JPRS ID: 9230 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS ATHEISM AND CONTEMPORARY COSMOLOGY BY B.S. SHANIYAZOVA

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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P`~LiT _ ~~t~ ~ ~ ~
; ~ITHE I ~M Al~t~ ~~~TE1~P'~~F~l~~' ~~~~t~L~G~
I~UG~~T ~H~il~ I C~F ~ ~

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_ JPRS L~'9232 ~
5 August 1980
West E u ro e R e o rt -
p p
(FOUO 34/80) ~
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JPRS L/9232
5 August 1980
WEST EUROPE REPO RT
(FOUO 34/80) '
CONTENTS
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
FRANCE .
Neutron Bomb Seen Key To nefense of rrance
(Jean Cau; PARIS MATCH, 27 Jun 80) 1
COUNTRY SECTION
FRANCF
PCF's Marchais: His Personality, Strategy Rev~ewed
(Auguste Lecoeur; PARIS MATCH, 27 Jun 80) 10
Gaudard's Reasons for Quitting 'L'HUMANITE' Staff Discussed
(Thierry Pfister; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 28 Jun 80).... 28
Aspects of pCF Internal Crisis Examined
(Thierry Pfister; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 2.1 Jun 8U).... 29
ITALY
Production of Naval Equipment Described
(DEFENSA, May 80) 31
SPAIN ~
- Army Upgrades Tanks, First BMR-600 Delivered
(DEFENSA, May 80) 37 ~
Unemployment Dilemma Continues To Worsen
(CAMBIO 16, 8 Jun 80) 39
' Basque, Catalonian Economic Ministers on Regional Plans
(CAMBIO 16, 22 Jun 80) 43
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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THEATER NUCLEAR rORCES FRANCE
N~UTRON BOMB SEEN i~Er TO DEFENSE OF FRANCE
Paris I'ARIS MATCH in French 27 Jun 80 pp 36-40-41, 78
[Article by Jean Cau: "Nice N-Bomb!--And if It Were Our Only Hope of Escap-
ing Holocaust"]
- [Text] Carter has r?fused to build it--s~ as not to compro-
mise the SALT agreements. The Russians give assurances that
they are not preparing ~t. Only France, audaciously, an-
nounces that it knows how to make it, that it has perhaps
made it and that it can produce it on the asaembly line.
Decision imminent. We are speaking, of course, of the neu-
tron bomb, which divides the political world but on which _
all the ~silitary seem to be in agreement. It is the solu-
tion to ttie problem that invasion by conventional forces
wc~uld ~~oHE~ to us. It is a Frenchman, Robert Ignace Dautray,
scientific director for military applications in the Atomic
~nergy Conunission, who is coordinating the research. "An
excepcionally gifted mind," says Alain Peyrefitte, who gave
him the job when he was minister of energy. In the follow-
in pages, Jean Cau opens up the neutron-bomb file. He has -
met with its "father." Both the one and the other find merits
in it. AnothFr fascinating application of neutron radiation:
the new Maginot line of impassable radiation conceived of by
Colonel Geneste and designed by Robert Bonneville.
For as long as there have been individuals, the enemy in war has had a face.
But the question finally arose: how to wipe out an enemy called a"mass,"
wi.tti mi.llions of inen capable of being thrown into the battles? Nuclear
- firepo~aer was then invented. Providence has taken care of everything. For
mass societies, mass massacres. While it is true that since the end of
tJorld War II, these wild beasts that are the great nations have let peoples
whose cornbatants they have encouraged, remote-controlled or armed tear one
another to pieces around them, thev have not fought directly against one an-
other. Each has Seen content to let its claws and fangs grow while keeping
an eye on the growth of those of its neighbors. Unfortunately ~~r fortunate-
ly (as one chooses), th.is progression is not being halt~d. When we had al-
ready accustomed ourselves to our good old terrifying A-bombs and H-bombs,
an unknown star appeared on the screens ~~f terror: the neutron bomb.
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.
What is it? Father--and tirst of all--who is its father? In 1943, a young
Ameri.can science student, Samuel Cohen, was called up and sent off to the
hiassacl~usetts Inst-itute of Technology (MIT) near Bostoii, to do engineering
studie~ before being assigned to some technical service in the U.S. Army.
He l~imself tells how one day, when he was very busy taking a nap and flunk-
ing an electronics course, he was brusquely 3wakened by a sergeant who
brought him before an official. This official had been ordered to round up
a iew students at MIT to complete the dev~.ce for a mysterious "Manhattan
Project" (in fact, the construction of the first atomic bomb), and since he
was pressed for time, he did not want to upset the classrooms and had asked
- the sergeant to bring him some students lounging in the cafeteria or snoring ~
in the dormitories. And that is how Samuel Cohen soon found himself in Los
Alamos, New Mexico. "And that," he says, "is how I became a'nuclear scien-
tist' by flunking a course!" Today he is about 60, in good shape. He loves
Paris, where he is at the moment for the issuance of the book "Echec a la
Guerre" [~heckmating War] (Editions Copernic), which he has written in col-
laboration with his friend the French Col Marc Geneste. Now that we have
established the identity of the father, let us see who the child called N- .
bomb is. Very simple: it is a miniaturized thermonuclear weapon ~a mini-H-
bomb) fitted with a detonator (A-bomb or laser). Its novelty consists in
this: whereas the ekplosion of a normal atomic bomb of the Hiroshima type ~
= liberates only 20 percent of its energy in neutron form (X-rays) but 80 per-
cent in mechanical Pffects (blast) and thermal effects (heat), the propor- ~
tion is reversed in the neutron bomb. Let us say that it radiates 80 per-
cent and blasts and heats only 20 percent. (This f~rmidable emission of
neutrons is due to the use of tritium as the basic product. It is very ex-
pensive: 30 million centimes per gram, and 10 grams are needed for one small
N-bomb. It replaces *he lithium of conventional atomic bombs, and on con- .
tact with deuterium, produces the neutron flux.
There. Naw you know everything.) The advantage of this bomb is trerefore
that it reduces the blast and heat effer,ts very considerably beyond 300 m
from the point of explosion. In counterpart, it releases a neutron flux so
dense that it passes thr~ugh the armor of tanks (for example) without de-
stroying them, but irradiates the crews, paralyzes them and kills them. At
the point of burst, where more than 1 trillion neutrons per cm~ are re-
leased, it "dries them up" in a few minutes. At 500 m, one receives 30,000;
- at 1,OOG m, 3,000. Now 600 are eaough to doom at?y living being to death.
"Does one suffer very much from ir.radiation, Mr Cohen?" "Less than from
mortar-shell explosior~s. Roug~ly speaking, one feels all the symptoms of a
very violent intestinal flu, with vomiting and diarrhea. But flu can be
cured, while the radiation cannot." Bitterly, passionately, Samuel Cohen
defends "his" bomb. ~uch i.s the charm of scientists even when they conceive
the mosr_ terrible engines of death: they love their children and celebrate
- their qualities. "Are you~, shall we say, embarrassed, Mr Cohen, at being
- the father of this homb?" He is surprised and almost takes offense: "Me?
No. Why should I be? Let's speak candidly, if you don't mind. After 20
years of strategic erroL,, Europe is militarily at the mercy of the Soviets,
who are permitted all the political au~acities by this situation. Now my
bomb is 'clean,' since it has very little radioactive fallout despite its
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increclible effe~tiveness. Tt is the death ray, the death bath; i� is the
most etfective device for crushing a ground offensive in which only the at- -
tackers would die. I have therefore struck a blow for peace, since I have -
invented a credible nuclear weapon, at least as regards strategic defense,
for it upsets ttie Russians' offensive designs terribly. It can be u-ed to _
kill but without destroying." "The fact remains that it is an abominable
wespon."--"Listen, in order to have peace" (here it is Geneste who takes
over f.rom Samuel Cohen and replies to us) "there are two solutions: either
improve human nature, which the cizurch and a few idealists have been trying
unsuc�cessFully to do for 10,000 years; or terrify the adversary, and if one
is Farced to do so, destroy him. Meanwhile, it is indispensable for us to
make an effective umbrella without holes in it. This is the N-bomb."--
"W~ich, Mr Cohen, as you humorously said to us, makes it possible to kill
the sniper isolated in the belltower, even if he is a bishop, without razing
- the whole village."--"Yes, and it is in this way that it is useful for close
' combat, since it wipes out all life at the ground surface, even if you are
protected by ar?nor." Seriously, what would one do if the 50,000 Soviet
tanlcs all started moving?
, Fry their crews with the N-bomb. One can imagine that the RLSSians, who ev-
ery month make a number of new tanks equi.valent to all those that the French
' Army has (most of which, besides, are more than 16 years old!), would be
fairly upset at the thought that their armada might be good for nothing but
~ scrap. Whence their loud cries, the most extravagant of which is: "The N- _
, bomb is a capitalist weapon! It kills persons and spares property!" Col- -
onel Geneste's repl}�: "And the bayonet?" And he adds: "To good people, de-
terrence means preventing war, but this is only a theory. With deterrence,
one must also have the desire to use it, and pressi_ng the button to exchange
tt~e absolute 'vitrification' of France for the destruction of a few Soviet
ci.ties is all well and good, but it is to forget that the other side is 100
times bigger. We can wound it, but it wipes us out and there is no battle."
Whereas with the neutron bomb, its partisans assure, everything is differ-
ent. It is a battle weapon and comes under a different concept than the
weapon of pure terror (the A-bomb or H-bomb packed with frightful megaton-
nage). It obliges the Soviets to reconsider their entire strategy. Indeed,
in the present state of affairs, they are, as Co'unel Geneste says, 100
_ times biKgez than we, and in the event of thermonuclear confrontation could
wipe. ti:; off the r~ap at a stroke. Except ttaat they know that we are capable
of wounding them seriously before we die if--obviously--we press the button. :
I~ut wouid we press it or not? Thay can avoid the risk of this bet--a mor-
tal o~c~ for us but very hard on them--by simply attacking with ground
f~~rces, since in this area, with their tidal wave of tanks, they also enjoy
overwhelming superiority. In the face of that, we are defenseless unless we
- oppose the ons~aught witn a barrage of neutson bombs. in brief, these
bombs oblige the Soviets, in their military thinking, to renounce the use of
their Formidable power of attack by ground forces, which they have never ne-
~;lecLed--qui.te to the contrary!--to go on strengthening ceaselessly. "Neu-
rron bc~mb? V~.ry bothersome indeed! The Western tricksters now seem to have
a battle ~aeapon, whereas we were able to crush them without using thermonuc-
lear weapons, to which--one never knows--they might have repiied," the Rus- -
3
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sians tt~ink. It. is a battle weapon because the N-bomb can lie f.ired eit:her
by artillery, with 20~-mm guns, or by rockets, airplanes or cruise mis,~iles.
Its weight? Li.ght. Barely 200 kg. Tirelessly ~rraining to explain its
"advantages," Samuel Cohen and Colonel Genestc~ declare further tl:at we ar.e
presently sitting on thousands oi nuclear mines "rea~iy to explode all at
once, or nearly so, at the slightest signal, which might be automatic tomor-
r~w if cPrtain American projects that make one's hair stand on end (for
_ those who have any) are carried out. In fact, it is planned, in order to
save the thermonuclear bombs from 'counterstrikes,' by their opposite num-
bers, to do nothing less than send them off to their targets ~that is; t~
the entire enemy territory) upon the 'missile alert' (Launch cn alert sys-
tem). Handing the fate of the wor~d over to electronics! Which mean:~, all
in all, that the exploitation of the atom for explosive purposes in o~rder to
ensure 'deterrence by terror' can quite simply wipe our civilization ~~ff the
map because of a false alert, a short circuit, a bad calculation or a~1 es-
calaL-ion out of control. Such escalation could, in our day, result from the
confrontations that are multiplying in the world up to the present, with
~eaks and troughs, but the aggravatiun of which could indeed ignite the ar-
qutbuses and the bombards in the heat of the action.... Therefore it. was
normal to ask whether the atom might provide, ior deterrence, more intelli-
gent solutions than its use in the brutal and unsubtle form in which we have
_ known it so far and which was only a gigantic extrapolation of the explosive
- virtues of TNT--to such a point that the power of nuclear w~apons is still
expressed in terms of thousands of tons of conventional-explosive equiva-
lent!... Thus ~vas the nev:.ron bomb born." Thanks to which,"deterrence
would be ensured i.n a totally credible manner without the need to blow up
the planet with the powder-magazine that asks only to explode undez~ our
feet. Under cover of the neutrons of tactical artillery, one could even en-
vision clearing the civilized world of these mines by gradual?y reducing the
'}~ostage-execution plato~ns' constituted by all t}~e H-bombs that make us run
a frig}itful risk, constantly aggravated by the strategic armament~ race,
wl~ ich has now become itisane and incoerci.b le
Where does this famous N-bomb st~.nd toda~? On the American side, everything
is summarized ir. a f.ew dates. 195?: the first tests are carried out in the
United States, while Eisenhower is president. The team assigned to develop
the bomh is led by Samuel Cohen and scientists of the Li'vermore laboratory
in California. 1958: a bomb explodes 160 km from a Pacific island. 1963:
one was fired i.n the Nevada desert. 1975: at the end of the Vietnam war,
several neutron bombs were used "experimentally" in the mi.ddlr_> of art inten-
sive conventional B-52 bombardment to delay the push of the tanks toward
Saigon. 1977: the Americans perfect the antimissil~ neutron bomb (for in ad-
dition to the mortal ionization thar it cau~es in liv~ng tissue, the N-bomb
also causes considerable damage to t:~e electronic devices of nuclPar ~aar-
heads). But following a colossal pr~paganda campaign unlerished by the USSR,
Carter blocks any decision.
