JPRS ID: 9228 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300010011-5
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 128
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORTS

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FOR OFFIC'IA1. USF: t~N1.Y
JPRS L/9228
31 July 1980 ~
Sub-Sah~ran ,Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 6~83
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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. JPRS L/9228
31 July 1980
Sl1B-SAI~ARAN AFRI CA ~EPORT
FOUO No. 683
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS _
Africans Polled on World Tensione
(Michel Crouzet; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Jul 80) 1
- Coa~entary on African Frats~ophone Summit
(Philippe Baleine; PARIS MATCH, 23 May 80) 10 ,
Western Sahara Issue Splits OAU
(Sei~nen Anilri~~airado, Abde18'~f~ D~hlnani;
JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Jul $0) ........................ti.. 16
Ki-Zerbo Ro1e in ~AIKE5 '~xamin~d
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE .4~'RIQ~JE, 4 Jun 80) 21
~ Strategy of National Languages Discusaed
(Jean Copana; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 May 80) 23
Agriculture in Africa Examined
(J. A. Plus; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Jun 80) 27
Briefs
Alleged MNR Support 41
Senghor Warns of Libya-Mauritania Tie 41
ANGOLA `
Alleged French Reluctance To Act Against UNITA, FNLA Elements
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun 80) 42 -
Briefs
Reported FRG Support to Units 44
Details~ ot~ Agricultural Cooperatives 44
1980 Coffee Production Estimates 44
- - a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]
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BENIN
Nation's Problems in 1980 Discussed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANEENS, 23 May 80) 45
1977 Balance of Payments Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 May 80) 49
Details on New Company Given
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 May 80) 51
CENTRAL AFRICAIv REPUBLIC
Briefs
OCF Replaces UNFCA 52
ETHIOPIA
- Briefs
Offensive Planned 53
GHAI~iA
Rawlings' Political Position Remains Strong
(Mohamed Maiga; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 4 Jun 80) 54
GUINEA
Lack of Repression Following Assassination Atte~npt
(Sennen Andriamirado; J~UNE AFRIQUE, 4 Jun 80) 56
- Brizfs
Tourists Under Detention 58
Agricultural Agreement With Romania 5E
IVORY COAST
Recent Political Changes Examined
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 25 Jun 80) 59 '
KENYA '
West's Failure To Give Needed Aid to Zimbabwe Scored
. (Ed:Corial, Hilary Ng'weno; THE WEEKLY REVIEW,
11 Jul 80) 64
Politicians Question Role of Nation's Press ~
(THE WEEKLY REVIEW, 11 Jul 80) 65 -
- b -
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c
Oginga Odinga's 'Political Future Full of Posaibilities'
(THE WEEKLY REVIEW, 11 Jul 80) 67
KANU Life Memberehip Received
Odinga's Views on Luo Politics,
Oginga Odinga Interview
MADAGASCAR
Paris Weekly Carries Wide-Ranging Interview With Official
(Didier Ratsiraka Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE,
23 Jun-6 Jul 80) 72
Economic Objectives Discussed
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun 80) 78
Propaganda Methods Discuased
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun 80) 84
New Lobster Firm Described
(AFRIQUE-A~IE, 23 Jun 80) 87
~
Minister Discusses Future Agricultural Developmene ~
(AFRIQt1E-ASYE, 23 Jun 80) 88
MALI '
Briefs
Swiss Anti-Desertification Agreement 92
MAURITANIA
POLISARIO Agreement Signatory Ould Sidi Interview
(Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi Interview; J~UNE AFRIQUE,
25 Jun 80) 93
MOZAMRIOUE
Briefs
Reported Calumny in Portuguese Press 97
NIGER
Possibility of Setting Up Political Organization
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Jun 80) 98
- President Studies Zinder's Problems
- (riARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 20 Jun 80) 104
.
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" Briefs
FRG Military Material 105
IDA Credit for Agriculture 105
French Financing .~greementa 105
SENEGAL
Data on 1980-1981 Budget Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 20 Jun 80) 106
Briefs
- Fuel Price Increased 108
UGANDA
Concentration of Authority Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 May 80) 109
'Democratic' Coup Assessed by Amedee Darga
(Amedee Darga; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 May-8 Jun 80) 112
ZIMBABWE
Mugabe Spells Out Prioritiea With UK Journalist
(Robert Mugabe Interview; THE TIMES, 1 Jul 80) 116 _
_ d _ ~
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
AFRICANS POLLED ON WORLD TENSIONS
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 pp 44-4$
[Article by Michel Crouzet: "Africans, What Do You Think About
the Tensions in the World?"]
[Text] As we go to press, more than 1$00 of you have given us
. your opinion on the tensions besetting the wor~d today. The
answers our surveys keep bringing back to us strengthen tlie
hunch that moved us to undertake them in the first place: in
the all-too-frequent absence of freely chosen channels, the peo-
ples of Africa need a forum for voicing their views. Where,
for instance, could one reader out of five say opEnly that no
head of state now in,power is what he had hoped for?
Is it correct to speak of Af rican peoples as a homogeneous whole?
' The conflicts which set the continent'U states against one ano-
ther and to which the latest OAS meeting provided further tes-
timony, would seem to indicate that it is not. And yet, in a
general way, the points of view you give us on world tensions
do converge, whether you come from north or south of the Sahara,
= and whatever your nationality may be. There are, however, some
clear shad~s of difference to be seen in Cameroon or Morocco,
in Tunisia or in ivory Coast.
All Africans agree on several major questions: they overwhel-
mingly disapprove, by more than 75 percent, of Soviet interven-
tion in Af ghanistan, the taking of hostages at the American em-
bassy in Tehran (mainly on groi.uids of principle), and of the
execution of the former rulers in Liberia. A considerable ma-
jority, more than 60 percent, is against boycotting the 0~_ympic
Games and hence in favor of their own countries' athletes tak-
ing part. This does not grevent ~heir approving quite lo-
gically, for that matter, since they devlore the Soviet Union~s
invasion of Afghanistan an OAU position hostile to Moscow
(an almost two-thirds maj~rity). On these critical issues
1
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the solid choices the Africans express give a picture of sound-
ness and consistency. The slight majority ($2 percent) support-
ing economic sanctions against the USSR 3oes not dim that con-
sistency, but actually lends it a t~uch of prudence: they approve
condemnation of the Kremlin for its role in Kabul; they also
feel that the Soviets pose the greatest and most hurtful threat
of intervention in Africa... This does not prevent their having
few illusions over the sanctions taken in Washington, nor their
finding (by $S percent) the Carter operation against Tehran in-
defensible. As for the role Africa might play in the American-
Iranian crisis, they are far from unanimous ($1 percent vs. 4~).
Asked about the tragedy now being played out in Chad, our rea-
ders blame the Chadians themselves (54 percent), Libya (26 per-
cent and r rance ( only~ .1Q percent of respondent s). An over-
whelming majority (88 percent) rules out any partition solution;
this does not mean, though, that tiney are mistaking wislzes for
reali~y: Chad is, after the Sahara, the place where the risks
are highest for multiplication or aggravation of conflict. The
polarization of ~oncern over this country certainly explains why
9 percent of our readers attribute a major role in Africa to
Gen Eyadema, which nobody did in our 2Z January survey. If na-
- tionality cloes not dictate responses, where are these splits
coming from? Basica~ly, they are dictated by age and by poli-
tical preferences as th~y are everywhere. Age? While '71
percent of readers under 2$ denounce the taking of hostages at
the American embassy in Tehran, that percen~age jumps to 88 per-
cent among those over 40; our youngest readers (2$ percent of
them) see the hand of France at work in Chad, but only 8 percent
of their elders do. In Liberia, 28 percent of the young approve
the executions of former rulers, while only 10 percent of their
parents do. Political preferences? Approval of the Olympics
boycott runs to 60 percent among thos~e with rightist leanings,
but drops to 20 percent among the leftists. The Tabas interven-
tion gains ~l-percent approval on the ri~ht, but not on the
left (only 32 percent).
Everybod,y thinks things are going worst in his own country, but
percent of readers who are rightists think so, while 66 per-
cent of their brethren on the left do.On the whole, life has
not got much better in the interval hetween our fzrst two ~ur-
veys this year: taking a11 ages and political preferences to-
gether, our readers see social inequities growing worse ($'7 per-
cent); while back in January 44 Percent said they were optimis-
tic over prospects of change at home and 40 percent saw chances
of improvement in countries of their region, those percentages
have shrunken today to 41 and 22 percent, respectively.
Does this mean that pessimism has carried the day? That is not
quite so certain. From one survey to the next, the general
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opinion has not changed insof ar as conflicts in Africa are con-
cerned, and remains skeptical as to the likelihood of a world
war (64 percent think it is remotely or not at all probable, as
opposed to 36 percent who feel it is f:~irly or very likely).
Above all, and despite the deterioration of the situation in
- Chad, only 23 percent of our respondents see these tragic events
as the major phenomenon from Africa's viewpoint: ,57 percent of
them give top rating to the far more hopeful and promising im- _
minence of 'Lombabwe's independence. _
- The sample on which these fio res were based consisted 21 percent
of Ivorian~, 14 percent Moroccans, 13 percent Comeroonese, 12 ~
percent Tunisians, $ percent Senegalese, ,3 percent Malians, Mau-
_ ritanians, and Voltans, and 2$ percent Africans of other nationa.-
lities.
Political preferences range fr~m 18 percent on the right to 2'7
percent on the left, with, 5S percent of i~eaders citing no ideo-
logical commitment. Those under 25 accounted for 27 percent of
respondents, those from 26 to 30 for 32 percent, those from 31
to 4.0 f or 29 percent, and those over 40 for 12 percent.
Other prof ile features (educational level, profession) having no
sibnif icant impact on responses are not given here.
Special Poll Results
The USSR intervention iri Afghanistan and its consequences.
1. Do you approve or disapprove of the Soviet intervention
' in Afghanistan?
Yes No No opinion
10 percent 89 percent 1 percent
2. In the wake of Soviet intervention, several countries deci- '
ded to boycott the Moscow Olympics. Do you approve or
disapprove of their decision?
Yes No
38 percent 62 percent
3. Do you think, personally, that your country should:
Take part in the Moscow Join the No opinion
games? boycott? ~
60 percent 39 percent 1 percent
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4. Besides boycotting the Moscow Olympics, the United States
has taken economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. Are -
you for or against such economic sanctions?
For them Against them No Opinior_
52~ 47~ l~
.
5. In your view, what should the OAU do about the Afghanistan ~
conf lict ?
' Side with USSR Side against USSR Take no sides No Opinion -
2~ 63% 34~ l~
6ven on the lef.t, only 17 percent of respondents apProved, as _
- compared with $ percent on the right. The Olympic Games boycott
turned opinior around: 26 percent on one side, 60 percent on the
other. While 71 percent of our left-leaning readers think that
their country should take pa~t in these sports contests (as do
37 percent of our rightist respondents), 57 percent of them agre~
that the OAU should denounce the USSRe A slightly larger percen-
t~ tage af Cameroonese approved the Soviet intervention (16 percent,
as campared with the 10-percent average) and disapproved the
Olympics boycott (73 percent as against a 62-percent avera;e). _
While Moroccans lean toward approval of economic sanctions (66
percent)S a slight majority percent) of Canieroonese oppose
them. Cameroonese (,51 percent of them) want the OAS to take
neither sids in the conflict, whereas the Ivorians~ Tunisians,
and Moroccans call for a commitment against the JSSR (between
_ 6$ and 80 peraent of them).Generally speaking, those who approve
of Moscow's intervention (10 percent) tend to favor OAU neutra-
lity (73 percen~); those who oppose it (89 percent) want the OAU
to speak out against it (69 percent). _
The Iranian Host age Situation
� 6. Do you personally approve or disapprove of the taking of
hostages at the American embassy in Tehran?
Ap;~ve- 23 ~ Disapprove: 7'1~
- If you do disapprove of the takir,.g of hostages at the UeSa
embassy in Tehran, is you attitud.e governed by:
Principle: 77~ The consequences 20~ No answer:
of host age--t aking : 3~
8. Does ~he United States intervention in Iran on 24 April in
an attempt to free the ;~ostages by force of arms seem to you: _
Justified: 44% Wrong: $5~ No Opinion: 1%
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9. Do ,~ou believe that Africa has a role to play in the crisis
~ between Iran and the United States?
Yes: ,51~ No: 47~ No Opinion: 2~
Despite a more lenient attitude on the left than on the right,
. the taking of hostages at the American embassy in Tehran is found -
' to be wrong (by ~0 ~nd 89 percent~ respectively), yet 3~ percent
of Tunisians are ready to stand up for it.
Bearing in mind the hostility of the left to the American attempt
to f.ree the hostages, it is worth noting that of every 100 rea-
~ ders who deplore their detention, almost half (46 percent) do
~ not believP, even so, ~that Carter had the right to mount a mili-
tary operation (that percentage rises t4 81 for Tunisians). As
For possible African action to help resolve the crisis, it is
interes+ing to note that older readers think more of the idea -
than do the young: 60 percent of readers over 40, and per-
cent of those under 26.... Sometimes, apparently, optimism t~nds
to bloom as we graw older:
Recent Event of Greatest Import to Africa
_ 10. Among the following recent events in Af rica, which seems to
you to be most important to the continent as a whole? ,
Stepped-up figriting in Chad 23~
The coup d'etat in Monrovia 10~ .
Zimbabwe's independence $'7~
~ The QAU economic summit meeting �f
Ni~scellaneous answers 5~
Zimbabwe~s independence leads by a ~.arge margin, but readers from
aouth of the Sahara give it more weight than those from the north
- (61 percent to 48). The same holds true for the coup d'etat in ,
Monrovia, which was cited by 18 percent of Ivorian readers, 13
percent of Cameroonese, and only � percent of Tunisians. Readers
wii~h leftist proclivities ~re more sensitive to Zimbabwe's in-
dependezce than are tizeir fP~lows on the right (67 percent as
against $6 percer~t), but tne ranking of chuices is similar.
The Cr~isis in Chad
11. In your view, which among all those responsible for the
cri~is in Chad is most to blame?
, The C2~adians themselves : 54~
Libya.,,.......o 26f
_ France 19%
No opinion.~. l~
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12. In your view, what will it take to restore peac e in Chad?
Reconstitution of a strong and unified government.. 60;~
Partition 3J _
_ Constitution of a federal state 28% ~
' Withdrawal of Gukuni Weddeye and Hissein Habre..... 5~
Miscellaneous replies 4i~
Sentiment is most heated over the civil war north of tr~e Sahara _
� (30 percent as against 20 percent). In the north, Libya is the
clear target f or blame, with 60 percent of readers fingering it
as behind the whole thing. Readers in Cameroon are n.ure prone -
to see Francefs hand in it (28 percent), while Moroccan readers
are least so ( 8 percent
In general, if you lean toward the left you will blame France
(29 percent), and if you lean to the right you will blame Libya
~34 per~cent): but all agree that the first stone should be
thrown at the Chadians themselves (62 percent south of the Sa-
hara, 44 percent north of it and ~;hat Chad mus~t remain uni-
ted.
Executions of former rulers in Liberia
13. Do you approve or disapprove of the executions of leaders
of the old regime in Liberia? ~
Approve: 22% Diaspprove: 76% No Opinion: 1~
Ur~ited in disapproval were 82 percent of rightist readers and
72 percent of leftists; we find that, when all shades of poli-
ti~al opinion are lumped together, o~~1y.69 percent of Ivorians
go along with that view.
Likelohood of a World War
1�. Do you think that, given the present international situa-
tion, a world war is :
Very like~.y 9~
Fairly likely 27~
Not very likely 45~
Highly unlikely 19~
If we break down the replies of those who think a world war is
very likely or fairly likely on the one hand, and on the other
those who think it not very likely or highly unlikely, we f ind
that about two thirds of respondents fall into the latter camp. -
Here, though, right-wing readers are most pessimistic: 4$ per-
cent of them sense that a general conflict is �airly likely, as
opposed to 33 percent of respondents on the left. -
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- Social Inequities
15� As of right now, are social inequities in your country
_ t ending~ :
To increase 570
To d.eclin~ 18~ -
= To stay the same 24~
No opinion 1~
- The Ivorians are the most unhappy: 65 percent of them ~eel that
social inequities are on the rise. At the other end of the scale, ~
_ only the Tunisians f eel the same .
- On the right wing, though, ,54 percent, like the left wing' s 60
' percent, agree that social inequity is on the rise.
- What Country Poses the Greatest Threat of Intervention?
- ~6. Which of the non-African powers poses the greatest and most
. harmful threat to the entire continent?
East Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . 1/
China ....................v...........,............ 1/ -
Cuba 13/
The United States 12/
France................... 22/ -
Great Britain Of
~ The Soviet Union 47%
Miscellaneous 4~
While the Soviet Union got most vote~, with rightists putting it
on top of the list by 66 percent, and leftists citing it by 39
percent, just ahead of France ~ s ,36 pErcent, the right wing put
the finger on France only after Cuba (11 percent and 17 percent,
, respectively).
Cameroon is most sensitive to the French threat (38 percent),
while 26 percent of Tunisians are afraid of the Americans and
Koroccans fear the Soviet danger ($7 percent). The Cameroonese
are less frightened by the Soviet Union than are most Africans
_ ( 3'7 percent ) .
The Role and Popularity of Heads of State
1'7. As of now, which African head of state, in your opinion, is
playing the most important role in Afr~ca (aside from your
personal sympathies)? Current Survey 23 Jan 1980
Julius Nyerere.o............ � 14~ 12/
' Leopold Sedar Senghor....��� 13~ 9%
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Now ,7anuary 1980 _
_ Gnassingbe Eyadema 9~
Felix Houphoue~;-Boigny......... 8% 11%
Anwar Sadat 80 l00
Mu'ammar Qadhafi 6/ 8~
Shehu Shagari S~ 5~
Robert Mugabe 3%
Hassan II 3/ 8~
Others 8~ 18f
None 23% 19~
And which African head of state is closest to what you
would like to see?
Leopold Sedar S~nghor.......... 12~ � 11~
Julius Nyerere 12/ 10/
Fe~ix Houphouet-Boigny......... 11% 11~
Hassan II 6~ 8f
Robert Mugabe 6~
Ahmadou Ahidjo...e 5% 4/
Habib Bourguiba.........a...... 4~
Seyni Kountche --f -
Anwar Sadat 3% 4~
Others 1$~ 24~ -
None .....................o..... 22% 230
R~spondents agree that Leopold Sedar Senghor is playing a more
- important role today than he was in January, as is Gnassingbe
Eyadema, while Hassan II's star is seen as setting. Robert -
Mugabe, Habib Bourguiba, an.d Senyi Kountche are still seeded,
and there are no major changes elseqhere.
_ Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Leopold Sedar Senghor have more of
a following on the right than on the left (22 to 6 percent for
the rightist, 19 to 6 percent for the left); and Julius Nyerere
has more backers on the left than on the right (20 against 3 _
percent).
The left registers the most ~~negative" votes (24 percent of those
responding like no head of state, as opposed to 14 percent of
- right-wing respondants).
How Are Things Going?
19. As of right now, would you say things are getting better or
~etting worse?
In your own country
Getting better.......e...... 41/ 44~
Getting worse 57~ 54/
No opinion 2~ 20
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Now January 1980
In countries in your region? .
Getting better 22~ 40f
Getting worse ~1~ 55%
No opinion 7~ S~
Worse than in January. But, while things are getting no better
at home, the same trend can be seen in neighboring countries.
