of optimization of
means of artillery fire support. We have demonstrated the possibility and
expediency of solving problems of optimization of these means without
detailed expansion of the function of efficiency of combat employment of
artillery on the background of simplified engagement models. Principal
attention has been focused on approaches to determination of the influence
of time on the effectiveness of combat employment of artillery, since this
question has lieen less thoroughly studied than that of the effect of
errors of ineans of artillery fire support.
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This book does not examine mathematical techniques of determining the ex-
tremum (mathema~ical programming methods), since they are extensively 3is-
cussed in the Soviet and foreign literature.
The basic principles presen~ed in this book may prove useful in elaborating
methods of optimization of a number of other items: means of support of
missiles of various categories, means of navigation for sea, air, and land
vehicles, etc.
This book will helg more objectively substantiate the characteristics of
means of artillery fire support and modes of their employment in artillery
units and subunits.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. GOST 18.001-76. Quantitative Methods of Optimization of Parameters of
Standardization Items. General Provisions.
2. Bubnov, I. A.; Kremp, A. I.; et al. "Voyennaya topografiya" [Military
Topography], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1969.
3. VBnttsel, Ye. S. "Vvedeniye v issledovaniye operatsiy" [Introduction
to Operations Research], Moscow, Sov. radio, 1964.
4. Gordon, Yu. A., and Khorenkov, A. V. "Artilleriyskaya razvedka" [Ar-
tillery Reconnaissance and Observation], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1971.
5. Lebedev, V. Ya. "Spravochnik ofitsera nazemnoy artillerii" [Field
Artillery Officer's HandbookJ, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1977.
6. Savkin, L. S., and Lebedev, B. D. "Meteorologi}~.a i strel'ba artillerii"
[Met~orology and Artillery Fire], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974.
7. "Teoriya strel'by nazeIImoy artillerii" [Theory of Surface-to-Surface
Artillery Gunnery], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1967.
8. Fendrikov, N. M., and Yakovlev, V. I. "Metody raschetov boyevoy
effektivnosti vooruzheniya" [Methods of Calculating Combat Efficiency
of Weapons], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1972.
9. Khan, G., and Shapiro, S. "Statisticheskiye modeli v inzhenernykh
zadachakh" [Statistical Models in Engineering Problems], translated
from English by Ye. G. Kovalenko, Moscow, Mir, 1969.
10. Chuyev, Yu. V., et al. "Osnovy issledovaniya.operatsiy ~ voye~?oy
tekhnike" [Fundamentals of Operations Research in Military Technology],
Moscow, Sov.~~radio, 1965.
17
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11. Chuyev, Yu. V. "Issledovaniye operatsii v voyennom dele" [Operations
Research in riilitary Affairs], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1970.
12. Ch~yev, Yu. V., and Spekhova, G. P. "Tel~hnicheskiye zadachi
issledovaniya opeiatsiy" [Technical P~-.-:blPms of Operations Research],
Moscow, ;iov. radio, 1971. _
13. Chuyev, Yu. V., and Mikhaylov, Yu. B. "Prognozirovaniye v voyennom
dele" [Forecasting in Military Affairs], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1975. '
COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1979
3024�
CSO: 1801
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BOOK EXCERPTS: HISTORY OF SOVIET BORDER GUARDS
= Moscow CHASOVYYE SOVETSKIKH GRANITS, KRATKIY OCHERK ISTORII POGRANICHNYKH
VOYSK SSSR (Guards of the Soviet Borders, A Short Outline of the History of
the USSR Border Troops) in Russian 1979 signed to press 28 Sep 79 pp 284-285,
265-269
[Annotation, Table of .Contents, For.eward and Conclusion from book by Major
General P.A. Ivanchishin (head of group of contributing authors); Colonel
Yu. G. Kislovskiy, professor and doctor of historical sciences (assistant
head); Colonel N..I. Afanas'yev; Major General V.K. Gaponenko; Colonel A.P.
