JPRS ID: 9253 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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t~c~k ~F-N~~c~,~~. ONLy
JPRS L/9253
14 August 1980
V~/est E u ro e R e o rt _
p p
CFOU 0 35/80)
FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9253 -
- 14 August 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 35/80 )
_ CONTENTS
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Aspects of Franco-German Relationa Keviewed
- ~CAPITAL, Jul 80) 1
Economic, Militsry Ties
Interview With Prime Minister Barre
Powerful Weapons, Aircraft Industy
F:ZANCE
President Announces Developmen.t of ~,ro New Weapons
(AIR & COSMOS, 5 Jul 80) 11
~ Decision To Develop Neutron Bomb Criticized
(LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 5 Jul 80) 13
Shift in Defense Policy, by Josette Alia
Leas Deterring Than Pluton, Pierre Messmer Interview
Heightened Risk of War, by Georges Sarre
Status of Strategic, Tactical Nuclear Porces in
1980 Described
(Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 12 Jul ~0) 22
Nuclear Weapons Choices for 1980-90 Exaa~ined
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 12 Jul 80) 26
Details, Modifications of M-20 Missile Described
(AIR & COSMOS, 12 Jul 80) 31
- a - (III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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Organization, Missions of Training Fighter wing
(LE MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUE, Jul 8C) 35
COUNTRY SECTION
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Oil Refineries Not Equipped To Produce Enough Gasoline
(CAPITAL, Ju 1 SQ) 38
FRANCE
Fictional Account o f War Sees France Losing
(Philippe de Baleine; PARIS MATCH, 4 Jul 80) 43
, PSF Seen Target of PCF's Attack on CFDT's Maire
(Ghislaine O tt:enheimer; L'EXPRESS, 21 Jun 80) 48 `
PCF's Press Crisis Examined
(Michel Chamard; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 14 Jul 80) 51
UPC President Simeoni Interviewed
(Edmond Sime oni Interview; PARIS MATCH, 4 Jul 80) 54
Ground Forces Get F irst SA-342M Helicopter
(Jean de Gal ard; AIR & COSMOS, 14 Jun 80) 56
'SYLA-20' Laser-Con trolled 20-MM Guns Tested Succeasfully
(Pierre Lang ereux; AIR & COSMOS, 5 Jul 80) 59
~Jutline of ONERA 19 80 Program Concluded
(AIR & COSMO S, 21 Jun 80) 60
- Briefs
Corsican ' Commando' in Marseille 63
Energy GDR E spionage Target 63 ~
New Missile 63
SWEDEN
Defense Minis~er Kr onmark: Weakening To Continue
(Eric Kronmark Interview; VECKANS AFFARER, 5 Jun 80) 64
~
Companies Push Oil Search in Gotland, Abroad
(Ake Landqu i st; VECKANS AFFARER, 29 May 80) 70
-b-
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THEATER NUCLEAR F'ORCES INT~,RNATIOIdAL AF'F'AIRS
ASPECTS OF FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS REVIEWED
Economic, riilitary Ties
Hanbur~; Cp.PITAL in German Jul 80 pp 125, 127, 129
(Textj riany call it a miracle, though as little notice as
~ possible is taken of it in Brussels and Strasbourg: France
and Gen2~y have moved close to ane another and represent -
an economi~c and military power car.nglex. In tkiis issue w~
� will e~:an.ine what links the two nations, haw econamic inter-
locking already campels political cooperation, what differ-
ences are yet persisting. C~?PITAL also talked with Prima
rlinister Raymond Barre about common successes and sims.
It appears that rrance's head of state Valery Giscard d'Estaing will need
the help of Gexrian cons~uners ar~d businessmen to prevai.l in next spring's _
elections. As increasE:d Gexman demand would fatten the order books of
rrench firms also and safeguard employment, the outloolc for the incianbent
~ would be good if the Germans were to raise their planned expenditure for
inves tment and cons~unption.
'I'his linlc b~tween the French presidential elections and the situation of
GexTaan business reflects the browing reciprocal. degendence of tihe two coun-
tries and is quite particularly a cansequence of the interlecking of the
two econ~nies. Dovetailing by way of trade, tourism, direct investrnents
and financial transactions in turn co~apels the Bonn and Paris goverr~auents _
to coordinate their measures for safeguarding monetary stabiiity amd econam~-
ic Growth. In otl-?er words: The quality ~f economic relations determines
the political relationship. The smoother and more extensive ttie econanic
relations, the more favorable the prospects for political integra~ion.
Char~e by way of trade--the goverrmients in Paris m1d Honn havp benefited
~ zor.~: this appreciation for the past 30 years. Initially involved were eco-
nc,mic integration and political recor,ciliation betw~en neighbors who had
been at odds for centuries. A beginning was wa~le in 1952, as the result of
the coal and steel union which, as a supranational aufhority, coordinates
the coal and steel production of both countries as well as that of Italy
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arid tl~c Lc~nela:: countries. An.~ther cornerstone was the 1957 establishu~ent
~f ttie Luropc:~z ~conau-~ic Caraulmity. Finally ;;onrad Adenauer and Charles
cic Gaulle sealecl the political reconciliation ~y the treaty of friendship
concluded in 1903.
Iniorr.ied obsPrvers say that, judgir~ by the cunent status of political co-
~ operation, econamic relations deserve to be marked "excellent." Recently,
far e::araple, the Landon TINf~.S wrote: "Forei~n policy is coordinated to an
extent rare bet~~een two sovereign states." And the ZEITSCHRI~'T DII2 DEUTSCH-
I~2~'~i`ZOf:SISCHEi! ~JT?'.iSCIiAFT expects that Franc~ and the Federal Republic wi.ll
end up in a"lcir_d of companionship by divine ordin~ce, which nay result in
united political decision making."
The infrastructure is :lready in place: It is visible in the close links
between the econaaies of the two neighboring cauntries, which Henri Chazel,
for the past 6 years coua~ercial attache at the French ~nbassy in Bonn and
one of the most acute observers of Germany, likes to cortapare to a"family."
This econor~ic alliance boasts an impressive economic potential. In any ,
case unchallenged in Western Europe, the No 1 and 2 econamic powers (the
Federal Republic accounts for 25 percent, Fraz~ce for 20 percent of the
total production of nonca~mulist European cauntries)--when pooling their
resources--cane very close to ~he superpawers. The Fr2nch business naga-
z~ne Lc, NOWEL ECONOMISTE reports that, with the exception of oil, France ~
and the Federal Republic are in fact the most prominent raw material impor-
ters frvm the Third World and head the list of suppliers to the Third World
with respect to technology, finished products and financial aid.
S~Fher., on the other hand, we assess the twn separately, the internPl rela-
tions are most obvious. France and the Federal Republic are each other's
most ir.tportant mar~:ets. German e.:porters obtain their every 8th D-narlc
frc~ Fr~ce. llze French are even more dependent an the Germans as their
customers, earnir~ every t~th export franc from them, Expressed as percent-
ages, this reads as follows: The German share in French exports ~nounts to
17,2 oercent, the French share in German exports to on~.y 12.7 ~ercent.
This status on the two narkets was taaintained in recent years although
French e-r.porters, benefiting from the relatively better econom~ic situation
in tr~e Federal Republic, gained more ir,~petus. Sti11, it was not enough for
the I~'rench to er.~er~e from the red in their trade with the Federal R~public
--their 1979 deficit still aanounted to nearly DM7 billion.
This year's deficit is liltiely to be greater yet because, according to the
data of the Federal Office for Statistics, Gerr~an e~orts are doing better.
I3or does this trend yield to the grawing preference of German constuners
for French cheese, wine, poultry and vegetables. In 1979 Gercnaiz i.mports of
farr~ and food products from the neighboring country were twice as great as
the equivalent German e:~orts to France. This g~ is likely to widen. As
incomes rise the ~Yench expect to enjoy high grawth rates on the Geruian
mar::et for gou.."met foods (at least that is the opinion of Franqois Ponanereau,
director of the Gerro.an branch of the French fazm promotion campany Sopexa).
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Punnnereau' s ca11ea7rrue I:at ja I3remer judges that "the Geanans are developing
Fren,ch tastes," For exar~cple wi.tlz respect to wine and cheese.
- Other French products, though, often la.ck the features likely to make them .
desirable for the gourmet. That is d~ae ~o German regul.ations on foodstuff
sales. In the case of pates, fox exaanple, their observance tends to result
in so~ae loss of flavor. The paulet de Bresse, a chicken raised as per ,
standards fixed by the I`rench state, i~ not iden*_ifiable for the Gennan
customer because, lil:c- all poultry, it may be sold anly mir~us head and feet
(t~ich show the breed) .
Gerruan standarcis are e~~en more onerous for many exnorters of i.ndustrial
products. This gives rise to a good d.eal of ~oyance, culminati.ng in the
accusation of hidden pratectionism exere~sed by way of a network of stand-
ards which, as a rule, are set higher thaaz in France. Uld Gaullist r~ichel
J~i~re toolc up the cause of the F`rench and asked the Foreign Tlinistry "why
the r~ussels Ca�mission has never done anything against the protection of
ti~e Germ~,:~ marlcet by the generalization of standards."
Camaercial AttacYie Chaz~~l, for n:~s part, does not consider conflicts such
as the difference on standards to represent much of a problen. "In tlze bi-
iateral e::c'nark;e tizere are no problens, ~erely saae occasional friction--
so~tning qu.ite nonual between siblings." And frvm the Germaxi standpoint
IIeinz Tenibrini:, head o~ the foreign departzaent in the rederal Association
of Ce~cnan Industry, says: "t�That differences there are, are quite petty."
The industriaL association thus assesses the regular "Buy French" appeals
~i the Paris Gavernu~nt and fihe enployers federation CNFP. Ge~an iruiul-
ge;ice for French distress co~aes quite easily because the appeals elicit
little response from Frencn cons~ers. Qn the contrary: "Sucli appeals ac-
tually have the opposite effect," observed Giselher SchZebusch (Gennar~
French Chamber of Industry and Co~m~rce) . Whenever canpai~ of that kind
are motu~.ted, foreign products reco.rd high rates of growth.
List of IIits
~dith one e::ceptiozi the sales lists of Frznch e:cporters to Ge~many and Ger-
raan e:~porters to I~`rance record the greatest successes for the s~ne group of
products--a si~ of the far rear_.hinb extent of reciprocal market penetra-
tion.
Genaa.z :~mort llits in France rrench T~ort liits in the rI2G
- Products 1979 Percent- Products 1979 Percentage
a,~e of Ex~orts of Exports
i~fa.cnincs 17. ? Chenicats 15.6
Chenicals 16.2 Agricult-ure/Food 14.4
- Vehicles 13.3 Vehicles 13.5
I ron/steel 8. 7 2�iachines 10.1
~.'~ectrical boods G.8 Iron/steel 8.7
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- Intervie~~~ L;ith 1'ri.~e :~Iinister Barre
li~burg ~APITkL in Geresan 3u1 80 pp 130, 132
. 'Llnterview with Prime Minister Barre]
[Text] T'ne Afghanistan crisis showied that Gex~nany and
_ F`rance are adopting similar approaches to foreign affairs.
The fonuer declaratians of friendship are acquirir~g more
, and more political substance. Business was the precursor
of these ;ooci relations.
[CAPITAL] Prizne ::ini.ster, the economic constellation in Europe has -
ch~ged. The ^ederal Republic is about to lose its unique status in for- _
eign trade and the monetary sector. Borm is increasingly confrontir~ prolr
Lens similar t~ those of Paris. Does this represent an opportunity for i.m-
prwing cooperation in econamic and taonetazy policies?
[Barre] Gexmany is just entering a new stage in its econamic d.evelopment.
For the first time it is suffering a substantial deficit in the balance of
~ayments, a weaker status of the D-mark and greater inflationary stresses.
That is the consequence of interna.tional i.nfluences which no industrial
country can escape. Let us recall the fix.~cial bloodletting with respect
to oil; worldwide inflation aald mrnzetary fluctuations related to the dollar.
The difficulties confranting France and Germany are comparable. So that
they iaay not becoa?e insurmauntable, our two countries must approxima.te to
each other in terms of econamics. The Federal Republic and France already
enjoy close coordination i.n this respect. This must continue and graw
stranger. To put it more precisely: It appears to me that the severe fluc-
tuations which have adversely affected international monetary relations in
_ the course of the past 6 months necessarily catl on the Europeans to streng-
then their manetary systcm. It has been operati.r~g smoothly since 1979, and
the countries irYVOlved may therefore provide a pillar of monetary stabili
ty for Europe and the world.
[CAPITAL] Are you at one with Borm on this point? ~
~ [Barre~ In the course of recent years the Federal Republic of Germany's
currency has been in grawir~ dem~uul as a reserve currency. biost recently
_ it suffered a substantial setback due to market canditions. It seems to me,
therefore, that the Federal Republic must be i.ncreasingly interested in the
European monetary system actually meeti.ng its responsibilities for the betle-
fit of rn~ore stable exchange rates between ~.'uropean currencies and those of
. the world at large. The consolida.tion of the European mcmetary system ob-
viously requires the participating countries to maintain internal. stability.
You know that, despite difficulties due to the employment situation and ceri
tai.n others follo~wing upon stru~ctural influenc:es, the French Govern~ent is
carrying an an econamic policy featuring control of the money supply, limi-
tation of budget deficits, wage restraint and the stability Qf the franc.
Thanks to this policy ~rance was able to avoid gallopir~ inflation, abolish
cu~.,.l~uls bothersome to employers and thus put itself in the proper position
better to meet the second oil price shoek of 1979.
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~CAPITALj LJhat are the i~ediate prob~.~s facing the two countries7 -
[Barre] In the coming months our two cauntries must assign priority to a
policy of mutual adaptation and econ~mi.c growth. Last June, at the ecoriaar-
ic s~nit in Tolcyo, we both obligated ourselves to restrict energy cansiau~-
tion. A resolute and steady advaa~ce in this direction is n~ecessary to ease
- t?~e strain on th,e world market azbd restare praper balances of pa,yment. We
and you have made this issue a basic element of our economic policy. The
present challer~ge consists in the necessity far us to prev~ent recession i.n
our countries ~d Europe as a whole fram becaming a pe~manent phenomenon,
to maintain our grawth despite the energy problem, ~d avoid ~y return to
protectionism. The latter w~auld be disadvantageous to our cotuitries and
the world in general.
[CAPITAL] There was unity on the Afghaa~istan issue also, when both caun-
tries refused to blindly follow the United States. Will this possibly pro-
vide a constnzctive basis for improved European cooperation at sane time in
the future?
[Barre] Fra~ce and the Federal Republic are agreed with the United States
and t;~e allies in their judgment of tkie events in Afghanist~. They have
explicitly condemned the Savi.et in~cursion from the aspect of the independ-
ence of the peoples. And on that issu~e they keep in constmnt touch. The
joint Geir,~arrFrench declaration of 5 February 1980 reiterates that France
and Germany, together with their allies, will--i.f necessary--take the me~-
sures necessary to guarantee their security and mai.ntain the internafiional
balance of power.
ivevertheless, neither France nor the Federa]. Rep~ublic intend to yield their
freedam in the appraisal of the situation and their c~pacity for independ-
ent action. France and Gezm~ny are ano~g the cauitries which suffered most
in the course of the last t~ro w~orld wars. F`rance has been at pains for ma~y
yeass to lessen tensions betuneen the blocs and contributed to a climate of
detente wliich benefited all coimtries on our Continent. The greatest advan-
tage accrued to the Federal Republic. It is therefore hardly surprising
fnr tlle Federal Republic and France to be especially an.~ious to maintain
~ peace, for them to i.nsist that the European powers have their awn responsi-
bilities and to endeavor to maintain the dialog with the Soviet Union. That
does not amaunt to concessions nor e~:clud.es vigilance. It is clear that
close ~:ooperation bet~neen France and Gexmarry is an indispensable element of
European aacmnulity, in particulaor in consideration of the consequences of
- the Afghanistan affair, and this is underlin~ed by th~e declaration issued
after the meeting of European heads of state and gwern~ent, held on
23 April last in Lux~mUaurg. Certainly the ex~eriences I gai.n,ed cl~r3.ng ~yr
worlc ~'or tY!e ~C have persua~ed r~e that the entente and cooperation between
I~rance and the Federal Republic of Ger~any rev~esent a pillar of strength
for thar Europe which meets its obligations to tne alliance as wiell as is
able to decide its awn fate.
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[ CAPI~PAL] Let us return to the Euro~~. ean monetazy system. Is the monetary
~mion sti11 possible at the date f irst envisioned?
[I3arrej The European monetary system has been operating most satisfactori-
ly for over a year. The heads of government of the participatir~ couir
tries h~~e repeatedly emnhasized their interest in the deveicmment of the
role of the Ecu and the establi~ent of a European monetary fund. For
- several manths past, for instance, ~ational experts and the Coamission have
worked on these matters very intensively in order soon to arrive at sppro-
priate settlen~en~s in this area. Ho~wever, the issue is quite delicate, and
I do not believe that it should be forced into the straitjacket of a fixed
date. The relevant point is the operatioTr-and satisfactory operation at
tizat--of the ~uropean monetary system. We must learn fran this experience
� arui may only approach the secand stage when we are sure that the proposed
solutians are indeed the best. By this I mean proposals whict~~ transfox~
this second stage into a new step forward for the CoaIInmity and represent
an.othe.r advance in the direction of a better organized internatianal mone-
tary system. In rw case could this happen before certain political key
dates, 1980 in the Federal Republic and 1981 in France.
[CAPITAL~ ~~,ty between Germany and France is maving ahead at a much
faster r~te, especially with respect to i.rcvestments in the respective nei.gh-
boring country. Are you pleased with t-his development?
_ [Barre] I~ content simply to rwte that Geiv~?y's gross invesUnents in
France amrnmted to Fr1.6 billion in 1979, while French irrvesi~nents in Ger-
many in the same period of ti.me totaled Fr540 million. The Federal Repub-
lic occupies secand place ~nac~g foreign investors in ~Yance and third place
among the crnmtries where firench capital is invested. Total direct foreign `
irrvestZnents in F`rance stood at Fr15.2 billian in 1978; 13.6 percent were
of Germa~ pravenance, secand anly to the United States. The percentage is
rising noticeably even naw. Qn the other hand France placed 6.7 percerrt -
of its direct foreign investments in Germany in the s~ne year. Here
Gexmany raz~lcs thixd after the United States aa~d the United Kirigdom. These
figures relate only to the capital flaw betw~een France ~d abroad and d~
not allaw any conclusions as to the totality of i.nvestments. Self-finar~
= cin.g and local loans are not taken into account. The Gern~ investsnent vol-
tnne in France or vice versa is decidedly pleasing, yet there is stil~ room
for more progress. It is possible, for ex~uple, that some German industri-
alists intending to set up a brar~ch in France may be deterred by the form~
lities to be campleted. As the franc has held its awn within the European
monetary system, will be able soan to plan appreciable relief: The gav-
_ errmient thus ~radually but resolutely pursues its policy of abolishing e~:
- ag~erated controls which have long weighed dawn the economic life of
France.
J [CAPITAL ~ j~ill joi.nt arms proc~uction have i.ncre~sing i.mportance for
Germart-French ecano[nic cooperation?
