JPRS ID: 9237 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020009-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9237
6 August 1~980 ~
Near E / '
ast North Africc~ Re ort
p
CFOUO 29/80) _
FBIS FOREIGN BROA~CAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9237
6 August 1980
NEA R EAST/NO RTH AF R I CA REPO RT
(FOUO 29/80)
CONTENTS
AFGHANISTAN -
. Writer Questions Whether Afghans Fighting, Dying Alone
(Michel Jobert; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Jul 80) 1
ALGERIA `
Chadli Style of Governing Examined
(Jean-LouisBuchet; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Jul 80) 4
FLN C~ngresa Sessior,s Analyzed
(Abou Feriel; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 7 Jul 80) 7
IRAN
Qotbzadeh Discusses Conditions for Release of Hostagea
(Sadeq Qotbzadeh Interview; PARIS MATCH, 4 Jul 80) . 10
'REUTER' Cites Beheahti on United Statea Hostages
(Alexander, Nicoll; REUTER, 2 Jul 80) 14
Days of Khomeyni Regime Believed Numbered
(Bechir Ben Yahmed; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Jul 80) 16 ~
- Clandestine Radio Attacka Mounted on Khomeyni
(Andrew Whitley; THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 28 Jun 80) 20
Qotbzadeh Remarks on Warning to Russians f'eported
(Robert Fisk; THE TIMES, 10 Jul 80) 23
Kord.estan Described as Iran's Vietnam
('Isam 'Abd-al-'Aa.iz; AL-WATAN AL'-ARABI,
16-22 May 80) 26
- a - [ I I I - NE & A- 121. FOUO ]
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- Oil Mi*~ister Announces Increased Crude Exports
_ (Patri.ck Cockburn; FINANCIAL TIMES, 7 Jul 80) 33
Oil Industry Spare Parta Bought Despite Economic Sanctions
(Simon Henderson; TkE FINANCIAL TIMES, 17 Jiil 80) 35
ariefs
Afghan Re~el Base Denied 37
- Rape Charges Against U,S. Hostage 37
General Bagheri Arrest Denied 37
Hostages' Release Rejected 38
Bakhtiar Praises Conspiracy Members 38
Quick Hostage Release Requested 38
Britons Ordered To Leave 39
Student Cited on Hostages 39
= MAURITANIA
Political, Economic Future in Regional Context Noted
~ (Jacques Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Jul 80) 40
Rank Issues Report on Economic Situation ~
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Jul 80) 50
SYRIA
Syrian Internal Situation Analyzed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 12-18 Jul 80) 52 -
TUNISIA
Actitiities of New Prime Minister Described
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Jul 80) 62
Country's Problems, Needed Changes Outlined
(Mohamed Charfi; JEUNE AFRTQUE, 9 Jul 80) 66
Excerpts From PCT Statement Published, Commented On
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 7 Jul 80) 70
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AFGHANISTAN
WRITER QUESTIONS Tr1HETHER AFGHANS FIGHTING, DYING ALONE
Paris JEL'NE AFRIQUE in French No 1017~2 Jul 80 pp 14-15 ~
[Article by Michel Jobert: "Are They 'Fighting Alone, Dying Alone'?"]
[Text] [dil.l the Afghans fight alone? Will they die al.one? To the questions ~
arising from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 the answer
is evident and overwhelming: yes, the Afghans are fighting alone; yes, they .
will die alone. Despite twisted claims to the contrary. Despite resolutions
drawn up in a noble but hollow and threadbare style. Despite the farce of -
the rfoscow Olympics boycott and the seeming and illusory American wheat
embargo against the USSR. Despite Giscard d'Estaing's remonstrances tending ~
to justify the Warsaw summit, except that the public does not know its con-
tent and does not see its effect yet. Despite what Schmidt, the German
chancellor, will say at the end of this month with the same confidential
firmness in Moscow. Despite the Islamabad Islamic conference and its calcu-
lated prudence. Despite China whose cries are less strong than usual and
who does nothing at all. Despite the "preo~cupations" of Mrs Gandhi to whom
the Soviet ally is all the more useful as it is not too close to India.
Despite the declaration c?f European leaders on 13 June in Venice, expressing
"Europe's deep concern about intensified Soviet military operations," and
demanding that "the Afghan people freely exercise their right to self-deter-
mination." Come on! Since the outset of the Russian operation in Afghanis-
tan all the~e protesters and makers of communiques have agreed to say the
least possible about it. To begin with, the United States which has shown
little concern since the 1978 pro-communist coup d-etat, despite the assas-
sinatiAn of its own amtrassador, Adolph DubbS, in 1979. In their attempt to
divide the world between themselves and the Russians, the Americans have
_ accepted to put Afghanistan under Soviet thumb, provided that it is:not too
obvious. In 1979, the Russians sent out several warning of their interven-
tion, yet the Americans raised no eyebrows. Thus why would have the Soviets
been uneasy? Likewise, in 1975 they weze hardly worried in Angola since
President Ford and his Secretary of State Kissinger had consented to let them
intervene.with their Cuban mercenaries. Most go,vernments, although stunned
by the cynicism and brutality of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan,
have seen fit to close their eyes, taking refuge instead in this heroic and
" 1
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~ classic declaration, "This time around, we hush it up, but let's say that it
be the last one!" How can sucn an attitude fail to remind us--the European
peoples especially--of the weaknesses of our governments from 1936 onward,
in the face of successive pawn-capturing attacks by Hitler? Forty-four
~ years later, the sons of ostriches behave ~ust as did their mothers of yes-
Cerday. Like ttieir mothers, they hide their heads in the sands at the first
sign of rumbling danger.
As f~r Afghanistan's immediate neighbors, they are too frightened to budge. ~
Pakistan, duly warned by the Soviets, has resigned itself to welcoming
Pathan refugees whose home, it should be noted, is ei~her Pakistan or Afghan-
istan. Does General Zia want to show that Americans have not the least
intentioti to provide him with money and necessary weapons? Moreover, w.ouldn't
~ India cash in on tr~. ~pportunity offered by such tension? Shi'ite Iran talks
big with its "holy war" appeal ta rescue Sunnite Afghanistan, but how can~it
do otherwise, given the foot-dragging para~.ysis into which it has sunk? China, `
realistic and careful, doesn't want to be a poacher, and for *_hat reason'it
regards Afghanistan as Soviet "hunting ground." Egypt would 'nave clandes-
tinely sent in a few anns shipments and Saudi Arabia would have forked out
some money.
Besides, at the very beginning of the bloody Russian operation the deal was -
strikirig. "Occupy Afghanistan if you can, but be sure to understand that
you have to stop right there. And above all, don't be tempted by Iranian
weakness to go beyond Afghan borders!" In a sense, things would b.ave returned
to riormal had it not been for repeated American errors on Iran, whetting even
more Soviet appetite. '
Rut voila! Afghans have refused to play the game, at the point of embarras-
sing everyone now! Undeterred by the conviction that they have to fight and
die alone, they are now fighting and dying alone! Starving, hiding out in
the mountains, moving by night, carrying old guns, audaciously--a qu.ility
. enhanced by the surrounding wall of cowardice--they are fighting and dying
alone.
tJhy'? To defend one of the lowest living standards in the world against the
socialist paradise, deter,nined to annex their country with napalm, gas and
executions? To save an "archaism" which, nevertheless, is no more absurd
than many servitudes of the modern world? To serve "these reactionary
forces" with which Soviet propaganda fills prefab hells being exported by
Moscow? To satisfy the folly of mountaineers a~d shepherds for whom guer-
rilla warfare would be "social promotion," as ci~me-a-dozen Western humorists
put it!
No! The Af~hans are fighting because they know? better than m~ny others,
that is d~.fficult to live and easy to die. They need no hope to fight. To
be true; they have no free choice: international ir~,~iifference has never
been ,~o lamentable toward a people falling prey ta aggression and deadly ,
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peril. Their resistance, so easily anticipated--nontheless, so surprising
for those accustomed to overlooking the resolve of a people--has upset the
judgment of cold-heart2d monsters. Events in the past few months have
attested to that reversion: in the first place, at issue was ho~a to whack
up a pie and to get the message across; then to draw a new line at Soviet
expansionism, hoping that the Russians will soon be behind the eight ball of
their own making. Chiefs of state are now playing the role of zealous inter-
mediaries to "save the face" of Moscow and, aclditionally, that of communist
parties in the world which have dared to ignore or ~ustify the Soviet aggres-
sion. All this is being done as if it is irrational to hear the cries for
freedom of an entire people coming from the nightly depths of slavery, and
rational to keep the torturer's face from being exposed to full daylight!
/
~Jhat statesman strayin~ from the: ~ duties fail to proclaim, public opinions
and "men in the street," their fragility notwithstanding, must do with sol-
emnity: the Afghan fight is our fight now against that Fascist totalitar-
ianism, which is Soviet communism. With bombs, napalm, gas, machine guns and
rockets, Soviet armored helicopters are attacking bare-handed guerrillas:
men who want freedom at the point of dying for it, before hearing the ring
of the "last hour of fate"! It is them who save world peace and not all
those prudent capitulators who buy, with others' lives, the prolongation of
their threatened quietude. They believe that they can get away with it by
, going from one thing to another, hardly showing any remorse. What a foolish-
~ ness!
ihe Third World, a Muslim world rising above its divisions, Westerners still
lucid and f~reed from a near-sighted egoism, European peoples under Soviet
control and the communists who don't want Lo apologize later for concealing
their present ignorance, all must make known by their daily attitude their
horrified reprobation of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Then ~he
Afghans will no longer be alone, and perhaps they will no longer die for the
defense of their mountains and villages only.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
- 9213
CSO: 4900
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ALGERIA
CHADLI STYLE OF GOVERNING EXAM?.NED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 pp 14-15
[Article by Jean-Louis Buchet: "Chadli Is Not Sadat"]
[Text] Ther.e were 17 of them; there are only seven left. No new men in the
FLN (National Liberation Front, the single party), whose make-up, as decreed
by President Chadli Benjedid, was made public after an extraordinary meeting
of the Centr,al Committee (28-29 June). Some semi-surprises, nevertheless,
such as the presence of Abdelaziz Bouteflika among the four former members of
the Revolutionary Council reta~ned in the politburo.
Good Influence
The fiery foreign affairs minister, Houari Boumedienne, who was sidelined at
one time, confirms by these moves that he is returning to the front of the
stage as certain signs indicated (JE~lNE AFRIQUE No 1012). Mohamed Salah
Yahiaou~ is still there, but his post of "party coordinator" has been abolish-
ed. Col Abdallah Belhouchet, inspector general of the armed forces, and
R~bah Bitat, presid~nt of the assembly and interim chief of state on the death
of Boumedienne (27 Dec 1978), are the other two survivors. For their part,~
two men whose sincerity and honesty are praised, but who are not figures of
the first rank: Boualem Benhamouda, who has been minister of the Interior for
a short time, because, it is said, of his Arab-Muslim sensitivity, and
Mohamed Said Maazouzi, a native Kabyle; he is a former minister, a former pre-
fect of Tizi-Ouzou. And of course Chadli himseZf, who is in charge of the
whole thing.
For, as the ,extraordinary party congress (15-19 June) decided, in addition to
reducing its membership the politburo sees its role redefined. While it was
awaiting an especially weighty decision which would confront the various groups
that have sprung up since Chadli came to power (7 Feb 1979)--which had para-
lyzed government action--it became a kind of restrained government that in-
cludes the chief of st~te's principal adviser~. Among the departures one no-
tices Kasdih Merbah, the former head of military security, who was very active
in Chadli's election; but he retains his duties as secretary general of the
Defense Ministry.
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In tlie upinion of most commentators the chief of stat e, who in May obtained
"fall powers" from the Central Committee and w}iose positian had been strength-
ened as a result of the congress, is finally indispensable. And though the
politburo reflects a certain balanced mixture, a new more homogeneous gov-
- ernmental team should be formed, in which "the president's men" would have
star billing. We add that Chadli has been given the means of setting up "his"
policy. Which might be a chal~enge to the Boumedienne legacy.
Prudence
In summary, Chadli would have been--Sadat. A hasty and even false conclusion,
it seem.s, drawn from an analysis that limits the current ~evelopment of
Algeria to Chadli's struggle for power. Which is not the whole,truth--far
from it.
Moreover, though he has elbow room today, the president's position as No 1 has
never been contested. Yahiaoui himself, whu is too often presented as a
rival, can be considered the head of a significant movement, of a different
sensitivity. But he does n4t seem to have sought a test of strength with a
president who has the support of the army, who also presides over the Council
of Ministers, "holds" Defense and directs the party as secretary general. ~
That is just about--as many powers as Boumedienne had. Of course the two men
are not alike. But doesn't the successor have enough assets on hand to elim-
inate his adversaries? And to start a movement in the opposite direction by
invcking the example of the departed?
He did nat do it, however. Even Belaid Abdesselam, t he much-criticized former
boss of Economy, is not completely left out of the system. There are changes,
but they are made smoothly, ~vith maximum respect for appearances. Officially
, it is tlie congress or the central committee that makes the decisions while the
president consults his mandate or the Charter, etc. No sudden exclusions or
abrupt changes of course. Chadli demonstrates pragmatism.
He tivants--and 11e is not alone in this--a better-funct ioning economic apparatus,
- eiimination of the most serious gaps, a limitation on gigantism in industry, -
an effort in favor of agricultural and social measures. The slogan of the
congress was evocative: "For a B;tter Life." The program is being taken up
again by means of nationalized corporations, less far-reaching corruption,
improved distribution channels, etc. But there is no question of harking back
to the socializing option of the economy or government monopolies. The basics
remain the same.
In the same sp~rit Chadli has released the political prisoners and--awaiting
Ben Bella's total liberation--he is stressing democratization. But there is
no question of multipartism, opening up to the opposition, real freedom of the
press. In Kabylie the worst has been avoided. And in the future, according
to the president's vows, more account will be taken of the country's cultural
diversity. But Algeria's exclusively Arab-Muslim character, as it has been
defined since the 19;6 Charter, is being vigorously r eaffirmed.
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Pragmatism, flexible in form and basically faithful; this is Chadli's po-
licy. Boumedienne with a human face. To whom can he be compared? Much
more than to Sadat, he can be compared to Nikita Krushchev succeeding
Joseph Stalin. Keeping everything in proportion, of course, it seems that
the Algerian revolution follows--albeit more swiftly--steps similar to those
_ of the Soviet Revolution. Ben Bella (1963-1965) was the agitated period,
confused and yet "romantic," that the USSR experienced from 1917 to 1924.
Then when Boumedienne came to power, a longer and more difficult phase opens.
Somewhat like what went on--again keeping everything in proportion--in the "
Soviet Union under Stalin: millions of deaths in no time at all. In both
cases there is the absolute reign of one man. The foundations of the system
are established.
The Army's Role ~
Still following this com~a~ison, Algiers 80 would be a little like Moscow 56.
And Chadli, like Krushchev a centrist who knows how to protect the basics
while eliminati~ig the most negative aspects of the preceding period. Which
is also a way of consolidating and stabilizing the system. Since Krushchev a
balance has been established between the various groups and sensitivities be-
ing expressed behind the No 1, confronting each other in times of crisis. But
tl:e political class in power has solidarity, plays the game and respects the
forms. Like Algeria today, where Bouteflika and Yahiaoui cohabit when they
are around Chadli. Another comparable element is the role of the army. Im-
portant, indubitably decisive, but diffuse and slippery. 4V'hat influence has
the military brought to bear behind f:hadli? Interpretations vary. As in the
USSR, in every circumstance, and again recently with regard to Afghanistan. -
Still following this thesis, in several years Algeria will have a Brezhnev at
its head. And we will so~n be hearing a"Chadli report" spoken of, as the
devastating Krushchev rPport on Stalin's crimes was heard at the 20th ongress
of the CPSU [Communist Paxty of the Soviet Union].
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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ALGERIA
FLN CONGRESS SESSIONS ANALYZED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 7 Jul 80 p 14
[Article by Abou Feriel: "The Men of the Charter"]
[Text] "It was a frank and democratic debate, the living illustration of the
responsible democracy that defines the Chadli style better than any other
qualifier." This was the reaction of one of the delegates, a member of a
kasma* in the capital. The 4,000 delegates, meeting under the white dome of
the omnisports hall of the Cheraga Olympic complex, had been conscious since
the meeting began of the role cf "the conscience of the popular grass roots"
that they had been called upon to p1ay. They had also struggled during the
work of the congress--which lasted four days--to express as faithfully as they
could the aspirations ef that popular grass roots, by means of as critical as
possible an evaluation of the political, economic and social situation of the
country, so that the recovery so desired by all may operate on healthy founda-
tions.
The congress opened with a vigorous appeal by President Chadli for a"perm-
anent mob ilization" of the rank and file to realize the objectives of the
National Charter, At the end of the second day of work, which was divided be-
tween plenary ~essions and committees, a debate was entered into on the in-
itiative of the chief of state. This was a great moment.
From 2100 until dawn the delegates engaged in a critique in accordance with -
- rules, concerning the functioning of the basic institutions and organizations
of the party and the government, pointing to "deviations that are in danger of
hampering the forward progress of the party and the revolution."
A Background Critique
In direct language most of the participants approached the crucial question
of the choice of inen to whom they would entrust responsibilities at all levels
in this new phase of Algeria's development. Expressing a profound papular
sentiment, they denounced the "patriots false to the revolu~ionary word," the
"deviationists" and "those with unashamed fortunes who preach socialism." ,
*A section of the party. �
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Careerism, nepotism, authoritarianism, corruption, misagpropriation of funds
and double talk were matters before the bar. Because of its direct and im-
passioned tone, and also because of its spontaneity, the discussion reminded
many of the popular debate on the National Charter that took place throughout
the countr.y in 1976. This debate, too, is certain to be a date in the annals
of Algerian political life.