Glukhov; Colonel (Ret) V.T. Kukin; Colonel (Ret) S. Ye. Lyubimov; Lieutenant
Colonel A.M. Plekhanov, docent and candidate of historical sciences; Colonel
K.V. Regush, docent and candidate of historical sciences and Ma~or General
G.P. Sechkin, professor and doctor of military sciences, Izdatel'stv.o�
Pola.ticheskoy Literatury, 100,000 copies, 286 pages]
. [Text] "Guards of the Soviet Borders" is short outline of the history of the
border troops of the Soviet state. It describes the role they have played
in defending the land of the soviets from the first years 'af its existence
~to the present day.
The book familiarizes the reader with ~life on the.present-day border of the
USSR, which extends 67,000 km, as well as with the military duties of the
border troops.. It provides an extensive description of the participation of
V.I. Lenin and the Communist Party in the organization and strengthening
of the border troops of the USSR.
The Uook is intended for the broad mass of readers. �
19
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Table of Contents
Chap ter 1
THE ESTABLTSHMENT OF BORDER GUARD FOR THE SOVIET STATE 1
1. In Defense of the Achievements of the Revolution............
2. On the Basis of Lenin's Decree.......... ....a....... . 9
.
3. On Guard Over the Borders of the Soviet Republic............ 21
4. On the Front Lines of the.Civil War 26
Chap ter 2
PROTECTING AND DEFENDING THE NATIONAL BORDERS OF THE USSR DURING THE
PERIOD OF THE BUILDING OF SO.CIALISM...: 35
1. The Party`s Concern for the Development�of.the~Border.Troops
and the Strengthening of Border Defense..........
2. The Borders Under Lock! 51
3. The Border Troops' Campaign Against Economic Contraband..... 68
4. The Border Troops' Participation in Peaceful Socialist Con-
struction 80
= 5. Against the Fascist Threat 88
Chap~er 3 ~
DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR.. 97
1. In Battles Along the Borders
2. Communists Set the Example ..................................113
3. In Combat 122
4. In Action Against Fascist Intelligence 139
5. Defending the National Borders 148
~ Chapter 4 '
ON GUARD OVER THE PEA.CEFUL LABORS OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE 159
1. The Party's Concern for Border Defense
2. The Establishment of Friendship and Cooperation with Border
Troops of the Socialist Countries 173
3. Battling ~nemy Scheming oni the Border 183
Chapter 5 .
GUAR.DIhG THE BORDERS OF THE STATE.OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE 193
_ 1. The Work of the CPSU in Strengthening Border Defense and
Border Troops :
2. Raising the Ideological Consciousness and Increasing the
Military Combat Skills.of the Border Troops 201
3. Adding tu Military Tradition 213
4. Border Defense--A Responsibility of the Entire People...... 223
5. New Advances 233
6. In the Tnteres'ts of Increasing Palitical Vigilance and In-
suring the Security of the Borders of the Motherland....... 246
7. Increasing Cooperation Between Border Troops of the USSR
� and the Fraternal~ Socialist Countries 257
COnCLUSION 265
BRI~F CHRONICLE OF EVENTS 272
20
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Foreword
The national border of the USSR is sacred and inviolable. It is the border -
of the motherland. And like the thoughtful and attentive owner protects the
house he has put up with his own hands, our people, the master of their own
country, watch over their f atherland and its borders.
The Soviet state has charged the border tronps of the KGB SSSR [Committee on
State Security of the USSR] with the honorable aiid responsible task of insuring
the armed defense of its national borders.
The Soviet border troops have behind them an illustrious military history.
They have been standing a vigilant watch over the boundaries of the motherland
for more than 60 years. The heroic actions.of our border troops have added
brilliant pages to the history of the land of the soviets.
Soviet border troops take pride in the fact that the formation of the border
troops and the development of the basic principles of border defense under
socialism are inseparably liniced with the name of.Vladimir I1'ich Lenin.
V.I. Lenin saw the def ense of the borders as an important function of the
socialist state. "We insist upon the necessity ~of the state," V.I. Lenin
declared, "and the state presumes borders."1 He proceeded to substantiate his
conclusion,concerning the need to sterngthen the Soviet borders in every
possible way and to carry on a determined struggle against any attempt to
weaken their security. V.I. Lenin emphasized that even "a partial, selective
opening of the borders carries with it the most serious risks in the sense
of permitting the penetration of Russia by all kinds of agents without our
having the least chance of controlling it."2 ~
The basic principles of border defense are based on Lenin's teaching concerning
the defense of the socialist fatherland. Even before the October revolution
V.I. Lenin wrote: "Socialists can and must acknowledge [the necessity of]
a military defense of the fatherland /only/ after that fatherland has been
restructured on a socialist b asis, that is, a~efense of the proletarian
socialist revolution against the bourgeoisie."
