JPRS ID: 9256 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9256 _
18 August 1980
Latin Ar~nerica Re ort -
p
(FOUO 17/80~
~BIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE -
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JPR5 L/9256
- 18 August 1980 -
LATIN AMERICA REPO~T
. (FOUO 17/8~ )
_ CONTENTS
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
Grenada's Bishop Stresses Friendshi~. With Cuba on
Moncada Anniversary
(Earl BouequeC; PRELA, 31 Jul 80) 1
Briefs
Venezuela Congratulates Cuba 3
ARGENTINA
Strategic Concerns Viewed as Hidal~o's Motives for Visit
(Sergio Ceron; LA OPINIOP', 6 Jul 80) 4
Political Independence N~ceasary To Make Nation Great Again
(Eduardo J. Paredea; LA OPINION, 6 Jul 80) 10
Nation Harvesting Fruit of Diplomatic Opennesa '
_ (Sergio Ceron; LA OPINION, 29 Jun 80) 15
CUBA
Government Drafts 1981-1985 Industrial Development Plan
(Rafael Contreras; PRELA, 25 Jul 80) 19
.
NICARAGUA -
~PRELE! Reports on Castro's Activities
(Javier Rodriguez; PRELA, 18 Jul 80) 21
Nicaraguan Town Meetinga, 'Direct Democracy' at Work
(Joae Bodes Gomea; PRELA, 17 Jul 8Q) 23
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PANAMA
Newspaper Scores U.S. Maneuvers Againet C:tba
(PRELA, 20 Jul 80) 25
PERU
Briefs
Labor Front Organization Planned 26
Newspaper Criticizes News Media 26
SURINAME
Dutch Party Supports Fulfillment of Aid Request
(PFtELA, 1 Jul 80) 27
VENEZUELA
Former Salvadoran 1?arty Leader Arrives; Criticizea PDC
CPRETA, 29 Jul 80) 28
Deputy Criticizes Government's Central America Policy
(PRELA, 21 Jul 80) 30
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INTER-AMERICAN AFI~AIRS
GRENADA'S BIS1i0P STRESSES FRIENDSHIP WITH CUBA ON MONCADA ANNI~'ERSAl2.Y
PA012123 Havalia PRELA in Spanish 0210 u'MT 31 Jul 80
[Article by E~irl Bousquet)
jText] St. Gr_orges, 30 Jul (PL)--Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice BlGh~p
stressed the liistoric meaning of the attack on Moncada Headquarters and the
importance fo-- the Latin American and Caribbean peoples of commemorating its
27th annivers:iry.
According to ~iishop, the Moncada feat has retained its significacice now that ~
the peoples o: ths region are intent on achieving unity in the struggle to
build their o~,m destinies, particularly Cuba, Nicaragua and Gren~da.
Otir people5, lie said, are engaged iz~ the task of constructing a r~ew sociQty
while confron~_ing the destabilizing campaigns launched by the a.r.ea`s ]'P.1rtlUil-
ary forces, e~icouraged by 1ed by the United Statas.
= He noted ttiat in (:uba, Nicaragua and Grenada the masses participate in the
conduct of st:ite affairs and are prepared to defend their countries anci their
revolutions because, he said, they have the weapons necessary to con.front
any enemy eitller from within or without.
Biahop spoke here this weekend at an event held to commemora.te r_he 27th
- anniversary oE the attack on Moncada Headquarters. Other speakers included
Cuban Ambassador to Grenada Julian Torres Rizo and outstanding CaribbPan
intellectual C.L.R. James.
The prfine minlster stressed that the world's most reactionary forces are cur.-
rently intensifying a campaign against the Cuban, Nicaraguan and Grenadian _
revolutionary procesaes.
That ill-intentioned propaganda, he said, has only managed to increasingJ.y
expand and strengthen unity among our peoples and make our determi~ar.i.cn
_ to fight ot~r :~ommon enemy, U.S. imperialism, even firmer.
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Commenting on the Moncada feat, he said it represents a moment of singular
importance in the history of the Cuban people, who have engaged in many other
battles wlthout stopping their overall development.
Proof of this, he added, is the fact that with only 10 million peoplP, Cuba
has more doctors working in internationalist missions than the World Health
- Organization does.
Referring to Grenadian-Cuban relations, Bishop said that one of the lessons
his people have learned from the Cuban people is their capacity to participate
in defense task~, thus guaranreeing the permanence of the revolutionary pro-
cess.
The strength of our revolutiona is particularly important for the Caribbean,
where U.S. imperialism has not stopped carrying out hostile activities aimed
at destroying the progressive movements in the area, he added.
An example of this, he went on, is the current situation in Jamaica, a small
Caribbean nation which is a target of local reaction in collusion with U.S.
agents opposed to the path of positive changes taken by Prime Minis~er Michael
Manley' a government .
After vo~cing Grenada's solidarity with the Central American and Caribbean
peoples, Bishop reaffirmed the firm cooperation and friendship that exi~ts
between Cuba and Grenada.
For his part, the Cuban ambassador said that in the Cuban people Grenada
has loyal friends, willing to give it their unselfish aid wheneve�; necessary.
- CSC: 3010
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ARGENTINA
STRATEGIC CONCERNS VIEWED AS HIDALGO~S MOTIVES FOR JISIT
Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 6 Jul 80 p Z2
[Article by Sergio Ceron: "Argentina Is a Strategically Valuable Nation -
to the United States"]
[Text] The visit by U.S. Secretary of the. Navy Edward Hidalgo., despite
the prudence with which he covered his movementa, offers enough indications -
so that one may state that the new phase in relations between that country
and Argentina is not only simed at raising their level but seems to be
aimed, almost without a doubt, toward an alliance. This statement appears
- to be very venturesome, but an amalysis of recent months, particularly
after the visit by Gen Andrew Jackson Goodpaster, reinforces that theory.
Shortly before initiating his trip to Brazil last Thursday, Hidalgo
acknowledged to Buenos Aires newsmen that in a meeting he had with the _
president of the nation the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendanent (which forbids
military aid to some countri2s, among them Argentina) and "the obviot~s
results of that legislation" had been discussed, which means the equipment -
. aupply problems it presents to the armed forces of those nations.