Two points appeared on the agenda of t~e extraordinary congress, provided for
in February 1979 when the 4th congress that brought Chadli Bendjedid to power ~
was extended: evaluation of the economic situation; adoption of the great
directions of the Five Year Plan (1980-1984) and amendment of certain articles
of the FLN statutes. In his opening speech the Algerian chief of state set
the framework of the debates by emphasizing on the one hand that "evaluation
_ does not mean judging an individual or a group of individuals. It means add-
ing up the positive and negative aspects, with strengthening of one and elim-
ination of the other." This applies to the economy. Bringing up political
questions, he added that the proposed amendments came out of the experience
of the past 18 months and "the need to re-examine certain provisions of the
party statute, so as to make it a faithful expression of the spirit of the
National Charter and more in harmony with the country's constitution." The
amendment proposals had been established in the past by the central committee
in extraordinary session.
- The first modification: the congress granted the secretary general of the FLN
the statutory means to make the party function more efficiently--especially
its executive board, the politburo--, bringing t}iis about through greater
flexibility in making up the politburo. In this way the number ~~f politburo "
members, which used to vary from 17 to 22, is reduced in the new statutes to
7 to 11. On the other hand, even while remaining collectively responsible to
the central committee, these office-holders become equally responsible to the
secretary general, w}io divides the tasks among them. This more precise defin-
ition of each one's prerogatives will allo~~v for more homogeneity at that level.
Two other significant modifications were granted by those attending the con-
gress. The first outlines the task of the party, whose mission at the internal
level is "to build socialism within the framework of national and Islamic val-
ues." The second concerns relations between the FLN and the mass organiza-
tions: labor unions, youth, women, combatants and peasants (UGTA [General
Un.ion of Algerian Workers] , UNJA [Na~ional Union of Algerian Youth] , UNFA
[National Union of Algerian Women], Moudjahidine and UNPA [National ilnion of
Algerian Peasants]). The new Art 120 in fact stipulates that the party is to
"play a driving, directing and controlling role in mass organization activi-
ties. Only that which is militant and structured at pariy headquarters may
be acceded to the leaders in the m3ss organizations." The latter provision
is to be applied in stages, with the central committee in charge of defining
it.
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~
Work for Principles .
But one of the most important �results of the sessions was most assuredly
the unreserved af�irmation of support for President Chadli by the 4,000 mem-
bers in attendance. In his closing speech he recalled a concept that has
always nourished the Algerian revolution, that militants must work for "prin- _
C1pIP.S and not for one person or a group of pexsons." Defining the criteria
�for choosing men, he stressed the fact that "sentiment has no place in this
area. It guarantees neither the strength of the state nor the future of the -
- revolution nor the future of the fatherland." Finally, approaching the prob-
lems of ~-lemocracy, he made a solemn pledge to continue and strengthen the
policy of dialog begun at his accession to power: "We are convinced," he
said, "that political leadership that does not practise dialog with the grass
- roots x~xns the risk of being isolated." This reminder was warmly applauded
by those in attendance; it underlines the perspective from which President
Chadli intends to approach the new phase of Algeria's development.
Tt reinforces the decisions of the congress that give the chief of state ~Che
necessary statutory means, especially those that enable him to surround him-
- self with a team in ord~r to carry out the tasks of building in accordance
with the National Charter, the ideologic referenc~ source of the Algerian
_ revo~ution.
_ COPYRIGI~'T: 1980 Afrique-Asie
89~6
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IRAN
QOTBZAD~H DISCUSSES CONDITIONS FOR RELEASE OF HOST~GES
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 4 Jul 80 p 47
[Interview with Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sadeq Qotbzadeh by PARIS
MATCH in Paris--date not given]
[Text] The Tehran hostages are beginning their 38th week of detention. ,~re
they threatened with that death more terrible than death, oblivion? "No,"
the Iranian minister of foreign affairs, at present visiting in Paris, told -
PARIS MATCH. "We are going to reactivate negotiations. But they will be on
our terms, which are the following."
[Question] While we are talking, Western delegates are meeting in Venice.
What do you expect of this conference as far as Iran is concerned?
[Answer] We would have liked the Europeans to take advantage of this meeting
to show a bit of understanding for our country and to demonstrate a little -
independence vis-a-vis the United States. Europe could play a big economic
and political role if it were allied with the Third World instead of always
siding with the two superpowers. But the Europeans do not want to understand
that the superpowers are only superpowers for themselves, not for us.
[Question] Speaking of superpowers, what do you think of the announcement
of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan?
[AnswerJ It is a political maneuver. And intended not only for the partici-
pants of the Venice conference. Because this announcement also comes at a
time when t~e Islamic Committee for Afghanistan has just held its first ses-
sion in Switzerl~nd, where the next conference of African chiefs of state
is alsu going to be held. So, the Russians are killing three birds with one
stone. Or at least, they think they are.
[Question] What do you think of the f.act that Moscow gave the scoop on the
news to Fra,nce? �
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[Answer] It is an enormous blunder, if not a downright scandal. For, after
all, the news concerned first of all Afghanistan's neighbors and, first among
them, Iran.
[Question] Stiil, your relations with the Russians are not so bad. You just
recently signed new economic agreements with them. Wouldn't there be some
thought of blackmailing the Western nations behind them?
[Answer] We simply renegotiated agreements with the Soviets that already
existed when the shah was in power. And we have proposed the same renegotia-
tion ~aith the West. But the Western nations refused, while the Soviets -
accepCed. If blackmail is involved, on which side is it? -
[QuestionJ Between ttie West and. Iran, there is the matter of the hostages,
which blocks all efforts. In connection with this, where do we stand with
this celebrated affair of the hostages? For 8 months there have been so many
ups and downs and your positions have varied so often that we no longer have
any clear idea of what is going on at all.
[Answer] A great deal of progress has been made. The Americans finally
understand that they will achieve nothing through violence and pressure. This
is very important for the future.
[Que:~tionj And the future, what will that be? What sort of procedure do you
have in mind for a settlement?
[Answer] For the time being, we are putting together a report on the matter
which should be presented to the Iranian Parliament. +
[Question] When?
[Answer] When the Parliament, which has just been elected, begins its deli-
berations. The deputies will first proceed with the election of committee
chairman, then go on to the appointment of Supreme Court judges, which will
take ahout 2 weeks. And then debate on the affair of the hostages, which
shoul.d specify our terms for negotiation, will begin. This should take
another. 2 or 3 weeks. In other words, negotiations could begin in a month
and a halE.
[Question] Cou1d you give us any information on these terms now?
[Answer] There will be two kinds: economic and political.
[QuestionJ Economic, I suppose that means lifting the blockade?
[Answer] Of course. And not only the blockade the Americans and their West-
ern friends are inf_licting on us. It also means lifting the embargo the '
Americans have imposed on Iranian assets that they have frozen and which
amount to the enormous sum of $12 billion.
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[Question] Which includes the $3 billion American companies operating in
Iran during the shah's regime claim under the heading of compensation.
[AnswerJ Naturally, that question will have to be settled and we ~an only do
so by renegotiating all the agreements we have with the American firms.
. [Question) So, you are not opposed to the Americans' resuming operations in
Iran?
[AnswerJ Not at all, if they do so in a way that is advantageous for us as
it is for them and is not pure colonial exploitation, as was the case during
the shah's regime. We are in no way prejudiced against the United States.
[QuestionJ And the political terms?
[Answer] The Americans will have to clearly and explicitly admit what they
have done i~ Iran. And let them not content themselves with expressing their
regrets, which would serve no purpose. Let them conduct a serious and thor-
ough investigation, in accordance with their own laws, as they did in the
Watergate case. Let them come out and say which big political, press and
business pe~sonalities received money from the shah, which of their people
they had installed in Iranian governments, what role CIA agents, gangs, etc.
played in Iran.
[Question] What purpose will that serve other than to offer you moral satis-
faction?
[Answer] It will be very important because it will inform the American peo-
ple about what their leaders have done in Iran without their knowledge and
in their name. And knowing that they could have accounts to settle with their
own public, future American governments wi11 not dare to start all over again.
Thus, the sacrifices we have endured in confronting American might will have
served not only the cause of Iran, but that of all the countries in the world.
[Question] And what if the "Islamic students" do not want to recognize the
National Assembly's decisions? What if they refuse to surrender the hostages?
[Answer] As of now, we have a Parliament. It is it and it alone which must
make laws. And the students must simply bow to it. Moreover, Khomeyni him-
self has said so again and again, and quite clearly so.
[Question] Meanwhile, Ayatollah Kalkhali continues to proclaim that he wila.
have partisans of the shah killed wherever they are and that his killer com- -
mandos are on the spot throughout the whole world.. A strange kind of
legality!
[AnswerJ That is for domestic consumption. It is not to be taken seriously.
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[Question] Nevertheless, in France your "enforcers" have already claimed at
least one victim, Princess Ashraf's son.
[Answer] We had nothing to do with that. That was a squaring of accounts
among emigres. We took score and have determined that Iranian emigres are
divided into 67 factions! On the basis of these figures, they will soon
succeed in eliminating themselves.
[Question] And the shah? Will you go on demanding that he be turned over to
you?
_ [Answer] I would rather not comment on that point. It wc,uld be pointless to
reinject confusion into the debate.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 par Cogedipresse S.A.
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IRAN
'REUI'ER' CITES BEHESHTI ON UNITED STATES HOSTAGES
JN021221 London REUTER in English 1206 GMT 2 Jul 80
[Commentary by Alexander Nicoll]
[Text] Tehran, July 2, REUTER--A senior Iranian religious leader said
toda,y he did not think the fate of the U.S. hostages in Iran would be
aff ected if the deposed shah died.
The shah, who is suffering from cancer, is in a Cairo hospital.
Reporters asked Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti if the hostages would be
affected should the shah die.
Dr Beheshti, a leading f igure in the clergy-led Islamic Republican Party
and the ruling Revolutionary Council, said:
"I don't think the fate of the hostages depends on the life of the shah,
because the main purpose in this process was an actual~statement on the
crimes of the government in the United States in relation to Iran,
especially in the last 25 years."
When one correspondent suggested that American diplomat [as received] said
to have participated in espionage should be treated in the same way as
a Soviet diplomat who was expelled from Iran for alleged spying this
week, Dr Beheshti said:
"It wasn't necessary to have a trial for the policy of Russia in Iran.
Meanwhile, it was necessary to have such a trial for the policy of the
Americans in Iran. Russia has not had the chance to colonialise Iran
as the United States has."
Dr Beheshti, holding his weekly pr.ess conierence, also said the Majlis
(parliament) would complete its procedural business in about two weeks ~
and would then ask President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr to nominate a prime
minister.
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_ _ .,..y~
The parliament, charged with deciding the future of the 53 hostages held
in Iran for almost eight months, was inaugurated on May 28 but has s ince
been bogged down in procedure, chiefly involving the form~l accredition
of each member.
Parliament, in which the hard-line Islamic Republican Party is expec ted to -
play a dominant role, must approve both the president's nominee f or
prime minister and the government itself.
President Bani-Sadr has said ~hat Revolutionary Council spokesman Hassan
Habibi would t~~ke the post, "god-willing."
Dr Beheshti said the role of the council would be ended with the app o int-
men t o f a government .
Asked when parliament would address the hostage issue, Dr Beheshti s aid: -
"It is not possible in this period of revolution to appoint an exact
timing for everything."
Dr Beheshti's press conference followed a week in which revolutionary
leader Ayatollah Ruho1].ah Khomeyni castigated the president and the
Revolutionary Council and urged trat all remnants of the shah's reg ime
be erased.
'To a correspondent who suggested that rhis was a sign of a power struggle
in Iran, the c.lergyman said:
"I don't find any power struggle by us and our friends. I find that
the revolution is basing (itself) on certain principles and we must
take care of these principies...the difference of views should not be
interpreted as a power struggle."
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IRAN
DAYS OF KHOMEYNI REGIME BELIEVE~ Nt!~MBERED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in Fr~ench y Jul ~0 pp 10-11
[Article by Bechir Ben Yahmed: ~~A Primitive, a Genius..."]
[Text] It is my sad lot to announce the imminent demise of the
Iranian revolution: it is doomed to die before our very eyes
of its childhood diseases, and I do not believe anything can
save it now. A lot of us beli~ved in it, expected great things
of it; we shall be left with the bitter taste of a great fail-
ure in our mouths, and before our eyes the sight ~f a great
conflagra~ion that will leave nothing behind it but a lot of
ashes...
How could we, throughout 1978, but watch in acl~niration as this
- great people rose in wrath against so base a government? Or as,
month after month, with no weapons save their bare hands, they
returned again and again to the attack, like waves sped shore-
ward by a rising tide?
Their hands were empty, but their hearts were staunch as they
faced down a political police force past numbering and the best-
equipped army in the Third World. This people, all alone, top-
pled their evil government, scattered the unnumbered police to
the winds, and brought the generals to their knees. That is
how they won aur adm.iration, aimost in spite of ourselves.
The people who led that rising were little known, but they had
long showed extraordinary perseverance and resolve, since for
30 long years they had steadfastly opposed that government. The
leaders were in exile and had been working from outside the
country, but inside it they had their acolytes: how can one
help remembering Lenin in 1905 and in 191~?
Like him and his Bolsheviks, the Iranian insurgents were clad
in the armor of an ideology both prideful and intolerant, which
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volunL-eered to fill a void so abysmal as to turn many of us
dizzy. It claimed roots reaching far back into history and
reaching as high as heaven. This is why that ideology angered
some of us and enticed others, but left nobody indiff erent.
We were all eager to see what sort of edif ice would emerge
�rom it.
Actually, the architect, Khomeyni, piqued our curiosity, and
this man of faith because of his age, his school of thought, ~
and some of his sybilline utterances raised doubts in us.
As for the masons and builders with whom he had surrounded him-
self and who in 16 months have yet to lay the first course of
the walJ, their babbling incoherence underscores their Iack of
practical know-how: they have trampled the ground and turned
~ a spadeful of earth here and there, but they have built no
wall...
Just think of it: since February 1979, when Khomeyni returned
to Tehran, in close to a year and a half, they have indeed
elected a president (who has no power) and a parliament whose
role is perilously vague, under a constitution that is quite
probably unworkable. But they have introduced not one single
structural reform of which it might be said that it will
charige Iranian socie~y, nothing that could be held up aw an
example or that anybody might ca11 a revolutionary achievement.
Nothing to justify the killings, the universities shut down, or
the paralyzed economy.
In almost a year and a half they have done nothing absolutely
- nothing to help the countryts fragile unity become less f ra-
gile. Quite the contrary: they have put it to such fearful
stress that it hangs today by a thread. They have made no
provision to defend their imperilled country and its revolu-
tion, unless you want to count the ragtag militia, quite un-
disciplined and of highly dubious efficacity, (wrongly) known
as the "guardians of the revolution."
In t}ie world outside, they have givPn the country and the new
regime few friends and a great many enemies; at ho~ne, the
forces which banded together to drive out the shah f ace each
other down, month after month, never quite managing either to
get together and work at the revolution or to resign themselves
to allowing one force to prevail and impose its sway over the
others....
. In a year and a half few Iranian intellectuals, enthusiastic
supporters of the new regime, have gone back home; a lot of
them have left home.... At no time in tha~t ycar and a half
have the friends of the Iranian revolution who hoped it wauld �
succeed and who had their ears to the ground heard any serious
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talk of the future only about the shah and his crimes, about
the Tinited States and its misdeeds: about the past. When the
American diplomats were taken hostage on 4 November last year,
that action did not even turn out to be the unfortunate turning-
point we thought it, nor yet what is called a'~fuite en avant."
The revolution was already sick and that act a'~flight bacward�?
was part and parcel of that sickness.
From the very outset, though we see it only now, the Iranian revo-
lution has been run by a clumsy, unskilled switchman who?
who has run it onto a sidetrack. Once tliere, another bad shep-
herd who? halted it so as to expose with ti.reless~vitupera-
tion the contradictions besetting =ran, without thus far even
trying to sort them out. It has got into the habit of talking,
not doing, and that brings us at the end of June 1980 to the
dumb�ounding spectacle you have surely read about: Khomeyni
threatening to oust the president of the republic and a11 his
ministers if, within 10 days, the government~s stationery, with
the shah~s coat of arms still on it, were not changed: Here you
have the leader of a revolution who has never paid the least at,
tention to government, exercised over the letterhead on government
correspondence; and the f act that it had not occurred to anybody
else, in 16 months, to change it is significant indeed.. Less so
than Pr�es.x.dent Bani-Sadris reply: ~'I have not picked a single
minister, I have no authority over them, and I can hardly be held
responsible for their failure to act. His predecessor, if one
may so call him, Mehdi Bazargan, complained of the same troubles
in his admission of powerlessness: he spoke of himself simply _
as ~'a knife without a blade.
Lenin, the professor of revolution, said it: yTou must take power
in the entire state. That basic precept is loftily ignored by
Khomeyni and his people: they think they can make do with power
over minds, overlooking the fact that such power can last only
if it is fed on daily deeds. The same goes for the sinew of the
revolution money whose importance they neglect as they al-
low their oilfields and docks to deteriorate to the point where
very shortly they will not be able to export enough crude oil to
meet the financial needs of the country and the state. That is
the day the United States (and the USSR) looks fo~ward to, the
day when, as they did with Mosaddeq in 1953, ~hey can dictate .
own terms. Will Khomeyni co~~e to as bad an end as did Mosaddeq?
