JPRS ID: 9198 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L19198
18 July 1980
?
~
USSR Re ort
p
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
CFOUO 14/8C3
Arbatov;'s New Book on Washington,'s Poiicies
.
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1~OTE
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JPRS L/9198
iJSSR REPORT ls Juiy i9so
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICaL AFFAIRS
_ (FOUO 14/80)
ARBATOV'S P~EW BOOK ON WASHINGTON`S ~OLICIES
M~scow BEZOPASNOST' V YADERP~YY VEK I POLITIKA VASHINGTONA in
Russian 1980 signed to press 24 Jan 80 pp 1-5, 213-269, 270-273,
287-288
[Book by A.G. Arbatov: "Security in the Nuclear Age and Wash-
ington Policies"]
- [Excerpts] In this monograph the Americanist A. G. Arbatov analyzes the
foreign policy of the United States during the 1960s and 1970s.
Especial attention is devoted to Washington's policies in the field of
nuclear missile weapons. The author examines the question of how and
with what purpose American militaristic forcPS are intensifying the
arms race. At the same time, in fars ighted circles in the country
there is a tendency toward negotiations with the Soviet Union on the
limitation of strategic arms and .on spreading detente to the military
_ sphere. Al1 of this reflects a very sharp struggle in the United
States ruling circles on the issues of foreign policy and security
during the nuclear age.
The book is designed for propagandists, lecturers, and everyone who is
interested in the important problems of the present day.
CONTEN'TS
FROM THE AUTHOR ......................................................3 -
Chapter I. THE BLIND ALLEYS OF THE POLITTCS OF STRENGTH .............6
, 1. The Nuclear "Boomerang" and the Crisis of American Global
Strategy on the Threshold of the 1960s ........................7
2. Kennedy's "New Frontiers" in the Sphere of United States
Policy and Military Strengtn .................................15
3. The Lurch Toward Nuclear Superiority: Missile Construction
Strategy and Programs 1961-1967 ..............................24
1 (III - USSR - 35 FOUO]
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4. The Evolution of MacNama.ra's Views on Security and
Strategic Balance ............................................37
5. The Price of the Democratic Leadership's M~.stakes.............48
6. The End of the Johnaon Administration Ar the Turning ~
Point of the American Nuclear Missile Policy .................61
~ Chapter II, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE REPUB.LICAN ADMINT~T~iATION: THE
RETREAT OF AMERICAN MIGHT ..............................65
1. The "Bal.ance of Power" Theory in a New Form ..................67
2. "Reality Politics" in Action: Washington's Cor?ceptions in
Conflict with the Wor1d ......................................73
3. Military Power in the Politics of the Republicans.............87
- Ch aptez III, THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND THE NtJCLEAR
"TRUN~ S" OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNME;NT .............104
1. At the Approaches to a Strategic Armaments LimitaCion
Treaty: Can "Coupling" be Tied in with Negotiations?.......106
2. The Conception of "Sufficiency" and the Anti-Missile Defense
System of the United States .................................116
3. The Republic Administration's Approach to Offensive Strategic
Weapons Programs ............................................125
4. The Ir_crease in the Number of American Nuclear Warheads and -
' the Evolution of the Conception of "Sufficiency"............134
5. Moscow, May 1972 Concrete Steps Toward a Durab.le Peace...141
_ Chapter IV. THE RELAXATION OF 'PENSIONS AND THE PENTAGON'S
MANEIJVERS .............................................149
1. An Improvement of the International Climate and the Latent -
Currents of American Policy ...............150
_ 2. Debates About the Next Generation of America~.z Strategic =
Weapons .....................................................157
3. Schlesinger's Strategy: "Counter-Fc~rce" Again? .............1$0
4. Schlesinger's Programs: The Realitie:� and rllusions of
Nuclear Missile Policy Por the 1980s ........................197 -
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Chapter p, MTITUAL SECURITY, PARITY, AND THE DYNAMICS OF WEAPONS...213
l. On the Road to Security and Equality: Vladivost~k, November
1974 ........................................................215
2. The Onslaught of Militarism Within the Ur~ited States in
1975-1976 and th~ Political Zigzags of the Ford
Administration ...............................................226
3. The Difficult Road to SALT-II ................................246
, CONCLUSION ...............................................270
Notes ...........................~...................................274
From the Auth or
Security is a concept which is as ancient as civilization itself. `
In seeking it states have from time immemorial relied upon territorial
seizures and superiority in military strength. And this ineyitably
threatened the security of other countries and gave rise to devastating
_ wars.
The 20th century has compelled us to take a new look at many truths
which seemed unshakable for thousands of years, and this applies in
full measure to the concept of security. History's greatest social
revolution and the growth of the might and influence of real soc~.alism
have created the possibi].ity of a fundamentally new way of ensuring
security. Defining it, V. I. Lenin said even before the Uirth ot the
first socialist state: "The end of wars, peace among peoples, and
a halt to plur~dering and violence this is our goal...."1 The
deveZopment of the scientific and technolc~gical revolution and the
creation of weapons of unli.mited destructit~;: pcu~er and range have made
a shift to this path a vital necessity.
But it was not in the sim~mer of 1945 when an atomic tornado swept away
Hiroshima and Nagasaki that the realities of the nuclear age were
recognized in all of their terrifying dimensions in the United States
~ of America. It was only in the beginnang of the 1960s that America -
was once and for all deprived of the inaci;essibility to which i.t.had
become so accumstomed and whj~:h was ensured by the two oceans that
separated it from the remainin.g wor~d. The shock which overtook the
- United States as a result of t?:~s was aggravated by the fact that
after World War II it had tried to ma.ke the basis of its relations
with other countries an overwhelming nuclear superiority and an
- unprecedented military and political expan:~~;n overseas.
In this b~ok wliich is bei:~g offered for the reader's consideration
there is an examination of the difficu7.t path which has been c~vered
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by the United States from the time of its awareness of ttie realities
of the atomic age to its adaptation to them. In fact, this path is
far from completed today, since the American rulin~ circles have not ~
yet given up their attempts to solve new problems with obsolete methods,
although they have taken on the form of increasingly perfected and
powerful weapons and increasingly sophisticated strategic ideas.
