JPRS ID: 9241 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPF~S L/9241
7 August 1980 -
Sub-Saharan Africc~ Re ort
p
, .
- FOUO No. 684
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JPRS L/9241
7 August 1980
SUB-S~IIARAN AFRI CA REPORT
FOUO No. 684
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Outcome of OAU Summit in Freetown Reported
(Various sources, various dates) 1
Lack of I7ialog Deplored, by Sennen Andriamirado -
Summit's Surprises, by Sennen Andriamirado, _
Abdelaziz Dahmani
Senghor Shakes Conference
Test of Freetown
N~ocolonial G~st, by Mumdy Fall
OAU: Probleu~s of Credibility, Editorial
Western Sahara, ~ad, Liberia Trouble OAU
i (Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Jun 80)...... 11
OAU's Failure To Establish Neutral African Force for
Chad Rapped
(JEiJNE AFRIQUE, 9 Jul 80) 13
Francophone Members Seen Losers With Election of New
AI~B Official
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Jul 8Q)........... 15
Briefs -
Tanzantan Conditions for Kenyan Trade 19
ANGOLA
Journalist Reports on Angolan Economic Situation
(MAR(~iES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Jun 80~ 20
B rie fs
De clining Angolan Coffee Exports 22
- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO] ~
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r~,i. ~~i�r il,iru, ~i;rl�~ ~,iri~~
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
President Holds Press Conference on Economic Situation
(MARQ3ES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEN~, 27 Jim 80)...... 23
Qi AD
Briefs
FAN Official Resigns 25
COMORO ISLANDS -
National Front Leader's Open Letter to President
(Editorial; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun 80) 26
CON GO
1980 Budget Amended; Distribution of Operating Expenditures
Reported ,
(MAR(HES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS , 11 Jul 80) 28
Briefs
France Donates Scientific Material 30
EQUATORIAL GUINEA _
Briefs
Country ComFletely Disorganized 31
GAB ON
Economy Back on Rig~t Course Follawing 1976-1977 Crisis
(JEIJNE AFRIQUE, 9 Jul 80) 32
- GUINEA
Briefs
Plans for Aluminum Plant 34
GUINEA-BISSAU
Briefs.
~raLilian-Gu?nea Bissau Commercial Venture 35
KENYA
Maize Shortage Having Effect on Political Situation -
(MARCHES TROP.T_CAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Jul 80)....... 36
- b - =
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LIBERIA
- Briefs
Iron Ore Exports to Pakistan 38
MALI .
B rie fs
Malian-Libyan Cooperation Prutocol 39
- NI(xER -
Three Financing Agreements Signed -
(MAR(HES TRUPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Jul 80) 40
~
Briefs
Major Arrested in Niamey 41
- RE UN ION
Efforts To Seek Autonomy Reported _
(,L~^r^G':~~ Burban; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 7 Jul 8(l) . 42
KWt1N DA
Radical Change Needed To Avert Debacle .
- (Antoni~~ Blis; AFRIQIJE-ASIE, 9 Jun 80) 46
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
African Development Bank Airport Ivan Granted
(MAR4iES TROPICAIJX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 J:ui b,~)....... 51
SEIVEGAL
~
- SFI Participation in Bank Reported _
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Jul 80)....... 52
B riefs '
Diplomatic Missions Qosed 53
Biao-Senegal Established 53
Saudi Economic Aid 54
S IE RRA LE ONE
Briefs -
New Director of ~ P,AILY MAIL' S5
- c -
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- SOMALIA
Briefs
' Financing of Bardera Dam ~6
TANZANIA
Briefs
IDA Loans
. Gold Mines Reexploited 57
ZAIRE '
Nation Faces Crucial Foreign Debt
~ (Editorial; MARQiES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
23 May 80) 58 -
- d -
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1'Ult Orl~ LCIAL US~: UNLY
INTER-AFRIG~'.N AFFAIRS
OUTCOME OF OAU SUI~Il~IIT IN FREETOWN REPORTED
- Lack of Dialog Deplored
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 p 9
[Article by Sennen t~ndriamiradoJ �
[Text] Fourteen chiefs of state and eight chiefs of government made the
trip to Freetown, capital of Sierra I,eone, to attend the 17th OAU summit.
Two days earlier, the local press had announced "an exceptional
participation by 45 chiefs of state." However, the participation revealed
itself to be exceptionally weak and=-with due erspect to the ministers
who headed the other delegationa--this aummit will be recorded in the
annals as the one which arouaed the least enthusiasm.
In July 1977, in Libreville, the number of conflicts in progreas had
- mobilized energies to attempt to close the gaps in the facade of unity:
Libya-Chad, Sudan-Ethiopia, Ethiopia-Somalia, tY~e Eritrean war, without
overlooking the crisis in the Sahara. In July 1978, in Khartoum, the
same scenario, the same obsession with saving face and unity. In 1979,
in Monrovia, two serious conflicts dominated the 16th summit: the conflict
in the Horn of Afr;ica and that in the Western Sahara. During the last
3 years, finally, unit was more or leas safeguarded thanks to the obaessive
desire to liberate southern Africa. However, Zimbabwe has become independent;
_ and Namibia will be independent one day. And the liberation of South Africa
seems so far away to some persons that their condemnation of the aggression
- against Angola by the South Africans seems derisory.
- What is the reason for this disaffection? Why is there a lack of enthusiasm
in the debates except when there is a question of sub~ects which are highly
emotional in nature? Dare we say the.t it is because conflicts have become
less numerous? Or is it because, on the contary, the conflicts are so
serious and the epidemic seems so irresistible Chat t~frica finds itself
unable to face up to the situation? Doubtless it is also due to the fact
that an unprecedented economic crisis is destabilizing African states more
than they were ever threatened by putsches. This is true to the point that
many st~tes have fallen back upon themselves and have too much to do at
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home. This confirms the following terrible statement made by a diplomat:
"Bef~re, it was simple. We fought between progressives and moderates about
almost anything, then we embraced one another at the end of the summit.
- Today, everyone is in torment, and the problema are such ~hat we do not have
time any longer for dialag."
Summit's Surprises
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 p 16
[Article by Sennen Andriamirado and Abdelaziz Dahmani]
[Text] The organization by Sierra Leone of the 17th 0?,U summit (1-4 July -
1980), which was preceded by the 35th ministerial conference (17-19 June),
is certainly the least pretentious and the least costly (everything is _
relative.') of similar summits held over the last 5 years. Operation prestige
has been reduced to a minimum. The streets are decorated; however, they
- are not cluttered with "posters" of chiefs of state, each more handsome and r
- braver than all the others. Only a few streamers and signs offer a
welcome to the OAU, which were paid f or by such-and-such company: Heineken, -
Pepsi, etc.
The host government, in fact, ~oas not authorized by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), which provides assistance in financial management, to
~ exc~e~.~ r.~ie ].vnit of $100 million for the organization ~f the summit. And
President Siaka Stevens doubtless did not wish.to repeat the experience of
extreme expenditures of Monroviu in 3 uly 1979 which had been one of the
reasons for the coup d'etat against William Tolbert. To lighten the burden
of Sierra Leone, assistance has been provided principally by Algeria
(50 Mercedes and $5 million) and from a few Gulf countries (the Arab Emirates,
Qatar...). Because of the absence of the Algerian, Egyptian and Libyan
presir~ents who customarily are followed by hu~dreds of advisers, journalists
and bodyguards, it is the Moroccan delegation which is the largest in
Freetown. ~
The people of Sierra Leone, who are very dignified, have greeted this summit
without outbursts of enthusiasm but w ith gentleness and good nature.
However, all is not sweetness and J_ight--for from it. The cost of living in
Freetown in prohibitive, and the delegates themselves have been able to
~ experience this. Hotel rates have tripled, increasing from 30 leones
(1 leone is worth about $1 or 4 French francs) to more than 100 leones.
The smallest meal costs 20 leones and, even for modest purses, a sandwirh
' at 4 leones is no bargain. For their part, taxi drivers who take journalis:.
from their hotel (the Stadium built by the Chinese) to Africa Hall where
- the summit is being held have quadrupl~~ their fares. It is true that there
are about 15 kilometers to cover....
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Senghor Shakes Conference
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 p 17
[Text] At the opening of the 17th aummi+. in Freetown, Sierra Leone on
1 July, the new president of the OAU, Siaka Stevens, asked tne
representatives of the 50 member states to observe a moment of silence
_ in memory of his predecessor, Liberian Pre'sident William Tolbert and of
Angolan President Agostinho Neto. Only the Liberian delegati~n remained
seated, under the look of reprobation of those in atter.dance.
However, Senegalese President Zeopold Sedar, departing interim president
of the Orga~zation since the death of Tolbert, created a sensation
by a speech which lifted the summit out of its doldrums.
First, he reproached the new Liberian leaders, not for having seized
power, but for having do~e so by means of assassination, "a very serious
act."
. The OAU is not accustomed to this kind of language. Senghor~s speech
next ~ook up Zimbabwe which had discovered a statesman, Robert Mugabe; the
_ Lagos eco:~omic summit; the Western Sahara affair which requires "a
dynamic compromise a 1'African"; Chad; the ambiguity of Israeli policy--in
favor of peace with Egypt but expansionist with regard to Palestine and
her other neighbors. Finally, Senghor shook the audience by a profession
of faith in the righte of man, recalling the Wolof proverb: "Man is
the cure for man."
. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
- Test of Freetown
_ Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 7 Jul 80 p 34
[Article by G.C.]
- fTex~] It was with particular interest this year that we awaited the ~
outcome of the work of the 17th suanmit of the Organization of African Unity
which met on 1-5 July in Freetawn, the capital of Sierra Leone.
- Several problems which are decisive for the future of the continenti were in
fact on the always very full agenda of these meetings, and the answers
which would be found for them once again would pe rnnit the measurement
simultaneously of the degree of maturity and independence of the A.frican
organization and the balance of political forces.
Although it was not theoretically inscribed on tl~e agenda the problem of
- the Western Sahara could not be avoided, aince the Saharan-Arab Democratic
Republic [SADR] before the summit had officially placed its name in the
hopper as a candidate for the 51st se~t in the organization. The
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crushiiig victories won by the POLISARIO Front and the increasingly
broad support enjoyed by the SADR, which as we write these words on the _
" eve of the Freetown summit is already recognized by 23 African states
- and which has now imposed itself even with the most "moderate" countries
as an irreversible reality, made foreseeable the posaibility of a positive
outrcm~e. Under the terms of Article 28 of the OAU's charCer, the admisaion
of a country requires the approval of a simple majority; i.e., 26 "yes" votes
out uf 50; therefore, 3 additional "yes" votes in fact were enough to attain ~
its objective. _
Nevertheless, there was no doubt that the debate--particularly in the ~
corridors--promised to be stormy and that the suspense was going to last
until the end, with Moroc.r..o ready, as it had demonstrated during the
ministerial conference, to resort to all kinds of maneuvers--ranging
from a fallacious legal argument to the blaclanail of withdrawal--to attempt
to block the request of the SADR. The entry of the latter in the community
- of African nations would in fa~.t be a clear-cut defeat at the diplomatic
level for the Sherifian kingdom and would greatly contribute to acceleration
of the inevitable victory of the Saharan people.
The Chadian conflict, whose gravity and canplexity no one is under-
, estimating, could not impose itself as a priority concern of the Freetown _
summit. Nevertheless, as recognized by the report of its secretary general,
the Organization of African Unity hds up to now appeared powerless to in-
fluence the course of events. And the proposal offered by a certain number
of countries, during the preparatory work of the ministerial conference
- of sending "blue helmets" fran the United Nations to Chad, apart from the
fact that the proposal is not without danger, would merely confirm this
impression. Also, a certain number of countries, including progressive
states such as Angola, were actively militating in favor of the establish-
ment at any price of a Pan-African peace force.
In any case, we could expect that the debate on this point would permit
clarification of the real facts of a problem which most often one makes
an effort to muddle, an~i to estab lish the positions of each party.
rfarked by the entry into the Pan-African organization of independent
Zimbabwe, the 17th summit wa to have been situated under the sign of tlte
total liberation of southern Africa. In this sector, too, and more than
ever at a time when the liberation of Namibia becomes a pressing irnperative
and when armed struggle seems to be the only way t~ put an end to the ~
apartheid regime, more concrete and more effecti�e overall measures are _
expected from the OAU by the peoples concerned. Ihe decisions made on _
this subject should constitute a test of the determination of all parties t;o
bring their deeds into line with their words.