- S~multaneously with that revelation by the secreta.ry ~f the navy, U.S. -
~ naval sources announced that during the tour they would consider aspects
having to do with the resupplying with equipment the five countries it
will cover: in addition to our country and Brazil there ~re Meacico,
- Venezuela and Panama. If to both reports we add the suggestive phrase
the clever U.S. official let alip out on the day af his arrival ("the
prophets believe that arna~ change can be expected in the future") with
respect to the attitude of the U.S. Congress, it is obvious that a procegs
of revision of the aforementioned amendment is underway.
In a very subtle manner~ more in keeping with the old European diplomacy _
than with the 3ometimes di~e~t manner of the Department of State achool, ~
Hidalgo tried to wrest importance from his nisit. "It has been," he said,
"one more visit of those which have been made recently between our two
' countries."
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Let us remember that Lt Gen Andrew Jackson Goodpaster, adviser to `
President Carter; one of tbe,officials of the highest intellectual
level, Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges; Export~Import Ba~ik President
Ronald Stingel; Assistant Secretary for Maritime Affairs Samuel Nemirov;
and a special ambassador, an expert in nuclear affairs gnd copreaident
- of the Trilateral Commission durin~ the 1973-1976 period, Gerard Smith,
all preceded him in coming to Buenas Aires.
In its last edition, the Latin American magazine VzSION published an
extensive report on Argentina in which it primarily emphasizes its rela- ~
tions witn the United States. It says: "The confusing movements of U.S.
diplomacy" are at this time aimed "at seeking a useful rapprochement with
Argentina after having sub3ected it to 4 years of affronts over human
_ rights."
Specifically, probably the moet important qualitative change took place
with the arrival of Goodpaster, who because of his military status~ spoke
in the same professional langusge as his Argentine colleagues and estab-
lished the conditions for iniiiating a new period in Argentine-U.S. ~
relations. It was as if it allowed the establishment of an agreement
whereby bo~h governments pledged themselves to creating a system of per-
manent consultations for considering r_ommon and world problems.
Secretary Hodges~ sticking to his specific mission--the development of
U.S. trade--did not hesitate to state that "my country has a new view-
point about trade relations with Argentina, a change which is due to the
strength and the importance of the Argentine economy in the world."
However, perhaps the one who su~arized the opxnion of the military and
economic sectors of the United States was Ambassador Raul Castro, who
declared: "Argentina is a strategic country which can provide food and
be self-sufficient inthe field of energy."
This is an important change in viewpoint by the Yanke~ embassy in Buenos
Aires. We recall a couple of qeara ago, when war with Chile was almost
certain, two of us reporters from LA OPINION were having lunch at the
house of an attache~ who said: "The United States is not overly affected
by a conflict in that area; it is a marginally strategic region for us."
Our arguments on the importance of the navigation routea which pass
, around the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Aorn were to no avail. The Shah of
Iran still ruled; no one in the world knew the Ayatollah Khomeini and the
- USSR was not thinking of sending its paratroopers and armored divisions
to Afghanistan. The oil of the Middle East, although expensive~ seem~d to
be assured for the avid industries of the West.
As we know, however, things changed greatly in only 24 months. In the
light of the events which took place in that period, Argentina, and even =
the rest of the so-called Southern Cone, acquired a fundamental importance
_ for the defense of the 'United States and noncoaanuniat Europe.
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Tk~i~ theory, repeatedly expounded in this column~ was reinforced laet
16 June by Lt Gen (R) of the United States~ Daniel Graham. ~n adviser to
presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, he repreaents a trend of thinking
which ia deeply rooted in the military circles of his country. However,
- it is beginning to invade academic circles, where a perceptible movement -
toward the center-right of the ideological spectrum is beginning to take
form after several decades of "grogressive" liberalism predominance.
Graham maintained that the nations of the Weat, which depend on freedom
of navigation~ must have control in the South Atlantic. This is as much a
natural condition, he said, as that of the Soviet Union having the largest
land forcea.
What was Graham getting at? It is obvioua that he took into account the
theory expounded in 1911 hy Sir Halford Mackinder, the clairvoyant British
geographer, who became a precuraor of geoatr~tegy and geopolitics. In a
famous lecture at the London Geographic Society~ he declared that the
nation which controlled the central area of Eurasia (he called it the
"heartland") would become the primary world land power. Inevitably, after
its consolidation as the controlling power on the Eurasian continent, it
wou~d compete for world power with the maritime coun~ries (at that time
Great Britain, United Statea~ West Europe~ Latin America, Australia and
Japan).
- With the passage of decades, the Soviet Union consolidated its control -
over the "heartland" and in the past two decades has developed a powerful
and technically advanced battlefleet and has by various meana obtained
bases for its units on the "Horn of Africa," Mozambique and Angola. In
thie way the "oil route" travelled by the eupertankers, which b ecause of
their size are unable to crass the Suez Canal, is subjected to a latent
threat.
Graham did not hesitate~ on the other hand. in sponsoring the creation of
an organization for the defense of the South Atlantic--similar t~ NATO--
which allows the resolution of the pressures Moscow exerts in the region.
- Moreover, he declared that if Reagan defeats Cart~r, the change would
be very important for "Latin America because once more the United States
is going to treat its old friends as nations and not as world welfare
cases."
This meana that after a period of subordinating paternalism there is
thought of the establishment of an alliance between the hegemon ic power of
the West and the nations which represent for it che possibility of creating `
a solid strategic structure for the defense of common interests.
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True Goal
Returning to the secretary of the navy, Argentine observers could not
but note his interests for lessening the expectations aroused by his
arrival in Buenos Aires. However~ a number of facts left no room for doubt
' as to the true goal of the trip. Let us lool: at some of the arguments
which truly strengthen the expectations in question: -
~
The presence of the U.S. official was due to a White House initiative.
- In hia party was Vice Adm Forley, deputy chief of operations of the U.S.
Navy. The inclusion of this off icer, who has the responsibility of plan-
ning thQ policy and operations of the navy command, as a member of the
secretary's party, would not have been suthorized for a private visit.
A meeting of the commanders in chief of the navies of the continent will
- be held in Ecuador i.n August~ a conference which will presumably examine
problems having to do with the d efense of the American maritime coastso
The 1JNITAS exercises are being intensified and prolonged during the next
6 months, a proof of the concern of Washington in consolidating the
common defense against a possible blockade of the strategic aea routes.