Of our readers, ~1 percent think things are going badly else-
where, and percent think they are bad at home too. When we
did our January survey, the corresponding percentages were 55 -
_ and 54. On the left as well as on the right, this means that,
when all is said and done, and even though there is little
- grounds for rejoicing, the situation at home is no worse....
Risk of Conflicts or Wars in Africa
20. Do you believe that, as of right now, the risk of multipli-
cation or aggravation of conflict or war in Africa are:
_ Very great 34% 27%
Quite high...........~...... 47~ 53~
Fairly low 13~ 15~
Very slight 5% 4~
No opinion 1~ lf
. Specifically, which conflicts do you have in mind? (Note:
Since multiple replies were given, the total is in excess
of 100J. ) ,
Sahara 41% 55~
Chad 39~ 9l
' Horn of Africa 11~ 18~
Southern Africa............ 12~ 39~
Egypt-Libya --f
Namibia
Uganda $�fo
Tunisia�.��.��.����������~� Jr~O
- The general view has not changed since January: 81 percent see
the risk as very great or quite high. ~he ~'Very high" replies
rose, however, from 2~ percent to 34. We find no significant
difference from right to Zeft. The left sees more possible con-
. flict in South Africa and the Western Sahara than the right does
(1$,~ to 7% and 43% to 35~)� In Morocco and Tunisia, readers -
also see higher risks in that region (63 and 53 percent).
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Af rique GRUPJIA 1980
- 6182
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
COMN~NTARY ON AFRICAN FRANCOPHONE SUNIMIT
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 23 Ma.y 80 pp 58-59
[Article by Philippe Baleine: "Africa Fias Achieved Little Success"]
[Text] Grandfather Zig would really be amazed if he had attended the French-
African summit in Nice: Grandfather Zig has been dead nearly 20 years. But
France has not forgotten him. Grandfather Zig* was the one who, to the sound -
of Corporal Mamadou's battered trumpet, with a handf~.il of sharpshooters, con-
quered Senegal, the Sudan, Mauritania, Niger, Guinea, Ivory Coast and a few
other bits of land that I cannot remember. He was the one that went up the
Congo in a dugout canoe under a hail of poisoned arrows, using the butt of .
his Lebel to beat ti.me to the paddlers' war chant, on the way to plant the
tricolor flag on an adobe fort. It was Grandfather Zig who with a bit of
bread handled with good naturE, helped the nice blacks along in fatherly
fashion toward civilization.
Ba.lm to Grandfather Zig's Soul
So it was understandably not without a pang that he learned in his Caa.cal
retreat of the independence of all those states in Africa over which his
gigantic protecting shadow was once spread, and that he died disconsolate.
But in the empire builders' paradise, Grandfather Zig must have gotten his
smile back again now.
- So there they all were in Nice: the presidents of the F`rench-speakzng states
that have emerged from our former colonies, to discuss economic problems with
our president. Also they want to urge him strongly to let the F`rench troops
stay on in Tabad. And even--as the Chadia,n representative said--to send cadre
to Africa in greater numbers, and even--yes, indeed:--some colonists.
*In his recent book, "The Conquest of Zanzibar" (Gallimard), Jean Cau tells
the heroic epic of Grandfather Zig.
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' ~~You decolonized too soon:" Such words are real balm to Grandfather Zig's _
soul. That probably causes him to refrain fron ironic cursing as he observes -
the solemn troop of presidents gathered around the green baize at the Nice
prefecture.
There is Leopold Senghor, president of Senegal and president of the OAU (as ~
replacement for N1r Tolbert, recently murdered). His country is deep in eco-
nomic difficulties. Famine threatens in the North and in the South; in
Ziguichor rebellious schoolboys are being fired on. Here in his blue robe
- is President Traore of Mali, the former Sudan [as published], a vast land
of savannahs, which after 20 years of the socialist experiment, is bankrupt.
And Traore has to tame his rebellious students too. That little man, between
two giants from the Sahel, is Omar Bongo, president of Gabon, who, despite
the oil bonanza, had to call in foreigners to sort out his finances. And
here are the presidents of Niger, Upper Volta, Guinea, all of them cour_tries
in which poverty and the single party system hold sway together. And rIr
Dacko, let us not overlook Mr Dacko, who has seated himself on Bokassa's
throne. But he is not emperor, not yet. That leopard-skin cap, wildly bob- _
bing about over there, belongs to Mobutu, president of Zaire, still irked
because it had not been possible to accommodate all of his entourage at the
Neg.resco. He had come with an impressive delegation of 20 people. He wants
to leave the hotel....Not very polite from a guest of France, which moreover
saved his regime by sending his paratroops to Kolwezi.
Not in attendance, the minister of foreign affairs of Liberia, the honorable
Cecil Dennis. His excuse: he was shot last week. Houphouet-Boigny is not
here either. He has an excuse, too: the pope's visit. But it is hinted
that he is sulking at Giscard because the latter made so bold as to ask him
if he had a successor in mind: Oh, I was forgetting, Houphouet has a bone
to pick with Lt Gulai Zoumana, who was arrested in Abidjan on ?8 April for
attempting a military coup d'etat.
In a while al1 these presidents will be meeting again at the great closing
banquet at the Negresco Hotel, to celebrate their having stayed in power
for another year. `
Pldjamena Sinks Into Total Disaster
A dining room full of floral designs and gilding, a sumptuous menu, champagne
of the best vintages. The president of Nig~r muses that the cost of his meal
is almost equal to half the annual income of a peasant in his country.,..
- For the moment, he is less afraid of his people than of the POLISARIO in the
West, the Libyans in the North, the Chadians in the East, and the Cubans all
over.
No wonder a few strong French battalions would be gladly welcomed here and
there, as more reliable in the long run than the national armies.
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I
rux urrlt,t~, ua~ UNLY
- The removal of French troops from Chad, for that reason, cast a chi11. People `
are wondering. Did the F~ench Cov?rnment just want to get its troops b~.ck?
(Ttiey were not going far. Just to Camerocn, nearby). Because they tended to
favor this or that faction? Or has it decided to let the strongest one wini -
That is exactly what scared the whole of Africa. Especially the Africa of
the blacks, the southern one. Those Africans, animistic peasants, have lived
for centuries under the domination of the (very tanned) white islamized nomads
of the North. At independence, aware of the danger, F`rance handed power over
to the blacks. Now the nomads are getting their revenge. They know their
business. They have never done anything else for thousands ef years but wage
war. The nucleus of the POLISARIO, for example, is men of the Reguib whose
specialty was the Rezzou. The pilots of Mermoz Aerospace at St-Ex feared
nothing so much as falling into their hands. And you should just see the fun
the child-soldiers of Goukouni and Hissein Habre have: And what arms: The
most sophisticated equipment from West and East. Armed and fed by all the
great powers, easily finding recruits among the jobless delinquent youth,
these medieval bands can confront each other for a long ti.me. On our conti-
nent, that was called the Hundred Years' War. The city of Ndjamena has now _
sunk into total d.isaster. No hospitals any more, no public services, no
rrater, no telecommunications, soon no more electricity. All the windscreens
on all the cars are smashed. All the body work has bullet-holes in it. Mean-
time, in the southern part of Chad, belonging to the Saras, Christian blacks,
peace and prosperity prevail. People are planting and harvesting. Colonists
are colonizing, and roads are even being rebuilt. Yes, black Africa is less
af.raid at the moment of the Cubans and the Russians than of the Arab wave ~
coming from the North, remote controlled by Algeria and Libya.
Poor Cubans, anyway, going through one disaster after another. In Angola,
whole columns are ~}rsteriously disappearing in the brush. In the very expe-
ditionary forces there are squabbles between (tanned) whites and blacks. 'I'he
Cubans have failed to regain control of the economy, completely paralyzed by
the departure of the 500,000 Portuguese `~colonists."
The East Germans have had to be called in. Prussians among the Angolans:
You can imagine how beloved they are. Their big problem: finding a cook
who will not try to poison them.
In Ethiopia, the disaster is even more gigantic. Despite the billion dollars
that the Russians have donated over the past year, the country is on the brink
of the greatest catastrophe in African history. Over 2 million Ethiopians are
threatened with total famine. The drought is getting the blame: But let us
say instead socialism plus war--the scandalous war against Moslem Eritrea. It
is at a standstill anyway, because the Cubans, at the behest of Algeria, have
decided not to take part in it any more.
Third World Affliction: Graft
An even more total failure of the Cubans and Russians in Guinea and Ma,li,
which are dismissing their achievement-crowned experts: delivery of snaw-
ploughs to Guinea and ploughs with 60-centimeter ploughshares to Mali, which
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- have permanently sterilized the fragile grou~zd, whose topsoil layer dues not
e~tceed 10 centimeters. In general, the Russians are dislikec~ because of
their annoying habit of sending machinery and agricultural equipment as aid.
But the black states of the region want money, francs and dollars, and that
is all. To pay their plethora of civil servants, and keep their over-
populated cities going.
`ihe preser.t organization of the former French black states has been described
often enou~;h for a mere reminder to be sufficient: 15 government�s insta.lled
_ in palaces, 150 ministers with Mercedes, chauffeurs, and private houses with
swirnmzng pools, a few thousand cabinet members with [Peugeot] 6~4s, thousands
of parlia.mentarians who earn as much in a year as an African peasant does in
a lifetise, and countless embassies all over the world. As for the civil
sez�vice, on a par ever since independence with the wages of ~ench civil serv-
ants (with the colonial supplement:), it has doub'led in numbers and has a
standard of living 10 to 15 times better than that of the poor wretch in the
brush. As they cannot pay for their Mercedes fast enough, the insatiable
civil servants have made an institution of that plague of the Third World,
graft. Graft in the final analysis is an illegal tax levied by the rich in
power on the poor, whose rights they cash in on.
Of course every African government has a draconian anti-graft program. ~rom
titue to time someone who has really gone too far gets shot. From time to
time a party of strong-minded, pure young officers overturns the extortive
governmer~t, and then, once in power, the good apostles yield to temptation
in their turn. And people become resigned. Nehru tried to explain why:
"Shouting from the housetops that everybody is corrupt only crea.tes a climate
conducive to corruption. Anyone who feels that he is immersed in that atmos-
- phere tends to become corrupt himself. So the man in the street tells himself,
if everyboc~y is corrupt, why not me, too."
All the urban classes, including the tradespeople, who ma.ke their living on
what the civil servants spend, subsist increasing.l;� on subsidies from abroad.
It is standard procedure in some cottntries to wait for the arrival of funds
from Fr~ance to pay the civil servants. If the fhnds are late, watch out for
a coup d'etat: The peasants in the interior have not been supp].ying the
cities for a long time now. They have caught on: Overwhelmed by taxes, with
their products being bought at ridiculously low prices, despised because they
work with their hands, they have resorted to a subsistence econotqy. Matters
might stabilize at this level. Unfortunately, Africa is very rapidly being
taken over by desert encroachment, as a result of deforestation and brush
fires, and the pea~ants, dxiven out of their little millet fields by the sand,
are flocking to the towns, where huge shanty-towns are being created, whose
means of subsisting are a perfect m,ystery. But why are Africans burning their
sa,vannahs when their flocks are tragically short of fodder? Answer: Africans
are unfamiliar with the use of fodder, In addition, they are unfamiliar with
_ ~;he use of the cart, indispensable for harvesting hay. And then, they are
unfamiliar with the pitchfork. And what else? Ah yes, I was forgetting, they
are not at all used to working. There now, the great sacrilege has been com-
mitted. Quick, let us take refuge behind the figures. In the whole forest
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rurc urri~~tu. u~~; u~vLY
- region, where the way of life is hunting and ~athering, supplemeni;ed by a
little field of tubers, a man works an average of 20 Yiours a week: a little
huntin~, a little fishing, a little hut-repairing. A wom~.n gathers berries
and hoes the ground in the li~~tle field. As she also takes care of the chil- -
dren and the cooking, she works more than the man.
- `~You Decolonized Too Soon� `
In the savannah region, the problem of the man's work has been solved by
polygau~y. The goal of every proper man is to own four wives. ~ro to culti-
vate the bit of land, one to take the surplus harvest to market, and one to
keep house and spin and sew in addition. The man fuilds the house (on~e and
for a11), huni;s (there is no game any more, but it makes a pleasant ramble),
takes the stumps out of the field (once and for all), and sets fires every-
where he can.
_ So it can be seen that, the social climate is not very conducive to peasant
- labor, and that in Africa people are a long way from the French earth-
_ grubber's 3,000 hours of work a year. Hence the very real threat of f~unine
hanging over sub-Saharan Africa.
Generally speaking, in the new African societies, altruism based upon the
idea of mutual service, which was very much alive in the li.ttle rur~l com-
munities of the past, has almost died out entirely in the big cities. Civic
feeJ_ing can hardly be created in the artificial nation-sta,tes, since they a.re
conglomerates of hostile e~;hnics.
As a result, peasants and their poverty are the least of the concerns of the
city-d.welling middle-classes in the new black states. And wYiat is expected
of France, Europe, and the wealthy world in general is good, new, ready money,
to support the consumer habits of the privileged and to pay the enormous oil
bill, another 1i~n-sized tax levied by the Arab aristocracy and middle-class
on the poor people of the Third World.
Here then are our troops, to back up weak tyrants or single-party presidents
for whom little military chiei's are on the lookout. 'I'here are our francs,
to keep our clients. _
Africa made a bad start, and so did we with it. And contrary to what may be
thought, the Russians and the Cubans are in no better a position. (Solzhenitsyn
prompts us not to forget that in the Kremlin there is a party opposed to costly
colonial undertakings). Are there any other solutions for France and Europe
to apply ir. black Africa? A three-way discussion? Certainly, but the far-
sighted Arabs prefer to place their money in America or ~ritzerland.
There is indeed Ivory Coast, the showcase of West Africa. But the French
stayed on there in large numbers after independence. There are even more
than 60,000 of them there today. They '~provide leadership.~~ Arid Houphouet-
Boigny has welcomed with open arms capital from everywhere.
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Ivory Coast is a magnificent exa~qple of successflil. neo-colonial enterprise.
, (My goodness: How can anyone dare say such things:)
The other exam~le is Kenya. Need it be said that the Ehglish stayed on there? -
Just as in Rhodesia, where Mugabe is said to have been advised by the Russians
to keep his whites (The RusFians probably want Rhodeeia, since they want the
world, but a Rhodesia in working order). Far from us be the idea that
Africans are const.itutiona.lly incapable of managing their resources. But in -
any case it was, we recall, Nh~ Kamougue (vice president of Chad) who called
- out "You decolonized too soon:" And it was in Bamako, capital of socialist '
Mali, that (progressive) students were heard in the streets shouting "French
ar~y, come and drive out our rotten leaders as you did Bokassa:"
Grandfather was quite overcome by it. -
_ His task is still immiense. And the youth of Africa must be helped, because
we have debts taward the~n that can never be barred (100 milli~on Africans are
missing at the roll-call because of the ravages of the slave trade that only
came to an end in the last century). ~hey muat be helped not to collapse
under the burden of outrageous increases in oil costs. They must be helped
to install the new energies, solar and biomass, in their countries. They
must be helped to discover fresh resources under their land. From this point
of view, Africa is the world's fltture.
And if, after all, we could agree among ourselves as whites--the Russians
are whites, you know--to restane for at least a little while, the work (which
was badly per~ormed, incidenta.lly, be it admitted) interrupted by decoloniza- �
- tion in a Third World tha.t we abandoned after destroying its traditional
structures?
There will be 5 billion of them by the year 2000. And only 1 billion of us,
you know.
COFYRIGHT: 1980 by Cogedipresse S.A.
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_ INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
~ -
WESTERN SAHARL~, ISSUE SPLITS dAU
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 Jul 80 pp 18-20
v [Article by Sennen Andriamirado and Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Th:: OAU: Vi ctim
of the Sahara"]
[Text] Officially, what is called the "Western Sahara question" does not
appear on the agenda for the OAU conference of chie�s of state and govern-
ments (Freetown, Sierra Leone, 1-4 July 1980). Because the African minis-
ters responsible for making preparations for this session--the 17th--,
_ wanted to hold to the decision made at the 13th summit (Port-Louis,
Mauritius, July 1976) which set this subject aside for a special session
of the OAU.
In reality~ it was a way of getting around it. Tt~e OAU ministerial con-
ference has always evaded thorny questions so that it can annotmce: s uch
and sucn a matter is not listed on the sum�nit's agenda but the chiefs of
state are free to discuss it. In the matter at hand, the Freetown summit
is not going to be able to ignore the Western Sahara case. But it is a
fact that~ in its 17 years of existence, the OAU has not experienced can- -
flicts so serious that they threatened to cause it to fly into pieces.
The reason for this anticipated crisis is: the candidacy of the Saharan
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) to occupy the 51st seat in the OAU. Led
by Algeria and Madagascar, at least 23 member states of the organizati an
are determined to support this candidacy against the opposition of
Morocco which denies the SADR any kind of existence.
Even worse~ the Sherifian kingdom has announced that it would withdraw
from the OAU if the Saharan state were to be admitted. The organiza-
tion~ supposed to be weighing in for the whole of Africa on the inter-
national scene~ would on the contrary become obliterated, a victim of
disagreements among its members. For the withdrawal of Morocco could
be followed by that of its fri~nds: Gabon~ perhaps Equatorial Guinea. -
and 7.aire, all threee having particularly close ties with Rabat, with-
~ out mentioning Senegal, whose kind regards �or Morocco as well as hos-
tility for the Polisario are known. On the face of it, the battle is
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- located on legal ground. From the point of view of the chart~r, what
conditions require such an a~mission to me~bership to be made? In the
eyes of publi~ international law, what criteria germit one to determine
whether or not the SADR is a state?
According to [he Law
The OAU Charter is explicit. Admission is granted by a simple majority
of inember states that is to say 26 would be needed. A tally which is _
not out of reach for the SADR: already recognized by 23 African states, -
it can certainly gather up three additional supporters at the last
minute. And all the more easily because it falls to the secretary
general, and he may do it outside any meeting context, to consult with
each member state and make a formal accounting of the votes.
We still have to answer another 1eg31 question: does the SADR bring
together all the attributes of a state? According to international law,
- three basic conditions are required on this score: one people, one in-
' stitutional structure and one territory.
Population is already the subject of controversies. Morocco maintains
that the former Spanish Sahara--the area claimed by the SADR--does not
include the whole Saharan population; there are Mauritanian or Moroccan
Saharans~ and ethnic identity by itsel� (even supposing that there is one
= in this case) is not a sufficient basis to constitute a people. Not with-
out justification, Rabat therefore denies that there is auy coherent
whole involved in the notion of a Saharan people. As long as we confine
the counting to the former Spanish colony, it barely tops 70,000.
To this the POLISARIO retorts--and justly so--70~000 inhabitants make up
a~opulation just fine; the Seychelles, a member of the OAU, barely
includes more than 60,00~ citizens. _
Second criterion: institutional structure. It's easy for the POZISARIO
to adva:~ce the notion~ in this regard~ that the proclamation of the SADR
is in itself equivalent to creating a state. And even if we don't yet
know exactly who, the POLISARIO Front's secretary general or its prime
minister, is the chief of state~ this is a matter for internal jurisdiction.
Fruitless Controversy
ihere remaias territory, the third criterion to take into account. Morocco
procliams pope-like to the world, "urbi et orbi," that it militarily and
administratively controls the territory claimed by the POLISARIO. The
latt^r, witho~c denying that fact~ maintains that this "territorial con-
trol" is in reality only occupation of the colonial variety. In other
words, Morocco has done nothing but take Spain's place--the colonial
po~ver.