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Neocolonial Cyst
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 7 Jul 80 pp 34-35
[Article by Mamdy Fall]
, [Text] The year 1960 which had witnessed the surge of African independence -
was described by certain journalists and aficionados of labels as the
"Year of Africa." ~aenty years later, 1980 alsn seems worthy of note
by history. Does that mean it will continue to be marked by a white stone?
Nothing is leas certain. The fact remains, nevertheless, that in the course -
of this year conferences at tYce highest level, s~umnits, (econanic
summits or not) will be held at an unprecedented rate. -
- The Organization of African Unity (OI~U) which met on 28-29 April in
Lagos for a"speciat summit" devoted to economic questions, has just held
its annual summit of chiefs of state. In between times, in Nice, from
8-10 May, the French-African conference took place in which 25 African states
participated; i.e., more delegations than cystomarily att~nd this meeting.
Because of this fact, the Nice conference seemed to take on an almost
Pan-African dimension. It was decided there, moreover, to call a
- conference of Francophone countries in the near future, the preparatory
meeting for which (at the level of ministers of foreign affairs) is to
be held on 5 November in Dakar.
What was are to think of this profusion of "diplomacy at the heights," and
of its effectiveness, in the face of the crucial problema which are
p osed today for Africa and Che African peoples? The most casual observer
_ cannot fail to note that, from one summit to the other, the objective
proclaimed above all is that of promoting the development of Africa, whic:~
leaves it clearly understood that this development has not made particular
' progress in 20 years. At the time of the Lagos summit, the OAU secretary-
general, Edem Kodjo, said: "Africa is exposed to the problems of its
s urvival." Some French colonial sectors which are rather inclined toward
c omplaisance go one step further and desciibe the record of 20 years of
i ndependence in Africa as "consternating." It is true that they
immedi~tety thereafter add that in Lagos the African chiefs of state have
had "finally demonstrated realism."
S ummarily, these French colonialist sectors, whose interests quite under-
standably for over 20 years have coartnanded them to put up the most
implacable fight against African revolutionaries and progressives, are
- forced to note that the African reali.Cy today ie distreasing. The figures
offer too long commentaries. In fact, we observe that the average
m ortality rate is 190 percent; i.e., the highest in the world; that life
. expectancy there is the lowest: 47 years, compared to a world average of
55 years; that industrial production there rarely reaches 1.5 percent of
the gross domestic: product; that trade between African countries has been
in continuing regression for the last 10 years (t:;lis means that African
countries are trading more with foreign countries than between themselves);
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doubtless a symbol of the derisory weight of Africa in world economy,
its share of world industrial production is barely 1 percent. Vying with
one an other in the repetition of the phrase that Africa "is making leaps
forward" does not change any of this sad evidence. _
At the time the OAU was being set up (May 1963), a clairvoyant Pan-
African, namely Ghanian President Kwame N'Krumah, was energetically c~ppc~sed
to those who then were advocating, as a solution to the basic problems -
that the continent would encounter (including the problem of development),
the es tablishment of an Af rican Co~non Market. He said: "African unity
is above all a political kingdom which we can only achieve.by political
means. The economic development of Africa will proceed from that political
development; the inverse is not true."~ We know that, since then, under
various guises ("common economic front," "great African econotnic entities"), _
the same thesis of "economic unity before political unity" periodically
resurfaces. At times, in the speeches of those which already put them ~
ahead of their time 17 years ago.
Another Analysis
tdhy then should we not be astonished by such stubborness in following a
course which we know will lead to an impasse? By contenting ourselves
with recalling that "the existing regional economic communities will have
to be strengthened," we are much afraid that the Lagos summit only
maintained this deademlcourse. During that same meeting, sane progressive
chiefs of state put forth another analysis. Angolan President Jose Edudrdo -
_ Dos Santos, for example, noteworthily said that any "action plan" adopted -
should be passed through "the national control, by each country, of its
awn res ources and the commitment to a struggle for real economic in-
dependence." He condemned European-Arab-African cooperation by means of .
which there was an intent "to use the resources of the underdeveloped
- countries to exploit other countries who are in the same situation." The ~
integration of almost all the countries of Africa in the Europe.an Common
- Market (EEC) is not, quite to the contrary, of a nature to contribute to
committin~ each country to a struggle for its real economic independence _
He condemned European-Arab-African cooperation by means of which there was -
an intent "to use the resources of the underdeveloped countries to exploit
other countries who are in the same situation." !.'he integration of almost =
- k
p 35: l. Addis Ababa, May 1963: "Summit Confer..,...e oF Independent
Countries," published in 1y64 by Presence Africair~;:, pr 117-i18. -
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all the countries of Africa in Che European Common Market (EEC~ is not,
' quite to the contrary, of a nature ot contribute to committing each
country to a struggle for its real economic independence. ~
For its part, the French-African conference in Nice "took note with '
satisfaction of the progress made in the development of initiatives for
the ~uropean-Arab-African 'trilogy' as regards the cultural, economic
and political sectors." The summit, "by confirming its active support '
for the plan, expressed the wish of seeing a continuation in the direction
of the Arab world and the ~frican countries of the information activities
undertaken to promote the functioning of the trilogy."*
A1.1 of these episodes, all of these facts, demonstrate sufficiently that,
- among African countries there is no unity of thougt, action and behavior
which would be necessary Eor any serious initiative within a framework
as the OAU.
_ The primary merit, in such a context, of the book, "Pan-Africanism and
Neocolonialism"^`'r which uias recently rewritten in a supplemnted and
published version, is to show as regards the various conceptions extant
of the method to follow to liberate and unify Africa that these "divisions"
- "and quarrels" are not of today's date. The first chapter in the book,
which is devoted to a historical review, demonstrates, with the help of
- stacements by participants in the process, that these "divisions" and
"quarrels" were already in existence in 1961; i.e., well bef.ore the
establishment of the OAU. And that there was a refusal, in those days,
by progressive African parties eo take these "divisions" into consideration,
to take them for what they were and what they conCinue to be, namely the
clear manifestation of social class oppositions--it is that refusal which `
had 1Pd to the provisianal victory which neocolonialism has won over almost
the toCality of African countries.
The following three chapters (300 pages) , also supported by figures and a _
rigorous economic analysis, show not only the mechanisms of imperialist
- dominations but also the objective foundations of the network of
"cooperation relations" between various African states, relations which
= increasingly lead to agreements between states to the detriment of
activists and organizations which are combatting the neocolonial regimes.
, "Pan-Africanism and Neocolonialism" is certainly not the firs~ book written
on the evolution of Africa, African unity and Pan-Africanism. It certainly
, will no~ be the last. However, it has a dual particularity: on the one
hand, it encanpasses in a uni.fying process the essential questions which
~ are being posed in Africa and which reveal its unsuspected interconnections.
- Se ~ ri,FKIQUE-ASIE, No 216
By Elenga M'buyinga, distributed by Harmathan and Presence Africaine. `
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The Africa of the neocolonial chiefs of state does not cane out of it
with a better image. On the other hand, the book recalls, at a time when
some African statesmen, whether they are voluntary or involuntary puppets
of the imperialists, are going through the motions of constructing _
African unity and promoting the development of this continent, that the
a fundamental thesis of Kwame N'Kr~nah (according to which "Africa must
unite" and unite politically, form a union of African socialist states)
continues to be the only serious position capable of giving dignity and
real freedom to a continent which has been held up to ridicule for _
centuries.
COFIRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
- OAU: Problems of Credibility -
Paris MAR.CHES TROPICAUX BT MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1719
[Editorial: "OAU Deeply Divided"] _
[Text] Ztao burning issues had been reser~ved by the preparatory ministerial _
conference for examination by th~e chiefs of state who came in small
n~unbers--there were 14 of them this year canpared to 25 last year in
- Monrovia--to Freetown, 1-4 July, for the 17th "s~utunit" of the Organization -
- of African Unity: Chad and the Western Sahara.
_ The summit decision with respect to the subject of Chad was not surprise. _
The Lagos accords continue to be the basis of all settlecr.ent and,
_ c onsequently, the demilitarization of Ndjamena must be imposed at a
time when, for the moment, fighting continues between the supporters of
Goukouni Oueddei, who are said to be assisted by a Libyan colonel,
according to a dispatch from the AFP, and the supporters of Hissein Habre.
If the Inter-African peacekeeping force made up of Benin, Guinean and
Congolese contingents cannot be established under th e aegis of the OAU
and sent to Ndjamena within a 1-month time frame, an appeal will be made
to the "blue helmets" of the UN which wi11 be called upon to recruit them
from Africans. It is doubtful that the OAU will be able in a short time
to assemble the $60 million needed for establishment of an inter-African
- force, its dispatch to Chad and its maintenance, since it has been unable
to do so since the Lagos conference. Although Goukouni Oueddei, who
headed the only official Chadian delegation admitted to Freetown, has ~
said that he is opposed to any "form of foreign in~erference in what
continues to be a purely Chadian problem, we cannot now exclude the _
possibility that the OAU will find itself forced to ask the UN to t1~:e its
' place. -
Will recourse to the UN one day be necessary to find a solution to the
~ problem of the Western Sahara, which is the basic subject of the "summit"
debates in Freeto~an and which very nearly brought about the break up of
Che OAU? Following the theatrical coup, namely the official request for
~
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admission ot the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, 26 states; i.e., exactly
a simple majority, came out in favor of the request. Morocco called
- attention to the fact that under the tenns of the OAU's charter only a
"sovereign state" can be recognized as a member of the Organization and
that he would challenge these two characteriatics of the Saharan Democratic
Arab Republic. Still relying on the charter, Morocco next asked ~hat a
two-thirds majority define the in terpretation to be given to the term
"sovereign state." In the heat of debate, an answer was given to Morocco
_ to the effect that it was not appropriate to worry about legal niceties.
A certain number of states among those which are customarily described
as "moderates" then declared a la Morocco that they would leave the OAU `
if the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic were admitted to the Organization.
The fever abated and the "summit" took up a canpromise motion prepared
by Nigeria. The conciliation commission made up of Nigeria, Ma,li, Guinea, -
_ the Sudan and Tanzania, under the chairmanship of Siaka Stevens, current
president of the OAU, will continue its efforts "to reconcile the parties
to the conflict and find a peaceful and lasting solution to this question."
That was uery nearly the same proposal which had been made by President
Senghor an3 which had been rejected the day before and in which he advocated
direct negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, but also
the AOSARIO, Association of Natives of Saguia, E1 Hambra and Rio de Oro,
which is favorable to the Moroccans and the elected officials of the
Sahara who were chosen in elections organized by Morocco,
In the face of the extraordinary c anplexity of the pro~lem, we cannot
refrain from noting that the historical and 1ega1 arguements advanced
by Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania in the past haveled to an impasse and
have not permitted the reaching of the "peaceful and lasting" solution which
the conciliation commission was seeking and if it were found to have '.t
_ endorsed by an extraordinary "summit" of the OAU in Freetown "in a 3-month
time frame." There is compelling evidence that such a solution can be
nothing but political. That, moreover, is the conclusion adopted by the -
conciliation commission at the end of two meetings held under the chairman-
ship of General Nimeiry, president of the Sudan and then-sitting president
of the OAU, and of its third meeting held in December1979. The co~nission
advocated a cease-fire and the arganization of a referendiun in the
Western Sahara. It is very unlikely that the conciliation commission will
reverse its decision in such a short ti.me, all the more so because Sierre
Leone has officially recognized the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic
which permits ~Iorocco to challenge the impartiality of~ its president, ~
Siaka Stevens.
_ It is becoming increasingly difficult to dispute the fact that the Sahara
conflict has now taken on an international dimension and an ideological
character which has come to superimpose itself upon the political and
economic interests of the only African states in the region. The
fundamental question, in fact, is knowing wheCher it is or is not a question
_ in the Western Sahara ot a decolonization problem and whether, in
consequence thereof, the peoples concerned should have the opportunity of
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1' VL~ Vll' 1V11'1L UJL' V1VLY
freely choosing their own future. Forty-three countries, including 26
African countries, by officially recognizing the Saharan Democratic Arab
Republic ha~�e answered in the ~ffirtnative. They are all members of the -
movement of nonalined countries and are members of the group of countries
considered as "progressive." But other countries, which have not
recognized the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic have come out in favor of
a vote of the peoples concerned by means of a referendum. That is the
- position of France ~n particular. And that is also the position of Che UN,
whose two 1975 resolutions, one of Algerian origin and the other supported
by Morocco, both state that "the inalienable right of the Saharan peoples
to sel�-determination."
The war which has been going on in the Sahara for 5 years is bringing
suffering to all the peoples concerned. It is arresting the economic
and social ~development of the countries of the region. The war permitis
Libya to intervene directly in the Western Sahara as it did in Chad.
