JPRS ID: 9229 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020001-5
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9229
~
1 August 1980
Near East/ '
~lorth Africa I~e ort
p
(FOUO 2~8/80~
FBIS F4REIGN BROA~CAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9229
1 August 1980
~ NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 2s/so)
- CONTENTS
NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Briefa
Daddah to Tuniaia 1
AFGHANISTAN
Eyewitness Account of Resistance in Kabul
(Jacques Buob; L'EXPRESS, 21 Jun 80) 2
Carter Was Informed of Giscard-Brezhnev Dialog
(Marc Ullmann; PARIS MATCH, 4 Jul 80) 12
ALGERIA
FLN Congresa Effecta Major Changea
(Youcef Adrari; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun 80) 17
IRAN
UK Correspondent Talka With Beheshti
(Robert Fiak; THE TIMES, 3 Jul 80) 19
- LIBYA
Briefs
Aircraft to Seychelles 21
MAURITANIA
Morocco Accused of Trying To Overthrow Regime
(Mohamed Razine; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun-26 Jul 80) 22 ~
Leaders Seek Solutiona to Protleme in Regional Framework
(Said Ould Khelifa; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun-26 Jul 80), 24
- a - [III - NE&A - 121 FOUO)
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SUDAN
- Current Domeatic Situation SLmmed Up
(Rachid Jawad; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun 80) 26 ~
SYRIA �
Violence, Arrests Continue in Northern Cities
(AL-WATAN AI,-'ARABI, 25 Apr-1 May 80) 28
Former Minister Seea DeIDOCracy as the Only Solution _
(Jamal al-Atasi Intrrview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
18-24 Apr 80) 30
Religious Leadera Are on Hit Liet ot armed Religious
Groups .
(AL-WATAN AL-'AFt~BI, 18-24 Apr 80) 38
TUNISIA
Split Among Communiata Reported _
(AFRIQLTE-ASIE, 14 Apr 80) 41
- Diverse Reactions To Executian of Gafsa Attackers
(Editorial, Simon Malley; AFRIQUE-ASIE, ?.8 Apr 80) 42 =
European Parliament Reacts To Execution of Ggfsa Attackers -
(AFRIQUF-ASIE, Apr 80) 44
Tunisian ~ppoaition Indignant aver Execution of Gafsa
Attackers
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 28 Apr 80) 45
~
- b -
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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
DADDAH TO TUNISIA--Moktar Ould Daddah, former presiaent of Mauritania
who has been a refugee in France, will tak~: up permanent reaidence in
Tunis~a st the end of the current year. [Text] [Paris PARIS M~,TCH
- in French 18 Jul 80 p 70]
CSO: 4400
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AFGHANISTAN
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF RESISTANCE IN KABU~,
_ Paris L'EXPRESS in French 21 Jun 80 pp 92-97
[Article by Jacques Buob: "Resistance Movement in Afghanistan"]
[Text] It is now Kabul's turn to burn.: Not from the fires of war. Not
yet. Kabul is now burning with another and more intense flame, the flame
of hatred of the occupying forces and of the need to resist them. Hatred
of these blond. barechested young men stretched out under the wing of their
aircraft or in the shade of their tank, young men who also pace up and down -
the streets of Kabul in their strange sw~er uniform, shaven head covered
by an odd-looking acout hat, and with a Ralashnikov rifle carried at hip -
level. Hatred of this haughty army so confident of its strength, and
_ hatred of the Soviet Union overconfident of its impunity and its genius.
In colonized AfghanisCan, Moscow naw lays down the law only to remnants
of t_he Afghan Army and a shadow government. ~
"Where do they think they are? In Hungary or Czechoslovakia? But this is
Afghanistan!" The man who spoke to us in this fashion holds an important
position in the Afghan civil service. We shall not mention his name. He
is not a terrorist, not a freedon~ fighter, not a member of the resistance
movement. He is a civil servant who had no other ambition than to rise
step .~-,y step in his career field until one day he finally became a cabinet
min{ster, undoubtedly at the cost of surrendering a few principles. He
i~ not a hero. He is scarcely a good Moslem. But he is at the end of his
rape. He is fed up with having to see his deputy minister stand at attention
and receive instructions from a Soviet adviser nonchalantly sitting at his
- desk. He can no longer put up with receiving orders under the pictures of
- Brezhnev and Lenin, as is the case everywhere in each ministry where
Rusaians have assumed control of all the affairs of state, all television
progra~, and the Bakhtar News Agency's dispatches.
That evening, in the house of a friend, he became angry each time a big
Antonov [transport aircraft) or a helicopter flew over: "They are using
our airports, our installations. They are trampling on our land, killing -
our children solely upon their own authority. They have stripped us of -
- eveiything: our liberty and our pride."
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Kabul is seething. This city of 800~000 has a large number of civil
servants, tradesmen, and military personnel. It has seen so m~ny coups
d'etat that one would think it had resigned itself to its fate. Yet Kabul
has flared up twice already. First on 22 February when the Chahr-Chatta
(four arcades) bazaar erupted, erected barricades with the help of the
~Iazaras, the country's most underprivileged and scorned ethnic group. This
uprising was very savagely put down by the Afghan Army and party militiamen,
armed and uniformed young boys, who fired on the demonstrators. The Russians
also fired on them in the vicinity of the large "sil.o.'' These victims were
Kabul's first martyrs.
Subszquently, in iate April and early May, agitation erupted in the secondary
schools aud the university. It began iri the girls high school. School-
girls of 13 to 18 refused to return to class: "We shall go back when the
Russians have left the country." At Malalai high school, they jostled tne
two Afgh2n soldiers guarding the entrance. They shouted at them: "~'rou
are women belonging to Russian~." T.he two soldiers wept. Russian troops
then arrived and the schoolgirls hurriedly fled, brandishing soda bottles.
They spread into the streets. They were aware that some of their comrades
in other secondary ~chools in Zargouna and Suraya had 'neen killed the day
before. 7'hey ran into Afghan troops armed with electric cattle prods. A
sWarm of blup dresses and whit~ scarves dashed into the shabby houses on
the slopes of the hill. Women.in the houses hid them in a double-locked
room. When the soldiers knocked at the door, one of the older women opened
it. The soldiers ~sked: "Who is in that locked room?" "The women of
the house," the old woman replied. "Our men are not here and refuse to
allow anyone to see them. You ahall not enter the room."
Skeptical but convinced, the soldiers, behaving as good Mosl~ms, departed.
The girl who told us this was 17 years old. She had been expelled from her
high school. To be readmitted azt3 allowed to take her examinations, she was
told she had to sign a statement promising to behave. But she refused to
sign. It takes courage to meet with a~landestine reporter in Kabul. When
I interviewed her, she kept nervousl;~ twisting the strap on her handbag.
She told me how in the Pul-i-Charki prison, her comrades, boys and girls,
had been tortured with electrical devices in an effort to get them to admit
they be~:onged to a resistance group. She described how two of her school-
girl. friends had come out of the prison broken automatons, unable even ~o
remember wt!at had happened to them.
"Aren't you afraid? I asked.
"No," she laughed.
"And what about your parents?"
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_ "They both i~ork in the government."
"Aren't you afraicl you may get them in trouble?"
She hesitated, but her answer was firm: "There are times when you have to make
a choice."
"Are you prepared to become even more involved," I asked.
"I am prepared to throw bombs, to become a terrorist," she answerQd.
~
wny.
"To make the Russians leave and then have an Islamic and nationalist xepublic
established in our country. We are Moslems. That is our culture. That
is our very soul. Nobody will ever wrest it from us."
The Kremlin's extraordinary deployment of forces has not fr.ightened the
Afghans. On the contrary. By fighting against somebody stronger than
them, by dyinp; for Islam, they go straight to Heaven. Did the Russians
underestimate Afghan pride to this extent?
Lapis Lazuli and Hashish ,
In the streets of Kabul, a person can amuse himself by listlessly saluting
an Afghan soldier standing guard in front of a ministry building. Because `
he takes you for a Russian, the guard clicks his heels and returns your
salute. His action is automatic, but it is definitely the only outward
- sign of respect a Soviet can expect in Kabul.
On the highway to the north I became caught by chance in a Red Army
convoy and to top it all I was riding in a green ~eep. This gave me an
opportunity to observe t~he aold, blank, and absent stare with which Afghans
, look at the occupier.
On Chicken Street--the main tourist thoroughfare with its antique dealers,
~ewelers, embroidered jackets, lapis lazuli, and hashish--a group of
schoolboys w~lked by two Russians in civilian clothes and exclaimed:
Russians go home!" In the elementary schools, small children deliberately '
spill their dail~? glass of milkand cry out: "We do not want anything from
the Russians!" Senior and key Afghan civil servants are fleeing the country '
_ in droves because they were too intimately fnvolved with previous regimes to
now join the freedom fighters and are too urbanized to carry arms. In an
effort to check this heavy drain, the government is no longer issuing pass-
ports. But the exodus of intellectuals and technically trained persons has
found another way out of the country~,;namely the mountain route. For 10,000
afghanis (1,000 francs), escape agenta will guide a fugitive to Pakistan.
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- This is a danKerous trip for many of these intellectu~ls who have had
little physical training. They are easy p~ey in the hands of an escape
agent who is not always reliable and may abandon his client deep in the
mountains or kill him in order to rob him. Ne~rertheless, people continue
to try this escape route. Once on the other side af the border, they
- buy new passports, travel to Europe and re~oin those relatives and
friends awaiting them there. Half of the homes in Kabul's new residen-
zial district are vacant. Before leaving them one night--suddenly, because
escape agents give~~them no advance notic.e--their occupants barely had
time to throw the key under the door.
Picking Up the raau ~
As night falls over the Kabul basin, the temperature becomes much cooler ~
and the streets become empty. By 22.',~, one-half hour l~efore the curfew,
tanks begin rumbling through the street5 to take up position at key city
intersections. The tank crews are Afghan but two Russians are posted
alongside each tank. Troops patrol. the streets. This is the hour when
the Soviet or Afghan soldier, or the militiamen, becomes more tense,
more apprehensive. There is the sound of sporadic bursts of gunfire.
. Soldiers on guard around the garrisons are afraid, and their challenge,
"Who goes there?", can be heard breaking the nocturnal silence.
Early in the morning at ~unrise when the curfew is lifted, about 0430,
teams begin picking up the bodies of ~ersons killed during the night.
These are victims of the bitter strife between the two wj.ngs of the party--
- the Khalq and the Parcham--as well as victims of the resistance movement
:~hich is only now starting to becom~a organized in Kabul. But it is already -
- making a name for itself.
On Saturday 14 Jun~, shopkeepers in front of the Afghan Stores, not far
from the Kabul River, were speculating about the origin of some foul-smelling
metal and wooden boxes on the sidewalk. Upon opening them, they found
they were filled with human heads. It is said that they included the
_ heads of Russians. Heads of Russians are also reported to have been found
inside trash cans in the modern housing development of Mikrorayon north-
east of the city where Soviet advisers and their families are housed in
small, cramped HLM [Low-cost Housing Program] apartments, And also there
is the report that the bodi~s of thr~e senior Red Army officers were tossed
in front of the Soviet Etnbassy one fine morning. The ladies from Moscow,
with their chignons and large derrieres, hardly any longer shop outside
Mikrorayon, except when escorted by armed soldiers. The lur.e of "easy"
money still prompts certain Russians to take risks, such as the officer
' who swaps automobile wheels for Afghan rugs or that other officer who
resells loads of vodka at 100 afghanis (10 francs) a bottle. "
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When Russians leave the confines of their encampment, they become appr_e-
hensive. If you look too long at the soldiers riding in trucks through
the streets in the center of the city, they become suspicious and you
can see them tighten their gr ip on their assault rifl.es. The wideapread
rumoura in Kabul reach ~their e ars. They know that out there in the coun;.ry-
aide, the mighty Soviet Army i s making no headway, is becoming bogged
~ down, and is dying in a.mbushes. They also know that Kabul, although -
formidably defended, is not s afe and that a11 the cannon, tanks, and
helicopters are hPlpless against the small beggar who someday may perhaps
toss a~renade at their feet.
