JPRS ID: 9257 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020029-5
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9257
18 August 198~
Sub-S~hc~ran Afri~a Re ort
p
FOUO No. 685 -
. FBI$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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. JPRS L/9257
18 Auqus t 19'8 0
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 685
_ CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Economic Developmente Siace January Regorted -
(M~tQi$S TROPYC~4UX ET MEDITERR~A.NL~ENS.,
11 Jul 80) 1
Correspondent Examines ACP-EEC Meetings~
(Jacques Latrem~liere; MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEF.NS, 30 May 80) 5
- ADB ~ocked by Discord, Scandal
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE,
18 Jun 80) 11 -
I,arge Loan to WADB Deacribed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET IWLiiERRANEENS,
4 Jul 80) 17
_ Beginning of OMVS Da.m Construction Announced
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
4 Jul 80) 18
Briefs
East-South Preferential Zone 19 -
Simon Malley Expulsion 19
ANGOIA
Briefs
Reported GDR Military Assistance Head 2Q
UNTA Demnnstration 20
Benguela RR Sabotag~ Admitted 2p
Oil Coatract 21
Officials at French Reception 21
- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO] -
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Details of Economic Recovery Plan 1980-1981
. (INDUSTRIES ET TP~AVAUX D'OJTRE-MER,
Jun 80) 22
UBAC Operations in Fiscal Year 1979
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
11 Jul 80) 29
EEC Aid To Be Paid in Form of Subsidies, Loans
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRA.NEENS~
11 Jul 80) ............o......o 30
CHAD
FAN Official Resigns in Protest
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
11 Jul 80) 31
~,'i'HtIOPIA
- WSLF Leader Attacks Ethiopian Colonialism
('Abd-al-Nasir Shaykh Adam Interview;
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 9-15 May 80) 32
Eritrean Situation, Soviet Intentions Discussed
(Georges al-Rasi; A?~-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
9-15 May ~0) 34
GABON
Overall Survey of Economic Situation Augurs Well
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
11 Jul 80) 38
GAMBIA '
FAD Sanitation Improvement I,dan Granted ~
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
27 Jun 80) 40 ;
GUINEA
~ Briefs
_ Eximbank Boeing Loan 41 '
- b - '
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IVORY CQAST
New Framework for Denacracy Assessed
(Jonathan Kolela; AFRIQUE ~iSIE, 7 Jul 80) 42
Political, Business (~anges Reported ^
_ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITEEtRANEENS,
20 Jun 80) 45
Recent Economic Developments Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
11 Jul 80) SO
MALI
Briefs ~
Seminar on State Enterprisea 52
- MOZAMHIQUE
Salt Prod~!ction Company Established To Increase Exports
;.KARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
11 Jul 80) 53
Briefs
Italian Company for Geological Survey 55
~ Italian Textile Plant Constructiox~ 55
Incr~asing Cooperation With Bulgaria 55
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
Briefs
- Political Prisonera Released 56
SENEGAL
PDS Leader Discusses Party's Program, Position
(Abdoulaye Wade Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE,
11 Jun 80) 57
Public,Sma11 Bueinessmen Unhappy With Ecoaomic Situation
(Sylviane Kamarar JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Jul 80) 61
TANZANIA
Financial Difficulties Said To Be Blocking Development
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, ~
4 Jul 80) 64
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. TOGO
Briefs
r^ood Crops Production Development 67
UGANDA
Tragic Conditions in Karamo~a Deacribed
(MARCHES T1tOPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
11 Jul 80) 68
ZAIRE
Transportation Statistics Reported -
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEI3S,
4 JuZ 80) 71
- Bri ef s
Mining Studies 73
UNDP Aid ~g
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS SINCE J.~NUARY REPORTED
Paris I~iARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~ItRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1726
[Article: "The Evolution of the Economic Situation of the States of
~ Central Africa Simce the Beginning of 1980"]
[Text] Our issue No 1796 of 11 Apri1 1980 (page 852) carried an analyeis
of the economic situation of the etates of Central Africa at the end of
1979. New and recent indications have been provided by the Bank of Centxal
L~frican States (BEAC), according to which the evolution of the economic
eituation during the f irst quarter of 1980 may be characterized as follows:
Noticeable decline in agric~iltural products for export, eacept for -
cacao and cotton in Cameroon and co'Efee ia Cabon.
Resumption of forest industrial activity except in Central Africa.
H~t expansion in productioa of p~troleum aad miaerals except in
Gabon, where the decline in petroleum production hes been accentuated by
the fact of the progreesive eabanstion of the depoeita.
Stagnation in real terms in the busiaess a:.tivity of industrial f irm.
~esarkable increa~e in the~fore~.gn ~rad~ Qf,.Cxmeroon at.'the end of
1979, as a result of exports of petroleum which led to a reduction in the
def icit in the commercial balance.
Notable al~wing down of ths increase in prices escept in Central
Africa, where a strong acceleratioa fn the rate of increase was noted, -
reeulting from the iacrease in the coat of eaergq. ~
Cacao - The def initive resulta from the 1978-1979 cacao season ahow pro-
duction of 110,000 tons for Camerooa (ug 3,000 tone compared to the pre-
vious seaeou), 4,754 tons for Gabon, and 2,772 toas for the Congo. At the
ead of March, 1980, sales amounted to 112,704 tons in Cameroon, 2,452 tona
in Gabon, and 1,196 tons in the Congo.
Coffee--The def initive results from the 1978-1979 season confirm the pro- .
visional estimates publiahed ia our issue referred to above. As of the end '
of May, 1980, sales of the preseat hanvest totaled 33,072 tons of Robusta
ia Cameroon;, 3,052 in Central Africa, 306 tona in Gabon, and 1,347 tons in
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the Congo. For Arabica, coffee sales f.n Cameroon totaled 13,651 tons as of
the end of Febxuary.
Cotton--~Cameroon, during the 1979-1980 season, had a recor.d production of
cotton seeds. A further decline in the harvest was recsrded in Central
Africa, and the conduct of the harvest was diaturbed in Chad. The def in-
itive results of the 1978-1979 season ahow 136,725 tons in Chad, 59,496
tons in Came~~on, and 32,150 tons in Central A~rica. The harvest of cot t on
naw under way amounted to 50,000 tons in Chad during the first two months
of ly�fl and 73,800 tons in Cameroon and 20,705 tons in Central Africa ae of
= the end of March, 1980. In terms of cotton fiber picked, t~e 1978-1979 ~
_ season provided 27,343 tons in Cameroon (up 37.fi percent over the previous
year), 50,143 tons in Chad (up 12.4 percent), and 7,291 tone in Central ~
Africa.
Bananas--With a total of 76,749 tons, net exporte of bananas during 1979
- by the Camcraon Banana Organization (OCB) reflected a decline of 5 percent
as compared with 1978. Production during 198Q will be affected by the pr o-
longed drought wh~.ch has affected the pl~nted aieas.
Tobacco--The Cameroon Tobacco Company (SCT), which durizg the 1978-1979
aeason produced nearly 630 tona of wrapper tob~cco and i,230 tons of cut
tobacco, has been required ~o close six of the 13 training centers by rea-
son of the difficult s3tuation .tn the international tobacc~ market. Under
theae conditions ;.he number of t:.~a~~o planters has declined from 9,000 t o
6,SA0, and forecasts for the 1979-1980 seaeon axe ia the order of 1,60~
tons. In Central Africa production has declinad furthe.r: 1,800 tona in
1979 (765 tons of wrapper tobacco and 1,Oa5 tons of cut tobacco). ~
Timber--profiting from the favorable situation in the international marke t,
the f orestry sector of the region, aince the end of 1979, has reflecte3
very auetained activity! except in the Congo, for Okoume wood [Gaboon wood],
and in Central Af_ica. In Gabon the production of Okoume wood in 1979 ~
recorded a decline for the third consecutive year, with a production of 1.2 '
millien cubic meters. On the other haad exporte (one million cu~ic meters)
expanded and at increased prices. Sales during the f irst two months of
1980 totaled 176,600 m3 (up 4.6 percent~, and exports amounted to 158 600 m3.
Local employmen~ of wood used 215,000 m of Okoume tim'~er in 1979 (agains t ~
296,900 m3 ::n 1977) .
In the Congo purchases of Okoume wood by the Congcleae Office of Wood in
1979 totaled 46,220 m3 (down 25 percent). Exporte and loc~,31 uae ~f the
wcod also declined respectively by ~6 percent and 81.1 percent.
In Cameroon exports of wood recorded at the port of Douala in 1979 brougYit
out 362,280 tons of bark (up 11.95 percent) and 91,520 tone of sawdust fup "
21.75 percent). ~
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In Central Africa the production of bark in 1979 declined to 368,600 m3
(down 20 percent), and that of sawdust amounted to 67,380 m3 (down 35.4
percent). The noticeable slowing down of forestry activity continued
during the f irst months of 1980. Exports for the year 1979 totaled 122,130 m3 "
of b ark (up 10 percent over 1978). Exports of sawdust, amounting to 23,275
m3, went down by 50 percent.
_ T'etroleum--Gabon continueu to record, in 1979, a decline in its petroleum
production with 9.8 million tons (down 7.6 percent), For the first two
months of 1980 the drop in oroduction, compared to the corresponding months
' af 1979, amounted to 4.9 percent. On the other hand the production of
natural gas i~ncreased by 7.4 percent in 1979 and by 24.6 percent in the
f irst t~,~o montha of 1980.
In the Congo the production of petroleum in 1979 was recorded at 2.7 million
tons (up 12.6 percent), while the production of natural gas declined by
15.9 percent. In the course of the first 2 months of 1980 the production
of petroleum increased by 5.8 percent, and the production of natural gas
went down again: 7.8 percent less co~pared to the same months of 1979.
Petroleum production in ~a,,.t~-;on ros~ in 1979 to 1.8 million tons (against
1.7 million tons in 1978), all ot ~t exporteu.
y
Oth~~r `iCnerals --With a production of 2.3 million tons, Gabonese output of
manganese ~.ncreased by 34.5 pe~;ent in 1979. The increase in production _
continued in the course of the first 2 months of ~980 (up 44.6 percent). _
Also in Gabon, th~~ production of uranium ore has grown steadily since 1977.
Production for 15~79 was recorded at 1,101 tons of uranium concentrates
(up 7.7 percent). The increase continued during the first 2 months of
1980 (up 14.2 percent).
In Central Africa the figures on production and exports of diamonds for
1979 were published in our issue number 1796, respectively 314,200 carats
(up 10.8 percent) and 300,020 carats. The value of the exports represented
2.6 bill~ou CrA (up 2S.8 percent over 1978). For the f irst quarter of 1980
~roduction rose to 99,900 carata, against 69,400 carats for the first
' quarter of 1979.
Inclustry--rn Gabon industrial activity was again maintained in 1979, with
the exception of the chemical and tobacco sector, with the latter suffering
from tl~e competition of foreign-made cigarettes.
In Central AL-rtca tne favorable trend of the first half of 1979 was not
mAinrained r.~ the end of the year, the overall business f igure of the firms
surveyed dectin~.ng by 4.5 percent by comparison with 1978. In real terms
the decline was much more evident. The textile induetry was particularly
affected, with a decline of 31.2 percent. Investment undertaken by the
firms concerned only amounted, in 1979, to 243 million CFA (down 35.5
percent compared with 1978).
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On the whole the industrial sector of Cameroon underwent a satisf actory
development during the period from October, 1978, to September, 1979, with
- an increase of 14 percent in the overall business figure and expor.ts
higher by 7 percent.
I'rices--A rather noticeable slowing down of the increase of consumer prices
was noted in the course of the first quarter of 1980. For the year 1979
as a whole the increase in prices was 8 percent in Cameroon, 9.76 per cent
in Gabon, and 11 ~~rcent in Central Africa.
Foreign Commerce--The foreign commerce of Cameroon was recorded in 19 79 at
271.2 billion CFA in imports and 238.7 billion in exports, for a def icit
of. 32.5 billion CFA against 35.6 billion CFA for 1978. The noticeab le
reduction of the def icit was due to the contribution of petroleum, whose
exports represented 56.3 billion CFA.
In Central Africa foreign trade in the first three quarters of 1979 -
produced a def icit of 1. ~s billion CFA. -
- For the Congo the latest statistics are for 1978. Imports totaled 56.6
billion CFA, and exports amo~snted to 26.6 t~illion CFA, for a deficit of
30 billion CFA (as against a deficit of 3.8 billion CFA for 1977).
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
5170
CSO: 4400
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS -
CORRESPONDENT EXAMINES ACP-EEC MEETINGS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Frenc~ 30 May 80 pp 1246-47
[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Reflexione on a Meeting"] -
[Text] Some S00 participants, from 51 ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific
countries (associated with the EEC)] countries out of 59, as well as 8
countries out of 9 from the European communities, Ireland being absent,
. met in Marseilles from 21 to 23 M~y, at the j oint initiative of the
Chafiber of Commerce and Industry and the municipality. Their purpose was
to examine in depth what could be calZed, avoiding official phrases, the
"instructions for use" of the Second Lome Convention, concerning com-
mercial and industrial cooperation, particularly in the regional framework
outlined by this doc:ument.
Opening just a few days after the closing of the Franco-African Conference
in Nice, such a meeting was bound to appear, more or less, its antithesis
or its rival. In Nice, however, the work did not concern only Lome II,
a sub3ect treated by Mr Olivier Stirn, but the North-South dialog, the
Euro-Arab-African "trilog," and b ilateral French-African cooperation
itself. In addition, the discussion was directed toward heads of state
o~r governmental delegations. In Marseilles, it was a question of bring-
ing together for a dialog head8 of compa.nies, or public or semi public
bodies with industrial or commercial purposes, and a few spPcialists
from the services in Brussels. It is with this in mind, that, leading,
along with Mr Gsston Deferre and Mr Mario Pedini, the Italian ~enator
and member of the European Parliament, tne Marseilles meeting to the -
baptismal font, Mr Claude Cheysson noted, a little ironically, that
"these days, civil servants do not seem to be involved in pxoduction or
commerce."
- While the majority of the ACP representatives present were bound, through
the institutions they represented, to their national orga~izations, it
should be understood that the Marseilles discussion was to be spontaneous.
Mr Gaston Deferre would thus be able to criticize the formulas suggested
or "imposed," recalling, along the way, the eminent role that he had
_ played, as the inventor of the "~lueprint law" for the independence of
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the African necples. This liberal look, complemented by several ~ttacks
in principle against the action of the multinationals in the Third World,
amounted to a political justificaGion of the city of Marseilles for the
fine organization of this meeting. In addition, he is said to have also
attracted certain listeners, such as the Malagasy, who refused to go to
Nice. Afterwards, he was quickly forgotten and the meeting went on as
if it had taken place in Brussels or Hamburg. A prolonged acrimony in
the criticism of the multinationals would t~ave, besides, been unfavorably
received by many of the guests taking part in the debate.
How should it be summed up? The official coII�nunique reflects the general
nature of the work, but not the comments made in individual reparts. The
main disadvantage of this kind of ineeting is that much time is lost in
listening to the reading of papers prepared in advance and which it would
be preferable to read in advance. The debate itself can be summed up as
a series of observations pre5ented one after the other, without any
connection between them. Each of the papers, and this was especially
true when they were given by specialists, had a specific subject. But
the speaker was careful, most often, to give it an elegant presentation,
submerging the most important part of it in droning cliches. What re-
mained afterwards was not so much practical conclusions as the dominating ~
influence of a few, whether it was a matter of the study of economic
mechanisms, of open perspectives on the future, or fire-breaks to reduce
excessive boldness.
Mr Claude Cheysson: A World Dimension of the Community
The cpening speech of Mr Claude Cheysson can, in that respect, be con-
sidered as an axis around which the papers were focused. Recalling the
amount of financing involved in Lome I and II and the overall rise of
58 percent in exports from the ACP countries between 1975 and 1979, which
was a resu'lt of this financing, he had to admi~ that the oveYwhelming
predominance of raw materials within these exports contradicts the opti-
mism that the bare statistics might at first suggest. One of the reasons
for this situtation has to be sought in the relative indifference of the
countries which benefit from the knowledge and the penetration of the
Western markets, like the problem of the transfer of commercial tech- "
nologies, in spite or the grants provided for that purpose in the first
and, especially, the second convention.