The war is poisoniing relations between the African states most directly _
concerned by the conflict and the European powers which formerly were
- colonizers or protectors. Arms deliveries are made to each side directly -
_ or indirectly by each of the two superpowers which are concerned one about =
maintaining its political influence in the region and the other about
weakening the opposing bloc. The war, as the Freetown "summit" debates
have just shown, is profoundly dividing Africa which is split in two
bratween supporters and opponents of admission to the OAU of the Saharan
Democratic Arab Republic. Like the war in Chad, the Saharan war has
become a threat to the political balance and stability of the whole of
Africa. -
The OAU has been unable to reestablish in Chad the conditions of a peaceful
, settlement, and it appears to be headed toward recourse to the UN. Barring
a last-minute miracle which would be an agreement between the interested
- parties under the aegis of the OAU's conci?iation commission, there is only -
- a choice between continuation of the war or an appeal to the UN which
up to now has sent the problem back to the OAU but whose jurisdicCiore
cannot be ruled out since Morocco itself had requested arbitration by the ~
- Security Council.
In both cases, it is the credibility of the OAU and its capacity to resolve
Inter-African conflicts which will have been profoundly affected. -
COPYTtIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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FUIt OI~N[CfAI, IJSL ~NLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
;
WESTERN SAHARA, CHAD, LIBERIA TROUBLE OAU �
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Jun 80 p 41
~Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "The Three Ghosts Who Haunt OAU"~
~Text~ The Western Sahara affair, civil war in Cha.d, Ma.ster-Sergeant
~ Samuel Doe's "trial"; so many points of dissension formi.ng the back-drop
of the OAU's ministerial conference, which opens on 18 June in Freetown
(Sierra Leone). Ma.ny subjects which, once again, cast the shadow of
dissension on the organization.
- First the Sahara, the most pressing question. The ministers view it with
a faint smile, while *~aiting for the struggle of the chiefs, the summit,
which opens on 1 July. This time the subject is not the POLISARIO and
Moroccan partisans' oratorical contests to which we have become accustomed,
some holding forth on the Saharan right to self-determina.tion, the others
on the historical and inalienable rights of tHe Moroccan Ki~gdom. The -
first do not intend to propose the recognition of the POLISARIO as a -
liberation movement, as they did in fihe past, but the adherence of the =
SADR [Saharan Arab Democratic Republic] to the OAU. Their winning trump:
the charter of the organization which stipulates that the adherence of
a new member is decided by a simple ma.jority (26 of the 50 stafies); the
number esf states (23) which have already recognized the SADR, whict~ could
be joined by other members at t~e last moment.
In opposition, Morocco and its friends intend to do everything in their
power to oppose what they consider a"coup de force." Their argument:
first, OAU's decision to entrust the Saharan question to an extraordinary
summit, while the Freetown meeting is only ~.n ordinary session; in
- addition, and especially, a judic~al argument which concedes that a state
exists only if it coritains a population (which the Saharans do not have), -
an institution (which the SAD~? is not)~ and also a territory (which Morocco
states positively it controls). Even worse, the adversaries of the
POLISARIO, according to the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, M'Hamed
Boucetta, are ready to take "all the necessary measures" if the Saharan
republic is recognized by the OAU. Perhaps; withdrawal is feared...And it
would be the end of OAU if about 20 countries would have to follow Morocco
in the "secession."
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1'Vri Vt C Ll.lt~l. UJL' VIVLY
Two are only too real, the third could be used as a diversion.
Second crucial point: Chad is only a state in name. Seeking to reconcile
two enetny brothers bent on slaughtering each other is not the point any
- longer. What is needed is to know whether OAU is capable of making them
stop the carnage, even by force. Actually, the contrary prevails: due
to the lack of ineans, the neutral African force which was to serve as a
buffer was never established; the Congolese units sent to Ndjamena were
never joined by the Guineans and the Beninese troops and packed up and
_ went off in March when the first shots were fired. Some countries, most
oF them, had proposed to appeal to the UN~s blue helmets. Nigeria opposed
it, or at least recommended to wait, before deciding, for the Freetown
summit (J.A. No 1014). Hoping no doubt that within the following 2 weeks
- the member states would find the funds needed for the establishment of an
African force. But one knows in advance that these means do not exist.
Doubly so since the only states in a position to pay are those that are -
= most suspected of coveting all or part of Chad. Such as Libya, willing at
the same time to pay and willing...to send troops. Which is what the other
states have refused categorically.
Failing to reach an agreement on these two crucial subjects, th~ Sahara
and Chad, a diversion is sought: Liberia. But there again, if it~ the
name of African dignity condemnation of the spectacular execution of the
former leaders was unanimous, it will not be in giving the silent treatment
to Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe's government. The proven friends of the late
_ William Tolbert are preparing to deliver a violent indictment to have the -
man who brought about his fall banned from the organization. They will be
wrong: it would be like condemning a posteriori the ma~ority of the
leaders of the member states who themselves took the power by a coup
d'etat, more often than nct, by ki].ling. However, sometimes with more
.
discretion than Samuel Doe (J.A.~No 1014).
~ Finally, for the first time in its histdry the OAU is divided by what was
its essential element; the forma.tion o:E a state. Can the POLISARIO form
a state? Is Chad still a state? Is Liberia not a member state any longer?
To answer these questions would be to make too many countries and too m~ny
state leaders uneasy. Everyone can have its POLISARIO. Everyone risks to _
become a new Cliad. Everyone is menaced by a Samuel Doe.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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FOR OT'FICTAL IJSE OI3LY
INTER-AFItICAN AFFA~RS
OAU'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH NEUTRAL AFRICAN FORCE FOR CHAD RAPPED
- Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 p 18
- [Article by S.A.]
[Text] "I tell you that my country will not contribute to the financing of
- a neutral African force for Chad." During a closed-door meeting of the
Council of Ministers, the head of the Rwanden diplomatic corps said aloud
Wha*_ h;~ colleagues are saying under their breaths. The bill in fact is
steep: no less than $62 million (12 billion CFA [African Financial Community]
francs). And, up to now, barely $375,000 havE gathered. ~Jhat is the reason
for such parsimony? "We are 6 months into our budgetary year, and we are
being.asked to lay out supplementary funds. We do not have them." we are
told very diplomatically by the Voltan Minister of Foreign Affairs.
A Question of Price
However, our interlocut~r did not say that in 1981 his cvuntry would give
priority to anything other than CY~ad. A Malagasy diplomat made us under-
stand: "We are against an appeal to a United Nations force for Chad. But
we cannot pay for an African force." The African force has even less chance
. of being established because of the three countries which were to furnish
troops, only the Congo has sent a contingent of 500 men.
However, the OAU is adamant: no question of appealing to the UN as this ~
would be a hard blow to Af rican pride. What is more, that is the offical ,
- position of Goukouni Oueddei`s government whose representatives in Freetown
told us: "We do not wish to internationalize the conflict." ~
And the Blue Helmets?
" The FAN (Northern Armed Forces) of Hissein Habre have come out in favor of
the Slue Helmets. Their representative in Freetown, Mahamat Saleh, has gone -
so far as to tell us: "We are in a position of strength; therefore, we are
for peace." On the contrary, still according to Mahamat Saleh, the FAP
(Popular Armed Forces) of Goukouni, the FAT (Chadian Armed Forces) of Col
Abdelkader Wadal Kamougue and the FAC (Common Action Forces) of Acyl Ahmat -
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are "opposed to an appeal to the UN because they still have hopes of =
- massacring us; ~;nwever, the war could last 10 years; and there will be _
no victor."
While a~vaiting a hypothet2calsettiement of the conflict, the OAU does not
- wisti to Eace up t:o reality. The resolution adopted in Freetown by the -
- c~nlerence of miiiisters is a manifesto of irresponsibility. Goukouni -
Oueddei's emissaries are delighted that the OAU is not making axi appeal
- to the United Nations. Hissein Habre's emissaries are pleased because ~
"ttie condemnation o~ interference by African countries in Chadian affairs
is a condemnation of Libya." This generalized satisfaction means that all
the conditions are present for intensification of the war, while the OAU
proclaims that we must "once again" ~an expression preferred over "one
last time"!) attempt to find an African solution.
In 2 months, a determination will be :nade with respect to whether the
hiatus for reflection should be extended 2 additional months. However,
a Central African diplomat told us: The civil war resumed over 2 months
ago and has caused 2,500 deaths. Ir. 2 more months, there will be 5,000,
in 4 months 7,500, in 6 months 10,000. In 12 months 20,000. And this will
be the OAU's 18th summit!" Are you cyni~al, Mr Minister? Most certainly. _
However, not more than the OAU which has succumbed to cowardice in the -
- name of I know not cahat "African pride."
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
FRANCOPHONE MEMBERS SEEN LOSERS WITH ELECTION OF NEW ADB OFFICIAL
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 pp 26-27
[Article by Siradiou Diallo]
[Text] The 16th annua.l meeting of the council of governors of the ADB
(African Development Bank) which was anxiously awaited for a year, after
having been postponed last May following the tragic events in Monrovia,
did not depart from the ambience of the big Pan-African conferences. This
meeting, which was held in the Ivory Coast from 23 to 27 June within the
sumptuous framework of the conference room of the Ivory Hotel in Abid~an,
- was, as expected, marked by the electricity and fever of holidays.
In The Absence Of A Salary...
Of course, the menu of this conclave which assembled the finest flower of
the African world of finance was not lacking in substance: there were no
fewer than 21 courses. It was not the admission of Angola and Mozambique
which was to pose a problem. Such admissions brought the number of ADB
members to 50. On the other hand, the case of Dr Kwame Fordwor was to
be much tho'rnier.
Forced to leave his post as president of the ADB in June 1979, as the re-
sult of a serious conflict which placed him in opposition to the majority
- of the council of administration, the Ghanian did not consi~er himself
defeated.
He planned to remain in fiis post, at least until the end of his term
(August 1981). And, failing that, to obtain payment of his entire sala_ry
until that date. After two hours of debate, it was decided that the
former president had been "definitively dismissed." Tempers were some-
- what overheated, and a delegate was heard to shout in the midst of the
brouhaha: "Let Fordwor go plead his case wherever he pleases. We will
see what court will jud~ge the representatives of the 50 independent
states of Africa:" The Ghanian had indeed threatened to institute legal
action against the ADB. Howe~er, it is not very likely that the case will
_ actually come to trial. He is making ready, nonetheless, according to
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- liis fri~~ndti, ti~ ~iihli~li a i~ook giving his side of thc~ story. Thc m:inu-
scri~~l i5 salJ tc~ be al.ready in the hands of a London publisher... -
Another subj~:ct: the celebrated question of the granting of ADB capital
_ to "nonregional members"; i.e., non-African states. A difficult question
which caused already known divisions to appear. As in 1979, Algeria and
' Libya indicated their opposition to this plan. The former stated thac it
would yield to the will of the majority, *.Jhi1e the latter threatened the -
- Bank with retaliation and said that it would not concur. Does this mean
_ that Libya effectively will boycott the ADB if a majority were to approve
the granting of capital?
After The Hors D'Oeuvres
In the corr~dors of the conference, bets on this subject were rampant.
In any case, the decision to grant capital would require a three-quarters
majority. The Bank is far from that figure since it has only a 53 percent -
majority. The position of Nigeria, whose delegate reserved the right to
change his mind will be decisive. From now to 31 December 1981, the clos-
ing date for ratification, many things can happen...
With account taken of the circumstances, a debate of thiti kind should not -
have aroused emotions. Similarly, the Bank's operational policy was
quickly dispatched.
We had just eaten the hors d'oeuvres. The main dish, of course, was the _
election of the president. This subject which had kept the African diplo-
maric sector busy for months, passed then from the ministries of finance
to the ministries of foreign affairs, before being taken in hand by the
chiefs of state~ "Never has the election of an ADB president been so
politicized," one of its administrators confided to us. While it is tra-
ditional for the divisions which place Francophone, Anglophone and Arabo-
phone Africa in opposition to show up on the occasion of each of these
elections, this time such was not the case. It was immediately apparent
that each of the groups was profoundly divided on the eight candidates,
even though the eighth candidate, the interim president, Malawian Goodall
Edward Gondwee, was not officially taking part in the competition, des-
. pite the fact that a certain number of countries had sounded him out.
I'rom Eight To Three
The resolution which had made him the interim president in replacement of. _
Dr Fordwor in June 1979 ha_~ at the same time barr~d the way to him by
stipulating that he could not be a candidate for the presidency in 1980.
This resolution was brought up by the Nigerian delegatP to have the Kenyan
proposal calling f.or a one-year extension for Dr Gondwee declared out of
order.