The February and May demonstrations proved one thing to the mujahidin,
namely that the Kabulis, whose true loyalties might possibly have.been -
suspect, did, in fact, back them. Strengthened by this popular support
which is becoming increasingly organized, two resistance groups currently
share influence within the city. They are the SAMA (Organization for the
I,iberation of the Afghan People) whose anti-Soviet leftist progressives
are more generally called Maoists, and the engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's
highly Islamic Hezb-i-Islami which is strongly supported by the Moslem
Brotherhood and certain Arab countr.ies.
There is talk of 8,000, or even 13,000 armed rebels inside Kabul. By
making allowances for some exaggeration, the consensus within Western
embassies is that there are a few thousand freedom fight~rs prepared to
launch an offensive inside the city and render Kabul as totally insecure
as other ma~or Afghan cities. Separated by a deep ideological gulf, the
twb groups have tentatively formed an alliance of convenience. A large
ma~ority of the population tar the SAMA with the same brush as the Khalq
and the Parcham, communists faithful ta�~he Kremlin. But the fundamental-
ist Islamic groups need the progressives, need their highly efficient
organization and their competency in psycholo~ical actions, a skill par-
ticularly useful ~n the university and the secondary schools. A member
of the SAMA I met at the home of a friend told me: "No, you will not get
met to say anything bad about the Hezb-i-IsZami. We are fighting the same
battle with the same single obj ective, Co drive the Russians out of the
country. After that, we shall aee what can be done, Afghan to Afghan."
The King? Why Not? ~
The Soviets may we.ll be succeeding in do~ng something nobody has yet
managed to achieve in this coun try, namely unify the Afghans. Of course,
this patchwork of ethnic groups d~.vided by religion, culture, and a his-
, tory replete with centuries of discord, will still not beco~~e unified
overnight. It is reported that a possible unifier, King Zahir Shah, has -
' left his Roman exile to gauge public sentiment in the Paktia region. The
King? Why not? He is an Afghan and a Moslem.
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The cement of Islam has already unified the people in their hatred of the
Russians. Thus far, thi_s is the only success Moscow has achieved. Some
6 months after its spectacular entry into Kabul on a hright Christmas night,
the mighty Soviet Army is bogged down. The Afghan resistance movement, _
with its skimpy rifles and dirty turbans, is holding the polar bear at bay.
- Hadn't the Soviets promised to annihilate this resistance? Yet ~t is gain-
ing ground. The fact is that if today Ka.bul is seething, it is because -
it knows that everywhere else, the Russian-Afghan troops have not man~ged -
to gain control. Above and beyond the anecdotes, the reports of fighting,
the exaggerations, and the legend being con~ured up, an observer need only
note the state of the country to 3udge the depth of the swamp in which Moscow
is sinking.
The large-scale operation launched this winter and designed to cut the
mujahidin off from.their rear-area bases in Pakistan, has fail~ed. Peshawar
is now more than ever the capita~ of Afghan political organizations. The
border remains pervious from the province of Paktia in the south to the ~
province of Badakhshan in the north, and the mountains are in the hands
of the rebels.
It was also believed that the Soviets would be content, initially, to
control the cities and major axes of communication, which are relatively
few in this country. The Soviets have apparently not achieved this mini-
mal objective. Today, ~~miar.tial luw has been decreed in the western city
of Herat and also in the southern city of Kandahar. The government has
more or less lost control of these twc cities, the second and third
largest in the country. They are the scene of a daily succession of
assassinations, other acts of violence, and search-and-kill operations.
In Kandahar, the provincial governor travels to his office in one of the
armry's armored vehicles. The provincial governor in Herat has been killed.
_ The government has had leaflets dr~ppe4 over the city a~nouncing that ~
Herat will be bombed if the situation there does not return to normal.
Herat h~s been destroyed three times: by Alexander, by Genghis Khan (who
left only 40 survivors), and by Tamerlane. Will it burn again a fourth
time?
The major rout.es are no better controlled. Kabul taxi drivers refuse to
take r_he road leading eastward to Peshawar. A bus ventures along this
road only on certain days. Between Sarobi.and Jalalabad, before moving
out toward Pakistan, vehicles have to wait until a convoy is fortned and
escorted by armored cars at the head and rear of the column. ~
Elsewhere, on the southern route to Kandahar and Herat, th^ mujahidin ,
largely control the coming and going of vehicles. They are reported to
have complete knowledge of who is who. If a person collaborating with the
government sends a shipment of goods to be sold in Kabul, his vehicle will
be burned and its driver kidnapped. If a vehicle belongs to a friend, it
,
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will be allowed to pass. The price of rugs in Kabul continues to riae
despite the slump in the sale of such items. Producers fetch a very ~
high price for the risk they take in transporting their products.
~ Even the highway northward from Kab~+l to the Soviet frontier via the Salang
Pass is not free f rom hit-and-run attacks, an old guerrilla ta~~tic that
has stood the test of tiem. Yet this highway is very heavily patrolled
and protected. It is the Red Army's vital main supply route. Hence it
is of major logistical importance. Every single section of this asphalt
road is under the watchful eye of a Soviet soldier. Nevertheless, in a
convoy of some 30 vehicles we passed in the vicinity of Charikar, 70
km north of kabul, we noted two windshields with bullet holes right in
front of the driver's seat. Unperturbed behind their sunglasses-these
Russian soldiers, who elosely resemble American GI's continued on their
way, rhythmically tapping the outside of their vehicle's door with their
_ f inge rs .
Hazaras Eat Roots
In the very Y~eart of *_he country, in the immense Central Highlands of the
Hazarajat region, the mujahidin are suffering more than anywhere else.
The Russians have little difficulty controlling the very few access
routes to this region of mauntain lakes and eternal snow. Up there, it
is sti11 very cold at night. Seeds have not yet germinated. In Kabul,
I met a certain Hussein who had gone to the Hazarajat region to f ight
along with his Moslem brothers who have Mongol features and belong to
the Shiite religion, two factors that make them pariahs in the eyes of
other Afghans. Hussein told me *he Hazaras were al.ready eating roots.
There was a shortage of matches and to start their fires the peasants
had reverted to the traditional method of striking flint against some
hard metal. In these inaccessible mountains, there are still some men
who f ight with old tripod-mounted long-barreled rifles dating back to the -
mid-19th century British invaders.
It is difficult, of course," said Hussein, "but we do manage to supply
- them by mule and by taking some very tough trails. They are especially `
short of inedicine, drugs, and doctors. As for everything else, the
Hazaras c3n subsist on very little and they will always fight." -
Time is on the side of the Hazaras, the Ta~iks with their tight turbans,
the proud and domineering Pushtuns (or Pathans), and the Turkomans,
homes ick for Samarkand. "The longer the revolt lasts," Hussein explained, -
"the greater the~~chances of one day s2eing unity among so many disparate
groups, even though it may be a union of convenience. The more time -
elapses, the more the international community will be able to take the
Afghans seriously. One day or another, that community will ultimately -
supply weapons to the Af ghans, just as Iran, China, and allegedly the
United States are already doing."
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Heavily Bomb-Laden Helicopters
The rebels have now arrived at the gates of Kdbul, on the mountains ringing
the city like a perfect ampitheater. And while th~y have never considered -
- a suicidal attack against the capital, the rebels are here, and little
by little, one by one, they are descez~ding into the villages in the foot- -
hiils. Tt?e Russian-Afghan troops, who already have a great many problems
_ elsewhere, have conducted search-and-kill oper~tions in the region -
northeast of Kabul from Istalif to Paghman, and Moscow has brought in
. two additional divisions. There are currently 125,000 Soviets in Afghan-
- isran. The vast Soviet base of Khaikhana; northeast of the city, now
" stretches unbroken over several kilome~ers up to the airport where,
- upon returning from a patrol, MiG's land by releasing their deceleration
parachutes. This base's area is large enough to house Chree divisions.
Dozens of sand-colored, camouflaged, heavily bomb-laden helicopters wait -
in neat rows to take-off on assigned miss#.ons. Upon their return from
such missions, 15-20 minutes later, it is noted that they have dropped
- their bombs not very far away at the base of the mountain slopes in an
effort to drive the muj ahidin higher up a~nto the mountain.
Their courage will not be weakened by the death of Majid Kalakani, a
leader of the resistance movement, along with 10 officials of Hafizullah
_ Amin's government and members of his family. Ma.jid was a legendary figure
= called the "Man of the North" because he operated north of. the Chamasi
Plain. He was convicted of banditry. He headed SAMA's military branch.
"The struggle will go on," said Hussein. "There is no lack of other leaders,
bandits or politicians, to take his place." _
In waging a war that is becoming more difficult day by day, the Russians
are increasinglq alone. The Afghan Army, wh~ch they only support off icially, -
no longer has more than 30,000 men. And it is not reliable. A unit of
the 41st Brig~~e dispat ched to Bamian, city of the giant Buddhas cut of
= solid rock in the mountain, rebelled, killed the gavernor, and attempted
to descend toTaard Kabul. This was another case of mass desertion with
weapons and equipment, and it reportedly triggered bombings in the Istalif
area and reinforcement of the Soviet forces.
Military advisers are desperately striving to rebuild an Afghan Army
weakened by successive purges. Young men are being forcibly enliste d.
Deferments are being rescinded, and everyday more and more~youpg men of
military age are going into hiding, fleeing s~ as not to fight against
their brothers, and being forced to do so by the Sovie~s holding, or
almost holding, a gun at their back.
Without a truly effective army on which to rely, and without popular
support, the sole Afghan elements still loyal Moscow are a puppet
government and its militiamen. -
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Babrak Karmal, a recluse in the fenner royal citadel in the heart of Ksbul,
is the very ~mage of a prisoner. Behind the palace gates guarded by
~ Afghan. soldiers, the Red Army alone rules. Babrak Karmal is now surrounded
solely by Soviets: his chauffeur, his bodyguard, his chef, etc. Rumor
has it that he is a sorrowful sight. In Hafizullah Amin's day, Babrak
had the reputation of being an enlightened and reaponaible man, a highly
acceptable successor. Why then did he let himself get into his present
mess? His gardener (an Afghan) is quoted as having revealed that Babrak
strol.ls about the palace gardens without a necktie, shoelaces, and belt.
He is reported to hawe tried to commit suicide. The Russians occasionally
have him appear with a few sta+.mch mullahs in order to have the photograph
of the meeting appear in the NEW KABUL TIMES and thus, naively, shaw that
_ Babrak Karmal is a good Moslem. To gain Islamic support, Babrak will send _
8,000 pilgrims to Mecca this year. Amin had sent merely 400. One Afghan
told us: "Even if Babrak were to build 50 mosques in Kabul, he would
obtain absolutely no recognition or thanks from the people." Babrak's
father, a former Royal Army general, no longer. wants to see him.
Cabinet Never Meets
Mrs Anahita Ratebzad, the minister of education and the prime minister's
_ alleged mistress, is in no better state. All those who know her conside:.
- herto be an intelligent and determined woman. Yet she now appears to be
very listless. Depressed by the savage repression of student demonstra-
_ tions, she reportedly,submitted her resignation. It was refused, of course.