1978: Carter, who wants to put some ~ards in Cyrus Vance's hand for starting
a discussion about the SALT agreements, puts off manufacture of the antitank
neutron bomb.
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Un this map of Europe, the black dots represent what would
- be the line of Colonel Geneste's defensive barrage, along
the border of the FRG. The defense would be complemented
by the presence of atomic submarines in the North Sea and
in the Mediterranean.
On the Soviet side, it is beyond doubt that they have mastered the tech-
niques of the N-bomb and have made it . At what rate--since this bomb, a
deftcsive weapon, is not their preferred weapon, since they have no attack
by ground military forces to ~ear? A rnystery. But there is no need for -
anxiety on Moscow's part: they are at the same point.
In 1978 they tested an N-bomb, while at the same time stirring up the entire
world against the United States, which was ready to make it on the assembly
line. Jimmy Carter replied sharply: "The Soviets know, and Presider?t Brezh-
nev knows, ttiar. the neutron weapon is designed to be used against a massive
and perhaps overwhelming attack by t~:nks on Western Europe. The Soviets,
for their part, have no use for a neutron weapon, and Mr Brezhr.ev's offer to
abstain from manufacturing them makes no sense in the European theater. He
knows thisl" Nonetheless, in the same year, Carter gave in to Brezhnev.
' Arthur Peche, principal rapporteur for the military-programming law, de-
clared to us: "This was the triumph of disinformation. In Europe, thanks to
~ ti~~ Communist parties and the hazy intellectuals, the Russians conducted an -
- incredible campaign against the 'imiriorality' of the N-bomb. This campaign
had a certain effect on American puritanism. 'How can we Americans do some-
thing immoral?' Then we let ourselves be abused once more, which shows the
extraordinary naivete of the Western world. Without giving battle, the War-
saw Pact has achieved formidable conventional superiority. Here is the re-
sult of a policy of renunciation!" Finally, where do we on the French side
stand? Do We have "the" bomb? We probably do! (There is even talk of some
5
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10 bombs already developed while the green light--if it is giver.--from the
Elysee which would lead to assembly-line production of the devices is `
awaited.)
And among u~, wt~o would its father be? Here we go back in time and find
ourselves in Paris on 1 February 1928, wher~ Robert Ignace Kouchelewitz was
born, to a Jewish family of Russian origin. [dhen war broke out, little Ro-
bert--whose father died as a deportee-~-was sent to the Causses, where he -
herede sheep whi?e trying, with books, to give himself an elementary educa-
tion. When the war anded (Alair.. Peyrefitte recounts all this in his book
"I.e Mal Francais [The French Sickness)), he ti~nidly wanted to "risk the bac- -
calaureate." He was admitted easily. On his return to Paris, he entered
the National School of Arts and Crafts at the head of his class. His teach-
ers, unanimous about this extraordinarily gifted student, advised him to ap-
ply to the Polytechnique. It was agreed that he not count on it! And he ~
graduated at the head of his class in 1949! The following year, he decided
not to call himself Kouchelewitz any Zonger, but Robert Dautray, and began
his career as a mining engineer in Cl;:rmont-Ferrand. He was soon detached
to the CEA (Atomic Energy Commission) at Saclay, ~ahere, according to Peyre-
fitte, "he did his exploits." The author of "Le Mal Francais," then minis-
ter of energy, then sought a new man to whom to entrust scientific manage- .
ment at the military-applications department of the CEA at Limeuil. "Dau-
tray," writes Alain Peyrefitte, "had exactly the prafile of Lhe man that we
needed. ~n exceptionally gifted mind that rapidly assimilates all the dis-
ciplines necessary for synthesis and master them; he was able to understand
the language of the component analyses and reconcile them." Thus he became
the father of the French H-bomb and, Peyrefitte concludes, "in August 1968,
de Gaulle had one of his final joys when our first two H devices exploded."
Since then, Robert Dautray has not ceased his specific research, under the
direction of Jacques Chevalier--himself father of the French nuclear-sub-
, marine engine and director of military applications in the CEA--and can be
considered the production supervisor for our N-bomb. He does not proclaim
this. This palefaced man, who wears thick glasses with silver rims, shies
away from publicity and glory. Upon his reception into the Academy of Sci-
ences, he asked for the press not to be invited at all. He lives in a blind
alley in Paris, in a sma?1 house with barred windows on which ivy winds. }le
contemplates, without entering the arena, the agitation occurring in France
about his bomb and the superartillery that the neutron weapon would consti-
tute--agitation that is increasingly ~harp as the shadow of the Soviet co- _
lossus lengthens over Western Europe. The UDF [French Democratic Union], on
the pretext, its report says, "that tomorrow Europe may be the major theater
of a possible confrontation, is for it. Arthur Peche, UDF deputy and prin-
cipal rapporteur of the military-programming law, declared to PARIS MATCH:
"I want my country to have the best possible defense, and the most effective
tool at the lowest cost. Then, when I heard talk about the neutron weapon,
I tried to learn whether we had the te�.:hnology for it. The answer is yes.
We can produce it. I wanted to know i.f it could be integrated into the bud-
getary efrort that we are devoting to our present forces. The answer was
yes. My third concern was te know whether this weapon could be integrated
into our strategic concept oc deterrence. The answer is yes." For Mr
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Peche, then, there is no technical problem for France. Isn't it more than a
budgetary problem? "We have the possibility of arriving at the develupment
stage in the space oE about 2 years.... Rockets,submarines--we have them
- while hoping not to have to use them, but one cannot rule out the possibil-
ity of the adversary's saying one day: 'I want to attempt a strike with con-
ventional mens.' We then have to be able to reply to him. We do not have
tiie ri~tit to do without the neutron weapon, whether we like it or not,
wl~E~ther we have succumbed to disinformation or not. It is a question of re-
sponsibility.... It t~as been acknowledged, and Mr Bourges has confirmed it, ~
tliat the Defense Council could take a certain number of decisions before
st~mmer. There was a meeting last week. There will be another. These are
limited council meetings at a very high level. For my part, I am waiting to
see what the president of the republic will say in his televised speech on -
26 June, if the question is asked of him." General Mery, chief of staff of
the armed forces, is also personally in favor of France's building the bomb.
The RPR, faithful to the Gaullist "all or nothing" concept, is at present
rather against this graduated and flexible response system.
The Communist Party is categorically against it, and the Socialist Party is
obviously hostile.
II this campaign by those for it and against it is so lively, it is because
it originates in the fact that for the last 30 years, Europe's security has _
depended entirely on American good will--on its will, period. There was ab-
soltite belief in the American nuclear umbrella. Now there is less belief in
it. Far less--especially since the USSR has reached and gone beyond nuclear
{~Arity and has established a 4-to-1 ratio between its conventional forces
and those that could be pitted against it.
_ It is against this background of anguish and terror that man will have to
reach a decision before long. Yes or no to our neutron armament? Yes or no
to "assembly-line" manufacture of N-bombs by France? For the time being,
Valery Ciscard d'Estaing, the president of the republic, remains silent.
His responsibility, in the position he occupies and has wanted to occupy, is
immense. Li.ke ttte position, for that matter, of all tliose in our modern
states and ict these new times af the atom who have the supreme responsibil-
ity. In these i~ew times, yes, for as Sa?nuel Cohen and Marc ~eneste write in
a report of the Total Strategy Studies Circle (CEST), we have seen nothing
yet: military application of nuclear energy is "still in its infancy. It is
only 40 years old.... After a few decades of existence, the "military" atom
--with due proportion kept in mind--has reached the level of its gunpowder
ancestor of the first a~;es, the stage of the arquebuses and bombards. And
in this report ("Earth without Massacre"), our two specialists explain that
after the neutron bomb it would be time to go still farther along a road on -
which "terror would be less asinine and less malevolent." The solution ex-
ists. "We declare that it is poss�ible to terrorize an enemy tribe and neu-
traliz.e its ability to do harm without necessarily exterminating it while at -
- the same time exterminating oneself.... It is sufficient to use controlled
radioactivity as an instrument of terror, to abolish the collective death
penalty with which we are all threatened today."
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c)n the bcisis o! this pr~amble, it is necessary quot~~ at len~;th the Aineric:an
father of the N-bomb and the French military man,who knaw what rhey arc -
talkin~; and writing about: "This weapon exists potentially today: it is tht~
gacnma }~omb, which we shall by that name because it derives its virtues from
the ~illegible~ specific aspect of nuclear energy, nonexplosive, the possi-
bility ~f spreading gamma rays as fearful as are the neutrons for individu-
als, but only at a distance, and whose effects, contrary to those of all the -
weap~ns that have preceded it, are totally controllable (1) in space, (2i in
time, (3) in their intensity. Let us suppose that a rocket warhead, instead
of expleding abruptly like the A, H and N devices, over an enemy city, or
any other target, limits itself to showering down on the t3rget a rain of
micropellets previously activated in a nuclear reactor specifically designed
for the purpose. A carpet of ga~na rays falls down on the zone in question.
Its dimensions are controllable. It is a function of the surface area cov-
- ered by this rain, which is deadly after a time. Its effectiveness time is
controllable in function of the duration of activity of the components chos- !
en. Its intensity is controllable in function of the density of the micro-
pellets, and of their nature. For the first time, it is a totally control-
lable weapon. And if the object of war is more 'control' than 'destruc- -
tion,' such a d~vice merits attention. Its effects on the enemy are spec-
tacular. Because they are not immediately mortal, they force him, under
pain of death, to get out of the target zone as quickly as possible, or go
underground and not come out until the end of the 'treatment'; he could be
there for a long time, and meanwhile would not be capable of doing any harm.
- One can imagine the reactions of a civilian population--of the East or of
the West--suddenly covered by such a carpet of radiation. _
"And to cap it all off, let us suppose that a small fraction of our micro-
pel.lets is made luminescent by radiation, which is very easy. A sinister
greenish glow would then blanket the target zone, marking the zone of slow
deatYi and at nighttime giving visible form to the bath of gamma rays to
which civilians and military are exposed if they do not scram. Everyone
would know that death was there. A hallucinating spectacle With the help
of nuclear mythology, all the inhabitants would take to their heels without
waiting for the verdict of the Geiger counters giving the administrative or-
der to evacuate.
It. would be a militarily effective form of bombardment that would disarm of
their personnel all the installations taking part in tt-� war effort, and a
mor.ally charitable one, since it would give che inhabitants a few extra min-
utes to save their skins, while fixing the boundaries of trie death zone,
which one could get out of by running. And contrary to the H-bombs, it
would give the aggressor the time and opportunity to reflect on the conse-
quences of his acts and renounce them. Without breaking a window or killing
_ anyone, except for traffic accidents or hear.t attacks attributable to panic.
Terror without massacre...."
No, this is not science fiction. It is our reality. We are immersed in it.
No matter what our ignorance and our desire "not to think about that," we
are living this reality. Monstrous, apocalyp~~ic in the porper sense of the
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wurd--war is there, insane but possible. The states are preparing for it,
staggering budgets are swallowed up in it, strategists are thinking it out,
the engines of war carry it on their sides. In this time, we are living oi~r
daily lives and what we believe lightheadedly to be "the ~reat problems of
tl~c~ hour." We are living our lesiure, our o~ork, our strikes, oui� unempluy-
mez~t, our political quarrels and our political sideshows. And tao often, so
lightheadedly, we tell ourselves that all our "difficulties" "have scraped
- the bottom of the barrel," whereas we are threatened with having something
else scraped.
Aft~~r an unimauinable self-genocide, a"ycraping-away of humanity and the
world." f(orrified, some scientists who have developed the radical apoca-
lypse are now trying Lo make it possible to lower Che rungs of the ladder.
By means of H-bombs or gamma bombs (and by means of what else tomorrow?), .
the~ want to negotiate the ravages of terror, at its zenith tod:y. At one
, ex[reme, we should thank them for this. Our fate is in their hands. We -
have opened--I say "we" because these scientists are our own--the horrible
Pandora's box. Only scientists are able, not to close it--that is impos-
sible--but to control the now-wild winds that are escaping from it. In this -
--for peace, a mortal g~ddess, will never be eternal--lies our sol.e, our
only hope.