- What is certain is that Nigeria was opposed at any price to the Gondwee
solution. Was it because the Malawian in June 1979 was placed above th~ _
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Nigerian vice president, Mr Segunro, who was chosen by trie council of
administration to succeed Dr Fordwor? In any event, at the end of the
third ballot, Niger at~tempted to have its big neighbor reverse its posi- _
tion. In vain. "Anyo_~e but Gondwee;" the Nigerian delegate replied.
Eliminated, Condwee, it is said, is preparing to join the International
~lonetary Fund. Therefore, seven official candidates remained.
Not for long, as from the first ballot it was clearly apparent that the
choice was to be limited to rhree candidates: Guinean N`Faly Sangare -
was leading with 26 proxy votes, followed by Malian Djim Sylla with 23
- percent, then Zambian Willa Mung'Omba with 20 percent.
Strange Dialog
Despite slight vari~tions, the order of this trifecta remained unchar.ged
at the start of the second ballot. At that time serious negotiations
took place, particularly in the Francophone group. Should not its candi-
dates in the competition who were, moreover, both from West Africa,
reach an understanding? In the absence of the ability to be subjected
to the criteria of competenca (still debatable), sho~ld not regional
solidarity be imposed upon the Malian and Guinean? Between them, they
had nearly 60 percent of the votes; i.e., more than required for one
candidate to win the election.
As it turned out, N'Faly Sangare took it upon himself to exhort Djim
Sylla to stand aside in his favor. "I would like to," the latter re-
plied; "but even if I do, you have no chance because some of my suppor-
ters including the most powerful, Algeria, have already made it known
that they will not for anything in the world support the Guinena candi-
dacy." In fact, for Algiers it was not a question of combining its
vote with those of Morocco and Egypt, even if these two countries were
not in such bad company by siding with Libya to supprt the brother-in-
law of President Sekou Toure. This did not prevent Colonel Qadhafi's
delegate from demanding the expulsion of "traitorous Egypt": A strange
dialog in the middle of comic s cenes in which supporters and opponents
, of the two enemy brothers went all out to ensure the withdrawal of the
less favored on behalf of the one in a better position vis-a-vis the
Zambian. _
Too late. Under the press ure of giant Nigeria, Mung'Omba was to come out
- number one on the slate with 46 percent of the votes at the end of the
third ballot. The Malian agreed at once (perhaps wrongly) to immolate
himself on the altar of' regional solidarity, leaving the Guinean the
_ honor of confronting the Zambian by himself. In fact, the outcome was
known in advance. Resolved to do everything passible to keep the
Guinean from the presidency, Algeria went right down to the wire. At
_ a time when most of Sylla's supporters elected to abstain in the fourth
ballot, the Algerian delegate gave his vote to the Zambian candidate who
_ was elected by a vote of 50 percent compared to the 36 percent of the
Guinena, with 13 percent abstentions: -
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rva~ vrra.~.iru. uac, Vl'IL1
Who Made You King?
Willa D. Mung'Omba was, by his own admission, the most surprised. With
his tall figure, his intellectual eyeglasses and his refined appearance,
this 41-year-old Zambian is not lacking in class. A graduate of the
universities of Makerer (Uganda) and London, an attorney by training,
a sometime diplomat, he was an administrator of the International Mone-
tary Fund before taking the post of director of the Zambian affiliate of
the Standard Bank (British).
The victory of this former member of parliament and a great lover of
music and the fine arts is above all a victory for Nigeria. However, at
the same time the victory is a resounding defeat for the Francophone
countries which were unab le to overcome their lack of discipline and
their disagreements. Not to mention the CEAO (West African Economic
Community) and the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)
which were unable to reach an agreement on a single candidate.
France itself, whose dip lomatic corps did not hesitate to commit itself
completely on behalf of the Guinean candidate, has nothing of which to
be proud. With all of this accumulated bitterness, Mung'Omba will have
_ a difficult job putting the pieces back together and restoring peace -
within the Bank, a condition sine qua non for his success.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUP;TIA 1980
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
T~~ZANIAN CONDITIONS FOR KENYAN TILADE--The 'fanzanian Commerce Minister,
Ibraliim Kaduma, said on 5 Jaly in the Tanzanian Parliament that Dar-es-
Salaam ~et four conditions for resuming trade with Kenya that has been sus-
pended since February 1977, the date the border was closed between the two
- countries after the explosion in the East African Economic Community. The
four conditions, to which Kenya has subscribed in part, according to
h1r Kadi.una, are: that commercial exchanges between Tanzania and Kenya be
carried out according to the sa.me rules as trade with ather states; t hat =
Tanzania does not suffer a significant trade deficit in its exchanges with
the neighboring country; that commercial exchanges between Kenya and the =
landlocked states, going through Tanzania, be subject to that country's leg-
_ islation; that a trade agreement be signed that states the Tanzanian posi- _
- tions. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
- 11 Jul 80 p 1754] 8946
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ANGOLA
JOURNALIST REPORTS ON ANGOLAN ECONOMIC SITUATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEllITERRANEENS in Fr~ench 28 Jun 80 pp 1643, 1644
[ExcerptsJ The INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRI'dUNE of 20 May drew a rather
alarming picture of the economic situation in Angola, while ascribing it to _
the aftermath of the decolonization.
Once prosperous Luanda, "Africa's Rio de Janeiro," has become a ghost town
in which everything is deteriorating: buildings are in disrepair, auto
bodies are rusting in the streets, elevators no longer run and g~ods are
rotting in the port, writes David Lam, author of the article.
Things are not any better in the four Angolan provinces visited by the
journalist during a 3,000-kilometer trip. "Angola is a fragile and wounded
country, in a state of total disrepair. Almost nottring escapes this deterio- -
ration, stagnatian, in~ompetence and inefficiency. Most people obey and -
appear bored."
Lamb further wrote that Angola was victim of both its past and its present. -
_ It has at its disposal a tremendous economic potential which it is placing
in jeopardy.
Angolans can purchase their food from governmental shops only if they can
present a work permit. Coffee production dropped substantially. Coffee is
earmarked for Cuba and the fish for Russia. Luckily, the mining wealth,
particularly petroleum, remains.
Oil production from Gulf Oil, in the Cabinda enclave, gives Angola a daily -
income of 5 million. However, according to western economic sources, 60
cents out of each dollar earned are earmarked for military expenses and for
the reimbursement of the debt incurred by Angola from the Soviet Union. _
"There are over 40,000 soldiers and civilians from communist countries and
not one of them came for free. For example, each Cuban teacher costs the
Luanda government $600.00 per montih." Angola has not published a budget
since 1G77. The same is true of the annual development plan. -
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llespite these many negative aspects, the Angolan economic situation has
certain assets which can be credited to its leaders. Unlike many African
~overnments, Luanda has not wasted the country's resources nor did it
embark on prestigious projects. Corruption is practically unknown. Public
authorities encouraged the creation of an egalitarian society in which no one
--whether black or white, rich or poor--receives special privileges. The
ministers earn modest wages, $800.00 per month, to whi~.h are added a few
advantages due to their vosition.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980 -
6857
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ANG~LA
BRIEFS
DECLINING ANGOLAN COFFEE EXPORTS--We must expect a 20 percent decrease in
Angolan coffee exports in 1980. They would thus drop from 60,000 tons
last year to 48,000 tons this year. This figure represents less than a _
quarter of the 219,000 tons exported in 1973, the last year before inde-
pendence. This year, Angola will generate 160 million dollars in coffee
revenues. Some 25,000 tons were exported during the first 5 months of this
- year. According to Jaime de Oliveira, director of the National Co;:fee
- Company (Encafe), the expected drop in the 1980 e~orts is the consequence
of reduced production due to the draught and to "the deficient structure of
the exportation system inherited from the Portuguese." Approxi.mately one-
third of the Angolan coffee is purchased by the United States, the Nether-
- lands and Portugal. The remainder is earmarked for Algeria, East Germany
and the Soviet Union.. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEN~
in French 27 Jun 80 p 1644] 6857 -
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_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
PRESIDENT HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC SITUATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1633
[Text] At a press conference in Bangui on 20 June President Dacko painted _
an encouraging picture of the economic situation in the Central African Re-
public. -
According to the chief of state, domestic and foreign opening up has been
the major preoccupation of the Central African authorities, who have put pri-
ority effort into repairing the national axes.
Agricultural activities since early 1980 have tended toward clearly increased
production. The figures of the program for cutting back coffee have exceeded
- predictions and this year production should reach approximately 14,000 tons,
compared with 12,000 tons in 1979. -
Concerning cotton production, estimates for this year approach 37,000 tons, as
compared with 30,000 tons in 1979. A huge technical assistance program
promised by the Central African government should relaunch cotton production
by rapidly increasing the cultivated areas.
The Central African forest, which has not been extensively exploited, covers
5,000,000 hectares. The government is encouraging reforestation of the ex-
ploited areas.
Al1 cattle-raising production is experiencing a high rate of growth. Several
projects are being devoted to relaunching beef raising, an especially dynamic
sector of the Central African economy. Apiculture, aviculture and pig raising
are going to be encouraged at the family level, to improve the daily diet.
In addition, tlie Central African ReYUblic is undoubtedly going to realize a
- record year in the field of diamond production. In fact, for the first quar-
ter of 1980 the estimated results are as high as 174,468.50 carats (against
156,049.51 carats for the whole of 1979). This remarkable production has
- brought in over 5,000,000,000 CFA francs, of which the state received about
969,000,000. -
" 23
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- I~OIZ (11~F].CIAI, USI's ~N1.Y
In the field of tourism the Central African government has taken measures to
protect wildlife, which until recently was handed over to unparalleled carnage. -
- Lastly, commercial activity is regaining its dynamism. Merchants, national -
or foreign, are finding again the atmosphere of confidence that had been lack-
111~T, bir llacko stated. Imports, even though they are not often primary food-
stui'f~, are comiiig in at a regular pace.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
~ 8946
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CHAD
BRIEFS -
_ FAN OFFICIAL RESIGNS--Ousman Djidda, an Arab world relations official in the
command council of the Northern Armed Forces (FAN), announced on 3 July in
Lagos that he was leaving the movement directed by Hissene Habre. In a com-
muni~ue to the press Mr Djidda accuses the leader of the FAN "of unspeakable
intrigues in his determined opposition to the enforcement of the Lagos ac- .
cords." He also mentions "the deteriorating situation in the movement," af-
firms in addition that "Hissene Habre, who personifies the FAN movement, has
always been and still is the only official of the polluting situation who
continues to act ruthlessly." The former FAN official appeals in his com-
munique to the countries that believed in Hissere Habre's sincerity and na-
tionalism to revise their initial position.!' Ousman Djidda finally stated
that he "was not counting on joining any group," but that he "was putting him-
self at the service of his country within the framework of the institutions
that emerged from the Lagos accords." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
[~II.:DITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1749] 8946
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- COMORO ISLANDS
NATIONAL FRONT LEADER'S OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jun 80 p 11
[Editorial: "Comoro Islands: Out With the "Dogs of tdar"]
[Text] The National United Front of the Comoro Islands
published an open letter to the president of the Islamic
Republic of the Comoro Islands: Ahmed Abdallah Abdereman.
; Below are major portions of the letter.
On 13 rfay 1978, a group of white mercenaries, headed by Bob Denard, invaded
~ the Comoro Islands and overthrew the legitimate government of Ali Soilih,
whom it then assassinated so that you could come to power. After more than
2 years under absolute rule, it is our duty and determination to show you
your responsibilities and to let you know about the people's awareness of
your illegal government and of your personal actions. _
The Comorian people, faced with a government that was imposed on it against
its wishes, has only one conviction, and only one: to free itself quickly
and to get back its national sovereignty thanks to the dynamic elements in
the nation.
Why diu this fierce opposition to you and to the power you represent come
about? l:t is quite simple, The Comorian nation was attacked by a group of
mercenarit~s led by the "awful" Bob Denard, and who put you in power solely
- by the forr:e of arms. The Comorians sent an urgent appeal to all inter-
national bc3ies, and asked that proceedings be started against you and the
clique that took power. For the Comorian people it is impossible to exer-
_ cise power ~:fter such accusations have been made, even for the head of the
mercenarie~; The Comorian people cannot be deceived: these accusations
are lev~>tied first and foremost at imperialistic France. Don't you see
that your system creates unemployment and thus emigration of manpower? The
Co~�orians are subject to your voracious, egotistical power that relies on
repression and arbitrary arrests. Censorship is still implacable, and
famine is rampant on all the islands. For want of drugs and personnel, the
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1
cleath r~i~c: be~1t5 a]..L world records. The cotLExs of the state are empty, the
services paralyzed, while the petrodollars and all kinds of aid flow to your
ofEice. Where does it all go? They say that "Only Mountains Never Meet".