When we asked a Western observer if the cabinet ministers ever met from
time to time, he replied: "It's highly unlikely." To stop the feuding
between the two wings of the party--the Khalq ("the people," Amin's faction)
and the Parcham (Babrak Karmal's faction)--the Russians have imposed a
strange coalition government including such men as Assadullah Sarwari, a -
deputy prime minister, and Ali Keshtman, the minister of planning. Sarwari
formerly headed Amin's Secret Police (the Kom) and thus was Keshtman~s=
torturer. The aforementioned Western observer stated: "If Keshtman
were to meet up with Sarwari, he would kill him. That is why, in my
opinion, the cabinet never meets, never discusses anything, and leCa the
Soviets have free rein."
The Khalq could well shatter this facade of unity. They now intend to show
that they were not the ones who invited the Russians, but that indeed the
Parcham did. Some Khalq members have already individually joined the
rebellion or attempted to do sa If the party's largest and best organized
factions were to suddenly secede, the pno-Soviet Parcham could easily
count its troops. The total would no doubt be close to zero, once the
apparatchiki and militiamen were withdrawn. Was it the Parcham that,
losing its foothold, attempted a ridiculous and dangerous provocation by
having toxic gases released in Kabul's schools and public places? The
- government made a great to-do over it, offici.ally accusing American intel- _
- ligence agencies. But no one here was fooled.
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One day, a school teacher was writing on the blackboard when a pellet of
paper hit hPr on the back of the neck. She quickly turned and 4sked:
"Who did that?" And the entire class repl~ied in unison: "It was American _
imperiallsm." ,
'We Are Chilly'
What are the Soviets'to do? Double, triple their number of soldiers so -
- as to reach a level of 400,000 men, the minimal troop strength required
according to strategists, to hold the country? Will they not then be
forced to increase theix means of repression and crush the resistance
movement by bombing it even more harshly than they are cioing today?
- And thus become involved in an escalating conflict similar to one for
wh~.ch another superpower, before them, has paid very dearly? Because
by offering so much resistance, the mu~ahidin will indeed ultimately receive
subatantial aid. It is a nasty dilemma for Moscow.
I almost forgot to mention that at the end of my interview with the young
_ girl from the Malalai secondary school, she told me: "I want to say
something to you about France. The Warsaw meeting between Giscard d'Estaing
and Brezhnev greatly disappointed the Afghan people. You are participating
in the Olympic Games. You are going to run and ~ump while your hosts are
killing us and depriving us of our freedom. We excepted a great deal
from France. Today we are chilly." She then got up and left, saying
"Thank you." A well-mannered achoolgirl who intends to throw bombs.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
8041
- CSO: 4900 ~
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AFCHANIBT~
CAR~R WAS IZQP~ OF GISCARD~-~H1Y~T DIALOG
Paria PAS~S MrITCH in French 4 Jnl 80 PP 3~39
[Artiole by M~c Uilm~ann]
- [Text] It i,e stinday night, bet~reen 233o aad 2400 ho~re, aud Mr Giacard
d'Betaing ie xalking hie dog, Ymnioe ie q~niet. 1/enice is beaatiFal.
- Like the lapping of the ra~es againat the f4ca~dea of the palaces, the agi-
tation of the etates~en g~eantly breake o~ the ~erez~e ma~ificence of the
eetting. ~e Fi^enah greeident ~m~joy~ theee re~t~l movents. ~11 d~y la~g.
he hse been in the thick of aw~sit disanssions, meesag+e Mr ~re~hhnev
bad seat him regarding the number of &wiet troop$ iia llfghanistan aad the
imoiin~nt ~ri~hdra~rs7. ot oert~fn oc~bat ~mita bad placed him in a poeition
Mhi.ch was both emriable aad embarr~s~ring. Bavi~ble becauee be ras the man
wh,o~ throug~h the neve aarriied, ~mbarrassing because he raa the risk oY
gPpe~~6' h~n?e aue leg o~ ea,oh side of t~he fenoe.
Siz Other I,eaders 7~i.etened to Aim
Mr Giscard d'Estai~ng ~took the t'loor" at luachtime to a~roid a~r oieuader-
B~nS. ~6 seide hia plate, ~ntting ehort individnal disaneeiams,
he clearly e~platned rby, sacmrding to 2~, I~Ir B~zlme~r's neesag~e vae tho _
natural conseqtienoe of t~he ilarsw oe~ves~ee,tioa, . She siz otber leadere of
t~?e great iiaetern induatrial poxere li~tea~d to his. Carter, the Ameriosa,
Schmidt, the Germa~, Coeaiga, the Italian, aad ~vdeau, tlie Canadian~ were
there, R~e Japauese prime mi~ni~er, ~rho died saddenly a few d~ye eg~o, ~
replaaed. by hia miaieter of foreiga affsire~, l~r 0]cita,. Of conrae, l~s
Thatcher ~ there too.
So~ Gieoard d'Esta3x~g e~cplained that he Ywd told Mr. Bre~hnev in WarasN tha?t
~~e~re could be no retv,rn to an interna,tional olimate of detente ae long as
Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan. Oti the aontrs,ry, there wauld be
ths permaaent risk of a heightea~iag of tensioa~s. Hea told ~r Hre$hnev that
the Soviet Grnrernmdnt would therefore ?~ve to look for a"politiosl eolu-
tio~" that wou].d eao,able it to xit.h~dr~w ite ezpedittita~~y oorpe~. Itnd vhe~?
xe e~r political aolutioa4, s+e are talking sbout the install,e,tion of a regime
in Kabul w2~ioh ie scceptable to bo~h the poople of Afg~sniatat? aad the
Kremlin.
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Still relating his Wareaw comereatiom, Gisaard d~Eataing aafd that he at
tnat iim~ ooneidered the militaxq aapeate of the aituation, Aacording to
him, the IISSR would not maa~g~e to oant;rol aad cover the map of a aauntry
of 15 millio~ people aad the sise of Fraaae with troope amounting to about -
~00,000 m~en, Aleo, the two coa~sideratiane resolve themselve8 into ones
Either Mr Brezbnev rrill. gradually reaah the point rrhere he wi11 seud ~ aon-
ting~ent of 500,000 mea to dfghanietea, and thie would be a eiga that he
haa abaadoned arr~yy thought of aompromiae, or he vill raduae the number of
- soldi.ers, and t,~.is, on the aantrary, ~ronld be an indication that he is
abauda~ing aRy attempt to arush the reeiataaae. In the first aase, ar~y
hope of a retura to a alimate of detemte would be det'initively buried, In
the secaoid aase, there Would be deescalation aad therefore the prospeat of
a political eolution. Mr Gieaard d~Setaing aoncludes that BrezYinev's mea-
eag+~ monet be plaaed in thia conte~ct. ~iere ie ao rea8on for too londly
applauding a xithdraxal r+hiah, for th~ moment, affecte ouly some 10,Ofl0 .
men, but re mnst try to malce the motion that hae begun irreveraible,
Basically, t~here are no d~.fferenaee among the Seve~ aa regards the mtl3.tazy
- situatian, All Weste~ informe~tion ~ervices attest to the faat that the
Afghan Ar~r has praatiaally aeased to exist an,d that the Srnrieta themeelvee
have to do the dirty xork. Patimatee~ of the number af So~iet GI's etationed
~.n ef~~an3.etan ,ra~y between 85, o0o a~d 95, ooo. ~b t1~.i.s we must add about
25,000 men atatiau~ed on the Saviet aide oY the boader but who make frequent
invaaione to support this or that "cleaaup" operation. The Ameriaana, Who
follow Soviet traop movements aa alo~ely as they can, thi.nk that there has
been no very peroeptible increase in the number of troops these past few
xeeke and Mr 8rezhnev is almost telling the truth when, in his meaaa~g~e to
Giecard d'Eetai.ng, he maintains that the aomings ~d goirige of military
aircraft correspond to the simple replacement of cer~.in uuits~
Does 'l~ia Prove That 'i'here Is Rbtal ~greementY
2'~.e did not keep Nire T4~atcher Prom eanovmcing that she eeea a diversionary
attempt in Brezhn~r'e messag~e. Ae ane of ber collaborators a~ys: "The
tim~ is tranapareat, but the Yaata are opaque." She insists on the naed
for avoiding ar~y si@� of divis~on amo~g the Western nation~. The Russiaus
Wanld take advaata~ge of that and we oa~ot e~ven be a~ire that they erould nat
tAIDOTl'OM send back the troops they are toda~ pnlling bac~c with ~o muah fan-
fare~
Italian Prime I~i.nister Cossiga in~ediately went everyone one better in con-
neation with the idea that the Seven muet at all aoste offer proof of their
uniry. He propoaee that they no~ aait uatil the oaa~fereace ie over to
publf~h a statement on ~fg3~anistan, Moreover, a draft ha~s alreac~y been pre-
- pared and all that r~rould be needed rtould be to add aose eentence, That cauld
be done the firat thing in the aftemoan. "i~fe have ~taken note," the 3even
say, "of the auuouncement made tc?d~y of ~he xithdra,wal of certain 3oviet
military units from Afg~~ist~m. If it aan be confirmed, to ooostribute
useftiil.ly to a eolutio~ of the Afghan arieis, t3iis withdrawal ma~et be per-
maaent aad ulti.mately follorred by complete evacuation of the 3oviet forcee."
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Does thia prove that there is total agreemsnt? Or ia this eoft misia merely
inte~ded to aonceal the harsh saund of diacord among the alliee4 The matter
ia too geriaua to be txeated lightly. ~herefore, at the riek of aeeming
oomplioated, I will aaa~sr the que~ation in claim~ng thnt t~rae levels are
imrol~ed, depending on Whet7~ar rre eore,tah more or le~ee dsep],y b01ar the
_ eurface. At the YiTOt level, there ie u rsaimity in the facaa~de of amilee
put out by o~ficial epoke~, At the eecc~d level, there is whisp~red
disagreeaaent a~ to the beat rrey~ o! presearix~g the Fhieaiana into 4c~ua1ly
e'vacuating their ~roopa f~om llfghani,etaa. Should they try to esve faao
ae Giooas~d d~B~etaing vauld l~ave it, or, o~ the aaaitrar~r, eh~u].d tt?~y impose
eaaoticne, a?+s 1~ Carrter m~intaiae~4 'lhen there ie ~Ysst ie really behind it
~].l, the obeervation t,~at the di~agreement o~ sanotians ia m~re epp~urent
than real aince these asnations are minimal, eren eymbolic~ .
Butter Has A1,reaciy Been gacrificed for pma
Aafi~ally, fihere are on7~.y tro aatic~e ~3.ch xould really liurt the II3SB. Qne
~+~auld be an all-ont reeu'ptiaan of the arme raae, ~tie Western eaonoa~r oaald
m~re aaeily snstain thie tban tbe Soriet eooaaam~,~~?ere butter has already
be0n eacrifioed for gnns. 7~e other vould be massive aid for the Afgban
rebels Mho laak weapooae. Naw it ia a3,ear that t~he mest ardent advocate of
eaactiona, Ji~qt Carter, is carefallT svoiding moving in e3ther of theea
two direatiaale.