The thesis on the defense of the socialist fatherland follows naturally from
Lenin's theory of ~the socia~list revolution and his conclusion concerning the
possibility of its victory in a single country taken individually. V.I. Lenin
emphasized that this victory will provoke "a direct attempt on the part of the
bourgeoisie of other countries to destxoy the victorious proletariat of the
socialist state. War on our part would under these circumstances be legitimate
and ~ustified."4
With the victory in our country of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the
defense of the socialist fath erland became a task of immediate practical im-
portance. "Now, from 25 October 1917," Vladimir I1'ich declared, "we are
the defenders; from this day we are for the defense of the fatherland... We
are for the defense of the Russian Soviet Social3st Republic."5
. 21
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On the b~zsis of Lenin's direction the party defined the role of border security
within the system of armed defense of ~he achievements of the revolution...
Experience accumulated in the struggle against the numerous enemies of Soviet
rule showed that reliable border security required special troops employing
methods of detecting and neutralizing enemy spies and smugglers.
Steps were taken from the very beginning of the etfort to set up a border
service to combine military security with the activities of the VChK, and the
first border troops learned revolutionary vigilance from the renowned Chekists.
I.eaning on the creative experience of the masses, the party undertook a search
for the most advantageous forms of border-defense-forr_e organization until it
concluded that it was necessary to include them within the state se;,urity
system. This made possible a fuller demonstration of the function of the
border troops maintaining the security of the country along its borders.
From the moment of their establishment, the border troops were, and remain,
at the same time an integral component of the Armed Forces of the Soviet
state. They operate on the basis of the same Leninist principles of military
organization which are the laws governing the life of the Soviet Armed Forces.
The most imp~rtant among them concerns the leadership to be exercised by the
_ Communist Party as the guiding and directing force of socialist society and
the core of its political system. The decree adopted ~n December 1918 by the
Central Committee.of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) upon the
initiative of V.I. Lenin, "The Policy of the Military Department," was oriented
toward strengthening the.~arty's influence within the Red Army. This party
aim fully applied to the border troops as well. With the aid of its ccmmissars,
political organs and unit (chast') and subunit (podrazdeleniye) party organ-
izations, the party strengthened its leadership within the border forces and
organized political party.work among their personnel. The border troops
became a reliable instrument of the party and its peaceful foreign and con-
structive and creative domestic policy.
The Communist Party carried, and carries, the class principle into practice
in the organization of the border forces. The border forces were created as
_ an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat and as a weapon in the
struggle on behalf of the interests of the workers and peasants now liberated
f~om capitalism. The border troops are now an integral part of the structure
of a socialist state of the whole people, in which the working class plays
the leading role.
V,I. Lenin and the Communist Party established on a sound basis and implemented
the principle of the indestructible unity of the border troops and the people,
the indissoluble ties between the border guards and the masses of working
people.
The border forces are guided in all their activities by the principle of
- proletarian, socialist internationalism. They have always come to the aid of
the working people of neighboring states. The formation of the world socialis t
system led to the military collaboration of the border guards of the socialist
countries. The protection of their borders is a cause common to all members
I
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of the socialist commonwealth. V.I. Lenin's prophetic words hvae been real-
ized; he wrote: "To the old world, the world of national oppression, national -
disputes and national isolation, the workers oppose a new world of the cn~.ty
of the working people of all nations...."6
Devotion to communist ideals, loyalty to the great motherland, unshakable
steadfastness and constant'readiness to do battle with the enemy for the _
triumph oi the cause of conununism, high levels of organization and discip.line
and irr~proachable integrity and honesty--all of these traditions of our party
have found their reflection in the military activities of the troops on the
border.