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[3~re j For iaany years :.~Yance h~ ~ursued joint progrmms for a~ms produo-
tion ~aith other European c~untries. This cooperation was usually bilate-
ral and of special interest to youz country. It seems to us to meet a
- dual r~eed; Or: the one hand the deve'_opment of canventional wea}~zs re-
qu::.res aQi increasir.gl~ challer~;ing technolo~,ry eand. involves steadily rising
costs. If the military needs of tl~e partners are icLentical to the point
�anerc joint cievelop~ent na5 be a~ropriate, the greater burclens may be
shared by ciividin~ the cost of research and devielopment, and wie will also
- oenefit fran lawer costs for larger nms. On the other hand, by facilita-
Lir~ the prodL.ction of ~ec'ru~ically superior an~d price campetitive wespons,
coo~~.eration helps the ~uropean countries avoid undue dependence on aut-
siders for the equipment of their aru~ed forces. Co~cisequently it repre-
sents on.c elem~ent in the maintenance of reasonable European defense prepa-
rec~ness. In consideration of this aspect the French and German Defense
t�.inisters sigr~ed a protocol ozi 5 February last, recording tlze wish to de-
velop and produce a joint battle tank for the 1990's. Thi.s initiative
clearly shows that we place a very high ~alue on the r~sults achieved
earl.ier and want to pursue the sa~ae approach--another syail~ol for reconci-
liation and the coop~ration of our tw~ countries.
Po~~rful Wea~ns, Aircraft Industry
IIa~~burg C.4PiT.AL in German Jul 80 pp 140-141
(Tex~t j National pride, the yearnir~; far independence
and business flair have helped France to achieve pre-
eminence ir. the Europeaal atms, industry.
The ~,nglish sneered, t~ut in the end they got tired of contradicting the
General. In discussions with his British opposite ntanber President Charles
de Gaulle had stubbornly insisted an the silent "e," and that is haw the
world's fastest civil aircraft got a French name: Concorde.
The obstinacy shown by the supreme FrencYunan more thazi 20 years ago in the
case of a minor issue could serve as a prime exmmple of the Grande Nation's
serious early ca~nit~nent to tlze pronotion of pramising techrwlogies. The
recipe worlced: France is internationally aclmowledged one of the leaders
- in aviation and space flight. This esteem bears fruit every year by w~y of
azms export ordexs. In the West the French are undeniable second behi.nd
the United States. Particularly successful are the Mirage ~et fighters
designed by riarcel Dassault.
_ The I~`rench owe their status as suppliers of ultra modern jet fighters, co�n-
rlex ~eapans systens and more peaceful proc~cts such as spacecraft ~d ex.e-
cui:i.~e j.:t:: nat anly to the�:.r ve.*_y definite yearning for na.tianal prestige.
They are qui.te prepared to caepranise whenever necessary. European and
U,S. partners, for e~ample, supply capital and technical knaw how. Yet the
r rencn do not brook any interferen~ce when it i~ a matter of selling the
jointly developed and assembled aircraft, rockets and weaponry.
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P,e~i~tered in I'ran,ce for that v~ry purpose are three firns: Airbus Industrie,
::uroaissile and Arianespace--a11 selling the results of ~ropean cooPeration.
The ~ai~enent is largely recruited fror~ the reservoir of young FYench e}:.e-
cutives who have shown their rilettle in the service of the state.
The yourigest of the nana,gerial hopefbxls is Frederic D'~,llest, pr~ssident of
Arianespace, the yaungest of the three firms. D'Allest, just 40;, has the
job of offerir~ co~etition to the American space shuttle. He holds rnzt
the prospect of satellite transport to the universe. The conveyer is tne
~siane (French ve~sion of Ariadne) rocket, evolved in European cooperation.
It is nore thar? m4desty which has prompted the partners in the Ariane pro- -
ject to accept French Ieadership. In fact the Munich P~IDB managers are honor-
in~ the ca~nit~nent of the FYench to an"independent European carrier roclcet
develonaent" and, without reservations, accept the clai.m of the Grande
;~ation to organize Arianespace in the French marmer.
Th~ stron~; French position is also justified by the fact that the French
have ccmtributed more than 60 percent of the develapm~nt costs anounting to
some Dt~1a billion. The Federal Republic paid 20 percent, the other 8 Eura-
pea~ represented in the European Space Agency (ESA) divided the remainder.
The ~Yench displayed a similar co~itznent in order to malce Airbus Industrie
(AY) nore than a mere sales organization for short and mediimm range jumbo
aircraft. Wk~n, after a slaw start, the European aircraft emerged in 1977
as a viable entry in the race, the French feared for the cantinued exist-
ence of the fizm. ~uropean partner companies pl~uzed n~ew cooperations far
other projects with new goals. As a result Airbus Inc~ustrie was to restrict
its o~eratians to the medi~r~ge j~bo. In other words, the partners
thought that the campany should cease operations once the project was corr
cluded.
The French settled this mena.ce to Airbus Industrie by French diplamatic
methods. They threatened to came up with a caapetitor aircraft unless the
Europezn., kept the faith with Airbus Industrie (AI). The instnanent
servi.ng them here was a relic fram the time when the French still thought
they cauld go it alone in the civil aviation business. "Chey began negotia-
tions with the American aircraft manufacturer rlcDonn,ell Douglas regardir~
_ the further develop~ient of the 'T4ercure" aircraft earlier designed in France.
Admittedly, experts did not ~hinlc that "Mercure" had much of a chance; it
had turned out to be a co~ercial flop even in its original version. Only
10 of the jets developed by aircraft clesigner Marcel Dassault as the reply
to Boing's successful 727 model were forced upon the state awned Air Inter.
= The negotiations with the Americans, every detail lovir~ly reported i.n the
French media, did not get another '7Ylercure" i.n the air, but they certainly
= had the desired result: The Eurapeans gave up their e~.-periments ~d promised
in future to go al.ong wi th AI .
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T3y their persistence the French even mai~ed to get the Et~glish in 1978
to consent to participate in the Aixbus operation. This titne, thou,gh, no
lon~er a:~ an equal partner with its awn asseanbly (as had Ueen the case in
the constru,etion of the super ra~id Concorde), but only as a 20 percent
= minority partner and co~ponent supplier for the Airbus final assc~nbly plant
r in soutnern French Toulo~use.
The Frer.ch thus achieved their aim. In future Airbus Industrie will be the
= only ~urope~ aircraft manufacturer for w~rld marlcet projects. In the
meantine a cui clawn version of the Airbus, A 300, and the A310 project hacve
:~een joined by plans for ~urther ewlutions of the successful ~et. A:rbus
Industrie is also intended soon to campete with Boing in the marlcst for ~
smallex aircraft.
' This preeminence is not due to ~y accic1ent. Felix Kracht, one of the i`'ew
Airbus managers of German origin, recalls: "The French had a cancept right
fram the start." Shortly after the end of Woxld Wa~ II e~merged the first
pl~ns for the rational.ization of the aircraft indusrsy, earli.er fragmented
into many small fizms. And this altbrnigh the politicians were aware that
only about half the 400,000 employees in the industry would then be needed.
tiearly 30 years ela~sed before the progr~ was finally implemented.
At the present time the lines are clearly drawn: Survived as aircraft corr~
stri~ctors have the private corporation Avions Dlarcel Dassara].t Breguet Avia- -
~ion and the state otimed Aerospatiale. Dassault is tarninb o'ut jet fight-
ers for the French air force ~d, especially, e~orts; also several types
or es.ecutive jets. Aerospatiale haaidles all other sectors: Ji.m~bojet corr-
- struction, helicopters, roclcets.
The two giants cau1~1 not continue without a multitude of specialized campo-
nent suppliers. Of the greatest i~portance here is the Ma.tra group, lmawn
- in Gercia~ny especially for its sporty tY~ree-seater Talbot-Aiatra-Bagheera and
the leisure vehicle Talbot-riatr~R~cho. The car busin.ess, though, is rw
more than a side interest fur ~he group. Matra has won renawn in particular
as the designer of remote controlled weapons.
Some technologically less spectacular companent suppliers also developed in .
I'rance under the Lmmbrella of industrial policy striving far self-suffi-
ciency. The Crouzet graup, for exa�nple, which supplies progra~ned controls
for riiele washin~ ~~a.chines also marrufactures special devices such as alti-
neters and navigational. systems for n~early a11 French arld Eurapean projects
in aviation and space flight. The state as customer has en~cauraged ~ie can-
ponent suppliers to caatpete on the world market also and offer their pro-
ducts worldwide.
The French aa~ their successful industrial policy i.n aviatian and space
flight to one of their specific national characteristics: When it is a ma.t-
ter of presentin~ their nation, Frar~ce does n~ot knaw party politics. The
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left, in particula~, is not afraid to demonstrate for hotly contested and
e:tpensive projects. It contimied to press for the c.onstruction of the
Concorde even after it had beco~me obvious t~hat not all 16 aircraft of the
first generation ~,nould find buyers.
CUFYRI(~iT: 1980 Gruner & Jahr AG & Co.
11698
CSO: 3103
~
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THEATER ~tUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE -
PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES DEVELOPMENT OF TWO NEW WEAPONS .
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Jul 80 p 27
[Article: "Mobile Strategic Missile Launcher and Enhanced-Radiation Weapon
Capture Headlines in France"J
[Text] At his press conference in the Elysee Palace last week, the hhief
of state furnished new particulars on French def ense policy orientations,
and particularly on two options open to France for enhancing the capabili-
ties of its deterrent force in the next 20 years. The first is a mobile
launcher for strategic missiles, dQSignated the SX, and expected to
supplement the strategic naval force's capabilitieG after 1992. i'he second
is the process of developing an enhanced-radiation weapon, a process that
is now wel.l underway.
Such were the two important new announcements made by the President of the
Republic who also made a point of reiterating "that any nuclear attack
upon the soil of France would automatically provoke a nuclear response."
Those passages of President Giscard d'Estaing's press conference dealing
with defense issues are quoted in extenso below.
"Nuclear deterrence is a beam. af threats, a, beam of r�iske, directed~ at
the adversary, and at least one of which is deadly.
"Where the use of nuclear weaponry is concerned, there are all sorts of
possible situations and hypotheses. We are not here to list them. Buz
there is one central point in our defense posture. It ie the point that
any nuclear attack upon the soil of F~ance would automatically provoke a
strategic nuclear response. -
"At the present time, we have strategic nuclear armament based on three
components. This structure will remain valid until 1990-1392, with the
intrai~~*_ic7 of multiple-warhead ballistic miasiles on our submarines
beginning in 1984-1985. As of 1992, we face the problem of replacing
certain components of our strategic nuclear weaponry. That is why a ~
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decision was made, during the most recent meeting of the Defense Council,
to undertake preparation of a mobile strategic launcher. Technical decisions
on this launcher's characteristics could be made before the end of the
year.
"With reference to the enhanced-radiation weapon, at a December 1976 meeting
of the Defense Council, I made the decision to conduct a feasibility study
of the enhanced-radiation weapon. These studies resulted in preparation of
the weapon~
"The first tests have been conducted. The production decision could be made
by 1982-1983, in this weapon's present configuration. Or 2 years later
if a different configuration is desired. The decision to be made then will
have to take account of the foreseeable status of nuclear weapons in Europe
at that time .
- "With regard to the question asked me about employment of the weapon, I
would remind you that there are 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons in the West
at the present time. The particular question of the employment of French
tactical nuclear weapons is, therefore, not the only question in this con-
nection facing the Federal Republic of Germany, far from it.
~ "When considering employment of that weapon, we shall take into account the
following basic fact: France is directly concerned with the security of
neighboring European states."
The chief of state replied as follows to a reporter who asked him to clarify
this last sentence: "As a matter of fact, that statement's value lies in
its remaining just as it is.... In statements on defense, and in particular
precisely on the employment of certain means of defense, there is some
information that has to be given in a form that allows the potential inter-
locutor to personally ask himself a certain nutnber of questions."
It will be noted that the president of the Republic made no mention of a
tactical nuclear weapon as successor to the Pluton, or of a"piluted"
component likely to succeed the Mirage 4 bomber for strategic missions.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1980
' 8041
CSO: 3100
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
DECISION TO DEVELOP NEUTRON BOMB CRITICIZED
Shift i,n Defense Policy
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 5 Jul 80 pp ~4-27
- (Article by Josette Alia: "A-Bomb, H-Bomb, N-Bo~b, How Valid Is the
French Shield?"]
[Text] Some call it the "bath of death." It has nothing to do with the
Ferris wheel, the "infernal river," or any other carnival or amusement park
attraction. Thzs bath of death is very real. It is nuclear,. conceivable,
programmable, and even program~med. It will be a reality by 1985 at the
laCest, or with a bit of luck, by 1982. What is it alI about? It will be _
quite simple. A neutron bomb--also called an enhanced-radiation bomb, a
nuclear antitank bomb, or the "respectable N-bomb" by its more ardent
supporters--will burst above your heads at a height of 1,000 meters.
At a height of exactly 1,000 meters. Any higha~r than that and it would have
no effect. It would be reduced to merely a brief flash in the�:sky. A
lower height of burst would cause too much damage and could blow one or two
houses to bits. But at 1,000 meters, the effect is perfect. The released
neutrons radiate earthward where three possible things can happen to you.
If you are directly under the burst, you receive, within a 300-meter
radius, a radiation dose of 8,000 rads. You become tot~lly paralyzed in
less than 5 minutes and die within 2 days. If you are within a 560-meter
radius of ground zero, the weapon will "delivet" on you--to use the military
jargon--a dose of 3,000 rads. You will remain paralyze~ for only 30 minutes,
but you will die in 4 or 5 days fc;;, sure. If you are insfide a 1,20f1-meter
radius, you will receive a dose of 650 rads. Physical disorders will occur
in the first two hours followed by death in 6 weeks if you have had medical
care and treatment.
To be e~:plic:it, in the fi~st ~wo cases you wi11 feel lethargic and dizzy
and have convulsions and fainting spells before dying. In the third case,
your slow, lingering death wil.l be accompanied more bg intestinal disorders.
Nevertheless, you will have one_ consolation: in all three cases, your
living room, your bedroom, or ~he geraniums on your balcony will not be
Ca 3R12~Et~.
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- To be even more explicit, if you are a civilian, and if you are allowed
- enough time, you will be able to take adequate shelter. The best protec-
tive materials are, in descending order of effectiveness: water, earth,
' and concrete. If, on the other hand, you are a soldier and are advancing
on foot, in a truck, or even in a tank, you are an ideal target and will
be literally vitrified. Neutrons do, in fact, have the strange property
- of piercing the finest armor more readily than a sack of dirt. The "nuclei"
of heavy materials are few in nim?ber and far apart, thus allowing neutrons
to pass through quite easily. In contrast, neutrons are slowed down and
then quickly stopped by the "nuclei" of light materials such as water or
earth.
Hence neutrons kill people without destroying equipment and the entire
environment. This is an unprecedented advantage whose true value is evident
to military experts, and one whose full import all Frenchmen must accurately
assess from now on. For the president plainly told us Thursday that France
now has the capability of producing N-bombs. Studies were begun in secret
at the Atomic Energy Co~nission in Decemer 1976. Secret underground tests
were conducted at Mururoa from 1978 to 1980. Today, the scene is set and the
first act is about to begin. The first series of small N-bombs could be
produced by 1982, or by 1984-1985 if we wait until a more sophisticated
model is developed. The project will,of course,have to be approved by
parliament. But inasmuch as the president and the general staff are in
agreement, it can be assumed that such approval is already a foregone
conclusion. After the A-bomb, the H=bomb, and the Pluton tactical nuclear
missiles delivery system, we are soon going to add a newcomer to our nuclear
arsenal, one about which we still know very little, namely the N-bomb.
Some 20 Minutes of Computation
The bomb's discovery was due to two chance circumstances. In 1943, at -
MIT in Boston, a young man was taking a nap instead of attending an
, electronics class, when he was suddenly and unceremoniously awakened and led
away by a hurried sergeant. The latter had been ordered to round up a few
students in the dormitories or cafeteria and bring them to work in the
Manhattan Project at Los Alamos where the first American atomic bomb was
being fabricated in extreme secrecy, and where there was a lack of both
technicians and manpower. This young man, Samuel Cohen, had, somewhat abruptly,
found his vocation. He would become an atomic scientist.
The second chance circumstance occurred in the summer of 1958. Cohen was
then a member of a USAF committee studying technological prospects for
tactical nuclear weapons. In one of the nuclear laboratories he was visit-
ing he asked researchers to outline for him their most "revolutionary"
ideas. They spoke to him about an H-bomb detonator that would no longer
, be a polluting explosive--like the miniature A-bomb still currently deployed-- �
, but a"clean" explosive without blast and thermal radiat~ion. Samuel Cohen
pondered their comments. If a"clean" explosive could be found, it should
also be possible to make a"clean" bomb, in other words, a bomb whose blast
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and heat would be reduced to a minimum while still retaining the same
neutron radiation. On the basis of the established data for the detonator,
he made some computations "during 15 to 20 minutes," to quote Cohen himself,
and concluded that the new bomb would be based on fusion (like the H-bomb)
and not fission (like the A-bomb.) It would release 80 percent of its
- energy in the form of a flow of high-speed neutrons and only 20 percent in
the form of blast and heat. If detonated high enough, the bl~st and heat
would be eliminated and the neutrons would induce no dangerous radioactivity
_ in the soil. They would now have but one effect. They would affect humans,
highly sensitive to nuclear radiation. And it would kill them but within a
reduced surface area and on condition that they are exposed.
Thus the neutron bomb was born. But we had to wait nearly 20 years for it
to get to us. Because of its inordinately limited radius of destruction,
the bomb did not interest the Americans. In the 1950's, the Soviets -
announced the start of a research program on "pure" fusion. Then they became
silent. Did they find it? Samuel Cohen is now convinced they did. But
their conventional military superiority in Europe--the only possible zone
of action for these weapons with a small destructive radius--is such that
the Soviets have probably not developed it. All things considered, the
only ones who could be interested in the new weapon are the Europeans. Or
ratiier the French, because they alone, outside of NATO, have the capability
of taking the nuclear initiative. Samuel Cohen was able to patiently con-
vince France. A CEA [Atomic Energy Commission] scientist, Robert Dautray,
worked first on the H-bomb and later on the tricolor neutron bomb that is
now waiting final approval to increase and multiply.
The N-bomb is not large. It weighs 200 kilograms and is a few meters long.
Is it expensive? Impossible to say, because everything depends on the
number produced, as is the case with peas. "On the average," according to
the military, the N-bomb should cost about as much as a conventional tacti-
cal nuclear missile. It can be transported by ship, submarine, aircrafr,
and truck, be mounted on a wheeled or tracked vehicle. Its delivery means
include artillery shells and missiles carrying one or more warheads.
In short, it is the "pocket" atom. An economical atom too: a small
1-kiloton N-bomb can "wipe out" the same surface area as a big 10-kiloton -
A-bomb. But it does so more "cleanly," as we have mentioned, because
instead of burning, crushing and exposing everything to nuclear radiation,
it "only" kills people.
This portable, economical, selective, and controllable atom del.ights the
general staffs, particularly the army staff which has had to keep its hands
off the prestigious strategic weapons and the Pluton missiles, and which
definitely would like to "play" a little with this amazing atomic artillery.