Ftirth~rmore, t1~t ie perf'ectly understandabls. l~br over 10 years nov,
rtor2d equilibrium ha,e relied ox~ the aotioai of "parity" be~i~reen Americaa and
Savie~ s~rategLa forces. 2his global parity does not pre~vent epecifia im-
_ balancea in terms of thie or that w~eapa~ ay~stem or in t~is or that part
of the xorld, bat it does imply t~at aeither of thra t~ro adversaries con].d
deetroy the other vrit.~it being certa,fu o~ being de~troyed ia turit, ~,y
dint of pa ienoe and caaltiauity in ii~e grogra~os, th~ USSB hae slig#~tly
benefited from th,is aotiom of parity, 'lbdsy~ ptr Garter ie inaresais~g the
Omericau mili~asy budget and xe oaa predict t~hat 3 yeare t'rom aow the pen-
dulum ri]1 retwm to its cerlter of balaace or sven ~ting alightly in t~he
o~her direetioai. Bet~neen this aad w~nting to eb,ang,e t~e xvla of "I'va got
you but yau've got me by th~ tail," there is s gap ~hat the II.3. president
is not ready to bridg~e.
As for aid for the Afghan rebele, re muet keep well ia mind the faat that
in massive form it could c~].y eater the cauntry thr~o~h pald,Btan and t~a,t
country feela itself to be too vulnerable ta risk doiag so, If absolutely
neceesazy, the IIaited S'tates wo~],d be oapable of protect3ag Paldstan against
a direct a~tack by 3aviert forcos, bnt ite aid wcrnld be t~in in aase of aa
upriei~og of ho+~tile tribee ma~nipn7~atsd by the Rusaians. DTc~x thsee tribes
eziet sad IKr Bsezta?~v xauld aoaly hav~e to give the word Por as~e to be dis-
p~?tched to the Baluo~hie, vho dre~a oY no~hing bnt r~veng3ng thea~selves oon
their Pua~abi "msaters," The moral: T5e P~kietanie alo8e their eyea to
- amall ooavoye directed to~rard the APg3~at~ reaistance fighters, but sre op-
poeed to ~he ehipping of larg~e quantitiea of equipme~a~ a~d to any treneitiag
of eophietioated j+~eapone~ '1'has, aua things ~tand nor, the Af~t roeietaaae
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has a fex sm~ll F~gyptiaa-made ariti-ta~ak minee, but i~ has no light ground-
to-~ir miesiles oapable of ~aiockirig out aombat helicopters,
So, rrbat ezaatly are t~e saaetiaaie being applied agaiaet the So~viet IIaiaon?
Nox that the grain embarg~o hae beezi developed to the point of being inei~
nificant, the aanly avenue leYt i~~~~ boyaott of the alympice. We cauld
g~o on endleaaly as to tha ineffsctiv~e~esa of euc3h a move. ~s Yor me, I
had hoped t.hat it ~ronld be g~eneral in eaope aa4 t~at all democrat3c amm-
tries a~oul d 3oin in, &it ve mnst sgree that t~he II~'s global policy rrill
- not be chan~god by a meaeure of this 4ort.
tdhen they met, ~nat the tvo of tth~m, late Snnday afteraoon, Mr Carter arid
Gisaard d~Eataing did not vaste their time tryiag to co~vinoe one aaother
of the nseftilness or neelegsnees of ueing sport as 8 political lever.
- Inetead, they resoued a~esment caaa their feeling t~at they had to suppe�z~t
~ the efforta oY the Ielamic canntriea to find s politioal solutirna ~o the
At~an aFfair. Mr (;arter eaid thst lsis g~oa1 r~rae not to "immobilise" the
Boviet IInion in a sox~t of 1980 9ersial of the SpaniBh C:`.vil War, bnt, cai
the coaitrary, to reetore peaae to thie very eensitive part of the tirorld,
It xould, of courae, be tempting to iu~rolve the IIBS~ in a colonial-type
war and thus tarnis~h ite imag~e in the SCbii*d Wo~ld. All the more te~ptimg
eince up to nox it has been partiaal.arly the "imperir~,7.fets" (even rrhen they
were ~rovid ag eaonomic aid) r~ho played the role of villain. However,
neither Psr Car~ter nor Mr Gieaard 'Pataing nor any of the seven atatesmen
who are meeting in Venice deea it advisable to keep ~ ftlse that ie located
so close to the Indian Oaeaa aa,d the Fereian t~ilY b~urning~~
On the Whole, it is better for tbe aompetition to be confined to the ideo-
logiaal domain.
- ~.is i~s ~r the Seven loave in Veniae approved a little dodge propoaed by
aa ezpert rrho is cunning bnt diecreet enou~ not cla3m to be the inventor
of the idea. ~ey have officially invi~ed the communist aountries to 3oin
the Westez~ nations aud the o31-erporting arnmtxies in formulating aad
applying su aid program for the poor aountriea, Of coures, the IIS~t will
do nothing, but every means xill be utilized to eee to it that thia is Imorrn
in every nook aad craany of the xorld.
idhen We Ta1k About Dialogue, We are Talking About Balanoe of PoWer
As far a.a the oil-producing aountries are oonaemed, the pre~vailing mood
is for dialogue rather than Qontronta?tion, But when we talk about dialogue,
we are talking about balaace of power~ This is why the 3evea have apecified
the ob~ectivea pegg+ed for the inplementation of alternative eourcea of eaer-
gy. The IInited States iri partiaular has let the eztent of ite aepira~tiwie
in the domain of coal and aoal-derived synthetia flxela be kao~ra. 7hese
aspir.atioma are so vast t~at they aaronnt to a warning for oil ezportere.
The latter must realize that 10 years from now the demaud for their pre-
aious l~.qnid will have ceseed to grow. Llternative aourcea of energy Will
represent almost nine times the curs~eo~t volwne of iarporta of a country like
France. ~ey r~ill meet the new needs eag+eadered by economic e=paneion.
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I6oa~d$1? s~?ening, eid~ by eide, the Seven aported a happy smile. gven I~Ir
Cartsr a~d I~Ir Soh~eidt ,femed to h4ve forgott?an their glterastion oS 2 cle~ys
betore. ~nd i~ had be~n a bitter oae. T'he p~eident had taken ieeue xith
the ahanoellor for not having olearly stated his iat~ntione on German par~
~ tioipatioon in the defaise of Ens~ope, ~he ohaacellor retorted tlia,t he had
e~t aut the tezt Qt' his epseoh in advanoe,
"I did not aee it," aai.d 1~ Carter, "It'e not my fault," Sanmidt replied,
"if your aesoaiatse toea Yaar paPer~ into the vaetebesket,~
Lfter whiah, tha two etateeaen o~l.med dorm aad diacovered... t~hat they
_ a8reed aoi the mstter,
Hov could they not agree ou it4 Japa~nese repreaent~tive Okita had the
last wordt ~le are a11," he said, "in the ~ame g,oaa,d,ola." Venise oblig^e,
['Yenice oblig+~a'; a pun on noble+sse oblig+a
COP'YRIGBTs 1980 par Cog+edipreeme S.A.
11,466 .
Cso: 4900
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ALGERIA
,
FLN CONGRESS EFFECTS MA�TOR CHANGES -
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jun 80 p 40
[Article by Youcef Adrari: "A Competent Congress"; words printed between
slantlines published in italics]
[Text] Important qualitative changes inaugurate the
launching of the first S-Year Plan based on the key-word
"The right man for the right job."
The proceedings o� the FLN's Algerian extraordinary congress are ~oing on at
the same time this issue is going to press.. While we are awaiting its results,
the significance and consequences of which we will analyze in our next is~ue,
some elements deserve to be pointed out. ~
As regards the Algerian people, this congress is an event of crucial importance
since it is being held at one of the most significant times in its national
and international life. If it is true that the FLN has been advised to amend
and adopt the next 5-Year Plan for development, the problems which have arisen
during the past few months should have led the members of the congress to
re-study the party's operation again, that is to say the need to review its
statutes and readapt them in the light of the experiences and ordeals the
country has sustained.
To fill the essential needs of the most disadvantaged in the nation: apply
the key word /better living conditions/ for. every Algerian man and Algerian
woman; assure a preponderant place to all.projects of a social order without
abandoning the industrialization effort; see to it that a more equitable
distribution of the national wealth is made, these are the preoccupations which
dominated the first days of the debates of the extraordinary congress of the
FLN, which be$an its work on Sunday 15 June.
The Sorcerers Apprentices.
In order to attain these objectives and that political, economic, social and
cultural life can be improved and established on firm ground, the national
charter clearly indicated the course to be followed: choose the right man for
the right job, in accordance with the socialist option of the Algerian
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revolution; neu~ralize, even eliminate fractional trends, the agitators who -
seek to destabilize the kinetic energy of the nati~n, fight an the inside as
well as on the outside, the intoxication of certain counter-revolutionary
curcents, frequently teleguided by imperialism and its allies, make those ~
who run away or avoid it, assume the notion of responsibility, fight against
waste, fraudulent dealings, against those who adopt a"wait and see" policy,
- and absenteeism. So many evils which the members of the central committee ~
were bound to denounce during their debates last month.
The enemies of the Algerian revolution are known: all those who refuse t~
respect the national charter on which FLN's basic ideology is founded, who,
according to president Chadli's own words, /seem to await the Messiah/ in
order to justify their refusal to fully participate, with a true sense of
patriotism, in the construction of their country. But these adversaries are
not the only ones; they are backed up by foreign countries, by imperialism and
its Western, African and Middle Eastern allies. An imperialism which is man-
ifested every day by the threats brandished by the little king of Morocco, the
Cairo coward, the Zionist aggressors, colonialist and French neocolonialism
nostalgia, and the sorcerers' apprenctices of the Carter-Brzezinski team.
Eighteen years after its independence, Algeria is preparing to establish a
new historical landmark. Its success wi11 depend essentially,.as has often
been said by its chief of state, not only on its vigilance but also and
especially on its determination to see to it that its national charter--its
best guarantee against deviations, interference with the socialist option
which the people, in an overwhelming majority, had already chosen--be scrup-
ulously respected. And that the people intend to follow this course whatever
the cost, and however great the sacrifices. -
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
7993
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IRAN
- UK CORRESPONDENT TALKS WITH BEHESHTI
LD030935 London THE TIMES in English 3 Jul 80 p 8
[Dispatch by Rnbert Fisk: "Iran's Power-Broker Defends Executions and Puts
Revolutionary Freedom into Perspect:tve"]
[Text] Tehran, July 2--Ayatollah Mohamed Beheshti has an unsettling
- habit of pushing his turban back on his head when talking to journalists,
wiping his brow with a paper tissue and chuckling in a deep voice when
confronted with questions that are meant to be difficult.
a
Imply that the Iranian revolution is not running quite as smootY:ly as he
and his c olleagues once hoped, and the Ayatollah looks at you sideways and
waves his hand in irritation.
"When you study the history of revolutions," he says, "you will find that
there are always problems. This is normal. When people here say they
are unhappy, it is because they have not experienced a revolution before.
There are problems--but they will be solved." _
AG head of Iran's supreme court, secretary of the Revolutionary Council,
effective leader of the Islamic Republican Party and potential candidate
for the p residency should Mr Bani-Sadr fall from office, Ayatollah Behesht:i
is a formidable power-broker.
He administers the Justice Department from one of the shah's old ministries,
a great three-sided building near the Tehran bazaar.
Since the supreme court has not yet been chosen, the Ayatollah ostensibly -
views the country's revolutionary justice from afar. But the courts '
_ which order summary executions and the ministries which are so enthusi-
astically purging their employees contain influential members and sympa-
- thizers of the IRP, which is the largest party elected to the Majlis
(Parliament). Not surprisingly, therefore, Ayatollah Beheshti professes
to be unmoved by the current executions and dismissals. `
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� v.� va a ~u1lW ~I~JL VL\l,L
"Don't you see," h.e says, "that there have been very few people sentenced
to death because of their failures in the ministries. Those people who
have been sentenced to death are in a different category--they are o~ium
or heroin dealers."