, Legal and customs documentation, statistics, price lists, data banks
constitute the necessary arsenal of the ACP cc,untries in the conquest of
_ the major European and American markets. But an operational knowledge,
which is acquired only through close contact with the businesses involved,
and not in the ministries, is still more indispensable. The same is
true for~industTializatiox~: A few o.perations developed thanks to the aid
of Lome I, such as the large cement factory owned in common by Togo,
Ghana and the Ivory Coast, or the encouragement given by certain African -
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- countries tp the development of small and middle size businesses,
should not del.ude us. 'I'he label of cooperation of the ACP countries
with Brussels nevertheless ought to open up, better than anything else,
access to the financial markets and in particular, those of Arab capital,
- since experience shows that where one unit of account appears, the Arabs
follow with six or seven. Mr Cheysson thus favored in Marseilles, for
the EEC and the EIB (Eurpoean Investment Bank), the recycling function
decided upon at Nice by Mr Monor for France and the Central Fund. Com-
petition or comp~ementarity?
To the facilities for financing in the industrial sector there must cor-
respond, in addition, security of access for the ACP countries to the -
markets of the Community. Certainly, the protection clauses will only
be able to work in the future under strictly defined conditions of con-
sultation. "But it is regrettable that the Lome II Conventfon has limited
to S years the guarantee of free access to those markets--a very short
term to justify an ir.dustrial investment--while countries like Egypt,
Syria or Algeria have obtained commercial clauses of an indefinite dura-
- tion." It is also deplorable that the ACP countries did not use the
considerable facilities at the disposition of the Commission of the -
Communities, in the framework of sector consultations, in order to provide
for industrial restructuring, in which the tarde unions aught to be in-
' volved and which would permit making room for their exports. ,
The worldwide dimension of the Community was finally mentioned. In the _
- opinion of Mr Cheysson, it is only on that 1eve1 that we can resolve
the major problems between the industrial countries and the PVD [develop-
ing countries], whether it is a matter of th~ price of raw materials,
the search for a legal structure as opposed to purely speculative opera-
tions, or of the deficit of the balances of payment of the Third World,
in a word, of this North-South dialog, whose routes, through the obliga-
tory convergence of Nice and Marseilles, are those of cooperation, as
opposed to the exchange of "missiles and megatons" which characterizes
the East-West dialog.
Technical Processes
, High quality studies served as a technical base to the work of the three -
committees: commercial cooperation, industrial cooperation and regional
cooperation as a framework for the first two. Let us note particularly
a report by Mr J.E. David, of the Office of Development in Brussels,
on "transfers of co~nercial technology," and the "problematics of regional
cooperation and the EEC-ACP Convention" of Mr Moussa N'Gom, the secretary
general of CEAO (West African Economic Community). It is nevertheless
in the domain of industrial cooperation (Committee B) that the papers were
most impressive.
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- Among many others, one must note that of Dr Ulf R. Siebel, a member of
the Vorstand o: the Afrika Verein, on the conditions of reciprocal re-
sponsibility in industrial proje.cts. Mr Jean Dromer, the president of
the International Bank for West Africa, treating the financing of these
projects, emphasized the prohibitive character o� certain interest rates
with respect to the infrastructure and the necessity, for the promoter of
the project, of retaining control of the financing, the dangers of an
abondonment of that responsibility showing up frequently in the "financir~g
in hand" operations. Supporting the thesis of Mr Dromer, Mr Diawara, -
the president of the Dakar Club, proposed once again, the creation of
- a multilateral fund directed by Europe permitting the offering, with a
guarantee to the holders of capital, particularly the Arabs, of outlets
in the industrial countries and sources of financing adapted to needs,
as much from the point of view of the length of the loans as of the im-
provement of interest rates. Mr H. Michel, the president of the "Co-
operation in Development" Committee of the Union of Industries of the EEC,
emphasized the guarantee of investments which ought to be, in his opinion,
sought in the framework of the Lome agreements.
Mr Jacques Alibert, the delegate general of the International Committee
for Black Africa (CIAN), presented a well organized study on joint enter-
prises, their objectives, their financial and technical mechanisms and
the results of Africanization of their posts as a function of vocation
training. While regretting that the participation of the ACP countries
in the capitalizing of businesses has been limited to governments or to
European companies, local small and medium size businesses having had
only a small role up until now in the movement, Mr Alibert emphasized
the speeding up function which could fall to the chambers of com-
merce and industry, even upon the interstates funds permitting the
placing on the stock exchange of companies installed in neighboring
countries. He studied the problem of the retrocession of participation
of national investment companies in local enterprises or with private
nationals as well as the mechanism, in the framework of the joint enter-
prises, of increases in capital, underscoring the disadvantages of
"foreign funding participation," which is only admissible to the extent
that non voluntary withdrawal "is linked to the length of the industrial
amortizations and to the transfer of capital and its fruits."
The Fire-Breaks
The concrete preoccupations of the private sector, at meetings such as
those in Marseilles, may engender, with regard to the great doctrinal
themes which may be developed, a certain courteous indifference. The
conformism which results from it would very quickly become a burden, if
certain speakers did not dissipate the mists by playing intelligently
the role of "devil's advocate."
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I[ must be said that by assuming this function, with ~reat restraint
mor.eover, Mr Xavier Torre, the chairman and president of Optorg, profited
from the Evangelical paper, which had preceded his, of Mr Christian
Megrelis, the chairman and president of Export Assistance International,
on the virtues of free trade. One might have expected in Marseilles
heated disCussions on the forms of the "joint venture" or some other
subject but the sort of Cobdenian cult(*) to which Mr Megrelis invited
his listeners of Committee A irresistibly called for a response. That
of Mr Torre was so pertinent that one almost regretted that it might have 1
seemed to have been dictated by the spirit of "repartee," although it
cont~iined, ~uit~~hle For everyone, a uaeful lesaon to think about.
How has the association of Yaounde, at first a limited zone for trade,
protected by the coimnon European foreign tariffs then changed into a
worldwide association because of the membership of Great Britain, at the
same time as BrussEls was making itself thQ champion of generalized
preferences and of lowering customs barriers, constitutes in itself an
interesting phenomenon to study. But, eliminating, in a spirit of
devotion to free tr3de, the sclerosing effects of worldism on the develop-
ment of the African economies, the original goal of Yaounde I, is much
more debatable. From 1972 to 1977, while world trade was tripling, ex-
ports other than oil from the ACP countries noticeably dropped in volume.
In all the exports for developing countries, those of the ACP countries
_ dropped from 13.5 to 1015 percent. "Even if the participation of the
Community remains preponderant in the ACP trade, their position in the
whole of trade with the countries of the common market remains stationary
while that of the other developing countries is growing."
Worldization works to the advantage of the industrial production of
Southeast Asia, of South Korea and of Latin America, contributing to
keep the ACP countries, in spite of the attenuation brought about by
certain mechanisms such as Stabex, in an underdevelopment all the more
anguishing since their share of exports to the EEC varies from country ~
to co~,~ntry, 8 ACP countries out of 59 furninshing 63 percent and by
product, 40 percent of these exports coming from countries in which
- the concentration by product is higher than 75 percent. We would be happy ~
of course to see Brussels assume global responsibilities if it were not
at the expense of the poorest countries, in Africa in particular, the
destabilization of which might have the most dreadful consequences for
Europe.
Mr Jacques Ferrandi, the president of CIAN, addressing Committee B on
the problem of industrialization, also recalled that the war cry of the
liberalists--"laissez faire, let things be," at times ressembled a
*Ri~tiard Cobc:en, economist and industrialist, was, in the 19th century, one
of the most ardent advocates of the idea of free trade.
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comr~and: "Let r~e do as I please, let me by." But he surprised his audi-
ence a little b;~ defending with talent the thesis that the development
of industry in the ACP countries constitutes a false problem, that of
- agriculture alone being important. But the thesis is not a paradoxical
one: through the capital, the labor, the raw materials and the consumers
- that it engenders, agriculture is, indeed, the necessary condition for
an industry which is "ready to break out" and ought, at all events, to
be the subject of another "trilog" between the private sector, the host
country and the public authorities of the industrialized countries, "who
alone are qualified to change profoundly the relations of their economy
_ with that of their African partners." Let us agree, however, that these
words are not at all in agreement with the spirit of a house in which the
former director uf the EDF [European Development Fund] was, for a long
time, one of the most influential forces. To treat in the same way, as
- he has done, the guaranteeing of foreign investments against political
risks by denying its stimulating effect in order to reduce it to a
simple problem of fairness, is to pose the philosophic problem of the ,
- relations of the guarantee and the inducement, but not to resolve, as -
the public was hoping, an actuarial problem in the framework of Lome
II. A little too much brilliance has harmed, in the work of a tech-
nical committee, the effect of words which would have been more wel- ~
come during a closing session, in which they might have balanced the
certainties of some economists.
That session, it is true, was reduced to the minimum. Its chairman,
- Mr Raymond Chasle, the ambassador from Mauritius to the Communities, and
chairman of the committee of ACP ambassadors to Brussels, was content to
limit himself to pointing out l~ssons of an immediate and practical
nature. Mr Cheysson was no longer there in order to give them a re-
sonance. Madame Simone Veil would of course bring to the delegates the
- greetings of the European Parliament. The subjects treated were too un-
familiar to her for her speech to rise above individual congratulations
_ and an end-of-the-meeting optimism. There was no real conclusion, which
was, actually, not important since an artificial formulation would risk
not dealing with the tendencies slowly evolved from the contact of
ideas and men.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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' INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ADB ROCKED BY DISCORD, SCANDAL
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Jun 8Q pp 54-56
. [Article by Siradiou Diallo)
[Text] As tradition would have it, the African Development Bank (ADB)
d istributes less money than dramatics. And now we f ind that this wondrous
institution has become the innocent victim of a military coup d'etat. By
overthrowing President William Tolbert, Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe
upset the delicate and complex scenario set up for the election of the
future president of the Bank. It was to take place in Monrovia from 12
t o 16 May .
A Cautious Game
Just when 5 tons nf documents and nearly 200 people from headquarters
were getting ready to leave Abid~an to move towards Liberia, the new
s trongman of the country put a veto on holding in his capital city the
16th annual assembly of the governing board (finance ministers of the
mem~er states). Reason: such a meeting would cost the Liberian public
t reasury a great deal of money. And that does not f it in with the
policy of austerity which the new regime intends to promote. But in
d iplomatic circles in Monrovia it is thought that the authorities would
not be in a position to guarantee the participants' security. _
AI1 the same, once the moment of panic caused by this untoward happening
was over, the management of the AD~3 was not long in getting back its
self-control. And then it consulted rapidly with the member states
b efore pontponing to June 23 this 16th assembly which will take place
at headquarters in Abidjan.
As a result the eight candidates for the presidency (J. A. No 999) now
possess a 6-weeks' extension. To polish up their strategy. Because the
game is tighter than ever.
As suredly, the election of the president of the ADB has traditionally
b een the sub~ect of long and better bargainings. Up to now the confronta-
t ion, always soft pedaled, of course, was localized more or less between
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Arabs and blacks, anglophones and francophones, if not between progressives
and moderates. This time the Arabs are not presenting a candidate. Which
- is interpreted as a sign of a waning of interest on their part.
Assuming that this interpretation is correct, is the North Saharans'
attitude the outcome of the opening up of capital to which certain of
them were opposed with all their might? Or of the policy of deliberately .
sabotaging Arab-African cooperation incarnated by the outgoing president,
Mr Kwame Fordwor? The fact is that international f inancial circles are
coming to fear more and more a withdrawal of the Arab countries. And
they make no secret of the fact that the Bank still is not strong
enough not to die of starvation, if it is deprived of the precious sap
which petrodollars represent.
Regional Balances
However that may be, the North Saharans having got out of the game,
they leave the anglophones and the francophones facing each other.
- To which are added the splits inside of each one of the two groups. And
that further complicates the outlook.
That is why voices are being raised to demand a stricter definition of
the rules before proceeding with the election of the president. It is
confided that useless confrontations must be avoidzd. The African experts
say that the criterion of competence should be the only one to be taken
into account.
For this club of right-minded persons the institution's policy will have
to be focused primarily on safeguarding a proper balance among the dif-
ferent regions present within the Bank. A balance which, if certain
people are to be believed, was brokeu by ex-president Fordwor. The
realities peculiar to each region must be taken into account at any cost,
they say. In the formulation and implementation of the Bank's policy
y as well as in making assignments to responsible positions. It is espe-
cially important, these good fairies gathered at the bedside of the "sick
person" feel, to define a clear position regarding Arab-African coopera-
tion and regional and subregional actions.
Resist Pressures
Similarly the position with respect to non-African countries associated
with the Bank must be clarified once and for all. Must the African
Development Fund (ADF) be promoted and developed? Is the opening up of
capital to foreign states definitely accepted, or is it a matter of a
mere road accident which is likely to come up again? With whom must the
Bank cooperate, according to what criteria, what mechanisms and within
- what limits? Whatever the answers to these questions may be, a con~sensus
seems to ilave been reached about one point: the new president will have
to conduct himself as a jealous but realistic defender of Africa's
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supranational interests. Thus not only resist pressures which the
powers outside of Africa will not fail to exert on him, but adopt strict
neutrality with respect to the countries and the political and ideologi-
cal tendencies and trends which divide the continent up among themselves.
Finally the board of governors will have to endow the ADB with flexible
but precise operating rules. To avoid the power conflicts that a~e so
detrimental to the institution's operations. In particular ~ef ine and
spell out more clearly the responsibilities of the board of administra-
tion and the director's office. And this is needed to avoid a recurrence
of the sad scene which the ADB put on in June 1979 in the form of the
_ serious conflict which pitted Kwame Fordwor against the majority of
the members of his board of administration.
So long as precise and workable rules are not adopted, it is said in the
halls of headquarters as well as in the waiting rooms of ministries, it
will be risky, not to say venturesome to elect a new president. Chosen
in these conditions, would he not, in fact, be running the risk of finding
himself sooner or later in the same situation as Mr Fordwor? And of
recreating tensions like those which led to his bemeaning removal and
gave rise to an atmosphere of crisis injurious to the Bank's reputation?
Now the big maneuvers are starting up in such a manner that considera-
tions of a political nature are apt to prevail, and by far, over criteria
having to do with competence and human qualities. Thus the Mauritanian,
Sidi Ahmed Ould B'Neijara, who for 3 months was the governor of his
country's central bank before becoming minister of finance right after
the military coup of 10 July 1978, is not particularly well known in
African and international banking circles. If for no other reason than
his age (33 years), he is thought of in these circles as being inexperi-
enced.
By the same token the Ugandan, Franck Mwine, does not en~oy the support
of any country. With a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School, Mr
Mwine, 39, has for 10 years been the principal advisor of the legal
department of the World Bank (IBRD) in Washington. Which has not failed
to cause trouble. In point of fact, quite a few ADB governors state
that they are shocked by the conduct of the Ugandan candidate who takes
advantage of his official trips to carry on his campaign.
Two other candidacies, in the present African political situation, do not
have much chance of succeeding: those of the Burundian, Donatien
Bihut~, and the Senegalese, Khalilou Sall. The former, 40 years of age,
is at present the minister of the plan in his country. Although spon-
sored by the sister republic of Rwanda, he is not considered a candidate
of any cousequence. As for the Senegalese, Khalilou Sall, he is not a
~tranger to the ADB, since between 1971 and 1977 he successively func-
tioned as chief of the projects division and director of the operations
department.
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Aged 54, the Sanegalese candidate, whose personal ratings are not ques-
tioned, still suffers from a serious handicap: Senegal, the story goes,
already is filling too many positions in international organizations.
' And so few countries seem inclined to vote for him. His being sponsored
by the Comoro Islands is in itself particularly symptomatic. On th~
other hand, the election arithmetic at the outset gives some chance to
the Zambian, Mung'Qmba Willa. This 41-year-old lawyer with a law degree
from the University of London, fulf illed numerous political functions in `
his country before becoming the administrator of the International Monetary
Fund from 1976 to -~978. Since then he has been managing the Zambian
branch of the Standard Bank (English).
Very well known to the whole of anglophone Africa, Mr Mung'Omba normally
ought to be able to count on the massive support of those countries,
that is 40 percent of the voting power within the ADB. In East Africa,
however, those who take exception to his "insufficient" action when he
represented the region in the IMF are numerous.