In M~;cr ?~eadquarters, enthusiastic officers list all of the new weapon's
advantages. It is unquestionab.ly useful in offensive operations: employing -
it in a surprise attack, enemy outposts could be neutralized with bursts of
radiation and our troops could move in quickly and occupy these positions
without any danger. With the battlefield thus secured, we could put the
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undamaged economic resources back in operation, and make use of the enemy's
weapons (once the corpses have been removed from the tanks). The neutron
bomb's advantage is even more obvious in defensive operations. To attack,
the enemy naturally has to advance. He then becomes vulnerable, and his
tanks, even if quite numerous, can be quickly immobilized, like empty
hulls, by the neutron weapons fired by defensive forces carefully shielded
and protected in bunkers.
There are some persons who almost go ~o far as to say~ that, after all, this
- bomb is moral, in that it kills only soldiers and sp~ares civilians, if only
adequate sh@lters are ever built for the latter. We now see this "respect-
able N-bomb" being embellished with all sorts of sterling qualities. In-
_ deed, how have we ever been able to live so long without it? Our defense
was defective. There was a gap in it. Today, tlt~at gap has at last been
filled. Moreover, the Soviets have the N-bomb, the Americans too. So
we also must have it, as a precaution. Even if we have to stow a whole
batch of small N-bombs in the "cupboard," in reserve.
When speculation reaches this inordinate level, we must stop, cool all this
enthusiasm, and ask that a hard look is taken at the way these weapons would
be employed. For these toys are nuclear. And nuclear weapons have their
hard and fast rules, rules not of combat but of deterrence which is the
. absolute contrary of battle, because the ob~ective of deterrence is, in
fact, to prevent adversaries from waging war against each other.
'Expanded Deterrence'
Yet doesn't this new weapon's necessarily ambiguous character--usable on
the battlefield as conventional artillery and at the same time as nuclear
artillery--imply a serious shift in what was and, in principle, still is
French defense policy? Let us review the major principles and stages of
that policy. When France initially possessed only the A-bomb, General De
Gaulle set forth his theory of the "sanctuary" and "all or noth3ng." This
meant that any attack, whatever it may be, against the French "sanctuary"--
defined by a"vital critical threshold," i.e. continental France proper--
would trigger a nuclear response. Subsequently there was a diversification
of France's nuclear weapons. The country's nuclear arsenal grew in quantfty,
quality, and megatonnage: H-bomb, undetectable submarines capa~le of
delivering a second strike or "deadman's strike." Z'he policy was modified.
This time it no longer called for a strategic nuclear strike in response -
to "any attack" against France but also to any attack against France's
"vital interests." Where do these vital interests lie? Still ~tithin
continental France proper? Or elsewhere, on its fringes?
This ambiguity increased with the deployment of the first tactical nuclear
weapons, the famous Pluton missiles, action that provoked a storm of con-
troversy. Where should they be deployed? In France? Their warheads would
fall on Germany, and furthermore, it would be quite late to have them inter-
vene effectively if we were to wait until enemy armies were 100 kilometers
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' from the Rhine. Why not position them in a"chink" in the "forward area," .
in other words, in Germany, of course? De Gaulle settled th e question, and
Debre maintained that the Pluton missiles would stay in France but would
act as a minefield, as a"supreme warning" given the enemy before opening
French nuclear fire that is now capable of destroying 150 Soviet cities
with its 75 megatons of firepower. _
Nevertheless, the French deterrent's range of application began impercepti-
b.Ly expanding. With Giscard's assumption of the presidency, this expansion
became institutior.alized. In 197E, in a speech at the National Defense
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHEDN), the president spoke, for the First
time, about "expanded deterrence." A year later, Prime Minister Raymond
BarrE, speaking at the Mailly military training camp, elaborated upon this
' same concept. This time, he clearly placed France's vital interests at the
"approaches" to France's national territory, in other words, among its
"neig}lbors and allies." Was this a lapse? Nobody knew at the time that
res~arch on the neutron bomb had already been actively underway for 6
months. A new weapon system demanded a new policy. When Valery Giscard
d`Estaing announced, ?ast Thursday, that France practically had an enhanced-
radiation weapon, everybody expected him to define the I3-bomb's role in
France's overall nuclear postu~e. Otherwise al2 speculation would be per-
missible and French deterrence, in its entirety, might be weakened thereby.
Yet the president gave no such details. He made ~erely two key statements,
one unintentionally obscure, the other de+l~iberately enigmatic. The first
statement was: "Any nuclear attack upon the soil of France would automati-
cally prov~ke a strategic nuclear response." Seated in fron t of hia televi-
sion screen, the average viewer wondered: "Does this mean that we do not -
:elease the bomb if the attack is not nuclear, if Soviet tanks sweep forward
in an altogether conventional manner? But if such is the case, what do we
do?" It was all a misunderstanding, however. Upon questioning a reliable
source, we learned that by this statement the president actually wanted to
respond to those persons who had ventured to question his de termination to
push the red button, and reply particularly to General Gallo is who had
mentioned the case of a"surgical" type of nuclear attack, such as, for
example, the pinpoint destruction of the missiles based on the Albion Plateau.
"Yes indeed," Giscard had wanted to reply, "even in that case, I would launch
our strategic nuclear weapons and would issue orders to go all-out."
No More Red Lines
The second key statement was by far the more important. In nuclear matters,
"France," he said, "is directly concemed wi.th the security of neighboring
European states." If this means the "sanctuary" is expanded to include
Fr.anre's neighbors and French strategic nuclear firepower protects them, then
French deterrence is no longer at a11 credible. Can you image Frenahtnen
ready and willing to let themselves be vitrified for the defense of the
Elbe River boundary? If this simply means that tactical nuc lear weapons,
and the neutron bomb in partir_ular, will henceforth be employed on German
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soil, then we have entered into a system which no longer has anything
Gaullist about it. This would mean that France, confident in the power of ~
its new weapons, its brand new and impending neutron artillery, had agreed
to wage the forward battle outside the "sanctuary," with nuclear weapons,
a battle that would obviously be fought on ttie Elbe rather than on the Rhine.
But this battle--which De Gaulle had always obstinately refused to consider
waging because of the disproportion in f,drees--can it be won? Probably not.
And what then will become of the clearly posted strategic thresholds, the
red lines proclaiming: "Crossing over this line is prohibited?" For the
adversaries as well as the experts, the indispensable signs appear blurred ~
and conf using .
Officials in the Defense Ministry and also in the Elysee Palace readily
hasten to explain: "But no, come now, nothing has changed. The neutron
bomb will be merely a warning bomb, but onE that is more imprQVed and hence
more credible than conventional tactical nuclear weapons. What is more, it
will give Giscard what he now lacks most, namely time to reflect. As a matter
of fact--let's be specific!--what can actually happen on the battlefie]1Q?
The answer is well-known. Everybody has a mental picture of a large-scale
advance with some 30,000 Soviet tanks sweeping westward in the traditional
two separate waves. The first wave having been 'irradiated' by the N-bomb
and stopped, we will have time to see if the second wave goes into action,
and consequently Giscard, in his ~unker, will have a few additional hours to
ponder the situation before pushinL the red button." Maybe. I am no strate-
gist. After all, the Soviets could abide by the rules of the game established
by our general staffs.... But this brilliant argumentation does not convince
- everyone. The co~unists are, naturally, violently opposed to it. The
socialists are divided in their opinion. The Gaullists are hesitant and
waiting. Waiting for what? Proof of the artf~l treachery they suspect.
Proof that Giscard is making his way, gradually tiut surely, toward what he -
has been dreaming of for years, namely a European-scale defense that would
come up to our president's monarchical expectatiions but inevitably bind the
French deterrent to NATO. That would mean the end of the nuclear indepen-
dence achieved by De Gaulle. But what can the Gaullists do? Invoke the
General's shadowy figure once again? There's no doubt about it, the Cross
of Lorraine i9 a heavy cross to bear these days.
Less Deterring Than Pluton
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 5 Jul 80 p 25
[Interview with Pierre Messmer, General De Gaulle's former defense minister;
date and place not given]
[Text] [Question] If France decides to produce the neutron bomb, will that
strengthen its nuclear capability and enhance the credibility of its deterrent?
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[Answer] No, because ~he enhanc~d-radiation weapon is a weapon that, in
my opinion, ~loes not belong to the deterrent or to the nuclear arsenal,
whether it be strategic ar tactical. In fact, it damages only humans and
h~is a very li.mitc~d range of destruction. Consequently, if anything, it is -
less deterring than the present tactical nuclear warhead delivered by the
i'luton missile. T even believe it strips t:he Plutons of part of their
er fect i~ ~eness.
[Question) It is not, however, a so-called "conventional" weapon, inasmuch
as i.t uri].izes the pr~cess of nuclear fusion.
~Ans~aer] Actuall~~ it represents the first real intermediate between the
two weapon systems, nuclear and conventional. But the nuclear aspect is not _
the c~verriding consideration, because the definition of these weapons is
ultimately ~etermined by the use made of them. Now the neutron bomb is
usable solel; on the battleEield as a kind of atomic artillery. Indeed that
is ~Jhy the army is so anxious to get it. But you will see that the first
pr~~blern to arise will be determination of the conditions under which this
new we.iPc,n shall. be emoloyed.
f~)u~.stionJ Dc~esn't this ambiguous character of the neutron bomb compl.~tely
ch.~llen;,;e thE: validity o4 the Gaull.ist policy on deterrence?
[~laiswer] Possibly so. It's obvious that the very existence of a new
weapon neceGSitates a tactical change, at the very least.
[Q:iestion] When this issue comes before parliament, will you vote for or
a~;.zinst the neiitron bomb?
(Answer) That depends on the effects its development will have on other types
of weaponry. If its overall cost is high, if to produce it in large numbers
requires slashing nuclear programs we consider to be priority programs, then,
yc..s this will create a problem for us.
Heightened Risk of War
Pari~ LE ~iOIJ~~EL OBSERVATEUR in French 5 Jul 80 p 26
[C~~mmentary by Ge~rges Sarre, member of the Socialist Party's executive
cc~mmittee and the European Parliament: ~~Pea.ce Through Deterrence or Neutron
Wa r?~~ ]
fText] Integation into the Atlantic community and the.cohesion of that
~~orununity are being achieved at an increasingly sustained rate. If there
i5 any one res~llt of the president's 7-year term of office that is hardly
deh~zCab.le, it is definitel.y this inr.e~ration. Under these circumstances,
how can anyone be surprised at seeing Giscardian tactics now turn to
attacking the hard core of our defense system?
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The gc~vernment's recent decision in favor of the neutron bomb is indicative
of tfie magnitude of the reversal made in policy.
The purpose of the deterrent force, independent of the blocs, is to prevent "
a battle of Europe. By the threat of substantial retaliation, this force -
can prevent the two superpowers from using European territory as a theater
of operations.
Contrastingly, the doctrine of flexible response is based on a conventional
clash followed by .:i nuclear conflic t limited to Europe. It means tarnsf orm-
ing this region into a battlefield whose boundaries and scope would be deter-
mined solely by the superpowers. The allies would become vassals before
serving as hostages. This is the NATO theory for ttte defense of American ~
interests. It cannot be ours.
D~tc~rrence is, first 1nd foremosC, a weapon of denial. It is by nc~ mc~an5
a new Maginot Line. AndtYiis is so f or at least two reasons. First oF all,
whr3t the experts call "the uncertainty of the threshold of deterrence" pre-
vF~nts a potential aggressor from spe culating about the stage at which France
coul.d deem its vital interests to b e at stake. Secondly, by making the ~ "
hattlc~ oF Europe impossible, the independence of our deterrence capability
is ~i stabilizing factor for the whole continent.
In complete contrast, the neutron we apon expresses deliberate acceptance of
the battle of Europe. It is no longer a question of preventing that battl.e
_ biit oE preparing for it. It is a terrifying weapon because it renders
nuclear war in Europe possible.
Frc-~ponents of the neutron weapon ar gue that it is the best means of stopping
Sc~vic~t tanks. To begin with, this argument limits its consideration to a
very old view of the danger.s we f ace and overlooks the fact that thE origin
of thE~ thr~ats is no longer so loca lized. By "sanctuarizing" Soviet and
Am~ric~iri territories, the SALT accords and the agreement on prevention of
thermonuc].ear war are a better indication of the major risk of our times,
namely ~he lise of European soil as a possible theater of confrontation.
- And the neutron weapon is not only powerless to ward off this threat, it
alsu hetps make it more likely.
The 'lact is that the neutron weapon can be of interest only to somebody
c,iit-side Europe. Such is the case with the United States or the Soviet Union,
bot}~ oL which would rather have anything other than a thermonuclear clash
ovc~r tl~eir terr.itory. This is clearly why neutron weapons can actually be
~iepl.oyed only within the NATO framework, in the framework of that "unique
battle space" referred to by Giscard d'~staing. Accepting the neutron bomb
, is, t}~erc.fore, tlntamount to increasing our dependence on the Pentagon.
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The President of the Republic's statements opened people's eyes: the problem
is no longer one of mastering the bomb's technology, but a question of
whether these weapons are to be deployed. This decision entails ser~.ous
consequences not only for our defense policy but for our relations with the
two blocs. Choosing to prevent the battle or to prepare for it is anorher
way of encouraging detente or the cold war.
There will be no socialist experiment in France without detente. Tension
and confrontations have their own logic that militates against the people's
cause by inciting everyone to rally to his protector's side.
Hence it is incumbent upon us to resist this involvement that would preclude
any socialist solution not only in France but also in Europe.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
8041
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I
_ THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRE',NCE
SiATUS OF STRATECrIC, TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES IN 1980 DESCRIBED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 12 Jul 80 pp 63-64
[Article by Jean de Galard: " French Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Forces
in 19 80" ]
[Text] Strategic Forces
France's strategic nuclear forces are currently organized into three
components:
a� The piloted aircraft component composed of Miraga-4 strategic bombers
carrying a 70-kiloton A-boinb ;
b. The strategic ballistic surface-to-surface (SSBS) missile component
consisting of missiles based in underground silos on the Albion Plateau I+-
("yesterday": 18 S-2 missiles; "today"" 9 S-3 missiles; "tomorrow":
18 S-3 missiles) ;
c. The strategic naval surface-to-surface (MSBS) missiles, 16 of which--
currently all M-20's--are carried by each of the fleet ballistic missile -
submarines (SSBN).
Strategic Air Force (FAS)
The first two of these components are French Air Force elements. Bot:~ are
assigned to the Strategic Air Force Command (CFAS). The Mirage-4 bombers
became operational in May 1964, the SSBS missiles in 1971. The 9trategic
Air Force is responsible for the operational readiness and employment of the
Mirage-4 bombers (refuelable in flight) and the silo-based Albion Plateau
missiles. The FAS co~ander, currently Major General Jean Saulnier, has the
mission of maintaining all of these forces--perso~el and equipment--in the
best possible readiness condition so that they can be ready for the chief
of state's use at any time.
Indicative of this readiness is the fact that a large part of these forces
are kept in a round-the-clock ground a1Qrt status throughout the year.
E~
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~ J
_ The Mirage-4 weapon system consists of the bomber, the nuclear weapon it ~
carries and the C-135F tanker. This system, whose three elements are
definitely aging--the Mirage-4 made its maiden flight in June 1959--is
deployed in three wings, two bomber wings and an aerial refueling wing. Each
wing is organized into three sq.uadrons. To reduce their aircraf ts' vul-
nerability on the ground, the squadrons are dispersed among bases at
Cambrai, Creil, Luxeuil, Saint Dizier, Avord, Bordeaux, Mont-de-Marsan,
Istres, and Orange.
Each squadron is responsible for the employment of its assigned aircraft
and compliance with alert provisions. To accomplish these tasks, it has
some dozen crews: pilots, navigators, aad the mechanics responsible for
_ routine servicing of the sircraft. The Mirage-4 aquadrons are supported by
their own Special Ammunition Storage Depot (DAMS) which maintains, stocks,
and assemb lea the nuclear weapons and also mounts them under the fuselage
of the aircraft.
A cotal of 62 Mirage-4's were built, and 47 of these are still in service
with 36 of them kept operationally ready at all times.
The operational readiness of all FAS personnel and equipment and the level
of training of air crews are evaluated in monthly exercises called Poker and
also in an annual maneuver called Fantasie.
- The Alb ion Plateau missilea are.in underground silos dispersed in sit~es
around the main base of Saint Christol. These sites are manned by the lst
GMS (Strategic Missile Group) which also includes protection and security -
units plus technical units based at Saint Christol and responsible for
periodic maintenance and repair of the missiles, and loading them into
the silos.
There are two.groups of nine silos each. Each group is linked to its own
launch control center (PCT) located deep underground. To make the SSBS
invulnerable and thus ensure their ability to respond effectively to any
nuclear attack, all sites and PCT's hava been constructed in accordance
with very strict protection and survival requirements. They are so .
effectively hardened against nuclear attack that their neutralization would
require simultaneous attack on 20 d ifferent targets, each attack with
several weapons. Thus their neutralization seems hardly conceivable at
the present time.
The headquarters of'the Strategic Air Forces Command is currently.�located in '
Taverny. In an emergency, or if necessary, the Mount Verdun Base near Lyon
will house the FAS command post.
Strategic Naval Force (FOST)
The third component of the strategic nuclear forces, FOST, was activated
in 1972. It is commanded by an admiral--currently by Admiral Pieri--who
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also commands the attack submarines. FOST comprises five nuclear sub-
marines: Le Redoutable, Le Terr~ble, Le Foudroyant, I''ndomptable,
and Le Tonnant. The co~nander FOST is under the operational command of
the armed forces chief of staff. The commander FOST's responsibility to
governmental authorities is the same as that of the commanding general
FAS. Under the ~commander FOST's authority, the commander of the SBN fleet
and the Ile Longue operating base near Brest has the mission of maintain-
_ ing personnel, equipme nt, and SSBN's operationally ready.
- The co:nmander FOc,r is stationed in Paris. The FOST's operations command
post is at Houille, Department of Yvelines, in a compound housing the Mille
Communications Center, the transmitting facilities for the Navy's master
communications system.
This command post is hardened against nuclear attack. It houses the FOST
staff and facilities enabling it to maintain continuous contact with the
SSBN's on patrol v~a a large number of communication nets. The organization's
main element is the Rosnay high-powered, very-long-wave station, most of whose
key facilities are underground. It must be noted, however, thht radio silence
from ship to shore is rigorously enforced.
SSBN's in service operate in a series of cycles. Each cycle consists of:
an 8-10 week patrol at sea, including a short trial and training phase fol-
_ lowed by the operational patrol proper; upon return to port, a 4-5 week
period during which the submarine undergo:es necessary repair and maintenance
at Ile Longue. Each SSBN has two crews. After one crew completes a patrol,
it is replaced by the other. The oncoming crew assumes zesponsibility for
~ the SSBN's security, assists in its repair and maintenance at Ile Longue, and
then takes the submarine out on another patrol. The first crew spends 5-6
- weeks in a"fresh-air recuperation and rehabilitation" facility before
being granted shore leave. Upon expiration of this leave, crew members
undergo about 6-weeks of training at the Rouche-Douvres Center in Brest
before going back on patrol. � _
When at sea, the SSBN`s are under the direct operational control of the
Commander FOST. The Ile Longue Naval base is responsible for the protec-
- tion, maintenance, and repair of each SSBN's equipment, missiles and
warheads.
Tactical Nuclear Force
The Tactical Air Force's (FATAC) Mirage-3E and Jaguar aircraft are armed
- with the AN-52 tactical nuclear bomb. FATAC's present commander is
Lieutenant General Michel Forget. FATAC has its headquarters in Metz.