As an integral component of the Soviet Armed Forces, the border troops have
added their contribution to the glorious traditions of the Soviet Army and
Navy: heroism, valor, boldness, combat experience, deep ideological convic-
tions, vigilance, professional skill and boundless devotion to the Soviet
motherland.
As was the case with all personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces, their loyalty -
to their military oath, mass-scale heroism in action and great courage in
protecting and deFending the national borders became the border guards'
greatest traditions. Examples from the Great Patriotic War provide graphic
evidence of this.
And now today, in our developed socialist society, the protection of our
national bor~'ers likewise remains one of the important factors involved in
insuring the counCry's security and the armed defense of the boundaries of
the socialist fatherland. ~ ,
The borders with capitalist countries and with China have become lines of -
active enemy subversion. Enemy ideological diversionary activity has now
become wide-ranging in scop.e. The intelligence gathering activities Qf the
imperialist states are b ecoming more cunning and insidious and more sophisti- _
cated in both form and metho~l. The enemy is striving more vigorously and
effectively to utilize the ex~~nding channel of international tourism as
well as other~connections.
Auiong the many fronts on which the ideological struggle against the JSSR is
waged, bourgeozs propagandists have now conjured the myth of the "closed
society," the essence of which comes down to the demand that the borders of
the Soviet Union be opened. The border troops are the subject of attacks
in this connectiori as well.
"ivo," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev emphasized at the Berlin conference of European
Communist Parties, "the socialist countries are not 'closed societies.' We
are open to everything truthful anii'honesr; and we are prepared to exploit
favorable opportunities in every possible way to increase contacts, which
contribute to detente. But our doors will always be closed to publications
propagandizing war, the use of force, racism and hat~`ed. All the more tightly
will they remain closed to the emissaries of~f~reign secret services and the -
anti-Soviet emigre organizations they set up."
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Under present day conditions, in which imperialist and Maoist provocations
directed toward the disruption of detente are on the rise, the border troops
remain a vital component in the overall system providing fo r the country's
national security. They function today within the framework of the new con-
stiCution, which legislatively conf irms the Leninist princip le of the invio-
lability of borders. The Communist Party is therefore striving tirelessly as
always to provide reliable assurance of their security. Drawing upon the
powerful productive forces of a developed socialism and the achievements of
Che Soviet people in the areas of economic, cultural and sc ientific develop-
ment:, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Governmen t have during re-
cent years taken a number of steps in the direction o� improving border
security, strengtt?ening the border forces and increasing the vig:ilance of
personnel.
Important programmatic documents for the activities of the border troops are
_ the Greeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Pres idium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the uSSR to the
:nen on the borders in connection with the 60th anniversary of the formation ~
of the bord er troops and the letter from Comrade L:I. Brezhnev, general
secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to personnel of outstanding-ratecl border posts
bEaring the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
L.I. Brezhnev as well as members of the Central Committee Po litburo devote
constant attention to the protection of the national borders . Tl~iey visit
border posts and vessels and interest themselves in the life, service and
conditions of the border txoops. Their paternal concern insp ires them to the
gerformance of new patriotic deeds.
Fur.ther exp ansion of the party's role in insuring the national security and
- protecting the borders and the sterngthening of the party's influence on all
aspects of the life and activity of the border guards is a natural and con-
sistent development of the present day. Exercising its direction of the
organs and troops of the KGB, the Communist Party is develop ing and implement-
ing a sound, scientifically based policy directed toward the undeviating
executi~n of decisions which have been made concerning the protection and
- defense of the b orders of the socialist fatherland and organizing political
parLy work, seeing it as the most important condi~ion insuring great vigilance
and skill on the part of border guard personnel. The content of this polit-
ical training is enriched through creative study of the materials of the
25th Congress of the CPSU, the new constitution and the thes es and conclusions
contained in the speeches and reports of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, general sec-
retary of the CPSU Central Committee.
Implementati.on of the party's economic plans as outlined by the 25th Con,gress
, of the CPSU is making it possible to continue providing our troops with the
latest weapons and equipment. The border troops have now become motorized,
and the process of raising the level of technical equipment of the subunits
directly protecting the national borders has been intensified. Troops tactics
and the means and methods of operational performance are being continuously
improved, the reliability of our border security ever increasing as a result
of these efforts.