The Ayatollah does not believe that this has inhibited free speech.
Indeed, the mere suggestian that Iranians might be frightened to speak
their minds in a society which has become soaked in the idea of counter-
revolutionary conspiracies, provokes a sharp cross-examination.
"It is true that there have been some restrictions for newspapers and
- press agencies," he says, "but not to the degree that people are frightened
to explain their own ideas. I don't mind if people speak their minds.
But can you tell me how many people you have spoken to who told you that _
they do not have enough freedom and liberty to explain their ideas?"
When you tell the Ayatollah that 20 out of 30 Iranians had expressed just
such a sentiment, he comes back at once: "From which class?"
TeZl the Ayatollah that they were mostly middle class and he wants to
know in which part of the city they were interviewed, suspecting no doubt
that they came from the wealthy north Tehran suburbs. Inform the Ayatollah
that the interviews were conducted in the center of the city and he
replies with a snort of disbelief. '
"There are some groups who want to clai.m such restrictions of freedom in
Iran," he concludes. "But I do not believe them. They have freedom
enough to explain their own ideas."
The Ayatollah can be both specific and elusive when he discusses affairs
of state. He told a press conference earlier today, for example, that
- a new prime minister would be chosen within 2 weeks, but he later added
a rider that 2 weeks was the time limit for the Majlis to ask the president
to appoint a prime minister.
After 2 weeks, Ayatollah Beheshti clai.med, the Revolutionary Council
would be disolved. But he clarified this statement a few minutes later
and said the role of the Revolutionary Council would end--implying that
another role might be found for it.
He denied that there was a power struggle between Mr Bani-Sadr and the IRP.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Zimited 1980
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LIBYA _
BRIEFS
AIRCRAFT TO SEI'CHELLES--Libya is not limitin~ its diplomatic and military
activism to Africa; 2 pursuit aircraft have just been delivered by Tripoli
to the government of the Seychelles. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French
18 Jul 80 p 70)
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MAURITANIA
MOROCCO ACCUSED OF TRYING Td OVERTHROW REGIME
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jun-26 Jul 80 pp 22,23
[Article by Mohamed Razine: "Franco-Moroccan schemes. Who wants Ould
Haidallah's downfall?" words printed between slantlines published in italics]
[Text) The feudalists and the bourgeois feel that their
interests are threatened; they send out pressi~g appeals
which are finding favorable echoes in Rabat, Paris, Dakar
and as f ar as the Gulf.
What is happening in Mauretania? The Elysee shows signs of irritation. The
Quai d'Orsay is not happy, the French mil3.tary staff issues warnings to
Matignon and Giscard d'Estaing, while the special services (SDECE) (Foreign
Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Service) increasingly demand that some
"action" is taken in order to hasten the downfall of the Ould Haidallah regime. _
Some of the reasons for this warning to the French Government are expatiated
by our correspondent Said Ould Khelifa in the article we are publishing
hereunder. But some diplomatic sources, stationed in Nouakchott have given
out certain detailed information which is worthy of being examined.
l. The thorough ministerial reshuffling carried out by Ould Haidallah in
the past,few months was interpreted by the Mauritanian feudalist and
bourgeois classes as a prelude to Mauritania's adherence to the camp of the
anti-imperialist countries of the nonalined movement. These privileged
Mauritanian classes who fear the socioeconomic actions which would gravely
_ impair their interests, are making strenuous efforts in Paris and Rabat to
sabotage the policy of their regime and encourage a coup de force, and even
the assassination of their president.
2. King Hassan of Morocco, sent "confidential" messages and emissaries to
Paris, Washington and to the leaders of the feudalist Gulf as well as to the
African neocolotlial regimes asking them to stop all economic and financial
aid to Nouakchott, saying: /Only a few weeks, and at most 3~onths' blockade
will be needed for t}~e regi.me, which is preparing to ask for Algerian military
intervention, to collapse. It is necessary to act rapidly before the "fait
- accompli" is achieved"..."/ _
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3. It seems pr~ictically certain that Ryad and Dakar had replied positively
tc~ Rabat's appeal. More serious indeed, the Senegalese Government had pro-
mised to /envisage/ a diversionary maneuver with the assistance of some members
of the black Maurltanian popu.lation. Other Gulf states are being pressured
by Ryad to aline themselves uith these positions.
4. The Elysee has asked its various governmental services to exert all
n~~cessary pressures on Nouakchott in order /to avoid a situation which would
risk having grave repercussions on future Franco-Mauritanian relations/. To
what situation is it being referred to? The recognition Qf the Arab Saharan
republic by NouakchottY A new political-economic agreement with Algeria?
A policy of rapprochement with other progressive and revolutionary countries?
With socialist countries? These are numerous eventualities and lead to much
speculation in the diplomatic milieu,
Fiowever, what is very evident is that Paris and Rabat have become engaged
in schemes and intrigues destined to overthrow the Mauritanian regime. And
for the sole reason that they have not found as yet in the new regime any
elements able to counteract or neutralize any policy capable of placing
Mauritania in the camp of countries where anti-imperialism is vigorou~,
positive and consistent.
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MAURITANIA
LEADERS SEEK SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS IN REGIONAL FRAMEWaRK
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jun-26 Jul 80 p 23
[Article by Said Ould Khelifa: "A long desert Crossing"]
[Text] Has the time for unnatural equivocations and
alliances come to an end? The answer is yes, but...
Decidedly, Mokhtar Ould Daddah's legacy does not stop poisioning the political
life of a country sorely tried by the war. It should be mentioned that the
many ~ies woven with some fo~eign powers under the old ,~egime, were so com-
promising that only a long period of political stability is capable of un-
ravelling them.
Since the coup d'etat of 10 July 1978, various succeeding teams tried to
establish this stability. It seems that they could not succeed due to the
principles which guided their activities. In fact, they were constituted on
a patronage basis and not or. ~ cohPrent policy. Hence, unnatural amalgamations
and alliances prevailed--inevitable reverses of admixtures and personal
relations. Such structures in any case could not face the immense tasks
necessary for national recovery and even less confront the traps set by _
foreign capitals which have not digested the Mauritanian-Saharan agreement.
Because it did not pursue to the end the purge promised under Ould Salek's
government, Mauritania continues to pay for the result of its equivocations
and compromiSes. However, although it is evident that the problems were not
- solved, they seem to be better understood. It is.in this perspective that
the thorough reshuffling which has been occurring recently should be in-
cluded. There is no doubt that dismissing the defenders of feudalism and
bourgeoisie can only result in positive repercussions on the policy which
Oul,d Haidallah persists on enforcing since his accession to power at the
beginning of this year.
This is not without embarrassment for Ryad, Paris, Rabat and Dakar who however
are not standing still with their arms crossed. It is really from the
Senegalese capital that a small group (Alliance for a Democratic Ma.uritania)
is agitating, taking orders from tne Moroccan palace. In addition, economic
blackmail which holds sway in the Gulf states would also crash down heavily
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I~Ut~ Ur~ iC]'Al. trSE ON~,Y
if Nouakchott recognized the SADR (Saharan Arab Democratic Republic). A real
race against time is actually being run. As for Morocco and its quadroon of
allies it is a inatter of preventing such an eventuality at any cost. Rabat
~ is not oblivious to the consequences which such a step would have at the time
of the next OAU summit. Fully aware of the stake at hand, the Mauritanian
progressionist group affirm, irony of fate, that it is the recognition of SADR
by the OAU which will guarantee the existence of the Mauritanian Islamic
Republic.
To be sure, up to date Ould Haidallah has not let it be known that this was
possible. However, the Algiers agreement initialled in August 1979 by the -
Saharans and the Mauritanians, is ex~licit enough in this connection. At all
- events, the recent trip, of the leading Mauritanian in the East and in the Far
~ast should allow him to adopt a more open attitude. During his long and
complicated journeys Ould Haidallah did not always meet friends, Peking remains
a striking example.
Important measures are aboL: to be taken in Mauritania, where after having
obtained the withdrawal of the French troops, it is increasingly clear that,
for the political leaders, the solution to the problems can only be effected
in a regional and/or continental framework.
Should Mokhtar Ould Zamel's recent visit to Algiers at the invitation of
Mehamed Benyahia, his Algerian counterpart, be registered in this perspective?
It is quite probable. But, once more, it is wise not to be too hastily op-
timistic since the debacle of the royal armed forces in the Western Sahara
and the unparalleled economic crisis which our neighbors to the south, Senegal,
� are experiencing, could be the sources of new troubles in the region. Inasmuch
_ as ttie Western protectors of these two countries are striving to remain the
masters of the game.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique Asie
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SUDAN
CURRENT DOMESTIC SITUA~ION SUNINiED UP
- Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE i:~ French No 216 23 Jun 80 p 25
[Article by Rachid JawadJ
(Excerpts) As to the Sudanese domestic situation, it does not stop deteri-
orating. While the black market takes on astronomical prcportions in the
wake of the government's decision to terminate the state monopoly on dis-
tribution and importation channels, the infla.tion rate already exceeds 70
percent annually. The price of sugar increased by 120 percent while that
of other basic foodstuffs has cli.mbed by 100 to 180 percent. Strikes and
demonstrations attributed by the regi.me to "atheists" and "Communists,"
although simply an expression of public wrath, were followed by the arrest
of several hundreds of inen and women who with thousands of others languish
in Sudanese prisons, particularly that of Kouber.
Lack of Respect for Commitments
On the other hand, the appeal la.unched by Numeiry to the opponents to
- "return to the country and contribute to the building of the nation"
petered out. Noboc~y trusts hi.m. And with reason: the leader of the
Oumma party and head of the influential sect of the Ansars, Sadek el-
Mehdi and the leader of the DemQCratic Unionist Party, Cherif el-Hindi
quite simply refuse to believe in the promises of a man w~o, they say,
never honored his co~anitments." Although E1-Mehdi had made it up with
Numeiry in Ma,rch 1978 and had rejoined his regime, he resigned, 8 months
later, from the Political Bureau of the USS (Sudanese Socialist Union)
found by N~neiry to the capitulation agreements signed by Sadat at Cam;~
David. As to Cherif Hindi he never wa,nted to return to Khartoum, but
continued in exile to fight against the regame, insisting on the need to
organize truly free elections. In other words, the "national reconcilia-
tion" campaign launched by Numeiry in July 1977 has totally failed.
Alone the Moslem Brothers--whose leader Hassan al-Tourabi joined the sole
Sudanese party--rehabilitated and reestablished, support Nwneriry. But -
their sympathizers, traditionally strong at the rJniversity, markedly dimin-
ished recently.
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Their loyalty to the regi~e evidently is linked to the Saudi petrodollars
which continue to mould the internal and foreign poli~tics of the Sudan.
The quarrel between Ryad and Khartoum following Numeiry's approval of the
Camp David agreements has in fact been replaced by reconciliation. Finan-
cier of the Sudanese regitne, Saudi Arabia also obtained from Num~?eiry that
he alters his aim and pretends to keep his distance from Egypt. Although
the Sudanese ambassad,or in Cairo was recalled, relations with Cairo were
never completely broken, especially since Numeiry cannot do without Egyp-
tian militaxy support. However it is to be noted that the relations be-
tween ~.dan on one side and Irak and Libya on ~the other appear to ~zormalize
in some way after Numeiry reaffirmed in ~.nis his loyalty to the B~.gd,ad
summit resolutions and his total cot?mm.itment on the side of the other Arab
countries .