However, these efforts have again and again been demonstrating their
bankruptcy and, at the same time, causing damage to the secur~ty of _
the entire world, including the T;,ited States.
For the essence of security and the way~ of strengthening it have
undergone a fundamental change under today`s coi~ditions when tremendous
stores of ineans of destruction which are capable of putting an end to
our civilization have been pii2d up in the world, when rapid techno-
logical progress is continually giving birth to increasingly terrible
types of weapons ~ahich can shake the military balance, and when in
many areas of the world centers conflict which threaten to put
these arsenals of global destruction into action have been preserved
and are ripening. The entire experience of the nuclea.r age suggests
a fur.damentally different approach to the problem of ensuring security.
It has been at the basis of the policies of the Soviet Union which
- have already produced positive results contributing to a relaxati~n
_ of tensions. "...~Ie are not seeking to achieve military superiority
, over the West,," the General Secretary of the CC CP5U and Chairman of
the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev has emphasized,
"for we do not need it. We need only reliable security. And there is
no doubt that there will be more security for both sides if the
arms race is harnessed, military preparations are curta:i.led, and the
international political climate is improved."2
In the West, and above all in Washington, an understanding of ttiis
difficult and untraditional truth is making a way for itself with great
difficulty, with halts and even with reversals, especially when it -
is a matter of concrete stepe to limit armaments which aff.ect the
interests and programs of the military-industrial complex. It is th~se
questic~ns which are at the center of the attention of the p:esent book
whic_h c.overs an imnortant and quite long period of United StatPs history. -
Of course, the author was interested only in those aspects of zt which
are directly connected with his topic. He was able to find support here
in the work of Soviet scholars in which there are detailed analyses of
the history of American domestic and foreign policy, of the mechanism
of the formation of the country's political course, and of the levers
by which the military-industrial complex influences this course. I
am speaking above all about the works of G. A. Arbatov, 0. N. Bykov,
A. A. Gromyko, V. V. Zhurkin, V. S. Zorin, E. A. I~ran~an, N. N.
w Inozemtsev, A. A. Kokoshir., Yu. M. Mel'nikcv, N. A. Mil'shteyn,
B, D. Pyadyshev, G. A. Trofimenko, N. N. Yakovlev, and others.
. In the present book the reader will find a detailed examination of
many American weapons programs and of the strategic co:ieptions connected
with them, since Washington's political approaches to the realities of
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the nuclear age are reflected especially palpably in th~sn and it is in
the struggle around them that a new attitude toward the problem of
security is making its way among the American pub lic and a section of
the country's rulin~ circles. Under present-day conditions even certain
issues which in the past seemed purely military ones are becoming major
problems of Soviet-American relations and important factors in the
_ international situation. They merit the careful attention of all who
are interested in international relations in which the great task today
is practical steps toward disarmdment. And this task, as L. I. Brezhnev
has said, is facing not only govermnents: "No one has a right to stand
alcof from this ma.tter. It cannot be expected that it will be possible
to turn the course of events around from armament to disarmament without
the energetic actions of international public opinion and of the
broadest political forces."3
Chapter V: Mutual Security, Parity and the Dynamics of A~naments
In a speech on Capitol Hill the United States Secretary of State
depicted the chief problem of American foreign policy in the 1970s as
~ follows: "If we pursue the goal of peace, regardless of any other
task (of foreign policy), our remaining interests may suffer damage
and, perhaps, be completely lost. But if unbridled competition leads
- t~~ a nuclear conflict these interests, like ever~thing else, wi13.
p~~rish in an inevitable catastrophe....The greates t task of our time
consists in reconciling the reality of competition wtth the necessity
of coexistence."1
By v~irtue of immutable historical laws a return to the "cold war" in
its, so to speak, "classical" form has become very difficult if not
impossible, attractive as it may be for dogmatists with i*_s simplicity
and constancy of foreign policy goals and interests. The preponderant
_ "nuclear superiority" of the United States and its a~solute hegemon.y .
in the capitalist world have retreated irretrievably into the past;
and the myth of a monolithic international "communist conspiracy" has
revealed its complete bankruptcy. An overall military equilibrium
between the USSR and the United States on the level of strategic
weapons and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the sphere of conven--
tional armed forces has become the distinguishing f eature of the new
stage of international relations. The dilemma of the West's ruling
~ircles has consisted in whether to restrict the dynamic movement of
the military equilibrium with ever broader agreements between the
opposing sides on the basis of genuine equality and an equal security,
or to attempt to make use of the rapid development oF death-dealing
technology in order to obtain one-sided military and political advan-
tages in the formulation of ever more sophisticated strategic
conceptions.
The choice of what path to follow on this very important issue will to
a large de~ree determine what the world will be like in the 1980s and
even the 1990s. Will it be a world of good neighborly coexistence and
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cooperation, or will it turn intc~ an arena of fierce competition and
confrontation in new fields and dangerous forms. To an e~ormous
extent this depends upon the policy of the Soviet Union and the United
States. The USSR's line on these questions which was once again
confirmed in the historic decisions of the 2~th CPSU Congress in February
1976 consists in strengthening detente in those areas wliere the objec-
tive conditions have developed for this, and in spreading it to new
areas of bilateral and multilateral relations. In the Summary Report
of the CC CPSli to the 25th Congress it was unambiguously emphasized:
"In its foreign policy the Soviet Uriion intends to patiently and con-
sistently s~ek ever n~w ways to develop peaceful mutually advantageous
~ cooperation between states with different social systems and paths
to disarmament. We shall steadily increase our efforts iii the struggle
for a durable peace."2
As for American palicy, it has been formulated in a stubborn domestic
struggle and has frequently shown contradictoriness and a lack of
consistency. Since the middle of the 1970s circles which have put an
intense emphasis on Soviet-American differences and have advocated a
sharpening of the rivalry have become more active in the United States.