Early next year, the naval air arm's Super Etendard aircraft based on the
carriers Clemenceau an~i Foch--recently refitted to carry and stock AN-52's--
will also be armed with these tactical nuclear weapons. A total of 42 Super
Etendards have been delivered to date. Full delivery is scheduled to be
completed in 1981.
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. FATAC currently has four nuclear squadrons, two at Saint Dizier and two at
Luxeuil. A fifth squadron is to become operational shortly at Istres
where there is already a Special Amm~unition Storage Depot (DAMS) for the
Strategic Air Force. These four squadrons undergo intensive training
throughout the year. In addition, they particpate in the annugl Centaure Cup,
a competitive exercise always conducted under the most realistic con~.itiona
possible.
The army also has a tactical nuclear capability with its five Pluton regi-
ments. The Pluton missile system is mounted on an ArIX 30 tank chassis.
The five regiments are stationed as follaws: the 3d RA[Artillery Regiment]
at Mailly, 15th RA at Suippes, 4th RA at Laon, 74th RA at Belfort, and the
32d RA at Oberhoffen. Each regiment is organized into three firing batteries.
Each battery has two launch vehicles. The launch vehiele conetitutes the
fire unit. Each Pluton regiment has a misaile support and aupply unit and
in peacetime operates its own missile depot. The regiment's substantial
organic transportation gives it a higl~ly flexible operational deployment
capability. A Pluton regiment is employed at corps artillery levi~l.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1980
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CHOICES FOR 1980-90 EXAMINED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 12 Jul 80 pp 59, 61
(Article by Pierre Langereux: "New French Nuclear Choices for 1980-90:
Strategic Mobile Missile and Tactical Neutron Weapons"]
[Text] The president of the republic recently disclosed the "new French
nuclear choices" made by the Defense Council at its 10 June 1980 meeting
in the Elysee Palace.
These choices are simple. The,strategic choice calls for replacing certain
componenbs of the FNS [Strategic Nuclear Force] in 1992. Specifically,
the Mirage-4 bombers are to be replaced by the "new component," namely
a strategic mobile missile for which there are two competing concepts: the
SX land-based missile.and the cruise missile in its air-launched or
ground-launched version.
The tactical choice is the neutron weapon.* Under development since 1976,
this weapon has already completed successful tests. It could be placed in
production by 1982-83 in its present configuration or by 1984-85 in an
improved version.
Does this tactical and technical choice also mean a shift in the French
strategy of deterrence, a change characterized by expansion of the
national "sanctuary" beyond France's borders? In this connection, the presi-
~ dent did state that France is directly concerned with the security of the
neighboring European states." There are some who will view this at least
as a manifestation of Atlanticism. Others will see it as a downright
renunciativn of the policy of strict independence in favor of a participa-
tion of sorts in a possible "forward battle" (with employment of tactical
_ nuclear weapons). Both of those views are being criticized in French
political circles.
*Z'echnical experts insist the neutron weapon is not a"bomb." It is also
known as the "enhanced-radiation ~eapon"or "limited side-effects weapon."
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To carry this analysis of new French nuclear ambitions any further, we will
have to wait, however, until either the "more detailed" answer the preaident
plans to give "on the entire spectrum of defense considerations and concern,"
or the National Assembly debate on defense issues, a debate promised by the
chief of state.
This debate is especially awaited in that Valery Giscard d'Estaing has
himself said that "the defense effort...inevitably affects alI Frenchmen."
Moreover, it does seem that by these words the pre~~dent wanted to criticize
Frenchmen for showing a certain "disinterest" in anything related to defense.
Such unconcern appears to be reflected in a May 1980 public opinion poll.
According to that survey, 50 percent of all Frenchmen do not believe the
president would order a retaliatory nuclear strike (24 percent believe he
would), and 72 percent are even opposed to France's use of nuclear weapons
(29 percent favor such use).
The chief of state reminded the 50 percenfi who thus question his "credibility"
that "any nuclear attack on the soil of France would automatically provoke
_ a strategic nuclear response."
_ Unfortunately, ~~hile this assertion is meant to be reassuring, it is also
disquieting. Indeed, what would the government's attitude be in the event `
of a non-nuclear attack, such as, for example, an invasion by tens of
thausands of Soviet tanks? Wouldn't the deterrent weapons be used in that
situation? It does appear, however, that all this confusion is much ado
about nothing and that the president simply "sinned by omission." If we can
believe the "information obtained from a reliable source" by a weekly maga-
zine (LE NOI3VEL OBSERVATEUR," 5 July 1980) after the presidential press
conference, Valery Giscard d'Estaing had no intention of limiting the
deterrent's application. It should be understood, therefore, that "any
attack" against the national sanctuary will be penalized by nuclear fire-
power. But why did not the president specifically say so? This certainly
deserves to be said in the clearest possible terms!
The president was contrastingly much more specific in his disclosures about
the future status of our strategic and nuclear weaponry over the next 20
years .
The Strategic Nuclear Force (FNS) currently has three "components": an -
air component consisting of Mirage-4~ bombers, a land-based component with
the SSBS [strategic b allistic surface-to-surface] missiles, and a naval
_ compor.ent wi*.h the SSBN's [fleet ballistic missile submarines] carrying the
MSBS [naval strategic ballistic surface-to-surface] missiles. The president -
clearly stated this organizational structure would remain valid until 1990-92,
with one notable improvement, however, "beginning in 1981~-85," namely "the
deployment of (~I-4~ multiple-warhead ballistic missiles on our submarines:'
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Hence the French "triad" will be retained--but with some improvements--
for another 12 years. Then it will be modified.
Valery Giscard d'Estaing explained that "the problem of replacing certain
components of our strategic nuclear armament would arise in about 1992."
Actually this problem is one of replacing the Mirage-4 bombers--armed with
AN-22 bombs--which are to be withdrawn from service in 1985, except for 15
of these aircraft that will remain in service temporarily and be armed with
the new medium-range air-to-surface tactical missile, the ASMP. Is this
problem also a longer-range one of replacing the SSBS-53 strategic ballistic
surface-to-surface missiles deployed in 1980-82?
The "manned bomber" strategic component is scheduled to disappear in the
short-range future. In fact, the government's general delegate for armament
annotmced in 1979: "It appears unlikely that the Mirage-4 will have a
successor in its strategic bomber role" (ARMEr~fENT, 5 March 1979).
The land-based component is also destined for replacement at some future
date. But deployment of strategic missiles on our national territory will
go on as a continued indic, ion of the territory's "sanctuarization."
The manned bomber component will thus be replaced in 1992 by what French
strategists are now calling the "new component," and no longer the "third
component," This would apparently indicate that the triad has seen its
day. Yet the defense minister, speaking in Apt on 23 May, again asserted
that "the three components are complementary." Regardless of what all this
may meaa, the naval component (SSBN and MSBS) is certainly going to be
- retained and even improved because it is intrinsically "inwlnerable" for
at least another two decades, according to the strategists.
The aforementioned "new component" will be primarily "mobile." In this ~
regard, the president revealed that the 10 June 1980 meeting of the Defense
Council had approved "preparation" of a"strategic mobile launcher."
Although he gave no further details about this launcher, Valery Giscard
d'Estaing did announce that "firm technical decisions on this (mobile)
launcher's characteristics could be made before the end of the year." In
our view, this is by no means certain, inasmuch as project planning will
probably still not have reached a stage sufficiently advanced to permit a
decision of this importance to be made, a decision determining the future
of our strategic nuclear armament for a period of 20 years.
There are, in fact, two projects competing for acceptance as the new stra-
tegic mobile component, the mobility of which will acutally not be perma- -
nent but rather "semipermanent," in other words, proportionate to defense
alert or warning conditions, i. e. slight mobility in peacetime and increased
mobility in time of emergency.
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One of these projects is the SX strategic ground-launched missile mounted
on wheeled vehicles (trucks}.
The other project is the strategic cruise missile. It could be deployed
as either a ground-launched weapon like the SX (truck-mounted), or as an
air-launched weapon (from aircraft). These two projects are still competing
with each other at the present time. No choice has yet been made by either
the technical services or government policy makers. Yet this choice could
be made before the end of 1980, as the chief of state himself has announced.
Four main criteria will guide officials in choosing between these two pro-
jects: mobility, of course, but also vulnerability and ability to penetrate
enemy def?nses, plus, naturally, the cost of each weapon system. The three
possible options--ground-launched SX, air-launched cruise missile, ground-
launched cruise missile--are obviously not equal as far as these crit~r.ia
_ are concerned. It is difficult, however, to foresee which option the
government will choose.
But the real "bomb" dropped by the president of the republic at his press
conference was unquestionably the disclosure that France possessed the
neutron weapon.
As a matter of fact, the president not only announced that 3 and 1/2
years ago "at a Defense Council meeting in December 1976" he had approved
'~conducting an enhanced-radiation weapon feasibility study," he also dis-
closed that "the first tESts had been made." Up to then, this had been a
well-kept secret.
_ The announcement that France had already tested a neutron weapon caused
a stir in Washir.gton where production of such a weapon was postponed by
Presider~t Carter's decision of 7 April 1978. France is now, therefore,
the third power, after the United States and the USSR, to have developed
the neutron weapon.
Work on the French weapon has apparently reached a highly advanced stage.
In any case it has made sufficient progress to allow the president to also
reveal that "the production decision could be made by 1982-83 in the weapon's
present configuration" (not explained) or "2 years later," hence in 1984-85,
"in a different configuration."
In his press conference, the president issued two warnings about the produc-
tion and employment of this neutron weapon, whose manufacture France can
still temporarily "shelve," as was done in the United States.
The first warning was that the decision on production of the neutron weapon
"will have tu take account of the status of nuclear weapons in Europe fore-
seeable as of that date." This statementolaviously has reference to the
strategic "balance" between NATO's "Euromissiles" and the SS-20 missiles of
the Warsaw Pact which is planning to deploy 600 of these weapons.
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The second warning was that employment of the neutron weapon will take
account of the fact that "France is directly concerned with the security of
the neighboring European states." This statement obviously has reference
primarily to Germany, the buffer territory , between the USSR and France.
Indeed, Valery Giscard d'Estaing's statements were rather well received in
Germany where the Munich daily SUD-DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG said it felt sure
that the French neutron weapon would be operational in 2 years. Furthermore,
this Munich newspaper considered that the French nuclear strike force as
a whole would be enough to make "even a superpower" think twice!
Moreover, this warning was very clearly noted and understood in Moscow where,
4 days after Valery Giscard d'Estaing's press conference, Leonid Brezhnev
strongly pressed upon Chancellor Schmidt the necessity for Europe to relin-
quish the neutron weapon.
This is a sign that Moscow is not indifferent to such a weapon being deployeci
in Europe. The USSR had, in fact�, previously proposed that the French--
and British--nuclear forces be included in the next American-Soviet negotia-
tions on strategic arms limitation (SALT II).
But the p~resident of the republic has clearly stated, since 10 January 1979,
that the French FNS is not negotiable!"
COPYRIGHT: A.& C. 1980
8041 '
CSO: 3100
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~
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
DETAILS, MODIFICATI4NS OF M-20 MISSILE DESCRSBED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 12 Jul 80 pp 65-67
[Article: "Five Operational SSBN's Currently Armed With M-20 Missile,
First French Missile Carrying a Thermonuclear Warhead and Which Became
Operational in 1977"]
[Text] The M-20 MSBS [Naval Surface-to-Surface Strategic Ballistic] missile
armed with a thermonuclear warhead has equipped the Naval Strategic Force's
(FOST) five operational submarines since Apri1 1980. The 1~20 is the third-
generation version of the MSBS.
The first-generation MSBS--the M-1--entered into service on the nuclear sub-
marine Le Redoutable in 1972. Since then, the system has been improved in
two phases:
a. A first phase designed to increase the missile's range. This resulted
in equipping the nuclear submarine Le Foudroyant with the M-2 version in
1974;
b. A second phase designed to arm the missile with a 1-megaton warhead and
enhance its ability to penetrate enemy defenses. This resulted in equip-
ping the submarine L'Indomptable with the M-20 version in 1977.
In developing these improved versions of the MSBS system, maximum effort
was made to minimize any required changes to the submarine's on-board mis-
sile launch facilities and to the missile assembly and support installation
at the Ile Longue Naval Base. Consequently in both the M-2 and M-20 versions,
the missile's diameter and first stage were unchanged.
The M-20 is a two-stage ballistic missile carrying a thernwnuclear warhead.
It is equipped with improved penetration aids and has a range of over 3,000
ki7_ometers. It weighs nearly 20 tons, is appxoximately 10 meters long,
and has a diameter of about 1,500 millimeters.
- 3l ~
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Its four main parts are: the first propulsion stage, the second propulsion
stage, the equipment section, and the upper stage including the thermonuclear
warhead.
fihe first-and second-stage propellants are of the isolane family, i.e. com-
posite propellants whose basic ingredients are aluminum, ammonium perchlorate,
and polymethane.
The first-stage (designated 904) casing is of 40CDV 20 SV high-strength steel.
The rocket motor is equipped with four rotating nozzles that impart roll,
pitch, and yaw control to the missile by differential commands. The first
stage weighs 12 tons including more than 10 tons of propellant. The first-
stage motor has a"bicomposition" charge with a star-configuration central
conduit.
The second-stage motor has a phenolic reain-bonded glass 5iber case manu-
factured by winding. The nozzle is fixed. Pitch and yaw control is imparted
to the missile by injecting f reon into the nozzle. The missile is ro11-
stabilized by two small steerable rockets. The second stage weighs 6.5
tons, approximately 5.7 tons of which is propellant. The second-stage
motor has a"monocomposition" charge with a circular-section central conduit.
The second stage is equipped with a thrust cutoff system (DAP) consisting
' of six thrust termination ports in the ~:~orward part of the motor.
The equipment section contains the three-axes inertial platform--manufactured
by SAGEM [Company for General Applications of Electricity and Mechanics)--
whose data are processed by the on-board guidance computer--produced by ErID
[Marcel Dassault Electronics]--which generates steering commands and sends
them to the flight control unit--manufactured by LCT [Central Telecommunica-
tions Labarator~].
The missile's upper stage has three main elements:
a. The 1-megaton thermonuclear warhead with its casirig enabling it to re-
enter the atmosphere. This nuclear warhead ts hardened against the effects
of nuclear antiballistic missile (ABN) systems;
b. The shroud designed to protect the nuclear warhead ~ahen traveling
through the watex~ and when leaving the atmosphere;
c. The mo~ule cont~tning penetration sids and sequencer equipment.
Missile Operatl.ons On-Board the Submarine
M-20 missiles are assembled and then loaded into the submarine at the Ile
Longue oper~ting base near Brest. In the submarine, a liner separates and
insulate~ the missile from the inner tube which it~elf is suspended in the
launch tube by a shock-absorbing system. Environment inside the tube is
32
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~
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33
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continuously controlled (temperature and humidity). Important missile safety
and readiness parameters are constantly monitored from an electronic control
panel associated with each missile. The missiles are subjected to periodic
inspections and tests to check their readiness for possible launch. The
most common of these tests is the simulated launch which is an identical
reproduction of the real firing sequence, with the exception of its irrevo-
cable phases. Most of the malfunctions--which are very few, in fact-
detected are repairable aboard the submarine on patrol because even the most
complex items of equipment are replaceable. All inspection and test data
are stored on data-processing media in very detailed fash~;on. After the
submarine's re turn to port, these data are automatically processed, thus
making it possible to detect any deviation and, if necessary, complete,
any corrective actions taken at sea.
The launching proper consists of two phases:
a. A preparation phase which begins upon receipt of the governmental
order, and during which preliminary guidance data is computed and the
- missiles are made ready for launch;
b. A launch phase during which the submerged submarine ejects a volley
of missiles.
To be able to f ire a complete volley in a very short time, highly reliable
automatic systems must interconnect all items of equipment participating in
the launch: the missile proper, electronic control panels, and launch tubes.
All of the ele ctronic equipment in the delivery vehicle subsystem represents
some 60 electronic panels containing more than 8,000 printed-circuit boards.
The SSBN's tot al MSBS weapon system comprises the aforementioned subsystem's
equipment plus the launch subsystem (tubes and associated equipment~, and the
data processing center (main computers) .
Flight Phases
As soon as the missile has emerged from the water, its first stage ignites
and develops a thrust of some 45 tons for 60 seconds.
After first stage separation, produced by explosive e3ection of the inter-
stage, the second stage ignites and generates a thrust of 30 tons for a
variable perio d of time (up to 60 seconds) based on the desired range.
During this flight phase, the protective shroud is jettisoned.
Then, after activation of the thrust termination system upon command of the
guidance computer, the nuclear warhead (or re~~try vehicle) continues its
ballistic flight.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1980
80~41
CSO: 3100
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
ORGANIZATION, MISSIONS OF TRAINING FIGHTER WING
Paris LE MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUE in French Jul 80 pp 15-17
[Article: The 8th Fighter Wing"]
[TextJ The 8th Fighter Wing (EC) has been based at Cazaux since 1964. It
is organized into two fighter squadrons, a special~purpoae equipment main-
tenance and repair group (the 15/008 GERMAS), a liaison and instrument
flight section (ELVSV), and various support and service activities common
to the two squadrons. _
The Safntonge O1/008 [lst Squadron, 8th Wing] Squadron was first activated
at Marignane in 1936 and equipped with Dewoitine 501 aircraf t. It con-
sisted o~ the Trident 3C2 Flight and the Lion 4C1 Flighz. Its designa-
tion at that time was the Marignane 1/8 Squadron. It fought in the~Battle
of France from 1939 to 1942. Subsequently redesignated the Saintonge ,
1/22 Squadron, it was based in Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Upon returning from _
Indochina, it was assigned to the 8th Wing fn Rabat under the designation
of Maghreb 1/8 Squadron. In 1964, it,was transferred to Cazaux and redesig-
nated the Saintonge 1/8 Squadron.
The Nice 02/008 Squadron is organized into the 73d SPA Advanced Air '
Training Section] and the 78th SPA. The 7�3d's unit insignia is a stork,
the 78th's a black panther. These two flights were initially formed in
World War I. In 1933, they were combined to form the 2d Group of the 7th
Fighter Wing, the Nice group, which was equipped with Morane 225 aircraft.
After the Battle of France, the group withdrew to North Africa and �resumed
combat operations in 1943. In 1945, the Nice group was sent to Indochina.
Later it participated in the police.action in Algeria and supported opera- `
tions in Bizerte. The Nice 2/7 Group returned ta France in 1961 and was
successively based at Metz and Nancy. In 1964, it was transferred to Cazaux
where it became th~ Nice 2/8 Bightex Squadron.
35
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Each squadron has an authorized assigned strength of 15 pilots and 55
specialists or assistant specialists who are non-rated (or not on flying
status) personnel (PNN).
The GERMAS has a personnel strength of 130 PNN specialists.
The ELVSV and the common support and service activities have a total of four
officers and some 50 noncommissioned officers and enlisted men. The wing's '
overall assigned strength is 64 officiers, 267 noncommissioned officers, -
and 59 enlisted m~n.
This personnel constitute the wing's "permanent party" to which are
added classes of 80 to 100 student pilots that annually attend flight
training courses conducted by the 8th Fighter Wing. These courses last
approximately 4-1/2 months.
To accomplish its training mission, the wing has the following aircraft:
, 47 Mystere 4A, five T-33, six Fouga Magister, and two Broussard liaison
aircraft.
The Mystere 4A is a single-seater fighter aircraft weighing 7 tons. It
is powered by a Hispano-Suiza Tay or Verdon jet engine rated at 3,400
kilograms thrust.