Hidalgo is visitin~ Argentina and Brazil--the natural guardians of the
South Atlantic--Mexico and Venezuela--petroleum exporting countries and
through whoae ~urisdictional waters tankers which supply the U.S. ec~nomy
have to cross--and Panama, the strategic ~alue of whose canal does not have
to be emphasized. -
_ Tt ie we11 to take a look at what ie taking place precisely in the area of
the Caribbean Sea. As of 1975 the expert s have detected a new phase in
Cuban activitiea. According to historian Hugh Thomas~ they are due to -
the fact that Kremli.n strategists have reached the concluaion that the
power vacuum exieting in the region because the European colonial with-
= drawal and th~ U.S. lack of will is as promising as the one created in
Africa in the last decade. We point out that this has the aggravating
factor that it ie an area located in the atrategic rearguard of the
United States. The bonea of Theodore F~oosevelt must be shaking with
indignation in his grave.
Let us make a brief examination of why Central America and the Caribbean
are of importance for the United States:
Mexico will become one of the main petroleum suppliers.
El Salvador is~ the center of U.S. b~usiness in Central America.
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_ Guatemala has just found petroleum deposits.
Nicaragua, with a phyloco~uaist government ia a center of e3ctremist
irradiation towards its neighbors. -
Jamaica ranks third in bauxite production in the world.
The island ministates of ~he Caribbean~ Grenada, Dominica, Saint Vincent
and Saint Lucia, are more or less subjected to the.influence of Cuba,
_ and the nearby sea routes through which passes the petroleum from the
- M3ddle East and Venezuela are controlled from their territories.
Guyana continuPs to play the role of the beachhead for Marxism in South
Aanerica.
This panorama~ in itsel:~ campleac, will be complicated~ as we have explained
in previous commentariea, with the possibility of the fall, aooner or
later, of the white government of Pretoria. The recent raids by the _
South African army into Angola against the Southwest African People's
Organization (SWAPO), are similar to the sorties by beaieged forces from
their castles during the Middle Ages.
_ South Africa
Many analysts believe that the happy days of the descendenta of the Boers
are coming to an end and r,hat inevitably South rlfrica will fall into the
hands of the movements ~�rhich demand its posaeasion by the blacks. It does -
not matter that the South Africans argue that when their forefathers came -
there no blacks lived in the region and that they came after years had
- passed, attracted by the economic progreas of the white economy. Whether
this ia true or not this argument does not change things. The political
dynamics of the continent indicate that unless logic is overcome the
Pretoria government cannot survive. _
In this case--whether the black government is neutral or pro-Moacow--the
strategic position of the USSR will be consolidated in the zone because
the South African Navy will have disappeared as *.he possible ally of the
West and as a factor of control of the oil route, or because as a aecond
alternstive, the USSR hae won new bases for its fleet.
In summary, this brief glance at the world strategic picture shows that
Argentina has ceased to be a marginal country and thaC, to the contrary,
its cooperation is of great value to the United Statea and to West Europe,
even tho~xgh the latter has not yet become fully aware of ita intereats.
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On the basis of this atatement, the stories coming from GIashington on ~
the possihility that the succeasor to Lt Gen Videla as tfie president
of the nation will pay a visit to the White Houae even before his '
inatallation in office, gain credence. Moreover, in an iesue of the daily -
CLARIN (2-7-80) , it is said that sources cloae to the U. S. Government '
declared that "the pertinEnt Argentine officials are conaidering a11
aspecte of the question." ~
- In the light of what we have analyzed up to here, it ie not an exaggeration
to think that this trip will take place aince everything appears to
indicate that there is a special interest in Waahington in renewing '
relations with Buenos Aires with a certain urgency~ And in this aspect ~
_ there is agreement in circles close to President James Carter and the -
advisers of his opponent ~tonald Reagan. This is because the great powers
- can give themselves the luxury of having their leadership classes '
fiercely fight for power on the domestic scene, however, in their world
strategy they know how to see, beyond momentary periods of confusion or
doubt, where their permanent interests are located, -
COPYRIGHT: LA OPINION, 1980
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ARGENTINA
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE NECESSARY TO MAKE NATION GREAT AGAIN
_ Buenos I,ires LA OPINION in Spanish 6 Jul 80 p 13 -
[Article by Eduardo J. Paredes: "Democratic Conviction Leads To Being
an Ally Without Being a Satellite"]
[Text] One should--and it can be done--exist as an independent nation,
defend sovereignty and handle foreign relatione as a fundamental in-
gredient of policy but not necesearily as a conditioning ingredient of
policy.
_ One can--and should--control the reins of the national economy and
behave with an independent criterion in trade relations with the rest
of the world.
One should not--and cannot--base the national strategy of a developing
country on a hysterical blindneas which prevents the measuring of
pressures and the interests of developed countries, the great powers.
One cannot--and should not--engage in economic xenophobia and at the
same time attempt a healthy development because the powerful countries -
control or exert influence in the control of the world economy. Although
some unknown emir may make millions of dollars from petroleum, he makes
them precisely because of the existence of those great industrialized
countries which consume energy.
Yugoslavia is the socialist country with the most independence with
respect to i:he Soviet Union in the acheme of things in Europe. However,
it was Brez':inev, not Carter, who shed tears--perhaps tears of happiness--
on the cofcin of Marshal Tito. Yugoslavia is the wayword son of Moacow's
policy, but a son nevertheless.
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_ Today Argentina is undergoing its domestic political episodes in keeping
~ with foreign political episodes. It is not necessary to expand on
information in this column since on this eame page Sergio Ceron had under-
taken~ with greater efficieacy, an analysis of tfie informatian related to
this undeniable theory. This aimply goes to stww thati tfiose who think
that Argentina shnuld necessarily act in keeping with U.S. policy 8nd
those who think that the goings and comings from Washington should
matter to uR not one whit are equally mistaken. Not mistaken, on the
oth~r hand, are those who believe that wizat is truly important--at the
same time truly difficult---is that AYgentine policy, in structure and
methods, not oppose that of the United States. Although it is not good
for the ~ountry to be a partner under disadvantageous conditions with
U.S. might, it is much worse to swell the ranks of its enemies without
a good reason which affecte national sovereignty in the moat overall and
broad meaning of the phrase. ' -
Based on a logical and simple balance showiag that there are no ideolog-
ical reasons or those of domeatic peace which force us to be an enemy of
Washington, the country is faced with a specif ic fact: It must prepare
a domestic policy which. is useful for its development without losing
~ight of the areas of geopolitical power which begin at the borders and
~and in the United States. One cannot be grossly naive. Conflicts auch
as those of the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia, the Central American
Marxist rebellions, the energ~ crisis, the international nu~lear agree-
ments do not directly affect Argentine policy but they do so through U.S.
policy. There were not many Argentines who knew where Afghanistan was
until it was decided not to attend the Moscow Olympic Games based on ths
condemnation of the Soviet invasion of that country. Let us be frank.