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The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government are not failing to devote
attention required to problems associated with the creative elaboration of the
theory of national border defense and are taking care to insure that border
troop organization measures up the mission to be accomplished. They are
outlining the main directions and courses to be followed in the further .:arch
for :improved modes and methods of border defense and insuring the widespread
introduction of scientific methods into the organization of border-troop com-
mand and control. The scope and direction of these current scientific efforts
~ are governed by the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU and subsequent
Central Committee decrees. .
Human beings, however, play the primary and decisive role in protecting our
borders in an environment of sharp resistance, to.the aggressive forces of
imperialism. Serving in the border gurads are fighting men who are educated,
who are well capable of handling the 1.atest military weapons and equipment
and who have been trained and indoctrinated in the military and Chekist tra-
ditions. They demonstrate high levels of political vigilance, ideological
steadfastness and moral and psychological preparation..
In performing their vital tasks in connection with protecting the boundaries, ~
defending the borders of the socialist state,,the border forces view border
defense as an integral element of ineasures taken to insure the country's
national security. The amicable and harmonious relationships between the
border guards and the organs and personnel of the MVD [Ministry of Internal -
Affairs], as well as with subunits and units of the Soviet Armed Forces, are
becoming ever stronger.
The ties between the border troops and the working people of the border areas
are also developin~ and improving with each passing year. This is an entirely
natural process. The increased role played by the popular masses in insuring ~
the security of the country, in protecting the national borders is a character-
istic feature of socialist society, one which has received legislative con-
firmation in the Basic Law. Today as never before the words ring out firmly
and resolutely: "The entire Soviet people defend the borders of the mother-
land." Each day sees an incerase in the activity of workers, kolkhoz peasants
and national intelligentsia in maintaining the necessary border state, main-
- taining technical apparatus along the border in its proper condition and in
detaining border violators. The border troops value highly the assistance
they zeceive from local residents in insuring the inviolability of the
national boundaries of the USSR.
The border troops' more than 60 years' accumulated operational experience
indicates that consistent application of Lenin's idea, "be alert," is one of
the crucial conditions for ins.uring a reliabZe defense of the sacred borders ,
of our motnerland.
Our border guards today lead a tense life full of surprises. Along the bor-
der, just as in a combat situation, there may arise complex situations re-
quiring skill, boldness, initiative and decisiveness. The men in the green
service caps are fu11y aware of their responsibility to the motherland for.the
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reliable protection of the national borders of the USSR, and they are following
strictly the traditions established by the early Chekists of the world's first
socialist state and enriched by the heroic heirs to their glorious legacy.
The book now offered the readers described the history of the formation and
development of the border troops from the time of their organi2ation to the
present time and the difficult military service life of the men along the
border, each minute, each hour of which is filled with danger, vigilantly
protecting the boundaries of the socialist fatherland.
"S~cialism," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev poi~.ts out, "can be maintained only if the
working people's authority is capable of defending the revolution against any
attack by the class enemy."$
In defending the peaceful labors of the Soviet people, in defending socialism,
the Soviet border guards are executing strictly their orders from the party
and the neople.
Conclusion
The book "The Guards Over the Soviet Border" is not simply a military history
of the border troops. It contains the story of people, of those who contin-
uously stand their honored watch along the frontiers of the motherland. ,
riore than one generation of young fighting men has taken its turn on the bor-
' der since the country's sacred boundaries were first placed under protection.
- Uniting them all as sons of a single mother, the socialist motherland, have
been, and are, a passionate love for their native land, boundless devotion
to the Communist Party, loyalty to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and to
mi~itary tradition, cbritinuous contact with the people, unflagging vigilance
and a deep awareness of their personal responsibility for the protection of
the borders.
Th~~e nobles qualities displayed by the guards over the Soviet borders are ,
being passed on from generation to generation. They have now been passed
to the Komsomol members and other youth born in the early 1960's. ,
Many y~ars of experience have shown that undeviating adherence to Lenin's
teachings concerning the defense of the socialist fatherland and the need to ~
insure the inviolability of the borders of the socialist state constitutes a
guarantee of successful border protection and border-troop organization.