Its weapons include two nose-mounted 30-mm cannon and bombs or rockets
carried under the wings.
The Mystere 4A is a supersonic aircraft when in a slight vertical dive.
It has a service ceiling of 12,000 meters and an operating range of 450
kilometers at low altitude. .
Although this is an old aircraft, it is highly suitable for the 8th
Fighter Wing's training mission.
The 8th.Fighter Wing is an operatiarial transition training squadron. Its
primary mission is to provide combat pilot training to youxtg pilots
graduating from the Jet Aircraft Specialiszation School in Tours. Situated
as it is between the flight training schools and combat units, the 8th
EC's obj.ective is to train pilots that are reliable under all circumstances.
The flight training of young pilots extends over a 15-week period during
which they log some 50 hours of fYying time in Mystere 4A aircraft. After
a short period of familiarization and transition training in tti~~:Mystere 4A,
the young pilot receives training in formation flying and air combat. He
must be able to perform effectively as a member of a light combat air
patrol.
36
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He simultaneously receives instruction in instrument flying and develops
his sense of responsibility. The young pilot must, in fact, be able to
bring an aircraft in trouble back to its home base and make an instrument
approach and landing under conditions of poor visibility. -
A few training missions are devoted to improving his very low altitude
navigational proficiency, and at higher and higher speeds. But
the principal new instructional experience for the young pilot is his
introduction to aerial gunnery. Student pilots conduct a certain number
of air-to-surface firing missions with aircraft weapons, rockets, a~d bombs
and air-to-air firing missions with aircraft weapons against towed targets. -
Upon completing their course of training in the 8th Fighter Wing, the young
pilots are assigned to different combat units of the FATAC [Tactical Air
Force] and CAFDA [A~r Command, Air Defense Forcea].
The 8th EC's secondary peacetime mission is to enaure that its pilet�
instructors maintain, a high level of operational proficiency. This
requires continuous training in very low-altitude navigation, simulated
,
attacks on ground targets, and air-to-air and air-to-surface operational
gunnery practice.
All pilot instructors must have ~t least a rating of assistant combat
air patrol leader. These instructors are selected from air force combat
units.
The Mystere 4A aircraft will soon reach the end of their rated service
life. The French Air Force has, therefore, approved their replacement ~
with Alpha Jet aircraft. This replacement is schedu].ed for 1982.
With the delivery of these new aircraft, the 8th EG's mission will most
likely be mcdif~ed so as to focus even more on weapons and air combat
training with all the rest of the training being conducted at the Jet
Aircraft Specialiaation School in Tours.
COPYRIGHT: De'ta Editrice S.N.C.-Parma (Italy) 1980 et DEFENSE Editions
8041
CSO : 3100 ~
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COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
OIL REFINERIES NOT EQUIPPED TO PRODUCE ENOUGH GASOLINE
Hamburg CAPITAL in German Jul 80 pp 22-24
[Article: "Old Crackers"]
[Text] Why the German Oil Refineries Are Outdated
~ If a shortage of gasoline occurs at the German pumps it
" is only due in part to the meager rations of the sheiks.
Because the petroleum industry has put off important in-
vestments until now, refineries in Germany are prc+ducing
- only half as much gasoline from crude oil as plants in
the United States.
~1 shrill, off-key note was injected into the chorus of aptimists at the most
_ recent industrial fair in Hanover. The head of the chemical giant Hoechst
_ Inc. in Frankfurt, Prof Rolf Sammet, jarred the exhibition of tomorrow's
markets with the harsh judgment that the domestic petroleum industry belongs
to the past. "The German refineries," Sammet said with great clarity, "are
outdated--not technologically, but with respect to demand."
A few weeks ago the chief of Hoechst had already revealed to a narrow circle
what it was that had moved him ko give the FRG's petroleum processors this
low grade. "If a shortage of gasoline for motor fuel were to develop in
our country, it would not be because crude oil was so very scarse," grum-
bled Sammet at that time, "but because we don't utilize the opportunity to
extract more gasoline from the crude." The chemical ma.nager used a compari-
son with the United States to illustrate the old-fashioned manner in which ~
- German refineries produce: "In our country only 25 percent of the crude
is refined to make gasoline. In the United States it is more than 50 per-
cent." In fact there is a clear divergence between the petroleum products
- put out by the German refineries and the demand for oil products in the FRG.
Instead of extracting fuels and the chemical feed stock naphtha from the
more sparsely flowing expensive oil, German refineries are still completely
geared to ~~esterday's market: hEating oil. In contrast to the U.S. pro- ~ -
cessors, who have always adjusted their plants in accordance with the gaso-
_ line thirst of the gas guzzlers, the German refineries concentrate salely
on hame-owners, power produCers and manufac~urers, in order to lure them
away �roat the expensive, dirty and cumbersome coal with cheap, clean and
conv~nient oil.
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But even the first oil shock in 1973 signaled that due to the high cost of
this raw material and its incessantly soaring price future oil sales would
, no longer lie in the heating oil market~ but in transportation and chemistry.
Although the Bonn government made it unmistakably clear as early as 1974
with the prohibition on new oil-fueled power plants that it is wasteful to
use ug oil in heating, the petroleum companies delayed the urgently needed
conversion plants. These are capable of cracking, that is to say breaking
up, the less demanded heavy oil into gasoline naphtha.
Instead, the oil companies perfer to buy from abroad one-sixth of the gaso-
line needed in Germany and one-third of the chemical feed stocks needed,
and this is why they are at the mercy of the abrupt supply and price fluc-
tuations of the uncertain Rotterdam spot market.
The o~l industry furthermore prefers to use investments in coal processing
plants in order to prove to the public how much they care about tomorrow
(BP [British Petroleum]: "Forward, Back Into the Stone Age," Mobil: "Coal
Turns Into Super"). No wonder, for whilP the companies have to pay for
conversion plants out of their own pockets they can count on abundant gif ts
of money from Bonn for coal convers3on plants.
However, State Secretary Dr llieter von Wuerzen of the Federal Ministry for
Economics has already announced to the oil processors that the outspoken
partisanship for the competitor coal, so scorned yesterday, does not save
them from the overdue efforts for conversion: "It is much faster and econ-
omically very much cheaper initially tc replace the greater part of the
20 million tons of oil burned in industry to produce heat with coal and to
crack the released heavy heating oil into fuel than to extract the same
amount of fuel from coal l~.quefaction."
This economically correct sequence--first heavy oil conversion, then gasoline
from coal--has already been accepted by one oil manager. "Until the last
ton of heavy heating oil has been converted to lighter products," in the
opinion of the chairman of the board of Mobil Oil Corp. in Hamburg,
Dr iierbert C. Lewinsky, "liquefaction of coal makes little sense economically."
Lewinsky knows that with this insight he is sure to get the highest approval.
For already after the economic summit meeting in Tokyo last summer ChanceYlor
Helmut Schmidt complained about the dependence of the FRG on the "at present
very expensive imports from Rotterdam"--because "not enough cracking plants
are available in our country."
The Chancellor's rebuke encouraged Hoechst chief Sammet to scold his neigh-
boring branch of industry outright. In drastic words he read the riot act
to crude oil processors such as Shell, Esso, Caltex, Mobil Oil or Texaco,
saying that by no means are any spectacular pioneering deeds by entire gen-
erations of engineers necessary in order to modernize the 32 German refiner-
ies: "Conversion plants which can make gasoline out of heavy heating oil
can be brought off the rack. Hundreds of them are in operation in the United -
- States." ~
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Contrary to the opinion of the o:Ll companies, Sammet in no way considers the
conversian capacity of 26.1 million tons our of a total crude oil processing
of 147.1 million tons last year to be impressive: "It is mostly a matter of
thermal cracking plants, which only separate a small part of the heavy frac-
tions into nonvolatile ones." The top Hoechst man regards only hydrocrackers
_ and catalytic crackers to be "really efficient," and they are "not yet under
construction to any great extent." While the capacity of the catalytic
crackerswill practically stagnate at 9.6 million tons over the next 5 years,
the equipment of hydrocrackers in ~erman refineries will improve from the
present small figure of 1.8 million tons to an estimated 5.2 million tons.
How far the German crude oil processors thus lag behind the U.S. standard
is substantiated by the folloc~ing comparative figures: With the aid of
ultramodern heavy oil separators U.S. processors extract an average of 44.1
percent gasoline from a barrel of crude, while FRG plants are satisfied
with a scant 16.1 percent. The difference becomes even more evident with
- the example of one oil company on both sides of the Atlantic: In the United
States Shell extracts 48 percent gasoline from the crude used; the Shell
- refinery in Cologne-Godorf, on the other hand, gets all of 19 percent.
Late enough the German Shell Corp. has therefore chosen this oil distillery
as "the point of emphasis of our investment program during the first half
of the 1980's" (managing board member Hans-Georg Pohl) and intends to build
a heavy oil separation plant for DM 500 million which after the end of 1983
is to convert 600,000 tons of heating oil annually into chemical feed stocks
that are in great demand. -
In comparison with the United States most German refineries come off even
worse, even when a distinction is made according to the kinds of crude used
in each case. In order not to produce even more undesirably great shortfalls
the German processors until now have bought the lighest and most low-sulfur
grades of oil. However, these good grades make up only 15 percent of world-
wide resources. But in German refineries they have so far covered up to
45 percent of the need for raw material.
Pohl from Shell therefore freely admits thaC "we are already picking out the
best." Prof Wilhelm Keim, director of the Institute for Petrochemistry at
the Institute of Technology in Aachen, recognized: "We shut ourselves off
from the viscous oils because our refineries cannot process them."
This period of spoiled nibbling at the oil cake is likely to have passed
once and for all no later than the end of last year, because according to
an estimate by the Petroleum Industry Association (MWV) the world oil market
has turned around from "unabsorbed supply and a buyers' market to shaky
equilibrtum." To the general manager of MWV, Dr Hans-Joachim Burchard, this
means that "after this year the consumption of petroleum will constantly
drop . "
This results in a three-fold superiority for conversion of heavy oil into
gasoline. Such conversion plants are over due because they:
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--halt the bur:~ing of the expensive oil, which makes no sense from the view-
point of energy policy, and instead increase the supply of highly sought
gasoline and chemical feed stocks,
_ --can process any kind of crude oil, even the heavy oils, until now little
used in German refineries and
--even when the supply of oil decreases guarantee through an improved pro-
cessing structure that oil products remain sufficient where they are initial-
ly most difficult to replace: in transportation and in plastics factories.
But the German oil processors have wasted precious time. As early as 1 year
after the first oil crisis Bonn signaled that there must soon be an end to
the heedless burning of heating oil. The Third Electricity Conversion Law
of 13 December 1974 demands that every new power plant fueled by heavy oil
"requires approval." Since then there has been a"tacit gentlemen's agree-
ment," in force, according to the spokesman for the Association of German
Power Plants, Ernst Buck, not to build any new power plants based on heavy
oil.
Since the private users of oil heating practice the virtue of saving with
zeal and success and industry is rediscovering its old love for coal, the
oil companies are losin; ground in the heating market, while demand for
fuels and naphtha is increasing.
Thus, gasoline, with a 1.3-percent increase in sales last year, diesel fuel
- with a proud 10.3-percent growth and chemical feed stocks with a full
15.2-percent increase in demand emphasize their future chances, while yes-
terday's runners arrived among the "also-rans": Light heating oil dropped
0.5 percent and heavy oil showed an 0.6 percent increase in sales.
Because this change in the market caught the ~.erman refineries unaware,
they were forced to produce 22.3 million tons of heavy oil which is diffi-
cult to sell, and on the other hand they had to buy abroad what they could
have extracted themselves from their dead stock of heavy oil: 3 million tons
of gasoline, 3 million tons of diesel oil and 6 million tons of chemical
naphtha. The consumer pays the consequence at the pumps, as oil expert
Keim explains: "We in Germany must pay the prices demanded in Rotterdam."
With the analyzing sobriety of the scientist, Keim also reveals where the
weak point should be sought: "National interest and corporate interest do
not run in parallel."
Conversion plants are highly sensible economically, to be sure, but they
are a horror to the business administrator because they are extremely
expensive, above all the hydrocrackers, which run on costly hydrogen.
According to Keim's calculations, a capital expenditure of at least DM 10
billion is necessary in order to convert the present surplus of heavy oil in-
to fuel with such hydrocrackers.
!~l
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A second hurdle in the stepped-up construction of conversion plants is fig-
uratively called the "tip of the iceberg" by Dr Norman von Scherpenberg,
director of the Wintershall Refinery in Lingen on the Ems. To be sure,
everything favors more hydrocrackers, because their yield is "more suit-
able than transportation fuel." But Scherpenberg sees a problem which he
considers more important than the cost issue so highly touted by his com-
petitors: "A residue of extra-heavy heating oil remains, which is highly
sulfuric and cannot be burned according to today's environmental regulations."
- The Wintershall Corp., a BASF [Baden Aniline and Soda Factory] subsidiary,
_ by assuring itself of rare sales opportunities for the undesirable petroleum
coke, for example as electrodes for the steel and aluminum industry.
Wintershall therefore dared build a hydrocracker ahead of its competitors,
~~hich in view of the questionable prospects for return is to Scherpenberg
an "exemplary business achievement." Since this heavy oil conversion plant
began operation in October 1977, Wintershall possesses in Lingen Germany's
most modern refinery with a yield structure on a par with that of the ultra-
modern U.S, plants and "which the German refineries must also attain in the
long run" (Scherpenberg).
The timely investment of DM 270 million is already bearing fruit. It simul-
taneously belies the complaints of the competition that the oil companies
would be driven strai~ht into ruin. At Wintershall not only has the yield
of gasoline and chemical feed stocks doubled, but earnings before taxes
last year took the same powerful jump as well--totally in line with U.S.
standards.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
11949
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
FICTIONAL ACCOUNT OF WAR SEES FRANCE LOSING
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 4 Jul 80 pp 42-43
[Article by Philippe de Baleine]
[Text] This week the president of the republic makes
the big decisions on defense. That changes may be
necessary emerges from new developments in armaments
and.srrategy which lead to the fear, as this fictional
study shows, that if a war exploded today~ Europe
would not win--at least in the initial round.
Suddenly--and the suddenness reflects only our own blindness--France and
Europe realize that war is at their gates and that this war will almost
certainly be lost given the present state of forces and strategies. The
recent debates on defense in the Chamber .[of Deputies] or within the staff
of the parties shows that once again--as in 1940-~Frar,~e, facing a growing
military threat, hesitates between several strategie~. There are those '
who do not believe in the effectiveness of the anti-city strategy and
who grimly contemplate conventional battle with the use of tactical
nuclear weapons. And those who believe the threat of nuclear holocaust
is not credible for other reasons, and that it is necessary to prepare
for endless battles of armies on the borders. These academic discus-
sions are frightening. Do they not bear a similarity to those which,
before the last war, pitted defenders of the infantry battle against
defenders of the tank battle?
- When one no longer understands a military problem, it has become fashion-
able to use the imagination to visualize more c].early the scenarios in
their real dimensions.
Let us therefore "play out" the scenario of a war .[sometime in the period.~
1985-1990 in order to try to grasp where are the w~ak points in our
defense.
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Fok c~~~1l.1cLL u~~ VNLY
Machiavelli Would Find it Absurd
--First Scenario. The ~dest attacks the hussians.,.I have already shocked
you. This possibility is dismissed by the political philosophers of the�
Western democracies: they will never be first to attack, Machiavelli
would find it absurd, especially to announce it. This obviously invites
the enemy to economize on his defensive system and to concentrate his _
resources on the preparation of an offensive. So whatever may be the
outcome of the first scenario, we will send it back to the archives.
--Second Scenario. The Russians attack! This seems more plausihle. Their
strategists have often said their doctrine is to take the offensive "when
the interests of Soviet Russia are threatened." So, these conditions
Ueing met (to the satisfaction of the Soviet leaders, in any case) here
comes the attack. What happens? In the first 15 minutes of the attack, _
several hundred SS-20 missiles with multiple warheads with an accuracy
to within 100 meters strike NATO's 600 recognized strategic targets (stores
of n~.iclear warheads, fuel supplies, barracks, telecommunications center,
command center, etc.). Well now! The war is over! The Russian army
has only to occupy the cleared terrain. And the American strategic
missiles? Don't count on them. It is known that neither the Russians nor
the Americans will use these weapons so long as their territory is not
directly threatened. This was long suspected, by De Gaulle first of all.
- Your scenario is warthless, the Americans will say. Starting right off
with salvos of tactical nuclear weapons is not fair. The rules say to
start with conventional engagements. Tactical nuclear weapons are not
supposed to enter into the picture unless the situation becomes desperate
for one af the adversaries. Bigger and bigger ones will progressively
be put into play, strategic weapons being in principle excluded so long
- as the territory of one of the two great powers is not threatened, all
of which certainly seems to ignore the territory of Europe, as the de- .
bate on theater weapons proves.
The Americans Are Not Fools
This doctrine, called "flexible response, is the one invented by Mac--
Namara and Kennedy. As a result of this doctrine, personally held by
these two "strategists", the tactical nuclear weapons which Eisenhower
had stored in great quantities (7000 warheads} in Europe--at least the
most powerful of them--were brought back to the U.S.A. to prove to the
Russians that one will stick to the little ones at the outset. These
little rockets were dispersed in Germany so as to make them less vulner-
able. The Americans are not fools! But neither are they foals enough
to let them keep their nuclear warheads permanently. And what if a
fanatical officer set off one of these nuclear rockets or shells, un-
leashing a world war! Thus the nuclear warheads are stored separately,
in depots fiercely guarded by military security and perfectly targetted
by the Russians. In case of danger it is up to the President of the ;
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U.S.A. (not to the unit commanders or even to the commanding general, mind
you) to order the joining of the warheads to the vehicles. Thisa it seems,
will take sume 20 hours at most. But never mind this delay, however
deadly, since the rules of the game as defined by MacNamara-Kennedy are
that war begins with engagements of conventioal units, and that one only
arrives at tactical nuclear weapons through a gradual, prudent, well-
thought-out escalation.
Fverything would be perfect but for one small detail: the Russians, in
their completely narrow-minded way, have absolutely no eyes fo- the
beauties of "flexible response." To tell the truth, they don't even
seem to have ever heard of it. Marshal Gretchko~ supreme commander of
their armies, says on the contrary, with the bluntness of an old soldier~
that Russian military doctrine remains that of surprise attack with
tactical nuclear arms. General Zanyalov and Marshal Sokolovsky confirm:
"The path of the attacking forces will be opened up by nuclear fire." A
Soviet strategist, Colonel Sirodenko goes one better: "Nuclear attack
means a simultaneous attack on the full extent of the enemy's deployments."
To conclude: The first scenario being eliminated, and the second scenario
unfolding according to the anti-"flexible response" theories of the
Russians, NATO is then hit by instantaneous destruction of its defenses
and in particular of its nuclear warheads stockpiled in targetable deppts.
There Is No Third Scenario.
And what about the French in all this? you say to me. Concerning the ~
French tnere are two possible sub--scenarios within the second scenario:
First sub-scenario: French forces have taken part in the battle from the .