The official backing that Nigeria brings him (12.5 percent of the voting
power) may not be either unconditional or irreversible. That is to say
Mr Mung'Omba's vc.itory is not a foregone conclusion. Especially since
the francophone members persist in believing that by virtue of the rule
(unwritten, it is true) of rotation the anglophone members who, with '
Mr Fordwor, have already held the position, will know how to play fair.
In that case the duel would be inevitable between the Malian, Seydou D~im
Sylla, and the Guinean, N'Faly Sangaly, 47, ex-governor of the Central
Bank of Guinea and several times minister before filling his present
position of delegate minister to the European Common Market in Brussels.
But his main asset rests mainly on the support which has just been
bestowed upon him by the headquarters country, Ivory Coast, after wavering
between the Malian and Guinean candidates.
A Family Candidate _
This surprised and even shocked a number of inember states which feel
quite rightly that as the host country of headquarters Ivory Coast should
have remained strictly neutral up to the voting day; or, in any case,
should abide by the duty of reserve which common courtesy requires in
such circumstances. That would be in keeping with the spirit of
African hospitality to which its directors lay claim. It is true that -
- the Guinean candidate is not just anybody. First and foremost he is
the :.~rother-in-law of President Sekou Toure and the "pet" of Mme
Andree Toure. For months the presidential couple have made every effort
to get the "big moneyman" of the family elected.
For his part, Mr Sekou Toure seems tc~ have dropped into the scales the
- full weight of his high reputation to win this battle. He stands a
chance of succeeding. In any case, from Accra to Cairo, from Rabat to
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Kinshasa, he has led the offensive personally. It is said that even .
France has been called to the rescue to win its African "friends" over
to the Guinean cause. Similarly it would seem F`idel Castro received a
special message from Conakry urging him to intervene with his Angolan, '
Ethiopian and Libyan allies.
- The only thing is, this personal and urgent intervention by President
Sekou Toure has shocked certa~n member states. So much so that what
Mr N'Faly Sangare takes to be a major asset runs the risk of becoming
his Achilles' heel. Through the interposed Mr Sangare would it not be
Sekou Toure in person who would henceforth be orienting the Bank's
decisions?
To get around such a threat the ma,jority of the francophone countries
seem to lean more and more in favor of the Malian candidate, Mr Seydou
D~im Sylla, who seems politically more acceptable to them. Crossroads
of ancient civilizations and a natural bridge between Mediterranean
Af rica and black Africa, his coun~ry maintains relations of understanding
and coopezation with all members of the OAU.
His candidacy is sponsored by the Congo. He filled different techni.cal
functions in his country before being designated as administrator of
the International Bank for West Africa (BIAO) at the instan~e of the
Central Bank of the West A~rican States (BCEAO). The Malian candidate
has likewise been executive secretary for the negotiating group of the
African States, the Caribbean and the Pacif ic in Brussels and the special
advisor to tt~e president of the Arab Bank for African Economic Development
(BADEA) in Khartoum.
That is, to say that Mr Sylla, whose talents as a ciiplomat are known and
appreciated, is just the right person to "resolve" the unity of the ADB
and win back the somewhat shaken confidence of the Arab states. Which
makes him the best candidate of the francophone group. Only this group,
even if strengthened by the Portuguese speakers, accounts for only 27
percent of the voting powers. That is why the unofficial support of
Algeria enjoyed by Mr Sylla is worth its weight in gold. Especially -
since Algeria can drain off into its channel states like Madagascar,
Angola, Mozambique and perhaps Libya.
In Case of an Impasse
If this broad spread of support should materialize, the Malian could be -
assured, if not of being elected, at least of moving to the head of
the group right after the first hallot. But it may be that to take a
pick between Sylla and Sangare will not be possible. On the assumption
that the latter refuses to give up, the former runs the risk of being over-
taken at the end of the race by a dangerous Qutsider in the person of
Mr Goodall Edward Gondwe, at present the acting president. Assuredly, on
replacing, in July 1979, the Ghanaian, Fordwor, this 44-year-old Malawian
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committed himself to abstaining from being a candidate, but in case an .
impasse occurs, he could appear as a last resort. In a letter dated
23 January 1980, the government of Kenya already requested that he be
kept in office for 5 years.
In addition to the atmosr?~ere of ease and sound management that he suc-
_ ceeded in restoring, it must be recognized that Mr Gondwe has managed
to accomplish other feats of strength. In particular the ADB is indebted
to him for having regained, barely a few months after the serious crisis
of the summer of 1979, the hearing and the respect of the member
countries of the ADF. The performances provided subsequently both in
matters of financing projects and on the level of mobilizing resources
on the international financial market astonish specialists and compel -
their admiration. It was thus that Mr Gondwe succeeded, at the end of
1979, in obtaining 150 million dollars. And still more recently
(17 April 19~0) he was able to take credit for obtaining a new loan of
250 million dollars signed within a few days by European, American and
Arab banks.
An Outsider?
No mistake can be made with signs like these. Of all the claimants to
the directorship of the ADB Gondwe up to now is the one who enjoys r:?~
best reputation, the one about whom everybody agrees to admit that he
meets the necessary human and technical conditions required to face the
basic obligations and put through the basic reforms that are called for.
But the game is far from being won. As long as nobody crosses the
finish line, three of the candidates at least, or even four, (Gondwe,
Sylla, Sangare and Mung'Omba), still have a chance, and can hope to
win. Until then each one will try to get in a good spot. Although they
may have to seduce the small countries while making pledges to the big
three (Algeria, Libya, Nigeria) without whose support no combination
stands any real chance of being the victorious one. Failing the reaching
of an agreement within their respective groups on any one of the candidates
now running, anglophones and francophones could--why not--fall back on
one last bandit: in such a turn of events the chances of the present
president of the West African Development Bank (BOAD), the Upper Voltan,
Pierre Claver Damiba, would not be negligible.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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_ INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIR,S
LARGE LOAN TO WADB DESCRIBED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAI~'EENS in French 4 Jul 80 p 1680
_ (TextJ To expand and diversify its relations with the industrialized coun-
tries, the West African Development Bank (WADB), represented by its president,
Pierre-Claver Damiba, signed on 30 June with the French Foreign Trade Bank,
the Bank of Indochina and Suez and the Bank of European Union a framework
buyer-credit agreement for 150,000,000 French francs (7,500,~00,000 CFA
francs) .
_ This framework agreement is for the purpose of financing a maximwn of 8S per-
. cent of the contracts concluded with French suppliers by buyers from the six
UMOA (West African Monetary Union) countries: Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin,
Senegal, Upper Volta, Niger.
As is well known, the WADB is an international public institution, founded at
the meeting of the chiefs of state of the six UMOA member countries on
14 November 1973. Since it Was~found.ed it has been dedicated to finar.cing:
on the one hand, regional and national projects of common interest working
toward the economic integration of the member states and West Africa; on the
other hand, projects intended to promote the balanced development of those
states.
In our 27 June issue, No 1807 (page 1622), we reported on the WADB's fiscal ~
year 1978-1979 and announced that three new loans amounting to 2,573,000 CFA
- francs had been granted to Benin, Upper Volta and Togo.
Since it was founded the WADB has been presided over by Pierre-Claver Damiba,
a former Voltan government minister.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BEGINNING OF OMVS DAM CONSTRUCTION ANNOUNCED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRAI~EENS in French 4 Jul 80 p 1680 -
[Text] On his return from a trip to Saudi Arabia President Senghor announced
that construction of the Diama and Manantali dams, in Senegal and Mali re-
spectively, will begin before the end of the year. These dams are part of
the program of the Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS), which in- ~
cludes Mali, Mauritania and Senegal; they are the two most important drought ;
control projects affecting the three governments.
The total cost of construction of the concrete projects (excluding hydro-
electric equipment) will be $600,000,000 to $650,OOO,fl00. As of last December
about $100,000,000 were yet to be raised.
To obtain this additional financing the chiefs of state of Mali, Mauritania
- and Senegal traveled to Kuwait, France, West Germany, Saudi Arabia and Canada.
On his return from Saudi Arabia President Senghor revealed that the latter
country had decided to increase its contribution by 50 percent (the original
contribution was $100,000,000). France and West Germany, which had announced _
their respective participation as $56,000,000 and $92,000,000, promised to
offer more, according to Mr Senghor. For its part Kuwait, whose participation
_ was $75,000,000, agreed to pay an additional $30,000,000. ~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
_ BRTEFS
EAST-SOUTH PREFERENTIAL ZONE--From 27 May to 7 June there is being held
in Addis-Abeba, at the headquarters of the Economic Commission for Africa
(ECA), the seventh meeting of the intergovernmental team in charge of
negotiations (INT) for the establishment of a preferential commercial
zone in East and southern Africa. During the meeting, the participants _
will be examining in particular four chapters of the treaty setting up
such a zone. The drawing up of this treaty began 2 years ago. It con-
cerns the "Horn of Africa" (Djibouti, EtHi.opia, and Somali.a) the former
Community of East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), Malawi and Zambia,
certain countries of southern Africa (Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe,
Angola, Lesotho and Swaziland), and the islands of the Indian Ocean
(Comores, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles). [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1253]
SIMON MAI,LEY F.RpUi,SION--Mr Simon Malley, director of the bimonthly magazine
AFRIQUE-ASIE, has been requested to leave French territory as soon as
possible. Egyptian by birth and having obtained American nationality, Mr
Simon Malley lived in France with his wife aad his three children for about
_ 20 years, but on a precarious basis. In effect he was sub~ect to the
regulation regarding three-mnnth exteneions of his residence permit, which
were renewable. For reasona which were not made clear to him the French
authoritiea, at the end of June, declined to renew his extension of resi-
dence for a new period of 3 months. The French authorities have an obliga-
tion to inform Mr Simon Malleq of the reasons which led to their decision.
Their refusal to do so could only be interpreted as a measure of censorship
againat a bi-monthly magazine whoae political views annoy theffi, a measure
- absolutely contrary to freedom of the press and publication, recognized
both by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and by the French Constitution,
_ and incompatible with the liberal character of F`reach society. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in ~ench 11 Jul 80 p 1718] 5170 .
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
REPORTED GDR MILITARY ASSISTANCE HEAD--The East German General Hans Ernett,
59 years old, reportedly has receatly assu~sd command of the military
advis~=rs placed by the GDR at the disposition of Aagola, according to the
West German conaervative daily aewspaper, DIE WELT (Springer Gruup) on
' 1 July. The newspaper referred to information provided by the Angolan -
rebel movement UNITA and by sources close to the South African intelligence
_ servicea. DIE WELT added that the South African intelligence aervices
reportedly have indications of the presence of East German instructors in -
the Angolan air forces, notably recordings of conversations by radio
batween pilots speaking with a Saxon accent. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUR ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1760] 5170
UNTA DEMONSTRATION--The National Union of Angolan Workers (UNTA), the only
union in the country, has appealed to the population to be ready for an
aggravation of the situation, to close ranks around the Party and the
president of the republic, and, in case of need, to take up arms. Moreover, -
elementary school students, high school studenta, and university studenta
who had been excused from class on 1 July by the Miniatry of Education held
an important meeting on the eame day to show support for the I~LA in the -
streets of Luanda to proteat against the South African invasion of southern
Angola. The slogans carried by the students condemned in particular "the
_ silent attitude of F`rance, Great Britain, the United Statea, Canada, and
the Federal Republic of Germany." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French J.1 Jul 80 p 1760] 5170
BENGUELA RR SABOTAGE ADMITTED--In the press conference which he held in
Freetc~wn on 30 June outside the OAU summit meeting, Mr Paulo Jorge, Aagolan
minister of foreign affairs, indicated that the Beaguela railroad is
operating between Zaire and Angola and even Zambia, while admitting that
"there are from time to time some problems and enen cases of sabotage, which
_ is very easy to accomplish, given the length of the rail line." He
emphasi2ed that embargo measures againat South Africa, to be effective~ must -
be atrictly applied and constitute a whole structure. He let it be under-
atood that, between now and the end of the qear, Angola would undertake its
first f ive-year plan and may consider ~oining the Convention of Lome when
~ 20
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- economic conditions are fulfilled. "We are still a young state and we muat
first make a detailed study of our potential and of our level of production,
which ia still low by reason of the deatruction which we have inherited
from the past." [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 11 Jul 80 p 1760] 5170
OIL CONTRACT--A production-sharing agreement has been signed between the
Angolan National Petroleum Company (SONANGOL) and TOTAL, a communique
published by the Franch Petroleum Company [CFP] indicatea. This contract,
which involves block 6(about 4800 km2) at sea off Luanda, was approved at
the beginning of May by the Angolan Council of Ministers. TOTAL is the
operator of the concession. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
_ MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 3u1 80 p 1760] b170
OFFICIALS AT FRENCH RECEPTION--Angolan Minister of Foreign Affairs Paulo
Jorge and SWAPO President Sam Nu~oma appeared at the official reception
offered by the French Embassy in Luanda on the occasion of the 14 July
celebration. Their presence caused a stir given the hard position re-
cently adopted by Angolan authorities toward France and the other so-called
"contact group" countries in relat ion to the sit~ation in Southern Africa.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jul 80
p 1874]
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBI,IC
DETAILS OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY PI~AN 1980-1981
Paris INDUSTitIES ET TRAVAUX D'OIITRE-MER in French Jun 80 pp 354~355
_ [Text~ The economic recovery plan 1980-1981 canpriaes
inveatments in an amount of 45.087 billion CFA of which
13.1 billion originate from foreign aid.
The disastrous financial and economical situation of the Central African
Republic (in spite of international aid of more than 100 billion CFA
from 1970 to 1978) inventoried after the c ollapse of Bokassa's regime,
induced the new team of leaders to obtain very urgent financial aid from
France and to draw up a biennial plan for economic and social recovery for
2980 and 1981.
The 1976- 1980 5-year plan was too ambitious in relation to the resources
of the state (the Central African Republic has 2.3 million inhabitanta in
a 623,000 sq lan area, its gross domestic production amounted to 101 billion
CEA in 1979 and the net revenue registered in the budget of fiscal 1980
~ amoun ted only to 21.8 billion CFA). Discounted foreign input did not -
quite materialize and after 3 years only 17 percent of the programs planned
were carried out.
The Central African economy, or at least the modern "sector" of the -
economy, depends almost entirely on the exportation of some of its crops,
from which the state receives the greatest part of its resources.
~ For 1979 the products feeding the exports represented 32,150 tons of cotton
seed (which after ginning would produce an export return of 3.3 billion CFA),
13,200 tons of coffee (8 billion~, 2,000 tons of tobacco (1 billion).
Lumbering furniahed 330,000 tons of logs (~?.4 billion). Diamonds accounted
, for 314,000 carats (8.5 billion CFA). _
(:hronica Ily deficient, the f oreign exchange balance for 1978 showed a
negative balance af 7.4 billion CFA, and the balance of payments for the -
same year, notwitnstanding foreign aid contribution for development, also
~ ahowed a deficit of 1.6 billion CFA.
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Thus, the recovery of,the econany is considered by the new governmental
team as a primordial and essential task. To this end, the 1980-1981
biennial program was approved on 21 March 1980, a program which should
serve to formulate a new 5-year plan for 1982-1986.
The entire program for the 1980-1981 recovery plan comprises investments
in an amount of 45.087 billion CFA divided (in million CFA) as follows:
Agric~clture 11.836, stock farming 2.593; waterways 2.088; road construction
10,095; serial ground surface organization 2.165; telecommunications and
broadcasting 4.195; city planning 2.,728; ind ustry 1.300; energy 215; mines
1.230; education 4.471; health and social effairs 1.901; administration 270.
The estimated usage program is assessed at 60 percent for 1980 and 40
percent for 1981.
Qn the volume of planned investmenta, 13.1 billion CFA in foreign aid
has already been acquired and its implementation will take effect in 1980.
Priority has been given to rural development and to the inatallationa, zhe
amounts apportionsd to these two sectors repreaenting respectively 32 percent
and 47 percent of the entire investment program.
Agriculture
The Central African econany is closely tied to the productions of the rural
_ eector which principally supply 80 percent of the active opulation
and they alone assure the major part of the exports; 60 to 77 percent between _
1971 and 1977 and 54 percent in 1978.