Formed under the direction of the Communist Party at the will of V.I. Lenin,
the border troops have always been an object of its attention and concern.
This produces a sense of pride in our border guards, multiplies their strengths
and inspires them to military achievement.
Z`he border troops have been worthy bearers of their battle flags throughout
the entire history of the Soviet state. They have executed the military '
missions with which they have been charged in honorable fashion at all stages
in the building of sociali~m and communism.
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The Communist Party and the Soviet Government are consistently implementing
the decision os the 25th Party Congress and the November (1978) plenum of the
CPSU Central Committee concerning the achievement of continued growth in the
motherland's economic strength and a higher material and spiritual level of
life for the Soviet people and devoting constant attention to increasing the
def ensive capability of the country and to insuring reliable protec~ion of the
borders.
This has been brought about by the difficult~international situation. Mili-
tarist circles in the USA and other capitalist countries are trying to destroy
detente; they are intensifying their aggressive activifiies and supercharging
the atmosphere along the borders.
As recents have shown, the Beijing clique, which with criminal lightheartedness
has set its military machine in motion, is creating a serious threat to peace.
C~ina's armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam once again
lays bare the true aims of Beijing's policy of combining in a bloc with,
making advances toward today's most arrantly reactionary forces.
In his speech at the pre-election meeting of voters in the Bauman electoral :
district, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev pointed out that, citing what they refer to
as the "Soviet threat," the imperialists are calling for the allocation of
more and more billions for military purposes. "They are trying to crush the
peoples' movement for liberation by force and interfering in the internal
affairs of other countries. The position of the Chinese leadership is tendi.ng -
increasingly toward this imperialist policy.
"With their Lnprecedentedly brazen and rapacious a,tta~k on a.small neighboring
country, socialist Vietnam ,the present Chinese rulers have finally revealed
to the entire world the insidious, aggressive nature of the hegemonistic,
great-power policy they are pursuing. Everybody now sees that it is pre-
cisely this policy that is presently the most serious threat to peace in the -
entire world."9
The imperialists' and Maoists' efforts to aggravate the international situation
have been accompanied by an intensification of the secret subversive activities ;
of enemy special services and an activation of ifleological diversions along
the national frontier. To a great exten"t this is what determines the nature
and orientation of the border troops' activities.and underlines the political
and military importance of the taSk of protecting our country against pene-
tration of its borders by enemy agents and other subversive enemy actions.
From Chukotiya to Brest, from Kushka to the latitudes of the Arctic, the
border guards are vigilantly protecting the borders of the Soviet state.
The motherland has placed them on the front line i~n the struggle to thwart
the schemes of the enemies~of peace and socialism in the full knowledge that
they can be relied upon and that they will not allow anyone to violate our bor-
der. Acquitting themselves with honor, the Soviet border troops indeed jus-
tify the great trust the motherland has reposed i.n them.
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The best sons of the Soviet people stand guard on the borders of this develop~d
socialist society. Only the worthiest are assigned to the border troops.
The border gaurds always keep in mind and take pride in the fact that V.I.
Lenin and F.E. Dzerzhinskiy stood at their cradle. "The notable traditions
of former generations of border troops," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev wrote to
personnel of border guard posts imeni Heroes ~f the Soviet Union, "their
heroism and daring, their boundless devotion to the cause of the Communist
Party live on in the military life of our younger t~oops--reliable sentinels
for the motherland."10,.
Successful implementation of plans for communist construction outlined by the
25th Congress of the CPSU, the development of a strong national industrial base
and extensive exploitation of advances resulting from progress in science and
technology have made possible the achievement of qualitative changes in the
equipment of our border troops and add to the resources available to them
for insuring reliable protection for the border in the struggle against
cunning enemy secret service agents.
Border subunits and units have now become highly technically equipped and
maneuverable. Their military and other, special-purpose equipment fully mea-
sures up to present-day requirements. High-speed ships�and boats, airplanes
and helicopters, motor vehicles, armored personnel carriers, instruments for
observation, warning and communication equipment, radar and so �orth are all.
making possible reliable protection for our borders.