The legal controversy would therefore be a fruitless one if it were
to be initiated among the OAU chiefs ~f state. Proponents and opponents
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of the I'ULISARIO have just as manv arguments either for the accreditation -
of or to attack the "de jure" existen ce of a Saharan state, The verbal
rows which are customary for the OAU would hardly be suff.icient to either
decide between or to convince the var ious protagonists.
Because, it is know, and it is asserted, going beyond the matter of the
SADR's formal admission to the OAU, that the question of Che Western
Sahara is more political than legal. Any reference to any notion of
legal right has since 1975 turned out to be mere quibbling.
For the supporters of the POLISARIO, the principle laid down by the
founders of the OAU, no more and no less, must be applied: the in-
violability of inherited colonial borders. According to this principle,
c. the day after the withdrawal of Sp ain, the former Spanish Sahara was
- to be considered an independent state and only needed to be procliamed
as such.
The rforoccaans, laying siege to the territory, were therefore trans-
formed into new colonizers, and it was in fact the duty of the Saharans~
who in earlier days had had to fight Spain~ to fight Morocco. To their
advantage, the supporters of the SADR bring an argument to bear along _
these lines: another occupier--Mauritania, who had divided up the
Western Sahara with Morocco--tiring of warfare, "got off the hook" in
1979 and renounced its claims. This is proof, it is maintained, of an
embryonic "decolonization."
;
- By liberation, the POLISARIO has therefore meant above all territorial
liberation. Hence its strategy which at the beginning consisted of
_ attempting to occupy the territory. To which however, the Moroccans
responded with another tactic: controlling strategic points in order
to let the Saharan guerrillas "gallivant" arotmd the desert. The Ouhoud
mobile unit of the FAR (Royal Moroccan Armed Forces) has prevented r_he
POLISARIO from settling down in any one area o� the Western Sahara. The
result had led to an abnor.mal politico-military situation. The POLISARIO~
not in complete control of any site in the territory it claims, has set
up in the cliffs of Warkziz, in undisputed Ploroccan territory. In time
_ this positian has become an awkward one: the jdarkziz did not so much
- as give any territory to the SADR. Otherwise things have changed: the
Moroccan army has retaken control of the Warkziz range, although it
hasn't completely "cleaned it out." A good reason for the desert
guerrillas to have wanted, on the eve of the OAU meeting, to strike a
decisive blow. Coming from Pfauritania--which has been transformed willy-
nilly into a sanctuary---they attacke d the Moroccan troops at Guelta
Zemmour. To demonstrate that on "their territory" they can attack any-
where anytime.
~dhat`s Really Going On Under the Surf ace
However, these military actions are n ot enough to convince their opponents
that the SADR controls any terr.itory whatsoever. For Morocco and its
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friends~ even the principle of the inviolability of borders inherited
from the colonial past does not apply. Priding itself on its existence
, as a state before colonial times~ Morocco can justifiably draw the con-
clusion that it is the colonial process which broke up its territory.
Even better, it is in a position to show that Spain, the administering
power~ ceded to it the territorial zones imder colonial government com-
ing uttder the administrati~n of the Western Sahara.
There again, the arguments of the one group and the other are not un-
- founded. So, supporters and opponents of the SADR have deployed any and
all methods of diplomatic warfare. And it is on this plane that the
POLISARIO has undoubte3ly scored points against Morocco. The SADR~
recognized by about 40 states~ can pride itself on having some sort of
international existence. But one must still be aware, on the other
hand, of under what conditions and by which states the SADR has been
recognized.
"Hundred Years' War"
Of the 23 African countries which support it~ 13 are in eastern or
southern Africa, that is to say from the area and the furthest away
from the combat zone and the least informed about what is really going
on in this "affair." This strong black African contangent compensates
to some extent for the indifference of Arab countries. Undoubtedly be-
cause the latter, whether African or Middle Eastern, know the "case
history" better. And they know, because of having participated in the
Arab League summit on 29 October 1974 in Rabat, that on that day the
late Algerian President Houari Boumedienne had given his support to the -
agreement between Me:~~co and Mauritania to divide up what was still
Spanish Sahara. Since then Algeria has changed and has become the champion
- of Western Sahara's independence. But on ly four of the 22 members of
the Arab League have recognized the SADR.
As one can see, the Sahara question is not as simple as one might want
to make it out. As the political debate heightens~ so do the emotional
overtones which characterize it. In morocco, for example, the reconquest
which materialized out of the Green rlarch of N~vember 1975 served as a
cementing force for unity. From one end of the political spectrum to the
other, reference is made to the "holy cause" and people declare themselves
ready for a"100 years' war."
This being the case, the question which must be asked is: is not the
ahara question only a fa~ade for a strug~le between the Maghribian states
for influence? Is not Moroccan "expansionism" the counterpart of
Algeria's and/or Libya's "hegemonism" aiming at rebuilding and controlling
the Greater rlaghreb? And, in this case~ should the OAU, as an organiza-
tion of continental scope, bear the brunt of this conflict between
- medium-sized powers separated by the Saharans? -
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No battle here can even be won, and all Afric~ns are being asked to take
~ a stand. The war could last 100 years, as the rl;,~occans say, but no
victor will emerge. The legal debate is hopeless because everyone is
right and everyone is wrong.
Is there still a str~ggle of principle when all is said and done? No,
nat even that. The self-determination of the Saharan people which is -
heralded by certain African le~de~, is not a goal for the POLISARIO -
when it can p roclaim: "The Saharan people has already achieved self-
determination via the struggle it carries on against Moroccan expan-
sionism." Which makes empty of any meaning th? OAU's desire to have the
Saharans consulted to choose their destiny. -
Those Who Will Bear the Burden
This is proof, if any were still needed, that what people are happy to
say in OAU conferences on the Sahara question does not always reflect
what is really at stake. The least that one can say is that the case :
- seems a vague one for those among the member states whose leaders would
be ready to listen to something other than their fiery speeches for
this or that cause. The POLISARIO'S refusal of a rPferendum on self-
determination is not clear to its friends who have fought for that
cause. Algeria's reserved posture which even seems to have frozen its
_ diplomatic initiatives on behalf of the SA~R is suspect: perhaps it
only relects hesitation on the part of the current leaders to take up a
cumbersome inheritance left by President Boumedienne. Finally, the
sudden activism of the Moroccans in diplomatic matters is worrying.
And amid this lack of rertianty, what is the OAU going to do? Get bogged
down. Because the debate about admitting the SADR does not serve its
- interests. The OAU was conceived to solve problems. It now risks being
transformed into a battleground. Because of a case in which national
ambitions are opposed. It is not far-fetched to say that: if Algeria
~ and Morocco were to become reconciled~ the Saharans would bear the
burden. At best , be being federated with Mauritania.
The OAU would also bear a burden; it would have lost its energy debating
a matter that was exclusively sub-regional, The leading lights on all.
sides will bear the brtmt of this affair: for having supported a cause
which was not their own.
_ COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
KI-ZERBO ROLE IN CAMES EXAMINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 4 Jun 80 p 37
[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "The Ki-Zerbo Affair"]
[Text] Power is so personalized in Africa that to a greater extent than
elsewhere, any institution is confused with the official heading it, as
shown by the Ki-Zerbo affair. The eminent Upper Voltan professor who for
17 years headed a discreet but vital inter-African organization, CAMES
(Af rican and Malagasy Council on Higher Education) , has paid the price f or
this conception of power. He has been removed from his post as secretary
general without any explanation or indemnification by the French-speaking
ministers of education meeting in April in Kigali (Rwanda). Since that ~
time, CAMES has been leaderless. Its activities are paralyzed and its
personnel (about . a dozen persons in all and for all purposes) without pay.
The very existence of the organization is at stake. -
Plurality of Offices
What has happened? CAMES, to which 15 nations in French-speaking Af rica
belong, receives, studie s and records the work of teachers in higher educa-
_ tion. If need be, it confers diplomas corresponding to their aptitudes.
It was in 1964 that Pr Jo seph Ki-Zerbo, agrege in history from a French
university, conceived the idea for the organization and operated it totally
without pay until 1967 when, at the proposal of the then Senegalese minis- _
_ ter of education, Ahmadou-Mahtar M'Bow, currently general director of
UNESCO, compensation was awarded to him. Later, when he was elected deputy
to the Upper Voltan National Assembly, Pr Ki-Zerbo cambined those duties
with the post of secreta ry general of CAMES, without requesting any spe-
cial salary for the latter activity.
_ However, the Upper Voltan .Ccnstitution adopted at the end of 1977 prohibits
any plurality of offices. Although elected deputy in the April 1978 legis-
lative elections, Pr Ki-Z ~rbo had to resign his term in order to continue
to head CAMES. Now he is driven out of that post as if he were dishonest,
- as if there were an attempt to humilia~e him and discourage him from ever
wanting to be involved wi th an institution he created through his own
i_nitiative, not to say with his own hands.
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rux urr t~ttu. u5r: UNLY
Party Affair
What is the reason behind all this? First of all, the governmen.. in
Ouagadougou looked askance upon the possibilities of an opening and contact
which CAMES offered to the leader of one of the most important opposition
parties. Pr Joseph Ki-Zerbo was one of the main candidates to run against
President Sangoule Lamizana in the May 1978 presidential elections. Today
he heads the FPV (Upper Voltan Progressive Front), one of the two opposi- _
tion parties recognized in Upper Volta.
Under such conditions, one can understand why in Kigali, the Upper Voltan
minister of education refused to nominate Pr Joseph Ki-Zerbo for the post
of secretary general af CAMES, preferring a young assistant from the Univer-
sity of Ouagadougou, Simeon Kabre, who is a member of a party associated
with the government majority. Certain ministers, particularly Kader Fall
(Senegal), opposed that "wildcat" candidacy and CAMES is now without any -
_ director.
But beyond this "political-politicking" maneuver of the Upper Voltan Govern-
ment, something more can be seen. Indeed, in Paris, certain cooperation .
circles were not enthusiastic about the proposals and above all, the objec-
tives which Pr Ki-Zerbo set for CAMES. The latter did not conceal the fact
that f or him, it was inadmissible that 20 years after our cour:tries' acces-
sion to independence, Africans should still be forced to obtain their -
agregation in France, that it~should be a foreign country which decides
upon the number and careers of African professors. "Did you know," he asked
us 2 months ago, "that until 1978, the aptitude list of university profes-
sors in French-speaking Af rica was drawn up in Paris?" It was by means of
a letter from the French minister for universitiss that an African assistant -
learned whether or not he was included on the aptitude list. It was French
professors who received and judged the works of African professors.
Stubbornness
It was not until 1978.th'at Joseph K:i-Zerbo managed to do away with this
outdated practice. Is it not his obstinacy, the persistent struggle he
waged against a certain French Malthusianism, for which the eminent Upper
Voltan historidn is paying today? The scarcely veiled attacks to which
he was subjected in Kigali on the part of Mrs Ali.ce Saunier Seite, French
. minister for universities, speak eloquently on this subject.
The whole question comes down to knowing whether, once again confusing the
man with the institution, African leaders will allow CAMES to be buried
and, in humiliating its founder, humiliat~ themselves b~ going back in
time 20 years.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- STR.ATEGY OF NATIONAL LANGUAGES DISCUSSED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26~May 80 pp 70-72
[Article by ,7ean Copans: "Can Linguistics UntanglE Languages?"J
' [Text] "An event without precedent took place today: The president de- .
livered a speech in Swahili. This event truly marks the beginning of a
new era in the country's history with.respect to language, national devel-
opment and the administration of governmental.affairs.... Today, we took
the liberty of speaking our own language. We shall get to the heart of
_ any discussion with confidence because we shall no longer have any doubts
= about the meaning of our words or about being correctly understood by .
others...."
The date was 10 December 1962. Sp,eaking before the Tanzanian Parliament
in Dar es-Salaam, Julius.Nyerere had just delivered the keynote address for
the Day of the Republic and it was poet and writer Sheikh Amri Abedi, min-
ister of community development and culture, who proudly derived the lessons
from it. The fact is that any consistent cultural and linguistic policy -
begins there, with that apparently simple act.so difficult to put into
practice: speaking one's language officially, using it in all public ac-
tivities. Naturally, we have seen that the problem is not so simple ar'ter
all,l and the domination of Swahili, one of the 100 languages of Tanzania,
is only possible because.of a long history and the profound Bantu alliance
_ between most of these languages.2
Having said this much, the politi.cal determination to change the ratio of
linguistic forces makes it possible to pose the problems concretely. Artd
this determination, within the context of dominant neocolonialism, is far
from being obvious, to say the least. But speaki~lg one's language, one's
- languages, in daily life, as all Africans do, is one~thing. Using them -
in official or public reports, in the political, economic and cultural
realms, is another, for independently of this political choice, and even,
one might say, of this choice of civilization, one must understand the
_ mechanisms for extending the functions of local languages. Above all, we
must know how we speak, how we ean enrich the African languages with new
- social customs, new functions ~(the transmission of written knowledge, mas-
tery of technology and the drafting of new political and economic concepts).
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It is therefore necessary to describe and analyze the African languages.
This scientific detour is indispensable, for putting national languages in
the driver's seat is also and quite frequently moving from the oral to
the written, from the word to phonetic transcription and a standardized
speZling. Naturally, the usefulne8s of knowing how to read is sometimes
deceiving because learning to read in one's language or in an African
language in no way implies that one is reading "useful" texts, texts that
elimi.nate the isolation of the grass-roors citizen.
Confusing Picture
Can one know the African languages scientifically? The situation is a
ver.y complex one, on the one hand, because of their multiplicity and their
dialectal subdivisions, and on the other hand, because of the variety of
effects to which they have fallen victim over the past century; fairly
substantial, destructive contaets with colonial languages, shifts and
migrations of populations leading to unhear~-of phenomena of multilingual-
ism (sections of the large cities), the outright disappearance of languages
in the tumult of social domination and change. The linguistic picture is
therefore increasingly confused. Traditional purity gives way to mixtures, .
all kinds of borrowings, semantic neglect. Ways of life and social and
technical milieus are changed; new linguistic needs emerge. In short,
Black Africa is at the forefront of linguistic innovation that is both
spontaneous and constant.
However, the linguistic theories and methods that are available are scarcely
adapted to these contex~s. .Aided�by the timidity of educational or infor-
mational strategies, the scientistic, functional ideology of Western lin-
guistics remains preponderant.3 Naturally, there are not enough persons
doing research in linguist~cs or linguistic experts. What is even more
serious as is the case.in the rest of the African humanities those
doing research in linguistics are always by and large from the West.4
If. there is one fj.eld in which for reasons of inethodology and social effi-
ciency, the Africanization.of research workers is urgent, it is definitely
linguistics. Furthermore, research underway is generally ill adapted to
needs and there is reason to think that one of the difficulties encountered
by nations having opted for a policy of national languages stens from the
inadequacy of the scientific instrument.
We actually encounter two types of linguistics: 1) a basic type, aimed at
reconstituting the functioning of languages, without taking dominations,
the dynamics of bilingualism or social cleavages into account. The language
of adults is not necessarily that of the you~g people, meaning that the
linguist often works with informers who "know," who are .therefore older,
- while literacy programs and.school enrollment plans are addressed to the
young. 2) applied linguistic~, which works more pragmatically and pre- `
pares studies on the current situation of languages. However, very often
(at any rate, this is obvious in French-speaking countries), this type of
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linguistics is aimed at a berter knowledge of local languages in order to
adopt the teaching of foreign languages (that is, the teaching of the
so-cal.led "national" or official language). It has been noticed that one
could not teach French to a Wolof or a Serer fro~ Senegal, a Baoule from
the Ivory Coast or a Beti from Cameroon in the same fashion. In this case,
the acientific knowledge of the African language turns against the Afri-
cans because it in f act further alienates them linguistically.
The most serious danger stems from the gap between linguists and those who
speak the languages. Specialists have a passive relation with their in-
formers. Nothing predisposes linguists (especially if they are foreigners)
to working with the people in a collective and democrati;c way. The devel-
. opment of lexicons, texts, literacy methods, the linguistic Africanization `
of school programs, written and audio-visual media and the development of
a new local culture in.the truly narional languages cannot take place in
a vacuum and be prepared in the offices and laboratories of a few hundred
specialists. Of course, not everyone is or could be a linguist, but it is
true that everyone has an idea about and means to product these new instru-
ments.
- Burden
Like the economic development projects that are generally "parachuted in," -
if not imposed on the people, literacy and school enrollment programs are
often proposed as a governmental decision within a debatable framework ~
(4Jestern-type schooling) and an ineffective context (sporadic, experimental
operations). �
Insofar as these initial indispensable operations, which literacy training,
school attendance and professional training are, do not lead to wider use
at the political, economic,~cultural and informational levels, they lose
some of their effectiveness and they are not renewed: The shift fram mass
literacy to functional literacy expresses this strategic change insofar as ~
mass literacy can only succeed when there is mass journalistic, technical ~
or cultural literature. If there is nothing to read or nothing interesting ~
to read, then why subject oneself to that which is perceived as a burden
since, until further orders, it is literacy training (that is, schooling)
in the foreign national. language that pays off?
The strategy of natioral lan~guages can therefore be nothing but overall and
it implies the development.of new scientif ic research in languages and even
a rejection of certain dominant theories. Linguistic mixtures today are
numerous (between African languages, between African and Western languages)
and spontaneous linguistic creation among the people is continuous. Now
then, on th~ practical level, the translation of linguistic analysis has
always led to a reconstitution of the internal logic of languages and
therefore, to an implicit respect of its rules. �
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LVL\ VLIIVLLlJ.1 VVL V1~1JL
Everyone also knows that there is the correct spoken language and the
language as the people speak it, that social groups and classes express
themselves differently with respect to vocabulary and syntax. Traditional
aristocrats do not speak exactly the same language as their peasants and
a dock worker or a minisCer will not speak their maternal tongue in the
same way. Consequently, the technocratic drafting of literacy programs or
schooling in the national language risks favoring the way of speech of
dominant groups because the linguist tends to reject the more popular or
bastardized (transformed) v~rsions of the language. Science is therefore
neither neutral nor innocent.
Africanizing research workers and increasing their numbers are not enough.
It is essential to transform the very mentality of the specialized linguist,
who acts as if he alone knew how others should talk.
It is not possible to assure the masses of a mastery of their maternal or
vernacular tongues by using the same means that ensured.dissemination of
the so-called "national" languages. Having said this much, the experiments
underway, whether scattered or national, teach us� about the possibilities -
of this linguistic revolution, which is cultural in the strongest sense of
the word. �
FOOTNOTES
1. See AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 211.
2. English would be introduced into primary schools in 1950, only to .
disappear aame 10 years later. From this standpoint, Tanzania has
escaped "bad" school, habits.
_ 3. It is not possible to retrace the panorama of linguistic theories,
but the current debate in this discipline has a great deal to do with
the orientation of research in the field in Africa. In opposition to
the structural-functionalist theories that have prevailed for 40 to
50 years are the generalist or trans�ormational theory of N. Chomsky
(the well-known anti-imperialiat American intellectual) and the Soviet
and American sociolinguistic approaches. The French and British tra-
ditions (colonial mother countries) are mainly based on the former,
while the American research workers, more recent but very numer~us,
refer more to the other two orientations. This situation (even if
healthy scientifically speaking) certainly complicates the development
of a unified African Africanist linguistic method.