Rural development activities listed in the biennial program cover in-
vestments in an amoant of 11.8 bil~ion CFA, over a period of 2 yeara
and 21.7 billion to be entered later in the next 5-year plan. These
activities concern five integrated pro.jected (food products, cotton
cultivation, light mechanization, rural groupe, rural trails and
commercialization) the establishment of an 8,000 ton sugar complex,
extendable to 16,000 tons for local consumption (6 billion CFA beyond
1982), for the res~mption of the Boss ongo palm plantation (1 billion for 1980
snd 1981).
- Stock Farming
To the 2.6 billion CFA scheduled f or 1980 and 1981, an equivalent amount
' of complementary investments must follow for the development ot stock farming
in the western territory, drainage of the Bambari zone, development of
agriculture in the eastern region, poultry farming and porcine breeding.
Waterways
Actions of a priority nature (investments in an amount of 2.1 billion CFA
for the 2 years already plann~d for the 2.7 billions at a later date),
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include maintenance and repair of the waterway fleet, reinforcing
the Kolongo repair yard, replacing the handling equipment in the port of
of Bangui.
Highways
Thp highway framework of construction comprises eight principal roads for
a total of almost 4,Q00 l~ of which only 290 km are in the tarred network.
To the 10.1 billion CFA credits allowed for 1980 and 1981, 8.1 billion
will be added for the completion of the entire program: repairing, rebuild-
i~g,bridge construction, reconstruction of the enclosure for public works
materiel.
Financing of this program is set up as follawa: pav3ng with aephalt the
Bangui-Bossembele axis (146 km) IDA-ADB (International Development
Asaociation- African Development Bank) Kuwaiti funds; repairing the -
Boasembele-Garoua-Boulai axis (440 km) through financing by FAC (French
Aid and Cooperatior. Fund), FED ~European Development Fund)-RFG; repairing
the trails in the cotton zones (1,700 lmi) through FAC-CCCE (Central Fund
for Econanic Cooperation) financing; and the Berberati-Carnot-Baoro axis
(200 km) financed by the FAC. The FED should also assure the restoration
of 40 art objects and t h-e :2 he avy reloading units recently delivered by
Japan should be assigned to the Sibut-Bambari-Bangossou roadway (S50 lan).
Financing must be found to effect the repair of the Sibut-Kaga-Bandoro- -
Chad border road and the Boasembele-Bossangoa-Bedaoyo road (345 lan), as
well as to insure the maintenance of the Nola-Berberati-Gamboula and
Bangui-M~Baiki roads.
Aerial Ground Surface Organization
The Centr~l African Republic has one international airport in Bangui (which
takes care of 95 percent of the air traffic) and 72 regional airports.
In the 2.2 billion CFA credit program, the extensian of the landing strip
for the reception of heavy carrier planes in Bangui has been apportioned
in the amount of 0.5 billion (1.7 billion later); the improvement of the
- atructures and of the equipment of several provincial airports, the
modernizat~on of security inetallationa absorb the canplement of the
equipment antici~ated.
Telec amnunications
The needa which are of greatest priority entail investments in an amnount
of 4.2 biltion CFA for the 2-year plan and 1.1 billion later. These
will cover: the renovation of Bangui telephone cables (2 billion), the
conatruction of the pan-African telecommunications "Panaftel" network
in the Central African Republic .6 billions (passage illegible) and
0.5 billion beyond 1981, renewing of transmission equipment in various -
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regions, installation in Bangui of a ground station for international
traffic telecommunications by SOCATI (Central African Telecommunications
Company) (partly financed 0.3 billion for 1981 and 0.3 billion later),
impravement of radiophonic cover of the country (1.2 billion and 1.2 -
billion beyond 1981).
City Dwelling
With city living amounting only to 28 percent the Central African Republic
_ is not too urbanized. The priority program has secured the city of Bangui
for the construction of an overall sewer system and the erection of a
filtering station (2.8 billion CFA over the 2 years anci 6.7 billion for the
period of 1982-1986).
For your guidance, 7 billion CFA have been anticipated through financing
by the European Development Fund for a later realization of. the first
phase in the supply of rain water.
Indus try
The industrial sector is still underdeveloped. The first venture in the
country is represented by the MOCAF brewery [expansion unknown] which
develops its activities regularly. ~AE (Central African Textile Industry)
has s2en its situation deteriorate due to their worn-out materiel and the
excessive inflation in the ninnber of its personnel. The decrease in cotton-
seed production has affected UCCA [Central African Cotton Union] which, in
addition to cotton ginning, extracta oil from the cotton seeds; for fiacal
1979-80 its deficit is estimated to 0.6 billion CFA. The cutting and
wood-peelin; units of Slovenia-Bois (wood) units suffered from the shortage
of the oil supply and the delays in moving their products. Cigarette
manufacturing has not progressed either during fiscal 1978-1979. The Bata
company had to put a ceiling on ita production due to the fraudulent
importation of shoes. SEGA (C anpany for the Management of slaughter
houses) must face charges for very high exploitation in comparison to
inaignificant receipts.
Significant figures in the industrial production of the Central African ~
Republic for 1978 are suum~arized as follows: 2.6 million meters of fabrics
(1.1 million less than in 1977), 659,000 ready-to-wear garments (minus
500,000), 749,000 pairs of shoes (plus 6,000), 268,000 hl (hectoliters) of
beer (plua 36,000), 14.2 million packs of cigarettes (plus 190,000), 52,200
cubic meters of sawed wood (plus 900), 4,400 cubic meters of plywood and
peeled wood (minus 600), 14,300 bicycles and motorcycles (plus 3,100),
730 tons of corrugated sheet metal (minus 220) ana 305 tons of household
equipment in metal (minus 90).
For the 2 years under the plan the investments foreseen total 1.3 billion
CFA of which 0.8 billions for the Central African Textile Industry through
financing by BDEAC (Development Bank of the Central African States) and
from private share-holders, and 0.5 billions for a tanning trade project,
privste financing being sought.
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As a reminder, other private invest~nenta matched by banking assistance
are liated to be carried into effect after 1981; introduction of a second
brewery in Bouar by a Belgian group (2.5 billion CFA), creation of a
cement factory (9.5 billion), and resumption of the project to manufacture
pharmaceutical products (5 billion).
In addition, to solve the problem of the cotton mills the arrival of a
foreign partner would be very welcaned, for his technical support a?~d his
capital investment would contribute to rebuilding the working capital of
the Central African cotton union which would bring its 20 c otton ginning
c anpanies into a new campany.
~t the present time the resumption of activities in ready made clothes
by CIOT (Industrial Company for Textile Work) is discounted and studies
are in the process for the overhauling of BRICERAM (Brick-making and
Ceramic Company).
The new regime plans to revise the investments code in the sense of the
dependence of the fiscal advantages accorded to investors with the economic
impact on the enterprises (added value and employment of nationals). ~
Finally, the BCI (Central. African Bank for Investments) must be given the
means to facilitate the promotion of national industries, particularly
for small and medium enterprises.
Energy
The situation of the sector is marked essentially by the weakness of the
national energy resources, and the decrepitude of the production units.
A total of 0.2 billion CFA in priority investments will be alloted to ENERCA
[expansion unknown] for extensiona and reinforcements for the Central
African energy network. Complementarily all the needs, after 1981, are
calculated to amount to 0.8 billion for extension and modernization, all _
this financing to c ane from abroad.
Minea
The Bokouma urani~ deposit situated at 450 km east of Bangui, is only
potential wealth.
Diamonds, the first exportation product supplies 30 percent of the overall
revenue. In 1978 domestic taxes produced 1.4 billion CFA.
As regards research, CONOCO [expansion unknownJ, an American company, is
continuing to prospect for hydrocarbon in a zone close to the Chadian border
and a Canadian group has abtained a peYmit for radioactive minerals in Che
Nola, Mbaiki, Bangassou and Berberati regions. Long term possibilities are
appearing for the Fatima-Bobosa limestone deposit in conjunction with the
establiahment of a cement factory, the financing of which is being sought
and for the deposit of iron oYe in Bogoin which was set aside up to the
present time due to the poor rentability of the exploitation, the project
will be re-examined when the 1982-1986 5-year plan is forniulated.
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In the 1.2 billion CFA for expenses anticipated for the biennial program,
1.1 billion covers a pilot workshop created in France for the treatment
of 500 tons of Batcouma uranium ore.
Education and Professional Training
Priority investments for 1980 and 1981 will amount to 4.5 billion CFA, and
ehose anticipated for 1982-1986 were estimated to reach 4.7 billion.
This financing concerns various projects: primary and secondary study
centers, technical state school, scholastic buildings, schools for collective
promotion [ecole de promotion collective] equipment and materiel, laboratory
equipment, etc.
Health and Social Affairs
The apportionment for the 2 planned years amounts to 1.9 billion CFA; for the
period beyond 1981, the needs are estimated to reach 2.4 billion.
The actions anticipated cover the construction of a 300 bed cormnunity
hospital in Bangui (1.4 billiona financed by the African Brank for
Development), the construction of a central laboratory, repairing rural
health centers, modernizing and equipping, as well as the establishment
of polyvalent ceaters for social development.
- Administration .
This heading has been allocated 300 million francs CFA for the purchase
of computers and equipment.
The actions under~aken by the new leadership team for the purpose of
activating the recovery of the economy by means of the 1980-1981 biennial
program analyzed "supra" will be accompanied by measures for the reorgan-
ization and will help raise the moral standard of the state campanies.
The situation of these companies is very alarming. Some of them have
virtually stopped making any payments and are surviving thanks to budgetary
subsidies. Almost all of them have deficits in their operating accounts and
their working capital is nonexistent.
This deterioration was due at the same time to a lack of severe meaeures
taken in management, budgetary inflation, granting of disproportionate
advantages, decrease in output,bad upkeep of equipment, generalized waste,
with s ane exceptions, poor accounting procedures, nonjustified levies by
the fonner regime on the treaeury of the stabilization fund for agricultural
products and Central African energy.
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Independently of the strigent measures which are needed, the state wishes
_ to associate now with foreign partners of unquestionable competence who
can bring their technical support and financing neceesary for the re-
constitution of the treaguries, the state agreeing to let these partners _
have a part of the powers of management.
However, although this partial exclusiveness could not be applied to the
production and distribution of water and electricity, to the control
of aerial navigation, to the management of the stabilization fund for
agricultural products, neverthelesa the foreign reinforcement of
technical assistance is very neceasary.
COPYRIG~T: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
7993
CSO: 4400
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CENTRAL AFRICAN RE~UBLIC -
UBAC OPERATIONS IN FISCAL YEAR 1979 -
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1749
[Text] The difficulties which preceded the fall of the imperial regime
seriously disturbed the economic activity in the Central African Republic -
and had unfavorable effects on potential invest~ents,
Given this context, the Union of Central African Banks (UBAC) was forced in
the course of the 1979 fiscal year to pursue the development of its opera-
tions. Its balance as of 31 December 1979 came to 7.2 billion CFA francs.
The level of custqmer deposits (current accounts, checking accounts and term
deposits) came to 2.9 billion CPA francs at the end of the year, up -
3.4 percent over t~e figure for the end of 1978. The employment volume was
slightly increased, and the portfolio of holdings and advances came to
- 6.1 billion CFA francs overall. Apart from tfie balance, commitments in
endorsements and guarantees and confirmed credit accounts totaled
1.1 billion CFA francs.
Operational income increased 12 percent and general expenditures increased
24 percent in comparison to the 1978 fiscal year.
A~ter taxes and the establishment o~ a fund of 30 million CFA francs for
general risks, the net profits ~or the 1979 fiscal period came to 96.6 mil-
lion CFA francs, on which the general assembly decided on 24 April 1980 to
declare a dividend of 15 percent on a capital of 550 million CFA francs,
matched by 49 million in reserves.
In November 1979, on the proposal of ti-~e public authorities,
Mr Celestin Gomhalet, chief clerk of the Central African Treasury, was
appointed director general o~ the UBAC, replacing Mr Francois Epaye. On
15 April 1980, six new administrators were appointed to represent the state,
and Mr Jean Poulain, director, was appointed bank administrator. ~inally,
- on 24 April 1980, on the proposal of the governmeut, Mr Jules-Marc Laguerema
was appointed president of the UBAC, replacing Mr Moukou Mondziaou.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
5157
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CENTRAL AFRICAN RE~UBLIC
EEC AID ~0 BE PAID IN FORM OF SUBSIDIES, LQANS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in ~'rench 11 Jul 80 p 1748
[Text] The aid given to the Central African Repub lic by the European
Economic Co~unity CEEC) within the �ramework of the second Lome Convention
will come to 49 million European units o~ ac~ount (UCE), or about 14 million
CFA francs.
- The joint communique publ3shed in Bangui on 7 July following the visit p~id
by the planning mission of the EEC from 3 to 6 July made it clear that this
sum will be made available to the Central African government in the form of
subsidies (13 billion CFA) and loans (1.3 billion CFA). ~
This aid will make it possible to finance the national development pra~ects. -
It will go basically to the three priority sectors defined in the recovery
plan discussed in Bangui: 34 pexcent will be allocated for rural develop-
ment, 36 percent for in�rastructures, and 11 percent for human resources.
- The communique said that the European Investment Bank (BEI) may participate
in the financing of industrial and agroindustrial pro~ect studies. Z'he
- BEI may also contribute to freeing the Central African Republic from its
- isolation, in the fields of telecommunications and river transportation,
among others.
The communique also specified that the EEC is also prepared to finance
transfers on the basis of the Stabex, emergency aid, and aid in food, as well ~
as subsidies for non-governmental organizations. '
The EEC delegation and that represent~.ng the Central African R~public also j
undertook an exchange of vie~as on regional cooperation. A portfolio which ;
may total between 14 and 17 billion CFA ~rancs will be reseryed ~or the
financing of regional pro~ects in the Central African Republic. '
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., ~aris, 1980
~
5157
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~
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CHAD
FAN ~FFIEIAL RESIGNS IN PROTEST
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR,ANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1748
[Excerpt] Mr Ousman Djidda, in charge of relations with the Arab world for
the command council of the Armed Forces.of the North (FAN), announced on
3 July in Lagos that he was leaving the movement headed by
Mr Hissein Habre.
In a statement given to the press in.wh3ch he explained the reasons for his
resignation, Mr D~idda accused the ~AN leader among other things "of in-
tolerable actions in his deliberate opposition to the implementation of the
Lagos agreement." He also xe~erred to the "deterioration of the situation
~ within the movement," and said in addition that "Mr Hissein Habre, who
personifies the FAN sector, has always been and still remains solely respon-
sible for the polluted situation which continues to prevail."
The former FAN leader issued an appeal in his statement "to the countries
which believe in the sin.cerity and the nationalism of Hissein Habre, asking
that they revise their initial position."
Mr Ousman Djidda made it clear, in conclusion, that he does "not plan to
3oin any movement," but will place h;Imself "in the service of the country
within the framework of the institutions resulting ~rom the Lagos agreement."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
5157
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ETHIOPIA
WSLF LEADER ATTACKS ETHIOPIAN COLONIALISM _
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 9-15 May 80 p 37
[Interview with Assistant Secretary General of the Western Somali _
Liberation Front 'Abd-al-Nasir Shaykh Adam, conducted by Kamal Hasan
Bakhit]
[Text] The news confirms that fighting has broken out an~w in Western
Somalia (the Ethiopian Ogaden area), with Somalia attempting to detach
this Somali-inhabited region and restore it to the motherland. AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI met with Assistant Secretary General of the Western Somalia
Liberation Front (WSLF) 'Abd-al-Nasir Shaykh Adam, who spoke about the
situation there.
He said, "What is now going on in Western Somalia is a grinding war
between the Ethiopian regime, supported by foreign forces, and our front's
forces. The inte~tion of Mengistu's reg ime is to wipe out the Western
Somali people's revolution, and to subject the will of our people to
its colonialist domination by force of arms.
"The enemy's losses during March were an estimated 2,220 dead, 5 tanks,
and 9 artillery guns."
[Question] How did your front arise and what are its goals?
[AnswerJ The WSLF came into existence in 1960, as a fulfillment of a
pressing need and as a natural development of the political conditions.
in Western Somalia, and in order to express our people's political
aspirations.
Ethiopian colonialism repressed the political organization in Western
Sotnalia, the Somali Youth Unity Party, and sl~ughtered the party bases
after the withdrawal of the English military administration.