But vigilance is the border guards;' main weapon. ~On the border one feels with
special intensity why it is the party so pointedly puts the matter of the
necessity of increasing ideological vigilance with a view to the aggressive
intentions and ideological diversions of imperialism and Maoism.
In the developed socialist society the CPSU sees the political vigilance of
the Soviet people and its military personnel as a most important public oU- -
ligation as well as a patriotic and international duty.
"The increasing political, military and economic importance attaching to pro-
tection of the motherland's borders poses the task of further improving the
modes and methods of border-troop operation, strengthening military discipline
and raising the level of combat ski7.1 and vigilance on the part of our per-
sonnel," declared Comrade Yu. V. Andropov; "each border guard must remain
continually aware of his personal responsibility for strict adherence to
officially required border procedures and maintenance of border arrange-
ments."11
Soviet border guards have been entrusted with our most'closely concealed
affairs--the preservation of the tranquillity and secuiity of the Soviet
people in their advance toward communism. The constructive, creative labors
of the steel worker and mechanical engineer, the worker in the kolkhoz~field
and the geologist; the productive work of the writer and, the scientist; the
peaceful sleep of the infant in its cradle--these would all be unthinkable
without the vigilant service of our border troops.
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Proceeding on the basis of the programmatic theses of the 25th Congress of the
CPSU and the decisions of the November (1978) plenum of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee, the political organs and party organizations within the border forces
are continuously improving the modes and methods employed in political party
work in connection with developing vigilance in barder personnel. In addition
to propagandizing the successes of the Soviet people in building communism,
special attention is devoted to exposure of the aggressive nature of imperial-
ism and Maoism and to shedding light upon their subversive actions along our
national borders.
The great vigilance of our border personnel finds its practical expression in
their adherence to communist principles; continuous combat readiness; dis-
cipline; bold and decisive actio~ in seizing and~holding border violators;
knowledge of~the techniques, methods and�devices resorted to by enemy spies -
in crossing a national border and in�their ability to preserve state and
military secrets and personal and official documents and to remain forever
alert. .
Today's border guards are experts in their field, skilled in quickly and
accurately "reading" a violator's trail, as well as in utilizing advanced
_ technology and the troop's faithful friend--the border guard dog.
The factor of vigilance under present-day conditions--this is the weapon with
which the border guards of all countries of the socialist commonwealth are
armed, the weapon which inspires confidence in its power and helps maintain
the inviolability of the borders of our motherland and of the entire socialist
commonwealth. When the Soviet border guard goes on his honored duty, he knows .
that at that very moment the Polish and Bulgarian border troops are standin~
vigilantly at their borders, preserving with him the peace of the socialist
world; that the troops of heroic Vietnam are repulsing the invasio~ of the
Chinese aggressors; that Cuba's coastal guard is keeping a vigilant eye on the
plots and schemes of the American imperialists; and that the border troops of _
the Mongolian People's Republic, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslo~rakia and Rumania
~ are reliably maintaining the security of the countries of the socialist com-
monwealth.
Executing the orders of the party and the Soviet people, the border troops
now, ~ust as 60 years ago, are mai~taining the inviolability of the boundaries
of the Soviet state.through their sel�less military service; they are success-
fully cutting off the numerous attempts to violate our borders and suppressing
enemy provocations, political and economic contraband a.nd 3deological diver--
sions. �
The border of our motherland, along which the Soviet border ~roops stand their
unchanging watch, stretches 67,000 km. Each passing day brings us new demon-
strations of their steadfastness and courage and .their great va.ligance in
protecting the national borders of the USSR.
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FOOTNOTES
1. V.I. Lenin, "Po1n. sobr. soch" [Complete Works], vol 31, p 435.
2. Ibid., vol 45, p 337.
3. Ibid., vol 30, p 198.
4. Ibid., p 133.
5. Ibid., vol 35, p 395.
6. Ibid., vol 23, p 150.
7. L.I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [On a Leninist Course:
Speeches and ArticlesJ, Moscow, 1978, vol 6, p 58.