Not to sell grain to the USSR meant an economic hardship. Not to send
athletes was accepting one of the points the United Statea proposed to its
_ allies; the most acceptable. However, it was important after all,
although not neceasarily congruent.
Undeniably a member of the western bloc lead by the United States,
political custom leads us to see three relatively easy alternatives
- clearly: that of a satellite, the famous "third position," anci black-
mail. The first is as repugnant ae it is unnecessary. The United States
does not want satellites but allies because the former turn out to be much
more expensive for it than the latter. Such was the case of South
Vietnam, Nationalist China and now South Korea, while Japan, Great
Britain and West Germany are always a reinsurance favor~ng Wasfiington
which can do a very good business in yen, pounds or marks in exchange for
enough miasiles to make the Soviet Union look more toward Persian Gulf
petroleum than to the petroleum of the North Sea. The aecond alternative
is a lie, which because it is so big seemed to be the truth. There is
no "third position" except in physical education cla8ses. If a country is
democratic~ it is an ally of the United States witlwut having to be its
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satellite or its partner. It is not so mandatorily but because of
~ ideological conviction since the tTnited States is the most important
democratic country in the world. That ia a definition of the inter-
national policy which goes far beyond the multinationals, the banks~
loar~s and Coca-Cola. One must not mix nationalist folklore on imper-
- ialism ~ith the ideological reality, nor mix the busineas of some little
minister with the political and social reality of a country. A demo-
cratic country should be an ally of the United States even though it may
have a perfectly structured and independent domestic policy and economy. ,
The only genuine "nonalined" countries are the Marxist countries which
work from Havana or Belgrade--Peking has already become aware that Moacow
is behind all that--so that the entire so-called Third World will become
definitively socialist. Finally, the strategy of blackmail--playing on
the side of the United States in exchange for investments with the per-
manent threat of changing sides--is alao repugnant and also dangerous.
- It can turn a country into the prostitut~ of the international community
and alienate from its political leaderahip the men with a def ined
ideology. In that way it falls with great ease into generalized corrup-
tion and it facilitates the growth--together with Marxist subversion--
of domestic disintegration. Argentina experienced that process during
the Lopez Regla period with abaurdities such as the miasion to Libya,
the talk by Isabelita with Chou En-lai--who died without ever learning
who that lady was--and the famous Havana industxial exposition to enable
Gelbard to sell some tires. They were classical blackmail maneuvers
against the United States, which alienated us from Washington and served
as a free show to the communist world. but which had the result of an
increase in corruption and the atrengthening of aubversion. This
mentally deficient policy is practiced less and less except by some small
underdeveloped republics.
Today's geopolitical situation indicates that the three methods should be
shelved forever if one desires to act seriously. The only chance for
developing economically and at the same time being able to be a democrat-
ic country consists of developing politically independently but in the
direction in which the interests of the already developed countries
indicate. The famous "cultural dependency," which communism disguiaed as -
nationalism brandishes as a specter, is the Achilles heel which any
political process such as the one being undertaken by Argentina, can
suffer because of a lack of a defined strategy. To identify with the
U.S. cultural ways through television aeries is as etupid as it us
counterproductive. However, to march in step witfi its science, its
technological advances, ite educational experiences and its formidable
practical diplomacy, is also a sort of cultural dependence, which viewed _
with ob~ectivity is not so negative. A country caa have its Martin
Fierro, its Borges, its Paii~to Ortega and its Maradona, without for that
reason being forced to have its University's progress Izalted in 1918, or
its sewer network dated as 1~3Q, or its political parties dated at 1890
or its educational system at 1920.
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Now, after 4 years of frankly unfriendly relations, Argentina is
preparing for a new phase in its relations with the United Statea.
It would appear that the sub.~ect is exhausted in the solution of some
more or less timely questions while waiting to see wfiether Carter is
_ reelected or Reagan wins: human rigfits policy, Humphrey-Kexu~edy Amend-
ment, nuclear agreement, UNTTAS maneuvers, the foundations of a profound
diplomatic relationship~ and short term investments. And military men,
politicians and newspapermen, we all engage in a priori guesses, whether
it will be "hawks" or "doves," liFierals of the le~t and liberals of the
right~ whether Carter or Reagan will w~tn, wfietfier we sfwuld accept 25
Cuban refugees so that they can sell sausages at the Costanera, whether
we can have nuclear powerplants. but urith tlie promise of no trickery in
the form of an atomic bomb, whether the wheat agreemeat, the meat,
whether....
Obviously everything is of much importance at thie time, but supposing
that favorable solutions for Argentina are found; tha.t Edward Hidalgo
recommends to hie country the abolition of the military embargo; that
Raul Castro recommends that Argentina not be haraesed by the Carter
policy on human rigFits; that the Pentagon becomes convinced that our
nuclear policy is one with peaceful intentions; that the blockades of
international prices for the sale of our traditional producte be ter- ~
minated, and supposing, finally, that Reagan wins and in place of
Patricia Derian th,ere is some nephew of Gen Alexander Haig, will we have -
truly established our ideological place in the international community?
It is very possibZe that the United States is interested in resolving
these frictions within the mere framework of the present but will retain
a great lack of trust on the future intentions of Argentina. It is
poesible that the lack of a definite intern~tional policy by our
country since the 30's, b~ginning with the British decline and the rise
- of European fascism places us more in the pneition of a blackmailer than
that of an ally.