As a result, a number of secret organizations sprung up, which soon
developed into the WSLF in 1960. From that time on, it has relied on
_ armed struggle, be it against the Haile Selassie or the Mengistu regimes. -
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Al1 the popular classes of Western Somalia are represented in the front,
since it includes peasants, shepherds and tradesmen in addition to
intellectuals. Its ultimate goal is the liberation of Western Somalia
from army and foreign occupation, and the achievement of total indepen-
dence.
[Question] What about the front's relations with Arab countries?
[Answer) We and our brothers in the Arab countries share a single
_ destiny and goal, since they are the natural allies of our people's
just struggle. The front has offices in Baghdad, Damascus and Algiers,
_ and representatives in Kuwait, Jiddah and Cairo. We are hoping that our
Arab brothers will help us confront the vicious onslaught which is trying
to eliminate our Somali Arab people's entity and religious beliefs.
[Question] What are the problems now facing the front from the military
standpoint?
[Answer] In mid-1977, we had liberated more than 95 percent of Western
Somalia, in spite of the numerical and material superiority of the
Ethiopians. However, Mengistu sought the aid of foreign forces (Soviet
and Cuban) which supplied him with arms, equipment and men who fought on
behalf of Ethiopian occupation. Our basic problem is the presence in
Somalia of those foreign forces in large numbers. Then comes the problem
ot our refugees and the meager aid which has been provided for their
relief, be it medicine or food.
[Question] What do you think would be the solution to the Western
Somalia problem?
[Answer] The only solution acceptable to us is for Ethiopian colonialism
to depart, and for the people of the region to be allowed to freely and
unconditionally decide their destiny. We will not be satisfied with
any alternative to complete independence.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
- 8559 , ,
CSO: 4402
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ETHIOPIA
ERITREAN SITUATION, SOVIET INTENTIONS DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 9-15 May 80 pp 36-37 -
[Article by Georges al-Rasi: "The Eritrean Rebels: Mengistu in Front
of Them and Numayri Behind Them"]
[Text] The Eritrean issue has once again returned to the diplomatic scene,
at a time when Ethiopia is getting ready for a new military venture in
the rebel region.
What is happening on the Eritrean scene at the start of the third decade
of its heroic struggle against Ethiopian occupation?
Recent news from the capitals directly concerned with tfie conflict,
- whether Addis Ababa or Khartoum or from within Eritrea itself, varies,
an~ does not give a clear picture of the Eritrean revolution or its
Ethiopian enemy.
The news from Addis Ababa speaks of an attempt made this week to regain
- the military initiative, beginning with the opening of the 600-km road
from Addis Ababa to the Red Sea port of Assab, preparatory to launching
a counterattack on the rebels who achieved brilliant victories in
December, at which time they strengthened their presence in the city of
Nakfa, located in the northern part of the occupied area, and inflicted
crushing losses on Ethiopian enemy forces. To this day they are still
besieging about 13,000 Ethiopian soldiers stationed among the hills
surrounding the city of Afabet.
As for the news from Khartoum, it speaks of hasty attempts to reach an
accord or a reconciliation between the Ethiopian gove~nment and some of
the liberation organizations on the basis of a proposal of autonomy.
The strange thing about the matter is that totally incompatible parties
are trying to bring about this Ethiopian-Eritrean accord in order to _
achieve mutually contradictory goals. On the one hand there is the
Sudanese desire to end the struggle in order to break up the Soviet- -
Ethiopian connection, first of all, and secondly to come up with a
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solution to the refugee problem, since to date more than 400,000 person~
have crossed the Eritrean-Sudanese borders fleeing the destruction which
Ethiopian planes have infli?.ted on their towns and villages.
The news about Sudanese mediation speaks of secret meetings at the _
Sudanese capital from 19 to 24 April, attended on the Sudanese side by
National Security Agency Chief Maj Gen 'Umar al-Tayyib, on the Ethiopian
side by Col Tesfaye Wolde Selassie, chief of the Ethiopian security
agency and member of the ruling military council in Addis Ababa, and
on the Eritrean sicle by Ahmad Nasir, head of the Eritrean Liberation
Front/Revolutionary Council (ELF/RC), and Isayyas Af eworki, assistant
secretary general of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF).
- These secret meetings apparently revolved around a study of the Moscow-
backed Ethiopian proposal for autonomy in the occupied region. .
It should be pointed out that Ethiopian President Col Mengistu Haile
Mariam, hesd of the ruling milltary council in Addis Ababa, recently
expressed liis desire to attend Sudanese President Ja'far Muhammad
Numayri's c:elebrations on rhe anniversary of his taking power on 5 May.
Sudanese Vice President 'Abd-al-Majid Khalil has visited Addi~ Ababa
� twice du:�ing the last 6 weeks. -
Other news confirms preparatory Ethiopian-Eritrean contacts in a number
of world capitals since early this year, in particular East Berlin, Rome
and Mowcow.
~ An Unhappy End for Ethiopian Arrogance
, The fact is, the eagerness now displayed by Addis Ababa for finding a
peaceful way out of the Eritrean dilemma did not arise solely from
_ Soviet desires subject to strategic considerations, but came about as a
direct result of the crushing military defeats which its advance forces
on the Eritrean front have sustained.
During the past year, Ethiopia had totally rejected even the notion of
meeting with the Eritrean liberation movements, and its military leader-
ship reached the height of arrogance in February 1979 when it succeeded I
in launching a counterattack on the revolutionary forc~s advancing on
Asmara, and regaining some of the region's towns from rebel hands. '
But its recent defeat and th2 retreat of its elite military divisi.ons i
- from the Nakfa-Afabet f ront has made it quick to accept Numayri's move
to play the role of inediator between the two sides.
As for the revolutionary forces, they seem to be maintaining their vitality
and vigor from the armament standpoint, especially since during their
recent battles they .~cquired large quantities of Soviet arms, including I
100 militar~ trucks, 17 T-54 tanks, long-range artillery, anti-tank guns, ~
and airplanes, in addition to guns of various calibers.
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Naturally, all these arms cannot be compared to the billion dollars'
worth of arms which the Ethiopian side has gotten from the Soveit Union
over the past 3 years, not to mention the military experts and battalions, -
in which, unfortunately, soldiers from some Arab countries have partici-
pated--countries which defend the "right to self-determination" of all
" the land's people while battling against this principle on Arab territory
itself.
As opposed to the Sudanese attempts at mediation and reconciliation (sup-
ported by Egypt and Somalia, as some news media have claimed), other
Ethiopian, Eritrean and Soviet parties are trying this time to find a
middle-of -the-roacl solution to the problem ox? the basi.s of the "ideologi-
cal unity" among some parties to the struggle, in order to strengthen the
- Soviet belt surrounding the Gulf oil fields. The Russians want to get
out of the Eritrean entanglement, which has caused complications and
disturbances in its relations with some of the area's states, as well
as embarrassment~for its Arab friends. But ar the same time, they want
to retain the positions they gained in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The Real Soviet Intentions
Here an important point must be made, one which is rarely mentioned in
news and analyses, which can be summarized by the following question:
Do the Russians really want a decisive Ethiopian victory in Eritrea?
The answer is most likely in the negative. Therefore, what is the secret
~ behind the Soviet stand?
The secret lies in internal Ethiopian affairs. That is, until ~urther
notice Eritrea is Mowcow's main means of pressure vis-a-vis tne existing
situation in Addis Ababa, with which it does not seem to be completely
pleased. -
The military regime of Haile Mariam has shown obvious hesitation in bring-
ing out into the light of day the pruletarian Communist "Workers' Party,"
which was completely copied from the Soviet Communist Party, and which
Moscow sees as a basic guarantee for its continued influence over the _
former Ethiopian empire. But the present Addis Ababa leaders know full
well that the crystallization of the party's format would simply mean
the removal of military figures from the government to the benefit of
the c ivilian leadership, and apparently Mengistu 3s not at all eager to
do this.
To keep the struggle between the two sides from breakirig out into the
open, Ha~_1e i4ariam is trying to delay things by forming successive com-
missions to draw up the forma~ of the party. The last such commission
was called the "Commission to Organize the Party of the Working People of
Ethiopia" ;COPWE). Meanwhile, it has been assumed that the establishment
_ of the party would finally be announced or. 17 December 1979.
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In addition to the silent struggle between Moscow and Addis Ababa, the
Ethiopian government is meeting increasing resistance in several regions.
In addition to the Eritrean revolution there is the Tigre People's
Liberation Front (TPLF); Tigre is located in southern Eritrea, and its
- capital is Makla. There is strong coordination between this front and
- the EPLF.
There is also the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Oromo being a region in
southern Ethiopia. The Oromo are an ethnic group, constituting about
40 percent of the E~hiopian population, and it is resisting the complete
control which the Amhara group imposed on it a long time ago. In the
past f ew weeks some officers of Oromo origin have been purged, including
two members of the ruling military council, Maj Dimisi Dirisa and Col
Abat Marsha. Recently this region has se2n a number of violent opera-
tions against the government and its representatives. And, naturally,
there is the West Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which is carrying on
its struggle in the Ogaden desert (see the following interview).
There remains another important point to be made in this rapid review of
the Eritrean-Ethiopian struggle: the growing split between some segments
of the Eritrean revolution, at a time when plans for settlement prolifer-
ate,
It is well known that today there are four revolutionary groups. The
first group, the founding of wh~ch dates back to 1961, calls itself
the ELF-RC, is led by Ahmad Nasir, and is ba~ed in the southern and
western areas of Eritrea up to the Sudanese borders.
The second group is the EPLF, led by Isayyas Afeworki and Ramadan
Muhammad Nur, which split off from the basic organization in 1970 to
lead the leftist wing of the Eritrean revolution. This is the group
which has waged the most violent battles against the Ethiopian forces
in recent months. It is concentrated in the mountainous regions sur-
rounding Nakfa.
There is, thirdly, the Eritrean Liberation Front-People's Liberation
Forces (ELF-PLF), led by Osman Saleh Sabbe, which was formed in 1976 and
which is basically linked with the Sudan and is active along its borders.
Finally there is the Eritrean Liberation Front-People's Liberation Forces
[sicJ, led by Osman 'Ajib, which was formed last month. It is based
along the Sudanese borders and follows a nationalist line.
The question is: Why doesn't the ELF learn from the liberation experiments
the usefulness of which has been proven, whether in Algeria or Vietnam or
even recently in Zimbabwe, and which are based on the principle of a
"broad front," inasmuch as the heart of the matter, at this stage, is
the liberation of national soil?
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL WATAN AL-'ARABI
8559
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_ , r -
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE OM.Y
GABON
OVERALL SURVEY OF ECONOMIC SITUATION AUGURS WELL
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in FYench 11 Jul 80 p 1749
[Article: "Improvement of the Economic Situation"]
[~eatt] The policy of economic recovery and of austerity, put in practice
in Gabon over the past 2 years, has had poaitive effects, a recent dis-
patch from AFA reports. Gross domestic product in 1979 regained the level
of 720 billion CFA units of account, which had been fihat of the period of
expansion and then had fallen to the level of 600 billion.
According to Gabonese financial sources, quoted by AFP, the balance of
payments, which had declined in 1977 to a deficit of 44 billion CFA,
registered a slight surplus of more than 10 billion CFA in 1979.
Due to the fact of the substantial increase in the value of exports of
petroleum and of the decrease in tmports--a corollary of the policy of
austerity--the Gabonese balance.of trade in 1979 had a substantial surplus.
Three hundred and seventy-seven billion CFA in Gaboaese exports to all
countries in 1979 were recorded, compared to 280 billion CFA in 1978.
Imports in I979 touched 113 billion CFA; they totaled 177 billion CFA in
_ 1977� The most important trading partaer of Gabon continues to be France,
with about 60 percent of the trade (Gabonese export8 to France: 68 billion
CFA; Gabonese importa from France: 100 billion CFA).
The increase in the price of petroleum compensated for a decrease in pro-
duction related to the exhaustion of certain deposits which should be re-
placed, it is hoped, by new discoveries after 1983. In 1979 9.8 million
tons of petroleum were produced (estimate for 1981: 9.1 million tons). ~
Exports amounted to 8,461,270 tons in 1979 (valued at 279 billion CFA).
Timber annually produced amounts to 1,250,000 m3. In 1979 it brought in
32.8 billion CFA in eacports, for a volume of about 1,215,000 m3. -
Manganese produc*ion underwent a aubstantial expansian, with 2.3 million
tone produced in 1979, particularly if one compares it with the sharp fall
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in production in '_978. The present year should confirm this tendency, it
is believed in Libreville. The 2,304,654 tons of manganese exported in
1979 were worth 26.2 billion CFA.
The production of uranium in 1979 amounted to 1,100 tons of uranium in
metal terms. With the new investments under way in 1980 this tonage should
_ reach the f igure of 1,500 tons. Exports in 1979, for their part, amounted
to 1,060 tons of uranium in metal terms.
The strict measures of financial recovery applied in Gabon made it, possible
to reduce the public debt noticeably, from 575 billion CFA as of the end
of 1977 to 440 billion CFA at the end of 1979, and there should be no more
than 365 billion CFA at the end of 1980.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paria 1980
5170
CSO: 4400
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G,f~ IA
FAD SANITATION IMPROVEMENT LOAN GRANTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1624 -
[Text] The African Development Fund.(FAD) recently granted a loan of
8 million UCF (1 UCF or FAD unit of account equals $1.15 U.S. or
258 CFA francs) to Gambia to help in the financing of the sanitation pro~ect
in its capital, Ban~ul. The loan is repayable over 50 years and there is a
grace period of 10 years.
The Gambian project is designed to equip the city with a mains dra~nage
system, to increase the capacity of certain drainage canals and to improve
the Bund Polder p~nnping station.
The FAD will participate in co-financ~ng the supply and installation of -
about 65.6 kilometers of sewage canals ranging in diameter between 150 and
160 millimeters, with all the auxiliary apparatus and hookups for the indi-
vidual ~unctions and the construct3on of ~ully equipped manholes. This FAD
participation comes within the #ramework of a parallel financing arrange-
ment for the project as a whole.
The total cost of the pro~ect is estimated at 16,500,000 UCF, including
13,200,000 for costs in foreign exchange and the balance (3,300,000) for
domestic costs. The total cost of the component taken over 3y the FAD is
estimated at 10,900,000 UCF, including 8,700,000 for foreign exchange costs
and 2,100,000 for local costs. The FAD loan will serve to finance about
60.5 percent of the fore3gn exchange costs, or 48.4 percent of the total
cost of the project.
The ex.ecution of the pro~ect, which has been entrusted to the Gambia
Utilities Corporation (GUC), will be spread.over 4 years beginning in July
of this year.
, The pro~ect is the third to be ~~,nanced fiy the FAD in Gamb~a, totaling in ;
all 15 mtllion UCF. In addition tfie ADfl j~lfxican Development Bank) and the i
. Nigeri.an Special Fund (NT~~ have made a total comm3.tment.o~ 12,QOO,OQO units
of account ~or the ~inancing,of tFie 4 pro~ects. ~
.
C0~'YRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980 ,
5157
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- GUINEA
BRIEFS
~'.XIMBANK BOEING LOAN--The U.S. Eximban~c granted Guinea on 14 July a$6
million loan for the purchase of a Boeing 737-200 C aircraft whose to.tal
cost is $19.8 million. This 10-year loan carried an annual interest rate
of 9.25 percent. ~This is the first time that Air-Guinee purchased a
U.S.-manufactured transport aircraft, and according to the bank, it is
expected that this company will order more Boeing planes. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jul 80 p 1855]
CSO: 4400
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IVORY COAST
NEW FRAMEW~JRR FOR DEMOCRACY ASSESSED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 7 Jul 80 p 30
[Article by Jonathan Kolela; "Important ICDP Congress in the Fall: With
Small and Measured Pace the Regime Advances Toward Democracy, But Queries
Still Abound"]
[Text] "The Ivory Coast has slackened its democratization pace, but econo-
mically and socially it is ahead of many countries." The Ivorian Republic
_ president has recognized that hia country is laboring under ~olitical
stagnancy, causing among other things the ad~ournment of the Ivory Coast
Democratic Party (ICDP) congress. Unfortunately, this admission was not
followed up by necessary remedial measurea, previously listed as impending
by many, including personalities close to the chief of state.