4. At the applied linguistics centers in Dakar, Abid~an or Yaounde, the
research workers are mainly French or Belgian and ttie technicians
nationals, a division of.work that says a great deal about colonial
traditions: ~
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r~R or~rr.cTnr. I1SF, ~Ni.,r -
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
AGRICULTURE IN AFRICA EXAMINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Jun 80 pp 63-70
[Article by J. A. Plus: "The African Continent: the Dossiers of Yesterday,
Today, and Tomorrow"]
[Text] Let us ask the "man in the street" if he thinks that Africa is a
continent with an agricultural calling. It is a good bet that he will -
answer in the negative. In fact, during the year the media published
information on emergency food assistanceto tMis African country or on the ^
risks of famine in some other country. The authorities of most African
countries outdo themselves in asking rich countries for help every year and
in evoking the specter of famine in order to evoke the understanding of
well nourished Western countries.
In 1980, after the countries of the Sahel, which announced a shortage of
about 800,000 tons of cereal for this year, it was Tanzania's turn to
sound the alarm of an unprecedented shortage with respect to its corn har-
vest, the basic food of the population. Other countires, like those of the
Maghreb, continue to import ever-larger quantities of foodstuffs each year.
The three countries of North Africa import about 30 percent of their cereal
needs.
In reading these figures= one might think that Africa is largely destitute.
But, however disheartening the reality is, there is too great a tendency to
_ forget that the black continent is also one of the foremost of world
exporters of agricultural products: coffee, cocao, hevea, palm oil, cotton,
peanuts, sugar cane in southern Sahara; citrus fruit, grapes, olive oil in
the north. The agricultural wealth of Africa no longer has to be demon-
strated. It not only has long given proof of this--and the colonial powers
- that had carried out immense exploitations everywhere had not been mistaken--
but this could definitely be increased tenfold--provided one begins to
attend to this.
It is moreover enough to see to what point new crops can quickly adapt. Is
wheat a particularly Mediterranean crop? It now grows on the Adamaoua
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plateau in the Cameroon. "European" vegetables and f.ruit, like carrots,
potatoes,or.. . strawberries,unknown to Africans until recently, are cul-
tivated everywhere in the vicinity of big cities where truck farmers easily
find a clientele of expatriates or westernized nationals. The most varied
agricultural products are sold on Western markets and, in walking about, no
one would realize that he is at the same time in what some call "the
starving continent."
To carry the paradox further, one could even say that, except for the really
desert aress, there are practically no countries that are completely
ill-favored from the point of view of agriculture. Even the Sahelian coun-
tries, from Senegal to Niger and Haute-Vol:ta, examples of th~ poorest of the
poor, all have a Sudanese area that is quite well irrigated and are per-
fectly capable of nourishing their population well. But that is not the
case. The causes of chronic food shortage in Africa have now been iden-
tified: nwnerous studies in the past 5 years have pinpointed political
blockages, economic errors, and inadequacy of agricultural techniques.
Trumps
This past March, a report submitted to the European Development and
Cooperation Commission, which held its second session on hunger in the
world, drew up a list of errors coffinitted in the agriculture of developing
- cauntries. They sometimes caused a loss of 20 years to African agriculture.
They could be corrected before it is too late if there existed, from one
~nd to the other of the continent, a real political willingness to develop
agricultural production in accordance with the needs of the domestic
market without, however, completely abandoning the export crops that pro-
vide the currency that is indispensable for growth. They must not in any
case cause one to forget that Africa possesses undeniable trumps and that
it is not inevitably doomed to malnutrition and to poverty. A self-sufficient
Africa, that at the same time is an exporter of agricultural products? This
is not impossible, provided the necessary means are made available to it.
Priority of Priorities
The international division of labor, instituted in the 19th century by a
West in full expansion, assigned the role of supplier of raw materials--
mineral and agricultural--tc: Africa, forgetting in the meantime that Af.r.icans
also needed to eat. The industrial countries' need to find sources of sure
and not very expensive supplies explains in great part the present char-
acter of African agriculture.
Imbalance
While certain countries--still too exceptional--like the Ivory Coast, have
considerably strengthened their potential in this domain, others, on the
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ther hand, yielding to the eas.e of mining exploitation, have completely
neglected the agricultural sector to the point of becaming importers of
foodstuffs--peanuts or palm oil, for example--which they formerly exported
in considerable quantities. This is the case with Zaire and Nigeria. Still
others, such as Niger, for years have been appropriating increasing 8mounta
of resources to food production and can hope to attain self-sufficiency in
, food in a foreseeable future.
On the whole~ however, the continent's production is not very satisfactory.
According to the FAO, the production of foodstuffs has increased only 1.5
_ percent a year from 1970 to 1978; that is, much more slowly than the popula-
tion, the rate of demographic increase almost everywhere being about 3 per-
cent a year. That means that food availability per inhabitant has decreased
in recent years. Several countries have even seen their overall agricul-
tural production decrease during that period. This is the case with Angola
and Mozambique, which have not yet surmounted the aftermath of the war of
independence; with Uganda, for reasons that one knows; but also with
Mauritania, Ghana, and Gambia.
But the African population not only is increasing: its structure is
changing with a rapidity that alters customs and requires an effort to meet
evolving needs.
Abidjan: 30,000 inhabitants in 1945; 1.5 million today; 3 million at the
end of the century. No country is escaping this giddy urban increase. The
population of cities is increasing approximately twice as rapidly as that
of the country as a whole. In 1985, 36 percent of the population of
Africa and of the Middle East will live in cities, compared with 25 percent
in 1970. This massive exodus to big cities, that one is ~ust about begin-
ning to attempt to control, creates enormous needs for foodstuffs which the
rural world, quite unprepared for this evelutiori, is at the moment inca-
pable of satisfying.
If this trend continues, African tood imports, which already amount to
$7 billion a year, will double between now and the year 2,000. Algeria
already allots some 20 percent of its oil receipts to the purchase of food-
stuffs, chiefly from Canada and the United States. Senegal now spends a por-
tion of its meager currency reserves to import approximately 300,000 tons
of rice a year; its overall cereal shortage this year amounted to 300,000
tons. The Sudan which, in the opinion of nimmerous experts, could become the
"granary of the Arab world, at the end of 1979 signed a contract for the
purchase of $100 million of wheat from the United States during the next
5 years.
These examples, which one could multiply, are enough to show the imbalance
of most of the African countries, in spite of their repeated willingness to
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accord "the priority of priorities" to agriculture in general and to
self-sufficiency in food in particular. -
The Exception of Sugar
A study of the situation--region by region--shows that the shortage does not
necessarily co rrespond to the arid or climatically disadvantaged areas, but
is due essentially to economic factors. -
. In Northern Africa there is a cereal shortage of approximately 10 million
tons. Leguminous crops, the basis of nourishment in several regions, is
also inadequat e. Only sugar production has increased in notable propor-
tions. There will still be a definite shortage in the region in 1990: the
rate of cereal self-sufficiency will amount to only 85 percent; the same
for meat, while dairy production will satisfy only 72 percent of the needs.
. The rice shortage in the Sahelian countries amounts to 500,000 tons a
year and the p roduction of millet and sorghum, which are nevertheless the _
principal cereals cultivated in the region, is also inadequate. The Sahel
imports 300,000 tons of millet a year. During the past 10 years the pro-
duction of leguminous crops went from a surplus to a shortage. Only the
production of ineat shows an overall surplus. In 1990, the Sahel would
probably have to import 800,000 tons of cereal, especially wheat and millet,
while it probably would achieve self-sufficiency in rice and corn. The pro-
duction of ineat will continue to show a surplus, but it will atill be
necessary to import milk in great quantity.
. In western Africa, while the production of leguminous crops and of root
plants is suff icient to satisfy domestic requirements, the wheat shoxtage, -
which probably would amount to 800,000 tons, has tripled compared with the
1964-1965 period. Rice importations exceed 400,000 tons a year, which
represents an increase of 50 percent campared with the level recorded 10
years ago. In 1990, this region will continue to import almost all of its
wheat needs and an important portion of its rice, while the millet andsorghum
production should satisfy its needs. A slight shortage in root plants will
also be felt.
The Great Mass
. In central Africa, the degree of self-sufficiency in recent years for all
foodstuffs has decreased, except for leguminous crops, oil seeds, and sugar.
The cereal shortage will still be very considerable in 1990, since local -
production will be able to satisfy only 60 percent of the needs. Contrary
to other regions of the continent, central Africa is still unsuitable for
the development of ~onsiderable cattle breeding. It will continue to be
deficient in meat, milk, and even fish.
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. Finally, for eastern and southern Africa as a whole, the degree of
~ self-sufficiency is higher and more stable than elsewhere. But, as every--
where, importations of wheat and of rice continue to in crease, amounting
_ reapectively to 700,000 and 400,000 tons a year.
The production of ineat has increased in recent years to the point of pro- -
viding a considerable surplus, but a shortage will again be felt, beginning
with 1985, in milk, meat, and fish. The cereal shortage will not be
solved, in spite of a surplus production of corn and millet. But root
plants and legimminous crops will satiafy requirements.
Still, these estimates for the 1990 outlook are optimistic. At a meeting
. in Arusha in September 1978, on the occasion of the lOth regional FAO con-
ference, the African ministers of agriculture in fact declined at that time
to make estimates based on projections of present trends, believing that
one would arrive at an "unacceptable" situation. They thus started from
an"optimistic" viewpoint, based on general economic expansion and on the
institution of a series of ineasures to raise food produ ction very much above
the present tendentious J.ine. But the evolution of the situation since the
1978 confere~ice calls for more circumspection.
In observing the structure of the shortage one notes in any case the impor-
tance of the urban demand, since the cities are the chief consumers of rice
and of wheat. As much as the demand, itself, national production does not
succeed in keeping up with the change in food habite, and the city-country
hiatus is continuing to increase. Will one soon see a modern and highly
prof itable type of agriculture capture the best land and devote itself
exclusively to the satisfaction of the needs of the city dwellers, while the
mass of peasants will continue to cultivate traditional cereals and tuber-
cles with more or less improved techniques?
New Outlets
This will be a quite likely pattern and moreover is begi~ing to exist in
some countries, thanks to the countries' development of big agro-industrial
areas. Modernization in any case has long developed so-calle d commercial
crops. In spite of the regular deterioration of trade terms, hardly offset
by the sharp and ephemeral price increases that were applied ta sugar in
1975 or coffee in 1976-1977, in the case of a great number of countries the
development of these crops is of ten the only means of supporting the public
treasury and of obtaining currency. Again it is necessary to differentiate
between stagnant crops, or those in decline, and those that have developed
at a zapid rate during the past 20 years.
In North Africa, for example, the areas devoted to vineyards have been
reduced by about half since independence, causing a significant decresse
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in exportations, to the extent also that the French market ceased to
receive Maghreb wines on nreferential terms. At the same time that this
decrease in production occurred, the three countries of the Maghreb have
actively searched for new outlets: thus, in a few years, black Africa has
become an important buyer of North Africa~s wines (of 500,000 hectares of
exportation, Tunisia has been selling 110,000 hectoliters a year for some
years), as have the socialist countries, in particular the USSR, for which
Algeria converts a portion of its production into brandy.
It would be difficult for the production of other export crops to increase
much in a near-at-hand future, the world market being currently incapable
of absorbing big surpluses. Thus the Tunisian production of olive oil,
after being greatly developed since independence, will not exceed 200,000
tons a year, since Tunisia is able to export hardly more than 100,000 tons
a year. The same for Moroccan and Tunisian citrus fruit. The European
markets that absorb a great portion of the exports are not infinitely
extensible, and these two countries already now have great difficulty in
exporting some 700,000 tons a year.
In the southern part of the Sahara,peanuts have caused the greatest frustra-
tions in recent years b~cause of drought, but especially because of severe
competition from the oil seeds that are being cultivated all over the place,
especially in the industrial countries. Senegal, the second world pro- ~
ducer after India, is the first to suffer from this situation.
The "Palm Tree Plan"
Considered as a whole, Africa has not increased its production of big tro-
pical crops in.a spectacular manner, except for a limited number of products.
One notes instead important changes in the distribution of these crops among =
various countries. Whereas poor management of the a~ricultural patrimony,
. or a hazardous economic policy,has occasioned dramatic drops in a certain ,
n~ber of countries, during this time others have acquired a leading posi-
tion for some crops.
For coffee, whereas Ugandan, Zairian, and central African production has
declined, that of other countries, like.Rwanda and Burundi--which produce
excellent quality arabic--have been maintained at a creditable level, while
others have made a big effort in this domain: Tanzania, whose production
went from 27,000 tons in 1961 to 50,000 tons in 1978; Cameroon and the
Ivory Coast, which respectively produce 90,000 tons and 330,000 tons of
coffee a year.
The Ivory Coast has also succeeded in becoming the first world producer of
cocoa, with a harvest of 320,000 tons in 1979 and which should amount ~o
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480,00~ tons in 1985. It has thus supplanted Ghana, which has long occupied
first world place, but whose production ras greatly decreased in recent
years, in spite of a slight increase in recent seasons.
Thanks to the imp~ementation in 1960 of a gigantic "palm tree plan," the
Ivory Coast has also become the first African producer of palm oil, with
an estimated production of 200,000 tons in 1980. Other countries are also
developing the cultivation of oil-producing palm trees; the world demand for
palm oil is ever-increasing. This is the case with Cameroon and, to a
lesser degree, Gabon, which probably will soon produce 15,000 tons of oil
a year, thanks to the planting of 5,000 hectares of palm groves.
Good Intentions...
There seems to be a good future in Africa for other oleaginous products.
Some countries in fact are proposing to ~oin the competition for soybean
production. The pro~ect is already very advanced in the Ivory Coast.
Export prospects seem promising and Europe, desirous or diversifying its
supplies, is actively encouraging the development of this crop in Africa.
But the undertaking is not without risk. In addition to its being a ques-
tion of a new exportation crop in countries with an already extroverted
economy, the United States--which posaesses a quasi-~monopoly of the world
production--could at pleasure cause a drop in prices in order to "break"
eventual competitors. In addition, new processes for the feeding of live-
_ stock in industrial countzies would doubtless cause the end of the "soybean
era," to tre detriment of producer countries. But, for the moment, it
- seems t~at the decision has been made to develop speculations according to
outside d~nand.
In recent years Af rica has also been accorded the role of supplier of tro-
- pical fruit and of out of seasun truck gardening products destined for
Europe. Pineapple and avocados from the Ivory Coast; pimento and green
beans from Kenya, Senegal, and Haute-Volta; mangoes from Mali, etc. supply
a considerable exportation stream to European markets. But this type of
speculation encounters great difficulties because of the instability of
markets. For example, the Ivory Coast encounters big problams in exporting
its production of fresh pineapple, which moreover has gone from 240.~.000 tons
in 1975 to 150,000 tons in 1980. Production costs have increased in spite -
of the low price for these foodstuffs paid to the producer. The very great
increase in the price of air freight poses enormous problems.
Among the industrial crops that have been developed in recent years, let us
finally cite tea in eastern Africa (chiefly Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi) and
cotton in western and central Af rica, if one excepts the decline in this
crop in Nigeria; with an annual harvest of about 175,000 tons of cottonseed,
Chad has become the third African producer, behind Egypt and the Sudan; and -
French-speaking countries as a whole, from Cameroon to Mali, have seen
their production develop considerably.
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- In spite of low remuneration for their products on the world u~arket, African
countries on the whole are big exporters of agricultural raw material and -
increasingly important importers of foodstuffs. However, the time has not
yet come for them to harvest the fruit of such a constancy in the outward
direct~on of their crops. International negotiar_ions with respect to Che
price of basic products always clash with the generosity of consiuner coun-
tries and the 5th UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment] session, held in Manila in May 1979, resulted in a series of failures.
No provision was made in behalf of vegetable oil and oil seeds. A new -
international agreement, which becamse ef~ective in January 1980, was made _
only for olive oil. The discussions did not lead to any new agreement on
coffee. Negotiations with respect to cocoa, which have been going on since
the beginning of 1979, ended in failure at the time of the Lond~n conference
this past March.
Therefore the prospects for African agriculture are not very optimistic. -
However, significant attempts are beginning to be made here and there to
correct the situation. In the trade sector, one witnesses attempts at
regrouping the exporter countries, while in the realm of food, almost all
of the African countries are currently concentrating on strategies for the
development of food production. Implementation is now necessary. In spite
~ of statements of principle, they are not always czrried out.
Unequal Development
The agro-industrial complex: that today is one of the key words of devel-
_ opment in Africa. Most countries have desk drawers full of attractive
plans, and the countries are on the look out for foreign financing--public
or private. There is a logical reason: on the spot processing of agricul-
tural raw materials in fact makes it possible to realize an added value to
that of the raw materials, to create jobs for an ever-increasing working -
p~pulation, to contribute to the exploitation of private regions, that is,
of resources.
Processing
One sho~~ld, however, differentiate between several t}~pes of agro-industries, =
which have not been developed to the same degree by all countries: indus-
tries that deal with the first st age of agriculture on the one hand, those
that process agricultural products on the other hand and, finally, those
which deal with local or imported products that are intended for domestic
demand .
The general degree of industrialization and the existence of a considerable
domestic market moreover candition ap,ro-industr;al development: the Maghreb, _
Egypt, or Nigeria are much more advanced in this regard than the Sahelian
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~ ~
countries or mos= of the central African countries. Other countries, such
as Kenya or the Ivory Coast, have embarked on an ambitious policy of indus-
- trialization, where the processing of agricultural products occupies a
choice place.
In the manufacture of item:: for the production of agriculture Africa on the
~hole is a continent that is not very advanced. The still very embryonic
use of fertilizers, the small amount of agricultural mechanization have
not created demands that would make it profitable to establish such indus-
tries. Yet, a potential demand does exist: African consumption of mineral
fertilizers (NPK) went from 7G0,000 tons in 1960 to 1.8 million tons in
1970, and will amount to 3.5 million in 1980-1981. But it is still a ques~-
_ tion of negligible quantities. Judge for yourself: whereas the developed
count:ies consume 59 kg of fertilizer units a year per inhabitant, Angola
- consu~es only 4.5 kg, and Haute-Volta O.l~Cgl The only countries that possess
a strong fertillzer industry are the continent's big ~,-oducers of phosphate, -
that moreover export a good portion of their production; this is the case
with Morocco and Tunisia. Other countries, like Algeria, have developed a
- domestic fertilizer rroduction. In the Ivory Coast, the SIVENG (Ivorian
~ Fertilizer Company), lacated in Vridi, produces 25,000 tons ~f various types ~
of fertilizer a year from i.mported raw materials, and envisages bringing
~ ics manufacturing capacity of feztilizer compounds to 120,000 tons a yesr.
Senegal and Cameroon also possess their own fertilizer fact.ories. There
are plans elsewhere, but their implementation is slow in materializing.
There is a similar weakness with respect to agricultural mechanization: out
of more than 15 million tractors in service in the world in 1977, only
120,000 were in service in Africa (excluding South Africa) and only 30,000
in tropical Af rica, that is, 0.2 percent of the world total. '1'he Maghreb
agriculture, characterized by the long-time presence of great colonial
domains, is more mechanized, and it is net surprising that Algeria is in
the forefront in this sector: the country in fact manufactures a portion of
the farm machines needed for its agriculture and has gone far beyond the mere
assembly stage, since there is an 80 percent degree of integration of its
factories. Because of its considerable needs, it still remains one of the
biggest importers of agricultural materi~ls and of separate parts,in the
Third World: in 1979, its imports amounted to 1 billion FF (50 billion
. CFA [Af rican Financial Community] F) .