Rest assured titat the people will ask for an accounting.
In view of such paralysis, we insist on reaffirming our point of vie~a. The
Comorians are not bloodthirsty. We would not wish that French troops be
sacrificed on a soil that is not theirs. Neither do we wish, Mr President,
- that your personal guard should die. We would be happy to see the Comorians
~ain their freedom through peaceful means. We only say: out of the Comor.ian
Islands with Bob Denard'r~ "dogs of war". French influence must be stopped
as soon as possible. Ti~e honor and dignity of the Comorians are at stake.
And peace in the Indian Ocean and in all of Africa is threatened. The chi.l-
dren of the Gomoro Islands are qui~e determined to have the last word, should
- you insist on remaining a deaf-mute.
One thing is certain: Ali Soilih left us, but other Ali Soilihs were bor.n.
In order to make sure that you reign as absolute ruler, you let the worthy
sons of the Comoro Islands die in your prisons, but others are still free to
act, and you iaill not escape their anger. The Comorians can no longer tol-
erate an illegal government that exists because of the mercenary-masters and
its threats of death.
Ttie day of reckoning is near, our faithless Mr President. And finally we say ~
to you that in a Comorian society, where peace and justice must reign, ther.e
will Ue no room for a renegade, a traitor of the nation. Today we peaceCully
ask tt~at you retire from the Comorian political scene, before the angry
Comorians points a finger at its enemies, of which you are one....
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
9465 .
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CONGO
1930 BUDGET AMENDED; DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATING EXPENDITURES REPORTED
_ Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1751
[Text) As announced in our issue of 27 June 1980, p 1635, the People's Na-
tional Assembly of the Congo, during its ordinary May session in Brazzaville,
examined the amended first finance bill for the year 1980.
Successive rises in the price of oil, as well as new production estimates,
have in fact brought with them a consiclerable increase in the petroleum re-
sources as compared with the original budget.
They are going up from 35,000,000,000 CFA francs to 58,700,000,000
6,000,000,000 for taxes and +17,700,000,000 for taxes on oil companies, for -
= a total of 23,700,000,000 additional).
To this should be added under operating budget a draft on the fiduciary funds
of the IMF of 400,000,000 and under the investment budget a withdrawal on the
- American loan of 8,200,000,000 CFA francs and financial proceeds of
8,000,000,000, for a total of 32,700,000,000 in new resources.
The operating budget goes up from 69,800,000,000 to 93,900,000,000 and the in-
vestment budget from 1fa,420,000,000 to 33,110,000,000.
Overall, the 1980 budget thus goes from 86,000,000,000 to 127,000,000,000, or
a net of 119,100,000,000 when the contribution of the operating budget to the
investment budget is subtracted.
Operating expenditures are now distributed as follows (in billions of CFA
francs) :
Public debt 10.78 + 7.43 = 18.21 -
Personnel 35.70 + 1 = 36.70
Equipment 6.75 + 0.79 = 7.54
Ordinary expenses 2.79 + 3.15 = 5.94
Transportation 13.78 +11.32 = 25.10
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The principal new expenditures in the investment budget concern:
ATC (Transcongolese Communications Agency), 5,000,000,000 CFA francs
(1,000,OOO,G00 for CFCO [Congo-Ocean Railroad] realignment)
t:tsouali-Obouy:i roaa, ~,U00,000,000
Brazzaville centenary, 1,423,000,000 (900,000,000 for lighting)
Bouenza-PN [expansion un?cnown] electricity line, 1,200,000,000 _
Presidential palace (section 80), 800,000,000
We recall that the Assembly also examined the recent financial data on the
- CFCO realignment.
A meeting of the backers of the realignment project was held in Paris on 16 ~
and 17 April under the chairmanship of Hilaire Mounthault, the Congolese min-
ister of Transportation and Civil Aviation.
_ At ~that meeting, in accordance with the conclusions of the conference of 14
and 15 June 1979, the Congolese government and the ATC presented to the dele-
gations from the states and the financing organizations:
The new estimate of the cost of the realignment project, now set at
75,000,000,000 CFA francs, a figure that was agreed upon by the ele- _
gates present
A previsional financing plan, proposing that ~che additional costs be
distributed between the various financing organizations with participa.- ~
J tion by the Congolese government amounting to 8,800,000,000 CFA francs.
~ COPYRIGI-iT: Rene Moreux et Cie,, Paris, 1980
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CONGO
BRIEFS
FRANCE DONATES SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL--On 2 July rrance made a gift of scientific
equipment amounting to 32,500,000,000 CFA francs to the Congo; this equipment
was intended for the Congolese Geographic Institute It consisted of tech-
nical and administrative equipment and equipment for working in the field _
- (three photographic reproduction apparatuses, editing equipment, prepr4-
duction and map-drawing equipment). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET -
N~DITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1751] 8946
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run vr r t~icw uan U1VLi
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
BRIEFS
COUNTRY COMPLETELY DISORGANIZED--Gabonese President Omar Bongo will be the
guest of honor at the celebration of the first anniversary of the overthrow
of riacias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea. The ceremonies are to be held at
the beginning of August; however, nothing is ready. In fact, the country
is still in a state c~f total disorganization. [Text] [Paris'JEUNE AFRIQUE
in French 9 Jul 80 p 41] 8143
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GABON
ECONOMY BACK ON RIGHT COURSE FOLLOWING 1976-1977 CRISIS
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1018, 9 Jul 80 pp 52, 54, 55
[Article: "Gabon: the Time of Wisd~m--an Endurance Race"]
[Excerpts] The exploitation of oil had made peop le believe
that anything was possible. A better perception of the -
realities has engendered greater prudence.~
= The big celebration planned for 17 August 1979 at Part-Gen til to celebrate
the 19th anniversary of Gabon's independence has been postpoaed...to 1982.
Officially because it was impossible to get the nece.ssary infras tructure
ready in time. In fact, as an austerity measure. But the inhab itants of
Gabon's economic capital have not held any resentment against the president
of the republic, since this sacrifice corresponds to a sav ings of 1 to 2 -
billion CFA francs for the state.
Euphoria -
Gabon is carrying on its recovery effort with remarkable d iscipline. Sev-
eral months ago, Mr Nana Sinkam, one of the administrators of the IMF [In-
ternational Monetary Fund] for French-speaking Africa, told us upon his re-
turn from a mission to Libreville: "It is rare for a country to adhere so
scrupulously to the austerity program that it has set for itself." Today,
Gabon seems to be coming out of the tunnel. The recently published foreign-
trade ind icators a ttest to this. The trade balance shows a surplus again:
40 billion CFA in 1979 as aginst a deficit of 2.4 billion in 1977. The
balance-of-payments deficit was reduced considerably in 19 78, dropping from -
about 30 billion in 1977 to 8 billion. In June 1979, equi librium was re-
established--at the cost of Draconian limitation of imports for a high-in- _
come country that buys a lot of equipment abroad and brings in from the out-
side the main part of its food consumption and manufactured products. The
wager of getting Gabon through the difficult period that b egan in 1976,
without calling on the international organisms and while honaring the
state's financial commitments, therefore appears to have been won. -
Since the alarm bell was sounded, the Gabonese authorities have taken rigor- _
our measures, but without thereby running the risk of breaking the rate of
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growtti. Overly strict measures a.ffecting in particular the equipm~~nt btid-
get of the state--the principal investor and employer--would have res~~lted
in a recession as abrupt as the precedix~g expansion.
While the state's credit seems to be restored, Mr Bongo nonethe less intends
to keep the recovery plan in force for as long as necessary--perhaps untit -
1982. He has assured himself of the assistance of a"recovery committee,"
- commonly referred to as the "hatchet committee --it hacks mercilessly--which
in the next 2 years is to maintain better management of the public debt, ;
identify the priority investment projects, develop a new 5-year plan and in-
itiate a reorganization of the state companies and the various administra-
tions (Treasury, Customs, etc).
Despite these encouraging results, it is estimated that it will not be pos-
sible to start out again on solid foundations until 1982-1983.
Real Development
~ In any case, the shock of 1976-1977 will probably prove to have ~,een salu-
tary. For President 3ongo, it will have made possible a real stocktaking
and a change of attitude among the Gabonese cadres and officials. The
search for efficiency has become the driving force of activity. President
Bongo wants to make his "second decade" that of a renascence of "democratic
and concerted progress." His objectives: improving the standard of living, -
better distribution of the national wealth to all levels of society, prior-
. ity for "real development" as distinguished from spectacular growth. Atten- _
tion will be given to four main priorities:
--the Trans-Gabon railway ~nearly la5 billion CFA already invested), the
economic and social fallout from which will be decisive for the country's
future;
--the cellulose plant of SOGACEL (Gabonese Cellulose Company] at Kango, in
which 100 to 120 billion CFA will be invested for a capacity of 270,0 00
tons of paper pulp per year. Negotiations are in progress with the foreign
partners, who are hesitating, not about the profitab ility of the plant it- -
_ self, but about that of the project as a whole, which comprises a number of -
ancillary infrastructures; nevertheless, in the view of the Gabonese offic-
ials, the creation of SOGACEL is irreversible;
--agriculture, with the Ntoum banana-plantation project, the rice-growing
project at Ndende in the south, stock-raising in the Haut-Ogooue and the
palm-plantation project at Lambarene;
- --social equipment; the emphasis will be placed on housing. `1'hus, the gc~v
ernment made the decision to commit a package of 1 billion CFA last year
for socioeconomic housing. The chief of state has specified that starting _
from 1980, the state budget will include 3 billion CFA for this sector each
year, in addition to the credits in the development budget for urban devel-
opment and preparation of rehousing zones and new neighborhoods.
- For the Gabonese leaders, the new philosophy is that development must no
longer be a speed race but an endurance race.
COPYRI(~iT: Jenue Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
11267 33
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GUINEA
~
BRIEFS -
~ PLANS FOR ALUI~IINUM PLANT--Documents related to the construction of an
aluminum plant in Ayekoye were signed in Conakry on 1 June between the
Guinean government and its partners: Algeria, Nigeria, Romania, 2 U.S.
firms, one Swiss firm and a Yugoslav one. According to previous infor-
mation, the plant will heln the development of the Ayekoye bauxite
- reserves, estimated at 500 million tons, through the production of _
1,200,000 tons of alumina and 150,000 tons of aluminum. Electricity will
be furnished by a dam on the Konkoure River with an output of 300 MW. -
- The studies for the dam have ~been undertaken by the Electricite de France
Company. A company had been set up in 1976 f or the exploitation of the
_ Ayekoye baur.ite reserves grouping Guinea, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya,
Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. [Text] (Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1318] _
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GUINEA-BISSAU
- BRIEFS
BRAZILIAN-GUINEA BISSAU COMNIERCIAL VENTURE--Guinea Bissau and Brazil decided -
to create a joint commercial company to develop b ilateral trade. President _
- of Guin~a Bissau Luis Cabral, in official visit in Brazil, discussed the
creation of this company with representatives of the Brazilian Exporters
Association. Seventy percent of its capital will be provided by Guinea ~
Bissau and 30 percent by Brazilian funds. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS _`_n French 27 Jun 80 p 1625] 6857 .
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KENYA
MAIZE SHORTAGE HAVING EFFECT ON POLITICAL SITUATION
_ Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET iv1EDITERRANEENS in Fxench 11 Jul 80 p 1752
~ [Text] The current maize shortage in Kenya gave rise early in July to lively
polemics in Nairobi.
T}ie ~iaily S'TANDARD in fact asserted on 2 July that the situation was tied in
with ill-considered exports. According to the newspaper the then minister of
- Agriculture, M. J. Nyagah, in 1978 and 1979 authorized.,xqaize exports in 17 -
, lots, for a total of 179,770 tons. The most important operations took place -
between February and July 1979. These sales, which cost Kenyan taxpayers
12,650,000 shillings in export subsidies, resulted--taking into account the
- domestic needs and the meager 1979 harvest--in wipino out the national re-
- serves of maize, which consisted of 5,80(i,000 sacks at the end of 1978, after
- the record 1977-1978 harvest.
The S'I'ANDARD went on to say that Kenyan maize exports wEre sent to West Afri-
ca, the Middle East, Japan, Venezuela and Zaire. Some shipments bore no men-
_ tion of their destination!
On the other hand, the newspaper recalls, the same minister abolished the GI~IIt
(guaranteed minimum returns) system that encouraged farmers to grow maize;
consequently, the STANDARD says, Kenyan production of that cereal diminished
by 40 percent, while the minister went on believing that Kenya had an abundant
- supply of maize and put the seasonal credit scheme into operation, but too
late.