As a result of the fundamentally new realities this course is not
capable of yielding the desired fruits, but it can seriously hamper
the development of detente and even undermine it in cer.tain areas
where the first positiye steps have already been taken. The limitation
of strategic weapons has remained the decisive issue in Soviet-American
relations. It is not surprising, therefore, that since the micl-1970s
it has been precisely around it that therc~ has been in the United States
the most stubborn struggle to determine the ch~ice oF a way to ensure
"national security" at a new and exceptionally important and complex
historical stage.
1. On the Road to Security and Equality: Vladivostok, November 1974.
The reorientation of Washington's strategic courae and its acceleration
of the development of new nuclear weapons 9.n the mid-1970s gave rise
to sharp criticism from realistic circles in the United States. Heated
disputes about this broke out on the Capitol. "Doctor Schlesinger is
waving the alarm flag," Senator Kennedy said. "His point of view
neglects to see the essence of the problem which will face the United
States in the itt~ediate future....Nowhere in the world today are
- there military threats to our security with which our exi.sting and
planned military might could not cope....We are much more threatened
by the Administration's inability to manage the economy than by any
imaginary shortcomings in our military strength."3 Many American public
and political figures and authoritative foreign policy specialists
came out against the policy of speeding up the arms race. A discussion
of Schlesinger's strategic initiatives unfolded on the pages of such
central American newspapers as THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE WLISHINGT~N POST,
and TH~ CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. Influential public organizations
joined the debates: The Association for Weapons Control, the F~deration
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of American Scientists, and the Center for Defense Information.
Examining the ~tLategic conceptions proposed by the Pen~agons G. Skowell
emphasizeci: "To make the waging of a nuclear war easier does not mean
to strengthen restrain~. It leads to increased risks that th e night-
mare of nuclear destruction will become a reality."4
However, certain circles in the United States tnought differen tly.
DespitP the valid criticism of a number of public figures and scientists
and journalists, Schlesinger's conceptians and the weapons programs
connected with them made a way for themselves into Washington's state
policy. Moreover, after several years of being under a"siege," the
military-industrial complex and its conservative political echelons
began to unify their ranks and preparE a counter-offensive along a
broad front. The coalition of mi].itar:sts was strengthened by its
alliance with Schlesinger in the Department of Defense and Senator ~
Jackson in Congress. The main direction of their work was a continua-
tion of the mass brain-washing of public opinion through the tested
method af frightening it with the "military threat" of the Sov~et
Union, Juggling statistics and strategic forecasts, the Secretary of
Defense did not miss an occasion to portray gloomy pictures of the
future "nuclear superiority" of the USSR as a result of its allegedly
"forced" missile programs. In support of these pessimistic prophesies
a widely advertised study under the name of "An Evaluation of the Global
Balance of Power" was performed by the Strategic Genter of Georgetown
= University. It was asserted in it, in particular: "...The growing
nuclear forces of the Soviet Union are capable of acquiring an obvious
degree of superiority in the eyes of the political leaders of the
entire world. This appearance of superior force will increase Soviet
� influence and prestige to the detriment of the United 5tates."S
On the Capitol Senator Jackson showered criticism upon the 1972 Tempor-
ary Agreement because it allegedly gave the USSR "major advantages in
the number of land- and sea-based strategic missiles. "He did not
mention here that as early as 1970 the United States had begun a
rapid increase in the number of its nuclear warheads by means of
deploying missiles with detachable nose cones, and he also passed
over the existence in the United States of a largA fleet of strategic
aviation and of its forward-based nuclear weapons near Soviet territory.
Especial emphasis was put on the issue of the so-called Soviet "superi-
ority in the throw weight" of ballistic missiles. According to
Schlesir.ser's and Jackson's arguments, it turned out that the "superi-
ority of many times over" of Soviet missiles in the weight of their
nose cones would lead to the USSR's "superiority" in the number and
power of its nuclear missiles after the deployment of its warheads of
the "MIRV" type. In addition, of course, there was silence about the
fact that the United States itself was creating heavy liquid-f uel
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missiles in the early 1960s (."The Titan"). It had restricted the
deployment of the latter by no means out of good motives, but because
in recent years the Pentagon, as has already been shown, regarded other
paths of military and technical development to be more effective and ~
undertook the reorganization of the structure of America's nuclear triad ~
on the basis of its ideas of strategic expediency. However, this did
not at all embarass the American prophets who had taken it upon them-
selves to frighten the public with the "Soviet threat." Some of the
supporters of increasing American military might like Senator S. Nunn
were unsparing in their assertions regarding an increase in the size
of the armed forces of the socialist countries that was allegedly taking
place in Central Europe. Others, like Retired Admiral E. Zumwa].t, became
noisy about an alleged increase in the "threat" from the Soviet Navy.
Senator Mclntyre, a recognized specialist on the problems of armaments,
rightly noted ir thi~ regard: "When the Pentagon plays for hig stakes
it publishes testimony with an ahundance of fears and exaggerations
but with a shortage of truthfulness and objectivity."6 And the stakes
of the military-industrial complex in the middle 1970s were indeed big.
They included a planned new round of the arms race, a weakening of the =
anti-militarist opposition within the United States, and the future
fate of the relaxation of tensions itself.
~ Other channels were also used to stir up anti-Soviet feelings in the
West. The new Arab-Israeli war which broke out in the Near East in
October 1973 and the subsequent repeated increase in petroleum prices _
which plunged capitalis~n into an energy crisis (aggravating the general.
economic crisis) were placed entirely at the ser_vice of. the anti-Soviet
campaign. And here American Zionist circles united in a single front
with conservatives and with the military-industrial complex. They
~ust about accused the Soviet`Union of "instigating" the armed conflict
and the petroleum embargo, and incriminated the USSR with "violating"
the spirit of the "Principles of Relations" which had been signed in -
May 1972 at the Moscow Summit Meei:ing.