Is Iran doomed to play the role of the "crushed precursor?'~ I
do not know.
Mehdi Bazargan, his former prime minister and perhaps the man who
knows him best, voiced an opinion of Khomeyni that should have
given us pause: "a rough and primitive (or elementary) man but,
at the same time, a genius... I have never known any other man
so skilled as he at exPressing the mood or the wi11 of the masses,
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at corranunicating with them thruugh a glance, or tnrough a few
words spoken a~; a great distance... But he has no politic al ex-
perience: he has never been a general, for example, or run a
business. He has no notion of_ administering a country or of
the techniques involved. He does not understand what a government
is...." Khomeyni~s genius made the revoluti~n possible: his
lack of. experience is in the process of niaking it fail.
That is doubtless what Hassan Nazih , who recently quit as head
of the Iranian Petroleum Company (where he had been appoint ed
last February with Khomeyni~s approval), meant when he said:
"~~Then Khomeyni was in exile, he used to say: ~The shah must go:~
When he came back t-o Iran, he said: 'The intellectuals must go,
the generals must go,.the lawyers must go, the leftist students
must g~o, anybody for human rights must go!"... Khomeyni was the
bull.dozer of the revolution. A bulldozer, though, is only good
for demolishing old structures, not for building new ones. An
Iranian friend who is equally perspicacious and whom,the revolu-
tion's vicissitudes have not made lose his sense of humor, told
me: "We keep on looking to Khomeyni, not because he is inf alli-
ble f ewer and fewer people still think so but because he
has become inevitable and also, alas: impenetrable...
'~I wauld point out, " my friend added, "that considering his age,
the m~in thing is increasingly the people around him. The men
around an old man in power are crucial... :-They assure the conti-
nuity of his thinking and his actions;they remember tomorrow
what was decided yesterday... They make it their business t o un-
dermine any tiny islands of firmness still close to the old man.
They are care�ul to ward off anybody whose influence they think
migh~; be harmful and, with the old man cut off from everybody
else, they get what they want from him...�
And so what might have been a great revolution turns out, a1as:
to have been only a fine insurrection in which the genius who
fomented it didn't know how (or didn't want) to be a revolutio-
nary. I don't know whether or not Iran is still sick today of
the shah, but I believe that what was to have been the Irariian
revolution is just as sick as he is: doomed to deteriorat e
steadily until some soldier bestrides what is left of it. Un-
less, of course, somewhere in the region, not too f ar away, ano-
ther great blaze rekindles the Iranian fire.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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IRAN
CLANDESTINE RADIO ATTACKS MOUNTED ON KHOMEYNI
LD281004 London THE FINANCIAL TIMES in English 28 Jun 80 p 2
[Dispatch from Tehran by Andrew WhitleyJ
[Text] A new weapon has gone into the armouries of the exiled Iranian
opposition groups fighting Ayatollah ~omeyni'.s regime. It may be
having an even more powerful effect than the exiles themselves had hoped.
The Ayatoliah's opponents, learning the lesson of the February 1979
revoluti.on which dislodged them, are turning to the airways to mount a
frontal gsychological attack aimed at undermining morale and paving the
way for a military coup.
Within the past six weeks three clandestine radio stations have been set
up to beam broadcasts in Persian into Iran assisted by neighbouring states
which would be happy ta see a change of regime in Tehran, Money is
thoughc to come f rom further af ield, including the United States and Israel.
They join already crowded wavebands. A longstand3ng clandestine station,
the National Voice of Iran, has been transmitting for over 20 years from
Baku in Soviet Azer~ai~an and there are 15 other above-board radios
broadcasting in Persian as part of established external services.
So great has been the interest generated by the new arrivals, with their
fiery condemnations of the clerical regime and predictions of its i~ninent
demise, that many disc~ntented Iranians of my acquaintance switch from
one station to another, then tape-record the "messages of hope" to replay
to their friends. -
Nor are the listeners confined to confirmed malcontents and Western-
educated or orientated Iranians. In the bazaars and small shops of
southern Tehran, as well as in provinc3al towns, transistor radios are
tuned in eeery evening to the crackling stations calling themselves "the
Free Voice of Iran," "Radio Iran" and "Radio Homeland."
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~ao of the new clandestine radios can be clearly identified and almost ~
certainly located, Radio Iran broadcasts on behalf of Dr Shahpur Eakhtair,
the st-.ah's last pri.me minister, who now runs his campaign against the
Mullahs from a Paris hea3quartere.
The Free Vo~.ce of Iran a.cts for Gen Gholam 'Ali Oveys," the "butcher of -
Tehran " as he was known in pre-revolution days, who heads the so-called
liberation army of Iran.
Both their radios, which began transmitting within a few weeks of each
other in May, are believed to be based in Iraq. The Bakhtiar camp claims
- that their transmitter is sited on the border with Iran, just inside Iraqi
territory, although technical evidence suggests that a 100-kw transmitter,
as they claim to possess, is more likely to be in Basra.
Almost certainly their rivals, who transmit coded messages to friends in
the regular Iranian az-med forces and give instructions to local cells
to "watch your district's clergymen" in preparation for an uprising,
transmit from Baghdad itself, using the facilities of the government radio.
Most interesting, and most shadowy of all, however, is Radio iIomeland, -
which has been broadcasting to Iran for up to an hour every evening for
the past six weeks or so.
Monitoring has disclosed little more than that it is vehemently anti-
Khomeini and realises how much popular interest it can generate by broad-
casting oldstyle Persian songs and poems to a people depressed for over
a year by an austere diet of Islamic themes from what is now known as
the "Vo ice and Vision of thP _T.slamic Republic."
Sufficient evidence is building up to point the finger at Cairo--where
the exiled shah is living--as the place from which Radio Homeland
broadcasts.
~What is thought to be the same station also broadcasts these days as the
Radio of the Mujaheddi~ (Islamic guerrillas) of Afghanistan," giving
heart to Afghan rebels of the same ideological persuasion as the Iranians
whom their radio station-mate is trying hard to oust.
How deeply the Central Intelligence Agency is involved is unclear. Help
~ could vary from financing the radio station to organising and running its
nightly bro~dcasts, tuning its output to suit what the U.S. judges to be -
the extent to which the Khomeyni regime is disintegrating.
Other, much smaller clandestine radios operate with in Iran. An aide of
Dr Bakhtiar said yesterday that their supF.~orts have a mobile station within
Tehran, moving physically and on the aizways to evade detection. Other ~
similar radios are known to exist in the Iranian Kurdish region in the west.
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Many still listen to the established foreign radios, in particular the
BBG and Voice of America (which has raised its output to an enormous
iour hour a day), even if they are often diamissed by Iranians as
tame in contrast with the exciting proepecte h eld ~ut by their more
shady rivals,
COPYRIGHT: The F`inancial Times Ltd, 1980
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. a ~.~a~~v ~UL VI~L~I '
IRAN
QOTBZAD~H REMARKS ON WARNING TO RUSSIANS REPORTED
LD100923 London THL TIMES in English 10 Jul 80 pp 1, 6
[Dispatch by Robert Fisk: "Iran Foreign Minister Accuses the Russians"]
[Text] Tehran, July 9--Mr Sadeq Qotbzadeh, the Iranian foreign minister,
exudes a kind of sleepy confidence, a flair for easy discussion, and--
~ when he stares at you--there is just a hint of the zealot in his eyes.
~ His years in the United States have bestowed on his English an American
drawl, the perfect co~lement to his square, close-cropped head which
j, mak.es him appear an Iranian version of a deep south Baptist. businessman.
His enemies hate him and there is a sign on the door of his anfiero.om~~
poli.~ely requesting visitors to leave theiz guns outside.
i:
. f The minister has no reason to fear assassination, but he is in more than
one firing line. Just across Che corridor you can see the two rooms
i in which the American charge d'affaires to Tehran has been residing
; since he lost his embassy last November. The n..ewspapers on sale round
; the corner accuse the foreign minister of employing counter-revolu-
; tionaries, and just now the Soviet Politburo is probably saying some
f infinitely nastier things about him,
He disclased uonchalantly this afternoon that he had given the Soviet
Embassy in Tehran a one-month deadline to complete the reduction of its
staff from about 40 to 15, and he spoke of "reports of intervention"
by Iran's Tudeh Communist Party. "We cannot tolerate the engagement of
Soviet diplomats in espionage activities. We have caught one of them
already. We asked for his expul.sion and he has gone."
Mr Qotbzadeh reserves his anger at the Soviet Union for a wider sphere.
"The Soviet military intArvention in Afghanistan is not acceptable to
us," he said, "We cannct tolerate it, especially because Afghanistan
is a Muslim country and was a common frontier with us and its people
are fighting against an aggressor. .
"We were against th e American military intervention in Vietnam and we
think exactly the same way about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
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It is exactly the same thin~. The Soviet Union claims it has come to
Af ghanistan at the request of the Afghan Government. The Americans were
in Vietnam at the 'req~iest' of the Vietnamese Government.
"So, with our frankness, we obviously could not accept this kind of
excuse--e~pecially since the present authorities in Kabul had been brought
in by the Soviet Union.
Mr Qotbzadeh expressed his hope that the Russians would withdraw from
Afghanistan, which would help t~ restore "good neigbourly relations"
with the Soviet Union, but he made it clear that he would like Iran to
furnish arms to the Afghan guerrillas. There were between 500,000 and
600,000 Atghan refugees in Iran at present, he said, funded by the Iranian
Government .
Would Iran give arms to the rebels if the Russians did not withdraw?
"I hope so,, I hope so," he replied.
The minister is a shrewd and careful man, apparently speaking his mind
with impetuosity but in reality weighing his words with caution. He
said today that he did not want to be foreign minister in the new govern-
ment--indeed, that he did not want any post in the new administration
because he was "very tired"--so perhaps he can afford a little outspoken-
ness. The recent executions in Iran have evidently disturbed him.
"The executions mostly involve members of the previous regime," he said.
"But I believe that there should be a rather more elaborate process for
the courts, The executions of those involved in drugs have increased
recently..." There was a pause. Did Mr Qotbzadeh agree with this
punishment?
"Not in the way it is being done," he said. "There has to be some due .
.~rocess of law to it. The execution of the women in Kerman (who were
stoned to death) was condemned by many people here. Protests came f rom
everyone, I myself deplored it, and said so to all those who were
responsible."
Although Mr Qotbzadeh does not say as much, his own position gives him
little room to shout too loildly about the apparent iniquities of Islamic
justice. ~he Islamic Republican Party is putting it about that th~
Foreign Ministry has no interest in Islam and that its employees yearn
for tl~e days of the shah.
The ministry's women employees now all wear a scarf, but Mr Qotbzadeh,
wl,o looks more like a jet-setter than a revolutionary, knows he is the
IRi''s real target,
"My conscience is absolutely clear," he said. "This is not the first
time that I have been under fire. They hoped they would break m~ and
they have not been able to do that--and they wi11 not be able to either."
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~ ~ ~v+.~aa~ vuL V~tLl
Mr Qotbzadeh's relationship with Ayatollah Khomeyni obviously acts as
something of a safeguard, The two were together in Paris and still meet
regularly. Today, the Ayatollah often appears angry at the bureaucracy
of government ministers. Has he changed since those epic days when he
returned to Iran to overthrow the Bakhtiar government?
"He is obviously very dissatisfied with the activities of the government
and he is touched by the dissatisfaction of the people. He has a burden
and a heavy responsibility now...but basically the man is as holy as he
was, as honest as he has ever been..."
Mr Qotbzadeh seems unhappy when you ask him what will happen after the
Ayatvllah dies. The same after him," he said. "Actually I am afraid
of what comes after. No one is going to have his stature and his greatness
in this country. We have not seen anyone like him for the last thousand
years, and I do not think we will see anyone like him for centuries to
come."
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspaper. Limited, 1980
CSO: 4920
0
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IRAN
KORDESTAN DESCRIBED AS IRAN'S VIETNAM
Paris AL-WA~'AN AL'-~YRABI in Arabic 16-22 May 80 pp 43-45
[Article by 'Isam 'Abd-al-'Aziz: "Iran's Vietnam"]
[TextJ God recognizes only one Iranian and some of his ayatollah and hojaj-
oleslam followers: ~this is what the Iranian regime wants to say. Therefore,
in its eyes there is nothing unlawful about F-4 airplanes and Chieftan tanks
bombarding peaceful Kurdish towns because the rebels in the mountains have
inflicted a devastating defeat on the Iranian convoys advancing towards the
Iraqi borders. Sanandaj, the peaceable Kurdish town nestling in the arms of
the mountai~.~s, has been transformed into a graveyard, with hundreds of unbur-
ied corpses scattered throughout it~s streets, roads and. houses, and with
thousands of wounded who cannot find medicine, treatment or doctors. What
is the opinion of Islam and the Moslems?
The yellowed; pages of the SHARAF NAMEH, which dates back to 1596 AD, tell a
strange ~able. One of the kings of old Persia, a tyrant named Zahhak, was
afflicted with a strange disease, in which a viper sprouted from each shoul-
der. When the doctors were unable to cure him, he sought the advice of an
old s~~rcerer, who advised him to kill two young men each morning in order to
be cured. So he issued orders to his executioner to do so.
But the executionEr t~nk pity on the.youtns, and would ki11 only one of the
pair, telling the other to flee. The fugitives who sought refuge in the
mountains lo~st no time in assembling and banding together, to become what
has been known since that time as the Kurdish people.
In this old legend, which is but part of ancient Kurdish mythology, the his-
torical explanation for the constant clash between the Kurds and the Persians?
One thing certain is that ther~~ is a thread connecting the resistance by
Kurds in Iran with repression ~~ver the course of time. It is also certain
that this tl~read has at present become knotted around a single issue: that
the Iranian Kurds gain autonomy, which would preserve their heritage and
identity, and that the administration of their local affairs be left to them.
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r~n Vrrll.l[i1, UD~. UNLY
But the Khomeyni regime does not see the Iranian Kurdish issue that way. The
issue has suffer.ed a number of reversals recently, definitely showing that
the new regime is using it the same way it is using the American embassy hos-
t~ges. After Khomeyni took power in February of last year, the controlling
factor in the Kurdish issue became simply how much the Iranian people rallied
- around or parted company from its new leadership,
Last July, i.e. before the embassy incident, Khomeyni declared that the lead-
ers of the Kurdish people were "Zionists, devils and agents." The "Revolu-
tionary Guard" and the remnants of the Iranian army actually began advancing
towards Kurdistan, in order to smash the Kurds' aspirations toward autonomy,
which had clearly incxeased after the revolution.
But the situation changed in late 13ovember,,that is, after Khomeyni put the
Kurdish issue "on hold" so as to thoroughly exploit the American embassy sit-
uation, which has been invated. Noticeable success was achieved in distract-
ing the Iranians from increasingly critical problems, and thus the Imam
ar�.nounced his desire to negotiate with the "Zionist and satanic" Kurdish
leaders who then became "possessed of good intentions."
Now, after the American embassy has lost its glitter and has become incapable
of capturing the attention of the Iranians, the Revolutionary Guard and Che
Iranian army has returned to Kurdistan to carry out a series of massacres
agair~st the Kurds.
Th~ Breathing Period LJas Not Long
The Kurdish demands for autonomy are not in f act based on fragile foundations,
f.or there are about 4 million Kurds in Iran, with their own language and cul-
ture. Also, the history of their struggle for autonomy extends back to the
First Wor1d ~dar, and it is a history in the course of which they have made
thousands of sacrifices.
The Kurds' lengthy sufferings from the depraved Shah's suppression of their
demand for autonomy led to a terrific wave of joy at the downfall of his
regime, in the hope that the new regime, applying its own slogans, would
grant them their right to express their national identity, especially since
the collapse of the Shah's regime was accompanied by a total disintegration
of tiie army and police apparatuses. Thus Kurdistan was transformed from a
region uncler heavy guard by the Shah's agencies into a region practically
devoid of any central agencies connected with the capital.
This, naturally, led to the Kurds' gaining the opportunity to self-administer
their region in practice, according to their wishes. Some Kurds assumed this
to be a permanent gain.
However, that did not prevent the Kurds from attacking what remained of the
Iranian army's barracks in Kurdistan in February 1979, wiping them out, and
seizing a large amount of arms and cor;cealing them in inaccessible mountain ~
hiding places, in consideration of the day they might need them.
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The new regime demonstrated its concern for the Kurdish issue, and sent a
special delegation to study the nature of the Kurdish issue and inquire into
- the views of Kurdish leaders. Shortly after the delegation returned, the
capital's response came in the form of the advance of army, airforce and
Revolutionary Guard forces to Kurdistan. It had become clear to the new
regime that the Kurds had become more insistent on autonomy than they had
been before.
This took place in the midst of a tumultous wave of mobilizing Farsi racist
feelings against the Kurds. Khomeyni declared the "holy war" against the
Kurds, canceled the Kurdish-language radio and television programs, and
' raised the slogan that Islam would unite the nation's races. Khomeyni of-
fered this as an excuse for repressing the Kurdish people's aspirations,
denying the distinction between Persians and Kurds, and finally and most
importantly, keeping the Kurds under Farsi control without any breathing
space for their national identity.
Reinforcing all of that was a long heritage of the Persians' treating the
Kurds as objects of disdain and scorn, be it their flowing, colorful gar-
ments or their language or the Farsi rumors about their extreme backwardness.