In tropical Africa, industrialization focused essentially on the manufacture
of smallequipment i.ntended to imprnve peasant farming: ploughss multi-
cultivators, seeders, harrows, carts, etc. -
For the rest, Af rican dependence is still very great and all the more pre-
_ occupying since the price of equipment and of production items is increasing
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rVt~ vrril,ltll. uJC uLVLI
at a much more rapid rate than that of raw materials. The price of phos-
rhated and nitrogenous fertilizers increased 10 percent in 1978 and that
of potash 20 percent. This increase continued in 1979.
As one might expect, the most developed agro-industria~ sector is th~t of
_ the important processing of agricultural products intended for exportation.
The Food Industry
- The oil mill sector is one of the most important of agro-industrial activi-
ties f rom the north to the south of the continent: olive oil, peanut oil,
palm oil, copra o~l are processed everywhere on the spot before being
~xported. It has also given rise to a series of subsidiary industries, for
both exportation and the domestic market, in particular the manufacture of
various kinds of fat and the installation of soap factories.
Textile plants also are at the basis of numerous industrial units: cotton
gins and cotton oil mills, but also textile complexes and the processing
of jute and of sisal, chiefly in eastern Africa.
Coffee and cocoa are also decorticat~~d on the spot before being exported,
although in this domain processing is not very advanced; a negligible por-
tion of African. coffee is roasted at the places of production and the capa-
bility for trituration of cocoa is still very slight: that of the Ivory
Coast does not exceed 70,000 tons a year, with a total production that soon
will amount to 400,000 tons a year. The diversification of domestic demand
has nevertheless made possible the creation of more sophisticated industries:
- chocolate factories, factories for soluble coffee are multiplying across the
continent.
As in the case of textiles, the food industry is one of the sectors where
implantation is relatively easy in the developing countries: local produc-
tions have often favored development of the already long-standing canning
industry in North Africa. This sector is particularly developed in Morocco
" and in Tunisia, countries which, once the domestic demand is satisfied, are
big exporters of flour and of canned fish, fruit, vegetables, and jams.
IiZdustrial Breeding
However, outlets are not always assured: in Morocco, the process:tng fac-
tories for fruit ~uices, which consume a portion of the agrononic production, -
cannot operate at full speed because of difficulties in selling the produc-
tion. The world market, dominated by very big producers, like the United
States, Israel, South Africa, or Spain, in fact leaves very little room for
newcomers. The situation is the same for tropical countries; the Ivory
Coast encounters great difficulties in exporting its production of canned
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pineapple: the SAI.CI agro-induetrial complex regularly produces less that
- its SS-ton capacity of preserves and 8 million cans of ~uice a year. That
is why satisfaction of the domestic market is an increasingly surer base.
Long after the Maghreb, almost all of the countries in south Sahara embarked
on the processing of tomato paste. Three factories were installed in Senegal.
The Ivory Coast has ~ust put the Sinematiali agro-industrial complex into
operation; it manufactures products obtained from 1,800 hectares of irrigated
~ land: 3,000 tons a year of canned local vegetables (grubo and eggplant) and
1,000 tons of mango oreserves and of mangoes in syrup.
Finally, the processing of cerals gives rise to a series of industrisl activi-
ties. While traditional cereals, like millet and sorghum, are still processed
through artisan meana--even though some countriea like Senegal have succeeded
in converting them into bread--increasing wheat requirements have resulted
in an increase of flour mills for domestic production in North Africa and
importations into black Africa. In the French-speaking countries, trade and
processing are still to a great degree in the hands of foreign interests.
Who hg~ not seen in Dakar, Abid~an, Douala, or Brazzaville the immenae ~
Grands Moulins silos that dominate the port? Setting aside the processing
of flour, in recent years biscuit factories, factories ror pastas (macaroni,
noodles, spaghetti, etc.), couscous, etc. have been installed everywhere;
these products are being increasingly consumed by urban populations.
Rice factories on ~he other hand, which have been increasing in the African
south Sahara for about 10 years, operate on the basis of a local production
~ that is ever-increasing, rice being in a fair way almost everywhere to
deposing trad�~tional cereals and tuber~les as the basic food of urb.an popula-
- tions.
The demand for the latter has also caused a spectacular development in small
livestock breeding in the proximity of big agglomerations in the most
advanced industrial countries and also in a dairy industry that is still
quite inade~uate in comparison to needs. ~
In this context, the breedi~:~ of poultry and of porcine animals (except in
Moslem countries) makes it possible to rapidly respond to increased require-
ments in countries where cattle breeding is inadequaze: in Tunisia, the
STIL company several years ago embarked on the processing of milk and dairy
products, on the production of eggs and of chickens for the provisioning of
urban markets. In the Ivory Coas~, the SIPRA company will produce at the
rate of 1 million eggs a week and 20,000 tons of food a year. In Kenya,
where family poultry raising covers only 25 percent of its needs, a poultry _
industiy has developed in the vicinity of Nairobi, Mombasa, and in the
- tourist areas (Indian Ocean coasts). Morocco is in the process of implement-
ing an ambitious dairy project, intended to make it self-sufficient in this
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a v~~ va . iv..~au vuaJ v~~a,a
domain. Finally, with respect to cattle breeding, several countries have .
embarked on an industrial-type breeding, thanks to the processing of live-
stock food from agricultural by-products.
Change of Direction
Thus an industrial-type of agriculture is in the process of emerging in
Africa. Concentrated around sone cities, it has only slightly penetrated
the rural world, which continues to live according to the . ~ of agricul- -
*_ural seasons and the traditional techniques that have:scarcely improved
at all. Nevertheless, the desire of countries for agro-industry is not
abating and some large-scale realizations are now relieving light industries.
The most striking example is that of sugar production. A substitution
industry for some countries like Morocco, whose production now amounts to
600,~00 tons a year, it now ranks as an exporter industry for a good number
' of countries that have had sugar complexes for about 10 years (up to that
time, the sugar industry had been concentrated in a very small number of
countries). Others, like Haute-Volta, Cameroon, or Gabon, several years
. ago installed one or two complexes, making it possible to largely satisfy
their domestic needs. Still others have resolutely embarked on a policy of ~
sugar expansion. Five other countries will become big exporters of sugar
between 1982 and 19$5: the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Sudan, Cameroon, and Swazi-
land. The possibilities for the creation of regional markets being extremely
limited, the new product will support the predominant trend of a north-south
= trade.
_ ~ls in the case of other activities, the agro-industrial ~,ector is still
developing in great part in accordance with the needs, or supposed needs, of
industrial countries. Evolution toward other priorities is very slow and
a change of direction will not occur tomorrow.
- ' Obstacles and Per~pectives '
' The increase in agricultural production in Africa is not only tied in '
` with the increase in cultivated areas or with yields, but also with the '
' protection of crope and ha~.rvests. The decrease in yields, owing to crop '
predacors such as insects, like the formidable locust, birds, or rats,
and to plant diseases, have often caused catastrophic losses that anni-
hilate years of ef.fort. In some covntries, losses due to the enemies of
crops can amount to 40 percent of total production. For a long time, a
series of phytosanitary measures have been taken in numerous countries.
But often the lack of continuity of action and the impossibility on the
part of peasants to buy the necessary quantities of pesticides have pre-
- vented counteractions from being truly effective.
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1~OIt Oh'l~I(;IAI, Utif: ONI.Y
The use of pesticides nevertheless has greatly increased in Africa,
in spite of a 10 percent increase in price in 1979. In order to aur-
mount the obstacle of price, especially for the plants that are big
consumers of chemical products, like cotton, one now tries to utilize
techniques of integrated counteraction, with a consequent reduction
in cost to farmers, while at the same time limiting the harmful
effects of the uncontrolled use of chemical products. Another big
obstacle to self-sufficiency with respect to food: that connected
with the stockpiling of harvests--the losses due to poor conditions
of stockpiling being also very considerable. Several c~untries, like
Senegal or the Sudan, have started to build silos in cities, while
at the same time they are trying to improve traditional techniques of
vi~lage stockpiling. Systematic measures in this re:gard, especially
when harvests are good and provide considerable surpluses, can make
' it possible to save 10 to 20 percent of the cropA. In these domains,
' as well as in others, there are existen~ techniques. In order to '
' put them into concrete form, willingness is needed at the level of '
' those in charge and necessary means are needed at the level of '
' peasants. '
~ ,
~
The Utilization of Land in Africa
Utilization of Land Millions of Percentage of
hectares the total
Arahle land actually 214 , 7 percent
cultivated
Pastures 822 27 percent
Forests 635 21 percent
Fallow land and 1,360 45 percent
other utilization
Total 3,031 100 percent
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avi~ vL�a i~,ina, u~~; Vl'1L1
Increase in Agricultural Investments in Some African Countries
A certain numher of Af rican countries have increased their agricultural
investments after the world food crisis at the beginning of the 70ts. But
a reading of the following table shows that the effort has not always been -
adequate. If the trend is encouraging with respect to some countries, the
part of agriculture in the total investment continues to decrease in other
countries, even though confronted with serious difficulties regarding
supplies.
Country 1971-1973 and Percentage of Agricultural Percentage of
1974-1976 evolution investments of total agricultural PIB
investment of total PIB in =
1976
Current 1970 1971-73 1974-76
price price
Algeria 68 39 7 5 8
Kenya 60 11 9 10 14
Tunisia 66 27 15 12 17
Mauritius 362 88 10 11 26
Egypt 57 23 13 8 27
Tanzania 356 181 16 25 37
Zambia - 41 - 59 21 11 38
Ethiopia - 7 - 27 8 8 45
Burundi 80 25 24 2 58
Malawi 48 10 23 30 60
The countries are classified according to the part of agriculture in the
total PIB, in increasing order.
Source: World Bank statistics. The countries chosen are those for which
the greatest amount of statistics are available.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
8255
CSO: 4400
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
ALLEGED MNR SUPPORT--The opposition to President Samora Machel of
r[ozambique are said to be still supplied fzom the southeast of Zimbabwe
by the South Africans. With the complicity o� white officers of the army
of Prime Minister R. Mugabe. [Text] [JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1013
4 Jtm 80 p 40] 8956
SENGHOR WARNS OF LIBYA-MAURITANIA TIE--Senghor, very concerned about the re-
organization of the Mauritanian army by the Libyans, has alerted Giscard:
"Their first target is likely to be Dakar and Senegal. Be prepared to have _
the Jaguar aircraft intervene." [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French
11 Jul 80 p 71] _
CSO: 4400
1~1 -
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ANGOLA
ALLEGED FRENCH RELUCTANCE TO ACT AGAINST UNITA, FNLA ELEMENTS
Paris AP'RIQUE-ASIE in French No 216, 23 Jun SO p 37
[Article: "FNLA Death Squads in Paris"]
[Text] In spi~e of the many economic agreements concluded between Paris
and Luanda (especially with respect to oil), certain French special ser-
vices seem determined to do everything they can to create and entertain a
state of crisis between the two countries. Neither the pressing requests
made by the Angolar: ambassador to Paris, Mr Luis d'Almeida, at the French -
Foreign Office and at the Elysees Palace, nor the official warnings of
the head of Angolan diplomacy, Mr Paulo ~~orge, appear to have succeeded in
convincing French official circles that they should take the necessar~ -
steps to end the dar:gerous activities of agents from puppet movements,
UNITA ar:d FLNA [Angolan National Liberation Front], whose leaders are known
to have entertained close relations with the CIA, the SDECE [FScternal Intel-
ligence and Counterespionage Service], the former Portuguese PIDE [Police
for the Cor.trol of. Foreigners and the Defense of the State] and the South.
African Boss [expansion unknown]. -
For several months, the French Ministry of the Interior, using legal csuibbles,
has been asking the Paris Prefecture of Police to open a special service to
handle the requests of so-called Angalan political refugees who, in fact,
are only FNLA,, UNITA and FLEC hit men and secret agents. Thus, Roberto
Holden has been able to move to Neuilly, to a villa belonging to the French
secret services and located near the Angolan ambassador's residence. A1-
though he is protected by scores of French policemen, Holden kept saying
he needed more bodyguards. And thus several members of the evil Death :~quad
which he had formed in Kinshasa to attempt to the. life of NII~LA leaders a.nd
sympathizers have arrived in Paris. Armed with submachine guns and sight-
telescope rifles, these hit men are headed by Cocoderiou and Tetelaoudo
- whose victim list is especially long. These two individuals have been
positively identified by Angol.an diplomats and their friends in Paris.
Under the cover of. the "political refugee" status, French police authorities
are prctecting these common criminals, these hired assassins. Certain diplo-
matic circles in the French capital have reason to wonder whether this is
not an operation intended to aggravate--if not create--a serious crisis in
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a V11. v1 ! i~/y~1L ~~~/L V1~L1
Franco-Angolan relations. The crucial question, however, remains that of
knowing what French or foreign power, or political or economic circles would
have an interest in disrupting the development of relations between Paris
and Luanda. The close connection existing between Roberto Holden and his
friends at the CIA might provide a possible answer.
In fact, in Parisian diplomatic circles it is not a secret that France's
overture toward Luanda has created a definite malaise in Washington.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
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- ANGOLA
BRIEFS
REPORTED FRG SUPPORT TO UNITS--It was the German Christian Democratic
Party which, of the Western parties, decided to give the greatest mili-
tary and financial assistance to the Angolan puppet, Savimbi. Well in-
formed diplomatic sources in Bonn affirm that, on instructions from the
- Bavarian leader, SLrauss, large loans were made to Savimbi. A campaign
' is said to be underway among certain German industrial companies to con-
tribute to ttiis UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola] fimd. It has furtlier been confirmed that the president of
_ 'Laire~ Mobutu, has himself encouraged German political and financial
circles to aid Savimbi in every possible way. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-
ASIE in French No 214 26 May-8Jun 80 p 15] 8956
DETAILS ON AGRICULT[JRAL C~OPERATIVES--Luanc3a has announced that Angola now
_ has 3,500 farmers' associations and 296 production cooperatives represent-
ing respectively 417,851 and 50,811 people. The associations consist of
_ cores of 20 families who devote 3 days each week to work in collective
fields. In cooperatives, which are the result of the evolution of associa-
tions, or of the transformation of small and medium-size colonial farms,
the farmers also o4;n the production means (or rent agricultural equipment,
etc.) in common, and share the profits according to the amount and quality
- of the work they provide. The existence of these numerous associations
leads to anticipate a significant inerease in agricultural production and
a progressive modernization of the wor.king methods used in the Angolan
country. [Text] [~ar~s AFRIQUF-AS2E in French No 216, 23 Jun 80 p 35]
9294
1980 CC~F`r'EE PRODUCTION ESTIMATES--The People's Republic of Angola anticipa.tes
- t.he export~~ion, this year, of 48,000 tons of coffee, which will represent
an amc,~unL Gf 160 million dollars (approximately 5 billion kwanzas), the
head of Lhe Department of Foreign Marketing of the National Coffee Enter-
prise (ENCAFE), Jaime de Oliveira, announced. It is estimated that coffee
preductxan this year will be double that of 1979 and will exceed that of
197E3 by 25 pex.cent. Angolan coffee is exported for two thirds to socialist
EuropEa:~ ~~oL:atries (East Germany and the Societ Union) and Algeria; the
rem~inir..~~ thi�rd is bought by traditional importers (the United States, the `
Nether_l~nc;s, Portugal) .[Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASI.E in French No 216,
23 ,7un 80 p 34] 92'94
= C Si? : Z.t1~0iJ ~
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BENIN
NATION'S PROBLEMS IN 1980 DISCIISSED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 May 80 p 1190
[Article: "Benin Facing Problems in 1980"]
[Text] The observer traveling through Benin from north to south and from
east to west will notice mainly two things as the present dry season r�ears
its end:
- Political stability has made possible certain economic developments:
Onigbolo cement factory, now under construction (ir,vestments: 25 tc 30
billion CFA francs); Save sugar manufacturing complex (45 to 50 billion
CFA francs); Bohicon multipurpose oil mill (2 to 3 billion CFA francs);
Bahicon corn mill (1 to 2 billion CFA francs).
The extension of the Parakou railroad to Niamey is also beinq contemplated: "
approximately 100 billion CFA francs. Financial backers will soon meet to
discuss the Mono dam.
- Petty police anno}~ances have ceased altogether. From the few police
road blocks, one realizes that safety officers are more worried about
public transportation or private truck drivers than about controlling
- the identity of ;i few tourists.
These observatior.s are a legiti.mate source of gride for a regime which, at
the start, was not expected to last over a year considering the uncertain-
ties which surrounded its creation, the blunders and regrettabJ.e~incidents
which occurred along the way, and the improvisations which characterize
the deci.sions made by the country's high officials. Thus, the struqgle
against witchcraft (in a country where the near totality af the population
goes to the voodoo convent, to a protestant or cathol~.c church, or to the
mosk) has been a failurE. The campaign to encourage production, poorly
designed and poorly crganized, has been abandoned. The campaign for
national construction has been a flop.
The country has thus to face tremendous problems. An essentially agricul-
tural country, it is striving to prevent an exaggerated extroversion of
its economy: self-sufficient food production, use of local raw materials
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in the burgeoning industries : corn-processing, table oils, soap-making.. .
- Parallel to these efforts, the drought--added to the disorganization of
aqricultural. trading channels and to the lack of technical cadres--has
contributed to reduce production in all sectors:
~ In spite of the incentives provided during the 1979-1980 ~air,paiqn, rotton
production will hardly reach again 20,000 tons.
- Oil palms have not yet recovered from the past years' drought. Some
~ mills (Ahezon, Gbada) have even been closed.
- Peanuts and coffee are stagnating. The incentives now offered, if ihey
are continued, will bear frui t only in a few years.
Food crops w ere likely to cover Benin's requirements and even allow for
some e;cportations. In President Kerekou's words: "The demagogic measures
taken by some revolutionary agitators of all tendencies," have consisted
in putting institutions incapable of flexibility in control of trading
channels: suspicious Beninese farmers have chosen to keep their corn and
sorghu~ c~r to sell it secretly to their usual dea].ers rather tha.n to sell
it dirt cheap to state organizations.
These observations have enabled financial experts to gather some significant
figures:
- Palm cabbages (in tons)
Prcduction Difference Variation
1976/1977 . . . . . . 41,425 - 8,360 -16.8$
1977/1978 . . . . . . 11,818 -29,607 -71.5~
The evolution for the four products exported is as follows. The products
' involved are palm cabbages, cottonseed, tobacco and peanuts:
1974/1975 1975/1976 1976/1977 1977/1978
Production 83,703 77,177 67,289 28,633
Index value 100 92 SO 34
The rate of growth of the primary sector anticipated by the World Bank for
the period 1978-1986 was between 3 and 4 perceni:, in actual value, against
1.6 percent actually achieved during the 1972-1978 period.
The strong growth anticipated, 13 percent for the 1977-1978 period, did
not occur; all agricultural productions dropped by nearly two thirds.
Hov;ever, the tertiary sector of private trade is doing well. Import trade
is brisk and, as a result, the trade balance shows a considerable deficit:
between 35 and 40 percent.
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_ This sector is under the indirect control of a pol.itical aristocracy from
the North and a bourgeoisie of tradesmen from the South. This phenomenon ex-
plains thespeculation and the large bank credits granted to the trade sector.