Nairobi's daily, in an article by M. G. Githii, the president of its publish-
ing company, also challenges Mr Nyagah and Kenya's iinance Minister,
M.M. Kibaki. He recalls that last 17 June one might read in his columns that ~
the maize shortage was not entirely explained by monopoly. In conclusion he
- states that the situation has not improved and that long lines are still to be
seen in f~ont of the shops that sell maize, the basic food of the Kenyan popu-
lation.
~
On the other hand, on the same day Charles Njonjo, minister of the Interior
and Constitutional Affairs and one of Kenya's most visible politicians, was
taken to task in the Parliament for saying that important people had been
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compromised in the maize monopoly scandal and that considerable smuggling of
coriuneal to Uganda was going on. He stated in particular, "Let me say that
- when morality rules in this Chamber there will be no more maize shortage in
this cowitry." . _
- '1'hose wor~ls haa all the more of an echo because the day before the vice min-
ister of Transportation and Communications, Nahashon Njuno, had stated in -
F'arliament that "corruption had become cancerous" in Kenya and that "if the
~ country was going down the drain, it was the fault of some money-lovers." _
Th~ vice minister of Economic Development, John Keen, stated in his turn the
next day that the country had lost 1,000,000,000 Kenyan shillings (1 Kenyan
- shilling = 0.56 French francs) as a result of misappropriation of funds and
deficits in the accounts of the para-gover;unent corporations--for example, the
Kenya Meat Commission, ~ahose 15,000,000-Kenyan shilling deficit was explained
in that way. He added that it was after maize exports that had brought some
~ersons 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 shillings that the government today had to
import that cereal at great cost to feed the population, and he suggested that
the monopolizers '~e arrested and brought to justice, that they are comparable _
to economic saboteurs. The vice minister of Culture and Social Services,
S. K. Meto, said they "should be hanged" because "people were dying in Turkana
as a result of the food shortage."
Confronting the commotion caused by this group of revelations, Finance Min-
ister Kibaki on 3 July warned the members of Parliament against placing "ex-
- aggerated con�idence" in the press. Mr Nyagah, who is now minister of Cul-
ture, stated for his part that he would not resign, and demanded from the
journalists more "concrete facts" than they had produced so far. In retur~i,
the K~nya..~Jnion of Journalists (KUJ) solicited Mr Njonjo's protection against
the dangers that could be brought about by freedom of the press, which is
- guaranteed by the constitution.
Also on 3 July the minister of state for the Presidency, Nicholas Biwott, ac-
knowledged in a parliamentary debate that the maize shortage had become a
"national problem," caused by people who "were only patriots toward them-
selves", and asked the journalists be "patriots" and do "constructive work in
favor of the people," adding, for the benefit of the newspapers, "If they
crush the nation, they themselves will also be crushed."
As we see, the maize shortage is having political consequences to the extent _
that it stresses the corruption in the ruling classrs, and to which
Charles Njonjo, the former minister of Justice who was criticized by some for
his hostile positions on Africanization for a pittance and his devotion to
values defended by Western countries, seemed to support the moralization cam-
paign undertaken in the press and aimed at men like Vice President and Minister
of F~nance, Mr Kibaki.
,
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LIBERIA `
BRIEFS
IRON ORE EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN--Pakistan will import from Liberia 1,700,000
, tons of iron ore for the Karachi steel mills which are currently under con-
struction, according to the terms of a contract signed on 2 July between
the two countries. Deliveries of iron ore from the Mount Nimba (Western -
Lireria) deposits will begin in November. Of course Liberia will be just
one of many suppliers to the Karachi steel mills which, built with Soviet `
aid, will go into service in 1981. They will also receive iron ore fram
Brazil, India, Canada and Australia. [Text] ~Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET `
_ I~DITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1744] 8946
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P'IAI,I
BRIEFS
MALIAN-LIBYAN COOPERATION PROTOCOL--On 16 June, Ali Abdessalam el Triki,
secretary fo r foreign affairs of the Libyan Jamahiriya, and Alioune Blondin
Beye, Malian minister of foreign affairs and cooperation, signed a protocol
of cooperat ion in economy and information. The protocol also includes plans
- for agreements on culture, trade and manpower. The next meeting of the joint
Libyan-Ma.li an commission will take place in Bamako. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1625] 6857
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~ NIGER
THREE FINANCING AGREEMENTS SIGNED _
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1743
[Text] Robert Galley, the French Cooperation Minister, while visiting Niger
from 2 to 5 July, signed on 5 July, with Nigerian Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs Hamid Algabit, three financing agreements for the sum of
1,200,000,000 CFA francs (20,400,000 French francs).
The first agreement (20,000,000 CFA francs) concerns the Acacia albida pro-
ject for fighting desertification in the Dosso department. The second, for
10U,000,000 CFA francs, is for financing the College of Agronomy ~nd the third
(900,000,000 CFA francs) for financing the second television section.
_ In a statement to the press Mr Galley said that his talks with President
Kountclie dealt chiefly with the dam project at Kandad;i on the Niger, tlie de-
velopment of telecommunications and television in Niger and French assistance
in the domaine of higher education.
As for the Kandadji dam, the French minister emphasized that neither France
nor the European Community is in a position to finance this project, which
requires international cooperation. Mr Galley added that a conference is to
be held soon, probably next January, to discuss the financing structures.
In addition, a mixed Franco-Nigerian company (Nigerian PTT [Postal Telephone
_ and Telegraph] and France Cable and Radio) will be created to manage the in-
_ ternational connections. Mr Galley emphasized that the development of tele-
vision in Niger was due to a considerable financial effort on France's part,
and he added that in two years Niger ~vill be endowed with a very modern tele-
communications and television system (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS
for 4 July, p 1685, on this subject).
Lastly, Mr Galley stated that President Kountche desired incxeased French as- -
sistance in the field of higher education, especially in medical training.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1~180
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NIGER
- BRIEFS
MAJOR ARRESTED IN NIAMEY--Niger Maj Boulama Manga, former minister and
member of the Supreme Military Council, was arrested on 17 June in Niamey.
Not for.plotting but for outright insubordination. Returning from a long
training course in France, he had refused to take up his new post as prefect
at Tahoua. [TextJ [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 p 41] 8143 -
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REUNION
EFFORTS TO SEEK AUTONOMY REPORTED
I
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 7 Jul 80 pp 28-29
[Article by Dorothee Durban: "Sovereignty on the Agenda"]
[Text] Pretaria, June 1980--The fiery reality o� South Africa does not
_ completely mask other subjects of interest that may capture the observer's
attention. Certain circles in the South African capital see the country as
an advance sentry of the "free world"--which will come as no surprise--, but -
they also see it as the eventual recourse against the undertakings of all
- national movements doing the same thing far from the shores of the Cape of -
Good Hope.
So they are talking here, without much mystery, of a South African lobby to
be installed on the island of Reunion. Such a lobby would maintain close _
ties with Pretoria and would prepare bases for a commando network like that
of the OAS in the Algerian war. This network, supported by South Africa, is
- ready to face a potential success on the part of the island's autonomist for- �
ces.
The lobby's center would be at St. Denis for the present; circles thoroughly
- familiar with municipal political life would not be strangers there. -
The basic reasoning of the ultxas is as follows: all conditions have been met -
' for the island to go on to independence. The economic situation is steadily -
deteriorating; unemployment is increasing and urging toward revolt; the.ac-
csssion to independence in recent years of neighboring territories, such as
the is1G~.nds of Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Madagascar serve as encourage-
ment to t~llow the same path.
The ~altras think moreover that nothing will happen before the 1981 French
- pre~;identiaZ election, the government and Giscard d'Estaing having too much
neeo of the F;eunion votes. Dropping the island would in any case have a de-
plorahle e�f~,ct on the electorate of the right. But the ultras believe that -
once tht el~:ctions are over things might develop in a different direction. _
_ In fact P~-ris seems very determined at present to prevent too-radical changes
_ by all means, including the military. But the French capital might, in the
grip of necessity, change its attitude; careful, in fact, to give itself a .
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more progressive .image vis-a-vis the third world countries, the oil producing
countries and the socialist countries, French diplomacy might agree to "re-
linguis}unents of sovereignty"--to use the hallowed expression--, which woula
put a definite end to the island's status. It is believed in the Pretoria
+ circles alluded to above, that this scenario might be presented within three
- years after the French presidential election. The alarm bell has already
rung in St. Denis and according to the same sources of information collected
in South African banking circles, flights of capital (principally to France)
have already been observed; while the bonds grow stronger between the Reunion
lobby and those in Pretoria who would be completely disposed to favor colon- _
ialist reaction on the island. Moreover they say the CIA, which has a great
interest in the NATO submarine (Omega) guidance station installed in Reunion,
would be following these projects very closely and with an eye as benevolent
as it is comprehensive.
To ask that question is to wonder whether Reunion is headed for total inde-
pendence and detachment from the French body. Put this way, the problem seems
to us to be a false problem. But a brief examination of the positions will
_ make it possible to give an account of the place occupied by the idea of au-
tonomy.
The Socialist Party, which garnered 10 percent of the votes in the presiden-
tial election, was at one time autonomist (it had signed the Morne-Rouge a-
greement with the communists). It has returned to "more classic" options. _
Like the parties of the right it has again become "departmentalist," that is
to say it does not challenge Reunion's status as a French department. It be-
lieves, liowever, that some adjustments are required that are no different
from those it advocates for the other regions of inetropolitan France.
The big autonomist force--and it has been so for a long time--is the Reunion-
ese Communist Party (PCR). Its influence over the island's poorest strata is
considerable. The powerful CGTR (General Confederation of Labor of Reunion)
- and the Youth Movement (FJAR)[Autonomist Youth Front of Reunion], influenced
by the PCR, have attitudes on the subject of autonomy that are very close to
those of the communists.
What difference does the PCR see between autonomy and independence? It must
be said first of all is not a priori against the idea of independence, but
that this makes sense only within the framework of an historic reality that,
_ at least for the moment, does not exist in Reunion. In a recent statement
(TEMOIGNAGE, 3 June 1980) refers first of all to tl~~., preamble to the Mor~?e~-
Rouge Convention, which was signed in August 1971 i~~ :ween the PCR and tl~c~ Com-
munist Parties of Guyana, Guadeloupe and Martiiiique, as well as other pro-
gressive forces. The preamble says: "The peoples of the four territories of
Reunion, Guadeloupe, Guyana and Martinique are, by virtue of their geographic -
frame~:~ork, their historic development, their ethnic components, their cultures,
their economic interests, national entities whose reality is variously felt
in the consciousness of the peoples. Consequently, no one can dispose of them
througll any legal artifice. These peoples themselves will determine their
destciny, democratically and in total sovereignty. Consequently too, no one
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- can put forward the claim, at the time of decolonization, that the field of
the power to decide to recognize these peoples is limited. But at a precise
moment in their history, in the atmosphere of imperialism in which they are
living in the economic context that the colonial power imposed on them,
these peoples may decide to demand /only a part of those powers/" [in italics]
(uii~lerlineci by the author). The PCR concludes its s~tatement in these words:
"Yes, we coulei liave dema~idecl independence or anytr~ing else; yes, it is the
most absolute rig}it of our people; but at the historic stage we are in, au-
tonomy such as we are demanding in the Morne-Rouge Convention corresponds to ,
our people's profound aspiratior~, because it alone is likely to bring solu-
tions to the colonial situation our country is experiencing."
- An Expanding Movement
It must bs added to that that certain political organizations having no great
_ electoral weight but having a real impact on public opinion are also "auto-
nomist" in the sense expressed by the PCR. This is the case with the Leftist
, Radical Movement (hiRG) directed by Joseph Varondin. It is also the case with
religious groups like those that gather around TEMOIGNAGE CHRETIEN DE LA
REUNION. The leader of this group, for example, Father Rene Payet, attacks ,
members of Parliament who go to confer in Paris instead of understanding
"that the battle is to be conducted elsewhere and for other things, on the
terrain, with our people, for its autonomy" (TEMOIGNAGE CHRETIEN DE LA
REUNION, 15 June 1980).
- This autonomy watcliword seems all the moxe realistic in that it finds, in
attenuated form (and by way of backfire against the impact of the communist ~
positions) an echo even in circles that are traditionally extremely far re- -
moved from anticolonialism. A number of local leaders of commerce and indus-
try, impressed by the sincerity and strength of the CGTR and the PCR, go so
far as to demand for the Reunionese economic and political initiative powers
(especially where relations with the neighbors are concerned) which, although
nothing is said about it, are by nature strictly "autonomist." This novement
comes together more clearly in the activity of a group that denies it is a t
political party and moreover does not run a candida�e for elections, the Com- ~
mittee for Progress, whose secretary general is Paul Hoarau. This committee,
which conducts discussion groups on the island, benefits from the support of
the bishop of Reunion, whom no one goes so far as to label "red."