Serious damage was caused to detente by the campaign which was begun
in the United States regarding so-called "violations of human rights"
in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The anti-Soviet
forces pursued the goal of using the weakening of tensions, the expan-
sion of contacts between peoples, and the growing exchange of informa-
tion for subversive activities against socialism and an unceremonious ~
intervention in the internal affairs of the USSR and the countries of
_ Eastern Europe. The movement by American Zionist Circles, reactionary _
trade union leaders, and the press influenced many liberal politicians,
which weakened their position in favor of detente and placed them in a
_ very ambiguous position regarding Soviet-American relations. On the
Capitol thc "human rights" campaign was led by none other than Senator
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Jackson. Through the efforts of Jackson and his supporters both
~ Houses of Congress adopted in December 1974 trade legislation in
which the granting to the Soviet Union of "most favored nation status"
and trade credits was qualified by conditions which concerned the USSR's
emigration laws. As a consequence of such an unprecedented intervention
in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and tt~e absolute unaccepta-
~ bility of the American conditions the agreements on the development of
_ trade and economic cooperation which had been concluded in 1972 did not
come into force.
Domestic events in the United States also had an effect upon the process
of detente. In the summer of 1974 the Warergate Affair reached its
culmination. President Nixon's closest associates, Haldeman, Erlichman, '
Alitchell, and others, were sentenced by a court to prison. Vice
President Agnew went into retirement. The l~ader of the Republican
minority in the House of Representatives, Congressman Gerald Ford, was
appointed to replace him. In Congress the movement to impeach the
President was growing. After Nixon's participation in concealing
illegal actions had become obvious, a judicial commission of the H~use
of Representatives, on 27-30 July 1974 in the three stages established
by procedure, passed a resolution to bring an impeachment action.
Faced with his inevitable removal from office, Richard Nixon decided
to abandon the ~residency. On 8 August 1974, in his last appearance
on national television, he announced. his retirement. "I no 1ongPr have
a sufficiently strong political base in Congress," he said. "I would
have preferred to remain to the end, regardless o:E the personal suffer-
~ ings this would cause me....~ut, in taking a different step, I hope to
speed up the process of the healing of wounds."~
- On 9 August President Richard Nixon went into retirement. Gerald Ford
became the next Presideat of the United States.
Great damage to detente was a serious side effect o~ Water.gate. On the
one hand, from the end of 1973 to the middle of 1974 the leadership of
the Adm~ni.stratian was practically paralyzed in the foreign policy
sphere. In the process of losing the remnants of his authority and
influence within the country, President Nixon was to an increasing
degree incapable of carrying out further steps in the field of detente
and weapons limitation. '1'he Watergate scandal consumed more and more
of the attention and energy of the liberal circles in the iJnited
- States, distracting them from the problems of foreign policy and the
arms racP. Although Secretary of Defense Schlesinger who took some
drastic stratEgic measures publicly called upon the opposition for a
- debate on military policy, the reply to this challenge was insufficiently
� decisive. To a large extent on acccunt of Watergate the individual
centers of opposition to the counter-offensive of militarism in the
United States did not turn, as ir~ ~receedi.ng years, into a united front
j of opposition.
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The opponents of detente in the United States, of course, did not fail
to make use of the domestic political situtation to cast a shadow on
the successes of Soviet-American relations and the improvement of the
international climate. Stubborn efforts began to be made to convince
the public that for the sake of its own popularity which was connected
with expanding detente the Administra~ion had allegedly permitted the
_ Sovi2t Union to acquire one-sided political and military advantages.
For example, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense W. Natter
asserted in his sensational study "Kissi.nger's Grand Desi.gn":
"Secretary Kissinger is glorifying agreements against which Professor
Kissinger would have taken an energetic stand. I am talki.ng about
such landmarks of detente as the ratification of ~he status quo in
Berlin, the recognition of East Germany, and the legitimization of '
the existing political regime in Eastern Europe. SALT-I is proclaimed _
an enormous success in limiting nuclear weapons, aLthough it permits
a substantial expansion of the Soviet arsenal....Such diplomacy,"
Natter concluded, "has created too much one-sided detente and has
resulted in a super relaxation of tensions in the United States and
throughout the West."8
Soon after President Nixon's departure fram the political scene which
concluded the scandalous sensations of Watergate a new exacerbation of -
the domestic struggle around the issues connected with the Soviet-
- American relations and a limitation of weapons began ii~ the United
- States. Conservative and mili.taristic circles made efForts to use the
change oE. the head of state for a sharp turn in Washington's policy in
the direction of sharpening confrontation and increasing military
rivalry. In their turn, the opponents of this line attempted to achieve
decisive progress in the development of Suviet-American relations which
had been constrained during President Nixon's final period by domestic
events. The chief clash between these current~ occured around the
future policy of the United States in the field of strategl.c weapons,
particularly the issues of SALT.
During his 25 years in the House of Representatives the new President ~
- of the United States had r.ecommended himself as a supporter or very _
conservativ~ political views. In domestic policy Ford was firmly
opposed to federal monies for social security, but during his member- _
ship in the Appropriations ~ommittee he invariably supported military
budgets and the development of new weapons systems. With regard to the
Soviet Union, Ford adhered in a traditional way to a ver~~ hard line
"No concessions, no deals." In Washington there were few people who
regar;led Ford as a person of outstanding qualities, but he had gotten
the reputation of being an experienced master of Capitol procedures
and inter-party combinations.
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~ Af ter b.ecorning Fresident of the United States, Ford refrained from new
_ appointments to key offices in the military and po.litical apparatus.
Only the post of [Jhite House Chief of Staff was taken b}~ the United
States Ambassador to NATO Donald Rumsfeld k*ho replaced General Haig
wtio was appoinCed Commander in Chief of NATO. Kissinger's position,
~ despite his a~ithority and popularity in the United States, had become
- much more difficul.t ;n 1474. His appointment to the post of Secretary
of State ~ahich in itself strengthened Kissinger's influence burdened
hi;a with current matters to ttie detriment of issues of par;unount impor-
tance. An especially large amount of his time and energy taas swallowed
up at the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974 by his so-called
"shuttle diplomacy" which was expressed ~n separate act_i.ons fiy
WaGhington i.n the Near ~ast, and this at the very moment when a critical
s r_age in Soviet-American relations and in the entire policy of 3etente
- and ar.-ms limitation had come!