Words and Acti~ns
On this level Numeiry's speech on 25 May did not bring anything new. The
head of the Sudanese State declared that Sudan's place is on the side of
the Arab nation which struggles.to liberate its territory and then recalled
the Sudanese contribution to the Arab people's fight for the last 30 years.
But these sweetened words mainly appear an echo of the Saudi positions
destined above all else to reassure certain Arab c~,pitals which "continue
to doubt ~ci~anese loyalty to the Arab cause." But have not Numeiry's acts
always belied his words?
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
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SYRIA
VIOLENCE, ARRESTS CONTINUE TN NORTHERN CITIES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABT in Arabic 25 Apr-1 May 80 p 18
[Article: ~"Syria: New Assassinations, but the State Has Tightened Its Grip
on the Northern Cities"]
[Text] Damascus--The few reports available here from Syria's northern cities
mention that new assassinat3ons have taken place of a number of partisans of
the government. However, the armed forces have completely closed off these
cities, including Aleppo, Hamah, Jisr al-Shughur and Dayr al-Zur.
According to military personnel coming from Aleppo, the number of armed for-
ces surrounding the city and carrqing out combing operations inside it street
by street and house by house, is 25,000 soldiers. Among these are 5,000
from the forces of the defenae detachments led by Colonel Rif'at al-Asad,
the younger brother of the Syrian president, Hafiz al-Asad.
Arrivals from Aleppo are telling of acts of violence or theft during searches
and arrests which include adolescent boys and girls. Meanwhile, colleges of
closed down University of Aleppo are swarming with large forces with their
mechanized units. "
Eqewitnesses say that Aleppo's policemen have been stripped of their weapons,
because of the regime's lack of trust in them. Most of them have been issue,
clubs and sticks. Meanwhile, patrols of modern tanks which the Syrians did
not see before are being sighted in the streets. It is believed that they
are suitable for inner city fighting.
The Syrian suthorities say that they have discovered large quantities of arms
in the sections they are searching. However, sources in the armed religious
groups deny this. These sources say that in the area of Bab al-Nayrab, which
is considered a religious and popular stronghold, the authorities have dis-
covered nothing but ~ive revolvers.
However, the Syrian authorities are arresting everyone found to be in pos-
session of religiaus books or publications, especially the books of 'Isam
al-'At*.ar, the leader o� the Moslem Brotherhood in Syria, who has been living
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in exile for 17 years. Tt is going about that a s~vere sentence awaits who-
ever is discovered to have 3.n his possession the secret magazine AL~NADHIR
[The Herald] published by the Brotherhood. It is believed that it is printed
in a European country and smu~gled into Syria.
The Syrian authorities are looking for two of the prominent leaders of the
radical religious groups, belonging to the clans of al-Qudsi and 'Atabih in
- Aleppo.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that the Syrian authorities have appealed to
the Christian clerics to condemn the "acts of armed violence" by armed re-
ligious groups. But the latter tactfully apologized that they do not want
to involve themselves or their Christian communities in a conflict which is
taking on a religious or sectarian character.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has also learned that pamphlets were distributed in the
Christian quarters of Aleppo in which the armed religious groups pledge
that they will not interfere ~rith the Christians and reaffirm their respect
for them and for the peaceful coexistence which the city has known for ages.
As a result of this, and in spite of the stormy events which Aleppo has
witnessed, an atmosphere of harmony dominates the relationship between
Christians and Moslems there.
On of the pamphlets says that the armed groups are not against the 'Alawi
[Moslem Nusairi Sect] community itself, but against exploitation, corrup -
tion and tyranny in general.
Observers here believe that the offensive of the security forces succeeded
in relatively freezing most of the activity of the armed groups, especially
as these groups failed to present to the Syrian citizens and the opposit ion
parties a program of firm and definite demands.
A number of senior Syrian military officers are frequently visiting Aleppo.
Among them are Brig Gen Mustafa Talas, the minister of defense, who is
married to an Aleppo woman from a well-known family and Rif'at al-Asad.
It is noted that groups of education citizens and former ~unior officers,
including Alawis, are undertaking large-scale leftist activity in behalf
of Mr Salah Jadid, who ruled Syzia with an iron fist between 1966 and 19 70.
It is believed that Mr Jadid and most of his major collaborators have been
kept in an elevated wing of the al-Mazzah prison hospital overlooking
- Damascus ever since Ha~iz al-Asad drove them out of power.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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SYRIA
FORMER MINISTER SEES DEMOCRACY AS THE ONLY SOLUTION
Paris AL-WATAN AL" ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Apr 80 pp 32-33
[Interview with Jamal al-Atasi, former Syrian minister and leader of Arab
Socialist Union in Damascus; date not given]
[TextJ Jamal al-Atasi, (age 59) is a psychiatrist and influential states-
man, educated in many fields of study. He is a former minister with long E
experience in the nationalist movement in Syria through affiliation with the
Ba'ath, then Nasirist movements. He was one of the first to associate na-
tionalist thinking with socialist thinking. He was imprisoned and tortured
during the regime of Salah Jadid (1966-1970) and welcomed the reform movement
of Hafiz al-Asad. However, he is once again at variance with the state on
the question of democracy. So what does this statesman and great thinker
say today about what is happening aroimd him in Sqria and the Arab world?
Dr Jamal al-Atasi needs no introduction. He was a militant in the ranks of
the Arab Socfialist Ba'ath Party,.then under the banner of 'Abd al-Nasir. He
is today still carrying the banner of Arab unity through the organization
which he founded and heads, the "Arab Socialist Union." In spite of the
difficulties experienced by this party, especially after the faction of
Fawzi al-Kayali split off from the party, left the Syrian National Progres-
sive Front in 1973 and 3oined the government, the party survived on the
Syrian scene in one form or another.
Dr Jamal is a psychiatrist. He receives his patients, as usual, in his
clinic in which medicine is mingled with politics. On the tables and chairs,
medical and pharmaceutical publications and magazines are mixed with poli-
tical reports of the Arab Socialist Union and other Syrian parties and
organizations.
At seven in the evening, when the number of patients gradually diminishes
leaders of the party and politicians of various orientations arrive at the
clinic in succession. When the doctor is free of patients, he begins a
democratic dialog such as Sqria has been lacking these days. The debate
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_ .
intensifies and points o~ view differ. flut there is finally agreement on
one point--that Syria is in need of a new climate, an open and democratic
clitnate.
Jamal al-Atasi strongly opposes terrorism. In one of the recent statements
of the Arab Socialist Union, fie said: "We oppose and re~ect terrorism
in all its forms, from whatever source it may come, particularly that
which nurtures bigotrq, is nurtured by fanaticism, and stir up factors of
national division. However, any nat~,onal progressive force which is con- ~
tent with condemning or criticizing terrorist violence against the regime, ~
avoid confronting the basic dimension of the problem.
In the clinic on Shahbadhar Street in downtown Damascus, I conducted the
follawing interview with Dr al-Atasi.
[Question) After all that has happened and is happening on the Arab scene,
what are the lessons which can be gleaned, in qour view, from the past of
the national struggle of the Arab homeland?
[AnswerJ Our concern and worry today centers on the matter of democracy.
The postulates of the Arab revolution so far have been those of a national
revolution (progress, national and pan-Arab integration, agricultural reform,
etc). It did not focus on democratic principles. The presumption has been
that the basic facts of civilized progress would come by themselve~ after-
wards. There was no clear theory as to how to direct change, and there was
no formula for social development. Progress was fragile, and for that reason
you find today that the wave of retrogression is strong.
During the 50's and 60's, the good omens were many, and there was progress ~
in spite of defeats. The Arab revolution was adhering to a general direc-
tion, and to a general guiding lirYe, in spite of setbacks.
But after the year 1970, specifically, after the departure of 'Abd al-Nasir,
the social changes which took place led to the emergence of a consumer so-
ciety, and to a disruption of the broad social base of th~ masses, which was
to be the foundation of the progressive movement.
[Question] Why is it that the issue of democracy was not on the minds of the
various regimes?
[Answer) The groups which were in control brought about changes but they
did not come up with solutions. They neither developed the idea of a
socialist society, even in its simple form, nor did they develop a bourgeois
society. The process of dictatorship and control led to the disintegration
of society, and to similarity between the various regimes with regard to
the social and class environment they brought about.
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For this reason, governments turned to native or imported resources and to
the resources of international u~ono~olist ~orces. Likewise, regimes engaged -
in open cooperation with imperialiam in order to frustrate realistic move-
ments for the sake o~ sta}ring in poa~er. Regimes sought to broaden their
base througfi interests associated with them instead of relying on develop-
ing new social and political relations.
[Question] Can you illustrate this analysis of yours with examples?
[Answer] We notice during the last 2 years the blowing up of these regimes
and the crystallization of new forms of popular reaction. We see t~day
similar movements in many countries.
In Egypt, a popular movement is now taking shape. Even the forces which
competed with one another in the past are ~oining hands today. The left-
ists, who were laying down long-range plans of leaps from phase to phase,
are today focusing on more fundamental and more realistic goals.
Syria today is also experiencing a nationalistic climate. Civilian forces
are demanding change for the well-being of the entire society. The con~ern
of the various regimes is to undermine the social principles which can be
used by movements of change, like the trade unioas, which are being trans-
formed into blocks of bureaucrats. The student movement was crushed. The
peasants in the villages returned to their isolation. The countryside is
migrating to the city.
Indeed, the movements which were presumed to be the pioneers of change have
been robbed of their ideology. Slogans have become mere abstractions to
justify state supremacy. And just when the people thought that the tradi-
tional line..., the Syrian countryside reverted to past conditions of
quarrels among families, tribes and the sects.
The popular movements in the Arab homeland are now in need of a regime which
- would support the movement for change. Cumulative evidence makes us feel
_ today that spontaneous factors can be transformed into an organized process.
Where Did al-Sadat Emerge From?
[Question] This means that the past stage of the national and pan-Arab
struggle was 3oomed by the points of weakness which led to a setback.
[Answer] A combination of factors produced the setback: Fragility of pro-
gress; weakness of revolutionary forces; lack of planning; lack of emphasis
on the democratic principle as a basis for building regimes. Therefore,
the retrogressive movement came out of the heart of the progressive movement.
From where aid al-Sadat emerge? From Eastem despotic regimes. From mid-
dle class elements' domination of the revolution. Thus, capitalism of the
state was merely transformed into a state of capitalists.
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Nasir's Formula Is Inadequate
[Question] Do you now criticize the experiment o~ Jamal `Abd al--Nasir, even
though your party bears the name o~ the last of his political organizations?
(Anewer] The experiment of 'Abd al~-Nasir wa~ an attempt to create a prac-
tical basis for steering an existing movement in the Arab nation. It was
an attempt to rebuild society and the state. There were, in fact, loopholes.
We accept his experiment only with regard to its general orientation. We
- are mindfu7 of the fact that every setback led 'Abd al-Nasir to try a fresh
p ush forward. But he did not draw up a long-range program in his attempts
to reb uild. He was content with a broad plan without adequate development.
Indeed, he had aspirations for a national revolution having an Arab orienta-
tion. This is the general overriding character of Nasirism. But the for-
mulas used were inadequate, although 'Abd al-Nasir was dedicated to change.
In the phase following the separation of Egypt and Syria, 'Abd al-Nasir
d rew up a charter and drew a picture of what Arab relations with foreign
powers ought to be based on. Although this picture had some flaws, some of
h is ideas are being proposed in Europe itself today, particularly in left-
ist circles. These ideas deal with, for example, the establishment of various
f actions of the people, the issue of the democratic road to socialism, and
the issue of involving the greatest possible number of people in property
ownership instead of making it merely public ownership.