Monsignor Aubry, a disciple of the "Creolie," proposes "a Reunionese model ~
located ;zat necessarily ~utside of a French national framework, as some are =
claimizg, but a model that should enable us to produce the most things right
~lere .fc~r. faod self-sufficier~cy" (interview in LE QUOTIDIEN DE LA REUNION,
5 Jun~ L980). Monsignor A.ubry in March of this year led an inter-island meet-
- ing ~f bishops, participants in which were the highest-level representatives ~
of the Catholic Church of Reunion, Mauritius, the Seychelles, the Comores and
Rodriguez Island~ This "mini-council of the Indian Ocean" adopted a long and -
marc ~oli.ti.~z.lly i,nteresting text, analyzing the ~lifficult economic situation
t}iat is cverwhelming people, emphasizing that "some wish for developments that
o~hers dreaa" and noting that "the legitimate desire of various pc~pulation
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groups and communities /to affirm their ~ultural identity/ [in italics] (un-
derlined in the text), to maintaia and develop their tra3itional values, is
not always understood."
Res1~o~ictil~g to r?n accusatory commentary in JOURNAL DE L'ILE DE LA REUNION, a
i~uriu~l ul' t.l~e ri.~ht, Monsibnor Aubry stateJ, "'1'he hierarchy must not neblect
tiie political problem, bttt we do not have to apply pressure; it is not for us
to turn against a status as a French department, nor /to preclude any choice
other than French departmentalism/" [in italics] (underlined by the author).
In various publications the Committee for Progress put forward ideas very
" close to those of the bishop. In fact, it "lays down as a principle that
- Reunion's political develapment must b e controlled first of all and mainly
y by the Reunionese themselves, whatever the outcome of that development" -
(November 1978). Tt "aims at making the Reunionese collectively aware, which
is likely to bring about tneir unity as a people." In a general way, it re-
commends regional entent~s (Mauritius, the Comores, the Seychelles) on the
economic and political levels. Some think they find in this an underlying
- desire to ~o.to a mora or less independent entity of various Indian Ocean
territories.
- Be that as it may, the question of autonomy is obviously a problem with pro- _
found implications. The autonomist demand, originally presented by the com-
munists alone, has acquired a growing audience through the years. In one
form or another it has become the more or less clear desire of a majority.
None of this is without contradictions or afterthaaghts. In a territory in
which a revolutionary party, the PCR, enjoys so much influence, it may be
tempting to cut the ground out from under its feet and find generally con-
servative solutions to the inevitable questions. They are problems of the
relationship of internal forces, which are obviously not independent of the
surrounding world. Some have understood this thoroughly--those who are seek-
ing already in South African fascism the impossible recourse against the move-
- ment of history.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
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RWANDA
RADICAL CHANGE NEEDED TO AVERT DEB~ACLE
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 9 Jun 80 pp 32-33 .
[Article by Antonia Blis]
[Text] Is the Rwandan system gangrenous to the point of being threatened
by collapse at the slightest sttock? That is the question being asked in
Kigali by those who aspire to a healthy change and those who are desper-
ately holding on to their privileges. In any event, everything is happen-
ing as if panic had taken hold of the bureaucratic and buying [compradore]
middle class; and events which have occurred during the last few weeks-- -
when certain personalities in the public eye, including Major Li sinde,
director general of public relations in the president's cabinet, and Donat
I~rego, legal adviser in the ministry of justice, were arrested--bear wit-
ness to the existence of a~roceis of decamposition which the present gov-
ernment may not be able to stop. .
For some time, President Habyarima.na had not ceased denouncing a nd condemn-
ing corruption, diversion of public funds, banditry, fraud, etc. Following
- his lead, other voices had been raised to echo the same thoughts. Last
April, the governor of the National Bank made public a letter de nouncing the
misdeeds committed by certain personalities. However, well bef ore that, one
voice with weight had made itself heard, namely that of the Catholic
bishopric which, in a pastoral letter signed by the archbishop of Kigali,
the archbishop-bishop of Kabgayi and the bishops of Butare, Kibungo
Ruhengeri and Nyundo for the first time in 20 years had drawn up a serious
indictment against the enrichment of those in power, the corrupt and the
corrupters, the speculators and profiteers, and denounced certain social
problems such as unemplo~~ment which strikes youth, or the inhuman conditions ~
prevailing in overpopulated prisons into which "criminals" are thrown.
This position-taking on the part of a Catholic church about which we could
say that it has been governing the country for three-quarters of a century--
the archbishop of Kigali is a mamber of the politburo of the gove rnment
party, the National Revolutionary Development Movement (MRND) jus t as in the
colonial period the bishops were ex officio members of the Belgian council -
of government--is revelatory of an explosive situ~ation.
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"...One cannot fail to be profoundly disturbed when he observes the abuses
engaged ir~ by certain holders of power..." the pastoral letter of the
_ Rwandan bishopric emphasizes. It also offers a reminder that power is not
given for the purpose of "self-service and the quickest possible personal
enrichment....
'1Je must point out, for example, the detestable custom of the bribe which,
- unfortunately, tends to be generalized. A bribe is becoming necessary to -
obtain an official paper, to put one's child in school, to get a job and -
many other things.... However, there are still other abuses. How can one
keep from wondering when he sees someone, in th e space of very short time,
become the owner of several houses and several trucks?"
"How can one remain indifferent when he sees th e privations suffered by the
little people to pay their taxes often turning to the personal profit of
those who divert public funds and whose diverting of funds has been formally _
denounced by the chief of state? ~
"A young man who, being without arable land and having looked for work in
vain in the city, is arrested for having stolen 100 francs to buy something
to eat. But are we going to permit freedom of movement to a man who diverts
up to thousands of francs because he boasts of having connections?
"There are courts," it will be said. "Go to the courts." In principle,
that is so: The court is the recourse of anyon e who has been the v'~.:tim of
injustice. But what happens to this recourse when some of those t~hose job
it is to provide redress for the violated rights says 'yes' or 'no' on the
basis of the sum of money they are given?
_ "...If the situation is to be redressed before it is too late, it is not .
_ enough to denounce the abuses: they must be eradicated...." -
In an earlier paragraph dealing with the "agonizing problem of youth," this
pastoral letter, which is a veritable cry of alarm, stated: "There has been
much criticism o~ today's youth; they are reproached for not wanting to
live on the hill and going to the city to live as band its. Of course, it
is the duty of all Rwandans, including the youn g people, to apply themselves
to obeying the directives of the authorities with a view to improving agri-
culture and livestock raising. What is more, r he arable lands required for
such improvements must be available. Has not the second five-year develop- �
ment plan revealed this scarcity of land as one of r'-~ principal concerns
- of the moment? The sight of hundreds and hundreds o!` youths standing i.n
front of a newly-opened workshop in the hope of finding work there when tl.~
number hired can only amount to a hand~ul, cannot leave us indifferent.... -
What is to be done to prevent all these young people, gnawed by hunger, from
resorting to banditry? How are these young peo ple going to be able to think -
about establishing a home?
F
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"We are not unaware of- the very good intentions of the authorities and dare
to implare tt~em to makc tt~e employment of youth their priority of prior- -
- ities. The authorities have spoken of many jobs in which the hands of th.e
young people, 'this primary wealth of the country,' would take the place of
machines wherever possible. Let the techaicians of the respective depart-
ments coordinate their deci.sions to begin such projects as may be con-
ducive to giving hope to our youth...."
Fina lly, the pastoral letter brings up the problem of the conditions of
- detention, among others. While stating that "it is all too obvious that
society must protect itself against bandits and murderers who, alas, are
becoming more and more numerous and are so gravely tarnishing the friendly ~
image of our country," the bishopric comments: "For all that, a prisoner
continues to be a man. He retains the right to a modicum of human dignity.
Prisons should be places of social reeducation and rehabilitation. Although
it is necessary to punish people, there can be no question of leading them
to the point of despair....
After having cited as positive elements the amnesty decreed by the chief of -
state on the occasion of his investiture to the supreme magistracy on
8 January 1979 and the actions 4,sken by the authorities "to hunanize the
- livin g conditions of prisoners," the bishops' document nonetheless goes on
to say: "However, can we endure in silence the anomaly tliat accused persons
are being kept in prison for months and months without a trial?"
The Only Solution
This problem of banditry and juvenile delinquency is also the subject of a
very instructive polemic which appears in the Catholic magazine, DIALOG,
publis hed in Kigali. It must be said that this phenomenon which is nothing
more than the most spectacular manifestation of more serious problems gnaw-
- ing away at Rwandan society is becoming an increasing cause for concern
despite the brutal and at times bloody measures taken in an effort to
_ eradicate it. (Thus in 1974, 20 young men charged with banditry and murder
were executed; at the same time the army had organized systematic rouniiups
of young people without proper papers who were sent to "reeducation centers."
However, two years later the situation became even more aggravated and new
"cleanups," as useless as the first ones, were undertaken;)
In its number 77, ~he magazine DIALOG
, , published an article by one of its
readers, ~mnanuel Bahigiki, who, in response to two previous a.rticles which ~
had appeared on this subject under the questioning headline: "Is Kigali
A Thieves Paradise? puts the problem in its true perspective. Rwanda is a
paradise for thieves, he says in substance; however, the real thieves are
not the juvenile delinquents denounced with such fanfare. The real thieves
are the "very great number of diverters of public funds in Rwanda"; they
are "the merchants who in a few years have accumulated millions of francs";
etc. Denouncing the problem at its source, Emm~nuel Bahigiki demonstrates
.
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i V~~ vl' 1 LtiLL1L l1Jli Vl`IL1
that if we w~ .it to clean up the situation, it is the entire system which
has to be thrown out.
"Since the beginning of colonization," he writes, "Rwanda has been engaged
in the capitalist system, a system based on the exploitation of the great
masses of the people by a handful of privileged persons. This system is
~
Uased on feudalism, and its spirit is obscurantist. The current author- -
ities have the sad objective (although at times they deny it) of wanting ~
to consolidate the national middle class (the country's big~aigs); i.e.,
to permit the middle class to accumulate as much wealth as possible in the
tiop~~ that it will bc~ very dynamic and will 'develop' RwandA. Since this
middle class does not have sufficient capital and know-how, an appeal is
made to foreign capita lists who do nothing more than reinforce the de-
pendence of the national economy.... However, encouragement is also given
- to members of our middle class by a11 kinds of credits, rax exemptions,
- tolerance of corruption, etc.
"Wealth, therefore, accumulates in the hands of a sma.ll majority, while the
great majority of the popt:lation becomes increasingly impouerished.... Thus
you will see food-producing fields abandoned, in a country where food short-
' ages are omnipresent, while everyone is urged to gruw coffee, tea and
- pyrethrum.3 You will also observe that fine and very expensive houses are
springing up everywhere to meet the tastes of foreigners and wealth na-
~
tionals, while the mass of workers has no hope of getting housing one day.... -
These members of the middle class a11ow themselves ever.y great luxury of the
- cor~sum~r society (automobiles, alcoholic beverages, expensive clothing,
gadgets of all kinds), while the fundamental needs are far from being satis-
fied. In 1973, for example (and nothing has changed since then), Rwanda im-
- ported alcoholic beverages and tobacco worth 168.9 francs and 70.1 million
Er.ancs worth of goods under the heading of 'healrh and hygiene'
' "At the end of the chain, you ~,rill find the ciass of those who have been
left out of the diwying up process; the other group is the one for which
it is said that Rwanda is a paradis;
In conclusion, Emmanuel Bahigiki says: it is, therefore, now time: "to
call into question the capitalist pathway which has been followed by Rwanda
up to now and of ~ahich banditry is nothing more than a byproduct."
As one can well imagine, the %aandan Catholic church does not at all share
this opinion. And in a rebuttal to the Enananuel B:','~ilci article, Fathe~-
Massion, the author of an earlier article which wa~~ challenged by the la~ter,
waves the red flag of communism, taking as his -~tness S'olzhenitsyn or th_
"notebooks of Samizdat."
This entire debate which is taking place in Rwanda is nonetheless particu-
larly eloquent; and rumors about an attempted coup d'etat fomented on ethnic =
based by reactionary elements which have been circulating in recent months
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clearly demonstr~zte that radical reordering is required the country is
to be saved from a debacle. -
FOOTNOTES
i. Following these arr~sts some of which involve speculation and diversion
of funds and other subversive actions, a judicial investigation was in- _
- itiated.