_ Simple postponement or def initive diamissal of a reform to which President
Houphouet Boigny is reportedly attached? The question certainly remains _
unanswered until the congress is held on the second half of September to
prepare for thQ year-end presidential and legislative elections.
However, on 12 June, in a 2-hour-long epeech before the enlarged party
national council (members of the Pol~tburo,~ of the�government, of the
leadership committee, o� socioeconosnic strata and chief stecretaries of
harbor subsectors) the chief of state already defined the limits of that
necessary democratization. To those who leaning an the example of neighboring
Senegal, demand a multipartite regime, the chief of etate replied with a
categorical "no." Ae stated, "All of us are Ivorian citizens, and as such
all of us are ICDP militants." Thus, the party continues to monopolize
political life, even if from now on grasaroota participation is expected to
- play a larger role than in the past.
Thus, the 147 deputies (instead of 120) to be elected to the National Asaembly
will be designated at departmental level, and not as usual on a single ballot
presented by party headquarters. Electiona to city councils and village
committees scheduled for this month~ wi11 be held along the same process.
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Important Decisions
For months, contradictory rumors about how to designate the president of
the r.epublic, keystone of a presidential system, have made the rounds of the
country. Doesn't the chief of state risk to launch another "rumor campaign" ~
by saying l.ittle about that question as well as about his own reelection, and
by not following up on his intention, reaffirmed a few months ago, of amending
the Conatitution to create--according to observers--an office of vice
president?
On the political level, the recent enlarged National Council was incontestably
a sign of political liberalization, but it should translate at the forth-
coming congress into the access to leading posts of new personalities,
younger but also less ~nvolved in the scandals of recent years.
As paradoxical as it may appear, while those habitually identified with the
party left wing have achieved auccQSS with some democratization, the right
wing has won hands down the test of nationalized companies. In a lengthy
review of the diff icult economic situation (some experts estimate that the
Ivory Coast has lost $95 million because of tardy cacao sales) the chief of
state shifted part of the blame on state-owned companies.
"These companies," he said, "are largely responsible for the country's
catastrophic financial predicament; their debts reach 600.million and the
country's, 16 billion AFC Fr."
That is why President Houphouet Boigny announced a major reform of state-
owned companies: 12 of them disappear purely and simply, outliving their
social usefulness or because of marginal, unsatisfactory activities. The
legal status of 11 companies is sensibly modif ied (Three transformed into ~
public administrative establishments (EPA) and eight into public establish-
, ments of industrial and commercial character), while three state-owned
companies slip under private sector control.
Only seven state-owned companies reta~n their former standing, including
Sodesucre, SITRAM and Palmindustrie. Beaides making room for private (and
often foreign) firms from now on,:the elimination of state-owned companies
has raised qualms about its possible economic, social and even political
consequences, and about its real impact on the effort to redress the present
- economic situation. ,
Concerning the second point, no one contests the fact that many state-run
companies were poorly managed or were sometimes used to amass fast and
dishonest wealth. But on the contrary, it is still hard to see how can
their suppression, their replacement with private companies, or even placing '
them in trust (from now on, major decisinna in most of these companies will
be taken, not by their boarde of directors but rather by-the minister-
_ trustee) extricate the country from the ongoing fix? -
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Finally, there is a more fundamental question: the Ivorian model calls
for accumulation of capital onto the hands of the state prior to retroceding
_ it to the national private sectnr. If the state has ceased to play its role,
does this abdication risk to iadirectly throw doubt upon the accumulation
- policy as well as upon the model in which it operates?
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
9213
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IVORY COAST
POLITICAL, BUSINESS CHANGES REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 pp 1563-1564
[Official Statement by the National Council of PDCI-RDA: "Liberalization ~
of Political Life. Reform of the State Companiss"]
[Text] The broadened National Counc il of PDCI-RDA [Democratic Party of the
Ivory Coast-African Democratic Rally] convened in the president of the
republic's residence in Abid~an on 12 June. Houphouet Boigny was present
supported by all the members of the Political Bureau. All governmeat mem-
bers, members of the steering committee, the general secretaries of the
subsectors of the port and the representatives of all the socioeconomic
strata of the nation attended the meeting. _
In a speech which lasted more than 2 hours, Houphouet~~Boigny announced, on
~ the one hand, the democratization of political life, and after a review of
the economic situation a refor~ of the state companies, on the ~ther.
- Liberalization of Political Life
The chief of state stressed the fact that the Ivory Coast must not evolve
towards a multi-party regime. Consequently all the deputies elected to the
National Assembly, the nutnber of which will rise from 120 to 147, will sit
as deputies of the PDCI-RDA. In return the election of these deputies will
take place on a departm~ntal level and no longer on the national ticket
system. Voting will include two ballots at a week's interval. The municipal
elections will be carried out under the same system and will take place
after the legislative elections.
Moreover, the elections of the village committees will be carried out in a
"perfectly democratic" fashion. In turn the village committees will elect
the general secretaries of the subd ivisions of the party. These elections
will be held in July 1980.
The Party Congress, which will be preceded by a preparatory pre-congress in
Yamoussoukro in August, will be held during the second half of September to
prepare the presidential election and the legislative election which will
take place on separate dates, before the end of this year. ~
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Houphouet Boigny kept his own counsel regarding the presidential elections
and his own reelection. While he had alluded last December to the possi-
bility of a reform in the constitution, he did not refer to it this time nor
did he at any time mention the nomination of a vice president empowered to
succeed him, when the time came.
- Alluding to the rumors of a coup d'etat, Houphouet Boigny declared: " There
has been a conspiracy in the Ivory Coast or a threat of a coup d'etat."
In 1963 the case of Captain Sio, who, at the present time, is serving his
- sentence, was, in effect, "definitely only a filthy crime." The cause of
Zuma.ra Oulai who originally started some rumors is unimportant. Oulai, on
the eve of being arrested for embezzlement, pretended to be at the head of
a plot which could overthrow the government. In fact he was the only one
to be denounced by the civilian and military region, who expressed their
attachment to the chief of state and the institutions. Oulai will be pro- -
secuted before a military tribunal only for embezzlement for which he is
charged.
The Economic Situation and the State Companie~ Reform
The Ivorian president recognized that the economic aituation of the country
is not excellent but he seemed quite optimistic and re~ected the thought of
asking for assistance, for the ti~e being, from friendly countries, although
they had offered it. The chief of state recalled that the government had
always been able to balance the budget and that it had not been necessary to
call for any foreign aid not for treasury advances to attain it. "We are
capable of straightening out this economic situation, he declared, as the
outside world has the greatest truat in us."
' A great part of the problems stems from the deficient management of the state
companies. Therefore, a very thorough reform of these companies is imperative. -
"These state companies are mainly responsible for the catastrophic situation
in which the state finances find themselves; their debts amounted to 600
million CFA for some and 16 billions for the others" specified the chief of
state. Anyway, this reform had been under consideration for quite some
time.
Restructuring of Ivorian State Companies
--State Socleties Maintained:
Air Ivory Coast
CSSPPA (Fund for the stabilization and price support for agricultural pro-
duction)
Palmindustry '
PETROCI (Ivorian Petroleum Company)
SITRAM (Ivorian Marine Transport Company)
SODEMI (Ivory Coast Mining Development Company)
- SODESUCRE (Company for the Development of Sugar Cane Plantations and the
Industrialization and Marketing of Sugar)
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--State Compar~ies Dissolved:
BNETD (National Office of Technical Development Studies)
SICOFREL (Iv~rian Company for the marketing of fruits aad vegetables)
SODERIZ (Company for the development of rice)
DISTRiPAC (Company for PAC ehaias--Commercial action program~ Authority
for the Southeastern Regional development
ARSO (African Regional Organization for Standardization) (Mission terminated)
AVB (Bandama Valley Development Authority) (Mission terminated) -
SONAFRI (Ivational Financing Company)
Ivorian Standardi~ation Office
Ivorian Bank for P and T(Posts and Telecommunications) (returned to its =
previous position as Po~tal Checks Fund and National Savings Fund)
Industrial undertaking center for livestock,
National center af~freight offices (~transformed inta mixed economy company).
ITIPAT (Technological and ~ndustrialfzatfon Institute for tropical food ~
products) (Replaced by a research structure in the ministry for scientific
~ reseaxch)
_ IVORY-TOOLS (Private Enterprise)
SOCATCI (Ivorian Rubber Company)
SONEGACIL (National Civil Engineering Company) To go into private busineas
State Co~panies Changing Status:
(1) Public Establishments of an Industrial and Commercial Character:
FOREXI (Company for the realization of drilling exploitatian in the Ivory
Coast)
LONACI (Ivory Coast National Lottery)
= SATMACI (Tpchnical Assistance Company for the Agricultural Modernization
of the Ivory Coast)
- SETU (Urban Land equipment company)
SIETHO (Ivorian Company for Tourist and Hotel Expansion}
SODEFEL (Company for the Development of Fruit and Vegetables Production)
SODEPALM (Company for the Development and Exploitation of Oil Palm)
SODEPRA (Company for the development of animal products)
(2) Public Administrative Establishmenta:
MOTORAGRI (Company for the Development aad Mechanization of Agriculture)
SODEFOR (Forest Cultivation Development Company
SOGEFIHA (Company for the Financial Management of Housing)
--To Be Noted:
BNDA (National agricultural Development Bank and the Ivory Coast)
Credit, public participation companies or para-public international are
assimilated with the state companies. They have both the orientation to be -
mixed economy companies.
The BNEC (National Credit and Savings Bank) is returning to ite original
banking activities. The BDI (Induatrial Development Office), the OPEI
(National Office for the Promotion of Ivorian Enterpriaea) and Securities
for Ivorian Enterprises whose activities are overlapping will merge in
order to form an entity which wi~l enable them to become more dynamic.
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The measures which were taken were announced at the National Council of the
party by Houphouet Boigny. To the difficulties which arose from the poor
management by the state companies, must be added the unhappy consequences
following the Ivory Coast's decision to stock about 150,000 tons of cocoa -
rather than. commercialize them at a price which it deemed insufficient. The
serious drop in market prices and the risk of deterioration in the stock
forced the Ivory Coast to sell 100,000 tons at a price of 1,000 FF per 100
kg on 6 June. Western experts estimate thz.t in this operation ivory Coast
suffered a loss of about 95 million dollars, that is, a loss of 75 million
due to the drop in the market price, 8 million in interest uncollected on
export revenue, 5 million for financing the inventory and 7 million for the
cost of warehousing. This very costly loss for the ?vorian economy could
be reduced by the hoped-for oil returns. In fact, some experts feel that
in 1983 the Ivory Coast ceuld reach a production of about 8 or 9 million
tons of crude oil.
In presenting *_he reform of the state companies, Houphouet Boigny stressed
- the fact that the liberal regime remaina the foundation of the economic policy
of the state and that consequently the rights of free enterprise will con-
tinue to be respected.
A law must thoroughly reform the statute of the state companies and public
establishments.
Only seven of the present state companies will retain thei.r statute; Air
Ivoire, Stabilization Fund, Palmindustry, PETROCI, SITRAM, SOAE~~, SODESUCRE.
The BNDA and Ivory Coast Credit, public participating companies or inter-
- national parapublic, are assimilated with the state companies.
Fifteen other state companies have been removed due to the fact that the
social purpose which had been assigned to them at the time they were
established, has been achieved, or because they occupied a marginal place in
their area of activity, or they did not meet the present needs of the economy,
or that theit management presented inaurmountable problems. Ttao of these
companies have gone into the private sector.
Three former atate companies have been converted into public administrative
establishments (EPA) and eight others into public establishments of an
industrial and commercial character.
- In fact the ao called state companies retain their administrative councils
with full management powers. Their control will be exercized by a ministerial
guardianship committee which will meet periodically.
The public establishments will not be administered by administrative
councils any longer but by advisory management commissions presided by
competent ministers (secretaries) or their representatives.
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Al1 the agents attached to the state in the state companies or in the public
establishments will be compensated in the future on the same salary basis as
those in the general administration. Special allowances will compensate here _
and there for special assignments. Only holders of high responsibility _
positions will be eligible for living allowances and aupplementary expens~s
which will be established by the government. Finally the number and speci-
fications of the service vehicles will be reduced to the administrative norms
as established by the presidential order dated 14 January 1979.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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IVORY COAST
RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Frenc~2 11 Jul 80 p 1740
[Article: "Ivory Coast: Recent Economic Developments" Words printed between
slantlines appeared in bold face]
[Text] The Central Bank of the West African States (CBWAS) has devoted a
recent economic and monetary bulletin to the Ivory Coast. The main -
- /agricultural productions/ of the 1978-1979 campaign dealt with 311,800
tons of cacao (+5,800 tons over the precedent campaign), 277.000 tons o�
coffee (+81,300 tons), 114,900 tons of cotton grain (+11,900 tons) furnishing
46,700 tons of cotton f iber to shelling machines (+5,300 tons), an.d 232 tons
of tobacco (-86 tons). In addition, the year 1979 recorded 579,400 tons of
, palm clusters (-137,500 tons), 30,650 tons of palmettoes (-2,500 tons) and _
129,650 tons of palm oil (-21,100 tons).
On the basis of the ruling purchase prices made during the above-mentioned
campaign, the producers have realized an income of 78 billion AFC F`r for
cacao, 69.3 billion for coffee, 9.2 billion for cotton seeds and 5.8 -
billion for palm clusters. At the beginning of the current 1979-1980
- campaign, purchase prices to producers were up from 250 to 300 AFC Fr per
kilo for cacao and coffee.
During the first 11 months of 1y79, the Abid~an international /airport/ ~
recorded 16,927 traff ic movements of commercial planes, a total of 698,300
a.rriving and departing passengers and 26,700 tons of freight. -
As of 31 October 1979, the gross index of /industrial production/ was 287.5
as compared with 256.9 a yea.r earlier (base 100 as determined for the year
1972). -
The general african family /consumer price index/ showed 282.9 on 31
December .J.979, as compared with 245.9 at the end of December 1978 (base
100 retained for the year 1970).
- During the first 11 months of 1979, /dnt~es~and taxes/ collected by custome
service totaled 165.4 billion AFC, including more than 80 percent on imports.
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~ The operational /budget/ for f iscal yea,r 1980 has been set at 338.4 billion ~
AFC, including both returns and expenses (+33.8 billion over the precedent); -
the special equipment and investment budget has been fixed at 312.8 billion
AFC 493 billion) with 107.5 billion from foreign contribution.
Foreign trade in 1979 yielded 528.9 billion AFC on imports and 534.8 billion
on exports, showing an excess of 6 billion AFC (as compared with a surplus
of 1.8 billion in 1978 and of 99.7 billion in 1977).
As of 31 December 1979, /paper currency/ reached 193.5 billion AFC, as
compared with 164.5 billion a year earlier. /Bank/ deposits reached a total
- of 437.4 billion AF'C at the end of 1979 (+23.1 billion over the end of
1978). Taking into account the circulation and deposits within the oanking
system, the /credits extended to the National econo~y/ totaled 797 billion
AFC Fr at the end of L~acember 1979 (-100.7 billion over the end of 1978).
Also on 31 December 1979, the Treasury of Ivory Coast had on the local level -
a positive balance of 43.8 billion AFC (-63.7 billion as compared with end
1978). During the year, the situation of /foreign credits/ has reversed
itself, from positive for the exchange value of 24.3 billion AFC as of 31
December 1978, it has become negative for the exchange value of 77.4 billion
at the end of 1979.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980 ~
~
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MALI
BRIEFS !