Nasir Made Mistakes, But so Did the Others
[Question] There were those who accused Nasir of expanding the reign of the
intelligence bureau in Syria, and substituting it for political partie~.
[Answer] The fundamental weakness was on the part of the Syrian political
forces, not on the part of 'Abd al-Nasir. It was wrong, of course, to abol-
ish political parties without providing a real substitute and without deep
understanding of the social and class structure. The formula for the gener-
al political structure of the Egyptian-Syrian federation was likewise aot ~
mature. However, the political forces lacked maturity too. They could see
no solutions except through their conflicts, especially the conflict be-
tween the nationalist bourgeoisie and the communists.
- 'Abd al-Nasir had a chance to experiment by way of his regime. He dedicated
h is life to create a popular political base for the regime and to come up
with a new formula.
The time for the political forces which he eliminated in Egypt has passed.
It is incorrect to say that the parties dissolved themselves in Syria. The
Ba'ath Party remained. So did the Communist Party. When the separation [of
Egypt and Syria] came about, it became clear that the fe~eration had initi-
ated~s movement of the masses. But the Left stood against the movement of
masse;s instead of standing with it.
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[Question] Then where does the Left stand, if it does not stand in line with
the masses?
[Answer] 'Abd al-Nasir created a popular movement through his nationalization -
measures and through dedi~ation to unity. But the common denominator among
the various forces at the time of the separation was deliverance from 'Abd
al-iVasir.
This weakened the [pol3.tical] forces on the scene, not the movement of the
masses. These forces returned to action without forming a base among the
masses.
Egypt Is a Basic Pillar
[Question) Let me recall names. Do you mean the position of Mr Akram al-
Hurani had no ~ustification?
[Answer] Akram al-Hurani, a true nationalist, played a large role in Syria,
and still does. But he ~s doomed by a complex to political ineffectiveness.
In any case, in spite of everything that has happened until this day on the
- Arab scene, the great gap is Egypt's departure. No [Arab] strategy can be -
, built without Egypt. There can be no firm foundation without Egypt's re-
turn. The Eg~yptian society is the most developed Arab society and their
expulsion from the scene is a big problem. We cannot create a substitute
for them.
But the Egyptian crisis lies in the Egyptian intelligentsia. 'Abd al-Nasir
used to say of them, "These people do not think." Today the group of inen
in the educated and ruling class is playing al--Sadat's game on the assump-
tion that he will provide them with a new climate.
However, their overriding character is an opportunistic one. They seek re-
fuge in the power of the state, and their ideology is one of dictatorship,
The thing that bothered 'Abd al-Nasir most was, specifically, the intelli-
gentsia, especially with regard to the fickleness and vacillation of the
education class.
'Abd al-Nasir doubtless disregarded the role of despotic authority. The
new thinking was not given a chance to crystallize and form a base. In ad- _
dition, there was a lack of crystallization of political and social forces.
The wide base of the educated class was opportunistic, and Egypt, even in
_ the days of 'Abd al-Nasir, did not see a unity of direction ~nong the edu-
cated leadership opposed to the state. This being so, al-Sadat knew how to
manipulate specific factors. The question is, will this set-up continue
indefinitely.
[Question] What is qour answer?
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av~~ v~aivttua VUL~ VL\LL
[AnswerJ It would not make senae if it did, from a historic point of view. -
However, the rise of a regional Egy~ptian structure allied with Israel will -
be a calamity for the Arab nation.
[Question] How do you view what has taken place in Iran?
[Answer] The Iranian revolution is positive from one standpoint--the power
of the movement of a people to change a regime like the shah's regime. A
general popular movement was able to do it b~ itself:. As for what followed,
that is something else. In Syria, the situation is totally different. Noth-
ing like what happened in Iran can occur. Here in Syria, the people's �
aspiration is for the unity of the nation. The latest program of the Moslem
Brotherhood does not demand more than demacratic liberties, and does not
propose any formula for rebuilding the state.
The Brotherhood Has Been Made To Look Bigger Than It Is
[Question] Do you believe that there is a danger of a sectarian explosion
in Syria?
[Answer] The sectarian fighting exists, and is dangerous. The assassina-
' tions and the reactions to them, the emergence of armed militias in some
areas, and the occurrance of armed clashes which have assumed a somewhat
sectarian character, represent a new phenomenon. However, there is no doubt
that the size of the Moslem Brotherhood has been made to look far larger
than it really is due to the torrent of accusation against it. One of
the Brot:~erhood's statements says that the treatment they are receiving
"qualifies them to lead the people."
- [Question] In your capacity as a militant Syrian in the ranks of the nation-
al movement, how do you see the cu.rrent situation in Lebanon, and what
solution do you see for the tragedy of the neighbor country?
[Answer] The problem is no longer merely a Lebanese problem. I, as a Syrian,
desire the restoration of Lebanese patriotism, even in its former coexisten-
tial format, as an alternative to the present situation. When its regime
was relaxed, Lebanon was a place where conflicting international and Arab
points of view could coexist.
In 1958, the Syrians almost became involved in the events in Lebanon. I
was, at that time, publishing the newspaper AL-BA'TH along with 'Abd al-
Karim Chuhur, a great statesman and educated man. We refused to write a
single word in support of the activities of 'Abd al-fiamid al-Siraj (ttie
director of military intelligence at that time). We said at that time:
"Lenanon must be preserved as a meeting place and a model of coexistence."
'Abd al-Halim Qaddur was sent to us to write an editorial siding with the
Lebanese National Movement in AL-BA'TH. Our posit3on in this regard caused
us problems with the party leadership. Salah al-Bitar wanted to revoke the
paper's license and others threatened to attack the offices of the paper with
stones, saying that we were causing embarrassment fo~ 'Abd al-Nasir. ~
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The Educated Are Responsible
[QuestionJ Many today condemn thE intervention of the military in politics.
Do you not think that the civilian politician~.bear a large responsibility
for the involvement o~ the military in politics?
[Answer] The educated bear an enormous responsibility for the surrender of
authority to the military. Their progressive and revolutionary stancs were
inadequate. They thought that the course they followed would produce the
required changes. But they occupied the seats of ~ower, although they had
no basic idea of the principles of social and historical development. To-
day there is an effort to make amends for their sins and to make serious
rea$sessments.
[Question] What is the so~ution now? ,
[Answer] The solution is the restoration of democracy. Some imagine that
this is an academic matter. But there is an increasing insistence on this
solution. Repressive operations have exceeded all bounds, and do not serve
the interests of those who are pursuing them. There is a general feeling
to this effect today.
Our Slogan: Recourse to the Masses
[Question] What about the situation with regard to the organization of the
Arab Socialist Union following the difficulties it experienced in recent
years?
[AnswerJ We left the National Progressive Front in I973, before the war.
We were criticized for this afterwards. We left weaker, but healthy. We
did not give up on forming a united Nasirist Party after tk~e dep~rture of
the group which thought that it had taken away the party itself with it--mean-
ing the organization of Fawzi al-Kaqali. In reality, all it took was a
position in the government.
We stayed in politics after 'Abd al-Nasir. Our strategy still had its funda-
mentals graunded in reality. There was something wrong with the system. We
proposed the demo~~ratic way as of that time. We began to rebuild new rela-
tions with other forces. Our slogan from then on became "recourse to the
masses." We then started a dialog with the progressive forces and even with
some elements of the regime.
[QuestionJ What are your relations with other organizations on the Syrian
scene?
[Answer] The present apgroach is to open a dialog with the co~nunists,
namely the group of the political bureau, i.e. Ripad al-Turk's group; with ~
the revolutionary wo rkers group; and with certain Ba'thist forcea. Some of
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rvn vrrl~lew uor. v~vLt
these forces are not large and the pressures they were subjected to in the
past transformed most of them into marginal forces. However, what we are
striving for today is to set in motion the broad labor base.
[Question] Are you dealing with the religious ~actions.
[Answer] We have no relaL~ons with the reli,;ious factors. But we will not
re~ect them if they accep,= a national democratic program.
[Quesrion] And the ~ommunist Party led by Ktialid Bak.iiash?
[Answer] Bakdash's group backs the existing situation, but receives nothing `
but contempt and mistreatmen~ in return.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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SYRIA
- R,~:LIGIOUS LEADERS ARE ON HIT LIST OF ARMED RELIGIOUS GROUPS
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Apr 80 pp 16-17
[Article: "Blacklist Includes the Mufti of the Republic and a Former Min-
ister of Religious Trusts"J
[Text] Dali~ascus--On the way to recovery in a hospital in a European capital
is Shaykh Salah 'Aqlah (age 61). He is one of the Islamic ulema of Dama- -
cus.
Shaykh 'Aqlah, known for his close friendship with Syrian President Hafiz
al-Asad had been struck by a bullet which pierced his left cheek and passed
through to his right temple. This occurred a few weeks ago ~~~hen he was
emerging from one of the mosques in the Sqrian capital. E
Friends of Shaykh 'Aqlah say that he had received more than one threat from -
armed religious groups. He was beaten up several times before the attempt
to assassinate him took place. The said religious scholar, who is a teacher
of religious curricula in Damascus schools, miraculously escaped death. He
was sent at the expense of the Syrian Government to receive intensive treat-
ment abroad.
~S group of Moslem ulema are facing similar death threats from the armad re-
ligious groups. It is said that some ulema have received a blacklist which
includes the names of those who have been "sentenced to death" for their
cooperation with �the current regime.
The blacklist includes His Emminence, Shaykh Ahmad Kaftaru (age 77), the
Mufti of tlie Republic. He too ia a personal friend of President al-Asad
, and one of the verq wealthy citizens of llamascus. -
The blacklist also includes His Emminence, 'Abd a1-Sattar al-Sayyid, who was
minister of religious trusts for some 10 years hefore he gave up this post
in the recent reshuf~le of the Syrian Government.
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lv~? Va'� LV.LaW V?U \i~~Ll
The armed religious groups were able to assassinate Shaykh Zahir Kaftaru,
~ a son o~ hit~ emminence, the Mufti of the Republic, about a year ago. It
is reported that his second son was exposed to a similar attempt.
- Caution and fear still dominate the situation in Syria. Here, contradictory
reports about the situation i.n the middle and .iorth of the country are cir-
culating. Tight supervision has been placed on the movement of non-Syrians
there.
According to unofficial reports, the aecurity agencies have been given
3 months to liquidate the "religious terrorists." A difficult operation is
now under way in search for arms and ammunition caches. Actually, some ,
quantities have been seized in the towns and countryside of the north, east
_ and west (the coast). It is noted here that Syrian political organizations
inside and outside the "National Progressive Front" are engaged in exten-
sive activities and intensive contacts in a process of reexamination and
self-criticism of their roles as well as of the policies of the regime.
Political pamphlets issued by these organizations are being circulated. Al1
~ of them urge the regime to adopt a true democratic course of action, and
express their extreme fear of the possible consequences of ignoring these
demands.
As to the official and party press, it continues its large-scale campai~r?
~ against "imperialism, reaction and Zionism" and would have these bear re-
sponsibility for what is happening in the country. It is observed that
this press has attacked "the childish left." It is believed that it means
by this term the group of Salah Jadid, who fell from power in 1970.
In this framework, the associations of lawyers, pharmacists and physicians
have been dissclved. President al-Asad had received cables of support from
groups within these associations representing members of the rul:~ng party,
factions of the [Natior.al Progressive] Front and a faction of the Communist
Party led by Khalid Bakdash {age 70). The elected councils of these assoc-
iations have been branded as "reactionary bourgeoisie." These councils had
refused to send cables of congratulations to President al-Asad on his all-
out campaign against the armed religious groups following the recen* events
in Aleppo and Hamah.