This emnity found a wide margin after Khomeyni's announcement that the rul-
ings of the Shi'ite Ja'fari school would be the ma.in source for legislation
in the new republic, and af ter the announcement of the new draft constitu-
tion, which did not contain one clause about the rights of national minori-
ties. On the contrary, its six articles dealt with prohibiting any threat
to Iran in the name of freedom, which was directed right at the aspirations
of national minorities for autonomy, even though the Kurdish leaders unani-
mously agreed that their demand was limited only to obtaining autonomy, not
separation from Iran.
Last August, the Iranian anny convoys reached the heights of Mahabad, which
the Kurds consider a historic capital of their region. Teheran announced
that the military operations against the Kurds would be commanded by the
defense minister himself, while Shaykh 'Ezzeddin Hoseyni, a prominent Kurd-
ish leader, announced that the Kurds were being massacred and that the move-
ments of the army and the Revolutionary Guard were directed against all
Iranian people. He stressed that the Kurds would fight on until they achieved
autonomy.
Victims By the Hundreds
The bloodbaths began between the forct~.s of the Khomeyni regime and the Kurd-
ish Peshmerga militia which was defend:ng Mahabad, Sanandaj and Saqqez. Phan-
tom F-4 planes, Cobra helicopters and heavy artillery took part in bombarding
Kurdish towns, killing hundreds of civilians.
After some violent battles, the Kurdish militia forces withdrew from the
towns and took refuge in the m~untains, in what was described as the start
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of guerrilla waY~fare against the Iranian army for the purpose of expanding
the confrontation front, whereby the army forces would lose the advantage of
the concentration gained during the operations to regain control over the
towns.
After Army Brigades 28 and 64 took over the towns, Ayatollah Khalkhali was
hastily summoned. It appears that Khalkhali was originally a butcher who
lost his way and arrived a.t a judgeship in Khomeyni`s Iran, since no sooner
had he arrived in the Kurdish towns that he i~nediately began practicing his
hobby by issuing orders for wholesale executions.
Khalkhali's trials, which usually last no more than l0~minutes, included, in
addition to prisoners, a number of Kurds who were dragged from their beds
at rlahabad Hospital and ~aere executed by firing squad during the "victory"
celebrations held by the young men of the Revolutionary Guar.d, during which
military medals were exchanged.
13ut the Kurdi~h meat was bitter. The people of the village of Kamyaran at- _
tacked the Irani.an military convoys after curring the road which passed near
the village, and destroyed 13 Chieftan tanks. Radio Teheran, which persis-
tentl.y broadcast anti-Kurdish statements, interrupted its program to announce
that a oang of Kurds had swooped down on the Rev~lutionary Guard position,
"at which time a battle broke out in which a number of flowers of the Islamic
revol.ution were martyred."
During the f.irst week of September, the Kurdish militia attacked six Iranian
army military positions and inflicted serious losses. The new regime real-
ized that the Kurdish issue was more serious than it seemed, f or the army
soldiers tiad begun deserting in the field, while the Revolutionary Guar.d
battalions clashed among themselves because of lack of coordination. Khomeyni
tried to boosr the morale of the f ighters by issuing an appeal saying, "An
increase in their efforts will please God and will increase their rewards in
Paradise." He was, in fact, planning another tactical step.
A Resumption oP Negotiations
In November, the Imam sent a statement to the Kurds in which he called for a
i-esumption of negotiations, saying, "I am expressung my modest desire for
that, as a servant of the nation passing the final days of his life."
Ae that time, it became clear that the military campaign had failed to achieve
its immediate purpose, the elimination of the Kurdish resistance. But in
fact, the regime had achieved an indirect end which it hact always been looking
for an excuse to accomplish: the remobilization and organization of the army
througti seeking the assistance of its old cadres from the time of the Shah,
~ahom Kliomeyni had described as being a"group of devils and satans." Never.-
Cheless, the "devils" which returned to the regime's paradise met the evil ~
of def.eat in Kurdistan.
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~
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Khomeyni issued his orders to the army and the Revolutionary Guard to with-
draw from the Kurdish towns while retaining same positions outside them until
further notice. The Kurdish leaders returned to those towns after having
hidden in the mountains for no more than 3 months.
A Kurdish co~?ission was sent to Teheran to negotiate, but the issue was fin-
ally solved in a manner not in the interest of the new regime. Even though
Teheran had announced that the negotiations had resulted in "complete agree-
ment" between the two viewpoints, the Kurdish commission denied that any
agreement had been reached, and one of its members said, "What was placed
before us was a copy of the conditions which Imam Khomeyni had drawn up be-
fore." _
Khomeyni's conditions were the Kurds' surrendering their anns in return for
complete amnest~ and absolute freedom of the press, but also the dissolution
of Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) formations led by 'Abdorrahmam Qasemlu,
which constituted the largest t~~oc in the Kurdish armed militia.
When the Iranians turned their attention to the spectacle of the American
embassy "circus" in November, Teheran decided to freeze the situation on the
Kurdish front for a wtiile. However, the situation remained tense in Kurdis-
tan, which refused to hand over its arms in spite of the "persuasion" trips
made by a number of "ayatollahs" to the region, because, as one Kurd said,
"They are hiding M-47 tanks in their cloaks, and they are treating us as if
we were defeated."
After the lights around the American embassy situation died out, Teheran
decided to reopen the Kurdish front around Sanandaj this time, the largest
Kurdish town. At the end of April, Gener.al Falahi, the commander of the
Iranian land forces, sent a warning to the Kurdish militia in the town to hand
over their weapons no later than 25 April, or else the town would be subjected
to an all-out military attack.
In another context, the timing of the new campaign had another connotation
connected with strengthening the position of Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, whose ene-
mies accused him of being incapable of taking any decisive step to confront
increasing opposition from minorities.
In addition to that, the concentration of forces along the Iraqi borders was
necessitated in order to rid the region of any 1oca1 opposition, especially
since the Kurds were holding firm so that the army or Revolutionary Guard
forces would not trample the territory of the Kurdish towns as one of their
basic conditions.
Renewed Fighting
A spokesman for the Kurdish militia replied to Falahi's threats by saying,
"We will not surrender our arms, and we will fight to defend our existence."
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i v.~ vi L L~.inL, val; vir1~~
Thus the army's heavy weaponry began shelling the two towns of Sanandaj and
Saqqez, which resulted in the death of 120 civilians, in addition to the
wounding of several hundred. It was said that only 30 militia members were
killed, the rest being civilians. The shelling of the Sanandaj hospital was
one reason for the increased number of victims who could not be aided.
But the basic loss was sustained by the Iranian army in the actual field of
battle outside the tc~wn, for whom the Iranian military convoy would mcve
r~long the mountain road connecting Saqqez and Sanandaj, it would be exposed
to an ambush set up by th~e Kurds which led to the halting of the entire col-
umn.
During the first week of May 1980, reports came out of Sanandaj about the
possible spread of epidemics because of the Kurdish corpses rotting in the
streets, and because the Iranian army had cut off food supplies to both
Sanandaj and Saqqez.
On 4 May, Bani-Sadr a:lnounced that the Iranian government would fulfill only
its promises to remove "irresponsible armed elements." Bani-Sadr made this
announcement out of his determination to put an end to the Kurdish issue by
force of arms. But military observers feel that this would be impossible,
eitlier because of the concentration of Kurdish arms or because the Kurds'
pursuit of guerrilla warfare in mountainous regions makes it hard for the
regular army to wage a traditional war. This makes the army vent its anger
on ttiP ~;urdish towns, since they can't reach the mountains.
A Kurdish mother summed up what is happening by telling a journalist, "For
God's sake do something to s=op this war. I don't know what the Kurds did
to be s.laughtered in this manner."
An inquiry into the bloodbaths in Kurdistan is now clearing up several out-
standing facts. The complication of the situation at the American embassy
after tl~e all-out Ar,ierican military operation, in addition to the bloody '
confrontation cahich took place in April at Iranian universities between the
Islamic and Marxist left and the Revolutionary Guard, has resulted in an
enhancement of the power of Ayatollah Beheshti and the leaders of the Islamic
Republican Party. At the end of April, Bani-Sadr announced a unilateral
ceasefire, but the Revolutionary Guard, connected with the party and the
Revolutionary Council, announced that it would not agree to this truce and
that it would continue fighting until the Kurdish resistance was totally
smashed. Bani-Sadr was forced to go back on his stand and issue orders to
the ;~rmy to shell Kurdish towns.
If this bloody conduct of the Iranian regime continues, which would be the
most likely eventuality if the Islamic Republican Party gains a majority in
the new parliament as expected, the results will not be as destructive to
the Kurds as they would be to the ruling regime in Iran.
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In the midst of this chaos and instability, Iranian Kurdistan would be trans-
formed into an Iranian Vietnam. This means that the Iranian army would once
again become threatened with dissolution under the influence of the heated
confrontation with the Kurds. Similarly, Iran's domestic problems, which
Bani-Sadr himself does not deny, will not be solved by shelling Kurdish towns,
but will simply become more aggravated.
'Ezzeddin Hoseyni, the Kurds' Ho Chi Minh
- Two prominent leaders occupy the greatest area in the Kurdish leadership in
Iran. The first is Shaykh 'Ezzeddin Hoseyni, who is almost 60 years old. He
does not rely on a specific political organization, but enjoys the loyalty
of the prevaiiing majority of Iranian Kurds.
Shaykh 'Ez2eddin says, "We shouldn't look at politics from a religious point
of view, for there are some things which do not enter into religion." Shaykh
, 'Ezzeddin approves the establishment of a socialist system in Kurdistan,
emphasizing that God would be pleased with this system, which would not give
a privileged minority the right to exploit the majority.
As for the other leader, he is 'Abdorrahman Qasemlu, secretary general of
the KDP, who leads the Peshmerga, the armed Kurdish militia. ~Qasemlu.spent
long years in exile during the Shah's reign. He demands the application of
a,special type of socialism suited to Kurdistan's conditions.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8559
CSO: 4902
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rvL~ Vrl't1~1t1L UJL' U1YLi .
IRAN
OIL MINISTER ANNOUNCE$ INCREASED CRUDE EXPORTS
LD071611 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 7 Jul 80 p 2
[Dispatch by Patrick Cockburn: "Iran To Double Oil Exports to Bulgaria"]
[Text] Tehran--Bulgaria will double its imports of Iranian oil to about
40,000 barrels a day under a si.x-month agreement.signed yesterday.
Iran has been striving to increase its exports of oil in the second half
of the year. Mr. Ali Akb~r Moinfar, the oil minister, said over the
weekend that exports of crude this month would increase by 25 percent
to about lm b/d.
New agreements have already been reached with independent Spanish o31
companies and Turkey which would account for most of the increase in '
exports.
Romania is currently renegotiating a renewal of its contract for the
first six months of the year, which is thought to be for about 45,OQ0 b/d.
This is almost all paid for at the official Iranian price, but includes
a small clearing agreement, according to the diplomats.
The Romanians announced on Friday that an agricultural aid agreement had
been reached with Iran. Romania is already supplying a range of farm
products including 12,000 tonnes of beef this year.
The key to a major increase in Iranian o31 exports is still the consortium
of Japanese companies which used to make 510,000 b/d. They withdrew in
April when Iran increased the price of its crude. The Japanese now feel
less worried about the price of Iranian oil since the producers have
raised their prices. ;
Faced with strong U.S. pressure not to buy, the Japanese are likely to
negotiate to maintain their place in the queue of potential purchasers
rather than with the firm intention of realahing an agreement.
Meanwhile two British journalists, Miss Christina Powell and Mr. Roger Cooper,
were released by the Iranians yesterday after agreeing to leave the country
within 48 hours.
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The two had been held for 17 hours after being detained by officials in
plain clothes on Saturday. They said yesterday they did not know which
authorities had detained them. They were interrogated separately but
did not knoW why they were arrested.
In another move against the foreign press, President Abol Hassan Bani~Sadr
has asked the revolutionary prosecutor general to close the office of the
French News Agency, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, in Tehran and to expel its
correspondents.
The president's off ice alleges that the te~ of an interview given by
Mr. Bani-Sadr and published in LE MONDE was distorted by AFP.
It has been announced that all women employed by the Iranian Government
will have to wear an Islamic uniform devised by the Revolutionary Council.
This will include some form of hejjab (head scarf) but not necessarily
the chador (long black cloak).
Over 2,000 women demonstrated against the new dress regulations on
Saturday.
Saturday's demonstration has been bitterly attacked in the press. The
ISLA~MIC REPUBLIC DAILY, which is controlled by the clerical Islamic
Republican Party, asked its readers to identify women taking part.
COPYRIGHT: The F~:iancial Times Ztd, 1980
CSO: 4920
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rw~ VL'1'1lilL1L uJG VtYLl .
IRAN
OIL INDUSTRY SPARE PARTS BOUGHT DESPITE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
LD171015 London THE FINANCIAL TIMES in English 17 Jul 80 p 40
r
[Report by Simon Henderson: "Iran 63 Million Pound Order Beats U.S.
Sanctions"J
[Text] Iran is buying spare parts for its;oil industry worth $150M -
(63.3 million pounds sterling) a year thrdagh a London-based purchasing
organisation, despite U.S. economic sanctions intended,to force it to
release the Tehran hojtages. "
Curiously, the non-profit making organisation, Iranian Oil Services (IROS),
is still legally owned by the consortium of Western oil companies, ,
including 11 U.S. companies, which produced most of Iran's oil before
lasr year',; revolution.
In theory, its operations do not infringe U.S. sanctions. The British
legislation allows supply contracts to be extended, and one of the
U.S. companies said yesterday that as minority shareholders they could
only ensure that no U.S. equipment was supplied. ~
At present British PetroleLUn has 40 per cent of IROS, Royal Dutch-Shell
14 per cent and Companie Francaise des Petroles 6 per cent. Of the
U.S, companies, Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Socal and Texaco each has 7 per cent,
and the remaining 5 pe~ cent is shared between Atlantic Richfield, Ameri-
= can Independent, Getty, Charter, Conoco and Standard Oil of Ohio.
v
' The fact that Iran still depends on the consortium to provide spare parts
for its vital oil industry is clearly an embarrassment to the revolutionary
authorities. Talks were attempted a year ago to sort out its ownership
but failed, apparently because nobody in Tehran was prepared to take the
necessary decision.
On the U.S, companies' side, the continuing legal relationship is also
probably embarrassing in the light of sanctions but worth continuing as
� a bargaining lever for outstanding claims against Iran, which nationalised ;
the Western-owned producing arm of the consortium.
.
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Until the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, U.S.-made goods were
estimated to form only 25 percent of IROS sales. In most cases these
can be obtained From other suppliers. British companies meet an estimated
35 per cent of the orders and Japan 15 per cent, while most of the
remainder are met by other West European countries.
IROS' role means present assumptions about the state of Iran's oil industry
may need to be revised. Industry experts say there is no particular
shortage o~ spares, and that present Iranian production of 1.5M barrels
a day could easily be doubled.
Instead, low production is blamed on Iranian pricing policy which, at
an effective level of $35 a barrel since April, still makes Iran's
oil more expensive than comparable crudes.
A role for the Soviet Union as a supplier of spare parts or experts is
also discounted, It is thought the Iranians first explored the possi-
bility this year, before the scope of the EEC sanctions then proposed
against Iran was clear.
Despite continuing sabotage of pipelines, blamed on Iraqi-backed local
Arab separatists, IROS has not been asked to supply pipe. It is assumed
there are still adequate stocks in Iran, or that the ma~or pipe mill at
Ahwaz can produce what is required.
Industry experts consider the National Iranian Oil Corporation capable
of running production and maintenance operations, areas which have long
been staffed by Iranians.
COPYRIGHT: The Financial Times Ltd, 1980
CSO: 4920
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~++.+.vlaaa. v~JL v1tL< ~
~
IRAN
,
` BRIEFu
- AFGHAN REBEL BASE DENIED--Tehran, June 26, REUTER--A Foreign Ministry
spokesman today denied Soviet charges.';that Iran was allowing Afghan
rebels to operate from a base in nortl~east Iran against Soviet and .
Kabul government forces in Afgtianistah. The Soviet Conununist Party
daily PRAVDA said yesterday that a"large regional�~~centre of armed
struggle against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" had been set
up in the city of Mashhad. The spokesman said: "Such a report is
categorically denied," and added: "Maybe they (the Russians) wanted
to interfere in Iran in the f uture The Islamic movement of Af ghanis-
tan, which sympathises with the rebels, has an office in Mashhad,
but the Tehran government has always denied that there is any Afghan
militar} base in Iran or that it is giving military aid to the insurgents.
[Text] [JN260928 London REUTER in English 0919 GMT 26 �Jun 80J
RAPE CHARGES AGAINST U.S. HOSTAGE--Tehran, June 30, REUTER--A Justice
Ministry investigator said today one of the American hostages from Lhe
U.S. Embassy would be prosecuted for the alleged rape of an Iranian
woman unless her parents forgave him, The investigator, Ali Akbar
Parvaneh, told REUTER a request for forgiveness would involve the parents
of the hostage, who is a marine sergeant, coming to Iran and meeting the
mother and father ~f the woman, identified only as Azem A., aged 23.
Mr Parvaneh said tha t any prosecution would go ahead whether or not the ;
Irana.an parliament decided to free the hostages. The woman was found
- s trangled on March 27 in an alley near the occup ied U. S. Embassy . Her
brother told police he had killed her to protect his family's honour �
because he believed she was pregnant by the marine, Michael Moeller, 28.