Perhaps, while solutiona advance for the problems of the times, we may
already be in need of offering some guarantee of our democratic convic-
tion, of the faithful practice of republicanism~ of the assumption of a
direct and spontaneous position toward serious international problems -
so that the United States will view us as a future a11y with great
independence as a nation insterad of as a suspect neutral although the
victim of economic satellite statuso
To expect too much understanding and patience from the United States is
a mistake because gre~i;. powers are first of all prepotent and that
- prepotence ie only reduced before the respect deserved by a lesser
country when that country sfiows its independence marked by an ideological
seriou~ness, by the genuine representativeneas of its foreign policy, _
by an advance of its technology~ a reaffirmation of its culture and
by the healthy defense ;,i its interests. ~aenty years ago, U.S. soldiers -
stationed in their country's bases in Okinawa, from behind protective
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fences, watched violent skirmiehes between the Japanese military police
and Marxiat atudents who proteated the existence of those bases, with
indifference. Today, any Japaneae political news warrante eeveral pagea
in TIME or NEWSWEEK. Japan, the defeated country in the Pacific~ did
- not win the reapect of the winner by manufacturing little watches but
rather by the complete resurgence of its people, the leadership class, .
by the assimilation of western culture without losing its own culture,
- by its strong democracy and by its realistic diplomacy.
Historically, we are faced with the moral need to become a grea~ country
again. But it is also that history, that everyday history, which forces
_ ua to be westerners in defense of an ideology and not because of a _
geographical accident.
'To be an ally of one who is in the right is neither the loss of
independence nor dignity. To be ita concealed enemy but to want its
dollars is as lacking in seriouaness as going to Libya...The "third
poaition" continues to be an absolutely ridiculous caper.
- COPYRIGHT: LA OPINION. 1980
8908
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ARGENTINA
NATION HARYESTING FRIIIT OF DIPLOMATIC OPENNESS
Buenos Aires LA OPIrTION in Spaaish 29 Jun 80 g 12
[Artiale by sergio Ceron: "9n Open Breaah in Puropean 3ocial Democracy
_ in Vienna; Argentine Diplomatic Opennesa Contreete With Pinochet~s Iso-
lation"]
[Text] With the minister of foreig~n relatione' visit to Qieuna., the Palacio
San Martin has ~ust taken one more atep in Argentine diplomacy's opening
- to the world to reaffirm the countrq's presence in the aoncert of natione.
The Auatrian capital, described aa the "psaae city" beoauae of that aoun-
try's strict neutrality, imposed aa a pledge for the withdraral of the
3oviet forces that oacupied it at the cloae of World War II, was an import-
aat reason behind t~he /lrgentine military gavernment'a attempt to seek a
= rapprochement Mith aertain aectora of F~irope ~rhere it had enaountered a
greater degree of ideological resistaace~ Austrian G'hancellor Bruno Sreisky
xas one of the epokeemnen in the criticiams w~lesehed in the E~iropean social
democratio maneme~t against the Buenoe Airee authorities, raiaing the
bann~r of bnimsa rights. But Breislq~ is aleo a statesman who lmows how to
- perfectly recoa~aile prinoiplee sritll the needs impoaed by having to lrnow
= how to behave xith a suitab2e measure of pragmatism, His adherenae to the
_ social democratic line aad hie atatus as a Jew do not, for exaa~ple, prevent
him from dieplaying a clear policy of rapprochement With the Palestine ~
_ Liberation Orgaaization, whoae adherence to the Western European ooncept -
of humaun righte would not be conaidexed - not even by the least 3mpartial
obeervora to be ar~y greater thaa that of the military grnreraments of
South America,
- If one likes, xreisky's attitude was reasouable inasmuch as his country's
national intereate were at stake,
7he importance Arg~eantina is beginning to acquire in terms of its signifi-
aant publia worke progrsm for the deoade (=115 billion), its food ezport
cspacity and ite imminent entry (1982 or 1983) iato the club of energy-
selling aouatriee (f~el oil and perhapa gas~, not to mention the possibi-
- lity of disaovering big oil depoeite in the lrg+entine Basin, is no doubt
turning it into an intere~tiag i;ra~de partner.
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~rom thie point of view, maz~y WestErn countries seem to be prepared ~o
forgive us for having wag+ed a war without quarter sgainst eubveraion. With
the same g~nerosity, of course, with which the ~rorld has forg+otten th~ re-
aponaibility eY-members of the Third. Reich etill have for the g+enocide of
_ 6 mil~ion human beings.
It is odd that, hardly three decad.es later, this Europe, xhich bled itself
in a merailess civil war which in the end was the fiaal struggle -
- imm~olated milliona of inen in concentration camps and xithout compunction
shot down patriots, ahould raise its accuaing fing+er aga3ilst those who have
defended its way of life agatnst the intrusion by meaas of terrorism of a
totalitarian philosophy.
But that is life aud we muat 'buiy the pa,at, r+ithout forg~etting it, of courae~
So, it seems that for Austria ~he time has come for the blossoming of its
friendship with Arg+entina aad we ahonld accept the fact with aa ertended
hand. It is highly probable t~at, onae economic relations have beea cor~
solidated, Mr Krsisky will reaah t~he conclusion that bilateral ties with
Buenos Aires are as I.egitimate as thoae ~uatria ma3nta3ns with Yasir.
Arafat.
Meanwhile, at the preeidential level, Argentine Minister of Foreign xelar
tia~s Carlos Washington Pastor has been the ob3eat of aa urrusual dietino-
tions the extension of his conversation with Rudolf Sirchschlaeg~er by aa
hour and a half, 7his was a prologue to the sudience C~hanaellor Kreislqr
was to grant him the nest d~?. 'ihe simple faat that this si~ificaat
meetirig r~ts held is a definitive sign th~?t a breach has been made in ~ro-
pean social democracy, in r+hich yre may perhApe have a~iend].y arbitrator
if not aa ally.
At a time of the opening of a nerr phase in our relations with the IInited
States, the recent si~aing of agreements xith Bsazil and President Videla~e
visit to the People'a xepublic of China, Pastor'a presence in Yie~a is
contributing to the delineation of a globa7. diplomatic atrategy which is
sketching the outlines of a new Argentine international perso~nality.
We may aacept or disagree with some of the steps t.bat have been takea in
this domain, but it would be hard for ar~yone to de~y the e~cistence of a
coherent and c~ynamic policy, for the first time in decades, ia the Palsu:io
San Martin.