Sec:~etary of Defense Schlesinger began to confindently pursue his own -
1in~: in the field of stxategic weapons. Schlesinger's first press
cen::erence in January 1974 at which a change in America's military
con~_eptions was announced caught the State Department by surprise. It
had not been informed in advance of the content of the Secr.etary of
Defznse`s strategic ideas. (In the White House Schlesinger.'s speech
was approved by General Haig over the head of the Secretary of State who
was at the same time the President's Assistant for National Security.)
When the State Department learned of the Pentagcn leader's initiative
a s~~ecial meeting was arranged with the Secretary of Defense wYiose
_ eGSF~nce was a protest against the strategy of "counter-force." However,
Sch.lesinger had no thought of yielding. A converstation followed as a
r.esult of cahich differences of a technical nature between the two depart-
ments were revealQd.9 However, they were not made public. Ap~arently,
in order to avoid weakening the already shaky positions of the Ford
Administration.
Ae r.he same time, no doubts remained that Schlesinger had performed a
profound and purposeful undermining action on the policy of detente and
a. limitation of the military rivalry of the two powers wt~ich had gradu-
a11y been taking shape in past years. With his strategic conceptions
I ~Znd, what is even more important, his weapons programs the Secreatary
~ of Defense had narrowed the prospects for achieving an agzeement on the
limitation of strategic weapons between the USSR and the United States.
Tn this way, hopes diminished for an expansion of. detente and for
the development of Soviet-American relations which were connected above
all ~aith progres~ at the SALT negotiations in Geneva.
As for the new Fresident, at that time he showed an interest in making
progress at the Soviet-A~erican negotiations. Having gotten into the
White House unexpectedly, Ford decided to become a candidate in the
1976 presidential elections. This meant that he had to gain prestige
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and popularity in the United States during his remaining two years ~n
office. What could be better for this purpose than the rapid achievement
of a new agreement on a limitation of offensive weapons which had not
moved from dead center during President Nixon`s last period in office?
Despite the anti-Soviet campaign of the military-industrial complex,
t'~e Zionists, and the reactionaries, there remained in the United Stiaties
extens-ve f eel.ings.in favor of detente and limitation of the arms raCe.
But the mos t important role in making progress at the SALT negotiations
was played by the continuing nuclear missile equilibr.ium between the
USSR and the United States, the Soviet Union's constructive policy,
and the objective interests of both powers in another agreement in this
field. After 1972, at ~he sECOnd stage cf the SALT negotiations, the -
American side raised the question of establishing "equal ceilings" on _
- the szrategic forces of the two powers. It is completely natural
that the USSR raised the question of talcing account of the American
forward-based weapons in these ceilings. It acted in accordance with
its off icial statement at the time of the conclusion of i;he 1972 agree-
ment that this question would have to be returned to when a long-term
agreement was prepared. For a period of two years it was not possible
to reach an agreement in Geneva, although certain partial and preliminary
steps were taken toward concluding it. In particular, even before
Presiuent Ford had come to power, in .7une 1973 at a summit meeting in
Washington it was decided that a permanent agreement would be signed in
~ 1974 and would include both quantitative and qualitative limitations
on strategic offensive weapons on the basis of the principle of
equal security for the sides and of the impermissibility of either one
of them ob taining one-sided advantages.l~ At the Moscow meeting
between the Soviet and American leadership in July 1974 it was agreed
that the new treaty would "cover the period until 1985 and concern
both quantitative and qualitative lim'tations."11 ~
Desiring to promote progress in the Soviet-American negotiations, the
leadership of the USSR took an important step in the direction of the
position of the American side. As the member of the Politburo of the
CC CPSU and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko later
- recalled, during the course of the negotiations in the fall of 1974
"in the interests of achieving an agreement we did not propose as a
mandatory condition the inclusion in the agreement of a point concern-
ing the elimination of An?erican forward-based nuclear weapons."12 The
Soviet Union's major political decision was aimed at.f.a~i:Litatingthe
current round of negotiations by postponing the question of American
advance-based weapons to the future. This made it possible for a new
agreement to be reached between the USSR and the Lnited States on the
- limitation of offensive strategic weapons systems.
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On 23-24 November 1974 there was a meeting between the General SecreLary
of the CC CPSU L. I. Brez~-~nev and the President of the United States
G. R. Ford in the environs of Vladivostok. At the center of the Soviet
- Primor'ye the leaders of both powers confirmeci their determination to
continue to develop their relations in the direction which had been set
during preti�ious years by the treaties and agreements concluded among
them. First of all, this concerned the agreements on preventing a
nuclear war and limiting strategic weapons which, as was noted in the
Soviet-American communique, were a"good beginning to the process of
creating guarantees against the appearance of a nuclear conflict and
of war in general."13
In order to make further progress along this path an agreement was
reached at the Summit Meeting in Vladicostok that the ne~a agreement on
the limitation of ~trategic weapons should include "the appropriate
points of ~he Tempo:-ary Agreement of 26 May 1972" and "cover the period
from October 1977 to 31 December 1985." Based on the principle of
equality and equal security, the new agrPement was supposed to include
a number of important limitations. In particular, both si.des would
have the right to possess a total of 2400 launchers for land and sea-
based ballistic missiles and also of strategic bombers. In addition,
both sides could have no more than 1320 launchers for land and sea
ballistic missiles equipped with detachable nose cones and individually
targeted warheads. It was planned that the working out of the legal
details and formulation and the conclusion of the new agreement would
take place before the end of 1975. Not later than 1980-1981 it was
planned to continue negotiations on a further limitation and reduction
of strategic weapons for the period after 1985.14
The Vladivostok Agreement was a very important step too~ard a limitation
- of the arms race. It es~ablished clear and equal long-term limits on _
the number of str_ategic weapons carriers in the USSR and the United
States, including long-range bombers,for the first time. Limits were
also placed for the first time on the deployment of detachable nose
cones, which was an initial step toward limiting the qualitative arms