COPYRIGHT: 19t~0 par Cogedipr~asse SA
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~
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' CC~UNTRX SECTION FRANCE
~ PCF~S MhRCHAISt HIS PER50NALITY~ S'lRATBGY REVIEWED
Paris PARIS MATCH in Frenah 27 Jun 60 PP 3~'1 ~
_ ["Excerpte" fr~m "T31e Strategy of the Lie ~rom the Kremlin to Ceorges
- Marahais" by Augus~e Lecoeurt "I~a~rchaie or the 5tra,tegy of the Lie"]
[Text] A teie~visior~ star but also secretary general of
the Frenah Commounist Party (PCF), through hie p~litical
broadcasts on the different networks, Georg~es Marc~a.i.s has
~ttracted a vast publia which is tickled with his verb~al -
performances, outbursts and $lyness, Which comes on in an _
unaophiaticated manner. During the past fex years, hie
_ public has oftex� found it difficult to follow the mearider-
~ ings of t~.i.s diecouree on the successive options of his
partq. Auguste Leooeur, former member of t~he resistanae
and Maruice Thorez~ former searetary of state aad heix
until his e~clusion from the pax~y in 1954, ~e published
"The Strategy of the Li.e - from the Sremlin to Georgee
Marcha3s" in the F~ditione Ramsay. In an exclusfve report,
- PARIS MATCH here prese~nts his analysis of the succeasive
and apparently contradictory standa taken by the PCF~s _
= future can.didate for the presidenay.
As with mar~y television viewera, we can be satisfied with holding our sides
with laughter at each of Marchaig' appearances on the little ecreen. Too
maay Frenchmen see in him a televiafon star who has perfected his act and
reached the peak o~ his caxeer ae a comedian. But let ua be on our guard.
There is nothing ~inny about this charactex. We can senae it through the
uneasiness we feel between txo epasms of laughter.
All else bein,g equal, in 1917, after the faZl of the Czariat regime, I,enin
too wa~ in hi,s oWn way lau~abl~ i~n his preterltions, At Russi~'~ first
Soviet congress in June 19'17, a gereasky mini.ster said "that t~here is no
political party in Ruesia rea~iy to assume ftia.ll power~" In the audience,
a little man g~ot up and shouteds "Yes, such a party does exis~cl" 7~at -
man was Lenin and the party he was al.luding t~ was the Bolshevik Party,
weak, divided, just emerging from a State of illegality. ~ere was a moment -
of general hilarity in the ha11, ~eers and gi.bes broke out for a long time.
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A Yew monthe later, thoae xho lau~ed had disappeared, Thinga m,ight have
been di~ferent if, in June 1917 instead of bein~r received urith laughter, _
Lenin had been taken seMously... _
the pagea that follow, let no one expeci; to find God lmor?~+ ythat aort of
~ens~tional revelation or apiay deta,~l on the life af Georg+es Marohais, -
b~ch readere rrill be rapidly disappoonted becaue~ that ie not the ob~ect
of thie anal.yreie, r+ta,rchaie ~ aai.ly life from 1943 ~ 1946, wh3.ch he himeelf
awreo~vex takea pleas~xe in surronnding wifih an artietic and euapeat kind
of vagueaeoe, is not in iteelf eo importani; that we aug3~~ to dwell on it
at l~r.gth aa~d. ir deptn, ~'he queation o.f. finding ont rrhether, wheref when,
how aud xhy Marcha~,s went throu~ the various atag~es of hia d!~ctriaaire
traixiing ~n the IISSB a.s al~o, after a11, of very minor 9.nteregt. Onae
aga,fn, while these trivia]. questions ma7ce p~ople aquirm rrith ~oy in ner+rs-
paper offiaee and when dining on~, they are not very important to the o~
dinary citizen, whose search for information is of a quite different kind.
Com~munist Strategya au Import
Le~ us reraember that the pol3ay of an~y comunznist pa~cty, in power or in the
nppo~ition, ia the one that is dietated by ite leader, period. ~Espeaially
wha.n, once3 it has gune through the delicate traasitional pha~se of consti-
tuent leaclership, such a party haa fixially mat2ag~ed to stabilize the orgar
niza~inn and definitively ~stablish ~he authority af the nex secretary -
= general at its head,
- 7~is absolute politiaal aaceridaricy of one leader over the entire organi~ar-
tion he embodies the apirit of ie, at one ead the eame time, the diatin-
guishin~ characteriatzc and th~ nanopoly of a a4mmunist party. And from
Augsi~uxg to KabuZ, e~ain satd. a,~a~iu we f3nd this aonsi~tency of behavior -
wo seQ :!n Max~chais ~s~i. --a beyand his mere pereon thrau~hout the party
he ~,ersanifiea, unfor-~z:2a,tely, t.~i~ eame 19~.c of polltical policy. Juet
as i~~A color ~r~d heig's1t of its ~1a.~ pormit u~ to identify the na.tionality
_ ~.::d. ~;c~si~~~~.on Uf a snin, c;~x~ful exa~wnation of Marchais' pexscraality oon
st;.tut~~ ~~1~~ ~rivilegti~d me~.s of ac:cesa to an overall understanding of the
- 1'~r' ~ iute~rx.~. r_e,:;'raan~a~:~ ~nnsl a correot .in~erpre~a,t ;on of the strate~y
c~;~~~ac L;: 4ic oy j.t,
:t~i~::-., of a..1.1, d~,: un~~era~~~d nnul^.ing i.f wd refl~se to :~ee that, unlike ot�h.er
~~~:z. ~:s, -~ie PC~' ~:n or~~Li~~~.tio~a af French creation. It rras not
c.�ew;,~~~; :1..~ ~ad ~o~; xou~d i~g~1f, It's ideolo~,ry, or,gaz~izat3ons, str~tegy
~.:u. :':..~tii].1.y i-:;s �re:.y xe~~on .f`or e.t:i.~�t~ are 3mports. Axi even moro d~.s-
conce-..^�t.ir?b nn~~: I"ui! l~te bir~ aour~t~rparts in the o~he~ parties, the seo-
re�~.:.~ ~en~~~~].% oalirsci ~n ~CO lead ~he party, is in no way reepansible to
t~.ti~ ;;1~~:. :r~.l.e f~er taa.s acta a:~.d deeds. Ho does aot have ta acaommodate
~,~.c, ~~.i~~.io~~~s U't11P.pt3 i.r~ his viewa nor b~nd to the fluctuatione of internal
ou5.:~~:i.:~~rz w~aah, ar~ ~he ccntxary, ~ the democratia partiea influences the
- ~~.h:s;~ric>~ :af t.Yi~ par~y machirle,
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What hae made thie poasible? Quite simply, the caandi ~iona und.er which tY?e
- PCB r+ae created. It ie~ parardo~ci.aally in faat, the f~uit of the re~eotion
of all the hum~nist traditiane and demoaratio etruoturee of the ~`rer?ah -
soa3aliet and rrorker movemen~. When he brought it to the beptiamal funt,
I,enin sub~eoted thie part3? to a oerta3n numbar of ideologiaal and organizar-
tiona~l imperatives. Later, all Sta1i~ had to do was to finiah the ~ob by
making ari absolute feud.al lord of the party in Moscow. From then on, per-
mauently loaked. in its Bolahevik iroa aollar, the PCFves to go ite wa4y
guided by its Soviet beaoon, yesterd~y e~,e it is to~ay.
When a communist party leader suddenly deoidea to impose a neW orientation
on hia party, it i,s not only the newBpapermen or the public at 1arg+e that
he take~ unawares, but also t~e party meatbers. It would be tedioue to
give the aom~plete list of theae hairp3n turne capable of disconcerting the
moat docile of inembers as well ,a~ those most u$ed to suc~ti practiaea, From
the German-Saviet Paat to t,he break xith the Left IInion, the PCF has fol-
lowed a courae ~rit,h mar~y ins and outa~ 1~lhether xe aall them "headings," _
^turnin~-points," "linee" or "aurvee" makes l~ttle differenae, 7hey are
alxays rather brutal etrategic breaks.
Commentators and hiatoriaas are in the habit of making big ieeuee of eaah
of theae phases, reactions or atates of mind of this or that aontroversial
iritellectual or of some vague figure moving torrard a specta.aular break. ~
~hey stick pins in their charts to mark these isolated instances, neglect-
ing to point out the i~ense psychologiaal baaklash produced ~?i.thin the
maes of the party members by this ohaag~e of politiaal line, ,
- Eben though `cheir departure ie raore diacreet, after having euddenly heard
the new PCF line on the radio or tele~vision, thousanda of followers from
a11 social le~vels will neverthelesa deaide to leave the paxty without de-
manding what is due them, ~ia bleed.ing of the ranka of the PCF ia not kept
t~ack of offiaially; it only showa np jn the nonp~yment of dues...
7R~orez Copied Lenin' s Method
~e party 3s chauging but its leader has not budged, keeping hia hand ever
- more firmly on the tiller. ~hus, despite the many fluctuationa in ite
political 13ne, the PCF has in the end seen only two authentic leadexg
~ succeed to power since its "Bolshevization" in 1924-1926, Actually, we
should note in parentheses the haadt~i.l. of empty figureheads charg^ed with
- assuring interim leaderahip and haudling current affairs. Just as Rhruahchev
in the IISSR - as hiatory has it Kas in the end limited to effecting the _
traasition between Stalin and Brezhnev without really maaaging to xmpoae
his will in a la.sting way, since his original initiatives fir~al.ly beaame _
cause for concern among the vigilant guardians of the Marxist-Leninist ideo-
_ logy, Waldeck-Rochet was satisfied with playing minor roles for several
yeass during the brief lapse of time aeparating the death of Thorez from
Marcha,is ~ official arrival on the scene.
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In connection wi~h. this, the moet widely-apread notion among the publia
at larg~e so xell as aawng euppasedly informed commenta.tor~ - consiste of
~.nterpreting communi~t behavior by espla,in3ng tha?t Stalin repreaented the
modern versioai of the ayriioal and bloodthirety despot or that he dieplaryed
all the symptone of a perfect imba~.a~noe due to peureaoia or cbronic megalo-
mania and., aonsequently, in "Stalln~iem" we must see ~uat a"traaeient,
chanae occtu~rence" with no future, an of caurae perve~rae, but aberrarit and
epheme~al. detour from the o~hexxiae ~ust an.d, prnper caurse of Marxiat-
_ Leniniem~
We are sorry to have to disillusion these obdurate utopians, but at the
risk of tempering their aomewhat irrepressible optimism they ou~t to
convj.nce themselves -~khat Stalin's behavior was inspired by neither mRdness
nor the egotism born of pereanal inte~est, but rather by an unsh,akable fa3th
in an ideology of which he was the gvarantor and zealous serva~nt. While
StalY.a's policy seems frightfhl to us, it is not ~il.y beaause of t,he mas-
sa.cres aad destructioal it provoked ead sanctioned, but also and especially
because it has ~iorringly perpetuated the I~eaini.st doatrine aad ita key
principles of orgar~izatian rrhich quite naturally lead to such arines and
destraction, whereas without Stalin we mi~t have hoped that thie ill-fated
~ ideology, xith its principles of action, wovld not ha~e survived Lenin~
In Franoe, ~om the start of the 1930'g, Maurice Thore~ in his turn showed
tt~t he had learned hie leeeons rrell. He too in faat served ae the party's
veapon, Mosoow had imposed on him aa inflexi.bility attuned to POF pc~liay.
To aahieve this, Thorez firet had to consolidate hia tru~teeshi.p. 'lhen he
got the idea of launc,~iing aa a11-out openness oampafgn ~n.th the watchttords
"Open your mouthsI No dunmiies in the pa,rtyla
Orie must really be very naive to still persiat in interpseting that today
as a aincere attemp~ at liberalizati.on, Actually a:1d wit,h due al.lowance
made, Thore2 limited himself to aopying the method that had been ao sucaeas-
ful for I~ea~in in 1921 and for Stalin in 1924, The "du~ies" to be broken
were those men who mi~t have slowad Thorez down in his rise to power. ~
As for the 3nvitation to au ope~ meeting of the mjnds aud dealarationa of
partisanism, thie ~ in fact not made in approval of irreverence; ra~~her,
on the contrary, it xa~ a quest for votea in praiae of himself and an
appeal to all of his supporters, virtu,al or carifirmed~
R~ese Oradours, Dubbed "Cleanup Operations"
From then on, the aecretazy gensral of the PCF systematically resorted to
this device everq ti.me he thought he saw a hint of opposition to his rule
forming or it seemed to hi.m that this or that party bigwig was ~hallenging
his policy line with the riak that euch disagreement would deg+enerate into
the format3on of a really oxgaaized faction, To remind us of this, 7.et us
reaall ~hese variaus a.ffairss ~orez versus Barbe-~Celor in 1931, versus
Doriot in 1934, versus Ti.llon-Mar~,y ~n ~952, versns Servin-Casaaova in 1961;
Maxcha.i.s veraue Claude Roy in 1956 ox, more recently, versue Ga,raudy in
19~o aad ~.szbin in 1979...