SEMINAR ON STATE ENTERPRISES--Gen Moussa Traore, president of the Republic
of Mali, presided in Bamako at the opening of a seminar on Malian state
enterprises and firms on 21 July. Amadou Abdoulaye Sy, minister of state '
firms and enterprises, declared that "this seminar, the first of its k;ind,
has been organized ~ointly by our ministry and the National Union o� Malian ~
Workers. Its aim is to offer the cadre of our country the opportunity of
comparing their ideas and experiences so as to define ways and means to ~
strengthen and reorganize the SEE (State Firms and Enterprises)." The '
- seminar will deal mainly with the independent national economy, the politi-
cal option of the sole constitutional party (t1DPM), the SEE's socio-econo- ~
mic environment, the dynamic role played by accountancy in the administra- ~
tion of the enterprise and the role of trade unions in it. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jul 80 p 1855]
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MOZAMBIQUE
SALT PRODUCTION COMPANY ESTABLISHED TO INCRF.ASE EXPORTS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER1tANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1760
[Article: "Pro~ect for Establishment of a National Salt Producing Company"]
[Text] A national company for the extraction, treatment, and procesaing of
salt--~which will work in liaison with aa already exiating factory, the
FABRICA DE HIGIENIZACAO DE SAL at Matola (Maputo)--is to be eatabliehed
this year in M~ozambique. Its headquarters will be at Maputo, and it will
open branches in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Sofala. It
will control directly all activity in tt~is line of businesa, which is ~o
be developed by the preparation of salt drqing ponds in the appropriate
regions. ~ao projects are to be carried ~ut, one in the province of Cabo
Delgado and the other in the province of Maputo.
The f irat pro~ect is known under the name of the "Dieze pro~ect," from the
name of the locality where it will be set up. It involves the establish-
ment, in Pemba Bay, of a salt drying pond with a capacity of extracting
5,000 tons of salt per year. Begun laet Januarys thia pro~ect wi11 be
completed by the end of the year. It wi11 have cost 3,000 Contos, of which
1,300 Contoa will be provided by the provincial government, tahich will also
provide the labor.
The "Dieze project" will make it posaible to resume activity in the salt
d~ying ponds in the northern part of the country. Before independence
there were eight salt drying enterprises in the province of Cabo Delgado,
_ but they have since been abandoned by their awners and now are under-
- exploited.
In the Province of Maputo, the salt production zone ahould be extended to
450 ha (an increase of 360 ha). This figure includes extensions planned
both in ~~he n~:tiorialized sector as well as in the private sector. tn this
wa~ the provincial production of ealt should be increased from about 27,000
tons this year to 40,000 tons in 1981. -
The beginning of work on the project is scheduled for next September. It
wiil go on at the same time as work on an increase in production by
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existing salt drying ponds. The necessar~ materials are in the course of
being obtained. The total value of the work will be in the order of 8,000
Contos. But this investment will be productive: it will make it po3sible
for thE: Province of Maputo to expand its exports of salt from 3,000 tons
this year to 25,000 tons next year.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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MOZAMBLQUE
- BRIEFS
ITALIAN COMPANY FOR GEOLOGICAL SURVEY--The Italian company AQUATER, which
is part of the ENI group, signed an agreement at the end of June with the
national department of geology of the People's Republic of Mozambique. It -
concerns the preparation of geological mapa and a detailed study of geo-
chemical research in an area of 48,000 km~. A serie8 of geological maps -
in detail with the geochemical analysis of sedimentary formations will be
prepared on the scale of 1:50,000 for an initial zone of 19,000 1~2.
Another series, on the scale of 1:250,000, will be prepared for a second
zone of 29,000 km2 in the Zambezia and Nampula regions. The work is to
begin immediately and to last for 3 years. The total value of the contract
is about $15 million. It is probable that an adminiatrative charge of 15
percent will be levied in the framework of the technical cooperation agree- -
_ ments reached between the Italian and Mozambican governments. AQUATER has
been active in Mozambique for many years. This f irm is presently completing
a hydrological project in the Inhambane region. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1760] 5170
ITALIAN TEXTILE PLANT CONSTRUCTION--The Italian engineering company SNAM
- PROGETTI, which belongs to the nationalized ENI group (National Hydro-
carbon Entity), at the end of June signed a contract with the minister of
_ industrq of Mozambique valued at $9 million for the construction of a
textile factory. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 11 Jul 80 p 1760] 5170
INCREASING COOPER4TION WITH BULGARIA--An economic delegation from Mozambique
has just visited Bulgaria to strengthen further relations between the two
countries. Already dynamic economic cooperation has been increased notably
in the hydrotechnical and the hydroelectric sectors, as shown in the
construction of the agro-industrial complexes which Mozambique needs.
Bulgarian foreign commerce organizations have undertaken irrigation work
in an area of 4,200 ha in the Chai-Chai region. Similarly, they are
- participating in the ma~or work in the valley of the Limpopo River snd in ~
the "Angonia" plateau. The Mozambique delegation was led by the secretary
of the Central Committee of FRELIMO, Marcelino Dos Santos, and the visit !
took place in accordance with the treaty of friendship and of long-term ~
economic cooperation which was signed by Samora Machel and Todor Zhivkov ~L
in October, 1979, in Mozambique and which remains in force until 1990. ~
The signature, duririg this recent trip, of numerous agreements on coopera- '
tion shows that this treaty daily finds new applications which are favorable
to the two countries. [Text] [1980 AFRIQUE-ASIE in FrenGh No 217 7 Jul
80 p 17J 5170 -
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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
BRIEFS
POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASID--The government of the Democratic Republic of
Sao Tome and Principe recently released about 20 political prisoners, some _
of whom were persons arrested in August 1979 following demonstrations againat
a census to be held by the governTaent which had to be ultimately cancelled.
The release of Maria do Carmo Neto, wife of a former com~ander-in-chief
of the army, should be noted. She had been ~entenced to a 15-year ~ail term
at the trial of those accused in the "Cobra-77" plot, an operation reported-
ly aimed at the assass~.nation of the chief of state, President Pinto da
Costa. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.ANEENS in French
25 3ul 80 p 1864]
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SENEGAL
PDS LEADER DISCUSSES PARTY'S PROGRAM, POSITION
~aris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Jun 80 pp 38-39
[Interview with Abdoulaye Wade, Senegalese Democratic Party leader--date
and place not given]
[Text] On May 16, 17 and 18, the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] held
its third national meetings. The opposition party, of ~ourse, did not
deal very tactfully with the government, and especially not with the party
in power. While agxeeing with some of President Senghor's findings, nameZy _
concerning the economic situation, the opposition party proposes another
analysis and another policy. To enforce it, there is only one legal route:
new elections. The leader of the PDS, Mr Abdoulaye Wade, who was willing
to answer questions from our special correspondent, did not seem to have
any douhts as to the outcome of these elections.
Waste
_[Question] During the third congress of the PDS, you stated that Senegal
is going through the worst economic and financial crisis in its h3story.
President Senghor attributes this crisis to the deterioration of the ex-
change terms, the drought and the petroleum shock. Do you agree with this _
analysis?
[Answer] I am not underestimating the infl:uence of the drought nor that of
inflation. I also do not exclude the government's responsibility. It
should have planned and been prepared to face the circumstances. Unfortunately,
its development program through industrialization is completeYy erroneous.
Creating 500 jobs will not take care of unemployment. It is not through
the monoculture of the peanut that one obtains alimentary self-sufficiency.
Most of the investments have proved to be nonproductive: our natural and
human resources have been wasted and plundered by foreigners. Not to
speak of poor management and embezzlements.
[Question] There is much being said about these embezzlements in Dakar here
lately. It has even been reported that the French paper LE FIGARO published
a Iist of the senegalese ministers having bank accounts in Switaerland. How-
ever, this is not true and LE FIGARO is denying it.
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[Answer] There have been, of course, embezzlements at a high level, custom
smuggling on a large scale, percentages collected from contracts, overcharged
factory or material sales. And fund transfers to foreign countries. In
1977, as Senghor has acknowledged, the Socialist Party spent 9 billion FCFA _
to ruin the PDS. Where did he get these billions? Recently, a"dignitary"
_ from the regime was dismissed for having embezzled 120 million. Today, he
says he used the millions to obtain votes for the PS... What is more serious,
however, is the fact that a high official has never been penalized.
A Minimum Program
[Question] You say that the policy that has been followed for the past 20
years has been a failure. You are asking for the dissolution of the Assembly--
where your party has 16 delegates--and for "free and democratic" elections.
Would you be ready to ally with other opposition parties in order to confront
the party in power?
[Answer] We do not need the other parties. Since they are only marginal,
they would be of no benefit to us. However, I believe the Senegalese people
need to feel that they are participating in a common task. This is why we
are asking for elections. There, it would be every man for himself, whether
four, ten or 50 parties are represented. We suggest that in the end only
three parties be recognized. A"marxist-leninist" one whose society project
is specific and which will anyway be a minority, and the two leading parties.
_ [Question] The other parties would then have to disappear. Is that not
_ taking a step backwards?
[Answer] We are partisans of a limited multipartism. But the parties must
he representative. Here, the conservative party is real folklore, as well
~ as the small leftist groups.
[Question] And there would be alliance after the elections?
[Answer) Yes. The three authorized parties would have to agree, after the
outcome of the elections, on a minimum program which would be implemented
by the ma~ority party, alone or in collaboration with the other parties.
Antidemocratic
[QuestionJ If the PDS wins the election, would it form a homogeneous �
government?
[Answer] Absolutely not. We would integrate the other parties. If each
person is involved, no one can withdraw his support for the government.
[Question] The African Party for Independence (PAI) of Mah~emout Diop was -
= officially present at your congress. However, the national democratic
Gathering (RND) of Cheikh Anta Diop was not seen, not was the Senegal-PAI
(clandestine) nor the Senegalese Republican Movement (MRS) of Boubacar
Gueye.
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[Ans~ver] We do r.ave contacts with the PAI but there remain some points of
disagreement. The PAI rejects straight off all discussion with the party
in power. We were also negotiating with the Senegal PAI but these ~tegotia-
tions were broken off. We have no contact with the MRS, conservative party.
I3or with the Mamadou Dia group, the RND or the small leftist groups.
[Question] You have close ties with foreign parties. Namely those that are
in the PS' black book. A coincidence?
[Answer] If the PS does not get along with anyone, it is not my fault and
if you are saying that our relationships are suited to the occasion, you are
wrong. When I was a student in London, I would meet with the present
leaders of Azanie's National African Congress (South Africa). in Paris, I
was the lawyer for the FLN and in Dakar, the correspondent for the MPLA and
the FRELIMO. These are very old friendships. As for the POLISARIO... The
PDS was the second African party--after the FLN--to recognize the Saharan
Arab DemQCratic Republic. But we also have excellent relations with part~es
that are presently in power in French-speaking Africa and whose leaders
have their headquarters at the OUA. They are cautious, they do not send a
delegation to our congress', but Senghor knows this. I even believe he sees
no objection to this.
[Question] Are you sure?
[Answer] In any event, this is what he said in Zaire. However, I also know
that the foreign affairs minister, Moustapha Niasse, has asked certain
countries to end their relationship with the PDS. This is antidemocratic.
Our support has already been sollicited for the Socialist International of
which the Senegalese PS is a member. H~wever, this is of no interest to us.
[Question] Basically, what do you want? -
[Answer] Power, because we are capable of straightening out the situation.
[QuestionJ In what way? By asking for international help?
[Answer] It is clear that the PDS will never accept the economic protection
of a foreign country or of an international institution. On the other
hand, foreign capital, namely Western--since we have opted for the west,
which does not exclude cooperation with the East--will be welcome if our
priorities are respected: development of the agriculture, command and control
_ of our resources, economic integration in the sub-~egion, and especially,
giving priority to the development of horizontal, African relationships,
rather than vertical relationships with developed countri~es.
[Question] Is security, that is national defense, one of your priorities?
The present government would like to increase the manpower and the budget
of the army. Is Senegal threatened by a strong power or by its neighbors?
Do these measures seemed justified?
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[AnswerJ Th~re are threats. The party in power has too many problems with
too many people. If it is desirable to decrease the military e~cpenses--which
we will do---in this precise case, we are not against their increase.
[Question] And the home threat? -
[Answer] It is real. The notion of State has been devaluated and discontent-
ment is widespread. Natice the number of strikes. Some, of course, are
only pretexts. The demands are in reality political: the Senegalese people
want a change, and if the PDS does not bring about this change, confrontation
is inevitable. Passive resistance has already begun.
One Only Needs a Sergeant
[Question] Are you looking for confrontation?
[Answer] For the PDS to take a position would surely accelerate the process. E
However, we are still counting on the wisdom of the leaders: they must _
realize that they are no longer capable of changing the situation. The
democra~ic alternative is possible and preferable to taking control by the
street or by the army. We do not want a revolution. A revolutionary situa-
tion is not very easily solved, and I do not know if the PDS could lead the
country in a civil war atmosphere. I am not the man of exception tribunals.
[Question] Thus, for the moment, you are following a policy of laissez- -
faire. Are you not running the risk of having the other take over?
[Answer] The risk of a military, leftist or integratist adventure controlled
from the outside does not exist. One only needs a captain or. a sergeant.
I have made it clear to the government: if the State cannot take the
necessary measures, the PDS will take the measures itself.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
9592
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SENEGAL
PUBLIC,SMALL BUSINESSMEN UNHAPPY WTTH ECONOMIC SITUATION
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 Jul 80 pp 36,, 37
- [Article by Sylviane Kamara]
[Text] It is strangely cool in Dakar this June and it is the onTy novelty
at first sight. At �irst sight onTy, for he.who looks at things closer
realizes that something ~s not right.. The jeweler's stalls are deserted
in the gold market at Sandaga. When you know the liking.o� the Senegalese
for adornment, this loss of affection is an unfailing.sign. $T Had~ Thiam,
jeweler, is upset about it: "We haxdly sel.l two or thr�ee jewels per day,
juot enough to eat.. Gold has risen a great deal. But the women especialLy -
do not buy any more because,_ with the riseg in-prices, thei~ husband's
salary is not even enough for current expenses~."
"Scrounging Around"
People talk only about the rise in prices. Electric power rates have
increased 6.5 percent since January. Gasoline is now in its fourth increase:
170 CFA francs for a liter of high test. And thi,s is not over.. The first
victims are the taxi drivers. The one who confides his troubles between
Ouagou Niayes and Tileen has two wives and~five children: "I, must.pay my
boss 5,000 francs everyday. Now with "~he increase" I also spend 6,000
francs for gasoline. Consequently I"am forced to:work all day and part of
the night,.for people take taxis less and less.. They.do not have any-money
either."
The taxi drivers who w~ant.an incressed fare--and who- think their trade.
union leadership is not very~aggressive--went on str.ike in mid-fitay. They
were not the only ones. On the 13th, SUDES:[Single.and.Democratic Union
~ of~ Senegalese Teachers] also~. called the teacher.s~ out on str:ike.. A striker,
a lycee teacher, explains: "We demanded.especially, an increase o� teacher -
bonuses and the extension of the housing allowance to all`.teachers. Wi.th
7 years of senjo.rity, T earn 93;000 CFA~.francs. I rent'an old.two room:house
- in Medina for 60,000 francs. I can no longer:make.it."
In fact, "living" becomes a more and.more risky occupation and to-survive
one is forced to "scrounge around" as they say in Senegal. In the country,
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peasants have eaten the seeds which ONCAD [National Office of Cooperation
and Assistance for Development) distributed to them. Others sold their
peanut or cotton crop fraudently and at a good price in Mauritania and Gambia.
Villagers kept part of their production to produce themselves their oil,
which they resell to townspeople. Dj ibril Sene, minister of rural develop-
ment, estimates these diversions of peanuts at 50,000 to 100,000 tons.
Abdulaye Wade, secretary general of the Senegalese Democratic Party (opposi- -
tion) is harsher: "We have produced 700,000 tons and 420,000 have been sold.
What has happened to the rest?" While, as a general rule, thiebou dieune
(rice with fish) is always bathed in oil (a liter for 5 kilograms of rice),
they have begun to eat less oil in certain families since a liter costs
230 CFA francs. Bread, instant coffee, evaporated milk, butter and sugar
have increased so much that they are resorting, among the most "pressed,"
to boiled millet for breakfast. Even tea is becoming a luxury: 150 CFA
francs a glass, to which must be added the sugar at 250 CFA francs a kilogram.
Life is hard, but not for everybody. At Fann Residence, the ultrachic sea-
shore district, the crisis is not recognized. A company director answers,
"let us not exaggerate anything. The Senegalese have bad habits. They live
beyond their means. They have willed the crisis." It is true that thin~s
are going fine for him, the owner of a villa, which he rents to an embassy
for 800,000 CFA francs. Some thus s ubstantially increase their end of the
month balances. .