Medical test~ confirmed that she was pr.egnant. Mr Parvaneh said today:
"We will not try Moeller if the parents of the girl he seduced forgive
him. If. Moeller' ~ parents come to Iran and convince the dead girl's
parents to drop the action against Moeller, then Iranian law allows for
the prosecution to be dropped." [Text~ [JN302112 London REUTER in English
2103 GM'r 30 Jun 80~
GENERAL BAGHERI ARREST DENIED--Tehran, 12 Jul, (REU'TER)--President Abolhassan ~
Bani-Sadr's office to day denied Tehrcn press reports that a former air
force commander had been arrested in connection with an alleged coup
3?
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conspiracy made public last Thursday. The reports, naming General Amir
Bahman Bagheri, who resigned his air force post a f ew weeks ago, were
carried in the Tehran dailies ISLAMIC REPUBLIC and AZADEGAN. An official
in President Bani-Sadr's office, Reza Taghavi, c~tegorically denied that
General Bagheri had been arrested when asked by REUTER for confirmation.
- President Bani-Sadr, in a newspaper interview on July 3, denied a report
broadcast by the Voice of America Radio Service that General Bagheri
had fled the country in an air f orce phantom j et. He accused the
U.S. of trying to sow discord in the wake of what he called an unsuccessful
economic blockade of Iran and last April's abortive attempt to rescue
the American hostages held since last November. [Text] [JN120802
London REUTER in English 0756 GMT 12 Jul 80]
HOSTAGES'RELEASE REJECTED--Tehran, July 11, REUTER--One of the militants
occupying the American Embassy in Tehran rejected tonight any suggestion
- that additional hostages might be freed following the release on medical
grounds of U.S. Vice-Consul R~,chard Queen. The militant also said that
Mr Queen, who was flown to Zurich today had suffered a recurrence of an
- ailment that afflicted him before the embassy take-over last November.
In a telephone interview, a member of the student council in control of
the embassy said Mr Queen's release was based on purely humanitarian
considerations and not due to lack of adequate medical f acilities in Iran.
Asked if any of the remaining 52 hostages might be allowed to go free,
he replied: "Certainly not." The militant declined to be identified.
[Text] [JN111808 London REUTER in English 1803 GMT 11 Jul 80]
BAI~iTIAR PRAISES CONSPIRACY MEr]BERS--Paris, July 11, REUTER--Former
Iranian Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar praised today the "courage and
determination" of inembers of a conspiracy which the Tehran government
said last night was aimed at returning him to power. Referring to
reports from Tehran that some of the conspirators had been killed,
Mr Bal~:htiar, the deposed shah's last prime minister, said in a statement
he deplored "huma~z losses which occurred during this attempt." Without
clearly accepting responsibility for the plot, Mr Bakhtiar, who lives
here in exile, said that in viPw of the situation in Iran, "it is natural
for elements favoring th e establishment of democracy to try to take the
law into their own hands without necessarily being directly linked with
(?nationalist) groups which act (?from abroad)." [Text~ [JN111521
. London REUTER in English 1457 GMT 11 Jul 80]
QUICK HOSTAGE RELEASE REQUESTED--Tehran, July 16, REUTER--A senior Iranian
clergy~pan today called for a quick release of the 52 American hostages
held by militant students since November 4. In an interview with ETTELA'AT
newspaper, Sheykh 'Ali Teherani, a member of the Assembly of Experts which
approved the Islamic Constitution, said: "I believe the hostages should ~
be [few words indistinct] as possible." Sheykh Teherani said he was
against a trial of the hostages because such a trial would not achieve
" anything for Iran. But he said the release of the captives should not be
unconditional and that the United States should free frozen Iranian assets
in return. [TextJ [PA162130 London REUTER in English 2105 GMT 16 Jul 80]
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BRITONS ORDERED TO LEAVE--Tehran, July 6, REUTER--~cao Britons said today ,
they had been told to lesve Iran within 48 hours after they were detained
overnight by unidentified authoritiea. Journaliata Christine Powell and
Itoger Cooper, both 45, spent about 17 hours in custody afCer being picked
up last night ty plain clothes officials. Miss Powell, an accredited
correspondent, and Mr Cooper, a Persian scholar, went to the British
Embassy soon after their release. They told REUTERS they did not know
which authorities had detained them. Earlier, the presidential office
and the Foreign rtinistry said the two Britons were safe but declined to
say where they were being held. Miss Powell, who works for Australian
radio, has lived in Iran for 6 years. Mr Cooper, who has lived here off
and on for many years, is an expert on~Persian literature. They said they
were interrogated separately but did not know why they were arrested.
They were no~ ill-treated, they said. In May, Nick Cu~ing-Bruce, a
British free-lance journalist, was arrested and told to leave Iran after
being detained. [Text] [JN061627 London REUTER in English 1620 GMT
6 Jul 80 ] ~
STUDENT CITED ON HOSTAGES--Tehran, June 28, REUTER--Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeyni and the Iranian parliament would decide the futur2 of the American
hostages if the deposed shah died, one of the hostages' student captors
said here today. The student, who said he was not speaking as an official ~
spolcesman tor his colleagues, was commenting on reports from Cairo which
said the former shah was seriously ill. If the deposed shah dies,
(President) Carter is going "to be blamed, and any new decision will have
to be made by the Imam (Ayatollah Khomeyni) and Islamic Majlis (parlia-
ment)," the student told REUTER. "The return of the shah is in the hands
of Carter. If the shah is not returned to Iran either Carter is purposely
stopping it or preparing the grounds for his death. In any case what we
have always said remains--that the hostages must be tried," the student ~
~ said. Ayatollah Khomeyni has said the future of the 53 Americans held
hostages in Tehran since last November should be decided by the parliament.
[Text] [JN281819 London REUTER in English 1805 GMT 28 Jun 80]
CsO: ~.906
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MAURITANIA . '
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC FUTURE IN REGIONP_L CONTEXT NOTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jul $0 pp 1685-1688
[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Mauritania's Present and Future"]
[Text] The principle of self-determination, supported by the United
Nations and the OAU for the Western Sahara is related to that of the in-
tangible nature of colonial borders which the acceptance of the
interested p~pulations alone, whatever their situation might have been
prior to the colonization, makes its requestioning possible. We under-
stand the hesitation of the African leaders to disturb, even though
lightly, a political structure which is as fragile as a house made of
cards. However, this reverence for borders established by tnose who
invented them as warranted by circumstances and their own interests, in
which actually, they did not hesitate to change on the basis of agree-
ments or the prPSSUre of arms, frequently appears to be stranger by the
fact that the concept of political frontiers is still largely alien to
Africa.
Should we be surprised? This concept, in fact, established itself in
Europe only at the end of the 18th century, at the same time as that of
the sovereign people. In Africa where, in colonial times, there were
only a small number of independent countries, and where the life of the
Sahel and Sahara populations was conditioned by a nomad existence,'the
jus loci had no chance whatever to establish itself. 31ood ties,
language, and, above all, the fact of having lived, traded, and fought
together, occasionally even ane against another, constituted, to a far
greater extent than a state tradition, mostly absent, the real bind for
the affinities which we find today, paradoxically, to be at the origins
of most inter-African conflicts. '
It is in this ~ense that we could speak of a Comoro or Somali unity and
that the claim filed by King Hassan~II in 1975 with the International
Court in The Hague seemed justifiable. Let us note, in passing, that
the answer of the court would havQ been less ambiguous, had the pre-
tender Ma-,e1-Ainine, who had left Smara at the turn of the century, to
~ overthrow the Alaoui dynasty, which he was prevented from accomplishing
: by a handful of French officers, had succeeded. The population would
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have been the same but no one would have thought of contesting the
- "Moroccan nature" of the Atlantic Coast, from Tarfaya to Cape Blanc, or
even, reaching for extremes, the "Saharan" nature of the Moroccan Coast
from Melilla to Tarfaya.
It was the unopportune decision to materialize intangible human affin-
ities~.that caused the fall in 1978 of President Moktar Ould Daddah, and
the,difficulties faced by his successors to protect the State of
Mauritania from bartles and, following the August 1979 Algiers A.greement,
to preserve its neutrality in a conflict which, let us admit it, ~in-
timately affects 7 of the l0 Mauritanian Arab-Berber factions. It is
obvious that numerous affinities exist between these factions and the
Sahraouis, some 75,000 strong according to the last Spanish census.
They are more debatable between the Saharaouis and the Moroccans of
Draa and Tafilelt, and seem to be even less so with the Algerians. The
latter, actually, are not part of the Western Sahara heritage, being
content to promote a democratic republic whose armed operations they
support and behind which they conceal, in addition to possible economic
conditions, their will to oppose any hegemony in the Sahara.
Libya is even less involved. Its interest in the matter was manifested
until then in terms of weapons deliveries only. This does not fail
occasionally to annoy Algeria. After all, it is of a mystical and
prophetic kind, reflecting the image of the Libyan president, even
though the latter claims to have traced his Requibat ancestry through
his maternal line.
In this context, a return to the intangible nature of colonial borders, ~
after their establishment, does noC seem to be of a kind truly to
_ stabilize the situation. Having acknowledged its weakness by withdrawing
from the tripartite battle, Mauritania risks to pay for it by the more
or less rapid absorption by one of the two rernaining parties to the
fight. The illogical nature of the territorial boundaries of the former
Spanish colony becomes clear on the military level, making Morocco with-
draw its troops, in the Mauritanian north, from Bi.r-Moghrein, �rom where
they controlled the E1 Aioun road, and forcing Nouakchott to maintain,
despite its neutrality and for obvious security reasons, a garrison in
La Guera which commands, on the other side of the border, the land access
to Nouadhibou. It is improbabl~* that this demarcation would appear more
logical in the. field of peaceful activities--extraction of iron ore or
phosphate--compared with a war.
Yet, it. is this ~arget of statu quo ante that is the official purpose of
the Mauritanian government whose desire to maintain a balance and a
= state of independence was clear until last March but which, since then,
seems to have been somewhat diluted as the result of the growing
pressures of the Polisario Front. Under the influence of Major Jeddou
Ould Sa1ek, who was overthrown in 1979 and who has since died as a result
of an accident, Lt Col Mustafa Ould Salek, who became head of state as a
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result of the July 1978 events, seemed to come closer to Algeria and the
Sahraouis insurgents in order to withdraw from the Moroccan alliance.
In the spring of 1979 Lt Col Ahmed Ould Bouceif, assuming the functions
of prime minister, turned relations back toward Morocco. Following his
death on 31 May 1979 as a result of an airplane crash, he was replaced
by Lt Col Mohamed Ould Haidalla who has also acted as chief of state
starting with January 1980. ,
The leanings of Col Haidella have been a subject of a number of ques-
tions. He is credited with being able to make peace with the Polisario
Front, as a result of the Algiers 5 August 1979 Agreement, without, how-
ever, having kept the promise to surrender to it, at the beginning of
- 1980, the Tiris el Gharbia, the southern part of former Spanish Sahara,
rebaptised Oued ed Dahab by the Moroccan forces which occupied it
immediately following the Algiers Agreement.
Without mortgaging the future by officially recognizing the Saharan Arab
Democratic Republic (SDAR), Lt Col Haidella removed from power the re-
maining pro-Moroccan elements, the others having gone to Rabat, where
they founded the "free officers" group which has since become the
Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania. At the same time, with uneven
success, he has tried to eliminate from his government those among his
collaborators reputed to be too favorable to the Polisario. It is true
that their appointment to positions of territorial command did not take
place in o~der to neutralize their influence. Furthermore, the sym-
pathies of his Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Ould Zamel fall along
the line of his Requibat relation, i.e., they hardly leave any doubt.
The Mauritanian chief of state thus hopes to "hold on" until the eventual
negotiations of a peace treaty which would bring together the various
involved parties and which he would attend with the label of uncontested
neutrality, whose credibility he is trying to strengthen by diversifying
his partners in the area of military cooperation to the benefit of Iraq,
for example. In this spirit he triggered the departure of the Jaguars
and the recall of a small contingent of French paratroopers who had
settled in Noudhibou at his request, reducing from 60 to 45 our technical
assistance personnel within the Mauritanian army.
He would also like the profit from this respite to improve the economy
of the south which has been worsened by several years of drought in the
south and by the decline in profits from iron ore mining in the north.
Trying to �eal tactfully with Morocco, which owns shares in the SNIM
(National Industrial and Mining Company), and is interested in the
future development of the Guelb el Rhein, and Algeria, whose supplies
make possible the operation of the Nouadhibou Refinery, without abandon-
ing the financial and political support still granted by the Arab petro-
leum produ~ing companies, the Mauritanian chief of state is thus
navigating oy eye, more or less well, locked within contradictions to
which he seems resigned, with a certain fatalism, to an ever growing
extent.
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Improved Management
The war. greatly contributed to tr.e downfall of the Mauritanian economy
as a result of the expenditures it entailed--about three billion ouguiya
(the ouguiya or UM = 0.10 French francs) per year, starting with 1975,
or 15 million CFA, not to speak of nonbudgeted outside support. The
worsening of the economy was due, above all, to administrative dis-
organization, and the consequent lack of all dynamism and lack of
continuity in the study and pursuit of development projects. What made
these effects worse was that no search for new resources was made to
compensate for the related economic misfortunes.
The first among them is the food shortage, chronic essentially, but
worsened by several years of drought. In this respect the years 1973
and 1974 marked the peak, justifying an annual aid in food totaling
about 10~J,000 tons for a 1.6 million population. Reduced to 30,000 tons _
in 1975 and 1976, it had to be raised to 60,000 tons in 1977 and 1978
and has been kept at that approximate level since. The 1979 harvest of -
millet, sorghum, and rice, totaling.47,000 tons, and meeting no more
than one-quarter of the needs of the population, the balance must- be
found mostly overseas, since the neighboring countries themselv~s are
experiencing shortages.
The other weak point of the economy is the drop of iron ore exports.
The output of the Kedia d'Idjil peaked with 11.7 million tons in 1974.
It has been gradually declining since, dropping,to 7.4 million tons in
1978, but rising as of 1979. Reflecting the effect of the world metal-
lur.gical crisis, mineral exports have dropped both in terms of tonnage
and value: 5.7 billion UM, corresponding to 8.4 million tons, were
earned in 1977, as against 4.2 billion UM for 6.4 million tons in 1978,
more than one-third of which purchased by France and two-thirds by the
members of the European Economic Community. The overall amount of
exports will be further affected by the total stoppage, as of May 1978,
of Akjoujt Copper which, after having earned 1,628,000,000 UM in 1974,
brought. only 273 million in 1978. Even though encouraging, gypsum pro-
duction obviously cannot compensate for this drop in mineral resources
which account for approximately 80 percent of Mauritania's sales abroad.
These troubles were translated, on a global scale, in the foreign trade
balance, through a growing deficit: 3.2 billion UM in 1975, 4 billion
in 1976, 6.2 billion in 1977, and 8.1 billion in 1978, representing one-
third of the CNP, the food deficit alone accounting for nearly 3 billion
UM. Import expenditures had been covered by exports to the 97.5 percent
level. in 1973 and 1974. In 1977 exports covered only 67 percent of the
cost o� imports. The figure dropped to 40 percent in 1978. This pre-
carious ratio explains the cost of servicing the foreign debt in terms
of exports, which equalled 42 percent in 1976, and which, today, seems
to have stabilized in the vicinity of the 33 percent level. The relative
a~undance of influx of monetary capital and one-directional transfers,
however, make it possible to reestablish more or less the equilibrium on
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the level of the balance of payments: + 0.4 billion UM in 1976,
- 2.2 billion in 1977, and - 0.8 billion in 1978.
Mauritanian Balance of Payments
(in billion ouguiya)
1976 1977 1978
Imports FOB 12.2 13.3 13.6
Exports CAF 8.1 7.1 5.5
Balance of trade - 4.1 - 6.1 - 8.1
Balance of goods and services - 9.2 - 9.9 - 9.2
Unidirectional transfers + 5.4 + 4.6 + 6.0 -
Balance of current operations - 3.8 - 5.3 - 3.2
Monetary capital + 4.2 + 3.1 + 4.0
Balance + 0.4 - 2,2 _ p,g
' The financial condi[ion of the state is a reflection of the state of the
national economy. The 1978 budget deficit, which totaled 5.4 billion UM,
could not be covered by foreign subsidies, including those of Saudi
_ Arabia, the countries of the Persian Gulf, and France (20 million French
francs). Totaling 12.8 billion UM, starting with a basic amount of 10.7
billion, the 1979 budget showed an even greater deficit (6.9 billion),
which seerqs to have been wiped off, this time, by a Libyan subsidy
accounting for close to one-third of the amount, a lesser aid (10 million
francs), an advance provided by the monetary fund, and payments made by
� Stabex, the balance having been financed by the Central Bank. By virtue
of these factors the stability of the currency could cause nothing but
worry, considering a negative net foreign holdings account (2.3 billion
UM in June 1979), and 1.9 billion owed to the Central Bank.
It was in these conditions and with the help of a mission of French
specialists that an improvement plan was formulated in Nouakchott at the
end of 1979. The start was difficult, since the planned measures clashed
with habits developed in the course of two years of absence of fiscal
control and the slowness of the demobilization which, normally, should
have covered 8,000 men but whose most visible effect, to this day, has
been stopped in the draft. The draft budget of 1980, therefore, totaled
9.9 billion UM or a 7.5 percent reduction compared with 1979. Even
though its structure may be debatable, since the law on finances ignored
military expenditures and the road infrastructure totaling 2 billion UM,
as a result of which, the budget deficit would probably reach 5 billion,
- the budget shows a real desire to reestablish order, with a revenue
ranging from 4 to 6 billion and appreciable savings (600 million) in
civilian expenditures.