- start, on the German of Czech frontier. They have doubtless been de-
stroyed by the first Soviet salvo. They will perhaps have been able to
retaliate--feebly-~with the Plutos, supposing that, contrary to present
doctrine, these rockets were deployed beyond our borders,
The Russians Advance Through the Palatinate
_ Second sub-scenario: France remained outside of the conflict and passively
- observed the destruction of the NATO forces, The Russians advance
through the Palatinate toward its borders. If the Russians stop there, the
war is over. France is neither attacked noX invaded. It remains in-
dependent insofar as any independence whatsoever is possible for France
in an entirely Sovietized Europe. If the Russians don~t stop at the Rhine
and attempt to cross it, the doctrine of the Frenc.i general staff is
that we would then utilize our Pluto tactical missiles, as a warnin~, be-
fore escalating to anti-city nuclear weapons. The use of our Plutos
wo~ild clearly signify, "we intend to resist you to the end, that is to say,
all the way to nuclear holocaust."
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r~c~ ~rr..,__... .,o~ VL~LL
This doctrine totally rejects the theory, howevex reasonable it may be~
that the Russians, intending not to stop at our boxders, would have dis-
posed of our armed forces, our strategic points, and our Pluto regiments
in the initial SS-20 strike, reducing our potential to resist to nearly
nothing.
As to the credibility of the threat to use our strategic nuclear forces,
it is weak. First of all because it is not credible that the president
of the republic should take as equivalent the total destruction of France
and the destruction of a few Soviet cities. Next because such a threat
cannot be brandished unless it is supported by popular consensus. Do
the French believe still that death is preferable to loss of liberty? A
recent survey says not. 70 percent of the French pre�er loss of liberty
to :~uclear holocaust. An elected president cannot fail to take this
into accoiint when his finger is poised on the red button.
Moreover, the [effort toJ blackmail with the use of strategic missiles
is comparable to poker. It is a game of blind bets and bluff, where the
, players should be equal on the surface. Niarchos could play poker with
Onas~is, but not with a tanker captain. Let us examine, for instance,
the Cuban missile crisis, which from the start of the game was antangled
in nuclear blackmail.
What, therefore, were the factors present?
1. The two adversaries were obviously of equal power. They could each
destroy at least half the other. The threat was thus credible in terms of
the margin of survival. "I will go all the way, even if I lose half my
potential," they told each other.
2. They both knew that they would not do it, But as this was never said,
a douht remained. A small doubt, to be sure, but a small doubt where the _
stakes o~ere infinite, and that is equal to an enormous doubt...
3. Then, one of the two forced the betting. Kennedy moves to the first
stage nuclear alert status. The other hesitates, He does not call. He
wavers. Makes his calculations, looks at his cards. Will he raise? No,
he folds. It is much similar to the way Ghinese generals gave battle in
ancient times; meeting cexmoniously around a map of the battlefield, they
showed the numbers and th~. positions of their respective soldiers and
described the tactics they planned to employ. Following this exposition,
an arbiter proclaimed one of the two generals the victor. The loser,
wno had saved his troops and munitions, simply paid a tribute. But one
~ sees immediately that this game could not be played thus except between -
a~'versaries o� perceptibly equal strength.
Une can better see then why France cannot play at the poker of anti-city
strategq wi.th an opponent 10 times bigger. It simply cannot be, it would
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not be f.air, even setting aside the absense~ howevex important~ of popular
consensus for total destruction (liberty or death;).
What can we conclude from these diverse scenarios and the tragic ends
which they all offer us? 'Itao things are very clear; 1~ In case of war,
the side disposing of atomic weapons covering the entire extent of his
adversary's troop disposition, stores, and lines of communicationr has
a crushing advantage. 2) The side which is attacked only has one chance
of survival: to fire, during the 5-minutes' advance radar warning, a
tactical nuclear counter salvo to neutralize the enemy invasion forces
and the launching sites of the ss-20's, which the firing of the ss-20's
will have made targetable. This latter mission could only be fulfil~.ed
by medium-range missiles, of the Pershing type, that Europe does not yet
possess and which the Russians are adjuring it, with menacing force,
to renounce.
~ The miss-ion of destroying the invading enemy forces could also be ac-
_ complished by neutron bombs, which are fashionable currently and have
the virtue of sparing buildings, But why spare buildings if the salvos
are fired on enemy territory where the invasion forces are stationed?
The Supreme Art Is To Win the War Without Making War
This capability of instantaneous retaliation assumes that the Western
tactical nuclear missiles are constantly armed wiLh their nuclear war~
heads, and that the order to fire can be given at the divisional level.
These two provisos are absolutely contrary to official American, that is
to say N:~TO, doctrine. Everything is under lock and key, and only
Carter can make the decision to fire~-but with the fatal delay in execu-
tion of 20 hours. Therefore, the temptation is imsnense for the Russians ~
to attack a Europe which is defeated from the start and which the Ameri-
cans assuredly will not defend with their strategic weapons at the cost of
the almost total destruction of their homeland,
The temptation is still stronger for Europe to buy its survival with a
series of Piunichs. Russian geopolitical doctrine also takes its inspira-
tion from the precept of the Chinese strategists at the time of the war-
rior empires: "the supreme art is to win the war without making war."
Concerning policies unique to France, we have seen that, in case it did
not participate in NATO's battle, its security and independence would
depend, in the last analysis, on Soviet goodwill. An interesting gamble.
There remains one last chance: the construction on our borders of a new
"neutronic" Maginot Line, so dear to Colonel Genes_e. A viable idea on
condition that the line fully covers the Ardennes this time...And that in
the interval of 10 years during which it is construr_ted the adversary
does not make any technological advances rendering it obsolete. But
this is another story....
COPYRIGHT: 1980 par Cogedipresse S,A.
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PSF SEE'.J TARGET OF PCF'S ATTACK ON CFDT'S MAIRE
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 21 Jun 80 pp 87-88
[Article by Ghislaine Ottenheimer: "Maire Traps the PCF"]
[TextJ By associating Guy Mollet, the tortures in Algeria
and the leader of the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation
of Labor] with one another, the Communists are aiming at
_ the PS [Socialist Party]. And it is the PCF which Edmond -
Maire is putting on trial.
After the breakup of the Union of the Left, and after the bodily separation -
of the Communists and Socialist3, came the divorce. And the trial. On
Monday, 16 June, at Belfort, for the first time in the history of the French
labor movement, two of its representatives, one a Socialist trade union
- leader and the other a communist political official, are settling accounts
before thP bench.
The plaintiff: Edmond Maire, secretary general of the CFDT. He is accusing
the Belfort federal secretary of the PCF of defamation for his statements
made in the magazine COMMUNISTE: "Do Francois Mitterrand, Edmond Maire,
and Andre Henry believe that we have forgotten that they pacified Algeria
with flame-throwers, that they tortured the militants of liberty, and that
they seized the press which testified to it?" It amounts to treating Maire,
a leftist militant, like Pinochet! It is too much...
In the dock are: Jean-Marie Martin, the Communist official of Belfort. A
young man 34 years of age, with the look of a dynamic official with his
blazer and sky blue Oxford shirt. Standing behind the witnesses' and lawyers'
benches are many trade unionists in open collars: on one side the CGT
[General Federation of Labor] members, and on the other the CDTF members.
The accused Martin rises. Awkwardly, searching for words, he tries to defend
himself: "Of course the formulation was unfortunate." "Do you know that
Edmond Maire has never been in Algeria?" asks attorney Robert Badinter.
The muffled reply of the communist: "It was not Maire who was the target,
but the PS."
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"The PS was born 3t Epinay in 1971," continues the lawyer. "Do you know if
Edm~nd Maire belonged to the SFIO [French Section of the Workers International
_ (French Socialist Party)]?" Silence. Then Attorney Badinter pulls out of
his pocket a yelluw card of the PSTJ [Unified Socialist Party]: that of th~e
- leader of the CFDT in 1961. The PSU which precisely always agitated for
the independence of Algeria. Attorney Badinter continues his examination:
"Is any member of the PS who joined after Epinay therefore responsible for
the excesses committed in Algeria?"
Unruffled, Jean-Marie Martin repeats his lesson: "I want to speak of the
historic responsib ility of the PS." Atto rney Henri Leclerc, Maire's second
attorney, succeeds in disarming the accused:
"Did you forget the napalm and the flame-throwers when you campaigned for
Mitterrand in 1974?" Martin's lawyers then come to the aid of their client.
"Was it necessary to stir up the whole press over a poor choice of words?"
asks Attorney Jean-Paul Ratier benevolently. The CGT members applaud.
The CDT members protest. Badinter interjects: "Poor choice of words,
flame-throwers, tortures?". Attorney Pierre Braun, lawyer for the PCF,
interrupts: "If I said that Mrs Thatcher had had Joan of Arc burned, would _
- Mrs Thatcher feel defamed?" The judge is obligated to interrupt the debate.
"Threats Against Liberties"
During the trial neither the "innocence" of Edmond Maire during the Algerian
War nor the anticolonialist attitude of the CFDT-�-the CFDT of that time--is
brought into it.
Then why this vitriolic phrase of Martin? The business goes back to last
January. The secretary general o` the CFDT had had the courage to state,
after the CP has approved the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that: "The
attitude of the French Communist Party causes one to ponder the dark threats
to liberty if its representatives shoul 3 succeed to governmental
responsibilities." So! Young Martin, a bit too ardent, said he was thinking
of "giving a lesson" to "this hysterical anticommunist." I wanted to remind
those people of the responsibi:l~t;; of the PS for the Algerian War who say ~
today that the intervention of. the Soviets who came to support the progressive
forces of Afghanistan is an invasion," says the Communist leader. And
associating Guy Mollet, the PS, the to rtures in Algeria, and Edmond Maire,
he launched his murderous phrase. -
Did the leader of the CFDT have to go so far as to bring the matter before
the courts? "No!" says the PCF indignantly, "Especially at a tim~ when
four militants of the CRDT have been bro ught by the Alsthom leaders ta face
this same bourgeois justice." "The trial was imperative," retorts Maire,
adding, "It was the CFDT which the PCF was trying to injure. It appears
clear that our organization embarrasses the Communist Party. Through its
establishment among the workers, it is an i~ovable obstacle to the
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hegemc~ny which the PCF wants to establish over the working c1asG," It is
true that for the r".irst time the CGT lost its majority in the committee
_ of the Alsthom-Belfort cozporation.
"Dirty Hands"
Actually, through this trial with its nationwide echo, Maire hopes to atop
the continual PCF attacks against his trade union. The Communist Party has '
lost this trial in advance. In order not to lose face it tried to talk
b ack. Accused, it played the role of the victim: "The purpose of thi~
trial is to make it u trial of our party and to wash.the PS of something
indelible," explained a Communist witness, Henri Alleg, author of
"La Question," an account of the tortures whi~h he suffered in Algeria.
The many witnesses called to the bar by the CP recalled that Mitterrand
was minister of interior during the Algerian War, and that Guy Mollet and
the SFIO had "dirty hands." While they, the Communists, had shown exemplary
- behavior from the beginning. Doubtless forgetting that they had voted
full powers to Guy :~Iollet in 1956. Forgetting that the FLN [National
Liberation Forces] had reproached the PCF for not having rendered uncondi-
tional support.
The judgment of the court will be announced after the lawyers' summing up
on 28 June.
Passion is a poor servant of history when it wants to rewrite it. Belfort
distilled the bitterness. The confrontation of Attorney Badinter and
Attorney Braun, who had practiced side by side during the Algerian War,
was sad for the people on the left. Sad also was the spectacle of the ~
fo rmer resistance fighters or pro-FLN militants who, after having fought
together, testified against each other today. Sadder still than the little
phrases exchanged between Marchais and Mitterrand in the hemicycle of the
Bourbon Palace.
COPYRIGHT: 1980, S.A. Groupe Express
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PCF' S PRESS CRISIS EXt~~1INED
_ Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 14 Jul 80 pp 17-18
[Article by Michel Chamard: "The Communists--Pens at Liberty"]
[TextJ The communist press has also had a"rotten" summer. In 15 days, _
the daily newspaper L'HUMANITE lost a department head, the weekly _
REVOLUTION lost two deputy chief editors, while a third periodical went on
= strike. -
At the same time, the federal authorities responsible for publication of
the party journal, meeting in Paris on 28 June, congratulated themselves on
the results achieved by L'HtTMANITE-DIMANCHE but remained silent on the
situation in other sectors. The sales of L'HUMANITE dropped 8 percent in a
_ year, and REVOLUTION has anly 20,000 0~ the 53,000 subscri.bers sought.
The collapse of the union of the left and the 1978 legislative defeats -
caused a serious stir among the intellectuals in the PCF. Journalists were
no exception to the rule: since the month of March 1978, 10 of them have
leFt the staff of L'HUM~INITE.
The party leaders undertook to calm the storm by promising a certain freedom
of internal criticism. Last October, the merger of the weekly FRANCE
NOWELLE and LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE n~ade it possible to launch a new doctrinal
periodical, REVOLUTION, "the crgan closest to the aspirations of the intel-
lectuals in the class battle," the Central Committee called it.
The inva~ion of Afghanistan and the hardening of the PCF which was it.s _
corollary revived the disputes.
On Tuesday, 17 June, Mr Francois Hincker, one of the five deputy chief
editors of REVOLUTION, and a~ormer member of the Central Co~n3.ttee, sent a
letter announcing his reaignation to the managing editor of the periodical,
Mr Guy Hermier, a deputy for Marseilles and the member of the Political
Bureau ~f the PCF responsible for the intellectuals. 24r Hincker accused
his employer and one of his 13,eutenants, Mr Lucien Marest, of challenging
the promises of the Central Committee. "The issue is not personal, but
political," he wrote.
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The reason for his resignation was Mr Hermier's refusal to allow
Mr Hincker to respond iii REVOLUTION to an artic~e written by M~ Marest a -
week earlier. In his article, Mr Marest asserted the pri~~,y uf the
communist leaders over the intellectuals in the defini'..~~~ of a cultural
policy.
_ The following Saturday, Mr Aermier convoked the 60 members nf the editoriaZ
council of REVOLUTION: only 30 appeared. Tense atmosphere. Mr Hermier
and Mr Jean Burles, editor in chief, were isolated. No ~ournalist took the
floor, and the discussion de~eloped among outside contributors. -
Mr Claude Frioux, former president of the University of Vincennes, and
television producer Daniel Karlin denounced Mr Marest's "Zhdanovism"
(Zhdanov was entrusted by the Soviet communist party with the "guidance" of
communist intellectuals after the war).. They recalZed that the clash c+f
ideas was a principle acknowledged at the time thc periodical wa,s launched.
_ Historian Claude Ma7auric and Deputy Jack Ralite supported Mr Hermier's
good faith. It was then announced that a colleague, Mr Serge Goffard, was
- resigning, complaining of the lack of diseussion on the editorial level.
Mr Claude Prevost, deputy editor in ch3ef, decided to call a"writers'
strike.�
On Wednesday, 25 June, in the subuxb of Poissonniere, during an editorial
= conference at L'HUMANITE, Mr Raland Lexoy, managing editor ~f the newspaper
and deputy for Seine-Maritime, announced the resignation of
Mr Jean-Pierre Gaudard, head of the economi.c bureau, because of "profound
- and almost total disagreement ~~ith the present policy of the party."
Harsh Blow
A journalist with L'HUMANITE for 10 years, Mr Gaudard, 31 years of age, was -
the hope o~ the editorial board: a protege o~ Mr Leroy, it was said that
high posts would be his.
In a letter addressed to a number of comrades, Mr Gaudard complained of the
"deprofessionalization" and "disqualificat~on" of his newspaper. L'~NMANITE
is more and more regarded as "a sort of intexnal bulletin the construction
- of which involves the journalists less and less."
On 6 July, it was the turn of Mr Michel Cardoze, deputy editor in chief of _
REVOLUTION. Previously the political and then the cultural editor of
L'HUMANITE, Mr Cardoze did not get along well with Mr Leroy. He had gone
over to the weekly where he thought he would find an atmosphere mnre con-
sistent with his views. He said moreover that his resignation involved
personal reasons, "excluding any disagree~ent with the general policy of
the PCF."
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~~ox oFrzcr~ UsE orn.Y `
The resignations from the co~unist editorial board, following one after the
other, are a relatively recent phenomenon. Many journalists have held
responsible posts within the party organization. Mr Jean-Luc Mano, preaently
_ editor of L'HUMANITE, served as president of the UNEF [National Union of
French StudentsJ, as did Mr Guy Konopnicki, before 3oining FRANCE NOUVELLE.
But the association with non-communist journalists made possiblE a broader
approach to the outer world than was possible for the permanent workers
' within a close3 apparatus.
Mr Auguste Lecoeur, who left the PCF in 1954 after holding leading posts,
made the following comment.
"The extension of compulsory schooling e~plains in part why the party is
abandoned more readily today. Henceforth the militant has minimal baggage:
he is le~s ill equipped outside the party than we wauld have been."
F'or Mr Lecoeur, an unskilled miner, leaving the party meant finding himself
j obless at 43, with 3 children. �
"I hesitated to abandon the feeding trough," he admits.
What becomes of communist j~urnalists who break with the body of their -
colleagues? Mr Pierre Daix, former editor in chief of LETTRES FRANCAISES,
_ writes books and is contributing to a number of "bourgeois" newspapers.
Among other things, he writes a literary column in the QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS.
Mr Konopnicki also writes books, contributes a.rticles to LIBERATION and to
~ MATIN DE PARIS. Mr Claude Perdriel's daily Pwspaper has welcomed
Mrs Catherine Clement, a former cou~unist p~~~s~ ~ourn3list.
The communist party image is suffering from this flood of resignations. But
_ its leaders do not seem to be reacting very much. Less than a year away
from the presidential elections, it doubtless does not seem to them a bad
idea to face the competition with editorial teams purged of any "moody
journalists."
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COUNTRY SECTION � FRANCE ~
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UPC PRESIDENT SIMEONI INTERVIEWED
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 4 Jul 80 p 69
[Interview with Edmond Simeoni, president of the Corsican People Union, by
Florence PortesJ
[Text] [Question] You announce a new wave of violeace in Corsica. Is
this for this summer? '
[Answer] It is difficult to program violence but Corsica is more and more
_ subject to outrages upon the law: 3,000 in 15 years--please note this
figure--surging upward over the last few months, causing death among civil-
ians and gendarmes as well. The new fact, which will be irreversible--if
the present policy of repression perpetuates, if disrespect for Corsican
identity continues to deteriorate, and if political and social problems re- _
- main unsolved--is the wlgarization of violence in a country like ours where
people grow accustomed to it and where some of them take a liking to it.
As a consequence, younger generations will become engaged in violence and
women will take part in the struggle. Given Corsican sociological back-
ground, one can say that inevitably there will be civilian victims if re-
pression does not come to an end because that policy is the least adapted to ~
a country where everyone has a weapon.
[Question] Plans for Corsican economic development are many. Frenchmen re-
gard them as success stories. But for Corsicans they are flops. On which
side is the blame? ~
- [Answer] It is true that since the Aleria incidents France has consider-
ably increased its aid. For instance: 30 billion Fr have been releas~d
per year for transports. Result: unct.~~nged situation. The cost of living
remained 20 to 30 percent higher in Corsica than on the continent. Please -
ask the tourists whether prices on their bills have changed:
~ [Question] Thus where is money gone?
[Answer] Haven't you ever heard any talks abovt Corsican clans and ruling -
families? Here, we are in the Mediterranean....
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' t~OIt Oi~FIC(AL IrSF. !~NLY
[4uestionJ lietractors ot Corsica always cite these examples: share of
France in social action: 12 percent in Meurthe-et-Moselle, 88 percent in
Corsica; active population on the continent: 40 percent; in Corsica: 24 .
percent.