Bankruptcy
A bank official declares, there is one of the causes of the recession:
"For 3 years, most of the credits granted by the main banks have gone to
- real estate, a completely unproductive field: Result, there is hardly any-
more liquidity. When the central bank cried disaster, credit was contracted,
but too tightly and dozens of small businessmen and entrepreneurs are on
the verge of bankruptcy. The rate of interest on deposits was also raised
to encourage saving, but who can save?" The government has the explanation _
for this crisis whose existence no one dares to deny any longer. Is it due
to the increase in the price of gasoline, electric power and a whole string
of petroleum derivatives? Inevitable, since the petroleum bill has risen
from 5 billion CFA francs in 1973 to 47 billion this year (40 percent of
export income). Imported products are becoming prohibitive (an increase of
_ more than 196 percent from 1974 to 1978). The reason for it is the drop in
the rates of exchange (139 percent for the same period).
There is nothing astonishing either in the fact that the increase in wages _
does not follow the increased cost of living, when we know that for 1979-
1980 the state budget (main employer), 172 billion CFA francs, declined _
6,10 percent with respect to that of 1978-1979 (178 billion).
Dissatisfaction
Because of the drought and occasional rains, peanut production was only
700,000 tons in 1979 (compared with 1 million for a normal year). Exports
of oil and oil cakes produced 75 billion in 1977, but only 23 in 1979. In
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addition, SenFgal must pay its debts: 30 billion CFA francs every year.
Everyone is aw 4re of the problems which the state faces--whose standard of
. living, the prime minister has announced, is going to be reduced--but a
certain uneasiness prevails. The development choices made by the regime
which has bePn in power for over 20 years are being criticized more and more.
Rumors--which have always proved to be false--circulate about concealed -
fortunes in Switzerland. Moreover, the fact that they are false does not ,
change anything, for many Senegalese believe it or want to believe it and
this fPeling of injustice has intensified the people's real discontent,
which the opposicion parties exploit.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Af rique GRUPJIA 1980
_ 8490
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TANZANIA
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES ~AID TO BF BLOCKING DEVELOPMENT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jul 80 p 1695
[Text] As we reported in our issue dated 27 June 1980, page 1638, '
Tanzanian Minister for Finance Amir Jamal decreed new taxes on beer,
ueverages, cigarettes, and gasoline to provide an additional 500 million
shillin;s for 1980-1981 state bu~iget resources.
In fact, dL.ring his draft budget presentation speech to the Parliament,
Mr Jamal stressed three elements, in addition to the increase in prices of _
energy and imported products, which came together to make the financial
situation of Tanzania particularly difficult at the end of the 1979-1980 -
- fiscal period. These elements were the war with Uganda (cost--1 billion -
200 million Tanzanian shillings for that fiscal period, plus 1 billion
616 million for 1978-1979, according to the mjnister); the increase in
costs of obtaining farm products following the difficulties in the pur-
- chasing and marketing of harvests; and the drop in state income in relation
to the estimates (a reported difference of 500 million shillings between
actual income and these estimates).
The Tanzanian state thus had to go heavily into debt. For goals unrelated
to development, 1 billion 900 million shillings were borrowed and the
domestic public debt was reported as 2 billion 938 million shillings at
the end of the 1979-1980 fiscal period (as compared to estimates of
_ 1 billion 667 million shillings).
1979-1980 Deficit
Reviewing the last two budget periods, the minister for,finance stated that
the ordinary expenditures of the state totaled 8.3 billion Tanzanian
shillings in 1978-1979, with regular income of 6.8 b illion. The re~ulting
deficit thus came to about 1.5 billion shillings. In addition, another and
considerable part of the real deficit was due to war expenditures paid out
in 1978-1979, but ~ntered in tr.e accounts in the following fiscal period.
Expenditures for development came to 4.75 billion shilZings in 1978-1979,
and foreign gifts and loans c~f about 2.43 billion partially covered these
expenditures.
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- The regular expenditures for 1979-1980 are estimated at 9.1 billion
shillings, or 1.63 billion more than the initial budget estimate. War ex-
penditures accounted for 1.2 billion shillings. Regular income came to
7.27 billion, or 500 million less than expected. The tax on internal sales
of domestic production alone brought in 400 million l~ss than planned, such
that the regular deficit for 1979-1980 came to 1.8 billion. The minister
noted that the estimates co~lnted "in an unrealistic way" on a surplus of
319 million shillings.
Expenditures for development in 1979-198Q came to about 4.8 billion, or
33 percent less than expec~~�ed. In real terms, the decline in the develop-
ment budget between 1978-1979 and the following fiscal period came to
15 percent.
The corresponding resources came to 2.6 billion shillings from foreign
sources, loans and gifts in 1979-1980.
The government had to go heavily into debt in 1979-1980 to the domestic -
banking system. About 3 billion Tanzanian shillings were thus borrowed in
the course of the fiscal period, including 1.8 billion to cover ordinary
e~enditures, a sum equivalent to the deficit in this category.
Difficulties for 1980-1981
Mr Jamal proposed a budget with a slight deficit for 1980-1981, with
expenditures coming to 16,3�3'~,800,000, including 9,342,000,000 for
ordinary expenditures and 7,040,000,000 for development expenditures. This
is a 25-percent increase over the expenditures in the budget estimate for
1979-1980, but only 2 percent above the final figures for that period. The
regular deficit would come to 331 million sh311ings.
' Development expenditures are 2 percent below the 1979-1980 estimates, but
15 percent above the real expenditures in that category for this fiscal
period.
For the corresponding resources, 4 billion 50 million shillings would come
from foreign aid in gifts and loans. -
= The minister noted that the decline in regular state income began in the
course of the second half of the 1979-1980 fiscal period, enterprise profits
being more and more absorbed by the costs of imports, which made themselves -
felt in the taxes collected.
Given th~ts situation, it was decided to reduce paid expenditures as much as
possible, while reorganizing the fiscal regulations, in view of the fact
that at best no more than 8 billion 500 million shillings in regular income
can be expected given the system in effect, while expenditures cannot be
brought below 9 billion 342 million Tanzanian shillings in 1980-1981.
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For 1980-1981, changes have been made in the tax on income and the
calculation of taxes on business profits has been simplified. It will be
collected at the rate of 5,000 shillings on income from clearly defined
professions, 2,000 shillings for public projects contractors, 1,000 for
companies meeting certain requirements, a list of which will be published,
500 for the majority of semi-state and private companies, 175 for officially ~
registered villages, and cooperative enterprises or those affiliated with
~ regions and districts. The result will be a loss of 10 million shillings
in state income, but the tax collection departments can thus devote them-
selves to other tasks.
Customs duties have also been simplified for imports. Medicines, books and
_ certain related merchandise will benefit from free entry into the domestic
market, while a duty of 15 percent will be collected on current products,
50 percent on goods which do not seem indispensable to the country (textiles,
small private cars), and 100 percent on such products as beverages and
luxury vehicles. No customs duty will be imposed on hydrocarbons, but there
will be a tax on retail sales, which will bring in 250 million on the income
obtained.
Taxes on retail sales are modified as follows:
Base food products will not be taxed;
- A standard rate of 25 percent will apply to shoes, furniture, crackers,
flours etc;
Another standard rate of 50 percent will apply to certain household appli-
ances and food products, c~tton and rayon underwear, and small private
vehicles; ~
- A ratP of 75 percent will apply to cloth and textile products in cotton and
rayon;
A rate of 100 percent will be applied to luxury products such as silk and
wool garments and automobiles with large engines; and
Special rates will apply to beer, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages,
cigarettes, sugar and oil products.
In addition, in order to promote the cultivation of coffee, a Coffee
Industry Productivity Development Fund has been established, and it will
receive 10 percent of the taxeo collected on coffee exports, which should
make about 40 million shillings available annually for coffee cultivation
development pro~ects, involving the Robusta variety in particular.
According to Mr Jamal, the changes in the fiscal system should prov~de
510 million additional shillings. The minister believes that an effort to
balance the budget at all costs would have been unwise, in view of the fact
that Tanzanians are already heavily taxed. -
_ In conclusion, the minister far finance stressed the role of agriculture in ~
economic development a~d emphasized that the slow growth in domestic pro-
duction could not be tolerated.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
' S15 7
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TOGO
BRIEFS
FOOD CROPS PRODUCTION DETlELOPMENT--A 6-member FAD mission headed by Mr
Leteuil visited Togo on 10 July for 10 days in order to initiate a pro~ect
for the development of food crops production in the eastern area of the
Notse administrative region. This FAD-financed pro~ect includes the per-
imeters of Notse-East and Tohoun and will initially start in the area com-
prised between national highway no 1 and the Mono. It will reach Tohoun
only when the results obtained in the first zone are judged satisfactory.
The project is aimed at providing a~istance for the peasants in the areas ~
_ selected for food crops production and marketing. A number of basic infra-
structures such as roads, wells and warehouses will be established. ;
[Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jul 80
p 1859] '
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UGANDA
TFtAGIC CONDITIONS IN KARAMOJA DESCRIBED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 pp 1753-1754 -
[Article: "Dramatic Situation in Raramoja"]
[Text] An AFP dispatch has ~ust thrown light on the dranatic situation in
Karamoja, in northeastern Uganda, as a combined result of drought and
insecurity .
This region is inhabited by the Karamo~ong, a tribal group of estimated
250,000 shepherds. In 3 months 15,000 of them have died, and their bovine
livestock has shrunk from 400,000 to 40,000 head.
The United Nations, the Red Cross, EEC and diverse privar_e organizations
(such as Britain's Save the Children Fund or OXFAM, ancl America's CARE)
are distributing hundreds of tons of food supplies in the region through
mi,ssionaries, most of them Italian.
But, around hospitals and missions, in villages and along ~ungle trails,
the same images abound: skeleton children with distended bellies--a sign
of acute malnutrition--and prostrate adults.
The villagers live in the constant terror of raids by armed bands scouring
the country, stealing cattle for resale in neighboring Kenya or Sudaa,
looting and killing along the way.
AFP' gave following details on that situation:--Sole responsibility for that
statement goes to AFP--Thousands of weapons had been stolen last year during
the Tanzanian-Ugandan war, allowing the looters to equip themselves with
_ sophisticated hardware: this past June, with m~rtars and automatic weapons
they attacked Moroto, at the heart of Karamoja, and made off in full
daylight with 320 head of cattle. Stories depicting their atrocities are
countless. In two main hospitals in Matany and e~bim 10 to 30~percent of
beds are occupied by raid victims. Surgeons operate without interruption
in more than precarious conditions.
;ri'
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Not a day has passed without a village being surrounded and set afire by _
plunderers. In such an onslaught, 10 or so people including women and `
children left behind, would be burned alive.
In its attempt to restore order, the governmer.t has in Karamnja 1,250
soldiers, a few police posts and a militia. However, testimonies recorded
fro m village to village unanimously accuse the military of being j ittery about
the plunderers, of avoiding combat and of levying continual exactions against
the population.
~ In May at Abim hospital, five soldiers pulled six patients, either sick or
wounded, from their beds and gunned them down, as well as four hospital
employees for the simple reason that all of them were of Karamo~ong origin.
- The soldiers have been transferred, but the mil~tia essentially composed
of Acholi and Lango, traditional enemies of the Karamo~ong, cont~nues to
hold the area under its thumb. Still recently, government troops stopped
a bus between Moroto and Soroti, south of Karamo~a, ordered eight passengers--
all from Karamojong stock--and mowed down seven of them.
Some experts fear that the Karamoja tragedy may provoke irreversible traumas
- among the population. Their judgment is backed up by innumerable examples.
- Employees of government dispensaries, often unpaid since m~nths, sell drugs
and food supplies to survive.
In addition to the AFP dispatch it should be noted that the Karamojong,
although familiar with cattle stealing and dearth have never known physical
and moral distress of that magnitude. Each boy receives at his birth an
ox as a gift, which must be sacrificed whenever the oponym dies. This
tradition accentuates the disarray caused by the ongoing loss in cattle and
human lives.
Thousand of starving people are camping out around missions, hospitals and
- dispensaries. The UN attempt to distribute food reliefs at village level ,
with the help of missionaries and tribal chiefs has not prevented the
emergence of a class of refugees, who undoubtedly will not be reaccepted
in their own villages.
Embezzlement of Food Aid
Relief organizations sending food supplies to Karamo~a announced on S July
in Kampala suspension of food distribution in MQroto city because their
supplies had been doled out there in the name of Uganda Peopla's Congress
(UPC) of Dr Milton Obote, fo rmerly chief of state, who attempts to return
to power.
According to these humatiitarian organizations, m~re than 15 tons of corn
flour and powdered milk donated by CARE and the World Food Program (WFP) _
and kept in a Red Cross warehouse in Moroto city, were snatched by Max
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Choudhry, Ugandan vice minister of education and one of UPC leaders, when his
demand for food supplies was turned down by warehouse officials. Thus, over
5,000 sacks of food worth more than $11,000 had been trucked away and
distributed later under the "Obote's food" label.
In June, Choudhry was charged by the ruling Military Commission with the
task of controlling food distribution in northern and eastern Uganda,
two regions hardest hit by drought with already thousands of deaths.
A report on the foocl diversion affair has been sent to the Military -
Commission.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
9213
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ZAIRE
TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 4 Jul 80 p 1693
[Text] Zaire's National Transportation Office (ONATRA) gives the figures for
traffic in May 1980 on the main operating systems:
A. Matadi Port: Imports, 62,323 tons; dry freighter exports, 41,236
tons; exports of edible oil in bulk, 3,103 tons; Bas-Fleuve traf-
fic, 1,085 tons.
B. Kinshasa Port: Loading, 2f3,679 tons; unloading, 32,522 tons.
C. Matadi-Kinshasa Railroads: Imports, 38,222 tons; exports, 34,635
tons; local traffic, 32,306 tons.
Il. River routes: upstream, 29,213 tons; downstream, 41,7I9 tons.
On all systems May is characterized by a clear improvement in tonnage trans-
ported or liandled. Although this improved total annual figure is explained
by an overall economic recovery, it must also be seen as a recovery of con�i-
dence on the part of the clientele toward its traditional shipper, ONATRA,
its presi~lent and general manager, Mr Paelinck, notes; he adds ~~hat at last
- tliere is a light at tl~e end v~' the tunnel of difficulties and insecurity that
}iad formerly presided over'transportation.
'1'he Office's efforts to incr~ease the speed and security of the shipments en-
trusted tu it are beginning to bear fruit, little by little.
The first experiment in special surveillance of the river convoys turns out
to have paycd off. It began on 10 May and by the end of the month six convoys
on the 5liaba axis I~ad arrived in Llebo without any break-ins. The system is
to be iiitensifiecl and exteixded to the railroad trains for grouped shipments of
merchandise subject to covetousness (farina, sugar, foods, textiles, etc.)
The six Series C-1000 barges, equipped with heavy panels covering the hold
wt~cri they are used to transport conventional freight, are now operational.
The C-1006 barge was loaded in early June with general merchandise destined
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for Kisangani, and manipulation of the panels requires the use of a crane
to open them; this, in addition to the usual fastenings, protects the freight
from any attempted theft during navigation.
ONATRt1 also points out that t}ie Kinstiasa Container Terminal (TCK) has been in
operation since 26 May. Entire trains of cars loaded with containers, when
they arrive in Kinshasa are pushed into the protective confines of the termin-
al, ancl the containers are immediately unloaded. In the first days of trial
operation of the terminal 66 containers were received and 34 were reshipped.
- '1'urnover time will be followed carefully.
Mr Paelilick notes lastly that ONATRA is ever more concerned with improving
the transnortation requested xts customers and will contact them in the coming
months to ascertain their concerns and the tonnage they might entrust to it.
COPYRiGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
8940
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ZAIRE
BRIEFS
MINING STUbIES--The United Nations Development Program (UND P) has granted
Zaire new aid amounting to $1,200,000 to make possible more precise evalua-
tion of the phosphate deposits already inventoried in the B as-Zaire region.
These studies will be conducted jointly by the lj'NDP and Zai re's Presidential
Studies Service and will last for four years. They should make it possible
to determine the characteristics of the soil and the deposits, as well as
the costs of exploiting, processing and shipping the product. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jul 80 p 1693J 8946
UNDP AID--The UNDP is also goin~ to provide Zaire with $87,864 in financing
to I~rovide training over a period of four years in the teledetection field
1'or ten agents of ERTS-[Earth Resources Technological Satel lites)Zaire, a
specialized organization responsible to the presidency of t he Republic.
[TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET NlEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jul 80
1693] 8946 "
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