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Zhere r.ae no reason for Thorez to be dieappointed in his trainee (Marahais)~
2'he latter quickly had a chauce tc show how capable he was of being a
staunch Stalinist supporter~ Need we remind our3elves, for esample, of
his eloquent attitude when ~writer Claude &oy vas escluded from the party.
Zhe latter had made the mistake of conde~ing marec,ver, in con3u ction
with a number of other party membera - the b3ooc~y Sovi.et intervention in
Eungary. He was immediately au~noned to his cell to appeas b~fore a sort
of trib~.l, It r+a~ preaisely Marcha3s ti+h~, rePi'esenting the party leaden-
ship, pla~yed the rnle of proseautor ia this aort of "Mosaow trial" in
France. But let us turn the floor aver to Cla~de &oys
"4ihen I spoke of millione of innoaeat people being deported or executed in
the USSR, of tens of thousaads in ~ngary, he raised hia voice to peak
volume. Yiolent at~ers 'Yes~' shouted I~arch~.is, ~they arreated people
and they threx people into prisont Well, let me tell yau.: They didn~t ~
arrest enou~ of theml ~iey didn't throw enongh of them into prison!
- If they had been tougher aad more vigilaat, we wonld not be where we are
t~Y ~ n
.
In accordauce with thia eaae kind of intelleatu.al logic, Marcha3s today
considers t,he genocid~ perpetrated by the Red l?z~rqr in Af~istaa as a
negligible matter, These mass-produced Oradours, rrhich are called "clean-
up opera,tions" in the Saviet Union the euphemiam is a pitY~y one - are
not reprehensible beeauae they follow "the direation of history"... "You
cau~t make aa omelet without breaking eggs," Lenin said... llnd, theY are
promising us a ta,sty omelet ~or the d~r a.fter tomorror+. Go ahead and
question the cook's methods aftex~rarda! '.Lhis moralit9 in terma of a
variable geometry is t~hat of rre must after all bear this in mind - a ,
future candidate for the presidenay of the nation. Frenchmen, g~et ready
to have your hearts skip a beat! In 1968 a party-intez~nal. offensive xas
outlined, capable of jeopardiaing the career of Georges Marahais, whose
promising rise had uritil then been effeated xl.thout a~ ma3or difficulty.
Roger Garaudy, for ezaanple, who at that time rras still a m~mber of the
Po~itical Bureau, did not aonceal hi.s hostility towa.rd Marabai.s in statements
he made outaide the party, Bnt, rrl.thin ~he Par'tY itself, opposition to
Mexchais xas expreaeed essentially through the voice of Berwit Frachon,
aa Frischman~a, who Kas also at the time a member of the Political Burean,
rras later persuaded to re~veal.
In 196s rtarcba~.s Hoped for Poiice Repression
We must admit that 1968 rras a really black year for the PCF.., even that
it was the worst it had aeen aince 1947. 2'he situation inaide the PCF
Was ar~rthing but satisfactory, At the head of the party machine, Waldeck-
Rochet carr~ed no wei~t at a~t:ime when the party needed someone capable
of fizmly ~ipping the tiller. M~oreover, the proaess of replacing him hacl
already been set in motion.
- To aohieve this, the Soviets, as alaays, expresaed their preference through
their spokesman, Jacques Duclos, useci to t,~.is kind of responsibility. ~e
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Kremlin's candidate to succeed Waldeck-Rochet was Georgea Maraha.is. NoW,
not all of the members of the Political 8+~reau were very keen ou aupport-
- ing such a candidate. Feel3~ig that he had enoug3~ intex~rial support, Rog~er
Garaudy then decided to publioly oppose him (that fe, of couree, outaide
ttio party' e regu~l,ar oxgani.zationn). We mu~t admit #hat, onae r~ga,in, the
aitw~tion iteelF ~.n 1966 oYfered Car~utly eolid grounde for ~uetif~ring aad
illuatrating his burgeoning dissidence~ The PCF he~i indeed etepped up
ita ehillysha11y3xig and blundering. It had been aau~it napping by the
great movement of universit,y rebellion~
In L'Hi1MANITE of 3 May 1968, Marohais published - or rather~ let us sa~r,
sigX~ed - an axticle, which has since become famoue, entitled "F'ake Re-
, volutionarizs to Be F~cpoaed," In it, he bluntly eaid that the Sorbeane
atudent Fronde was merely aa action produced by "a baadful of small left-
ist gro~ps" which had to be liquidated, ~e author of the article could
have 3atisfied himself with suggsating to "the maes of nonleftist students"
to g+o and try to reason With the feW black sheep~ Bnt no, Marchais appeal-
ed directly to the g~vvernment to take ateps calculated to reatore the
faculties to normal operation,
Car~cied aw~y by the virulence of his criticism of the leaders of the stu-
dent revolt, our editorialist maintained modest silence on the excesaes of
police repression when he did not g+o so far at~ to openly encanrag+e it.
Too often, we forget to eay that the then mini.ater of i~zterior found in
hia~ a not so negligible aad virt~aally unezpeoted source of eupport.
Grabbing the ba11 in mid-air, Garaudy aad his frieads ezpresaed their dis-
approval - it g~oea Without sayifig of what looked like the adoption of
an official position, 3udging it to be sueh that it w~uld damtig~e ~he party~
It was true beyond ar~y shadow of a doubt that thia attitude did hurt the
p~rtyr, because the parliamentary electiona, which in June imo~ediately fol-
lo~ed the events that had taken plaae, xere also turned into a net decline
in votes for the PCF.
~o manths latex, the shock produced by the Soviet intervention in Czecho-
slovakia naturally only flzrther emphaiezed this decline in public apinion
in favor af the PCF. There, once again, Ga.raudy beiieved wrangly to
have found in tne current sitv.a,tion an ideal pre ~ext for bettering his
position.
1~ Cade Messa~e ~at Opened the Door to Power
But if the philosopher and the group of sympathizera that centered about
him imagined that the trrafold situation national and interaat9,ona1
would weigh in favor of their axguments and their wishes, they irere eadly
mistaken~ ~ar from destroying Marchais' positions, it precipitated. hia
rise to power and, at the same time~ the diacreet elimi.nation of Waldeck-
_ Rochet.
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Yes, of courae, all the circumstaaces r?e 1za.ve ~nst discusaed spparently
dealt the party a severe blow but, as a1Wa,Ys, xhere the comm�un~st world is .
concern~l, it is not the tip of the iceberg one whould rratah, but the sub-
merg~ed m~sss. 1Qow thia more or lesa aoncealed masa brou~t to bear the full
weiglit of the ideology and the party ma~chine. Aud on the contrary, the
latter xere cansiderably strength~ened in the procesa.
Contrar.y to vrhat Ges'au~Y believed, Marchaia had in no way ma+de a mistal~.a
in publiahing the artiale the machine had l~m sign in I~~y 1968... ~
A real leader in power, he wae na~tuua'ware of the faat that he had to Set
aver one last hurdle, a ma~or one at thats the fe~vorable opinion of the
Kremlin, that "nihil obstat" indispensable to the qnalification and final
coufirmation of an,y potential eecretaYy geaeral. It it should be rrithheld,
thia formidable final appraval is~liksly to bar t~e ~r~r to~a fni~re enP-
pliant.
~Ib obtain this, he rras clever enou~ to aend the Kremlin the code message
that opened a11 the important doors to power to him. Indeed, let ua not
- forg~et that in 1968 xe were in the m3ddle of a phas s during vrhic~'i Moscow
was obsessed rrit'i the dr~nger the in its eyes growing influence of Maoism
almost everywhere in the world represented (this was the era of the aul-
tural revolution in China) and ita leftist factiona, which were p~+olifera-
ting, particularly in nirope.
Now, since Lenin, leftism has been m1e of the Soviet IInion~s most dan8er-
ous enemies~ It has "to be cut out xith a ecalpel" (the Father of ~he
Rervolution said), In sig~aing hia famous article, vhich struck out at the
protesting atudents wi.th ma~or ezaommunioation - and wliich, f~irt~erm�re,
for the ff~rst time attracted the attentfan of e~veryone a~~elf under
rrorld - Marchais deliberately aad opportunely pl
the ideological 3uriscliction of Mesaow at that preci~e moment in tlze evo--
lution of internatiosia7. communie~. His obaession was the same as the
Bremlin~s aad he ahowed the masters of 3oviet Ruesia that someone in Pazie
waP; reasiy to place hi~mself at their dispoaition... ~iarchais' lightnin~-
like promotion to t,he PCF party machine was for the fisst time officially
confirmed at fihe 19th PCF Congreae in 1970, r~rhen he t~as appointed titular
- assistaat secretazy g~eneral. Now the usage and custom befitting tlais kind
of coammnist ceremor~y demand tbat the lengtt~r speeches introducing and
welcomin~ the recipient of the title rival aaze another in true ditl~yrambic
style~ Al1 the party's rehtorical flowers ~ere gathered to comcpose a
bouquet in order to flatteringly expatiate on the numeroue virtues arid
merits of the exceptional individual Who had been called on to henceforth
- guide the deati.r~y of the party down the path of an exultant future. Mean-
wloile, raised to white heat, the audience clapped in ca~d.ence, aometiffies
even going so far as to toss confetti i.nt~o ~he air.
On tha,t day, t~'~e ~ob of introducing Iiarr,hais fell to Gastan Plissonier,
formerly appointed by Waldeck-Rochet and his ex-colleague on the editorial
ata.ff of the newapaper T~/l TERRE before his aceeseion to the administrative
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aecretariat, Now, as pariegyrrics g+o, that one rra~s rather brief, I leave ~
it to the reader to figure out vhy. ~e speaker did not have much to sa~y~
"Our comrade is 49 years old, ia a metal aorker and ~oined t~he party ia
1947."
~ese fe~r bits of irLfor~ation Were then rrrapped in a sham pack~g~e~ Not
the slig~test allusion to the Fbgular Front or the war orr the liberation~
It gbes rrithout sayin~ that, if Me~raha3s had baen deported and had eeoaped
- in the process, t,he lyrioal flight of eloquence on bis aervice to the party
would not have beeu lacki.ng~ Bnt as such flights g+o, this aaie was more
like an angel pas~ing mrerhead...
Strange Silence of the Media an a Donbtt~7. Past
For ag~es noW, the party, ~Yiorez, Duclos, Fra,chan and the whole machi,~ae
includ~.ng, and especially, those par~ticulaxly responsible for liaieon with
Moscow had Irnown a11 about Georg~es Ma~ccha3.s' troublesome family back-
growod. I~irthermore, it turna out that, since at least 1963, tha poliae
and the General Information Bureau consequently t~he political xorld ae
well have been axase of the ahady pa,et thie Communist lead.er hae been
aarryi.ng a~round with himself ~ No~? no one has ever let the aat out of the
bag. This ia why Marcha3e was not taken eeriouely whea he be~ieved he had
the right to eay in court, under oath and betrreen two sob~, that "he and
his arty (had been) the victims of a conepiracy f~om the moment he nhad
been~ entrusted with h3.~ respoa~sibilities," Thie bit of per~urq wae merely
ariother linlc in a lor~g chain of earlier lies. In fact, if we take into
accoun.t Maro~sis ~~atianal respaa~sibilities, w~e realize that they began
when he ~oined the Ce~tral Con~aittee in 1956 and then the Polj.tiaal Ettreau
~ 1959. Iri 1961 he succeeded Mar~cel Sexvin in the poet of n~atianal sec-
xetary to the organization, an event rrhio~h the prees of the time reported
on rather ~ri.dely. In February 1970 he vas appointed ar; we have eeen
asaistant s~cretary g~eneral, whi.ch mesris that eince thPn he has been of-
ficially confirmed as the veritable boss of ~the party, since Waldeak-Rochet
has been permanently kept out of party affairs due to his inctarable illneas.