In Rwanda, like Bvrunci a mountainous country, the hill is the basic -
~listrict.
3. A plant with rich insecticidal properties.
COFYRIGHT : 1980 Af rique-As ie
~ 8143
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~
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
~.I~ i:Tl:r\i; BEVELOPriFNT SANh AIRPORT LOAN GRANTED
- P a ris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Jun 80 p 1634
[Excerpts] A loan amounting to one million units of account (UC)--or ap-
- proximately 280.74 million CFA francs--was granted to the Democratic
Republic of Sao Tome and Principe by the African Development Bank (ADB) to
finance implementation studies for the expansion of the international air- _
port of Sao Tome, the capital of the island by that name. Reimbursement of
the loan which carries with it a 5-year grace period, will be spread over
the next 25 years.
The runway of the present airport is only 1,933 me.~ers long. It can only ,
handle short-range planes like the Boeing 737 or _~k.ker F 28 types. The -
location lends itself to further development.
As part of its aid to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, the
- Portuguese government recently completed a full study pertaining to the
first phase of the runway lengthening by 210 meters. Work to that effect .
wil?. begin sometimes this year. The planned financing will therefore make
it possible to extend the total length of the runway to 2,443 meters.
Total cost of the project is estimated at 1.225 million UC, one million to _
' cover costs in foreign currency and the remainder--or. 225,000 UC--to cover
costs in local currency. This loan will therefore help finance the totality
of the costs in foreign currency or 81.6 percent of the total cost of the
project. The government of Sao To~e and Principe will assume the remainder
of the costs.
- Studies are scheduled to begin in January 1981 and be completed by December -
of that same year.
This is the second intervention of the banking group to Sao Tome and _
Principe. A first loan from ADF (African Develo~ment Fund) amounting to
8 million units of account was granted in 1978. Tt was allocated to the
cocoa plantations reclamation project.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie 1980 -
6857 -
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SENEGAL
SFI PARTICIPATION IN BANK REPORTED
- Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1739
[Text] The International Financial Company (SFI) has invested $475,000 in
the authorized ca~ital of the Housing Bank of Senegal (BHS), a Senegalese in-
stitution specializing in financing housing for the modest-income classes, as
revealed on 1 July in a communique from the company. In investing in this
largely privately-owned bank the SFI joins some 75 other shareholders from
the private or public sector, among them nearly all of the country's finan-
cial institutions. The SFI investment represents about 8.6 percent of the
authorized capital of the BHS, the entire amount being $5,500,000. The BHS
was founded recently with technical assistance from the SFI and the World
Bank, with which the SFI is affiliated. The SFI investment is intended for
the extension of a plan for improving structures and services in Senegal;
this project is also receiving aid from the World Bank. Housing being inad-
ec~uate in Senegal, the BHS is expected to increase new housing and make hous-
ing more accessible to more of the population, and at the same time develop
_ volume and improve conditions for domestic savings. By mobilizing institu- -
- tional savings through the issuing of long-term bonds and by issuing bonds to
the public, the BHS will contribute toward developing the financial market.
The BHS' resources, formed by its authorized capital augmented by a start-up
subsidy from the Senegalese government, will be supplemented by funds from
savings deposits, by the placing of bonds, by loans, by the rediscount facil-
ities of the central bank, as well as by the income from certain taxes on
housing, The BHS' operations will increase the activity of the housing sec-
tor, which will stimulate the local construction industry, encourage the de-
velopment of small and medium-sized firms connected with that sector, and it
will contribute toward creating new jobs.
COPYRIG.~IT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 19~0
- 8946 ~
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SENEGAL
i-
i
I-
i
BRIEFS
DIFLOMATIC MISSIONS CLOSED--The list of ~he 22 Senegalese diplomatic missions
whose closing "for reasons of budgetary austerity" was announced last 4 July
was published on 5 July: in Africa, the embassies of Senegal in Mali, Mauri-
tania, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands, Niger, Ghana, Zaire and the Comores; _
in ~urope, embassies in Romania, Bulgaria, Portugal and Austria, as well as
_ Senegal's legations to UNESCO in Paris, the FAO in Rome and UNO organizations
in Geneva, and Senegal's Information Bureau in Paris; in Asia, embassies in
Lebanon, Syria and India; in Am~rica, the Senegalese consulate in Rio de
Janeiro and the legati~n to the OACI [expansion unknown] in Montreal. 'I'he -
Lebanon embassy has been closed since 30 June. Senegalese interests there are
being handled by two honorary consuls, one at~Heirut, the other at Jounieh,
20 km north of the capital. The Damascus embassy has also been closed since
early in July. The embassy in Austria has been closed since 2 July. However,
Mademba Sy, Senegal's first ambassador to Austria, will continue to represent
his country at the UNIDO .(iJnited Nations Industrial Development Organization)
and the AIEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Finally, the closing of
these 22 diplomatic missions, which represent half of Senegal's mission abroad,
is to provide a savii~g of 2,000,000,000 CFA francs, the Foreign Affairs min-
ster said. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET NIEDITERRANEENS in French
11 Jul 80 p 1739] 8946 -
BIAO-SENEGAL ESTABLISHED--Established in Senegal since 1853, the BIAO (In-
ternational Bank for West Africa), a French bank with capital of 161,280,000
French francs whose company headquarters, as is well known, are in Paris, has
put all of its seven agencies and offices in Senegal into a company ur.der Sen-
_ egalese law with capital of 2,000,000,000 CFA francs, ;~hich has taken the com-
pany name BIAO-Senegal and which was officially founded on 28 June 1980.
Xavier Althuser, formerly regional manager in Senegal, ~~;as appointed managing
dirPCtor of the new bank. This transformation of t}ie BIAO in Senegal is part
of the process of affiliating all of the BIAO's Af-rican and Europsan network.
We recall that the principal shareholders are the BNP [National Bank of Paris] -
and the CCF [French Railway Company] through the agency of the France-Africa
Financial Company, as well as the Union of Swiss Banks, the Bank of Brazil
and the Inter-African Bank Company. [Text~ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
[~DITERRANEF::~ in French 11 Jul 80 p 1739j" 8946
J -
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- SAUDI ECONOMIC AIll--Saudi ~rabia is going to grant to Senegal "very important
financial commitments, the total amount to be determined later," the Dakar
- daily LL' SOLEIL has indicated. The Saudian authorities made these commitments
during the visit of the Senegalese chief of state to Riyadh at the end of June.
Senegal, which because of the drought, inflation and increased oil prices is
going through a financial crisis, had decided to appeal to "friendly countries"
for the necessary 30,000,000,000 CFA francs to redress the credit situation in
the economy. At the same time the Senegalese government will utilize to its
advantage the specific and contractual mechanisms (loan:; from the Internation-
al Monetary Fund and the World Bank). Finally, we recall that STABEX [expan-
sion unknown] intervened previously :in Senegal's favor by advancing
5,20U,OOU,000 CFA francs for 1980 losses of export income (MARCEiES TROPICAUX -
ET I~DITERRANEENS, 4 July, p 1681). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
N~DITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1739] 8946
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SIERRA LEONE
BRIEFS
NEW DIRECTOR OF'DAILY MAIL'--Jonathon Modupeh Johnson, who was for 22 years a
printer in the Sierra Leone national printing plant, has just been appointed
managing director of the local daily, the DAILY MAIL, replacing Samba Kamara,
who is returning to the ministry of Information and Broadcasting as informa-
tion director. It should be noted that the DAILY MAIL's has gone up from
five to ten cents, in line with the country's other newspapers. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET N~DITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1744] 8946
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- SOMALIA
BRIEFS
FINANCING OF BARDERA DAM--Construction of the large dam being considered
for Bardera, in Somalia, would cost the enormous amount of 500 million dol-
lars, covering only the absolute necessary minimum work, namely, the dam
itself, the access road to Baidoa, the power station and an electric power
transmission line to the town of Chisimaio. At the time we went to press,
- results of a money lenders' meeting scheduled for 25 June were expected.
e This meeting was organized to search for an additional 200 million dollars
still needed after the present leading participants made known their
_ eventual financial contributions: 100 million dollars from the Saudi Funds;
30 million from Italy; 25 million from France (CCCE [Central Fund for Eco-
nomic Cooperation]); 45 million from Germany; and 70 million from the fifth
IDF, to which should be added a contribution of approximately 30 million
from the Somali government for the access road. Cost of the pro~ect could
even be higher if, as it was considered for a while, an electric po~rer trans-
mission line to M~ogadiscio was added to the facilities currently planned. -
This would cost an additional 120 million dollars. [Text] [Paria MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1639] 6857
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TANZANIA
BRIEFS
IDA LOANS--Tanzania will use an IDA (International Development Association,
an affiliate of the World Bank) credit of $10,000,000 to realize a project
to aid the Tanzania Rural Development Bank in developing its accessibility
~ for the country's small farmers. On the other hand another IDA credit of
$30,000,000 g�ranted to Tanzania will aid in financing a petroleum exploration
project to be developed in the Songo-~ongo Island region. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET NIEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1754] 8946
GOLD MINES REEXPLOITED--The Tanzanian secretary of state for Water, Energy =
and Minerals, Maokala Tojolo, stated on 4 July in Parliament that Tanzania
had a plan to reexploit the gold mines in the country, as a result of the
rise in the price of that metal on the world market. [Text] [Paris MARCIiES
TROPICAUX CT [~iDI'CCRRANECNS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1754J 894b
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ZAIRE
NATION F'ACES CRUCIAL FOREIGN DEBT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 May 80 p 1217
[Editorial: "Foreign Debt, Zaire's Crucial Problem]
[TextJ In April, Zaire made an initial repayment to
commercial banks of $58 million out of a total of $434
million of its readjusted debt. Yet this gesture, if
one is to believe a special correspondent of the FINAN-
CIAL TIMES IN Kinshasa, was received with a certain -
amount of skepticism by western economists, Zaire's
foreign debt having been, for the past 5 years, such a
major concern of the banks and governments that do
business with it.
According to a report prepared for the Bank of Zaire by/Lazard Brothers, _
Kuhn Loeb Brothers, and S.G. Warburg/[in italics], the Zairian foreign debt
reached 3.65 billion dollars by 30 June 1979; since then it has risen to
- about 4 billion dollars. In 1980, the debt represents 26 percent of the
value of exports, without taking into account the outstanding debt estimated
at about $1.1 billion. The total amount of the public and private debt,
which represented 32 pexcent of the gross domestic product in 1972, today
would reach 100 percent (we can note that in 1978 the World Bank estimated
- Zaire's gross national product at $5.5 billion).
In 1975, Zaire began to negotiate the readjustment of the debt because of
its deteriorating economy following a drop in copper stacks and the after-
effects of Zairianization. The two "Shaba wars", in 1977 and 1978, added
another disruptive element by leading to a slowdown in copper production.
However, negotiations concerning the debt were started in June 1976, with _
members of the "Paris Club" representing the creditors of the Zairian
- Government. The negotiations continued in 1977, with no results, At the
same ti.me, negotiations were also taking place with private banks, but they
also failed.
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It was only in 1979 that an agreement was drafted for the bank debt, antici-
pating a significant reduction for repayment in 1980, relatively low repay-
ments of yearly installments from 1981 to 1984, and the payment of the rest -
between 1985 and 1990. This agreement was officially signed on last 23
April (see P1TM ot 2 May 1980 p 1048). The $58 million repaid at the end of `
April by the Bank of Zaire represents back interest and 10 percent of the
principal owed.
As for the national debt, negotiations with the "Paris Club" resulted in an
agreement, in December 1979, for the repayment of an important part of the
debt: $1.3 billion, including the arrears, and with due dates falling
between 1 July 1979 and 31 December 1980. The payment is between 10 and 30
percent of the amount due, the rest of the debt to be repaid in 10 years,
with a 4-year grace period.
But we must remember that this agreement includes a condition that requires ,
the achievement of economic stability for the 18-month period extending _
from July 1979 to December 1980, a program on which is also dependent the _
- aid from the International Monetary Fund.
Will Zaire be able to face up to its obligations towards the banks and the
Paris Club? That is the question asked by the FINANCIAL TIMES, emphasizing =
_ that the service rate for the debt would be twice a5 high in 1980 as in the
previous years. The agreements represent between $440 and $470 million, or
23 percent of the exports, but without the readjusted agreement they would
have amounted to 540 million. Many observers in Kinshasa find that few
things have changed to prove that the government would reach its objectives. -
The future will tell, but in any case it is certain that Zaire will be
unable to overcome its difficulties without a new, strictly orthodox finan-
cial policy, and a strict economic policy.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
9465 END
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