To gain control over it, the state has created approximately 130 companies,
among which national and provincial trading companies. However, the func.- .
tioning of these institutions has been corrupted by the bureaucracy: private
trade has continued to develop at the expense of state trade, which seems
quite normal in a society where commercial acumen is devel.oped in the in-
dividual at an early age. -
This sector is growing so well that state employees will desert their jobs
or resign to devote themselves to it. After making visits to the Cotonou
m~.rket where he met state employees engaged in trading during office hours,
the minister of labor decided something had to be done. The government shared
his view and, last 23 April, a long communique was published in which the
following were denouncedr.
_ - carelessness in administrative management and work;
- increasinq i.ncompetence due to a lack of taste for work, and especially
for work well done;
- lateness at work due to laziness and thoughtlessness;
- increasing total or partial absenteeism due to a lack of control by
immediate ~upervisors and to the employees' sheer lack of discipline;
and especially delays in carrying out the tasks assignFd, and the mediocre
quality of the: work performed, the employees being more concerned about
their private and extraprofessional interests. ~
This communique provides a startling summary of "the disease which under-
mines dangerously our admi.nistrations, our public and semi-public enter-
prises.
The government reacts, penalizes, reorganizes structures. Thus, a few
people are dismissed at each meeting of the Council of Ministers. The
head of the state has even created a Ministry for the Inspection of Com-
panies. A minister fcr propaganda is st~pposed to "increase the awareness -
of cadres and the masses." But nothing helps.
The true proY;lem of this country is that it has always been--and continues
to be--secretly run by political aristocrats from the North and bourgeois
tradesmen from the South, military and intellectual idealists and opportun-
ists. Under these conditions, the penduZar motion consists in getting
into the good graces of both social groups so as to be in the clear.
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~
1 Vl~ Vl L 1V1AL VvL/ ~/1'1L1
From time to time, President Kerekou will denounce this type of behavior.
But they retrieve him right away; as a result there is an authority cr.;.sis,
some companies being managed contrary to common sense and those respor~sible
still retaining their positions.
Under such circumstances, beautiful speeches no longer help. The People's
Republic of Benin has all it takes to succeed. Now, after eight years in _
power, President Kerekou must again convene the cadres, incl.uding those
of his own party, to draw a. balance--which, ~esides, is not all negative-- ~
and a new program-speech is required to mobilize the new er.ergi~s. The _
economy of a country is not something which one can improvise. ~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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FOP. OrI~IC2AL iJSE ONI,Y
BENIN
1977 BALANCE OF PFYMENTS REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 May 80 p 1209 _
[Article: "1977 Foreign Balance of Payments"]
[Text] BCEAO [Cer.tral Bank of the West African Statcs] has recently analyzed
the foreign balance of payments of Benin ~'or. the year 1977, which has been
approved by the Balance of Payments Committee on 30 Januzry 1980, at the
same time as the 1976 balance. _
_ The main element~ of the 1975, 1976 and 1977 balances of pa;:znents can be
summarized as follows (in million CFA francs):
1975 1976 1977
_ Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit
Goods and services - 25,834 - 24,014 31,013
Transfers without counter-
parts , , , . . , , , . . 14,396 - 11,408 - 20,472
~ -
Foreign assets and monetary
gold. . . . . . . . . . . - 10,951 - 6,918 - Q,475
- Foreign liabilities. . . . 17,599 - 11,472 - 13,078 -
Special drawing rights
(SDR) allocations . , . . - 93 50 - gg _
Total net transactions 31,995 36,878 2'?.,930 30,932 33,639 40,488
Net errors and omissions . 4,883 - 8,002 - 6,849 -
Total 36,87~3 36,878 30,932 30,932 40,488 40~488
~
For each year, the nega~ive balan~e of t;;2 item Goods and Services indicates
the deficit of the Beninese foreign t~,,de; imports are far in excess of
exports. Under the same Services item, t:�avel and transportation for 1977
show a surplus of 213 million CFA franc~., while foreign capital dis=nvest- ~
ments show a total outflow of 740 million CFA francs.
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Transfers without counterparts include the repatriation of tre savin~-c of
Beninese workers working abroad (positive balance: 5.7 billion CF.~'. ~.ancs
for 1977) and forEign assistance grants (13.8 billion CFA francs).
Foreign assets and liabilities include international loans obtained by -
Benin and, conversely, the annual instalments in repe,yment of the debt,
~ and the deduction resulting from the trade imbalance.
As for short and long-term private capital investments, foreign participa-
tion into local enterprises in 1977 resulted in a surplus of 4.1 billion
CFA francs.
For each of the three years considered, the equilibrium of the balance of
payment has been ensured by entering, as a credit, a large ai^~unt for net
errors and omissions.
COPYRIGHT: itene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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BENIN
DETAILS ON NEW CONIPANY G~IVEN
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 May 80 p 1209
[Article: "SABI:I: Publication of By-Laws"]
[TextJ On S June 1977, in Tripoli, SABLI [Agro-Animal Benino-Arab Libyan
Company] was created; this is an industrial and ~ommercial company with
nixed public capi.tal, having the legal statu.s of a corporation and enjoying
financial autonomy. The by-�laws of the company have just been published
(in EHUZU, the Cotonou daily, 7 May 1980). -
SABLI, which has its headquarters in Cotonou, has for its object th~ cul-
tivation of lands, the realization and m~.nagement of -~rricultural projects, -
~ the realization of projects to develop livestock-rais~.ng resources (espe-
cially the development of poultry farming, the creation ar.d op~~ation of
ranches and feedlots, the production of cattle feed), industri.alization,
and the marketing and exportation of agricultural proc',ucts.
The registered capital of the company has been set at 2 million dollars,
divided i.nto 1,000 actions of 2,000 dollars each. The participation of
the parties is as follows: 49 percent to Libya, 51 per.cent to Beni.n.
The shares taken up by each of the parties will be paid for in full, in
cash and in convertible currency, 25 percent at the time of creation of
the company, and 75 percent when called up by ~he board.
SABLI is headed by two organizations: a general assembly comprisinq nine
members (four from Libya, including the chairmand of the board, and five
from Benin, including the general manager) and a board of six members
(three from Benin, including the general manager, and three from Libya, ~
_ including the chairman of the board). The company has been created for
a period of 25 years, and is renewable.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
- 9294
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- CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBI,IC
BRIEFS
OCF REPLACES UNFCA--The Organization of Central African Women (OCF) waG
created last May to replace the National Union of Central African TAomen
(UNFCA), dissolved after the fall of Bokassa who had changed it into a
political orgarization affiliated to the only political party, the MESAN. _
The OCF is apolitical, it is not affiliated to any party, and its purpose
is to educate the Central African woman and prom~te her emancipation.
Mrs Ruth Rolland, who is in charge of the armed forces' social service,
has been elected OCF ~hairwoman. [Text] [Paris MF~RCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1570] 9294
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L'Vl\ VL'C1V1KL UJP. Vl'IL1 -
ETHIOPIA
BRIEFS
OFFENSIVE PLANNED--The Ethiopian governmenr of Col Mengistu is getting
ready to launch a new offensive against the nationalist movements in Eritrea.
_ It recently received large shipments of Soviet arms, notably 30 Mi-24 combat
helicopters, similar to those used by the Red Army in Afghanistan. [TextJ -
[Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1018 9 Jul 80 p 41]
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GHANA
RAWLINGS' POLITICAL POSITION REMAINS STRONG
- Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1013,4 Jun 80 p 41
[Article by Mohamed Maiga: "When Will Zorro Return?"J
[ExcerptsJ ~ao attempts at a putsch in 2 months; a tense political cli-
mate and a catastrophic economic situation. Almost 9 months after the
installation of the civilian government~ Ghanians are asking questions
about the future. -
A troublemaker to some, a last recourse to others (see JA No 1007)~ the
hero of the coup d'etat of 4 June 1979 has caused a lot of talk. Period-
ically, the government tends to discredit him by accusing him of tribalism
or even of having covered up the corruption of certain members of the
AFRC [Armed Forces Revolutionary Council]. Each time his answer has pre-
vailed: Rawlings' press conferences fill the hall and no one places his
sincerity in doubt. To neutralize him, the government is said to have "
proposed to him~ in vain, a"golden" exile in Great Britain. Another at-
traction: a seat in the ~ouncil of State (coneulting), but Rawlings will
not hear of it. Only if it were going to deal with agricultural questions.
A prospect which causes fear because the team of President Limann suspects _
the�former captain of wanting to draw closer to the peasants in order to
- create a"part of the masses."
Lethargy
For the moment, Jerry Rawlings is safe from attack: his men, who have
- remained in the army, would be ready to act and the constitut~on of the
Third Republic forbids "interferring with" former members of the AFRC.
He still heads therefore the Fourth of June Movement (not officially)
which watches over the spirit and the accomplishments of the revolution.
What is more~ betwean the old guard of the People's National Party (PNP,
in power) which has remained faithful to the first president of Ghana~ the
late Kwame Nkrumah, headed by Imoru Egala, the right wing headed by the
president of the party, the very wealthy Nana Okutwer Bekoe and finally
the intellectual and trade union left, Limann does not know whom to
- listen to. Even less since~ 1 year after the Rawlings coup d'etat which
gave him back thepower, the civilian team has not kept its promises.
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C~hana is threatened with real famine, even though it is one of the
African states most well endowed by nature. The inflation rate is close
to 100 percent per year while wages remain frozen. Foreign invest-
ments are not being made, as investors wait for a return to stability.
Because of a lack of replacement parts, factories are running at 20
percent of capacity. And, finally, cacao productian (65 percent of
export income) has stagnated at aroim d 250,000 tons (500,000 tons in 1963).
In 1980, it will just barely cover oil imports ($400 million), while the
budget deficit is worsening. The national currency, the cedi, (officially,
1 C equals 190 CFA francs), having lost about 300 percent of its real
value in 3 years, 50,000 tons of cacao have secretly found their way to
the Ivory Coast and to Togo, where the CFA franc is more profitable.
Reconversion
One year after the "purification" putsch by the young officers and en-
listed men, the young Ghanaian democracy is once again in danger of
being submerged by corruption and "shady deals." Zt,io plagues which had
motivated the Rawlings coup d'etat. But it is true today that Jerry
Rawlings is no longer in the army.
- COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
8956
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GUINE~?
LACK OF REPRESSION FOLLOWING ASSASSI?4ATION ATTENIPT
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1013 4 Jun 80 p 31
[Article by Sennen Andriamirado; "Guniea~Liberia: Each Has Its Own
Big Brother"]
[Text] During his brief visit to Conakry, on 23 May, Chief Sergeant
Samuel Doe was given a talking to by President Sekou Toure. It was the
first excursion for the new master of Liberia. It was the first lesson
, in political morality to be ~iven in a long time by the Guinean chief of
state: Assure your fellow citizens," he told his young visitor, "the
enjoyment of the rights of man. Be honest and sincere with those whom
you govern and try to lead the Liberian people rapidly to the socio-
economic prosperity they need."
It was enough to reassure Samuel Doe, a little out of favor with Africa .
since his coup d'etat of 12 April. So much so that, in the good old
African tradition, Sekou Toure, the beneficiary of age and reason, is
_ now his "Big Brother."
One is tempted to believe it was only a mean joke when one remembers that
this was the same Sekou Toure who~ in March 1979, had sent his troops to -
help the late William Tolbert put down the "rice riots" (JA Nos 1007 and
1012), which had been organized and supported by the opposition at that
time. The Liberian president owed his survival in power only to ilis
bloody repression: 70 dead, more than 400 wotmded.
Since then, Doe has replaced Tolbert (assassinated) and has had executed
13 of his former associates (JA No 1011). A sordid accounting would
. sho~v that, as far as the rights of man are concerned, Doe has been worse
than Tolbert. What is worse, Doe has killed fewer--far fewer--than the
person giving him lessons, Sekou Toure, after 20 years of terror.
This sudden zeal for moderation on the part of the Guinean president is
all the more a welcome surprise since, after the attack in which he was
almost killed on 14 May (JA No 1012), a new wave of repression had been
f.eared. He had had arrested about 100 people, among whom were some of
his close associates, such as former minister Toumani, even relatives~
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r�uh ur'FICIAL US~; UNLY
like General Lansana Diane. But he freed them afterwards, following
their interrogation. And he had just ordered these releases and had counseled -
moderation to the last contingent of his faithful, when he received Samuel
Doe in Conakry. Why this siidden turnabout?
Actually, Sekou Toure himself received lessons in prudence and inoderation
from his own "Big Brothers." Fearing an immoderate reaction on his part,
Felix Houphuet-Boigny, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Valery Giscard D'Estaing
and Gnassingbe Eyadema had sent messages to him, if not messengers, to
tell him in substance: "Do not yield to the temptation of repression,
you will only be helping your adversaries. Be magnanimous." Did Sekou
Toure need such. advice? Probably, in the opinion of anyone who knows his
past. But he probably also profited from the lessons of this past and
has understood that his adversaries have always needed to see him use
repression. So they could fight it. And that is perhaps the best lesson
that Sekou Toure ought to learn from the determination of his mortal
enemies. ~
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
8956
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GUINEA
BRIEFS
TOURISTS UNDER ~ETENTION--Diabate Arafan, a Guinean holding French citizen-
ship and Christian Faure, a Frenchman, are being detained in Conakry for
"not having entered ~uinea directly through Conakry." This is at least the
explanation provided the mother of one of the tourists. Having left the
Charles-de-Gaulle airport on 3 June, they h ad gone first to Dakar, then on -
to Guinea via Labe. Following their arrival in Mamou, they were arrested
and transferred to Conakry. Their families have no news of them. Accord-
ing to his relatives, Diabate Arafan, a worker in a Lyon hospital, married
and the father of two children, had never b een involved in politics. He
was not known as an opponent of the Sekou Toure regime and had gone to
Guinea to visit his parents. His friend Faure, a geography student, was
accompanying him simply out of curiosity. Despite the demarches under-
. taken by the consul of France in Guinea and the Frency Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Conakry does not seem ready to free the prisoners. The Quai
d'Orsay and the respective families are wondering about the incident,
especially since both prisoners held valid visas and Faure's mother had
given the Guinean Embassy in Paris a written itinerary for the young men's
trip. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1018 9 Jul 80 p 29)
ACRICULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH ROMANIA--Guinea and Romania will implement an
agro-industrial project aimed at the development of 2,500 hectares of
fodder corn for poultry raising. The project, which will be based in
Kindia, is the result of the agreement signed on 20 June between Guinean
Minister of Agriculture, Water and Forests Alaf e Kourouma and a Romanian
delegation visiting Guinea. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
_ RANEENS in French 4 Jul 80 p 1682]
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IVORY COAST
RECENT POLITICAL CHANGES EXAMINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Jun 80 pp 30-32
[Article by Siradiou Diallo, special correspondent in Abid3an: "Cultural
Revolution?"]
[Text) For months many bets were being made in the affluent drawing rooms
of Cocody and the smoke-filled bars of Treichville. And the rating of such
and such a big shot of the regime would climb or tumble on the succession
stock market depending on the gestures and whims of the "Old Man" [President
Felix Houphouet-Boigny].
President Houphouet-Boigny has put an abrupt halt to all these speculations.
The political and eco.lomic measures that he announced before the National
Council (which includes the representatives of all the active forces of
the nation), summoned on 12 June 1980 at the presidential palace in Abidjan,
have indeed caught short the entire Ivorian p.olitical class. After receiving
a veritable crushing blow in this respect this class is now thinking less
about the minor game of primacy and succession at the head of the state
than salvaging its own position: All those at the top of the top--that is
how the average Ivorians refer to the members of the ruling class--are
worried and wondering about their future.
Scalpel Incission -
Members of the [party's] politbureau, deputies, state company directors and
heads of ministerial departments--all those whom the Ivory Coast has by way
of big shots, of "bosses," "chiefs" (whether genuine ones or those who
claim to be so)--are trembling. With the changes announced by Houphouet-
B~igny, who is going to keep his position and therefore his privileges and
distinctions? Who will return to being a simple citizen, fading back into
anonymity and the wanness of the streets of Treichville and Koumassi? These
are *_he questions which, since 12 June 1980, have been obsessing the ~inds
and haunting the sleep of the golden class, of the human locomotives of the
opulent Ivory Coast. This is a concern whicfi recalls that of the Chinese
cadres at the start of the Cultural Revolut~on when Mao Tse-tung proclaimed:
"Fire on the general staff!"
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In the economic realm a generalist of the ilk of Felix Houphouet-Boigny
(he is a physician by training) has not hesitated to borrow the surgeon's
scalpel to operate on and amputate all the gangrenous portions of the
patient's `uody. Aware of the serious threats which the international crisis
is imposing on the economies of the Third World, the "Old Man" plans to take
measures to protect his "dear Ivory Coast." To be sure, the latter continues
to evidence a brilliant record in the field of development, especially in -
the agricultural realm where, from being fourth among cocoa-producing
countries in the world, the Ivory Coast ranked first in 1979 while continuing
to be second in the export of palm oil and third in the production of coffee.
This is in addition te the fact that the Ivory Coast is also the leading
African producer of pineapples and bananas.
But this export agriculture is seriously handicapped by the worsening trend
in the terms of trade (the obstinate refusal of cocoa-importing countries
to commit themselves to guarantee a floor for prices paid to producer~ is
a case in point). Furthermore, the young Ivorian industry comes up increas-
- ingly against the prot~ctionism of the European markets. More serious, the
level of indebtedness now stands very close to the ceiling considered accept- _
able for a well-run country--a level correspondin g to 20 percent of export
revenues.
Thus, moving ahead of the recommendations of the international experts the
"Old Man" has deemed it prudent to himself relinquish a series of industrial
or infrastructural projects included in the development plan now being ~
implemented. That is the case of the sugar complexes whose number has thus ~
been reduced from 10 to six (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1013); the paper pulp
mill planned in the San P~edro region; the second airport of Port Bouet;
the radio broadcasting center; and others.
Not satisfied with postponing these projects despi�te the fact that President
Houphouet-Boigny likes some of th~m very much, the head of state has made
a genuine clean sweep. First in state companies by putting an end to the
legal mess represented by their bylaws and by alining the compensation of
their employees with that of officials in the general public administr.ation.
A1so, by proceeding to a thorough r~form of their structures. Thus, while
- some of these companies are amending their bylaws, being converted from _
state companies to ordinary government establishments or those with an
industrial and commercial character, others are purely and simply being
scraped. Among those doomed are some especially well-known companies such
as the AVB [Bandama Valley Development Authority], ARSO [Southwest R~gion
Development Authority], SONAFI [National Financing Company], SODERIZ [Rice
Cultivation Development Company~, and athers. In all, of the former 36
state companies only seven are escaping the knife. The best known of these
are Air Ivoire [Ivorian Airline], Palm Industrie [Palm Oil Industrial
Company], PETROCI [Ivorian Petroleum Company], SITRAM [Ivorian Marine Trans-
port Company], and SODESUCRE [Company for the Development of Sugar Cane
Plantations and the Industrialization and Marketing of Sugar].
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The severity of the sentence is explained, it is said in authorized circles,
not only by the fact that some of these units no longer have a"raison
d'etre" or no longer meet the needs of the moment but especially by the fact
that their management cannot be trusted.
Indeed, it is mentioned, most of these state companies had not been estab-
lished to meet the country's development needs but first and foremost to
provide jobs for "buddies" and to secure a f~~llowing. Thus, it is not
surprising that uncontrolled management should have led to increasingly more
onerous deficits for the state budget. This is true to such an extent that
by lancing the sore the head of state undoubtedly expects to improve the
administration of this sensitive sector of the Ivorian econou.y. He also
hopes to put an end to some anomalies which had led to veritable bailiwicks
whose lords had become all the more arrogant as they believed themselves
to be irremovable.