Naturally, this effort will have to be doubled if a durable improvement
_ is to be achieved along with a general restructuring: srabilization of
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farm prices, fiscal reform, reorganization or elimination of unprofitable
publicly owned enterprises and, finally, adaptation to the needs of the
productive sectors of an unnecessarily self-competitive banking infra-
structure.
Development Projects
Assuming~that inadequate management, aggravated by circumstances, par-
tially explains the crisis experienced by the Mauritanian economy, the
only ~aay to come out of it would be through a positive effort aimed at
increasing exporfs and eliminating losses resulting from food purchases.
This is the purpose, on the one hand,'of the mining operations at Guelb
el Rhein, and the development of agriculture in the Senegal Valley, the
Gorgol Noir and the Aftouts es Se~l~, on the other, but not at the
expense of other operations of the~same nature but of lesser extent,
covering a total of 50,000 irrigated.hectares. As a third priprity, the
exceptional abundance of territorial' waters should gradually m`ake
possible the development of a fishing industry which, unfortunately, has
no local tradition and is left entirely to foreign fishing vessels.
The drop in the sales of iron ore is not exclusively the~ resiilt of the
world energy crisis but of the forthcoming development of'the Kedia
d'Idjil and Tazadit deposits which, despite a slight increase in output
in 1979, will have to be abandoned by 1992, with the Guel.b~~project taking
over and, that same year, insuring the extraction of 12 million tons,
~ahich could be raised to 14 million,.by 1994 with the opening of a mine
at Oum Arwagen. The Guelb reserves* are estimated tn total 1 billion tons, .
285 million tons of which at Guelb el Rhein, currently being financed
t~gether with the building of an ore cuncentration plant. The overall
investment will eotal $500 million, with $42.7 million coming from SNIM
self-financing, $120 million from a capitalization increase subscribed
by five of its foreign stockholders, and the balance coming from bank
loans of which the Central Bank for Economic Cooperation, associated
with French commercial banks, will account for $50 million, two-fifths
of which will be for equipment purchases.
The financing plan shows the priority party of Arab participation. This
is an illustration of the practice of the trialog recently developed at
the Nice Franco-African Conference. Let us also note the participation
of the Moroccan BRPM (Mining Research and Participation Bureau), totaling
$20 million, in increasing the SNIM capitalization. Following the
laborious draft of constituent documents for the operation and the con- '
clusion of the loan agreements, a specific agreement remains to be con- ~
cluded governing the management of foreign exchange stemming from SNIM
acti.vities, separating it from other Mauritanian projects. As of now,
' however, orders have already been placed based on self-finance resources. ,
^ Arabic term meaning "heart" referring to ore nuggets.
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Guelb el Rhein Mining Exploitation Project
- Financial Plan
(in million dollars)
1. SNIM self-financing 42.7
2. Increased capitalization subscribed by SNIM stockholders:
Arab Mining Co. (Arab League) 28
Islamic Development Bank 10
KFTAIC (Kuwait Mixed Economy Agency) 40
Iraqi Group 22
BRPM (Morocco) 20
Total 1 + 2 162.7
3. Bank loans:
Saudi Fund 65
BIRD' 60
France (CCCE and commercial banks) 50
Kuwai~ Fund (public) 45
Fades (Inter--Arab Economic Development Fund)............ 20
European Investment Bank 30
Abou-Dhabi Fund 20
OCEF (Japan) 16 -
BAD 12
OPEC Special Fund 5
Total bank loans 338
Grand total 500.7
We know that the cornerstone of the Diama Dam, whose completion is
scheduled for 1983, was laid on 10 December 1979 during a ceremony
attended by the heads of state of Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania.
Assuming that ~no financing difficulties will occur, its initial impact
on agriculture is anticipated for 1985. The Gorgol Noir project will be
financed by the Europe~n Development Fund and the FRG. It will cover
3,600 hectares and affect 4,640 families which will se~tle there between
1980 an~l 1985 as follows: 400 the first year and 800 each subsequent
year, ~aith technical aid currently being studied by the FAC.
Wi[hi~ the self.-help program the USAID has allocated $22,OO~J for the
implecran!~tion of the 11 minor agricultural projects. The World Bank is
fi.nancirag a project of the same typ~. China took part in the development
of tl~e M'Pourie area by building pumping stations for the development of
1,424 hectares, 800 of which to be cultivated by private farmers, the
balance going ta state farms.
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Fi.nally, the major Aftout es Sehli project, which will provide the irri-
gation of this lowland from the Senegal River to Nouakchott, behind the
coastal area, is a long-term project whose feasibility study has already
been completed by Sogreah for the FAC which had planned a loan of $30
million over a 3 year period for the first part of the project. Iraqi
aid may have been requested for this major project covering the develop-
ment of 15,000 hectares. However, to this date it is unclear as to
whether it w.ill be used to replace French aid or cooperate with it.
The fauna of Mauritanian waters is exploited today only by 1,000 Spanish,
Japanese, Russian, and Korean fishing boats which cannot be controlled
Eor lack of material facilities. The 150 licenses issued for annual
catches of 1.5 million tons, only 6,OOO~tons of which.~are unloaded at
Nouadhibou would account for 500 million UM of budget revenues.~ -
This area could effectively become most~immediately productive. It is
natur.al that France is interested in cooperating in~this a~ea with a view -
to the development of a research center for the study of the fishin~ stock,
involving ttie assignments to Mauritania of five Orstom researchers.
Technical agreements could also be considered between the authorities
and the Camaret and Douarnenez fishing companies t~ equip Mauritanian
vessels with French lobster fishing facilities.
Foreign Aid and Peace
As we may see, the country is not short of foreign aid, ranging from the
Wor~d Bank to Arab development funds, via all types of bilateral coopera-
tion methods. France which remains the main financial source for
development for the African states formerly belonging to its :o}onial
empire, is witnessing here the fact that the 100 million francs which
it gives Mauritania annually quite substantially outstripped, even though
it may retain i[s priority in trade.
Yet, no one could ignore the fact that four-fifths of the foreign aid
granted hlauritania comes directly through credit institutions from
petroleum-producing countries in the Arab Peninsula, or Western coun-
tries wi.th a liberal economy. No more than about one-fifth comes from
Algeria, Libya, Iraq, or China, these four countries pursuing, actually,
both abroad and domestically, different objectives.
In this respect, Mauritania does not doubt that an excessively long
"phagocytage" of its political and administrative apparatus by the
Polisario Front, i.n the revolutionary spirit of thaC organization, could
deprive it of support wh~ch, so far, has been firm. This is clearly
true i.n the case of Morocco but is also the case of Saudi Arabia which
it: 197~+ did not display the same generosity as in 1978 in plugging the
holes in the budget and which, together with Kuwait and Abou-Dhabi,
tends to subordinate its aid to Rabat's approval. ,
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Could we say that such an attitude is shared by Western aid, French aid
in particular? This is readily insinuated in Nouakchott which, specifi-
cally, attributes the minor apparent effect of a recent CNPF mission to
the latent, even though silent, hostility of French investors to the
options of Lt Col Haidalla in foreign policy matters.
The truth lies elsewhere. It would be normal for investments to dry out,
to begin with, as the result of the excessive financial laxity which had
developed in the management of public affairs favoring the hostilities.
The nature of the fi.nancial efforts undertaken since 1979 are such as to
attenuate this effect. However, the interest in Mauritanian development
can be truly conceivable enly within the framework of a peaceful foreign
policy and, internally, respect for the rights of investors.
On the need for external peace the investors agree entirely with the
Mauritanian leadership. However, the phagocytage to which we alluded
should not enu by imperceptibly drawing Mauritania into a conflict with
i~s former ally. In this respect a gap still exists betweent the current
situation, based on the cease-fire, and a real peace which would be
joined by all the parties to the conflict.
Is this settlement imminent? Unfortunately, there is no sign to indicate
it in the behavior of the opposing parties equally convinced of the
justice of their cause. The lack of preparedness of the Moroccan troops
for desert warfare, along with some tactical errors made at the time of
their arrival in Western Sahara such as, for example, refusing the
cooperation of some 5,000 mokhazni armed, outfitLed, and trained by the
Spanish, who hastened to organize, with Algerian help, the nucleus of
the Polisario forces, led to Morocco's involvement in a murderous costly
con�lict which triggered a weariness which gradually annulled the effect
of the enthusiastic support for the Moroccan sovereign generated in the
course of the Green March among the Moroccan population.
On the Polisario side, an objective evaluation of the chances of a
Sahara reptiblic should convince its leaders that the war, whatever the
exalting events may be for a people which has always considered war a
great honor, is decimating, in the final account, the naturally very low
personnel strength with foreigners slowly filling up the gaps made by
the true children of the desert and that, on this basis, it might be
opportune to provide the opponent with an honorable means to put an end
to it.
The Sahraouis could then consider, together with a Mauritanian population
which is not only closely related to them but is largely identical to
them and have the natural advantages they lack, an economic development
which the international aic~ agencies would have no reason to refuse.
Would there be a"Polisariozation" of Mauritania or a"Moritanization"
of the Polisario? The answer to this question would largely determine
the preservation and future of the populations of the Western desert.
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FOOTNOTES
1. French [echnical assistance provides for 332 jobs, 202 of which in
the field of t~aching, corresponding to three-fifths of the subsidy.
Scholarships total 3.3 million francs. In additi~n to the partici-
pation in fishing, as mentioned, together with the CCCE the FAC
subsidizes, within the framework of exceptional aid to the Sahel,
the development of small irrigated parcels, with the help of wells
or pumping water from the river, with the development of livestock
breeding and grazing, phytosanitation protection, and related non-
irrigated crop growing.
Let us note among the various projects currently under study (a
, sugar refinery complex and private agriculture in the Teka region)
the resumption and expansion of archeological digs in Tamchakett and
Koumbi Saleh in which President Moktar Ould Daddah is very interested.
Conducted jointly with the Mauritanian Institute for Historical
Research, this operation has proved to be a model o.f constructive
scientific cooperation. ~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
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MAURITANIA
BANK ISSUES REPORT ON ECONOMIC SITUATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jul 80 p 1666
[Bank report: "Some Facts on Mauritania's Economic Situation"]
[Text] Following are some indicatious on the state of
t~e Mauritanian economy taken from the report of
activities for the 1979 fiscal year of the Mauritanian
Bank Company, completing the study by Jacques Latramliere.
The 1980 fiscal budget was based on the adopted austerity policy. It
totals 9.9 billion ouguiya as against 10.7 billion in the 1979 budget,
or a 7.26 percent reduction. Following is a comparison between the two
budgets ( in million ouguiya) :
1979 1980
Revense:
7 Direct taxes 1,464 1,529
Indirect taxes 747 902
Customs fees and levies......... 2,548 2,162
Fishing dues and fees........... 2,100 1,200
Various 700 650
- Repayment of loans and advances 240 22
International aid 1,227 1,951
Loans 1,700 1,532
Total 10,726 9,948
Expenditures:
Operational expenditures....... 8,443 8,237
~ Equipment and investment credits 1,433 1,282
Public debt 473 329
Loans and advances 250 30
Financial participations....... 127 70
Tox al 10,726 9,948
From the end of 1978 to the end of 1979 cash in circulation rose from
4.1 billion to 6.9 billion ouguiya. Bank deposits dropped from 1 billion -
to 0.9 billion ouguiya.
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Help to the ec~~nomy totaled 9.4 billion ouguiya at the end of 1979 as
againt 8.9 billion the previous year, and advances allowed to the
Maur.itanian treasury totaled 1.4 billion ouguiya 0.4 billionj.
In 1979 the balance of trade worsened above all as a resul* of increased
'�rmports oE consumer goods and equipment, despite increased iron ore
exports. The deficit with France and the EEC members worsened. France
remains the leading partner, accounting for 43.58 percent of imports and
27.89 percent of exports for 1979.
The overexploit'ati.on of~Mauritanian fishing resources by foreign fishing
fleets which paid the cauntry ridiculously small �,~,es led the government
to for.mulate a new fishing policy. The new.,stipulatiohs call for -
unl.oading, processing, and mer.chandising sea..products by Mauritanian or
rni.xecl r.ompanies. On th~ fiscal level, the regulation calls for payments
for f~ish expor.rs.
At Che end of May 1980 nine agreements were concluded with traditional
partners (DuCch, Soviet, Romanian, Portuguese, S.wedish, Norwegian,
Korean, Nigerian, and French). Other agreements are being negotiated.
- After four months of the new regulation, the amount of land investments
totaled ~91 million and capital pledges totaled $97 million (47.6 per-
cet~t to the scate, 2.9 percent to Mauritanian private interests, and
49.5 percent r.o �oreign associates including Libyans, Iraqis, and
Algerians). In 1980 f ishing should contribute 332,000 tons, which is
subs:antially bel.ow the maximum catch of 532,000 tons as estimated by
the FAO.
The reorganization oE the sea fishing sector, whose activities are
currently concentrated in Nouadhibou, would increase the activities of
the port of Nouakchott.
Over:al.l tinancing totaling 37.2 million ouguiya was granted by the West
African F.conomic Community (CEAO) for the development of agriculture.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreur. et Cie., Paris, 1980
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.~YR7'A
' SYRIAN INTERNAL SITUATION ANALYZED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 12-18 Jul 80 pp 28-31
' [Artic 1e : 4!Is It Too Late to Save Syria?'~]
[Text] Political violence has been renewed in Syria.
This tim~ it is spreading from north to south toward -
Damascus. The regime is meeting violence witl~ vio-
_ l.~nce, but how long can the regime continue to kill
and be kilied at the same time? Rif'at al-Asad,
President Hafez al-Asad's younger brother, says that
t~e regime is ~repared to sacrifice a million casu-
alties. The question now is, is there an alternative
to viol.et~ce and kill~.ng?
Damascus--In the past, ~hey used to say that between one mosque and another
in Damascus, there is yet a third mosque. Today, they say that between
every intel;.igence building and another, there is yet a third building oc-
- cupied by one of the numer~us branches of this intricate security organiza- .
tion, upon which President ai-Asad's regime depends as one means of con-
tinuity a~d survival. ~
These gloomy, well-guarded buildings, whose internal actiyities are not -
well-unde~stood by the average citizen, and from which swarms of agents and
mechanized patrols sally forth to cruise the streets and quarters night and
day, are in the f,orefront of those disturbing things which trouble the
Syrians' lives.
Despite this, Dr 'Abd al-Ru'uf al-Kasm, the current prim~e minister and
former governor of Damascus; was able to introduce ma.ny beautifying touches
to this ancient city, which is congested with more than two million persons,
with public ,utilities adequa.te to serve only about a million.
The holes in the streets have'disapgeared, or nearly so. The communi-
cations crisis has subsided. Bus lines and stops have been revised in such
a way as to relieve congestion in the straets. ~'raffic police have become
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. more courteous in thnir dealings with citizens and drivers. There is a
media campaign to encourage citizens to adhere to public hygiene prsctices
and to throw their litter only into baskets, which the prime minister
established for them when he was governor.
Syrians wish the professor of fine arts [al-Kasm] had stayed on as governor.
If he had, he could have devoted more time for service in the f ield in
which he could have effectively served his city. But now, they see him as
near as can be to failure six months after he assumed the post of prime
minister, ~incapable of achieving what he had promised on the day he rose
from his municipal office t~ his high political position. �
The administrative inefficiency is still unchanged. Pull is the way *o
deal with governmental organizations which are crammed with countless
numbers of officials and civil servants, distributed fairly and unfairly
throughout the ministries and public sector institutions.
Corruption has its protectors. It still manipulates influence in such a
way that a11 the powers of Dr al-Kasm fail to control it.
The most important thing is that all the promises which the slender,
cultured gentleman made to adhere to the sovEreignty of the law, to open
doors, and to alleviate the harshness of the repressive apparatus, have
vanished wi~h rhe large-scale campaign launched against the central and
nortnern cities. The noise of military operations and accompanying ex-
cesses and brutalities--not to say individual or collective slaughter--has
been heard by international organizations and assemblies an~ has been de-
scribed in lengthy reports in the files of Amnesty Internat~~una'.
Lawyers Under the Thumb of the Regime
Dr al-Kasm has now stopped making premises, especially since the last
promise he ma.de to the council of the lawyers federation to respect the
laws and to abolish state courts and e~ergency measures, has ended in dis-
solving lawyers' councils ana violating their independence. Their presi-
dent and most of their elected members have been thrown into jail or de-
tention camps, and a number of 2awyers and agents of the regime's apparatus
have been appointed by governmental 3ecree Co replace them.
Perhaps the prime minister has now understood that his selection as prime
minister was a ploy to conceal the large-scale campaign which was launched
to combat the religious violence groups.
The third armored division was called up for this campaign. It is consid-
ered to be the cream of the shock troops upon which the regime relies.
Also mobilized were defense squads especially trained on inner city fight-
ing and on suppressing demonstrations and strikes, in cooperation with the '
dreaded security apparatus with all its power, expertise, resources and
equipment, and its swarms of agents.
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After two months of campaigns involving searches, pursuits, sieges and
clashes, the authorities concerned said that they have been able to break
the back of the terrorism.
However, the calm did not last long. A new wave of violence broke out,
represented principally by the murder of the governmentrappointed head of
the Damascus branch of the lawyers' federation and the editor of the of-
_ ficial magazine AL'URUBAH in Homs. This coincided with the daring release
of some 10 detainees belonging to the religious violence groups, from one
of the Damascus prisons.