race. Finally, the agreement'on equal ceilings could serve as the -
point of departure for lowering them, as it also could for new qualita- -
tive limitations at a subsequent stage of the negotiations. Taking
note of the positive role of the V ladivostok Agreement L. I. Brezhnev
said in the Summary Report of the CC CPSU to the 25th CPSU Congress: -
"It is clear that an agreement on this important issue would be of
very great importance for the further development of relations between
the USSR and the United States, for strengthening mutual trust, and
for strengthening world peace."15
For his part, President Ford of the United States stated at a press
conFerence: "I believe that the agreement that was concluded at the
f.irst stage of the negotiations on a limitation of strategic weapons
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was a step fonaard. If we succeed in concluding a second agreement on
a mutual basis, it will also be constr.uctive within the framework of
detente."16 In this connection, Secretary of State Kissinger observed:
"The negotiatior.s on restraining the strategic arms race and detente
are in our common interests. We are not doing any favors Yiere for the
Soviet Union. This follows with necessity from the circumstances of
- the present period. In seeking to prevent a nuclear war we are not doing
anyone any i:avors."17
The Vladivostok Agreement was met with approval by a suUstantial part of
America's public and ruling circles. In January 1975 a majority of
the Senate adopted Resolution No. 20 which had been put forward by
Senators Kennedy, Mathius, and Mondale ~n support of the Soviet-American
agreement in Vladivostok. In February of the same year the House of
Representatives adopted the almost identical resolution No. 160 which
had been proposed by 15 congressmen, including those like Bing, Zabalocki,
Findley, Schroedex~ ~ggett,and others. Speaking in support of the
Vladivostok Agreement, Bing stated: "The importance of the agreement is
completely obvious....The Vladivostok Agreement is a positive step
toward slowing down the strategic weapons race. jde support the efforts
~ of the Administration to turn the agreement in principle which has
been reached i~nto a concrete treaty limiting the amount of strategic
delivery systems and individually targei~d warheads which the United
States and USSR are permitted to have."
But the opponents of the limitation of nuclear missile rivalry in the
United States did not retreat from their positions. On the contrary,
they carried out a broad offensive against the Vladivostok Agreement,
trying to hinder the conclusion of a long-term agreement and to open the
way fer a continuation of an increase in armaments. Some of them like
the expert from the Hudson Institute D. Brennan who has repearedly been
mentioned above, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense P. Nitze anct
the former Secretary of Defense M. Laird carried out a frontal attack
on the principles of Vl.adivostok. They asserted that the agreement
allegedly gave the Soviet Union one-sided advantages in "heavy missiles,"
missile throw weight, and the amount of powerful warheads of the "MIRV"
type. The president of the Rand Corporation, G. Rowan (whom we remember
as one of the chief inspirers of the "nuclear superiority" strategy in
the Pentagon in the early 1960s) called openly upon Congress to retuse
- the support an agreement based on the Vladivostok principles.l9
Otliers chose a more sly tactic. For example, Senator Jackson, camoufla-
ging himself with the slogan of lowering the Vladivostok ceilings
which had been put forward by some sincere supporters of the agreement
- in the United States, called for a lowering of the maximum on strategic
carriers from 2400 to 1760. Within this framework, according to his
plan, both sides would be permitted to have no more than 800 inter-
continental ballistic missiles, 560 BRBL (silbmarine missiles and 400
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aircraft. In fact, u.nder the plausible pretext of a radical reduction
in weapons, Jackson was trying to ensure one--sided advantages for the
United States. By virtue of the unequal structure of the strategic
forces of the two states, the above-measures would have a much greater
effect upon the Soviet Union than on the United States. "Jackson's -
proposal was a diplomatic maneuver that was completely unacceptable
to the Soviets," the American scholar A. Cox noted. "B~ut due to the
complexity of the nuclear numbers game many supporters of detente were
deceived and decided that this was a good idea."20
Finally, many representatives and allies of the military-industrial
complex, especially those who occupied important posts in the Admini-
stration, began a kind of flank-action by-pass of Vladivostak.
While supporting the agreement in words, they tried to create difficul-
ties for turning it into a Treaty. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
stated with complete loyalty at first glance: "...We have to strive
to establish contr~l over weapons, but we must also preserve an
equilibrium in our military might with the Soviet Union."21 However,
under the pretext of "maintaining an equilibrium" allegedly within the
Vladivostok framework he demanded an increase in military appropriations
and the speeding up of strategic weapons programs. Schlesinger announ-
ced for example, that it had b.een planned to commission ten projected
"Trident" submarines not instead of a corresponding number of "Polaris"
missile carriers (as should have been the case in keeping with the
1972 Temporary Agreement), but in addition to them.2~ Eeyond this
number of carriers, it was also planned to deploy substantial numbers
of new "B-1" bombers.
The Pen.tagon's budget request fcr strategic weapons programs in the
1976 fiscal year and for a three-month carry-over* came to 9.8 billion
dollars almost 2.5 billion dollars larger than the strategic section
of the previous military budget. From a formal legal point o� view,
most of America's military programs did not violate the principles
agreed upon in Vladivostok. But, in essence, these long-term arms race
plans went contrary to the spirit and purposes of Vladivostok. Their
task was to acquire one-sided strategic advantages in spite of the
principles of equality and equal security which had been proclaimed in
November 1974. These programs threatened to emasculate the meaning
of the limitations which had been formulated and to destabil2ae the
general strategic situation.
*The additional funds were included in connection with th;. movement in
1975 of the beginning of the fiscal year from July to October, which
in fact made possible a"free" addition of one-quarter of the annual
appropriations to the 1976 fiscal year.
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~
2. The Onslaugh~ ~f Militaris~u in the United States in 1975-1976 and
the Political Zigzags of Y.he Ford Administration.
Iu 1975-1976 the strugg].e within the United States bet~.reen the suppor-
ters and opponents of tlie arms race again entered an unpr_ecedentEdly
acute phace comparable perhaps to the debates of 1969-1970. True,
during that period the anti-militari5t opposition was on the offensive
and pushed back the military-industrial complex along the entire front.