~here Was No Better Scarecrow Thari Marcha,is
Once again, th.~st election constituted an event that was of "number-one
i.mportance" for the entire presa, Now the media xou].d devote no apaae to
~he s~ i~test commenl,,ary on th,e peauliar "holes" the new PCF lead.er's per-
sonal 'aistory wa~ ~ysteriously shot through irith,
SoP since tnere was no leak between 1956 and February 1970, we mast asaume
that a sort of gentlemen's agreement had been negotiated, A little later,
we could see that even then the preaident, the predeaea~or of the current
preaident, did ~a~t want the affair to be divulg+ed. R4ie first disturbing
_ indiaation was the police record determined by the minister of interior~s
General Information Bu~.�eau~ Before T,~ NATIOH SOCIALISTE published. documenta
. throwing ~ig~ht an Georges Marchais~ real life, this recozd aonaisted of
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nothing but f~1se information, favorable to Ma,rchais~ Thus, at the begin- _
niz~ of 1977 - I did say 1977 - thie record. still showed that Marcha.is
nha~ been conscriptad by the F~orced Labor Service (STO)." Be~~;ter yet, two
para~aphs farther on, th~is record. indiaated s'that it was imposaible to
l~ow whether Mr I~farc~aa.~s had actually ~,rone to Germar~y to ~rork~ There is
no re~cord oi his departvre nor of bis returil tfl Fra~nce."
_ Now rre understand how publiaatiaai of ttzeae documenta on Georges Marchais'
voluntary departure :for Germar~y, with all the pertinent detafls, could
have upset the plaas af this whole wo~derfl~l. world~ �
Now, on the eve of the 1981 presidential electians, the demonstration o~
this caa be eas~ly made. No need to be aa expert an politics to compreh~nd
that no majority leader could dream of a better scarecrorr than Marchais
at the head of the PCF. 7~e great risk for fihe rigYit now in power is that
it finds itself forced to oppose a g~ood, cxedible candidate who comes from
the Socialist Party (PS). For the majority, to mobilize and really gro for
the PS is not ~ood ta.ctics for a presidential election in which it has to
take into consideration the support it derives from vote shifts aad the
national climate once the election is over~ So, according to aome, here
comes providence or, according to others, the gremlin, sending them Georg~es
Marchais. First of a11, in 1978 he helped them to win jrhen, by breakinpr,
up the Left IInion, he gave them an unexpected ma~ority. Since then, the
PS has again hecome the chief enen~~, Socialist le~,ders likely to be can-
didatas in 198i have been taken by storm and sub~ected to t~he withering
fire oi Communist attacks.
Unde~ the circumstances, why be surprised at the favor M~.rchais en~oys r~rith -
~lyaee newsmen on the radio and television? The more Marchais is seen in
a favora:ble light, the better his chances of winning votes. From which
electoral constituency w~ll he take votes? The RP'R [Ra11y for the Republic]?
Tlze IIDF [Frencn Democratic Union]? Fhou~ joking around. He can reaover
votes from the PS (since his canacpaign has been eased aad encouraged by
the majority). Just a few points won by ~s from the Socialist caia-
didate would be a guarantee of victory for the ma3ority caudidate,
~ ~973 ~cha,is ha,d already benefited fron this support, When a11 poli-
tical parties were in the process of crioos~xzg candid.a,tes, the voting dis-
trict where r�faschais would be rurnning was examined as were the other dis-
tricts assigned to the different party leaders, In the first district of
Va1-~.e-Marne, Maxcha.is' constituency, the Gau113.sts at iirst plaz3ne~ on
choosi.ng Pierre Q~rpy to run, bu~ Clostermann became -the candidate. He -
~umpe~ into the ring, setting tne tone for the campaign with a statement
calculatad to kick up a row:
"During 1�he was," he said, "I shot down the Gern~an planes ~archais built. -
Today, I'~ going to shoot him down."
In fact, the whole thing took no more than the time it takes ~o send a
press co~mulique. When it was nnnounced that iasue ~i~rit be t~.ken with
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I~tarchai.s' C,exznari past, tne F:l.ysee got t:nat candidate to withdraw from the
race and opposed Marchais xith a. candid~-ie with principles and a low profile,
~ Mroe Laveiile, who d~d no ~ want to be supported by so c~ynt~mic a~,artner as
Clostarmann,,,
_ The entire F'rench political world, and along witl^_ it the majority of the
countrv'a ordinary citizens, is now convinced that Ceorges Ma.rchais deli-
. berately smashed the Left IInion, which he did not want to win in March
~978. A certa,in number of hypotheses are still beii;~, proposed, here aad
there, on the reasons tha.t drove Marchais to make that decision, Yet, ~
_ there is no ~rstery as to why he d.id so, Perha.ps a bit late, Maz~chais
draw i.nferencea froa~ his failure which, in the eyes of the oldest party
members and the Saviets, wa.s i.nevitab? e inasmuch as for the fisst time i.n
the history of Socialist-Co~munist relations the PS appeared to be the
ma~or beneficiary of the PCF's unity strategy~ Of course, Georges Ma~chais
could not say that he ha,d not been warned, Wanting to relieve concern, he
announced to the Central Committees
'"ale consider the joint program to be a step forward~ enabling us to create
the ~ost favora.ble conditions for setting the ma,sses in motion With regazYi
to aur ideas, our solutions and our objectives~"
3~e 1973 parliamentary elections were a disappointment. At the 22d Congress,
Marchais was persistent aud wanted to cleas the air by iiaproving the party
ir~a.ge in the country throu~ more forceflil criticism of t~he methods arid means
exercised i.n the ~SSR and the socialist countries aad, by ag~a,in becoming
the fixst party of the Left IInion througi~ a fundamental criticism of t~ie
PS, to make the PCF appear to be fihe only hope of democratic revival for a
socialism which would be flying the French colors,
Deliberate, Planned and 5ustained Ambiguity
This national-commurLi.st or liberal-commun,ist liue convinced no one in the -
country, The PS continued to strengthen itself and the Sovieta felt offend-
ed. That was where the attempt failed, Marchais had neg~otiated with M
Mitterand and a fossilized PS, jus~t barely risen from the ashes bequeathed
b~ C;uy ~;ollet 4r,ci thau rie suddenly found hi.mself up against a stren~thened
PS, Vt?r'J rn:c'ti ai.ive, o;:e ~L-ha~ was fihe leadi.ng paz-~tY in the I,eft IInion~
ra~ Geor~s i~ta.rchais and t;he Com;aunists, a victory of the Left IInion should
have co.lsolidatEd a~C~' victory a,nd the defeat of the PS. Thi.s result was
no ~ obta~.ned, w~icn neant a defeat,
~,biguity, misca.iculation tihese, more or less, are the terms an immediat~
analy,sis of the Comr~unist poiicy brings to mind~ It only becomes clear
when projected ir:~o the future~ We can then see that the ambiguity wa.s
deliberatP, pla.~ned and sustained i,n or~ier to achieve carefully concealed -
- ob~ectives~ ~'Y~.e Co~~.,~n:;.sts would not hesitat.e to get rid of_ ar~ything that
mi~nt, sc,one-r cr la ~~r, ~eopar~ize ~;he:a, For example z in 1939, theY chose
the Sovie~-German Pact to the deirimen~ oi unity in the struggle against
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ia.scism; i.n 1 g47, they chose the Cominform to the detri.ment of unity for
national reconstruction; in 1977, they chose defeat of the joint program
_ ta the detriment of tlne Left IInion; in 1980, #hey have chosen Soviet ag~es-
sion in Kal~ul to the detriment of Fast-West detente aud peo~~les' ri~t to
guide t~heir own deati.n.ies,
Ftiir t,~e PCF as well a.s for all co~maunist parties in power, i~.tiatives _
that signal a chang~e in policy are inspired by Kremlin strategyr. While
real, I~farc~aia ~ passin,g falling?-out ~riich BsezYmev was merely ari episode,
brou~t on by Maxch.ais' opportunist blun,der, which never threatened active
solid.arity o,rith the PCF in terms of Soviet foreign ~policy. To ftiil.ly under-
staud I~,rchais' opportunist blundex (blun.der i.n B~cezhnev~s eyes), we ha,ve
~ 8n back a bit in time. We must bear in mind the difficulties encoun- -
tered in Moacow starting with the death of sta~tin in 1953s from Malenkov's
swift passag~e, the elimination of Beria a~nd xhat, including Molotov, r~ras -
- called the antiparty faction, then the 20th Con~ess ~.n ~ebruazy 1956,
from T{hrushchev~s reigu until 1964 aad the arrival of BrezYmev.
: ~he problems Soviet leaders had to orapple rrith during eac~ of theae pha,ses -
along rrith fihe intrigues they hatched in search of unity of thought and
action j,n a stable eituation had their repercussione in. the other communist -
parties without, evidently, aparing the PCF. I will not go into the ups
and. downs the party experienced in France in order to keep the party in
line with the policy that xas incorrectly oalled de-Stalinization (we ean
talk of de-Stal.inization when aa ideological revision undertakes the de-
Russification of party atruotures and ide~ology).
In reaction to the dogmatism of Stalinist leadership, Khrushchev wanted to
give comnmxnism a more open, more human im~~'e. He set the exaaYple in taking
liberal initiatives on the domestic scene. As for foreign affairs, he gave
the si~,al for a renewal of the policy Qf rapprochement with the socialists
and in reality restored the specific channels to a"peacef~il. transition to
a parliamentazy system," He favorably received the objections registered
bY ~Sliatti, who critici2ed not only Stalin., but also the system that Y~a,d
made his accession to power possible and the way he exercised it.
Khrushchev's reintraductYOn of "frontism," that is, the tactic of "extend-
ing one~s hand to the other forces of the left," did not displease Thorez
and even less so Waldeck-Rochet, who set the par~y on the r~ad to a broad
open:ing until -the incident involving Soviet intervention in Czechoslovak.ia
(itself i.n a way the result of the timid attempt to launch a k~nd of "social-
ism with a human face") put a sudden stop to his own aspirations.
Bzezhnev Criticized Khrushchev's Progressivism
- In his donestic policy, Marchais fol2oWed the same old course...
He ha.d realized and he said a.s mucu - that ti:e paT.h ~hat had been fol-
lowed until then was leading to an i~asse. He opened t'ne way to new pros- ~
pects by sayin~ at his meetingss "If we go o:~ a,s we have, we will be
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_ oelebrating the i'CF's hundred-year ann:ivereary as an oppoaition party."
He there�ore proposed :o march boldly 3own the path of union~ Better yet,
= he wanted the PCF to no long~er be in ~he opposition; tha,t is~ he was com-
_ mitted to concessions +~t ~ possible agreement on a g~overnment program,
~ the program Wa2deck-Rochet ha,d dreamed of.
Tt was from that moment an that Brezhizev probably first became concerned
over the situation. Wit~hout bringing in the "secret report," he criticized
"~hrushche~r'a progressivism~~ and what he called his "sub~ective errors";
he conde~ned his predQCessor's "fickle and erperimental opportunism~'~
In ~ance, xhile not condemning it, Marchais should at least have "evalu-
- ated" his predecessor's pOppOr'~',1171j..SIRp in the same way~ Bu~ he was very
careful not to do so arid, quite the contrary~ set out on the path that led
to the joi.nt government program, 'I'he success he baaked on for his party
was late in showing up~ Pesaimism ga,ined ground~ R'Yie ana,lysis he made
be�are the Central Committee the day after the r2arch 1973 par~iamentary
elections, which hard,ly xepresented a success for the PCF, absolutely dis-
plea,sed the Sovieta,
In fact, one of the reasons appealed to to explain the party~s lack of suc-
cess was that it was not distinct enough from the Eastern EY~ropean commu-
nist regimes or that of ~the USSR, The Central Committee almost involun-
tarily - and that is the beat w~y it could have happened demonstrated
that the Cammunists were getting into closer rapport - if I m~y use the
term with France by keeping their distauce from Moscow.
The Soviet reproach can be su~ed up as follows: "You capitulate to the
bour~eoisie ~ s anti Soviet campaigns and seek comfort i.n the sha,de of social
democracy." Brezhnev reacted to Maseha.is like the boss of a company with
his best worker who decides to set himself up in business for himself to
compete with him,
The moment oi greatest t nsion ha,d not yet arrived, Shifts in temper be-
came more irequexit and appeared very clearly after Brezhnev, Zagladine and
r'farchais ~et a~ ~he Soviet FJn~assy in Paris on 7 December 1974. The PCF
secre-ta.~ry ~~eneraZ ;,ried tu dernor~s~trate to his Soviet interlocutors that
h5.s palicy of ope_s.ess wa.s a co~^rect adaptation of the international move-
~ent' s genez~.7. stra.tegy to conditions in France,
FCF i~enied I~cistence of (~lag in Russia
Wh2t foilowed ~nowed tha.t Marchais had not convinced his partners in the
discussiono Tize ex.amples of Yugbslavia, China, Albania and others proved
too we~.l to tne Soviets tnat, while national com~unism certainly did not
destroy tne party practici.n~ it~ it did deal a severe blow to international
communism, arithout whose unity and discipline -the USSR would on a worldwide
scale lose i~s wcst eifective means oi action. What the Soviets laid open
to question waa not the "frontist" tactic, which in the past Yia,d always
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- favored the PCF to the detriment of i1;3 p~rt.ner~, the Socialists in parti-
culax, but the political. conditions and commitments conaeded by the PCF in
the 1972 joint program. 'Ihey described these comoromises as opportunist, _
reproached the PCF for having un,deresti.mated the strength of the Social -
Democratic Party and of having thus perha,ps tied their hands in terms of
ixiternational affairs.