7~ie world ia confronted with the possibility of a heightening of tensio~a
among the great poxers, which would not completely rule out the possibility
- of an arms confrontation. We caa oaly hope that ia such an event the con-
flict wil.l be limited to the use of conventional weapons. The Middle East
is, at the present time, the ~ovoat likely "casus belli" to arise at thia
point in hiatory. 'I'he IInited 3tates and F~irope's dependence on the snpply
of oil from that region i8 such t~hat a~y political destabilization aad
possible paralysis of the supply could be converted iato a pretezt for
military intervention with unforeseeable co~sequences~ Nor does the CId
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prediction t,hat by 1985 the Saviet Unian's ~ydxocarbon deposita will no
long~er be suffiaient to meet the needs of that porrer~s econoapr aad those
of the Eastern Etiiropean satellite na,tio~s ca~tribu.te to our peaae of mind. -
Consequeatly, as we at LA OPII~T20N ha~re repeatedly pointed out, everythiag
that has to do with controZ over the oil ro~utea that start from the St.ra3t
of Hormuz, ekirt the coaet of ~sst Afrioa aad penetrate tlie South Atl~ntic
haa assumed relevant strategic importaace,
The recent naval maneuvers taking place on our aontinent fall ti+ithin t~is
framework of the si-tuation. ~e 21 et Operation IIni.ty xill bring tog~ethex
- naval units from the IInited States, Argentina, E~azil, Colombia, B~uedor,
Peru, Yenezue'la and IIrugu~r, xhiah will maaeuver in South Americaa rratere "
for 6 months,
Frid~y, U.S. ahips under the cor~and of Qice Ad~miral Peter Cullina will
sail from the Puerto Ric~a port of Hooeevelt Roads aad it is f~rthermore
anticipated that larg+e number of naval aircraft, chiefly from the Antiauo-~
marine Combat Group, ~rill participate in ~he exercises.
Of course, the ob~ective of these maneuver~ is the strengthening of pro-
tectian for the sea routea in the aonthern hemiephere in view of t11e i~ ~
portauce thia region has been acquiring during the past few months. ;
i
i
Because of a political deaision by Jim~r Carter, hoxever, tkle Chilean Navy ~
cannot be represented. Rhe Democratia administration doea not appear to ~
be willing to forgive Gen Auguato Pinochet for ~he death of ex-Miniater of ~
Fbreign 8elationa Orlando Letelier or at l~ast for the faat that it has ;
not taken very clear steps to clarif~ the matter.
Aware of the international isolation of its ~+avernment, the Chilean presa '
has hastened to enthusiastically welcome Brazilian Minister of Foreign ,
A.ffaixs R~~ro Saraiva Guerreiro'a trip to Santiag~o, 7he fact is that
the si~ning of agreeme~nts betweea Arg+entin~a and Brazil, whose relevance
ia reco~ized not only in aontinental circlea but also by II.S. and E1u�opean
abservers, set transparent guidelines in terms of whiah any Chilean attempt '
to apply pressure against Arg+entina on its northeast flank - a potc~ntial
alliarice With Brazi.l wa.s as of then doomed to failure, '
And that is no doubt the way it is. But B~rasilia oannot throw overboard
- what was ita historio a11y in, at the end of the last aentury and duririg
the eaxly decades of the carrent one, confronting Argentina'a virtual lear- ~
rlerahip in South ~merica, Today, convinced of its potential, Brazil feels
that friendship and cooperation with Buenos Aires are much more interest-
ing t,han confrontati~n~ At least as long as the current world aituation -
lasts, in which the rise in coat and scarcity of energy aad the economic
recession are leading its model of development into a arisis~
With the diploma.tic subtlety that is typical of them, after travelling to
Chile, the Brazilians on Thuraday hastened to overcautiously delimit the
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basis for the~ r minister of forei~ affairs' conversations in Saatiag+o.
A~pokesman far Itamaraty called a press conference to e=plain to reporters
tbat the searetary of atate'a trip ~?as in no w~y a preparation for the one
Preeident ~Toao Baptista, Figueiredo is t;o make to Chile in the aecozid half
of the year, Firthermore, he intimated to diplomatia observEra that the
p~nrpose of these atatements is ~`,,o emphasize "the s+,rictly commeroia7. si~
nifioance of the Guerreiro mission aad to g+et rid of aqy interpretation
- to the effeat that this is B~aziliaa support for the aurrent domestic
policy of this Andeaa cauntry,"
Obviously, the perspiaacioua slips of t,he to~gue rm,de by Bsazilian Minietry
of Fbreign Affairs spokesmen are an attempt to subdue a~y attempt by Buenos
Aires to interpret (~erreiro's presence there tuith suspiaion, considering
the fact that the thor~y queetian of the Beagle is still pending and
that aeveral unidentified Chilean aources have spoken of the poesible
signing of a nuclear pact xith Brazil.
Simultaaeously, our country's aad 8razil's naviea will be launching Operar-
tion Fraterno II. The Arg+entine task force consiste of Drummond ar~d
Guerrico missile-equipped corvettes and the submarine "Saa Luis" in addi-
tion to naval a3r squ,a~drons, ~e Bsazilian foroe oonsista of the frigates
"Conetitucion" aad "Defensora" aad the snbmarine "'l,ocnelero." In both cases,
the most up-to-date combat unite, suited. to the sophieticated technology
today prevailing in the navies of t~he big powere, are involved..
7heae maueuvers xill be a repetition of thoee enggg+ed in in 19?8 in Hrazil-
ian territorial xaters aad will be deployed in Arg+entine watera, Zhey will
~ focus on the reciprocal action oY both fleets so that they will be capable
of exercising effective control aver sea traffio in their respective apheres
of influence in the event that ehould be neceseary, -
_ Some newspapers in our neighbor countzy ha,ve attempted to interpret thie
ini~iative in a way t~hat Argentine Ministry of Forei~ Helatione spokesmen
have hastened to aorrect. It is not a question of e3gning an Arg+entine-
Bsazilian defense pact, nor of replaaing as these news media claim
Americari etrategia dominance with a new kind, baoked by a bilateral alli-
aace, The hemiaphere's strategic and ecanomic iaterests are at stake~ Tt~e
best way to defend them is to prepare anreelves in the eveat it mqy be
necessary to enga~e in a~oint aation in the South Atlantic area along with
those covntries that have coa~on intereats~ Both the IInited States aad
Bxazil share t,his characteristic. Arg+entina vaxits to count on the frisad-
ahip of both without having to try to drag iteelf thsough the alippery
realm of blocs aud confrontatione.