Now, however, the reverse process was occurring: By making use of
domestic and foreign political conditions and of certain objective
difficulties which had been encountered on the patli to detente, milita-
rism utade a fierce attempt to get back its lost positions.
In Congress the liberal wing under the leadership of such figures as
Senators Kennedy, Mondala, Mathias, Mclntyre, Musk.ie, McGovern,
Symmington, Humphrey, and Brooke entered into an intense struggle with
the conservative wing led by Jackson, Buckley, Thtirmond, Stennis,
Goldwater, and HruSka. To a definite extent their struggle amounted
- in nractical terms to pulling over to their side twenty-five to fifty
senators who occupied centrist positions and did not have firm opinions
on political militar~ issues. After the successful p~.ssage of resolu-
tions by the Senate and House of Representatives in support of
Vladivostok in January and February of 1975, Senator McIntyre proposed
in May of the same year an amendment to the military budget for the
- 1976 fiscal year which provided for the removal of appropriations for
the development and testing of detachable nose cone systems of the
"MaRV" type. It was blocked by a small ma.jority, to a large extent as
the result of an anti-communist campaign regarding the final collapse
of the puppet regimes in Indoehina. However, a resolution by Humphrey
was adopted which called in a less categorical form for a postponement
of tests of "MaRV" type warheads until there were "convincing reasons"
for this. (A similar resolution, however, was killed in the house of
representatives.)
, In the summer of 1975 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of
Representatives condemned at its hearings the Pentagon's "counter-
force" programs. But in the Senate a McGovern amendment on halting
the development of the "B-1" system did not pass, in the same way that
a Kennedy amendment to reject the production of an additional numUer of
intercontinental "Minutema.n-3" missiles failed to pass. Nor was support
given to Kennedy's amendment on disassembling a missile defense complex
which remained in the United States in the area of the Grand-Forks
(North Dakota) Air Force Base. On the other hand, a resolution on a
"freeze" on all construction, with the exception of radar construction,
was adopted. Finally, in the fall the Capitol nevertheless reduced ~the
1976 military b.udget by a total of a whole 10 billion dollars.23 At _
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the same time, Congress had been unab.le to discredit and reject the
strategic conceptions of "equality in essence" and "selective nuclear
strikes" which to a large extent the Pentagon's financial requests in
the field of increasing nuclear missile forces were ba~ed. For this
reason, matter~ were limited to a slowing down of a numbei of weapons
programs and to a redistribution of appropriations among other weapons
systems.
Outside of the Capitol the debates involved wide circles ~f the public
' and gave rise to a polari~ation of it such as had not occurred since
- the days of Vietnam. The sharp controversy surrounding the problems of -
a military balance and of a new SALT agreement on the basis of Vladivostok
called forth in the United States a clear demarcation of two groups of
numberous public and political organizations compri5ed of former offi-
cials, retired military people, scientists, and public figures. They
held seminars, pub.lished articles and pamphlets, sent letters to
Congress and to the government, and made financial contributions to
the election campaigns of politicians. They made use of their connec-
tions caith offic~.als, Washington politicians, and the press as sources
of information and channe~s for exercising influence on governznent
policy.
Organizations like the "Council for a Liveable World," "Citizens' ,
Organization for a Just Peace," "International Peace and Law and Order,"
"Center for the Study of Nationa7. Security," "Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions," "Association for Arms Control," and the
"Federation of American S~.ientists" occupied a leading place among the
organizations which came out for arms limitations by means of Soviet-
American agreements and against new United States military programs.
T.n their political work these organizations based themselves upon a
whole ne~work of scientific centers like Harvard, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Stanford, the Center for Defense Information,
and the Brookings Institute which worked on military-political and
military-economic problems. These groups were joined by large sectors
of the business world which were not directly connected with military
orders, had suffered losses from the swollen defense budget and infla-
tion, and were interested in trade and economic cooperation with the
socialist countries.
On th,e other side of the political struggle were such conservative,
chauvinist, and pro-militarist public organizations as the "American
Legion," the "Veterans of Foreign Wars," the "American Council for
Security," the "American I:lstitute for the Study of Public Policy," and
the "Coalition fcr a Demc~cratic Majority." These groups were given
scientific research support by the Center for Strategic Studies of
Georgetown University (the main rival of the Brookings Institute in
Washington), and also the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the
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Institue for DeLense Anal~~sis, and Chicago University. Of course,
these forces received a large ariount of financial support from military
busine~s, reactionary trade union leaders fre~ the AFL-CIO and a sub-
stantial number of Zionist organizations. "It was obvious that these
' forces represented millions of votes," A. Cox writes. "They made up a
_ pr2ssure g,9~aup to increase military expenditures which at first g~ance
- seemed t.o be preponderant."24
The point of view of these circles was expressed in perhaps its most
concentrated form in the July 1974 and July 1975 reports "For an Adequate
Defense": "If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the myth of
detente, reduce our military might, and allow the erosion of our
alliances (ahroad), we may suffer irreparable defeats which will pose
a threat to the preservation of democracy in America....The best diplo-
matic signal that the United States can give to the outside world,"
the reports concluded, "would be a sharp increase in our defense programs
beyond the requests recently made by Secretary Schlesinger in Congress."25
Replying to these militaristic appeals, Senator Kennedy expressed the
essence of the position of realistic American circles: "Neither of
the sides possesses superiority, and at the same time neither yields
to the other. This is the lesson which finally has to be ].earned by
our military leaders...who are still chasing after the chimera of
building real superiority, although this fruitless search provokes new
and more dangerous rounds of the arms race."26
But it was not only the great intensity of the struggle i.n Congress and
among the American public and scientific circles which di~tinguished
the period that followed immediately after the Vladivostok Agreement.