Despite the warni.ng of the Soviets and of man,y party members, MarcY~a.is in-
siated on following the same path. He gave his follo~rers the impression
of for the future being satisfied with a communist party that would serve
a.s an ausi.liary force for its 3oint pro~am alliea. He would administer
an,d alternatively at tha.t the affairs of the compax~y born of the appli-
- cation of the joint gnvernmeait progxam. -
As far a.s the USa"R was concerned, the PCF's new behavior seemed to con.firm
tr.is strategic Y~rpothesis. Indeed, for a half a centusy the PCF had vehe-
mently denied the existence of concentration camPs in the IISSR. ~en, fol-
lowing French Television Charinel 1's 11 December 1975 telecast of a report
on a concentration camp in the Soviet IInion, the PCF's Political Bureau
the next day announced: "'I'he film that was shown gives us an intolerable
picture of the conditions of detention in thi.s camp. I~zrthermore, the cam-
mentator said that some :+f the prisoners are political prisoners. Tku.s
claim is of a11 the more interest to us inasmuch as there are in fact
trials in tYie Soviet IInion conducted against citizens because of the poli-
tical positions they ha.4e adopted.. Under the cixcumstaaces, the PCF's
Political.Bureau announces that, if the actual situation corresponds to
the scenes that have been shotom and if ~the Soviet authorities do not pub-
licly der~y that this is so, it wishes to ezpress ita profound surprise and
most formal censure of the situation,"
A month later, L'HDMANITE devoted a lengthy article entitled "Leonid -
Plyushch's Arrival i.~, Paris" to the affair. On that occasion, the Com~unist
daily cited an editori.al by Rene Andriewc .in which he wrote: "We are not -
indifferent to the case of mathematician I,eonid Plyushch arid we have long
sought to obtain infornation on the matter.
"If it is true - and unfortunately to date no proof to fihe contrary has
been offered - that he has been confined ir. a mental hospital because he
had adopted a position opposed to certa.in aspects of Soviet policy or the
re~.me itseZf, we can only very clearly confirm our total disapproval and
riemand that he be relea.sed. as quickly as possible... "
When Plyushch wa,s released and arrived in Paris, in the name of the PCF
Pierre 3uquin shooK his hand at a public meeting. When Plyusnch granted
his first press conference, L'HUMANI~ g"ave ari objective account of it, one
tha,t was very unfavorable to the Sovi~t regi.me,
G'
~a,t sane yea,r, the problem oi auother famous Sovie~ ciissident, Vladi.mir _
Bukovsl~yy, provoked axiother PCF attack cn the Soviets. When, in December
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~976, an e~har~e of two political prisoners was made~ the release of
_ Bukovslqr ~or that of Chileari Communis~ Party sPCretary general Luis Corvala.n, -
- the only foreign co~munist leader who found a reas~n to stigmatize the
transaction was Georges Ma~cchais~ He said: ~
Marchai.s Lost His National Aspirations in Corsica
"R~o men, two political prisoners, have ~ust become the object of a deplo-
rable exchang~e~,~ We feel that the hargain.i.ng that has taken place between
a soeialist country and a fascist country over the fate of two men who were
tried for having exercised their ;nal~.enable human ri~te ia inadmiseible~"
6~iite evidently, Marchaie wanted, with little expenditure of effort, to
show +�hat he retained his free will as far ae Brezhnev is concerned~ At
the time, m~ention of the latter was systematically omitted from the colu~s -
of L�HUMANITE or ~e wa.s refer.red to in dribleta~ For esample, his 70th
birthday, 19 December 1976, was the ocoasion for speoial festivities in
the USSR. Out of a total of eight pages, PRAYDg devoted six to his birthday~
- He was ahowered wi.th teleg~ams from overy corner of the globe and - what
could be more natural - from a11 comm~unist party secretary g~enerals -
with one exception: Georg+es Marchais! From France there were measag+es
from first sta.tesman of the nation, President Giscard d'Esta,ing, f~om the
- first man of the opposition, Francoia Mitterand~ and from Gaston
Plissonier in the na3ne of the PCFt This gra~tuitous pettiness of Maxcha.is -
admirably i1.].ustrates all the inconsistency of the man~~~
It was during this euphorious period that Marcha.i.s was hospitaliaed for a
completely unimportant illness. This ga.ve Mitterand an opportunity to make
the following sta.tement:
"The friendship I have for Ceorges Marohais and the consideration I have
for h.a.s efforts - the Left U:v.on owes him a lot Zead me to feel deep
concern over the news." People were wrong in ridiculing this e~pression
of esteem, i~.itterandys error was not in expressing hia esteem, which~
given ~�he domestic situation, Maxchais well deserved, but in dimming the
pr~spects of t'r.e communist novement and ignoring the ~deological nature of
i~s leaders, i~iaxcr.~is ha_mself provided hi,m with the confirmation of hia
e~�or =;,n r.is pracipi~cuus re~~ in tne sunmer~ of 1977 from his vacation in
Corsica w'rle.~e ne ~a.d "done a lot of thinkin~, " To those who doubted the
independence af h:s thinicing~ Marchais replied: "I am not returning from
~~:oscow, I ha,ve ;~o ~ pa~.d a visit to the Soviet IInbassy, "
He w~o t-ries ~o prove ~oo nuch,.. ~eryone h~ows that in our beautiful
~na de~ocratic country Soviet "tourists't have the ri~t to travel every-
whexe, na.tu-rally including Corsica,. As for Paris, we have met with the
~oviets tnere tihrou~ '`~orez, lluclos a~d at times Frachon without ha.~ving
to go tu Moscosa or. ti~eir embassy in ~~ance, The Soviets ha,ve enoug~i dis-
creet apartner~ts :in Paxis and '-i,he suourbs, comfortable country houses where _
we used to dine ve~f discreetly "in a�raterna.l manner~"
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Ijutiatives Assumed Without Consultin~r the Party
Still, this wa,s merely anecdotic r~nd we have shown this to be the ca.se,
There was no need for Maxcha,is to gro to Moscow arid there was no rea.son for
expecting any other aonclusion than the one he brou~t back from Corsica
in his suitcase, Soviet pressures, or their arguments, if you prefer,
were ri~ht about Georges Marcha.is' national aspira,tiona, E~rerything turned
aut the way the Kremlin wanted it to,
A little latex, perha.ps,, Marchaio realized that the Soviet ~~riticisma were
justified~ He also real.ized that the Sov~ets, who had helped him that
is the least one can say of this in his rise to the top of the PCF,
could also con,ribute to promoting someone else. He delivered hie self-
criticism publiciy, on television. Disregarding the debates of the public ~
meetings with the Soc~alists, he sa,i.d: ~ _
"T~~e Left IInion policy failed becauae we ha,d illusions about the PS, be-
cause the ma,sses did not assume enough responsibility for joint program
ob~ectives. We must build a new rank-and--file union based on concrete
objectives corresponding to the needs of the workers,"
Given the fact that in the lauguage of Lenin and Stalin "needs of the
workers" translates into "needa of the ~ommunist movement," Marchai.s wa,s
repeating word for wo~d the cxiticisms the Soviets ha.d leveled at him since
1973.
Today, with the coup in Kabul, the mass media have discovered that the PCF
_ is following in the footsteps of the Savieta, This is an opportunity to
ct,serve th~,t the prese with the ~xcQption of those newsp~pers managed
or financed by the I'CF is i.n agreement in recognizing that in the field
of foreign polic:y, the defense of Soviet interests is still the PCF's
dominant concern and that it is only when French interests coincide with _
- Ftussian i.nterests tha.t the Communists are good patriots.
- These sam~; newspapers, with the sa.me unanimity, ase also discovering that
f.he searetary ,g~eneral of the PCF is the only one to assume political ini-
tiatives in the name of the party, which he does not consult since the
party is an instrument for the application of the policy decided on at the
- top, not an organ.i.zation for the elabora.tion of that policy. The rank-and-
file member is kept up to da.te on these g^~eat decisians by the ra,dio or
televiaion or by the "bnurgeois press."
We ha.d to ha.ve a public statement, like the cne Henri Fiszb~n ma,de (to cite
one of the most recent~, for it to dawn on the pre3s, Now the dissent re-
vealed by Fiszbin is to be found in most of the cells.
We have to ~o a long way back to find a comparable situation,
The unrest amang the rank and fiie is a reflection of criticisms from Yhe
surroundin~ environment, tha.t is, from the mass of ordinary people who
�
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vote for tne left, With the exception of the period of mutual beax hugs
right after the liberation, a PCF leadership ha,s never afforded the right
as ~uch satisfaction as the one Maschais heads,~, Maxchais' independent
aspirations with regar~l to the Kremlin have today, as we ' ~w, completely
disappeared. On the occasion of four 3mportant political events, he has
differed With the rest of the E1~ropean communist movement. The first of
these wa,s Maxchais' lone campaign at the end of 1979 a8ainst the installa-
tion of Pershing missiles in Airope~ when the "+'urocommunists" did not
follow his lead at all, moreover, no m~re than did the French Socialists,
si.nce the Soviet origin of that oper~.tion was too obvious~ The second
evant was the YC~' Political Bureau~e ~tatement aftex the Red Artiqr~s inve~
~ion of Afghanietan on 27 Deaember 1979. In that communique, t,he PCF's
� Political Bureau described the Soviet aggreesion "as aid ag~inst a rebel-
lion supported from abroad~"
Keeping the Audience A~used to Mr~ce Them Forget A.f~ani.stan
The comiminist partiea which, along with Georges Marchais, sanetioned this -
lie were the same ones tha,t sanctioned the invasion of Czechoslovakia on
21 August 1968~ Among them axe the satellite country parties and the com-
muniat parties of Portugal, the FRG, Luxembourg, Cyprus, etc., that is,
those for whom the monthly paycheck from Brezhnev is indiapensable to as-
sure their meane of existence~
The other parties, which did not sanction the Kabul coup, were the same
ones that adopted a position aga.inet the Prague coup, including the com-
~cunist parties of Ita1y, Spain, ~gland, etc, Therefore, in considering
in the words of its secreta-ry general that the invasion of Afghanistan
was a"normal procedure,� ~he PCF was the only party to shift from one
camp to the other~
The third event tha.t permitted Mascha3s to abattdon his Europea.n oomtmanist
movement "friends" was his trip to Moscow, made 3 days after the Political
~3ureau conmunique we just mentioned. After having beforehand in vain at-
tempted to entice Berlinguer in Rome~ Marchais once more singled himself
out from the others, but this ti.me throu~l-i his absolute alinement with
Moscow,
Th.i s ~rip was for him a.n opportunity to ga.ug~e the rank he held in the
Soviet harem, He was the object of exceptional honors and favors ~f the
kind tne I{remlin reserves only for a titular chief of state, On his depart-
ure fro~ Paris and on his retvsn, he was greeted by Soviet Ambassador
Chervonenko. On his arrival in Moscow and on his depaxture, he was re- -
ceived at the airport and reaccompani.ed io it by the team of Suslov and
Ponor,~axev, a ce�remonial en,gaged in only for ~uests who have proven their
- greatest docili�cy with regard to Kremlin ukases~
Durin~ his stiay, ~'r.e Soviet press wa~ mobili~ed and devoted as much space
and time ~o him as to a. foxeign chief of state of one of the satellite
countries. Heaped with honors, Marchais was granted three consecu~ive
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convsrsations with Brezhnev, an eYtremely rase privilege.
The fourth event that marked Maschais' final about-face in the direction
of Moscow was the conferenae of E~irope~n communist parties held in Paris
on 28-29 April. F'irst of a11, as coorganizer of the conference and chair-
masi, Marcha.is blithely retracted what he had said at the previous Ea.at
Berlin conference in June 1976, when he was opposed to the holding of a -
conferance of the eame kind in the f`uture. 50, the Paris conference (which
ho coneented to oonvoke at the requeet of the Soviete) wae merely a sort
of repetition of the one held in Ea,et Berlin in June 1976, including its
title. In 1976s Conference fAr Peaae, Security, Cooperation and Social
Progress in Europe. In 1980s Conference for Peace ~nd Disarmament in
Europe. 7~e same cliche, but this time to keep the audience amused while
the Rusaiana were with difficulty digesting Af~anietan.
However, there is a major differeace betweea t?,ieae trro conferencea: In -
Berlin, it was a success in terms of nwmber of ~articipants; in Paris, it
Ended in a serioue defeat.
PCF Could Not Evolve by One Iota
At the grevious conference, in Berlin, the only Eastern bloc country missing
was Albania and the only Weater~ representative was the Icelandic Communist
_ Paxty. At the Paris conference, there were more defections than attending
parties. Ten E~zropean comm~unist paxties were absent and txo others, the
Swiss snd Belgian parties, limited themselves to sending ~ust "observers."