The Arab Socialist Union Party issued a statement in which it said that the
events of Aleppo and other cities repreaent a"popular movement in which
all classes have taken part and are not caused by the Camp David nations as
the regime claims."
_ The st-atement demanded the li~ting of martial 1a~~, the abolition of the
- ~tate of emergency and of the state security tribunal, the institution of
freedom o~ the press and of political parties, the holding of free elections,
~ -
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th~ release.of those in detention, the el,itq~aation,o~ ahowa o~ ~orce and of
stop-and-search operations, and the check~ng o~ in~lation and high prices.
~ The Political Bureau o~ the Syxian Co~onun~st Party in the city o~ Aleppo
, issued a statement in whcih ~t described the events o~ Aleppo in moving
terms. TEie bureau ca11s ~or the release of detainees, the abolit3on of the
state of emergency and the lifting oP martial Iaw and of restrictions on
civil liberties.
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TUNISIA
SPLIT AMONG COMMUNISTS REPORTED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14 Apr 80 p 20
[Text] What is going on with the Tuni~ian commi;nists? It was apparent
that a fire was smoldering unde r the ashes. in recent years, two ~
groups did in fact emerge and s ince 26 January 1978, the wrangling and
disagreements steadily increased. Neverthelesa, the unity of Tunisian
communists withstood it all. No t any longer.
Tunisian Communists in France, both young and old, disappointed by what they
describe as the "weakening" of part of the Tunisian Communist Party~s
leaders, have ~ust made their po sition public. They re~ect the content of
recent statements published on b ehalf of the PCT, as well as the latter's
alliance with Ahmed Mestiri and the so-called "liberals." They stress the
choice they have always recommended, that of a priority alliance with
progressive Tunisian forces.
The statement published in Tunis on behalf of the PCT after the Gafsa affair
was the straw that broke the came 1's back. Those who have chosen to break
with this line issued a statemen t in Paris denouncing "...the false communist
accomplices who, come hell or high water, persist in the path of Ahmed ~
Mestiri, who had already led them to label the young, innocent victims of
26 January 1978 as anarchists." They virulently attack "the false consensus
that has emerged around the gove rnment following Gafsa, which embodies the
concepts of the National Pact p roposed by Mestiri, approved by the false
communists and proving to be no thing more than a new edition of the famous
~ national Union of Power..."
"...What we are now seeing in the Sahara should serve as a lesson: Because
of their king's connivance with his American masters, young Moroccans believing
- they are dying for the un~ty of their country are in fact killing and dying
for strategic interests that are totally alien to them. We do nc~t want our
suffering youth, (exile, labor camps, and so on), the victim of unemployment,
to one day become cannon fodder for a regime which, in order to defend the
privileges of a minority, will no t hesitate to call on French and American
protectors for which the courageo us Tunisian people will pay dearly."
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TUNISIA
DIVERSE REACTIONS TO EXECU'iION OF GAFSA ATTACKERS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 Apr SO pp 16-17
[Editorial by Simon Malley: "The Crime"]
(Text] He began his reign in blood, the blood of a man who had been his
traveling companion for 20 years: Salah Ben Youssef. He decided to have
- him assassinated and sent a commando group of secret agents, led by Zarg
el-Ayoun, to cut him down in his hotel room in the FRG. Once the deed was
done, the murderers were immediately welcomed in Tunis by Habib Bouguiba
himself, who then congratulated them--he was to confirm it publicly and
boast about it some years later--"for the patriotic task you have ~ust
completed." This is how he described the sordit job he had perpetrated
against one of the most distinguished figures of the Neo-Destour Party of
which he was secretary-general. And it was done solely because Salah Ben
Youssef, a nationalist of integrity, had opposed the signing of the French-
Tunisian agreement granting Tunisia internal autonomy while advocating
continuation of the struggle.
At dawn on that Thursday, 17 April--at the end of a life which the Tunisian
people will one day view as nothing more than a long, far too long, chain
of corruption, misappropriations, political perversion and deterioration,
accompanied by the inevitable consequence of crimes, imprisonments, torture
and the execution of opponents--it was the hand of the same executioner
thar_ struck. Thirteen young patriots were immolated: workers, peasants,
teachers and students, the representatives of an overexploited class whose
only crime had been to sacrifice themselves in order to make themselves heard,
to tell the whole world that the time had come to look at the misery,
hunger, unemployment and sufferings of 6 million Tunisians. By means of a
spectacular gesture, however desperate, they sought to demonstrate that
the Tunisia run by this sick and senile autocrat, manipulated in turn by his
wife, his son "Bibi" or the most dubious courtiers of a discredited,
incompetent political class that was both unpopular and behind the times
and history, had become a veritable inferno~ "'hey sought to prove that the
overwhelming majority of the people lived unrer intolerable conditions of
poverty, that oppressors and exploiters were to be found at all levels of
government, that the billions amasaed by the ministers, ambassadors and ;
i
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board chairmen and fraudulently hidden in Swiss banks or elsewhere by the
Wasailas, Belkhodjas, Ben Ammars and their accomplices were the fruits of
a racket [hat victimized a people. They wanted to show that the standard
of living of that people was steadily deteriorating parallel with the
enrichment of a political class which always finds ~ustification for main-
taining the etatus quo. The 1950's and 1960's marked the whole-hearted
denunciation of Nasser, "dictator of the Nile." Then came Libya and
Algeria, which provided Bourgui~a with other targets. The local Tunisian
or "foreign" press echoed his condemnation on command.
Bourguiba's supporters did not wish to allow the shouts of the heroes, the
martyrs of Gafsa, to spread further in the neo-colonial night of Tunis. The
protection of their interests depended upon their being stifled. The parade
of these politicians, on whom Bourguiba had heaped insults and sarcasm,
before the "Supreme Combatant's" palace to denounce the Gatsa revolutionaries
and conde~, first Tripoli and then Algiers, solely in order to acquire a
ministerial portfolio or a diplomatic post, was enough to make one vomit.
� In this climate of "national unity," as Habib Bourguiba described it in a
letter to one head of state who had asked him to spare ~he lives of those
condemned to death, "How could I permit myself ~o back down? Even the pro-
Libyan (referring to the creator of the aborted Tunisian-Libyan unity,
Mohamed Masmoudi) knelt at my feet to ask forgiveness "for his past mistakes."
I could not elude the voice of that national unanimity(...) and fail to
_ teach tomorrow's sourcerPr's apprentices a lesson.
Habib Bourguiba~s crime will not go unpunished. We make this assertion,
convinced that although maiikind~s memory is often short, that of the people
is tenacious, lasting, permanent. Fear of prison, torture or the gallows
- never caused revolutionary heroes of centuries past to retreat. Nor will
it ever discourage colonialized, oppressed, terrorized peoples who know they
have nothing to lose but a life of misery, indignities and shame.
One day, you, the assassin of Carthage, will pay for the innocent blood you
shed with a cyricism equalled only by the scorn you show for your people.
- Remember, in the last moments of your life, the fate reserved for the Idi
Amins, Haile Selassies, Ould Daddahs, Pol Pots, Reza Pahlavis, Lon Nols,
_ Thieus, Somozas and Bokassas. Do not forget what happened to Tombalbaye
and Macias and only a short time ago Tolbert. You should be aware of two
things, Habib Bourguiba: The Tunisian people will avenge this crime and
the others and we will spit on your tomb.
COPYRIGHT: Reported 1980 Afrique-Asie
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TUNISIA
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT REACTS TO EXECUTION OF GAFSA ATTACKERS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 Apr 80 p 16
[Text] News of the execution of the 13 men condemned to death for their
involvement in the Gatsa incident had the effect of a bombshell. The aston-
ishment and consternation that gripped Europe was in direct proportion to
"the hope that Bourguiba would pardon them:"
A few minutes after the tragic announcement was made, Henri Martin, speaking
on behalf of communist elected officials and those in the European Parlia-
mentary, called for an interruption of the meeting to say: "I wish to express
our emotion and voice our indignation over this bloody, iniquitous crime
comtnitted by Bourguiba with utter disregard for the human individual
and human rights. For the time being, there is nothing further I can add."
Louis Baillot, European communist deputy and member of the Central Committee
of the French Communist Party, told the AFRIQUE-ASIE correspondent: "It
is a crime and we can only condemn the attitude of a government that has
defied the world, becausA numerous appeals were formulated everywhere asking
- for the pardon of those men condemned to death. It is a defiance of
progressive mankind and to mankind period. Bourguiba decided to kill, to
assassinate 13 Tunisians
Georges Sarre, French Socialist and deputy in the European Parliament, told
us the following: "I took the step, 3 days ago, of submitting to the European
Parliament a resolution aimed at making an appeal to President Bourguiba in
favor of clemency. Unfortunately, Bourguiba refused to heed our appeal. For
our part, we are all the more moved because every time a man dies a violent
death, we regard it as something dramatic. We believe that Bourguiba~s ~
regime, which is a repressive, intolerant government, is coming to an
end in a river of blood."
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TUNISIA
TUNISIAN OPPOSITION INDIGNANT OVER EXECUTION OF GAFSA ATTACKERS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 Apr 80 p 17
[Text) On the evening of 17 April, three political groups in opposition
to the Bourguiba regime published statements expressing their indignation.
Labeling the executions as assassinations, the Tunisian National Opposition
Movement (I~FONT), led by Ibrahim Tobal, claims that the executions took
place the evening before--that is, on Wednesday, 16 April, "which proves
once more that Bourguiba's government had to act as is its wont, by stealth,
as criminals do." MONT salutes the memory of the 13 martyrs of Gafsa, whose
names "join the long list of martyrs of the national oppos~Stion, such as
Salah Ben Youssef, Ma~or Zallaq, Hocine el-Had~, and others."
Their sacrifice, MONT adds, "will fuel the relentless struggle which all
Tunisian progressive and patriotic forces must unite to wage in order to
defeat this merciless, bloodthirsty regime."
For its part, the Popular Unity Movement (MUP), led by Ahmed Ben Saltah,
condemns "the violence of this regime," which "is the cause of the events in
Gafsa and those of 26 January 1978."
It adds: "Disregarding the people's aspirations, deaf to the anguish
of young people and the workers, counting only on the violence and the
protection of foreigners, the Tunisian regime has once again defied the
great majority of the Tunisian people." It emphas~.zes, however: "No! to
the use of violence The Tunisian people may one day forget, but they
will never forgive. It will be up to the Tunisian people, to the youth of
Tunisia, to learn the lessons from the grave events that have repeated
themselves over these many years," the MUP continues.
Another violent reaction came from the Tunisian People~s Revolutionary Party
- (PRPT), many of whose leaders including Zine el-Abidine and Medkouni, are _
being held in Tunisia.
Briefly recalling the bloody repression that has prevailed since 1956 and
for which "the mach3nery was established by France at the cost of another
bloodbath," Che PRPT salutes the memory of "the 13 revolutionary soldiers.~'
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It states that "the Tunisian national progressive movement must be clear-headed
and united in meeting this new test imposed by a fascist regime. There can
be no hesitation; no use of the blood spilled at Gafsa will be permitted.
Lastly, Tunisian communists in France denounce what Chey describe as "this
hefnous crime" which "cannot fail to strike at the conscience of all those _
who continued to believe that the massacres of 26 January 1978 were but an
accident by a regime that could still mend its ways, and who also continued
to believe, influenced by a mystified and mystifying opposition, that
Bourguiba might still be a man capable of a gesture in keeping with the situ-
- ation."
- COPYRIGHT: Reported 1980 Afrique-Asie
7129
CSO: 4400 END
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