30, ~ust as it has counted c~n overaoming a long period of confrontatione
and rivalries ~rith Brazil, Buenos Airea hopes to establiah a nex re~latior~
ship with the United States Which will culminate in friendship and allisrice~
COPYf',IC~ LA OPIIJION 1980
11,466
csos 30~0
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~
CUBA
GOVERNMIIVT DRAFTS 1981-?985 INDIISTRIAL DEVELOPI~NT PLAN
PA252307 Havana PRELA. in Spanish I314 GMT 25 Jcil 80
[Comm~utarq by Rafael Contrerae]
[Text] Havana, 25 Jul (PL)--During the next 5-year p eriod, 1981-85,
Cuba will invest heavily in the augar, energy, chemical, shipping,
_ textile and other industries, which will~give the principal impetus to -
the nation's development.
All of those investments are related to the upsurge in the sugar industry,
the nation's economic mainatay, which ia turn will contribute to expanding
the nation's other economic branches aad subsequently result in increased
exports and higher living standards for the people.
Preparations for making these investments a.re contained in draft guidelines
for economic and social policy for the island's Second 5-Year Plan, which
will be submitted for approual to the Second Congress of the Communist
Party of Cuba, to be held here toward the end.of this year.
Investments for the 5-year period exceed Z00-million pesos, which is
equal to 27 times the value of the installations existing in 1959, and
will employ more than 50,000 workers.
When the Cuban revolution.triumphed in that yeax, only 40 small machine
shops existed, with an estim~ted capital of 26 million pesos and employing
slightly under 4,000 workers. These were mainly dedicated to maintenance
= of the sugar industry. -
Fifteen new sugar mills will be built and nine others expanded during the
next 5-year period, and. the Cienfuegoa Nuclear Powerplant in central Cuba
and other installations~w3.11 be placed in operation during the third S-year
period, 1986-1990.
In addition, new thermoelectrical units wi11 go into operation in the
national electricity grid with a potential of 1,100 and 1,300 megawatts,
which will satisfy the demand estimated for 1981.
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During that period, the Cuban state will dedicate its efforts toward pro-
duction of new fishing and recreation boats for export, and for maintenance
of the present fleet.
As far as the chemical industry is concerned, new plants for the production
o� intermediate resins and calcium carbide will be built, and production
of industrial gases will be increased to meet total domestic demands.
In addition to these plans, production of knits and manufactured textiles
will be increased some 75 percent (over that of the last 5-year period,
1976-1980) and construction will begin on new industrial projects that
_ should be operational after 1986.
According to these economic plans, production of color television sets,
othEr durable consumer goods, technical equipment and computer equipment
for export will be initiated.
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NICARAGUA
'PRELA REPORTS ON CASTRO'S ACTIVITIES
PA190113 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2359 GMT 18 Jul 80
[Article by Javier Rodriguez]
[Text] Managua, 18 Jul (PL)--On the f irst day of his visit to Nicaragua,
Cuban President Fidel Castro made an interesting tour of areas around
Managua.
Accompanied by Commander of the Revolution Htmmberto Ortega Saavedra and
by the other members of the Cuban delegation, Fidel Castro made a short
visit to Santiago volcano, located near the city of Masaya.
The Cuban president observed the impressive crater of the volcano from �
two different lookout points, located at key spota in the Masaya National
Park, a beautiful tourist center which extends for several hectares around
the volcano.
Fidel asked many questions of CoBmmander Ortega and park employees regarding
the characteristics of the area, such as the climate, the sulphur content
of the air, damage caused by the volcano in its last eruption and other
matters.
After leaving the site, imgressed with its natural beauty and the size
of the volcano, t~e Cuban chief of state and his party went to the
~ historic city of Masaya, the bastion of the insurrection against the
Somozist tyranny.
In Masaya the forces of the Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSLN]
faught fiercely against the Somoza National Guard and its residents
suffered intensive and destructive brnnbing until the people's revolution
triumphed.
Fidel arrived unexpectedly at the ruins of the ~owa's former military
garrison, which was razed by the peoples militias and the people in the
days preceding the Sandinist triumph.
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In that city he heard from Co~ander Ortega and many residents ~f Masaya -
accounts of the fighting in the city and the manner in which the FSLN
set the military installation on fire with home-made "ccntact bombs."
The news of Fidel's presence in Masaya spr.ead like wildfire and in a
few moments hundreds of persons gathered in front of the ruined garrison
to cheer the Cuban leader, Commander Ortega and the revolutions of the
two countries. -
Fidel talked enthusiastically for some moments with several of the persons
who vied for the opportunity to embrace him, shake his hand or simply
get close enough to speak to him.
A young shoemaker from the Masaya handicraft industry narrated some periods
of the insurrectional struggle and answered Fidel's questions about the
kind and quality of shoes made at his work site.
One woman, stirred to emot.ion, embraced and kissed Fidel, shouting at
the top of her voice that she is ha~~py to have him in Nicaragua and visting
Masaya. Many other people also cou).d not contain their enthusiasm over ~
the unexpected meeting.
One touching moment occurred when Fidel talked with the son of Carlos =
Ulloa, the Nicaraguan internationalist fighter who died at the Bay of
Pigs defending the Cuban revolution fram the mercenary aggression of 1961.
Accompanied by Ulloa's son and surrounded by a erowd of persons striving -
to greet him, Fidel went to the center of Masaya Park, where a bust of
- Ulloa had just been unveiled. He asked about the other members of the
deceased fighter's family.
Shortly afterward, the Cuban delegation visited a modest residence in
the area where Nicaraguan revolutionary Commander Camilo Ortega Saavedra
llved and was assassinated. In talking with the present inhabitants of
the house, Fidel expressed interest in the handicrafts that they produce
- for sale during the area's traditional holidays.
When he stopped at a furniture factory where wicker and oakwood are used
as the main materials and where the owner gave Fidel a beautiful armchair, =
_ Fidel Castro spoke for a long time with some cowboys and employees of a
. dairy.
- After this talk, in which he asked about their working conditions and the
technical conditions at the dairy, Fidel had a fraternal meeting at Che
side of the highway with Hortensia Bussi, widow of Salvador Allende, who
was on her way to Masaya.
The Cuban president's first hours in Nicaragua were therefore characterized
by an immediate meeting with the people and at the same time by a confir- -
mation of the Nicaraguan men and wamen's solidarity with the Cuban revo-
lution. -
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NICARAGUA
NICARAGUAN TOWN MEETINGS, 'DIRECT DEMOCRACY' AT WORK
PA181319 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1402 GMT 17 Jul 80
[Article by Special Correspondent Jose Bodes Gomes]
[Text] Managua, 17 Jul (PL)--The Sandinist revolution has given further
proof of its popualr roots and political clarity by holding open town
meetings throughout the country.