The absentee record was broke~ at thie international oonference in Paxis,
- The arain reason for theae re~ectiona easential.ly has to do with Soviet
aggression zgsinst Af~aniatan.
7'he mi.strust on the paxt of the "brother partie9" is, of coiarse, primarily
due to the record. of Marchais' activities eince he has been secreta.ry gene-
~ xal of the PCF. Marcha.is, ~rho has again become one of the Soviets' most
effective vassals, is the only communist leader to have switched sides in
such acrobatic fashion in the domains of domestic, European and i.nter-
national policy.
A conscious instrument of Soviet forei~ policy, as he clearly expressed
it to Frenchmen over television antennas, Marcha.is did not hesitate to
sacriYice the Left Union in ~'rance and Ebroccmmunism in ~rope,
What is obvious today was l~ss so when the joint ~overnment program was
signed~ But men like Mitterand, Deferre and Mauroy, to mention only the ~
most e~rperienced Socialist politicians, were not apprentices in this field.
The hopes the Co~unists ha.ve always entertained for the future, the methods
of and mean:~ available to the leader~ of the org~nization have held no
secrets for them. They lrnew that tha ~CF could not evolve by one iota as
long as it remained faithful to ita ideology and its Leninist-Stalinist
principles.
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Frvm that point on, out of 1 yalty to the institutions of a liberal society
and with the prospect of t~he esta.blishment of a democratic aad humane kind
of socialiam~ Mitterand and his frienda owed ~t to themselves not to re~ect
the union and eleatoral agreements, but to refuse to sign a g^overnment
- agxeement without having beforehand oonducted an ideologi.cal debate whioh
wouid expoaQ the gulf ths,t separatea totalite.rian communiam from democratic
socialism. _
In breaking up the Left IInion, in sanetioning Russian imperialist expansion-
ism in Kabul and elsewhere, the PCF itself today imposes the need for a.n
ideological debate. So, once aga,in, the PS, which should have been pre-
sent on a field of action that could only be favorable to it, has placed
_ itself on the defensive. It is afratd it would suffer an electoral defeat
in 1981 arid ha,s taken re~fuge behind its 1972 signature! It is paralyzed. ~
by its fear of co~unism, which it does not knox "how to deal with" and
its fear of "what tYiey will say in L'Hi1MQN1TE," for which Leon Blum in his
time had already reproached it. This kind of ob3ective submission, this _
fear of being branded anticommounist was i,mpoaed on it by the PCF throug}~i
a etill effective tactic.
A Very Well Perfected Terroriat Method
Thus, the PCF opposes any criticiam, whatever it may be, with a barrage
whose everlasting effectiveness it is aware of. It yellss "Narrow-minded"
or "crass" anticommuniam. This method of intellectual terrorism works
wonderfully well becauae it relies on the bad consciences of the adversaries
i~i.s axgument, as hollow as it is, succeeda in making feel guilty, at once
and beyond all expectations by disqualifying their speec~hes in advance.
Thus, consentin~ to remain on the defensive, the partner in the discussion
hastens to deny the inflammatory aacusation aaid swears to God that he ia
not oppoaed - far from it to co~nuni.sm or the PCF or the Soviet Union,
as though it were a ma.tter of as many ta,bus. This devotion (to repeat a
term used by Jean-F~ancois Revel~ of free men is the poisoned apple repre-
~ented by the practice of ideoloaical capitulation to communist totalita-
- riani.sm. But it ~5o stems from the terror~-fascination effect produced _
by corrIInunist party so certain of ita future victory, as it is of the
inevitable triu~ph of Soviet communism over the whole world, that it cannot
stand for even a hin~~ of criticism, much less a challenge~ The specter of
I~cunic~i, which ha,,-~gs over the actions of the Western leaders, like the in-
tell.ectua.l a.nd moral account-rendering of the chief socialist leaders, can
only comfort the i'CF in its attitude,
COPYRIGHT; 1980 pax Cogedipresse S,A.
- ~1,466
cso: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
~AUDARD'S REASONS FOR QUITTING 'L'HUMANITE' STAFF DISCUSSED ~
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 28 Jt!:~ ~S~ pp 28-29
[Article by Thierry Pfister: "Resignation From 'L'HUMANITE
[Text] "Could you work anywhere else but L'HUMANITE?" Harris and Sedouy
asked Jean-Pierre Gaudard 6 years ago. "No," replied the head of the eco-
nomics department of the communist daily. He explained: "I follow an
ideology before I f ollow a trade." At the L'HUMATIITE staff conference
on Wednesday, Roland Leroy was nevertheless forced to announce the resigna-
tion of Jean-Pierre Gaudard.
Several weeks of discussions with the PCF leadership could not make this
- young rising star of the communist press go back on his decision. He be-
lieves that he can no longer carry on in his profession. The position of
the PCF on Af ghanistan also seems to have played a decisive role in his
feelings. It is true that Guadard, whc ~oined the party in 1966, is the
prototype of the new cammunigts shaped through the march toward unity and
who want a complete de-Stalinization of their group. The most serious
error is not to live democratically," Gaudard explained to Harris and Sedouy.
"From that error stem all the others."
In fact, it is the absence of internal democracy that most troubles the new
cadres of the PCF. This is true at L'HUMANITE and striking at REVOLUTION.
The weekly's editorial staff ineeting following the resignation of Francois
Hiucker from his duties as assistant editor and that of Serge Goffard was
revealing. The lack of openness and confrontation is so deeply felt that
- Guy Hermier, editor of REVOLUTION, and Jean Burles, editor in chief, noted
that none of their associates came to their defense during the debate.
Their silence was eloquent.
The next session of the Central Committee will take up the situation thus
created in the communist press, but also the case of Henri Fiszbin, whom
Georges Marchais criticized for speaking out in LE MONDE..
- Nothing would seem to indicate that this body of the PCF has any sudden
desire to "live democratically."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
' 28
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�
ASPEC'1'S OF PCF II~'IERNAL CRISIS EXAMINED
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 21 Jun 80 p 32
[Article by Thierry Pfister]
[Text] Jean Elleinstein scr�eams political. censorship. He accuses the
"Editions Sociales," an outfit controlled by the French Communist Party (PCF)
to have withdrawn from him the coordination of the eight volumes of the
"History of Contemporary France." To this Lucien Seve, member of the Central
Committee of the Co~unist Party and director of the Editions Sociales replies
matter of factly by underlining the serious delays of Jean Elleinstein in
the delivery of promised texts. The position of the protesting communist
historian would be stronger if his difficulties were limited to the publish-
ing firm of the PCF. This is not the case. Jean Elleinstein is in more
or less serious conflict with the publ~.shers Le Seuil, Grasset and Albin
Michel. As to the publishers Stock they went so far as to have a part of
the proceeds from the sale of the historian's library seized. In order to
recoup unhonored contracts.
If there is palitical censorship in the PCF it should be looked for somewhere
else. It is more serious and goes deeper. The crisis which is shaking
REVOLUTION illustrates this. Francois Hincker, assistant chief editor of
- the weekly, in fact, just felt obliged to resign because Guy Hermier, member
of the Political Bureau and director of REVOLUTION refused to approve one
of. his articles. It concerned, it is true, an answer to Lucien Marest,
Hermier's collaborator at the section of intellectuals and culture of the
Central Committee.
In two articles of REVOLUTION, Marest has just defined the new line of the
party in cultural matters. It consists in the favoring of animation over
creation. One does not go on admitting that the cultural centex~s of Communist
_ municipalities produce works which do not attract the public, a complaint
already voiced by Guy Poussy, group secretary of the Val-de-Marne district
and mouthpiece of Georges Marchais. In its stride the direction of the
PCF by the way intends to take charge again of the country groups. No more
invitations of whichever singer to the local celebrations of the party.
Renaud for instance is specifically outlawed. No more preference for the
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rvn vrrl~,tew uon V1YL1
productions of "bourgeois" publishers rather than for those of the party
workshops.
I~rancois Hincker had wanted to say that this policy would again make the
c~pttun5 of the PCF qiiestionable. He has been condemned to silence. This
is mosc serious for REVOLUTION. Already in the strictly political field, the
weekly had to toe the line or, as in the case of Afghanistan, shut up. If
the direction of the party imposes on it the same rule in cultural matters
the specific value of REVOLUTION disappears. As it is, the figures are not
that great. The objective of 50,000 subscriptions is far from achieved.
There are only 15,000 and the distribution amounts to around 40,000 copies.
It is true that the young weekly--it published its 15th number--cannot count
on the Communist press to become better known. L'HUMANITE ignores it and
Roland Leroy forbids the journalists of the daily to give a leg up to
REVOLUTION.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
PRODUCTION OF NAVAL EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED
Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish May 80 pp 26-29 -
[Article by Artabro: "Italian Navnl Exhi.bition"]
[Text] Italian technology in the mi.litary naval field
appears, at present, to be one of the most complete and
competitive technologies. Within it, the United Naval
Shipyards (CNR) group coordinates and assembles a large
part of the facilities and export capability.
Multipurpose Escorts E
i~ie "Lupo" and "Maestrale" class frigates have meant the definitive con-
solidation of Italian industry as an exporter of complete principal
fighting ships, that is to say, with purely Italian technology in almost
all their systems and subsystems.
The "Lupo" class ships are 2,525-ton ships, fully loaded, and are 113
meters iong. Multipurpose is the basic aim within these moderate dimen-
sions. Their basic gunnery is one 127/54 Oto Melnra "Compatto" [com-
_ pact] gun the gun with the most rapid fire that there is with that
caliber and two Breda twin 40/70 antimissile mounts. Antiaircraft _
protection is increased by means of placing onboard an Albatros/Aspide
. point defense missile system, also with good antimi,ssile capability, while
the antiship capability goes much beyond �~the gunnery ~tar}ge by the re-
ceipt onboard of Otomat missiles, up to eight, with an impact distance
limited by the radar horizon much more than by its own propulsive action
radius. Antisubmarine activity is based on a medium-sized helicopter and
short-range homir~g torpedoes, launchable both from the frigate and from
the helicopter.
The electronic equipment on the "Lupo" class ships, and particularly the
sensors, are also mostly of Italian technology, with the exception of
the sonar. Although they are variable, depending on the request, they
are naturally incorporated in the ship's weapons system. The matter of
- support measures and electronic countermeasures, especially sophisti-
cated, is to be emphasized particularly. Propulsion, of the CODAG
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[expansion unknown] type, makes maximum speeds on the order of 35 knots
possible, very infrequent in modern escort ships, with 31.7 knots sus-
tained speed (40,000 horsepower), but with only 7,800 horsepower, maximum
sustained diesel power, it is possible to maintain 20 knots. Z'his makes
very great radiuses of action (5,500 miles at 16 knots) ~ossible.
In short, the "Lupo" design has sought to combine multipurpose, good per-
formance and economy. This kind of frigate can operate both by itself and
on escort duty. It can also be incorporated in air-sea tactical groups,
regardless of how fast they are. Four units were built for the Italian
Navy, at the same time as the Peruvian Navy ordered four more (of the "Car-
vajal" series) and the Venezuelan Navy ordered six ("Mariscal Sucre" se-
ries), in both cases with local variants. The first one of all, "Lupo,"
was finished in 1977.
The "Maestrale" design, produced in principle on order by the Italian Navy
to proceed to build six units, is merely an enlarged and improved "Lupo."
The displacement now increases to 3,040 tons full losd, with a length some-
what less than 123 meters. By using somewhat more powerful diesels than
the "Lupo" class, but with the same FIAT/General Electric LM 2500 gas tur-
- bines, the maximum speed barely exceeds 33 knots, still higher than what
is normal in recent constructions, but the action radius is 6,000 miles
at 15 knots. Its military capability seems to be increased, in compari-
son with the preceding design, primarily in the z-?tisubmarine area:
There are two medium-sized ship-borne helicopters, or one heavy helicopter,
all with air-to-surface combat facilities. _
Wire-guided 533-millimeter long torpedoes are added (Italian A-184).
The hull sonar seems to be supplemented by another variable depth sonar (sys-
tem identical to the systems of the Spanish "Descubierta" class corvettes,
second series).
The radical increase in hangar capacity is owing to the shifting of the
- Aspide/Albatros missile launcher to the bow.
Although up to now only the Italian Navy is continuing to order escorts
of this class, it seems beyond all doubt that new orders, cominq especially
from navies usinq American World War II destroyers, will follow them, par-
ticularly when the first units become tangible.
Smaller Units
The CNR offers a very wide range of alternatives, both in dimensions and
in assignments and functions, in the field of small combatant ships.