8. Ibid., vol 6, p�588.
9. L.I. Brezhnev, "In the Name of the Happiness of the Soviet People: A
Speech at a Meeting~with Voters of Moscow's Bauman Electoral District on
2 March 1979," Moscow, 1979, pp 16-17,
10. POGRANICHNIK, No 7, p 2. "
11. "Sbornik statey Glavnogo i Politicheskogo upravleniy pogranichnikh voysk
KGB USSR], 1978, No 5, p 8.
COPYRIGHT: POLITIZDAT, 1979
8963
CSO: 1801
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BOOK EXCERPTS: EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGET DETECTION
Moscow EFFEKTIVNOST' OBNARUZHENIYA TSELEY in Russian 1980 signed to press
20 Aug 79 pp 1-io, 2~+-25, 52,93, i26, i56-i58
[Annotation, Table of Contents, Introduction, etxcerpts from chapters 1-5,
and Bibliography of book by V. A. Gorbunov]
[Excerpts] Title Page:
Title: EFFEKTIVNOST' OBNARUZHENIYA TSELEY (Effectiveness of Target
Detection)
Publisher: Voyenizdat
Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1980
Signed to Press Date: 20 August 1979
Number of Copies Published: 12,000
Number of ~ages: 160
Brief Description:
This book presents a classificafion of surveillance systems on the basis of -
various criteria and examines methods of evaluating the effectiveness of
radar means of surveillance as sources of information for modern automated
control systems. The author examines the principles of efficient placement
of ineans of search and detection, methods of calculation and evaluation of
the effectiveness of simple and multiple-component suxveillance systems.
The description is illustrated by examples of evaluation of effectiveness
of target detection. This book is based on materials published in the
foreign press. It is intended for military specialists working with ob-
servatian and surveillance equipment and for readers with an interest 3n
problema of target search and detection.
Table of Contents
Tntroduction 3
. 31
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Chapter l. General Premises. Target Detection Criteria _5
1.1. Basic Terms and Definitions
1.2. General Description and Classification of Surveillance $
Systems
1.3. Features of.Design.of Integrated and Nonintegrated Sur-
veillance 9ystems 10
1.4. Instrumental and Tactical Search Modes, Principal In-
dicators of Their Effectiveness 14
1.5. Criteria for Evaluating Target Detection Capability. 19
Some Problems of General Methodology
Chapter 2. Effective Range of Surveillance Equipment 24
2.1. Methods of Estimating Anticipated Effective Range
2.2. Concept of Surveillance Instrument Range Distributions 31
2.2.1. Uncertainty of the Act of Target Detection by a
Surveillance Instrument. Random Character of Range
of Establishment of Instrument.Contact
2.2.2. Distribution of Effective Range 33
2.2.3. Standard Laws of Range Distribution 37
2.2.4. Concept of Distribution of Con�ealment Range and 40
Receding Target Surveillance Itange
2.3. Method of Statistical-Probability Description of An- -
ticipated.Effective Range 41
2.3.1. Figuring in Uncertainty of Physical Conditions of
Establishing Contact 42
2.3.2. Standard Effective Range Distribution Curves 44
2.3.3. Probability Characteristic of Effective Zone of
Surveillance Instrument in a Horizontal Plane 46
2.3.4. Figuring Altitude (Depth) of Target Movement.
Detection Zone in Space 4$
Chapter 3. Effectiveness of Establishment of Instrument Contacts 52
3.1. Mathematical Description of Processes of Establishment
of Instrument Contacts " " ' S3
3.I.1. Instantaneous Target Detection Probabilities 56
3.1.2. Accumulating Target Detection Probabilities
3.1.3. Methods of Determining Analytical Relations for the 59
Law of Establishment of Instrwnent Contact
3.2. Distribution of Detection Range for a Target Traveling 64
on a Course Parameter~Other Than Zero -
3.2.1. Dist-~ibution of Lateral Detection Range 68
3.2.2. Dif.tribution of True Detection Range
3.3. Methods of Determinating Effective Range (Detection)
Characteristics 72
3.3.1. Effective Range of Detection of a Target Moving on 73
a Course Parameter C1ose to Zero
3.3.2. Effective Radius of Action and Effective Surveillance
Unit 74
3.3.3. Effective Search (Detection) Bandwidth for a Target 77
Moving on a:Course Parameter,Other Than Zero
_ 32
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