The ne~a wave of violence reached its peak when President al-Asad himself,
on 26 June, was subjected to a precisely planned assassination attempt, from
which he was saved by a miracle.
Froru this renewal of disorders, the observer can draw some conclusions and ~
observations, chief ly the following:
1. The religious violence groups are better organized and entrenched in
society and the government administration than was previously thought.
2. These groups meet with popular sympathy enabling them to operate freely.
3. These groups are easily capable of shifting their operations and ac-
tivities to the middle of the country (Homs) and to the south (Damascus),
leaving behind them in the north the security apparatus which had been
moved there early this year, on the basis that it was the center of
religious violence.
4. The measures of Dr al-Kasm's government to combat corruption, put an
_ end to inefficiency, and restore respect for law have not achieved the de-
sired goal, which is to eliminate popular discontent, and, subsequently, to
remove the grounds used by the religious groups to continue their operations.
The Regime Steps Up its Measures of Revenge
~ With the renewal of the wave of violence, the authorities resorted to more
severe counter-measures than its previous actions. Field military courts
were formed to try those whom the government believed to be members of the
"moslem Brotherhood." It decided to increase the punishment for belonging
to this group to execution, and to abolish the easy entry procedures which
foreigners had enjoyed.
A few days after the assassination attempt a;=.ainst his brother, President
al-Asad, Col Rif'at al-Asad, who leads the hawks in the regime, threatened
to liquidate the opposition at home and abroad, even if that meant '4aaging
a hundred caars, destroying a million ~tanctuaries and sacrificing a million
martyrs." He said that the long arm uf the security apparaL�us "would get
them, because it knaws their wheieabouts in the country, in the Arab world
and abroad."
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. v~� v~ a ~.vl~lV V~.IL VL\LL
According to the newspaper AL-BA'TH, the internal situation is now char-
acterized by "increased fierceness of the conspiracy," and "continuation
J of the wave of crime and terror."
The newspaper says that the authorities are determined to "shift the battle
to the nests of the conspiracy abroad, and to take vengeance upon the
plotters and ringleaders," as well as against American and reactionary in-
terests which "are not out of our reach." According to Col Rif'at al-Asad,
the authorities are also determined to carry out a"sorting operation," to
determine who stands with his brother and who stands "as a spectator, as a
weakling, as an accessory or as an accomplice."
Thus, with regard to the renewal of religious violence, the regime has de- -
cided to respond in kind and meet violence with violence. It has decided
to enrage in increasing escalation, and to cieal with citizens and with
political and professional forces in terms of either black or white, i.e.,
"whoever is not with us is against us." �
Some observers here say that they are not taking seriously the regime's
threat to resort to "nati~nal screening." The evidence is that large num-
bers of inerchants in the major cities have been granted import licenses,
in spite of the large deficit in the balance of trade, in order to appease
them ar.d keep away from alliance with the "Moslem Brotherhood." This is ~
happening at a time in which the government press is raising its radical
tone after a long letup. ~
Has the Regime Reached an Impasse?
Most observers here do not deny that the regime is living in a crisis
similar to that of Salah Jadid's regime (1966-1970), which became a
captive of its revolutionary and radical slogans. As a result, the only
domestic ally Jadid was left with was the Communist Party (Bakdash's wing),
' and his only foreign support was verbal encouragement from Moscow. Thus,
cahen President al-Asad led his "corrective movement" in 1970, he did not
have to move a single soldier.
This does not mean that President Hafiz al-Asad's regime lacks the power
that Salah Jadid's regi*~e did not have. However, circumstances are almost
completely similar. ,
Domestically, Sa1ah Jadid put himself in opposition to all the political
and popular forces, from the far right to the far left, at a time when
little by little he was losing his base in the armed forces upon which he
depended. This ultimately made it easy for his allies to swoop down on
him. The sole distinction between the two cases is that Salah Jadid's
regime did not face the kind of dangerous wave of internal violence which
al-Asad's regime is facing today.
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With regard to the Arab world, the radical Syrian regime has engaged in
verbal battles with various Arab regimes, including Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. '
When President al-Asad began hi"s rule by waviag the olive branch at every-
one, including Jordan which Syrian tanks had once invaded, he was able to
revive the vital role which Syria used to play on the Arab stage.
The rPgime appeared to be more realistic and flexible with its modest slo-
gans, The silent majority accepted the fact that a citizen from other than
the majority ~ect in the country should assimme the presi~~:ncy, for the
simple reason that he was able to give his fellow citizens a greater sense
of stability and moderation.
Then came th~ October war. This was a golden opgortunity which the regime
was unable to exploit and benefit from in terms of raising its popularity. _
On the contrary, the regime rapidly dissipated whatever it had. It was a
cruel shock.when it found that its biggest ally and partner in the Arab
arena, the Egyptian regime, had overnight joined hands with Israel and put
all of its cards in the hands of the United States.
The embarrassment of the Syrian regi.me by its partner switching ~rom a
cautious approach to a peaceful settlement to an open, eager, and headlong
rush to a unilateral solution, via Camp David, was accompanied by a series
of decisions whose results were not accurately calculated. This increased
the regime's difficulties and its isolation both internally and abroad.
If�the Syrian involvement in Lebanon was unavoidable, as they say here, the
intervention was done before Damascus had obtained commitments from all
parties to strive to reach an agreed upon settlement within a definite time
perial. Thus, the Syrian intervention appeared as if it were to rescue the
`'Lebanese Front" at the expense of the nationalist and Pal~estinian forces .
Then, Syria quickly became involved in taming the "Lebanese Front" without
success,
The invoLvement reached the point of using the deterrent forces as local
police to break up local disputes, along with accompanying excesses and
- abuses in a country which was emerging from a bloody civil war and which
has extreme ,political sensitivities.
_ With regard to the Arab world, indecision, or, to put it more correctly,
bad luck was evident. Agencies of the regime obstructed natural rapproache-
ment with Iraq, which was the only way out of the dilemma. Instead, they
sought to form an axis of "steadfastness and resistance," which included
_ parties which were not dependable from a material or moral point of view,
because of r,easons connected with temperament, international ties, or geo- ~
graphic location. These factors prevented this axis from becoming a viable
reality.
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Beginning of Domestic Deterioration
The internal situation had become increasingly worse. The regime was af-
flicted with flabbiness. The national front had become a cardboard politi-
cal facade for the ruling party after the regime had weakened it from with-
in. The security apparatus suppressed every voice raised in criticism. In
the absence of any vestige of freedom and democracy, even in its simplest
forms, ma.nagerial corruption took hold in the government. Exploitation of
influence spread terribly, and senior officials who were supposed to be
symbol_;; oi honesty, sacrifice and self-denial were involved.
Perhaps we should record ~hat a party official here told us that the secur-
ity apparatus had been unable to accurately determine the identity and as-
sociations of those carrying out the acts of violence in the country a full
year after the phenomenon had begun. Thus, some suspects were arrested on
grounds that they were "agents of Iraq," and then were tried and executed
on grounds that they were members of the "Moslem Brotherhood." ~
This is a simple example of the apparatus' flabbiness. As a result of the
inability to choke off the violence and eradicate it, suspicions were di-
rected at the conservative Arab states that they were behind the training
or financing of the Moslem Brotherhood. ~
, As a rasult of these doubts, relations with ,Jordan worsened, and became
cool woith Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The regi~ vascilated between
its urge to openly voice its suspicions and its interest in keeping on good .
terms with these countries, especiaLly as they, and not the steadfast and
resistance front, financed (along with Iraq) the front facin g Israel, and
made up for the larger portion of Syria's deficit.
Thus, President al-Asad's regime found itself isolated and faced the very
impasse which Salah Jadid faced in 1970: internal isolation, successive
waves of political and religious violence, isolation within the Arab world
caused by suspicion or indecision, and, perhaps, ill will or just bad luck.
Moscc~w Strengthens the Regime's Resolve
Some senior members of political organizations both within and outside of
"the Natiorial Front" believe that President al-Asad's regime was prepared to
offer many political "concessions" at the end of the year, in the interest
of domestic relief from the pressure of the wave of religious violence which
has cost the lives of nearly 200 supporters of the regime.
However, a major political change has occurred as a result of a foreign ele-
ment, represented by the visit ot Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign min-
ister, to Damascus, and his lengthy conversations with President Hafez
al-Asad.
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It is difficzlt to know what takes place in official meetings surrounded by
extreme secrecy, but it is possible to track their results by looking for
any changes or modifications in the regime's foreign and domestic policy.
After the visit, a sudden hardening occurred in the regime's positions.
The olive branc:h, which had been extended to the opposition political
forces abroad, vanished. ThF calm Arab tone turned into an obstinate
radical tone. The voice of Dama,scus these days has become more Zike the
_ voice of Aden's 'Abd al-Fattah Isma.'il, if not like the voice of l~a~mal in
Kabul.
Did Damascus find secure refuge in the Soviet boat?
It may be fair to say, quoting the Syrian regime's supporters here, that
Damascus is not Aden or Ka.bul, and that Ha.fiz al-Asad is not 'Abd al-Fattah
_ Isma'il or Karmal. Perhaps this is true to a considerable extent. Even the
Syrian Communist Party, loyal to Moscow under Bakdash's leadership, acknow-
. ledges in its semi pi:blic pamphlets and newspaper that it is wrong to de-
mand that al-Asad's regime be socialist or radical.
Perhaps this is true to a considerable extent by virtue of the fact that the
regime depends on a non-communist military and sectarian base to protect
its back and to prevent Syria from being transformed into a red state.
However, who can gua.rantee the future?
Fidel Castro was no cammunist when he came down from the mountains to at-
tack Battista, but later became secretary general of the Cuban Communist
Party.
It may be difficult for President al-Asad to be a Castro or a secretary gen-
eral of the Syrian Coffinunist Party, because of various political consider-
ations, but who can guarantee what might happen in the foreseeable or un-
foreseeable future in terms of a friendship treaty and military cooperation
with Moscaw, or in terms of a"qualitative change" in relations w~th it,
according to the expression of the socialist "gentleman" 'Abd al-Halim
Khaddam?
Muhammad 'Ali Haytham was prime minister in Aden under the umbrella of the
alliance with Moscow. Salim Rubay' 'Ali was chairman of the presidium under
the umbrella of the alliance with Moscow. And 'Abd al-Fattah Is~a'il was
chairman of the presidium under the umbrella of the alliance with Moscow.
Muhammad Daud led a coup against his cousin, King Muha~ad Zaher~Shah in ~
Kabul in 1974, in agreement with Moscow.
There is no need to recall the fate of the four under the umbrella of
cooperation with Moscaw. Perhaps it can be said that there are treaties of
friendship and cooperation binding more than one country in the Third World
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. v�� v. ~ ~.vtaau tJUL vLtLL
with Moscow, and that what happened to Haytham, Rubay' and Daud did not hap-
pen to the leaders of these countries.
However, the answer to this is that these countries are not ruled by iso-
Lated regimes which can be easily swapt away.
Damascus and MDSCOw must be reminded that Syria is extremely sensitive to
this t e of treaties or to " ualitative chan es "
YP q g [in relations].
Syria and Egypt did previously contract with a communist country to import
arms in the fifties,but Syria itself did not evett accept assistance from
specialized international agencies and organizations for two long years
after its independence, believing that this assistance might affect its
independence.
But what is happening today?
The Soviet Union has provided vast amounts of military assistance to Syria,
and perhaps had a lot to do with supporting its steadfastness. But the
Soviets, in their race with the Americans over the strategic centers in the
world, especially in the Middle East, are making a big mistake as Washington
did a long time ago.
Moscow today, like Washington, as a means of achieving its tactical or
security interests, supports regimes which, to say the least,could be de-
scribed as "isolated" or "unpopular." This support is done at the expe~se
of the subjugated peoples' struggle to complete their national, political
and economic liberation. It is support which completely contradicts the
public principles of a major power like the Soviet Union, whose record so
far cannot be compared to the black record of American policy in dealing
with the peoples of the Third World, and especially with the Arab Nation.
Relxgious Opposition's Positions Obscure.
We have talked about the regime. But what can be said about the opposition,
and in particular the religious opposition? The visitor to Damascus, weigh-
in g the stories and tales passed on sometimes by whispers and sometimes
openly, must surely record that there are young men ready to take on the
police. They know beforehand that the confrontation might end in death by
the authorities' bullets or torture until death in their dungeons.
However, there is much more that must be said frankly to the religious
violence groups, just as frankly as we addressed the regime itself, so long
as the ultimate goal is to protect this country so dear to every Arab's
heart.
Tacit popular sympathy does not negate the fact that there is a large ques- .
tion mark in Syrian minds about the political direction of these groups, a
matter which causes them to appear very obscure to the Syrians.
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No one knows anything about the political program or the ideological cast
of these groups, nor about the form they would set for Syria in the future.
The pamphlets and printed material abundantly distributed here, and probably
in other Syrian cities, offer a simple, almost naive picture of these
groups' political aspirat ions.
It is not fair, as some politicians and intellectuals in the Syrian capital
say, to sacrifice all this blood and life on behalf of obscure purposes and
goals. On the contrary, this ambiguity is one of the weapons to which the
security apparatus resorts with the citizenry in combatting these groups.
There is nothing in the pamphlets about provisions for a desired and hoped
for democratic life, nothing about public freedoms, nor about guarantees of
these freedoms. There is nothing about freedam of parties, freedom of the
press, freedom of beliefs or freedom of thought and its diversity. There
is nothing, in detail, even about applying the Holy Sharia, nor about forms
of government and~their le gal and constitutional responsibility.
The religious violence groups have so far shown their weapons and their
readiness to sacrifice, but what about thzir ideas?
The danger of the course of religious violence is represented by
whether it persists within the framework of superficial co~nunication
which cannot differentiate between political and social systems beyond us-
ing terms such as "Party of God" and "Satan`s Party."
Beneath the present state of intense pressure and maneuvering on the Syrian
scene, Syria has politica 1, social, sectarian, denominational and racial
movements, factious and associations, along with dissimilar and conflicting
cultures.
We cannot remove the facade of one regime only to replace it with another
facade of "obscure simplic ity," merely using different slogans and justifi-
cations. Otherwise, whatever impelled the religious violence groups to bear
arms might cause other groups to use the same method against them.
Is It Too Late?
It is right for the observer visiting Damascus to stop for a minute, in the
midst of vio~.ence and coun ter violence, to ask: "Is it too late to retrieve
Syria from the abyss into which it is falling?" To put it more frankly and -
boldly: "Is it possible to reach some sort of political formula in order
to stop the killing be tween the regime and its opposition, so long as its
result is known beforehand to the combatants?"
We put our questions to some informed politicians here. Some of them re-
plied with scornful ppssimism. "Do you expect peace when you hear about
"national screening" and about preparation for a slaughter whose victims
will be "a million martyrs." Or, "Do you expect peace when you read in the
pamphlets about 'atonement' and about 'the Nusayri regime?"'
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However, some of those to whom we put out questions, whose political and
cultural position cannot be denied or who cannot be accused of not being
widely informed about their country's affairs, said cautiously: "Yes, it
is possible. It is still not too late to retrieve Syria. The opportunity
is still good, despite all the bad things that have happened so far."
How ?
President al-Asad can do a lot to achieve political liberalization in the
country, if he can persuade the extremists in his regime that retreat does
not mean defeat. He can argue that establishing a true, democratic regime
with specific guarantees, with a share being given to~the various political
forces in the country, is the only choice, not only for the regime, but also
for the forces which oppose and fight it.
What are the guarantees?
How can there be a"retreat from a position of power" w ithout a loss of
face? What are the constitutional forms for the proposed regime? What is '
the role of the arnry, the parties, and the groups in th is regime? Or
rather, frankly, what is the position of each group and faction in it?
It is difficult to.devise a formula or im~ose it. Sure ly it is up to every-
one, all organizations and factions. There must be a truce so as to sit
down around a table and conduct a national dialogue. '
One who hears that it is possible to save Syria, while he follows from
abroad the chain of violence and bloodshed, is convinced that it is impos-
sible to reach a solution through dialogue. However, liv ing among Syrians
these days, whatever their leaning ma.y be, convinces one that the nature of
this small, vital people is very far from violent. However, a courageous
step is necessary. Does the regime have the courage to take it? Or is it
predetermined, as Col Rif'at al-Asad says, to sacrifice "a million martyrs"?
Are the privileges of some regime or other, or some group or other, worth a
people shedding their blood for them, and sacrificing a million martyrs?
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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TUNISIA
~
ACTIVITIES .OF NEW PRIME MINISTER ~ESCRIBED
Paris MARCtiES TROPICAUX L'T MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 pp 1721-22
[Text] ~Vhile Prirne .Minister Hedi Nouira was unavailable for health reasons,
President Habib Bourguiba put all his energy into ensuring the highly-placed
personal co~tacts so indispensable to conducting the affairs of the Tunisian
government. And since Mohamed Mzali became the head of the government on
23 April the chief of state has only partially given up this revival of ac-
tivity. Besides visiting the convalescing Hedi Nouira frequently in the in-
terest of friendship, he continues to have long talks, not only with highly-
placed foreign visitors, but also with politically unportant Tunisians--such
as for example Tijani Abid, secretary general of the Tunisian General Federa-
tion of Labor (UGTT), and Bechir Zargalayoun, chairman of the "Rank and File -
Advisory Council," who were received on 26 and 28 June respectively; he pre-
sides over importan~ demonstrations, as for example the "Day of Knowledge" on
30 June at the famous Sadiki College. And Mme Wassila Bourguiba, his wife,
svho must have exerted considerable influence in the political changes that
accompanied Mohamed Mza~i's accession to power, is also receiving many people,
not without publicity.