Open Elections
- It is especially in the political realm that the measures announced on 12
June 1980 could lead to far-reaching disruptions in established privileges.
The decision of the "Old Man" to "place the democratic train back on its
rails" breaks in a manner tha.t is as abrupt as it is explosive with quarter-
of-a-century-old practices and methods. Indeed, so far the dishes of the
electoral cuisine had been planned, prepared, and enrirely served by the
high priests of the single party's politbureau, the PDCI [Democratic Party
of the Ivory Coast].
At any election no matter which, the heads of this church would draw up,
here as nearly everywhere in Africa, the complete slate of candidates at
the rate of one for each electoral district. On the day of the voting they
would experience no problem in having their designees ratified by a voting
public which was becoming more and more blase and indifferent. These prac-
tices of superficial unanimity with their famous winners polling 99.99
percent of the votes which do not fool the electorate any more than the
elected officia.is used to be the good old days of the "African democracy"
of the 1960's. With time it became more and more evident that this policy
of. the ostrich di.d not solve any political problem but, contrariwise, that
it constituted an encouragement to disorder and favored the more or less
bloody intrusion of the colonels--not to say sergeants--on the political
scene.
To remedy this state of affairs African leaders are striving more and more
to find a system taking into account both the imperatives of national unity
and respect for the popular will. Accordingly, without renouncing the
single party principle, Tanzania, Kenya, Tunisia, and Zaire have allowed
various candidates, designated with the blessing of the gqvernment, to
challenge each other within the same electoral district. Because of this,
well-known per.sonalities witnessed resounding defeats at the time of the
1979 legislative elections in Kenya and Tunisia.
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The democratic game which the Ivory Coast is getting ready to inaugurate is ~
more original and much more d~ring than all the experiments tried el~ewhere
in Africa, at least within a s~ngle party structure. Indeed, the head of
state spoke clearly in his speech of 12 June 1980. Henceforth in any elec-
tion, whether what is involved is to designate within the PDCI the general
secretaries of subsections, villages, or districts or to elect deputies or
mayors, no more lists will be sponsored by the party's politbureau. Even
better, said politbureau shall not either designate official candidates
nor even supervise the elections. Any Ivorian citizen will be able to
seek any political position without having to go through the party. "Our
people," Houphouet-Boigny declared, "have reached their majority and must
prove their political maturity by making good choices." This means that a
grand premier is involved 'in Africa. Hence the gratification of the "good"
Ivorian people in the face of the discomfiture of the regime's mandarins.
Battle Plans
The system will soon be tried since, with the party's congress slated to be
organized in the second half of September 1980, elections will be held
beginning in July 1980 in order to renew the leaders of the various party
organs. Then, municipal and legislative elections are scheduled. All
*_hese elections will be supervised by prefects and subprefects, it being
understood that it is absolutely prohibited for them, at the risk of their
jobs, to support any given candidate. However, the fact remains that all
those elected will be the choices of the PDCI. For in the mind of the
"Old Man" all Ivorians are members of the party and, therefore, all those
elected will be so in the name of the PDCI.
The election campaign is already under way. Prospective candidates have,
without delay, started to make contact with the body of voters, whereas
elected officials, formerly parachuted and.elected by voters who, at times,
did not know the candidates, now hesitate to participate in the forthcoming
contests. In contrast,young cadres who have so far remained on the side-
lines of these activities are getting ready to join the electoral fray.
Everywhere, in the residential districts of Abidjan as well as in the cities
and villages of the hinterland, it is possible to witness a lot of stir.
Meetings and conferences continue late into the night. The intentions of
some are probed, the prospects of others weighed, and battle plans drawn
up. Will such a dignitary be returned to the National Assembly or to his
position as mayor? Another, it is rumored, is seeking an electoral district.
Such or such a brilliant technocrat who for years had failed to return to
his village suddenly hurries back to seek the goodwill of his people. Yet,
- Houphouet-Boigny stated, "I have constantly urged young cadres to build
their bases in their villages and to return to them as often as possible..."
New Lease
Alas, the advice was taken only by some. Needless to say, these will not
have any trouble in future to win the votes of their fellow-citizens. As
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t~~r tl~~~ utli~~r~, m~~re numerous, they are biting their fingernails today.
~~t :inti~ rate, wh.it is sure to every~ne is that of the 120 deputies now making
up the Nationa] Assembly fewer than half will be re-elected.
'I'his gives some idea of the scope of the changes that are in the offering.
Suddenly one no longer hears talk of the succession to the "Old Man" who
thus has earned for himself a new 5-year lease--in all tranquility.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
_ 2662
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I~OIt (11~FICIAL U5t: 4N].Y
~ KENYA
WEST'S FAILURE TO GIVE NEEDED AID TO ZIMBABWE SCORED
Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 11 Ju~ 80 p 1
_ [Gclitorial by Hilary Ng'weno: "A Letter From the Publisher"]
[Ter:tJ wrstcrn natic~nx .l~uld.ht~�astu~mct~ of them-
~ selves. N'hen limbah?wc: natiunalitits we,~rc negotia-
ting with thc Hritish.govrrnineqt and the then rebel�
regime of Mr. lan Smith, th~e,westCrn ndtions, led by
the United States, e~peeially in the hcyc~a~ of the.then -
American secretary of state, Dt. Henry Kissinger,
dangled the promise of one billion dollars in aid for
the reconstruction of ~Zimbabwe if fhe nationalists
ti~uuid a~i.rc tu an ordcrl~� transl'rr c~f ~ower, ~ind if tl~crc wert~
expropriation of white properties. The'money~was in fact ~ntendea to
- buy out white Zimbabwearts who wotild choose to leave th~ country to
Africans. As it turned aut, things:havegonebetterthaneven Kissinger
ever dreamed they woutd..but rtovy western nations are, pl.&ying -
Scrooge. The Ame~icans came up with the m'rserable sum of $20 -
million in aid to the nevir cot~r~try; and from all indicati~ons there is
n~thing which the government ~of Mr. Robert Muga6e can expect
from Washington ~n the . near fufure: .The British, despite their
economically straightened conditiori, did better; they have so farcome
up with $173 million. The ~reneh recently agreed to give between $SO
and 70 million. The Germans havc not been heatd from. Altogefher -
Limbabw~e has received in real cash or'pledges less tha~ one fourth of
what thc country needs for reconstruction duringthe next ihree orfour ~
years. One Fjegins to wonder about 'either~ the meral fibre ~of western ~
nations or their f'oresight in glolsal polittcal is$ues. Are we toconclude
that fhe one biliion dollars prom~sed by Kissingetwerea~gtitentof his
imagination, or was that money to be used only f,or easing the trauma
white people in Zimbabwe we~re likely to be subjected to because of the
- coming of majority rule? [i the latter is true, then it would not be
surprising~ if the frustrations which the govert?ment c~f M,ugabe is -
beg~nning to feel in its atfempt to reconstruct tha countryafieryears of
- civ~l war translate themsel~ies into t~e kinds of political violence and
instability which would ultimately force out most di the. ~vhites
Kissinger and his western colleagt~es were so anxious to hetp. ~
COPYRIGHT: 19$0 by Stellascope Ltd. -
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I
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i~u~t uri~i~.ini, u>i~, uivi,r
KENYA
POLITICIANS QUESTION ROLE OF NATION'S PRESS
Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 11 Jul 80 p 4 _
[Text] ~
THE pte~s in Kenya oontinua to be which The Standnrd was conducting on
+under scruriny; m~inl~ arising out behalf of the new minister for consritu-
of the current shortages of maizemeal tional and home affairs, and formcr
ansi aher foodstuffs. As poliricians cry attorney-general, Mr. Charles' Njoujo,
to apportio~i blame for . the shq~ts~es, while. at the same time crossing
~ battle appears to be shap~it~. up swo;ds with Kibaki and the minister for
between the country's nevvepapers and eukure and social affairs, Mr. Jeremiah
politicians, with the banner of tAe press Nyagsh, ~whom The Standard has
~side being canied by, ~e Standard ~b~amed for .~nost of the shortages of
and ics new execudve` chaistnaA and mai~semeal iti' the country. (Nyagah was
former� Daily Nation .editor ~n. ,c.h~ef, Keqy~'s minister for agric~lture during
Mr. Gevrge Githiil -iq' an uide about period in which che shorcages starced).
The Standard's. coverage of the ThC aupport for Njonjo may not come -
maize shortage last weelc, tbe vice as a surpr~se to Standard readera for
president and ~ minister for fmwce, Gi~hii wAS oae of the election campaign
Mr. Mwa+ Kibaki, asked his fellow managers for Njonjo v~hen he stood
' parliamentariar~ not to be obsessed, for che Kikuyu by-electior:~ in April co
abouc wliat c6ey read in newspapers filt the seac left vacant by Mr. Amos
for, in Kibatki's views, newspaper Ng'ang'a; but it has ' a few people
editors are ;vnly doing , their master's wonderittg where the battle . of words
bid~ing. ''There is nothing .~yp,ttial in th~e, .,press is going w cnd+ One
.s~bait be~ming an editpr or chai,rtn~t~ thing wHich seetns clear is chat president
af. a R~spaper", the ,vice preaident~ Daniel ar~p , Moi is not 'taking very
said. T6kre was an immec#iace rejoind,et kindiy: to, the high pr~le which is being
from The Standard w~hich in an given to the maize shortage i~sue in the
ei~itbrial .tomment sa9d � there press. Moi ~ lias r~portedIj'? ~sent ' word
was p noeh~hg ~ epecial aboat be-, to his miniscers and assistant= ministers
co g a.~viee presiidenc eichei. Saong thac . chey � should . l~V' of~ che .maize
w~o~s in -a` cou~icry ,which is not used ahortage ibstte, and indeed the~ same
t,. verLaf. batt'[es between che. press triri~s~age is ' being. senc out by many
_ ~oice ~xr~idencs. ~ 'p~litician~ who. . feel chat, che; ..issue
~vhot�;gava new~ers food for. c~1'~e~om~. ezpldsive ~f it wers,tc :aec
'tilro~ght w~rs the seltming ca~lzpaign out:of ~lsand;~'L'h~e 1~airobi�~branc~ of':tbe
65 ~
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~uling party. Kanu, lasr week called
upon policicians, esNecially members
of parliamenc, to desist from making
policical capitai out of the t~aiu-
meal shortage. Whether they will,
remains to be , seen, and whethei
ochers will let the issue alone is also
- in doubt.
Last week wheri the University Staff
Union was given a licence by the
government to conduct a demonstration
against the apartheid regime in South
Africa, some of the p(acards which
the academics canied through the
streets of Nairobi decried t'he shortage
of maizemeal in the country. Undl the
current cror o4'maize is hatvested, whieh
is in anotl~er month or so, and t~fe
srores are 611ed wi.th maizemeal agaia,
food shorta~es will ptovide ~ great
cemptatiQn �to disgruntled peopie . o0
make policical hay, and in coveriag t~eir
activities .the pre~s wil~ be in for
~ further crit'icism.
The scrutiny which t'hd press is
receiving at the moment is not all bad,
however. tif parliamenc this week as
front bench members were warniif~,ihe
press againsr concehtr~ting ,on' issues ~
oE conupcion `and ma~practicbs ~in the
, co~ntry, many ba~ck-benchbrs ' ~ tbOk
the -view that t}~r press~s~dubd~ -ao~ be
shackled ia its invescigarn?e� re~brting,
"The press works as a:wqtchclog boc:~the
public. The wclrk it~ is cioieg i~ ~vital, iffwe
are to surv~ve, '~"he . prg,ss is, ,~tit~; '
good ~aith". Sai Nfr. Mcha~e
Ali MP for Man~ra W.est,
COPYRIGHT: 1980 by Stellascope Ltd.
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KENYA
~
OGINGA ODINGA'S 'POLITICAL FUTURE FULL OF POSSIBILITIES'
KANU Life Membership Received ~
Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 11 Jul 80 pp S-6
( Te xt ]
NINE months ago Mr. Oginga Odinga that fro.m now on there would be no ex-
was persona non gra~a with Kenya's KPU. peo.ple on the one hand and thc
_ ruling party, Kanu. Odinga had taken rest of Kenyans on tHe other, and true to
the momentous step of suing Kanu's his word; a fortnight ago, ~vithout any
secretary general, Mr. Robert Matano, fan-farc, the president. signed Odinga's
fur callir.g him and former Kenya � Kanu life�membership certificate: With
Peoples Union members who had been the gr~ntingbi't}iatcertific~te, Oding~'s
released from poiitical detention r~tu ri'' t0 . the Kanu 'fold, is now
security risks. Matano had made the cc2mp1ete, "and ~ many .;observers think
remarks as one of his many reasons for t~~.t`~tse way is'po~r clear fpr the former
withholding Kanu's, election uicepresidGn;c~if.heso~wjshestoetr~bark
sponsorship from Odinga and his on the p�lit;cal cprne back:which he has
colleagues. President Daniel arap.Moi beep.seekic~g witl~oait,any .succ,@sy,,ever
latei used the eourt,suit as aprete~tfor siuce~~i~e~��was,.raacar~d f'rom pa3iticnl
barring Odir~ga and his collea.gues from datentioP ~in~ iATk : � ~
- standing in last ~ year's general ~~~T~oe%�issue ~�Gfe ~nembership in the
,the president .was concerned, he did nQt Fuli~fg~ ~iar~y .h~~!~b~ri a~vore one tor
see how Odinga could sue K~u ~ga: 'tN � 1974,�, ~d{itga ,was~ ~ba'rrci~
_ Presi,dent Moi made no distincrion ~m ~ta~ding~for~tFte g~ncral'eleCtior~`s
bqtween Kanu as a party and Matano as ~'bec~use, ~s Matano's colleague in the
an individual - while at the same time party's � naiional executive, the
he was seeking Kanu's sponsorship in organising ~ secretary, Mr. Nathan
the elections. Muhoko, then put it. Odinga had not
Those days and their bitterness are received clearance from the president,
now gone. .Fresident Moi ~appointed the late Mr. Jomo Kenyatta. ' Party
~ Odinp~ to t~echairn~ar~ship of the Cotton clearan'ce, which could come only from
= Seed and Lint Marketing Board Iast the president, was a hurdl~. which in
December. He has since appointed to 1974 all former political detainees had
various parastatal boards ma~+ of the ex- to surmount before they could secure
KPU colleagues of Odinga wha had party sponsorship. for running for any
joined the former vice president in the ttective post in the country. Clearance
abortive court action against Matano: was a sign that a,formcr dissident was
Recently, the president told Kenyans no Ibnger of the same political
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~~~,i~ ~~i~ric;ini, usi: ~~rti.Y `
cc~mplrxion which brought him to gricf anti-Odinga elements in Luo politics
~n th~ t~rst placr. ~I~h~~ugh c)~iinga had recently decided to drop a High Court
been ~>ut ot~detention fur the manciatory petition against the election of
threc ycars rcyuircci by the party's new Mr. Hezekiah Ougo, an Odinga supporter,
- constitution, hc lacked clearance, ahd
so he had t~~ H~ait until 1979. , who defeated Omamo in Bondo during the
In 1979, hc~a~c~cr, a ncw~ kind of general elections of 1974 and 1979.
hurdlc ha~i t~~ br tiurmcwnted. Every, Omamo gave as his reason for dropping
wc~uld-be candidate needed to possess a the petition his desire to work within
valid Kanir iife me~mbership certiticate the new spirit of unity in Luoland.
in wer play which removed
former president Godfrey Binaisa has been spelled ;~ut in s 13-point
_ document put forward on 18 May by the military comn~ission of the National
Liberation Front.
This complicated structure includes the military commission, a cabinet
made up of 37 ministers and deputy ministers~ a presidential commission,
and a national consultative cotmcil.
The military commission has assumed the real power. Originally made up
of six members--Paulo Muwanga, former interior minister, then minister
of labor in the Binaisa government; Yoweri Museweni, former minister o�
regional cooperation, who abandoned the former president to join the
junta; Major General Tito Okello~ commander in chief of the Tansanian
army; Brigadier General David Ojok, chief of staff; and Colonels Zeddi
Maruru and William Omaria--it has been augmented by two government
ministers, M. R. Bitamazire and Dr M. Apiliga~ as well as three special
assistants: Yona Kanyomozi, former minister of cooperatives and market-
ing who will be in charge of economic affairs, Chris Rwakasisi to run
political affairs, and Sheika Ali Omar Senyonge diploma.tic affairs.
The military commission is presided over by Mr Paulo Muwanga who is prov-
ing to be the new regime's "strongman." The commission has reserved the
_ right to "give direction to the cabinet in all political matters."
To make sure of its own continuity, the military commission has decided
that its authority "is not to be questioned before any court of law" anc~
that no legal action is to i~e initiated against it concerning tr~ ma.nner
in which it seized power. It decreed as well tha.t no Ugandan who served
in an official capacity during the 8 years o� Idi Amin Dada's dictator-
ship is to be elected to an important position without its approval.
However, this last provision does not apply to the 6 original members of
_ the military commission. The reason for this exception is obvious. _
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Mr Paulo Muwanga, who was in the foreign service, had been appointed
_ Uganda's ambassador in several countries--notably in Par.is--by Idi
Amin Dada, who he did not break with until 1975. And as for Colonel
Zeddi Maruru, he stayed in the army after ldi Amin's coup before going
i:~to exile.
The cabinet (whose make-up can be found Lmder the heading "Uganda") is
to be in actual fact controlled by the military commission since it will
be chaired by Mr Paulo Muwanga, and its role will be merely an implement-
ing one.
The national consultative coimcil will do nothing from now on except
draw up legislatian. To become effective legislation must be approved
by the presidential committee which is supposed to include 3 members~
most likely two judges and a medical doctor. If the members of the
pre3idential committee cannot agree on submitted legislation, the mili-
tary commission will take its place.
- These new institutions were approved by Tanzania's President Julius
Nyerere with whom Mr Paulo Muwanga~ accompanied by Mr Museweni, General
Ojok and Colonel Maruru, met in Arusha on 16 May. Since th~re are 10,000
men from the Tanzanian army present on Ugandan territory, the coup would
hardly have been crowned with success if Mr Nyerere had decide3 to oppose
it. He has chosen to abandon President Binaisa to his fate, and make
sure hs is unharmed, since Binaisa is guarded by Tanzanian troops, and
to recognize the new regime while imposing a certain number of conditions
on the Ugandan jim ta: there must not be any executions, public order
must be reestablished and legislative and presidential elections are
to take place before the end of the year and under *he supervision of a
Commonwealth commissian.
Kampala's new authorities have officially announced that elections will
be held at the previosuly anticipated time, in other words in December
or perhaps even at an earlier time. Howeve, they have not yet made con-
tact with the Commonwealth secretariat~ and in regard to the latter it is
not certain that they would agree to take responsibility for "free and
fair" elections like they did recently in Zimbabwe. Observers in London
point out that the Commonwealth could not possibly take on this responsi-
bility without a certain number of assurances having been made before-
hand. In particular, the army would have to be subordinated to civilian
authority, according to the requirements of democracy. In the second
place~ there would have to be put forward candidacies for the office of
chief of state other thau Milton Obote's which were likely to be viable
ones. We do not know, in fact, if Messrs Yussuf Lule and Godfrey [BinaisaJ
wi11 be permitted to run for president and under what conditions. On
the other hand, we are forced to confirm that the overthrow of President ,
Binaisa, and the make-up of the military co~tission as well as the
. cabi.net which Mr Milton Obote's partisans dominate, that all thi.e �avors
to a considerable extent Obote's return to power and the same for his
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party, the Uganda People's Congress. The Democratic Party is, in reality,
only meagerly represented in the new cabinet by the new finance minisCcr~
Mr Lawrence Nebolu.