The largest patrol craft produced so far by the Italian company are in
compliance with an order from the Libyan Navy, where they are building
the "Wadi" series, four units, followed then by another orr~er from Ecuador
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for six more. With dimensions similar to the FPB-58 design of the German
Lurssen Company (the Spanish "Lazaga" class and the Israeli "Reshef" class),
their displacement is definitely greater (630 to 685 tons full load, de-
pendin5 on the version). It allows various configurations of weapons,
sensors and propulsion. This always affects the multipurpose feature of
the basic design. In fact, these small ships tend to be classified as
corvet~es rather than as patrol craft. Zhe installation of a 76/62 Oto
Me lara gun, the familiar "Compatto," and a twin 35 or 40-millimeter mount
_ for close-in antimi.ssile defense is common to all the variants provided.
The re also always are Otomat ship-to-ship missiles. The various versions
are determined by the alternative presence of antisubmarine torpedoes,
short-range antiaircraft missiles and even a helicopter, in spite of the
small displacement of the design,
A project connected with the foregoing one, although with more originality,
is the "Saettia," not yet ordered definitely, and whose armament and sen-
so rs are basically similar to the "Wadi" class, without antisubmarine wea-
pon s or antiaircraft missiles. The originality of the design lies in the
_ almost elimination of superstructure, thanks to a high draft and consider-
able freeboard, which find expression in seaworthy features very superior
to what is usual in ships of their size (360 tons full load) and much in-
terior space. They also offer a small radar silhouette and few dead spots
for gunnery fire. The theoretical speed probably reaches 40 knots with
20, 000 horsepower.
Still in the line of missile-launching patrol craft, CNR pioneered construc-
~ion of military hydrofoils in Western Europe, owing to its "Sparviero"
prototype, completed in 1974. Its most remarkable detail is its compact-
nes s. On a hull with a maximum displacement of only 60 tons its houses a
76/62 Oto Melara gun and two Otomat missiles, with pertinent electronics.
'I'he "Sparviero" is capable of attaining 50 knots with a 4,500-horsepower "
gas turbine. Si more units are going to be produced for the ~talian Navy
(th e factory name for the series is "Swordfish").
A number of other light combatant craft projects are offered by Breda, in
Ven ice: 400-, 250- and 150-ton missile-launching boats, with various
armament ar.a equipment possibilities, including a helicopt~r with a tele-
scopic }iangar on the largest. At the same time, other sp~cialized ship-
yards offer smaller craft, like the 41-ton and 8-ton fiberglasa craft from
- CRES TITALIA, used by the Finance Guard owing to their high speed (34
knots), or tlie 21-ton patrol craft, also made of plastic, from INTERMARINE.
This Sarzana firm is nrecisely the one that has a contract with the Italian
Navy to construct a series of Italian minesweepers, an Italian ruzswer to
the European tripartite design. Ten units are going to be produced for
now, forming the 'Lerici" serie.s. It is an unquestionably interesting
deve lopment and ver~ comparable with the best of other navies.
With regard to logistic support ships, CNR produced two fleet supply ships
for the Italian Naw , the "Vesubio" and the "Stromboli," displacing
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8,700 tons full load. Based on their experience, it offers enlarged de-
siqns of them, displacing 13,500 and 21,000 tons. 'This last-mentioned
ship is a real surface fighting ship, because it adds, to its logistic
capability, two heavy helicopters, Aspide antiaircraft missiles and four
40/70 millimeter guns with electronic equipment similar to what is found
on an escort ship. Breda, in turn, has designed a very complete 3,000-
ton submarine rescue ship, capable of operating at great depths, especially
ir it uses the Breda 13-ton minisubmarine, capable of reaching a depth of
600 meters (with a safety coefficient of 1.25).
Onboard Weapons
Naval weapons have a possibly greater relative importance, within Italian
exports, than the complete ships themselves, to the point of having made
' local industry one of the leaders of the world market.
Naval gunne ry is very particularly the gatherer of the greatest exporting
achievements and especially for the compact products of the Oto Melara Com-
pany. The 127/54, that we mentioned already when we discussed the "Lupo"
and "Maestrale" frigates, has a very light mount (34 tons) , with a very
high rate of fire and both antiaircraft and surface capability. It has
66 rounds in continuous supply. It has received fareign orders (from Ca-
nada, in addition to import~rs of frigates built in Italy), but it seems
that its commercial activity is just starting.
Nevertheless, the lighter 76/62 is the gun u.sed most extensively all over
the world among the new automatics. It has been adopted by over 20. navies,
including the United States Navy, which calls it NDc-75. Altogether, it
weighs 7.3 tons. It can fire 85 rounds a minute and maintain continuous
burstsfor a whole minute without serious damage to the barrel. This means
that it is capable of putting more explosive weight in the air than a dual
semiautomatic 126-millimeter mount, in the same time. Its low weight makes
it possible to install it also on very light ships.
The variants that Breda has produced on the Bofors 40/70 guns are also
noteworthy_ the automatic loader for a single mount, providing 144
rounds in automatic ammunition supply and, especially, the closed twin
mount, with a joint rate of fire of 600 rounds a minute and continuous
ammunition supply of 444 or 736 rounds. This mount is shipborne parti-
cularly fo r antimissile purposes, above all since a proximity fuze was
placed in service.
Breda also produces the 105-millimeter window and electronic decoy rocket
launcher system, which also admits flare or ground bombardment rockets.
Twenty-tube rocket launchers are made for medium-sized ships and 6-tube
launchers for patrol boats and corvettes.
_ Another important item is torpedoes. Whitehead Motofides has produced sub-
stitutes for the American antisubmarine homing torpedoes, calling them
A-244 and A-244S. Their same launching tubes can be used, although there
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is an autochthonous launching system, the ILAS-3 of ELSAG. A new long,
533-millimeter wire-guided torpedo, the A-184, is used on board the new
"Maestrale" class frigates.
Concerning missiles, we have already commented on the performance of the
ones used on the new frigates. The Aspide, incorporated in the Albatros
control system, is a remarkable improvement of the NATO Sea Sparrow, with
more r.ianeuverability, greater range and wider margins of operation, in
addition to increasing its antimissile capabilities. The Otomat, in its im-
proved Teseo version, has a high degree of maneuverability for diversion in
proximity to the target and it is highly immune to countermeasures. It
is also the ship-to-ship missile with the greatest range on the whole
Western market.
Electronics
This is another item that has been equipping Italian-constructed ships for
years now, with our own technology.
The ELSAG Company not only produces radars, but also close-in defense sys- ~
tems (the Dardo), fire control systems and electronic decoy systems.
ELETTRONICA SpA specializes in an electronic warfare system with a quality
and advanced design that is without competition in the world. Thus, its
countermeasures systems are used in many navies. ELMER produces communi-
cations and data-transmission systems. SELENIA is the prime cor~trac-
tor for long-range search radars and it also produces command and control
systems for integrated weapons systems. ~
Engines
In conclusion, we can mention the existence of a wide variety oE Italian
propulsion systems. GMT produces its series 230, 20-cylinder diesels,
used on frigates for economical propulsion at cruising and patrol speeds.
Stabilimenti Meccanici, in Trieste, manufactures the VM TI-1312 series for
small craft, with 380/480 horsepower, and CRM makes its series of 1?.-
cylinder V CRM 12 D/SS diesels, in the 1085/1374 horsepower range, in
Milan.
To meet the requirements for power and high acceleration in escort ships
and fast ships, FIAT manufactures, under license, the General Electric
- I~~12500 gas turbine, derived from the TG-39/CF-6 jet, which equips the
commercial DC-10 for example, with a maximum power of 25,000 horsepower.
FIAT also provides electronic automation systems for machinery.
Genoa
- In summary, al1 this and much more is to appear in the Naval Exhibition,
which will be amply covered by a team fron; DEFEDISA.
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Participating Companies
(1 ) ASTILLEROS (6) ARMAMENTO Y ELECTRONICA
- Buques mayores ( 2) Breda Meccanica Brescia.;~a Brescia
Cantieri Navali Riuniti Genova ( ~ FIAR ~9i~an _
Cantierie Navale Breda Venecia 2) C.I.S. D~G Roma
Italcantieri Trieste Contraves Italiana Roma
- Buques menores ( 3) Consorzio SMIN Roma
Cantieri Baglietto Varazze Elettronica Roma
Can:ieri Navali Liguri Riva Trigoso ~lettronica S. Ciorgio (;enova
Cantieri di Pisa Pisa Elmer Pomezia (Roma)
Caqtieri Piccliiotti Viareggio F'ace Standard Milan ,
- Crestitalia Ameglia Fratelli Borletti Milan
Intermarine Sarzana Gajon Genova
Italcraft Roma (1 3 ) [R ~:T Triest~
Navaltecnica Messina ltaltel Milan
~4) SISTEMAS DE PROPULSION, Litton ltaliana Pomezia
5~MAQUINARIA ELECTRICA Y AUXILIAR Harconi Italiana Genova
- Sistemas de propulsion Microtecnica Turin
Aifo Milan 1~fisar Gnedi
Alfa Rom~:o Abbiategrasso Oerlikon [taliana Milan
C.R.M. Milan Officine Gatileo I~lorencia (14)
Piat Aviazione Turin Oto Melara La Spezia
Franco Tosi Legnano Selenia Roma
Grandi Motori Trieste Trieste Sistel Roma
Isotta Fraschini Saronno S.M.A. t~lorencia
V.M. Cento Snia Viscosa Roma
- Maquinaria Elecurca y Auxifiar Usea Pugliola Lerici
Ansaldo Genova ~~tehead ~foto F'ide~ Leghorn
.4rona Vo~hera AVIACION NAVAL.
~ A.T.I.S.A. Genova ~a) AvionesdePatrullaMaritimay~'xploracion
Cutler Hammer Italiana Milan Aeritalia ~apoles (15 )
Deichi Villasanta Aeronautica Macchi Varese
Elettrital Genova Ind. Aer. Rinaldo Piaggio G~nova
Fratelli Garbazino Acyui ~teteor Roma
Ghisalba Turin SIAI Marchetti Sesto Calendc
l.F.L�.N. Roma (9-) Helicopteros navales
SocogeaJIntar Genova Costr. Aar. C;. Agusta Cascina Costa
Magr?eti Marelli MilSn Breda Nardi ~lilan
Sace Turin (10 ) ~;QUIPOS ESP~:CIALh:S
Termokimik Milan Gale;~zzi La Spezia
Termomeccanica Italiana La Spezia lndustrie Pirelli Milan ,
Nuova Callegari & Chigi Ravena `
Ofticine Panerai l~lorenria
Oleodinamica Magnaghi NilSn
Riva Calzoni Bulonia (16 )
Signani La Spezia
Technisub (~enova
Key: 1. shipyards; 2. large ships; 3. small ships; 4. propul-
sion systems; 5, electrical and auxiliary machinery; 6. arma-
ment and electronics; 7. naval aviation; 8. sea patrol and
- search aireraft; 9. naval helicopters; 10. special equipment;
11. Genoa; 12. Venice; 13. Rome; 14. Florence; 15. Naples;
16. Bologna
COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defensa, S.A. Madrid 1980
10,042 -
CSO: 3110
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,
COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
ARMY L'PGRADES TANKS, FIRST BMR-600 DELIVERED
Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish No 25, May 80 pp 88, 90
[TextJ The Spanish Army has been displaying considerable activity in the
area of armored vehicles in the past few months with the incorporation,
procurement and modernization of this type of equipment for its various
units.
First came the signing of the contract with the Santa Barbara Military ~
Industries National Fnterprise last June for the construction of a new
series of 100 AMX-30E cars, whose patent became the property of the
Spanish Government precisely in 1980, a fact which will facilitate its
production, improvement and modification.
The incorporation of the new M-48E (M-48A5) tanks, whose first 10 units
were delivered to the Montesa 3d and the Alcantara lOth Armored Cavalry
Regiments in Ceuta and Melilla, has been taking place since last August.
These vehicles form part of the first lot of 108 Spanish Army M-48 tanks
undergoing thorough reconditioning and modernization at the Chrysler
Espana company's facilities in Villaverde (see DEFENSE No 3).
The operation practically affects the whole tank, with the cupola, hull.,
engine cool7.ng grilles and fenders undergoing transformations. lhey get
a new ~1VDS-1790-2A diesel engine and transmission, have the final stages
r~placed, and the stispension and running gear repaired and improved. New
fuel tanks also are installed. The driving and aiming optical system is
improved and a new ballistic calculator is provided.
But all in all, what makes the modernization really worthwhile and upgrades
the tanks is tl~e installation of the 105/51mm L-7A2 gun, a weapon of
acknowledged effectiveness, accuracy and quality employed by a large number
of Idestern tanks (Leo~pard, M-b0, Strv-103, Centurion, Pz-68, etc.).
This modernization brings the M-48E t:anks, except for weight and mass, to
the level of the tariks currently in service--especially the M-60, with '
which it has numerous details in common--and constitutes a significant
increase in Spanish armored potential.
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