[Answer) That's right. Public money is not used on productive aectors.
Corsica is being turned into a reserve of unemployed people. Instead of
creating new jobs, France simply keeps Corsicans afloat through injections
of social aid distributed in proportion to ballots. Corsica would have
cost much less if companies had no headauarters in Paris: their AVT would
thus not be comptabilized to the benefit of the capital. As for petroleum
tax (50 bil:ion), it is not put to our credit as we11. Neverth~less,
despite all that, a Corsican costs Frar.ce 1.8 Fr only per year. But, the
habit of continually saying "it's expensive" will lead to sucin overstate-
ments as "it's very much expensive." Well, at that stade, Frenchmen would
became the most ardent partisans of self-determination.... This by the by
would not displease me. -
[Question] No kidding: How can you do without French assistance?
[Answer] It is you who are kidding. It has been said that Corsica is poor
' but what do you do with 400 billion former france coming from savings and
banking assets, three-fourths of which feeds the econamy of the continent?
And the 1.2 million tourists per year? Isn't a source of wealth? What
do they do to develop it?
[Question] The Corsican National Liberation Front (CNLF) speaks with bombs.
You speak with mikes. Toward the same goal, isn't?
[AnswerJ We conduct a political combat within the limitoof the law to
secure internal autonomy. The CNLF demane~.s independence through armed
struggle. There is no possible confusion.
[Question] Your movement has stagnated since two years.
[Answer] It seems to be at a standstill in the face of radicalization. The
economic crisis is more strongly felt in Corsica than elsewhere. My com-
patriots accustomed to leaving the country no longer find traditional
colonial outlets, nor jobs on the continents. Then what do the youths? -
They do not take refuge in activities patterned after Italy's Red Bri~ades
because Corsica is allergic to leftism. Then in the face of the only ad-
venture proposed to them: to be subsidized middle Frenchmen, they have to
prop up violent movements for claims. However, our movement is structuring.
We are 1,500 trained militants, who can use a gun but don't want to use it.
The idea of autonamy progresses. Twenty years ago: talks about regionaliza-
tion provoked smiles, Now, there is straight-forward talk about a Corsican
nation and about decolonization.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 by Cogedipresse S,A.
9213
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
GROUND FORCES GET FIRST SA-342k~ HELICOPTER
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 14 Jun 80 pp 33-34
[Article by Jean de Galard]
[Text] Last Monday, 9 June, the official cerempny took place at Marignane
marking the delivery by Aerospatiale [National Industrial Aerospace CompanyJ
to the Ground Forces of the "Gazelle Hot" SA-342M helicopter, 128 of which
have been ordered by ALAT (Ground Forces Tactical Air Support). In the
_ presence of representatives of the principal industrial firms which took �
part in carrying out the "Gazelle Hot" program and of many military
personalities, Mr Roger Chevalier, general manager of Aerospatiale, ~
presented the keys for a Gazelle 342M he~icopter, serial number 3,475, to _
General of Engineers R. Guenod, director of the Technical Department of
Aeronautical Pro grams, who then passed them on to Brigadier General Rabot,
deputy chief (operations) of the Ground Forces General Staff.
Aerospatiale representatives present included: Legrand, mar.ag~r of the _
helicopter division; Carayon, manager of the Marignane establishment;
Allier, manager of the engine division; Petit, manager of helicopter studies,
and Mouille, deputy manager; Besse, manager of flight tests; and Pasquet,
chief test pilot. The Turbomeca company was represented by its general .
manager, Mr Pertica; Westland, by Mr Frost; Crouzet, by Mr Kholer; and .
SFIM [expansion now known], by Mr Bloch.
General Rabot, representing the chief of the Ground For~es General Staff,
was accompanied by Brigadier General Maurice Cannet, commandant of the Ground
Forces Tactical Air Support, and Colonels Bailleux and Sommervogel. General
of Engineers Colin, director of the Flight Test Center, was accompanied by ~
Chief Engineer Foucher, while Chief Engineer Meyer represented the southeast
directorate of the Industrial Armaments Department (SIAR). Chief Engineer r
Dujois represented the Technical Directorate for Ground Armaments, and
Principal Engineer Guimonet represented the Teleco~unications and Aero-
nautical Equipment Technical Service.
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The Ground Forces, First Customer of Aerospatiale and the Biggest Still Today
In his welcoming speech, Mr Legrand stressed the part played by the Gro und
Forces in the success of helicopters developed by Aerospatiale. "The label
_ ALAT is not only an important sales point, but also, in most cases, a
necessary condition for sale." He recalled, moreover, that the French
Ground Forces remain the first customer of Aerospatiale both from the
chronological viewpoint and that of importance: first because of the
number of units ordered, and next because of its level of competence. The
fact that ALAT put its doctrine of aeromobility into practice led to its
acquiring unequaled experience in everything pertaining to the use of
helj_copters. In conclusion, M-r Legrand expressed the wish that the spirit
of cooperation shown throughout the carrying out of the Gaz~lle/Hot program
between the army and manufacturers, as well as among the constructor
countries (France, Great Britain and the FRG) will continue to develop.
Mr Roger Chevalier introduced the SA-342M not only as a variant of the SA-341
but especially as a modern antitank helicopter "of modest size but exemplary -
character," a fine illustration of what can be accomplished within the
limits of a reasonable budget and acceptable delivery schedules when
manufacturers and their customers are motivated by a common will to achieve.
Addressing himself to the representatives of the chief of the Ground Forces
General Staff, and of the technical director of aeronautical constructions,
the general manager of Aerospatiale made a point of stressing "a very
important point for accomplishment of this system of first-generation anti-
tank weapons." Aerospatiale, Mr Cheval~er continued, has responsibility
for both vehicle and armament. "Our company is in fact one of the rare
world~oide manufacturers who ~can take complete .:esponsibility, vis a vis the
client, for the overall s~spply through its helicopter division, aircraft
project manager and its tactical weapons division.
"I know that your considerations will lead you to select a manufacturer
who will be responsible, for future series of the SA-342M, for good functioning
of the weapons system as a whole.
"Today, in the presence of Messrs Legrand and Allier, I am able to assure
yau that my company is ready to reply favorably to such a desire."
In his speech, General of Engineers Guenod stated that all the SA-341
helicopters had been "made able to carry the Hot antitank weapon" and that
the SA-342M, thanks to an extension oi the area of its use (aptitude for
night combat in particular), is a true weapons system, having been the
object of detailed studies made to reci>>ce its "detectability." In concluding,
he called attention to the importance of purchase and commissioning costs in
any pro gram of this type.
General Rabot discussed the subject of antitank combat, "destined to last
a long rime yet, whatever theater of operations is envisaged"; he expressed
the idea that "dissuasion rests on a group of coherent forces" and he
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formulated the wish that the cooperation shown throughout carrying out of
the Gazelle Hot program will be found again "for the future mode~ which will ~
see the light of day at the end of the 1980's."
Well Adapted to Antitank Combat
Successor to the Alouette III/A.S. 11/ antitank helicopter system, the
Gazelle Hot SA-342M is a clearly improved versiou of the Gazelle SA-341.
It profits, with respect to the latter, from a strong reserve of power (870 _
French horsepower [1 French horsepower = 75 kilogram meters/second] instead
of 600 French horse-power), and from an increase of 100 kilograms in the
maximum weight. Its Astazou XIV M turbine of Turbomeca has automatic
starting, high-energy ignition and an all-fuel regulator. The definitive -
- version includes a jet deviator, which reduced infrared emission. The unit
is equipped with an SFIM 85G automatic pilot and an autonomous navigation
system whose main elements are: a Doppler RDN-80B radar (Marcel Dassault
Electro nics); a Nadir navigation calculator (Crouzet); an IP 152 polar
indicator (Crouzet); a gyromagnetic compass (SFIM); a 201 temperature probe
(Crouzet); a 51 compensated anenometer (Crouzet). Moreover, the cockpit
lighting was adapted to allow night flight with small-channel binoculars.
An Efficient System
The helicopter-missile weapons system is today considered to be the most
effective of all antitank combat methods. The reasons for this superiority ~
are both tactical (immediate availability of the helicopters and thus
very short delays before going into action; rapid concentration or dispersion
of antitank action) and technical (great "drive" and high ~recision of the
missile; location and identification of the target as well as very high
probability of reaching it). The French-German Hot antitank missile
constructed by Euromissile (Aerospatiale-MBB [expansion not known] coopera-
tion) has a 400-4,000 meter range of fire and can pierce all existing armor -
plate. An SA-342M with four Hots could halt the progress of six tanks.
The 128 SA-342M helicopters will be delivered between 1980 and 1985, in
annual series of about 20 units.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1980
5586
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
'SYLA-20' LASER-CONTROLLED 20-MM GUNS TESTED SUCCESSFULLY
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Jul 80 p 35
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "SYLA Gun Fire Control System")
[Text] Thomson-CSF's SYLA twin 20-mm weapon system with laser fire control
recently successfully completed its first tests. It will be available on
- the market very shortly. Designated SYLA-20, this system is of modular
design so as to be adaptable to any type of vehicle of suitable tonnage.
Specifically, it can be mounted on the Crot~le type electric-wheeled
armored vehicle whose great cross-country mobility, notably in sand, have
prompted its relection by many countries. This version of the SYLA 20 could
complement Crotale [surface-to-air missile] units deployed in local defense -
systems whose very short-range ground and air close-in defense can thus be
provided in a well-knit context of mobility and operational and lagistic
complementarity. In such a defense eystem, the Crotale's acquisition
vehicles would furnish early warning and target designation support to the
antiaircraft guns.
Thomson-CSF also produces twin 30-mm antiaircraft weapon systems,
equipped with the Oeil Vert [Green Eye] fire control radar, for the
static defense of key points as well as the mobile protection of armored
- units. Thomson-CSF is currently mass-producing the twin 30-mm weapon system,
equipped with laser-radar fire control and TV tracking units, to be mounted
on the French AM~C-30 tank chassis. It is also planned to mount this twin
30-mm gun systPm on the German SPz Marder tank as well as on any wheeled
or tracked vehicle capable of carrying the BT-30 turret whose relatively ~
light weight (8 tons) makes it highly suitabl? for a wide range of vehicles
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1980
- 8041
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
OUTLINE OF ONERA 1980 PROGRAM CONCLUDID
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 21 Jun 80 p 18
[Text] We examined the topics of ONERA research in the field of aeronau-
tics (aircraft) in our issue number 814; the article published in Air ~
Cosmos number 815 was devoted to work related te rotary wings, turbo
engines, and related components; we now complete this survey with a look at
the bureau's work in the field of missiles and space.
With 145 million francs for operating expeases, which is 28.5Y of the
planned budget for 1980, strategic and tactical miasiles and their asso-
ciated equipment occupy a considerable place in ONERA's activity. Sowever,
a good part of the work is classified so it is acarcely possible to discusa
it in detail.
- In the f ield of strategic missiles, thc work in questioa obviously is re-
lated to the futtrre M4 missile, especially the re-entry portion (wiad
tunnel tests in progress).
The ASMP (mediuurrange air-to-ground missile) will be propelled by a liquid-
fuel statoreactor. The ONERA is thus continuing its work in this field,
with which it is well acquainted. This work is directed by the Department
of Energy and by the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies (D.E.S.) and
is coordinated by the D.A.M. (Department of Military Applications of the
- Atomic Energy Commission).
Still in the propulsion field, the ONERA, in cooperation with the SNIAS, is
continuing its work on the statorocket, composed of a statoreactor combined
with a gas generator, the fuel being stored in eoli3 form. This is a new
concept, initiated and developed by the bureau's engineers, and it appears
very interesting.
The space f ield obviously has two aspects: one dealing with launchers and
one with satellites. The Bureau has par*~ci~ated appreciably in several .
fields in the development of the Ariane launcher, including study of the
Pogo effect, the launcher's aerodynamics (attempts to reduce drag),
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determination of noise level, etc. The work on the Pogo effect, for
example, is being carried out in collaboration with the CNES, the SNAIAS
and the SEP. The results obtained are interesting and very positive, since
the Pogo effect is nil at the first-atage level and weak at the second-
stage level. The phenomenon has now been completely mastered, and France
_ is in the lead with respect to the knowledge that has been gained.
The work on noise level at the satellite's outer shell and through the
latter is the result of studies r_arried out on the changes in wideband
pressure passing through the structure. The contracts are let by both the
ESA and the CNES. This is a model appl~cation of basic and applied re-
search giving excellent results. It is of great importance because it con-
sequently allows making calculation concerning the atxucturea of the
satellites, which are sub~ected to a harsh environment (about 180 decibels).
Another example of work which allowed highly sophisticated equipment to be
developed is that on ultrasound-measuring meters developed in cooperation
with Crouzet and which allow the precise measurement of ergol levels in
order to obtain optimum distribution, especially toward the end of a
motor's operation.
Again with respect to Ariane, the work in progress deals of course with
the detailed analysis of the results of the f irst launchings. Longer-term
work is related to studies of cryogenic moters powered by ergol which can
be stockpiled (uneven combustion, etc.) with the idea of developing a
family of Arianes; to recovery of the first stage; to aerodynamics, etc.
We might also mention here the HERMES and MINOS programs.
The work on satellites deals with several sectors; the corresponding general
activity is centered at the CERT and deals with the development of space
technology: a study of the effects of the space environment on the satellite
and its components (aging), effect of ionized particles on the latter (for
example a decreasing yield of the solar cells with time), loss of function -
of the thermal coatings, etc.
The DERTS is also studying electrical phenomena encountered on satellites
of the "Symphonie" and "Meteosat" types and which are expressed, for example,
in the form of inappropriate telecommands. The same department is studying
the behavior of balloon coverings in harah atmospheres (work on VENERA).
The DERO is studying charge-transfer detectors and the systems which will
be used on observation satellites to detect light (photodiodes) and
particle (photon) counters and is supplying the CNES with technical assis-
tance for Project SPOT. In the military f ield, the ONERA is taking part
in preliminary studies on the future SAMItO satellite.
The bureau's grating spectrometer will be used for the study of infrared
radiation on the Spacelab, while tests are being carried out on a balloon _
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at up to 40 1~ altitude. Aircraft tests should also be mentioned (STRATO~
experiment with the Caravelle) which are being carried out in cooperation
with the National Weather Service, and the LIMS experiment (an~lyais of
the results obtained by the NIM}3US satellite). In general, the grating
spectrometre belonging to Andre Girard is proving to be one of the world's
best; it permits analysis of the minor conponents of the upper atmosphere,
even in trace amounts. The work related to the study of the environment
and climate is based on a better knowledge of these phenomena, whence the
importance of this work.
In clos ing, let us mention a feasibility study of a"Super Cactus"
presently under way for the ESA whose purpose is to measure the earth's
radiation halance (Pro~ect BIRAMIS) and to carry out precise tra~ectographic
and rotational measurements of the earth.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C., 1980
8838
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Le.'v
_ COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
BRIEFS
CORSICAN 'COMMANDO' IN MARSEILLE--The National Liberation Front of
Corsica (FLNC) has established a"commando" unit in Marseille. This group
of approximately six members is prepared to take military actian. This
move constitutes a complete change in FLNC strategy. With its population of
- 120,000 Corsicans, Marseille is France's largest Corsican city and up to
now has served as a refuge and meeting.place for Corsican separatists. In
fact, the Corsican independence movement has held several summit meetings
in that city. Only Paris and the Paris region have experienced nights of
Corsican instigated violence. Now the independence movement wants to "bring . ~
the fighting into the enemy's territory." A pretext for such action atill
has to be found. For example, a rather stiff sentence given FLNC militants
_ by the State Security Court. [Te~tt] [Paris L'ERPRESS in French 28 Jun 80
p 68] 8041
ENERGY GDR ESPIONAGE TARGET--It is more complex than the investigators
expected.�--more serious also. The espionage ca~.~ which provoked the
expulsion of two East German diplomats, disclosed last week by L`EXPRESS,
is surprising because of its breadth. Documents were stolen from the
Ministry of Industry. They relate to French petroleum exploration in '
Africa. An employee of a petroleum institute is in prison. But the East
German spies were interested in other French energy sources--the nuclear
ones. [Text] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 7 Jun 80 p 130] 5586 _
NEW MISSILE--The builders of "SATCP," the new very-short-range ground-to-
air missile for the French army, may be chosen very soon, perhaps in June
or early July. Of the four bidders for the pro~ect, only Aerospatiale
and Matr~ are still in the race; Thomson-Brandt and the SEP were succes-
sively eliminated after examination of their bids. Three types of "SATCP"
may be produced: one for the infantry, one for sitE~ defense (transportable
type) and one for ground vehicles. A naval type is also under considera-
tion. The missile would in principle be for the three military services
and especially for antiaircraft defense, but antihelicopter defense is
also being considered. The "SATCP" would have a range of several kilo-
meters. [Text] [Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 21 Jun 80 p 30] 8838
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COUNTRY SECTION SWEDEDT
DEFIIVSE MINISTER KRONMARK: WEAKIIVING TO CONTINUE
Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 5 Jun 80 pp 56, 57
_ [Interview with Eric Kronmark, defense minister, by Lars Eklund, ~ournalist: '
"Kronmark's prescription for savings : Increased fi~t against the dePense
bureaucracy"]
[Text] "A minister of defense is not supposed to be popular
am~ng his own. He sha11 call for productivity ,just as
any other corporation manager." So says Erik Kronmark
who will be exposed to haxd pressures to contribute
. to the cutting of goverriment expenditures. In the short
run, he does not have any worries about the credibility
of the Swedish defense. And, among other things, he
points out possibilities for rationalization by utilizing
services "across the borders between diPferent military
service branches and different kinds of troops." "We
will have to start thinking along new lines and slaughter
some holy cows."
[Question] Can Sweden, in en economic crisis that necessitates a severe -
restraint in private as well as in public constunption, maintain a credible
dePense force?
[Answer] We cannot get the additional contributions needed to reach the
aims of the defenae resolution of 1977� That would imply an increased
allocation by one billion crowns (in fixed prices) annually. In ~
,judgcnent an increase in the expenditure ceiling by at least the same size
as in 1977, in addition to a restructuring of our peace- and war organization, _
would be required to sustain the fighting force necessary for our policy -
of neutrality to remain credible. _
It is true that the defense forces will suifer a we~kening in relation to
those of foreigii countries compared to the present situation - but they
will remain strong during the first part of the Eighties thanks to the
heritage from the.Fifties and the Sixties, the decades of growing supplies
of equipme:~t for the armed forces. We s~ill have one of the strongest air
forces in Eux-c~pe .
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~
I'UtC Ur f 11.1t~L UJ~ IJIVL~
[ Question ] Fate appor~tions her favours uneven~jr - as for example when a
member of parliement for the Moderates jConservatives] forgets ~"~out the
voting on the defense issue...
[Answer] As it turns out there Will not be a~y unforseeable consequences _
folloking from this unfortunate drawing by lot. The coming fiscal year
is financially secured. So it wi11 go totally e,cccrding to plans . The
Government is als o firmly committe d to ful filling the res olut ion o f 1977 .
- There may be some paper-w~rk, but when it comes to the military substance
the Government stands firm.
[Question] Is Jan Myrdal right: we ase now in a situation, which is -
weirdly similax to the last years of the Thirties? ~
[Answer] As you know he is not the only one ~th such thoughts - Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt, among others, has entertained similar trains of thought.