Quite naturally the new leaders of the party and the government, by speaking
at many demonstrations, are showing their desire to fulfill their roles bril-
liantly. Mongi Kooli, the party~s director, is addressing not only the
Destourian cadres, but youths, teachers, etc., to recommend in classic fashion
militantism, integrity and altrui.sm. Driss Guiga, minister of the Interior,
who in his post as ambassadcsr to Bonn has been away from the country for a
long time, is rene~,ving clossr contact with it by means of his provincial tours.
On the other hand it may be said that after he left the party leadership
Mohamed Sayah certainly did not efface hi.mself: as minister of Equipment he
emphasizes t~e present and future accompiishments of his department, from the
Bizerte road bridge to the Medjerda-Cap Bon canal and the Lake Tunis purifica-
tion project; nor does he neglect his traditional mission as an historiograph-
er; and his evocations of the internal autonomy first achieved a quarter of a
century ago are very pleasing to the chief of state.
But, as is fitting, it is chiefly Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali who is givin~
more and mor,.- short speeches and interviews. An official trip to the Mahdia
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governorate during the latter half of June enables him to develop social--
especially economic--themes to which his predecessor had accustomed provin-
cial audiences. Perhaps more willingly, he approaches with verve the sub-
jects of general policy, governmental doctrine, education and ethics.
On 21 June Mr Mzali interrogates Mahdia's Destourian cadres: "Why are some
youths still on the fringe of the national community? Why have not all the
citizens been made aware of our development programs? The difficulties are
neither of a material nature nor due to the harmful actions of certain sub-
versive elements...The explanation lies rather in the shortcomings of our
orientation and education action. The cadres, instead of busying themselves
with initiating youths into beneficial action and real self denial, are them-
selves neglecting those virtues and getting lost in details; they must look
within themselves and change their attitude..."
"The spirit of openness," Mr Mzali continues, "certainly does not mean casual-
ness, let alone anarchy, but really listening to the ideas of others, being
available to young people, a willingness to change...Real openness can only
be achieved by a strong, just government that enforces the law and administers
ec{uitably, without oppression or repression."
With regard to foreign public opinion, however, Mr Myali is still prudent.
When asked early in June by the Saudian daily AR RIADH about whether he might
be intending "to tighten the ranks and help to unite all the forces," he
answers by minimizing the problem: he "does not think there are fundamental
differeiices between the nation's active forces, the Tunisian society being a
golden mean society that does not believe in the inevitability of the class
struggle and has known neith~r feudalism nor bourgeoisie." The differences
are not profound; they express a conception of the Tunisian society as a
"common denominator based on national unity, aspiration to democracy anci de-
votion to socialism." This is why, he ~dds, he himself has always "remained
isolated from the politicking policy that ends in playing politics" and has
devoted himself to "constructive, modest and objective action." His method,
therefore, will be Bouxguibian, in order to bring together "the greatest num-
ber of skills, energies and currents."
Dfohamed Mzali's first official trip abroad as head of the government had
Morocco as its destination. According to President Bourguiba's directives, he
was to consolidate the fraternal and cooperative relations established between
the two countries, to accelerate the setting up of previously-concluded agree-
ments and to increase the numbex of joint economic, social and cultural pro-
j ects.
Morocco and Tunisia having no common borders, ideas of Maghribian and Arab
unity can be approached by both states in an atmosphere of perfect understand- ,
ing. "Our Maghribian and Arab peoples," says Mohamed Mzali in AL ALAM, an
organ of the Istiglal (2 June), "aspire to unity without a doubt. But in the
future we must spare them the disappointments that result from improvization
and being too precipitate. It is incumbent upon us to weave the solid ties of
cooperation and reconcil:ation that definitely lead to unity, even if. it takes
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several generations. Unity is an end that we'must bring about by progress-
ing toward it in steps, without either hesitations or changes of mind...
Our relations must follow a clear plan, solidly based, rejecting revolution-
are solutions, such as watered-down solutions and false solutions contrary to
the principles...It is in our interest to continue to be the Maghrib of the
States, as a step toward realization of union, followed by unity."
When he arrives in Rabat on 9 June Mohamed Mzali begins the talks he charac-
terizes as "fraternal, positive and candid," and confirming "the identity of
positions and similarity of approaches." While the Moroccan premier,
Maati Bouabid, sees in this contact "a new milestone on the road to building
the Great Maghrib," the head of the Tunisian government believes "the time
has come to make progress in together laying the foundations of the Great Arab
Maghrib."
Mohamed Mzali's visit had been hoped for, on the part of the Moroccans, so
that the possibilities of approaching Algeria might be jointly explored,
with a view to negotiations on the subject of the former Spanish Sahara. But
the Tunisian premier, well informed on Algeria's position and not wishing to
compromise his chances for dialog with that state, where he plans to go soon,
gives no hint of his positions on that subject, in the course of his audience
with King Hussan or during the talks with his Moroccan counterpart.
Also, the final speeches on 11 June agree on a wait-and-see policy, albeit
expressed in rather different ways. For Morocco, a Saharan peace sanctioning
the territorial ascendancy it has achieved remains the immediate objective:
"We are," says Maati Bouabid, "condemned to being just one nation alone, and
our only hope is that everyone will be aware of our passionate desire to see
peace and cooperation established in our region, in mutual respect for the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the regions of ~he Creat
Maghrib." For his part, Mohamed Mzali, believing that the two countries are
"linked by the same future and a common destiny," concludes by evoking a moral
and abstract unity, to be made more specific in the long run: "Unity does not
mean integration, at least as far as our generation is concerned...We are aim-
ing at a functional unity, reflected in unity of hearts and feelings, unity in
programs and coordination of positions."
In line w,ith those future prospects it was decided, at the time of the Tunisian
premi_er's`stay in Rabat, to create a"Tunisian-Moroccan Fraternity League,"
whose prot:igonists are Ahmed el Jed and Moulay Abdullah Alaoui--both members
of the Young International Economi.c Chamber--and whose initial structuring
will be provided by Tayeb ben Cheikh, the Moroccan secretary of state for
Planning and Regional Development. Along the same line, a Tunisian-Moroccan
Investment Company was founded.
Finally, on that occasion two agreements were signed, one relating to economic
and technical cooperation, the other establishing a large joint commission.
It was agreed that a commercial agreement would also be concludec~, exempting
from customs duties the products exchanged between the two coun~ries and
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prov.idiiig for m~itual consultations making it possible to bring Moroccan and
Tunisian progre~s into harmony with the expansion of the EEC, a measure that
~ also threatens their production.
Moh~med blzali, who was received at the Rabat Guest Palace, which is generally
reserved for foreign heads of state, and welcomed by the sovereign with spe- -
cial benevolence, was able on that occasion to measure the diplomatic and po-
litical credit of which Tunisia is the beneficiary.
COPYRIGI~T: Rene Nforeux et Cie Paris 1980
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TL'NISIA
. CQUNTRY'S PROBLEMS, NEEDED CHANGES OUTLINED
Paris JEUNE AFRTQUE in Fr~ench 9 Jul 80 pp 30-31 ~
[Article by Mohamed Charfi, professor at Tunis University: "The Swallow and
the Summer"]
[TFx~j I:iportant events are taking place in Tunisia. President Bourguiba
has replaced the government team in the broadest sense of the word. True to
fiis usual method, he has acted with successive strokes, taking one limited or
indiVidual measure each day. After three months one realizes that, from top
to bottom of the scale, most of the organs of government have changed ~hands.
The movement has of course affected the members of the government, but it has `
also affecte~d the members of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Pa.rty] politburo.
the governors, the principal directors of the administration. Another move-
ment has begun which affects the diplomatic corps and the presidents and man-
aging directors of large national corporations. One would say that even though -
it has remained faithful to its president, Tunisia has changed its political ~
apparatus. And, by the same token, its policy.
Wage increases have been decided upon simultaneously with a series of not in-
significant social measures, which were announced in a much-talked-about
speech, remarkable for its style, made by the prime minister or~ 1 May. Last-
ly, most of the imprisoned union members, basic militants and members of the
legitimate executive bureau of the UGTT [Tunisian Ger.eral Federation of Labor]
have been released. They even allowed themselves the luxury of delivering a
passport to Ahmed Ben Othman, who holds the sad record for the longest and
most painful resistance to the "interrogatory sessions" of the,police.
More generally, we are witnessing a relaxation of tensions in political life.
The most optimistic go so far as to predict that soon /the legitimate leader-
ship/ [in italics] of the UGTT will return to its rue M'Hamed Ali quarters, .
that the main opposition currents will be in a position to publish their news-
papers and tha't a general amnestv, providing it is ~,ronounced in proper form,
will be applied, at least de facto.
One could only applaud if Tunisia could actually go--in a few months and
s;~oothly--from a monolithic and authoritarian regime to a pluralistic and
open liberal regime.
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1-lowever, certaiil parallels inevitably come to mind. During the 1969-1970
term Tunisia experienced a comparable change in the composition of the gov-
ernme?it, in the distribution of the principal political, administrative and
diplomatic offices, and there were also releases of politi,:al prisoners.
Some saw in this a sign of liberalism in the regime. But c~thers were not
fooled by it. In particular, the victims of the 1968 repression were famil-
iar enough with their torturers to know that they were still in place. No-
thing fundamental had been abandoned. Even though in the person of
Ahmed Ben Salah a scapegoat had been designated to shoulder the responsibil-
ity for the authoritarian practices in use, one knew that the evil remained,
having its cause in personal power and the single party system. So all there ~
had been was a temporary relaxation of tension, a false opening up.
- Are we i�ritnessing today a repitition of the experience of the early 1960s or
a much ~uore profound change? If the country's needs are taken into account,
th~ latter is true. For Tunisia is going through a grave and multiform
cri.sis.
On cultural, linguistic and even civilizational levels Tunisia has experienced
a relatively sudden change. From a traditional, half tribal society, having
a foundat-ion of Arab-Muslim civilization, on which are grafted the residue of
the dark centuries of our decadence with all it implies, such as archaic cus-
toms and backward attitudes, we have gone in the space of a quarter of a cen-
tury to a so-called modern society--that is to say, basically urban but also
and chiefly Franco-Arabophone, copying the West in everything and no longer
knowing what it is.
Traumatizing mimicry. Like any excess it has produced its opposite: the in-
tegrist movement. It is no easy task to find the happy medium between these
two extremes.
Although the pro-Westernism was created by grave internal problems, who can
say whether it is aggravated by a si.milarly orien~ed foreign policy? Tunisia
should asswne its role as host country to the Arab League, chairman of the
"Group of 77," Africa's representative in the Security Council, while a form-
- er foreign affairs minister is secretary general of the Conference of
Islamic States. Instead of that we see Tunisia voting, for example, against
Iran in the Security Council. This is no simple happenstance. It is enough
ta recall that during the Vietnam War the pro-Americanism of some of our lead-
ers led them to reveal themselves to be more royalist than the king.
Geopolitical imperatives, like the sensitivities of public opinion in the in-
terior, should lead to a change of foreign policy, in particular to better re-
lations ~vitn our neighbors, until it becomes possible to build the Great
Maghr.ib. Of course the clearly liegemonic attitude of some does not make things
any easier. But the problem is not necessarily unsolvable.
In tlie economic area, the policy practised ir. the last decade was in one sense
a success. The decision to favor tourism, small business, immediately profit-
able projects, was appropriate fox a country that has few natural resources
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and where the fundamental i.mperative is to create jobs. It has born fruit,
which it would be u,ijust to minimize. In the non-oil-producing Third World
Tunisia is one of the top few with a strong average increase in the PIB
[gross national product] and a not insignificant per capita income.
. However, this economy is suffering from two serious maladies. On the one
}iand its turning outward, especially toward the West, means a heavy depen-
dency and a dangerous fragility. On the other hand, growth is chiefly
quantitative. Its bad distribution has dug a huge chasm between the well-to-
do and the others.
The existence of an active and fully representative labor union movement is
indispensable in that regard. Without minimal social justice the experiment
would be non-viable and development impossible. In that respect the experi-
ment of 1974-1976 was beneficial. For the first time in the history of in-
dependent Tunisia a free union movement was allowed to develop and was thus
strengthened. That was the period of the simultaneous play of influence and
counter-influence. One got the idea that Houira and Achour were inseparable
because they were indispensable to each other. To think that was to make an
abstraction of political fact. The regime developed in monolithism from the
time it was born and could not accept with any gaiety of spirit an evolution
so clearly leading to a bipolarization of political life--even, middle term,
to bipartism. The drama of 26 January 1978 was ample proof.
But, just as an infection is not cured simply by lowering the temperature, so
an important social phenomenon cannot be suppressed by destroying its external
manifestations. The discontent of the working class is one of the basic as-
pects of the present crisis.
~ At the same time, youth is angry. The university is functioning badly, para-
- lyzed by student strikes. This institution seems to be entering upon an im-
passe.
More generally, t}ie Tunisian society is experiencing a profound crisis. A
totally underdeveloped society has its balance. Advanced development creates
a certain balance. But progress toward development is a constant source of
tension. Transitional situations are known to be the source of seriaus dif-
ficulties. Great flexibility is needed to solve them, a perpetual search for
new balances, an almost permanent challenging of solutions decided upon, in
order to ada~t them constantly to changes. Well, on that level, policy is
not following along.
Everything h~s changed in a quarter of a century. The political regime alone
is experiencing an imperturbable permanence. No organization, no structure
plays a decisive political role. Mes~iri and Nouira are well aware of this;
each has had his congress that turned out to be a short one.
Tunisia is confronting enormous difficulties for which there is no formula.
_ Except for the formula that consists of establishing a broad and
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noti-exclusionary national debate, after emptying the prisons and opening up
the country to the political exiles, and of making every citizen feel it is
possible for him to bring real influence to bear on political life. Obvious-
, ly this requires a radical change in governing methods.
In those circumstances do the measures taken in recent months announce a
change? Hope is not forbidden. But one swallow has never yet made a sum-
mer.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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TUNISIA
EXCERPTS FROM PCT STATEN~NT PUBLISHED, CONA~NTED ON
Paris AFRIQ~JE-ASIE in French 7 Jul 80 p 8
[Text] Mohamed Enafaa, Mohamed Harmel and Abdelhamid Ben Mustapha have sent
us a statement on behalf of the PCT [Tunisian Communist PartyJ, dated 9 June
and prefaced by the following letter:
"In your edition of 14 April 1980 your newspaper published an article entitled
'Rupture Ampng Tunisian Communists,' basing the article on tracts circulated in
Paris and signed ' Young Tunisian Communist Woman' or ' Tunisian Communists in
France
"We are amazed that your newspaper is jumping into hazarc~ous speculation with-
out verifying the merit and the true origin of these tr%scts. Your good faith
has certainly been caught out. To reestablish objecti�re verity, we ask you to
= publish the attached statement."
At the very least it is i.mproper to circulate a statement intended for us be-
fore we have even received it. This text, addressed to AFRIQUE-ASIE, was in
fact distri,buted in the form of tracts at a congress held in Paris last 16 to
18 June. Nevertheless, here are some excerpts:
"AFRiQUE-ASIE thought it should credit this operation and devoted a commentary
to it under the title 'Rupture Among Tunisian Communists.' For purposes of de-
mystification we issue the following statements:
"l. A sin~le individual is hiding behind these signatures...
"2, In these tracts, in which invective and calumny take the place of argu-
ment, the author denounces the Tunisian Communists as 'accomplices of
the government' and calls them 'false comm~.nists' and 'false opponents.'
"3, Violently attacking the socialist democrats, calling them 'false liber-
als,' the newspapers ERRAI and DEMOCRATIE, he reproaches the PCT for
having a policy of alliance vis-a-vis these currents...
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"4. Despite the freedom he took with the principles of their movement,
despite his declared hostility toward their positions and despite the
efforts he deployed to poison their relations with friendly movements,
the Tunisian Communists have shown patience and good will in permitting
him to make corrections. But in the discussion that naturally followed
he chose the path of provocation, by publicly and disloyally developing
a line he had never expressed before. He thus bears the responsibility
for placing himself clearly and deliberately outside our movement."
The above words also call for four comments:
1. AFRIQUE-ASIE was not the only periodical to inform of the rupture among
Tunisian Communists. The upheavals that have existed within the PCT
since 2b Jan 1978, which were amplified following the Gafsa insurrection,
have caught the attention of numerous observers. The weekly AL DESTOUR
and the daily AL SAFIR among others have echoed it. It is true that both
are forbidden in Tunisia, as is our own newspaper, by the way.
2. The positions takeii by the PCT shortly after 26 Jan 197g and the Gafsa
affair brought on a malaise--the least that can be said--~n Tunisian
patriotic and progressive circles.
3. Wishing to minimize the rupture and blame it on the initiative of a
single person (which is inaccurate), the signers of the statement certain-
ly do not take into account the interest aroused by the tracts signed
"'I'unisian Communists in France" and the animated discussions that have
taken place in Tunis as well as in Paris. It was for that reason in partic-
ular that our newspaper believed it would be useful to publish news of it.
4. This statement, which is very late, makes no reference at all to the Gafsa
affair, which, we recall, constituted the essential point dealt with by
the incriminated statement.
The Editors
COPYRIGIiT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
8946
CSO: 4400 END
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