The members of the state council were sent to the various departments
(provinces) to hold unrestricted direct dialogues with the people.
The very creation of the state council in May constituted a correct
= decision aimed at collaborating with the National Reconstruction Government
Junta in legislative tasks.
With simple words, guerrilla Commander Omar Cabezas explained at the town
meeting held in Leon how this process developed:
"We *~oted that the government junta could not carry the full weight of �
ruling and legislating. That is when we thought about a state council
to help it promulgate laws and create the democracy that Somizism never .
permitted."
The state council is compri~ed of 47 members who represent the worker and
peasant centrals, the Sandinist defense committees and other mass organi-
zations, as well as the political parties and the private sector.
Reviewing the activities the open town meetings held during the past =
- weekend, state council President Crnmnander Bayardo Arce praised the
popular sectors' participation in these assemblies.
The citizens discussed their various problems and in certain cases even
suggested solutions.
One o� the participants at the town meeting in Leon asked that Article
No. 134 of the Labor Code, which establishes a 14-hour work shift for
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maids, be abolished. A reform of that law is currently being drafted
in order to adapt it to the social changes that have taken place in
Nicaragua.
At the town meeting in Granada, a labor leader askEu what sanctions will
be imposed on those who use the media to attack the revolution. State
council member Commander Hugo Torres explained that all freedoms have
been conquered in this country, but that the freedom of expression cannot
_ be used to undermine the people'~ vict~ry.
~
Various participants commented on requests for the construction of homes
f or workers. Regarding this, the council representatives resg~nded that
these proj ects are not progressing as quickly as desired becau5e the
country has only very limited resources.
As Commander Bayardo Arce explained, the experience acquired at these
assemblies confirm that the people are fundamentally interested in f inding
solutions to the most pressing needs inherited from the Somozist dictator-
ship.
- There was no talk about elections or superstructural problems at these
town meetings, the state council president explained, and some of the
sectors demanding participation did not even show up at any of them. _
- This observation supports the slogan that appears on one of the murals
of the new 19 July plaza in Managua: "We workers and peasants will -
achieve our ends."
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PANAMA
NEWSPAPER SCORES U.S. MANEUVERS AGAINST CUBA
PA202255 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1943 GMT 20 Jul 80
[Text] Par.ama City, 20 Jul (PL)--The newspaper LINEA stated that with
its maneuvers against Cuba, the United States has moved from the offensive
to the defensive and is now reaping the bitter fruits of its aggressive
policy.
In an article entitled "The United States Tasted the Bitterness of Its
Maneuver," the Panamanian publication, in its last edition, analyzes the
~ problems of indiscipline and crime provoked by the Cuban antisocials in
the United States, Peru and other countries to which they have emigrated.
Noting that on the initiation of the Florida-Cuba air bridge U.S. President
James Carter spoke of receiving the antisocials with open arms, LINEA
points out that his smile turned into bitterness when the recently
, arrived elements triggered disorders in Key West and Fort Chaffee.
To LINEA, such demonstrations by the presumed refugees point to the
failure of the U.S. anti-Cuban maneuver and explain Carter's desperate
efforts to send them back to their country.
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PERU
BRIEFS
LABOR FRONT ORGANIZATION PLANNED--Lima, 13 Jul (PL)---The Peruvian Communist
- Party (PCP) has made a call to organize a labor front to include profes- -
sionals from all sectors who are sympathetic or are PCP members. In a
document signed by Dr Asuncion Caballero Mendez and released here today,
the PCP announces the holding of the first national meeting of communist
professionals. After expressing its solidarity with the wave of strikes
being held throughout the country, the PCP announces the creation of
coordination crnmmittees for the meeting which should have the participa-
tion of doctors, dentists, teachers and other professionals. [Text]
[PA140440 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2000 GMT 13 Jul 80]
NEWSPAPER CRITICIZES NEWS MIDIA--Li.ma, 13 Jul (PL)--The newspaper DIARIO
MARKA today branded the liquidation of Telecentro state enterprise and the
return of television stations to their former owners as illegal and as
returning the news media to the stone age. Telecentro has been producing ,
newscasts and programs for channels 4 and 5. Channel 3 belongs to the ~
state and will remain so. The partnership Delgado Parker, Arbulu and ;
Umbert liquidated Telecentro without consulting any state official and
went ahead to form enterprises which only the goverx~ment should be j
- engaging in, DIARIO MARKA indicated. Meanwhile, the debts of the Delgado ;
Parker partnership and the investigation of illegal activities which the !
Comptroller General's Office was conducting have been left pending. i
The paper says, in a front-page editorial, that in this manner the news ,
media will be alienated by the transmission of canned programs and the
massive propaganda sponsored by the transnationals. [Text] [PA1G0450
Havana PRELA in Spanish 2110 GMT 13 Jul 80)
_ ~
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SUR INAME
1
DUTCH PARTY SUPPORTS FULFILLMENT OF AID REQUEST
PA101545 Havana PRELA in English 1403 GMT 1 Jul 80 `
[Text] Paramaribo Jul 10 (PL)--The Dutch Pacifist Socialist Party
(PSP) declared support for the positions adopted by Suriname Prime
Minister Henck Chin-A-Sen regarding the conflict with The Hague on
economic assistance.
The PSP declared that it supports the Suriname request for Holland to -
keep its aid pledge of one million 800 thousand dollars and accused the
Netherlands Government of being insensitive to the people of its former
colony.
Concretely the Dutch party accuses Development Cooperation Minister Jan
de Koning of having supplied a one-sided version of the discussions with
Chin-A-Sen and me.mbers of his Cabinet in Paramaribo. "When De Koning
- turned down the request for an additional sum to ease the effects of
inflation, the Suriname Government proposed other alternatives," states
the declar ation.
These proposals, states the PSP, were turned down by the Netherlands
Government, while Minister de Koning failed to mention that part of the
discussion.
The tSP said it is prepared to launch a campaign of pressure in Holland
to warn the country of the "intensive attitude" of the government
regarding the people of Suriname.
Meanwhile, over the past weekend there were demonstrations in this
capital to protest the Dutch decision to suspend the negotiations on
~oint development programs. _
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