This r.ew government is the third since the fall of Idi Amin Dada. Wi].1
it be able to restore public order and put the country's economy back
on its feet~ tasks at which President 23inaisa and his government and un-
questionably failed? The former president's opponents formed an opportunistic
alliance in order to overthrow him. In reality the Uganda Peopl:e's Party and
the Democratic Party have in common only their determined opposition
to holding elections under the umbrella of a single party: the National
Liberation Front. Within the military commission itself Messrs Paulo
Muwanga and Yoweri Museweni are political enemies of long standing and
the latter is far from being partial to former president Obote.
Fhat policies the new authorities intend to follow, preoccupied as they
have been up to now mainly with consolidating their power, remain largely
unknown except regarding foreign relations. The new minister of foreign
affairs~ Mr Alimadi~ while receiving foreign diplomats on 19 May for
the first time since the coup, assured them that the country's foreign
policy remained inlchanged. The new regime will remain "loyal" to
Tanzania and will endeavor to develop good relations with all neighboring
states.
The latter are following the development of this crieis with a certain
anxiety. As soon as the coup was announced~ the Sudanese chief of state
Gaafar Nimeiri interceded with President Nyerere of Tanzania and Presi-
dent arap Moi of Kenya to ask them to use their "good judgment" to bring
peace back to Uganda. The three presidents in fact met at Mombasa last
month in the company of ex-president Binaisa to examine the situation in
Uganda, to which they had promised aid and assistance.
For his part~ President Nyerere, who obviousJy desires to have on his
northern border a stable government from wh~ch he certainly intends to
get reimbursed for the cost of the war waged by Tanzania to overthrow
Idi Amin Dada, had as early as 13 May sent his foreign minister to see
the Kenyan president. The latter had expressed his serious fears
regarding the future of Uganda~ judging it probably that the country would
remain imstable after the coup.
As for the United States and Great Britain, to whom President Binaisa had
appealed to come to his aid in personal letters addressed to President
Carter and Mrs Thatcher, they have held back to wait and see. They un-
doubtedly feel that it is a matter which must be handled by Africans them-
selves and that the Organisation of African Unity, which President Nyerere
had strenuously criticized for its inaction at the time of the invasion
of the Kagera bend area by Amin Dada'a aYtny, would be the best qualified
institutiun to offer to mediate if peace in the region came to be threatened.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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UGANDA
- 'DEMOCRATIC' COUP ASSESSED BY AMEDEE DARGA
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 May-8 Jun pp 26-27
(Article by Amedee Darga: "A 'Democratic' Coup"J
[Text] Barely 48 hours zlapsed between the time of
Ugandan President's Binaisa's decision to dismiss
General Ojok, the army's chief of staff and a supporter
of ex-president Obote, and the bloodless coup which oc-
curred during the night of 11-12 May. Binaisa, who the
military had tried to win over, was relieved of his
- duties as chief of state and president of the FNLO
[Ugandan National Liberatian Front], the party in power~
and he was replaced by a"presidential commission"
charg~d with making preparations for the December legis-
lative and presider~tial elections in which all the
political parties are supposed to participate. This
decision cancelled outthe one announced ten days before-
hand which prohibited these parties from taking part in
the elections and compelled candidates to run Lm der the
FNLO umbrella alone. Binaisa, especially fearful of the
party of ex-president Obote who still enjoys a certain
amount of popularity and army support, tried via tliis
measure and by dismissing Gneeral Ojok to eliminate
his most dangerous political adversary.
"This is not a military coup, because the commission
which has been set up is a political body; and this
is not a UPC [Uganda People's Congress] coup either,"
stated Mr Musoweni of the Fronasa faction, one of
the five people who participated in Binaisa's over-
throw. It is confirmed, moreover, that on 27 May
- in Kampala ex-president Milton Obote~ in exile in Tan-
zania for 9 years, will as anticipated chair the party
congress of the UPC, which is considered to be the most
progressive group in the country. It is expected that
the political program which is to emerge from the con-
: gress will pay particular attention to the country's
ecanomic recovery since it is near to catastrophe.
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7n the course of his 11-mon~h rule, Bir..aisa did not
- tackle any of the ser~ous problems which affect -
Uganda. The presidential cammission, which has
accusPCt that regime of corruption as we11, has sett].ed
on guaranteeing iaw and order, and on ensuring emergency -
supplie5 of basic necessities for the markets, as its
. prio~ity.
- Nearly year after the overthrow of Amin Dada, Uganda offered the world
a picture of muddled stability.
What was reassuring was first of all that the FNLO regime had attempted
~ to avoid the pitfalls of tribal rivalries, that it had managed to achieve
a certain reduction in armed robberies ar.d banditry and above all had
managed to institute the beginning of a democratic life, so essential
for these people who have known 8 years of censorship,.terror and dic-
tatorship.
However, as one noticed that the FNLO had ~lready dumped its first pres:i-
dent Yussuf Lule and that the second one, Godfrey Binaisa, had almost
fallen during the week of 15 February; and noticed the musical chaira
of ministers dismissed from their positions or who changed ministries~
from Youvezi Museweni, first minister of defense, to the case of Paulo
Muwanga, first removed from the Ministry of the Interior, then installed
in the Miilister of Labor's seat; there emerged an impression of fragile
stability.
For those who know the dangers that tribal feeling have made for in this
co~mtry, for those who had recently observed the abyss into which Amin
pl+m ged this country by destroying the economy, the basic infrastructure
(water, telephone connections~ etc.) and above all ~the moral standards
ofthe populatian which for ,years lived with looting and the black
market, weren't the odds completely against the FNLO in wanting to re-
build Uganda while maintaining unity and learnings toward democracy and
promising general elections tmder universal suffrage for 1981?
The economir_ situation was such that it was not necessary to do an ex-
tensive analysis of it but simply to list the facts. In this country~
cut off as it is from sea lanes, the large Entebbe airport was slowly
starting up service again. Readjustments were being made; bus trans- -
portation was being organized to link Entebbe with Kampala. Government
officials were being asked to relinquish the hotels they had had to
occupy for lack of other accommodation, in order to fix them and open
them up to tourists, investors, businessmen and other visitors. By
using water systems originating in Tanzania, the water distribution -
service in Kampala and the other cities was being set up again~ as well
as telephone communications.
The government was also actively engaged in restoring the main roads which
had been devastated by tanks and shells and in importing buses to re-
establish connections between major cities.
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. But, while particular attention was being paid to restoring the basic
infrastructure to working order and to reestablishing a greater measure
of safety in the country, the two biggest problems which remained were~
on the one hand, the disastrous state of agriculture and the absence of
_ industries, and, on the other hand, the lack of basic foodstuffs.
Coffee~ tea and sugar production had fallen almost to 20% of what they
had been before 1971.
And assistance furnished mainly by Tanzania, which is already having
difficulties~ itself, and then by France~ the United States, and Great
Britain, is only a drop in the bucket.
Two Courses
There were two clashing courses o� action regarding the coim try's in-
dustalization. The first~ supported by President B~.naisa and certain
ministers who had personal interests at stake in it, was to favor accept-
~ ing massive investment from multinationals. The second one, supported
by nationalists and progressives~ was to encourage investments by the
Ugandan middle class and eve~ by certain Ugandans of Asian origin, all
this in order to assert a kind of national independence.
But the biggest day-to-day problem was still the shortag~ of basic
products like rice, flour~ butter, milk~ etc. For a certain amo~m t of
time, the damaged shops had not been suitable for setting up trade.
_ But efforts made with an eye to revitaliz~.ng commerce were particularly
_ undermined by the black market ("magendo") and smuggling~ which made it
so that nearly 50% of certain conmiodities sometirnes went to Zaire or
Rwanda. The "magendo" is a destabilizing practice which affects not only
basic commodities but also coffee production (Rwanda last year exported
more coffee than it produced:) and foreign exchange reserves-at a time
when the dollar goes for 7.3 shillings, the black market will peg it at
between 20 and 40 shillings:
The FNLO, set up a few months before Idi Amin's regime was overthrown,
was the product of a united front strategy of the Ugandan leftist ele-
ments that were particularly activen then in Dar es-Salaam.
In spite of the numerous conflicts and contradictions that inevitably
ran through this front, which was made up of no less than 5 parties, the
leftist elements not belonging to any goruping had succeeded in making
two principles accepted within the front and in the country at large:
maintain unity at any price, and, above all, resolve political differences
by democratic debate. TE?e Moshi conference, prepared for on the basis
of a committee set up in November-December 1978, succeeded in getting
together the main parties and progressive individuals not belonging to
any party on a program conveying these two basic principles and reaffirm-
ing the struggle for political~ economic, military, diplomatic and cultural
independence vis-a-vis imperialist forces.
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Within the National Consultative Council (NCC), which was the interim
national assembly, the 127 n~embErs were distributed in the following
. way:
- The UPC (Milton Obote's party). About 25 members; head men: Paulo
Muwanga and L. Kirunda;
- The DP [Democratic Party]. About 20 members~ divided between an
"old guard" led by Semogerere and Adimola and a progressive faction
with Okulu and Olum;
- The Fronasa. About 12 members, with Youvezi Museveni, fonner minister
of defer.se~ the strongman;
- The SUM (Save Uganda Movement). About 10 members; strongmen:
P' Osok and Ejalu;
- The KY ("Kabaka Yekka")--an old party. About 10 members; strongman:
San Sebagereka, who was a minister under Yusuf L~ule.
The other members do not officially beong to any party; certain ones have
sympathies for parties which have been set up, and the others are leftists
such as Dan Nabudere, minister of culture and community development.
President Binaisa did not belong to any of the aforementioned parties.
In the struggles between the front's di�ferent factions, it is indepen-
dent leftists~ - who were responsible for the united front's constitution -
men like Omwony Ojok or Professor Yashpal Tandon, the only Asian on the
NCC~ and who was one of the prime movers o~ the Moshi conference - who
often played the decisive role.
This leftist element explained that~ for them, none of the parties would
be capable by itself to govern Uganda without clashing with the other
ones, which would bring in a resurgence of tribalism and would end in
dictatorship.
During the debates over the constitution for a new Ugandan army, this
element succeeded in stressing the fact that this army, whose nucleus is
the Uganda National Liveration Army (UNLA) led by Colonel Tito Okelo,
is to be a detribalized and politicized army, that is to say aware of its
role as defender of the people's interests, and no an instrument of
repression.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
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ZIMBABWE
MUGABE SPELLS OUT PRIORITIES WITH UK JOURNALIST
[LD011341 London THE TIMES (Europa Supplement) in English 1 Jul 80
pp (Roman) I, IV ]
[Interview with Zimbabwe Prime Minister Robert Mugabe by Nicholas Ashford;
~ no date or location indicated]
[Text] Question: You have said that you did not carry out the struggle
in Zimbabwe to maintain the status quo here. In the short time you have
been in office how far have you been able to change the status quo, and
to what extent have your actions perhaps been constrained by the political
and economic situation that you inherited on coming to power?
Answer: Changing the status quo in terms of the political and economic
objectives we espouse cannot be achieved overnight. We have done.quite
a lot so far, but of c~urse we have definite priorities which guide us.
One is the achievement of total peace and a state of security in the country.
It is only in the context of peace that we can attend to the social and
economic problems that confronts us. We have done out best to achieve
peace. It is possible now for people to move around although there are a
few dissidents still at large. The process of integrating ~ur forces,
' although slow, is taking place.
Naw we are beginning gradually to attend to other problems that impede the
achievement of our social and economic goals--the task of resettling our
- people, of reconstructing our economy, of bringing education and health
services to the people. All this is going on in gradual steps.
There is also the need to attend to the immediate demand for increased
wages in the private sector as well as in the public service. We have
established minimum wage scales which we believe are a good start. We
are going to appoint a commission soon to inquire into the totality.of
conditions in the private sector so that we can come up with satisfactory
recommendations on wage scales.
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Then, in terms of the country's international status I think we have achieved
qu~.te a lot. There was hardly any international relationship between this
country and the ~utside world. We have completely changed that, and r.ow
_ we are friends with almost everybody. We are the d~rling of the world at
the moment.
Qsestion: In formulating your present policies how conscious are you of
trying to avoid taking actions that might provoke a white exodus? How
important is it to retain white skills in Zimbabwe?
Answer: I think it is very important. It is a very crucial matter. We
are worried that already so many are leaving. We cannot do without these
people with definite abilities and skills, and so we must try to retain -
, those skills. I believe the best way to develop future African skills is
to base them on existing skills. Those who have them should become tutors
for the future generation.
Question: Whay are they leaving?
Answer: For various reasons. There are those who have never accepted the
- fact that we won the election and who believe our political persuasions will
not enable them to stay. Then there are those who leave as a result of
fear--fear that we are going to act aginst them, perhaps in a physical
sensP, but I think more in the sense that our policy will be to replace .
whites with blacks. Then others are afraid that their acquired benefits
will vanish.
Question: Are these fears justified?
Answer: No, I certainly do not think they are justified to the extent that
these people believe. We do not intend to act against anybody in physical
terms; we are pledged to a policy of peace and reconciliation. The consti-
tution prevents us from enacting retroactive legislation and we do not
desire to do that; we are pledged to the prin~iple of forgiveness.
' In terms of the fear of replacement, we are carrying out a policy of African
advancement but, that does not mean we are going to make the public service
or any other s2rvice totally black. We cannot do that. True, the blacks
are in the majority but what we need is a kind of balance. If we carry out
African advancement to the extent that we feel to be satisfactory then the
future process will be one of recruiting on the basis of inerit.
Question: You have said on a number of occasions that your ultimate goal
is the establishment of a socialist state in Zimbabwe, but one could hardly
describe your present policies as socialist. Does this mean you have
modified your aim?
Answer: No we have not. We are going to work towards the establishment
of a socialist society, but we have taken into congnizance the reality of
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the capitalist system here. You do not destroy an infrastructure that is
in being in order to realize your socialist aims. In fact you can do so
by bu.ilding on the structure ~hat is there.
' And what i~ socialism about anyway? It is about bringing benefits to people
in a definite way, using definite modalities. Our view is that we can -
proceed to work on socialist principles at the present moment. In any case
there are quite a number of things which are already socialist; education
and health are already state-controlled. We are going to have collective
agriculture. This is not going to be by way of imposition; we are going to
educate the people into accepting the system. You do not begin by imposing
the system, you start by creating a consciousness among the people.
.
Question: Will there eventually have to be some state participation in
sectors like mining or industry? _
Answer: Szate participation? There will be that. I am glad that most of
the multinational and foreign companies which want to invest in the country
are suggesting state participation. Where we can, we will participate, of -
course, but where we feel the field should be left entirely to private
enterprise we will do so. I think that in commerce and industry generally
the field is better left to private enterprise. But in the crucial areas
like mining and certain sectors of the infrastructural system like hydro-
electric schemes and vast irrigation schemes the need for the state to
participate exists and in my opinion should be emphasized.
But the state need not participate as a state-directly. It can establish
a statutory body, which is what you already find in the airways, the grain
marketing authorit}� and the electric supply commission. These already -
exist.
Question: Where are you going to get the money to pay for the reforms
you wish to carry out in areas like land resettlement, education and health?
Answer: We have tried begging, and grants have not been al?_ that forth-
coming in spite of the honeymoon many people are enjoying with us. The
British have given us 75N pounds, the Americans about $35M, the Germans
DM50M, dnd there are smaller sums from other countries. That is all by
way of grants, but I do not think we are going to receive such large sums
in the future. We want loans and we are busy getting loans for various
pr.ojects.
Questiont Why do you think the flow cf foreign aid has been rather disap-
pointing?
Answer: I suppose it is because there is a state of economic recession
throughout Europe. The economic situation in Britain and the United States -
is not encouraging. Nor are the politics of the moment either, with elec- -
tioneering taking place in the United States. I suppose, too, rhat after
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people have had a look at our infrastructure they think we do not deserve
much help. That is the disadvantage we get from our level of development.
Q~estion: What role do you see for foreign investment, and do you think
that Ioreign investors are holding back until they see the true colors of
y ouur government?
Answer: Certainly not. Contrary to what some circles in Europe are sug-
gesting, we are actually taking our time in examining which foreign investors
can be of greatest benefit to us.
Question: You are not envisaging any changes in the regulations concerning
foreign investment?
Answer: No, except that we will expect some of them to propose joint
ventures with the government, or else we will propose joint ventures. They
are free to come, but we would prefer it if the enterprises became localized
and a greater number of their shares became owned locally.
Question: Zimbabwe's foreign policy is one of non-alignment. How do you
see Zimbabwe's relations developing with the West, particularly with the
European community?
Answer: On that basis of non-alignment, but we want to be associated with
the EEC under the Lome Convention. We are in the process of finalizing
~ arrangements for our entry as an associate member.
Question: What about Zimbabwe's relations with the Eastern block, particu-
larly the Soviet Union? Zanu's ties with the Soviet Union have never been
particularly close?
Answer: Well, not because of Zanu but because the Soviet Union chose it
that way. They had their own preferences. We are not responsible for the
cool relationship that exists. If they want to be more friendly than they
- have been in the past then we are ready.
Question: The news broadcasts on the Zimbabwe radio always describe South
Africa as "racist" and "apartheid" South Africa. Yet your country is likely
to have to import up to 200,000 tons of maize from that country next year.
Can you define your attitude towards South Africa?
Answer: Our position is clear: A political relationship with South Africa
is out of the question. We cannot have any political relationship with them
for obvious reasons. We feel revulsion at their sysCem of apartheid. What ~
we have reversed here is what they are still practicing thez~e. But on eco-
nomic ties, the relationship which we found in existence will continue to
exist because the reality is that our ecc~nomy, both historically and geo- _
graphically, has tended to depend more and more on South Africa's economy.
This has to be recognized although in Lusaka (at a meeting in April between
~
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~?ine b.l~ck Soutliern Atrican countries) we committed ourselves to the inter-
dependence of our economies in this region and the l, ~ening of dependence
on South Africa.
Question: What scope is there for Zimbabwe to lessen its economic dependence
on South Africa in the foreseeable future?
Answer: Well it depends on the pace in the development of relations and
communications between us and the rest of the African countries of this
region. We also produce lots of goods here which we can sell to countries _
in this region. Then there is Zambia which wants to use the ports in
- Mozambique; Zaire too.
Question: Have you had any contact with white South African leaders?
- Answer: No, but we are prepared to sponsor a meeting here between South
Africa and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) on the
question of Namibia.
Question: Do you think that a negotiable solution can be achieved in
~lamibia on the basis of United Nati.ons Security Council Resolution 435?
Answer: I think so. I think the parameters are there, the principles
have been spelt out and some basic requirements demanded by Soutfi Africa
seem to have been met. It appears that SWAPO is forthcoming--perhaps more
forthcoming than South Africa--on the question of a conference to work out
the manner of implementing the United Nations resolution on Namibia.
- Question: Many people, particularly in the European community, believe
that Zimbabwe will sooner of later become a one-party state like most
other countries in Africa. Is this going to happen and is it desirable?
Answer: You already had a one-party state here in the past, not because
the constitution decreed it but because that was the reality. I myself
- am not against a one-party state as long as it results fxom the decision
of the people, but at the moment I do not see that being the political
trend. We have a constitution that ~ccepts a multi-party system: under
it we had a landslide victory.
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