And if you have a disposition to draw historical parallels you could easily =
find support for the +hesis saying that great powers after some successes
get an increased stimu7~as to go furtl2er.
[Question ] During the wage negotiations many people complained about a "
lack of awaxeness of the crisis in Sweden. Maybe we are equall,y unaware
of the increasing tensions in world politics?
[Answer] We have a certain tendency of screening off ourselves . The world
around us is ~lear about the radical change in the international situation.
We were awakened by the events in Iran and Afghanistan - but the cold snap -
occurred alread,y in the mid-Seventies .
Taking a divergent opi~ion from many observers it seems as if a great
nlunber of Swedes think that the situation has returned to normal.
The 1980's will probably be characterized by continuing sharp tensions
between the blocs - primari'y in relation to the struggle about the oil, a
struggle which will not abate but instead cu].minate some time during the
- 198G~s.
These conflicts in world politics will in a]1 probability lead to increased
rearma.ment on both sides.
[Question ] NATO's storing of a:rms in Norway and Denmark - the Russian_
concentration of forces in Murmansk and on the Kola peninsula?
3
~ [Answer] Earlier NATO- plans concerning the defense of Norway and partly
~ as regards Denmark were based on the West`s dominance of the seas. As a
result of the spectacular expansion of the Soviet fleet this dominance
has now become part of history. The strategic balance in the Norwegian Sea
has been :hif`ted - in a ma,~or conflict receiving supplies by the Sea will _
- be difficult . It is easier to transport people. That is why NATO finds it
neccesary to store arms in advance.
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Foreigr. observers now ask if a reduced Swedish defense capacity could
create a dangerous vacuu.,~. i~{y reply to this is that our striking power
is not reduced in real terms within th.e borders of Sweden, only in
relation to the world around.
"We are strong enough not to yield to pressures"
[Question] And this makes us more susceptible to pressures and demands
from abroad?
[Answer] We still have a defense, st rong enough for us not having to yield
to pressures . This colultry cannot be sub jugated by a simple operation - it
would require a~assive effort, even by a major power.
Our threshold of credibility shall be such that the Swedish defense capacity
does not invi.te presst:ses:
[Question] The inviolability of the Swedish aa.r territory: Can w;-~ Y,~ndle
cruise missiles an their way toward targets in another country?
[AnswPr] According to international law we have an obligation to uphold the
Swedish air territory. It will take some time before the cruise missiles
will become operative - but we know that already our Viggen-system has the _
~ capability to discover and to bring down ths missiles. That capacity, among
others, we must have and, preferably, reinforce. -
[Question] The total conflict, is it possible - including intercontinental -
nuclear bombaxciment?
[Answer] Even if circumstances lead up to a conflict this does not have
to imply a total conflict - as long as both sides have second strike
capability the balance of terror re~ains a reality. That is wY~jr I think
flzture corflicts will be limited. The United States did not revert to
~ nuclear arms in Vietnam - this was not even considered when the entire
prestige of the nation was at stake and defeat beceme increasingly
recognizeable .
There are certain signs of common sense shown by political leaders - even
when it comes to ma~or powers in a situation of crisis.
[Question] If there is a big crash, where will it take place - in the
Middle East?
- [Answer] The center of risx is right there - a.mong other things this is
evident from the strong concentration of nava_l units, which is taking place
in the Arabic waters outside the Gulf a.nd to the south. But many people
point to the fact that military strategic conditions there are complicated
for the two super-powers. Limited possibilities f~ir keeping bases and long
distances to cover.
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If a ma~or conflict develops attention is directed toward Europe, where the
major forces are located.
[Question] A number of years ago a military defector from the East stated
that the Soviet Union estimated that 48 hours would be required for
completing an occupation of S~reden. What is the reaction of a minister of
defense to such talk?
[Answer] Science fiction: Such a plan, if it exists, is not credible.
Sweden is a large country - and we still have a respectable defense. I have
said it before: A coucprehensive effort would be required to break the
Swed.ish resistance.
[Question] The concentration of forces in the North and the Norwegian f,jords -
maybe attractive as submaxine bases?
[Answer] Trying to look e.t things in an ob~ective ma.nner, it may in some
circumstances be in the interest of the East to expand the protection zonE
for the b ase at Murn:ansk. Naturally, the West has also an interest in getti~g
as close as possible to it. That is part of the Atlantic strategy. A further
factor is the oil shortage which has made the Northern part of the Atlantic
Ocean outside Norway even more interesting.
But, from a Swedich point of view, we should look upon Murmansk as being
p art of the strategic expansion of the super-power.s. At present the world's
largest military base is located there, and in a certain situation the West
may wish to attack it. But, we should not consider the base as being
specifically pointed toward us - it is pointed toward the large sea. This
means that the possib ilities for us to receive supplies in the event of a
major conflict will be highly reduced in relatir~n to the last great war.
"Impossible to support a non-military aircraft industry without a military
- basis?
[Question] Do we fray our neutrality at the ed~es if we develop the JAS-NY
aircraft in cooperation with a NATO-country? Mey Wechselmann thinks so.
[Answer] We have never built a car in this country without forei~3n parts.
And no aircraft either. Materially speaking, Viggen is 30 per cent foreign
and presumably JAS will have the same propc~rtions if this aircraft is
developed.
There is no reason for us Swedes to start inventing things that alreac~y have
been invented:
We must bu}r an increasing number of module: systems from abroad. And if the
intention is to build an aircraft which w:ill remain modern also in the
future there is a need of module systems ~zot yet at hand. Consequently
it is reasonable to enter into development cooperation with an aircraf~t
industry abroad.
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{~rfl~ ~)t~;~ It: i!~L !~5f'. r,NLY
::i.i~ : ili~t1 ;:ii;ti - i,..~: I.t~ttil ;;;y~StE:it1 - 4Ii11 S ~ay Swedish and 11T11Ci11@ t0 US
and to our conditions and circUmstances. We wi11 not have to pay for excessive -
= performance characteristics we do riot need. We will ret~.in a technical skill
which is the fundamental condition for a non-military aviation industry.
Because there does not exist any serious aviation industry which does not base
its existence on military production.
All logical reasons indicate that we should concentrate our efforts on a
plane which satisfies our Swedish specifications and is within our specified
economic ceilings. I believe our aircraft industry is able to meet the
challenge - if not, we will, of course, have to turn to the international
market - whereby, regrettably, domestic civil aircraft construction would
decline. Some debaters reall,y show a touching concern for our neutrality.
- According to their views, we shall not have ar~y air planes at all. As a
matter of fact, a neutral country must maintain a national air force. It is,
of course, of additional value if the air planes are Swedish.
[Question] Be that as it may - when the fat really is in the fire we will
stand there without any planes to buy from abroad nor anp~ m4dule system to
- acquire. That is what happened the last time.
[Answer] We wi11 have to stock as much imported components as possible. Or
we will have to follow the practice from the blockades during the Second
_ World War: to start "pirate - production."
[Question] How to maintain an efficient defense when expenditure ceilings -
turn tight?
[Answer[ By f~rther rationalization of the peace organizstion: by utilizing
services across the borders between different military service branches and
,different kinds of troops. A century of thinking along territorial lines may
- be difficult to erase - but it can be done. Some years ago, we cut the higher
staffs down - reducing personnel by 30 per cent. The result was a clear
success.
We will have to start thinking alon~ new lines and slaughter some holy cows. ~
_ A minister of defense should not aim at being popular among his own - r~e
shall call for productivity just as any other corporation ma,nager.
I am no friend of extensive studies with many decimal points: it is better
to go straight to the heart of the matter - this amount of money is
available to us, that much is your sh~re. Start solving the task of how
to defend Sweden. It is surprising to see the amount of fresh thinking that
crops up once some r~gid red tape is removed.
[Question] Is the aircraf'~; issue a young cuckoo in the nest of the Swedish
defense?
[Answer] Al1 systems may, of course, be regarded as young cuckoos - not
_ because of the development of the military forces h�at on ~.~count of Sweden's
~
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dilernma as regarcis its domestic econo~qy. Is the universal military training
a young cuckoo? It is expensive, i.a. due to regulations relati~:g to working
time and the development of wages and salaries. But it is needed because we
have a sma11 population living in an extensive country: we need a relatively
large number of military units.
But here we face a dilemma - and when choosingbetween many units�with obsolete
equipment and fewer units with good materials we have to choose the latter.
� Iluring the last days of the Second World War a certain Mr Grofaz was sitting
in his concrete shelter in Berlin co~nanding armies that only existed on his
own maps .
- The Swedish military force must not lose touch with real life: our units
shall have a modern equipment. Juggling with out-dated brigades does not
deter any potential enerqy.
[Some personal characteristics of Mr Kronmaxk]
Does not give in to political complications.
A characteristic feature of Eric Kronma,rk, Minister of Defense, ~+9 years old,
is that he is very stubborn. An example of this is his ability to - ti.me and
again - infuse fresh life into the Swedish aircraft pro~ect, which af'ter every
crash in the Riksdag has been rigged up again and reintroduced into the
debate with a partly new content .
That is wY~y it is not absolutely certain that Eric Kronmark will accept the
factual consequences oi the voting mistake of Per Unckel, his party brother
and colleague as a Member of the Riksdag, trimming the planned appropriations
for the defense during the next 5 year period by tko billion crowns. As a
result of this, total approvriations were reduced from 68.2 billion crowns,
as proposed by the Government, to 66.2 billion crawns, as proposed by the -
Social Democrats.
The voting mista.ke will in all probability be amended by a supplementary
Government bill.
COPYRIGHT: Ahlen & Akerlunds tryckerier, Stockholm 1980.
9608
CSO: 3109
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COUNTRY SECTION SWEDEN -
COMPANIES PUSH OIL SEARCH IN GOTLAND, ABROAD
Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 29 May 80 pp 25,27
[Article by Ake Landquist, ~ournalist: "At last - the Swedish hunt for oil
accelerates by the putting up of 100 million Sw~edish crowns as starting
capital."]
[Text] Not until after two oil crisises has the S~redish
oil search accelerated. The Seventies became a lost
decade. A special state-financed fund has only been h.alf-
used and so far the results of the oil prospecting during
a whole decade have only been some splashes of oil fram
Gotland. Now, the state grants for oil prospect�ing will
be amended - the goal is prospecting for 100 million crowns
annually.
S~aedish oil prospecting is beginning to get started. The number of
prospecting rights is growing, the number of drillings also. The 1980's
may be the deCade when Sweden itself finally produces some of' the oil on
which the country is so dependent. Sweden has the largest dependence on
imported oil of all the industrialized countries in the worl d(on a
per capita basis).
There had to be two oil crisises - 1973/7~+ and 1978/79 - before serious
S~redish oil prospecting got started. The 1970's were characterized by
lacking Swedish prospecting policies. "We let the trains pass us by.
The effort was totally insufficient. Sweden on~}r spent a fraction
compared to what the competitors did," says Bo Ekman, President of Volvo
Petroleum.
"Did we have ar~y prospecting policy at all?" says another critical oil
- compar~y director.
The 1970's meant a lost decade when it ca.me to Swedish oil prospecting.
But toward the end of the decade the establishing of guidelines got
started. The goal was laid down in the energy bill proposed in Maxch, 1979,
by the I,ibera,~ Party Government with Carl Tham as the responsible minister
of energy:
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FOh ~~FFICTAL i15~' 0.1LY
Oil prospecting at a level of 100 million crowns annually from and
including 1980/81. Even though this goal will not be achieved implies
a significant improvement.
The st arting point is 1978. Then, spending for prospecting were about 30-40
- million crowns aniii;ally. That yeax, an oil prospecting ftind was established
to which the corporations were allowed to apply for grants to oil prospecting
in accordance with a new set of rules for grants. At the same time the
Government decided to concentrate state prospectin g spending to a central
base organization within the state-owned oil compa.ny Svenska Petroleum. At -
present, SP Exploration AB constitutes this organization. -
The ftiuid is financed through a special stockpiling fee on oil. Finn this,
4 crowns per cubic meter heating oil and diesel (but not gasoline) go to
the flind. Since the start on July l, 1978, the ftiind has re~eived a total
amount of about 180 million crowns. At present, the balance is somewhat
above 100 million crowns. Around 80 million crowns h ave been disbursed. All
funds except for 700,000 crowns have been used for oil prospecting by the
- state.
Only one private company has received any money: A Johnson Exploration for
prospecting on the British North Sea shelf. One company has been turned
down: Salens Ehergy fo r prospecting in Turkey. The reason was that Turkey
has put a ban on the export of oi:1.
The cardinal rule for receiving a grant is that the oil that may be found
or at .;.east most of it is to be shipped to S~aeden. The general grant covers _
50 per cent of the prospecting costs. For prospecting by the state a
speciel gre~nt of 100 per cent may be available. In this case all the
proceeds are to be paid to the Government. "This is a form of co~ission work,"
says Lars H~ort, Dep~zty Under Secretary and Head of the Energy Section of the
Minist ry of Industry.
Up to now the general grant h as been tied to prospecting in the North Sea
� and surrounding areas. However, at the turn of the mid-year the geographical
link will be repealed. The grant will then be pa~3 for prospectinB
irrespective of where in the world it is pursued.
The reasons for this change is that it is diff`icult to be admitted to the
Norwegian continental shelf. Thus, grants for prospecting have not been
fully utilized. The Norwegians demand industrial pro~ects or cooperation
in research and development to grant concessions. Of S~aedish companies only
Volvo Petroleum has, until now, succeeded in passing over this threshold. -
Difficult To Reach the Goal
~ The prupose of the fund an d the system of grants is to increase the S~redish
prospecting activity up to the level of 100 million crowns. That will enable
the execution of such a number of pro~ects that a reasonable spread of risks
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and a gooci continuity is obtained. But the goal will not be reached, as
intended, in two or three years time i.e. 1980/81. The reason is the very
diff`iculty in being admitted to the Nos~regian shelf. During its short
existence, SP Exploration has not succeeded in coming forward with the
necessary industrial pro,jects. ~.irthermore, Volvo's agreement with Norway
was not concluded. ConsequentJ~y, the 5~redish prospecting taxget had to be
postponed for the future. Now, the goal is estimated to be reached sometime
198~/85.
Another instrument to secure Swedish crude oil is a g~overnment guaxantee.
It can be used to make it easier for Swedish compa.nies to ~oin as partners
in concessions or in alreac~y producing oil fields (and aiso for, e.g., gas
and coal). The guarantee amounts to a total of two billion crowns. So far,
SP has used around 500 million crowns for an agreement with NorWegian Oil
Consortium (Noco) on the Norwegia.n shelf. Furthermore, 32 million crawns
have been spent on a st orage plant for bottled gas in Oxelosund (being built
by SSAB, SFK, Fagersta and others).
Four Swedish organizations axe engag~d in oil prospecting:
SP EXPLORATION. Affiliate of SP and the Government's instrument for its
prospecting policy. Replaced Petroswede in 1979� In the beginning of 1980
PPtroswede and SP had spent about 100 million crowns on prospecting. The
budget for 198o is 1+5 mi]lion crowns. SP Fxploration crwns the following
prospecting rights:
--Norw~ay. A share in a block in a.ccordance with the Noco agree~ent.
Drilling was performed in 1979� No drilling plans for 1980. Intends to ask
for a concession in the sixth round.
--Eagland. Owns share in three blocks. Agreement is almost concluded
regarding shares in two other biocks. "An agreement in principle has been
negotiated. It wi11 be concluded this summer," sa,ys Bengt Holmgren,
responsible for the pr.o,~ect at SP Exploration. Will ask for a concession
in the seventh round. Has alreac~y ~oined two bidding groups and is in the
final negotiations with a third. 1979 meant the break through on the
British shelf.
--Tunisia. Has p rospecting rights in three blocks. Three to four drillings
are to be made this year. A gas find.ing included too much non-flaum~able
gas to be exploited. At this moment an oil finding is being evaluated.
The ana~ysis will give the answer during this su~er. This is, so far, the .
most interesting oil fin ding having a Swe dish interest.
--Italy. Has a prospecting right in the Adriatic S~a. Seismic examination
is being done.
--Trinidad. Has a prospecting right in the sea northeast of Trinidad. Drilling
is now being done. -
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--S~reden. OPAB is prospecting for oil since ten years. 200 million crowns
have been invested. t3ntil naw 172 drillings have been made. TYIe G~vernment
now owns 60 per cen~ of the sheres in OPAB. Of the funds 109 miLlion crowns
are invested by the Government. Budget for 1980: 11 raillion crawns in -
Government f~.inds. The private shareholders have not invested ar~y money since
1977� Minor findings have been made on Go~land. Until now, 81~+0 cubic meters
of oi.l have been produced. It is being refined at Nynas at Nynashamn. The
proceeds from the oil have covered the vaxiable costs of about 800.000 crawns
annually during f~ur years . An interesting find.ing on the northern part of
Gotland is now being evaluated. Drillings at sea later this year.
Volvo Petroleum. Volvo indicates its efforts as regards the energy sector
by the recent establishment of an inter-compar~y group. Volvo Energi AB has
three branches: Volvo Petroleum (to prospect for oil and gas), Volvu Offshore
' (to supply equipment) and Volvo Energisystem (to sell ener~r technics and
services).
Volvo Petroleum has joined the International EYier~r Development Corporation
(IEDC), which is going to m~ve from London to Geneva. The IEDC has recen~tly
got a fourth shareholders: the national oil company of Kuwait, Kuwait
Petroleum Corporation. All the shareholders own 25 per cent. President is
Nordine Ait-Laousine, a former top man in Sonatrach, of Algeria.
--Norway. Volvo Petroleum has ~oined a concession north of the 6~d latitude.
Dri71 ing this summer, maybe two drillings. Will ask for means from the oil
prospecting fund.
Johnson Exploration. Is owned by Nordst~ernan a.nd Nyn~s Petroleum. The
Johnson Company Group is a pioneer in Swedish oil prospecting (since the
Nobel brothers prospected in Russia before the revolution). Has been in
the business since the mid-Sixties and has invested 15-20 millian crowns
during these years.
--~gland. Owns shares in six blocke. Will apply also for the seventh
round. Participated in the very first oil findin~ in the North Sea (non-
commercial). Has found gas, the Ametist field, which is not yet in production.
Is gcing to dri11 this summer (with Government grants).
SAI~ENS. Prospecting together with Keman Nobel and Swedish Match in the sea
off the Philippines. A very large concession - 15,000 squa,re kilometers
( compared to Nor~regien blocks of 500 a.nd Briti sh of 250 square kms
--The Philippines. The three S~redish companies have invested 35-~+~ ~llion
crowns. Gas has been found in one place. The possibilities for production
are now being examined. May become an offshore a~onia-urea plant or an
electric power~plant. F~zrther drillings are planned.
--Turkey. Has prospecting rights together with Scandinav~.an Trading and
the Turkish petroleum company TPAO in the north-eastern corner of the
Mediterranean. Seismic investigations are in progress.
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t~clit t)1~ i~ LC I A(. U~;I~: c1NI,Y
Both SP Exploration and Volvu intend to apply for grants from the oil
prospecting fland. This will mean that the balance of the f~Znd, at present
approxima.tely 100 million crawns, will rather quick~jr be exhau~sted. Then
the Government will have to fe,ce a problem, which it probably welcomes':
- to increase the financing of Swedish oil prospecting.
COPYRIGHT: Ahlen & Akerlunds tryckerier, Stockholm 1980.
.
9608
CSO: 3109 END
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