What was even a more rare and eloquent testimony to the intense conflict
- in the United States was thata :~eep_split~:book place within the Ford
Administration itself. Beginning with early 1975 the center of the
domestic contradictions was occupied by two leading government officials
in the field of American "national security" policy: the Secretary of
- State and President's National Security Advisor Kissinger and his former
Harvard classmate, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. The political
differences and rivalry for influence within the government which had
begun between them as early as January 1974 had now developed into open
disagreements on the principle issues of "national security." During
the course of their stubborn struggle each of them tried ro in�luence
goveriunent policy through their own administrative sphere. The Secretary
of State directed his efforts toward the most rapid conclusion of a
long-term agreement on the Vladivostok basis. The Secretary of Defense
set himself the goal of giving the new agreement such terms as would
emasculate its restrictive effect For American military programs, but
would unjustifiably tie down the other side. In essence, this was a
provocational plan, Gince a refusal by the Soviet Union to sign such an
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unequal treaty would also be to the liking of the military-industrial
complex. In such 3n event it counted on pushing the United States into
another rotind.of an.;acc:~],Prated aiws race without any limitations whatever.
The opponents of SALT became active in two basic directions. First,
official representatives of the Pentagon and their allies in Congress
and in the scientific and business. world and press began an intensive
campaign in favor of a new strategic weapons system ~vinged air-, sea-,
and land-based missiles. Seginning with 1`~75 winged missiles were at
the center of the attention of the American public and ruling circles
as being almost the "only hope" for American defense. Express~ng the
point of view of the united group of the adherents of the new system,
G. Rowan asserted in mid-1975: "The winged missile embodies a funda-
mental technology ~hich will lead to a revolution in military capacities
and doctrines. Schlesinger, Carey, the Pentagon generals and admirals,
Jackson, Nitze , Brennan, and many others expressed themselves in the
same spirit. They gave all manneznf praise to the combat effectivene~s,
economicalness, universality, and other strategic "virtues" of this
type of weapon. At the same time, pressure was increasing from the
military-industrial complex against the limitation on winged missiles
in the future SoviEt-American agreement. And it was pointed out here
that due to their small size and other technical characteristics, it
would be impossible to control the number and range of winged missiles
by means of national space observation equipment. (The military
"establishment" did not even wish to hear about a prohibition against
this weapon.)
Meanwhile, the character of this type of weapon did not inake it possible
to agree to its unlimited and uncontrolled deployment. "In Vladivostok
this issue did not exist," USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A.
Gromyko later pointed out. "No green light was given there to winged
missiles."28 However, the Pentagon and its advocates performed stunts
of juridical casuistry and demanded the deployment of these systems
without any limitations, in no way bothered by their obvious negative
consequences for strategic stahility and the SALT negotiations.
The second direction of the campaign by the opponents of a SALT agreement
was some propraganda sensationalism about a new Soviet weapons system
the jet bomber which had been named in the West "Backfire." The
General Secretary of the CC CPSU L. I. Brezhnev at a meeting with
President Ford, and also the Soviet representatives at the Geneva
negotiations provided the American side with unambiguous explanations
to the effect that the "~ackfire" was not an intercontinental bomber,
but a medium-range aircraft. Thus, it was not subject to limitation
on the same level as strategic weapons systems.
However, despite this, in the United States beginning with 1975 fahrica-
tions were stubbornly spread about the "capability" of this airplane to
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reach American territory by means of fueling in the air and to make a
landing on its returr. flight in Cuba or in other countries of Latin
America. Under pressure from militarist opposition, the American side
began in the SALT negotiations to absolutely arbitrarily tie a limita-
t.ion on winged missiles to a limitation on the deployment of the
"I3ackfire" homb.ers. Meanwhile, the only thing that they had in common
was the fact thar, as in'the case of the campaign in favor of the w9nged
missile, the sensation surrounding the "Backfire" system had a dual
goal. On the one hand, there was a plan to obtain the right to deploy
strategic winged missiles "in exchange" for giving the Soviet Union
"permission" to create medium-range airplanes intended for completely
different defense tasks. Or, in the cor.trary case, in accordance with
the plans of the most aggressive circles, it was planned to "overload"
the agreement with irrelevant demands which for understandable reasons
would not be acceptable to the USSR and, in general, wreck the agreement
on the Vladivostok b.asis.* _
The provocative line of the military-industrial complex which was aimed
at torpedoing or emasculating the Vladivostok Agreement was supplemented
by continuing to whip up an extensive campaign ahout a mythical "Soviet
threat" and by inciting anti-Soviet feelin~s in the United States. This
included, in particular, the spreading of unsubstantiated rumors con-
cerning alleged "violations" of the terms of the 1972 Temporary Agreement
by the Soviet Union. The instigator of these fabrications was the
former Secretary of Defense Laird who in June 1975 published an article
in the READERS DIGEST which carried the plain title of "The Russian,
are Deceiving U5." Laird's accusations were enthusiasticaily seized
upon by anti-Soviet circles in the United States.29 True, ths Adminis-
tration leadership made a public refutation of these irresponsible
i.nventions. But the provocational fabrications did not cease, especi-
ally since Secretary of Defense Schlesinger ar~d his protege the Director
. of the CIA Colby confirmed Laird's "facts" at a secret report to the
Senate, and Jackson immediately organized a"leak" of this information
th e press.30 '
Finally, the opponents of detente in the United States al.so made use in -
their interests of foreign political events. After the collapse of the
puppet regime in Saigon in the spring of 1975 which gave rise in the
United 5tates to indignation among the reactionary forces about the
"in~~ction" of the goverrunent, a sensation was created regarding the
construction of an imaginary Soviet Naval Base on the coast of Somali
which was allegedly intended to provide rear-echelon support for USSR
*The inclusion of the "Backfire" airplanes in the Vladivostok ceiling
of 2400 would demand a one-sided reduction by the Soviet Union of its
_ strategic weapons sy~tem.
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war ships in the Indian Ocean. In fact, the "threat" by the Soviet
Union to the petr~leum sea route from the Persian Gulf was needed b~ the
Pentagon as a pr~text for conti.nuing to build the very large United ~
States Naval Base on the island of Diego-Garcia. American naval head-
quarters calculated that this base would help with the deployment of
an aircraft carrier strike unit in the Indian Ocean, and also in suppor-
ting the battle watch of the future "Trident" missile subma.rines.
In this situation it was becoming mr~re, an~ more dif.ficult to find a
diplomatic compromise on the Vladivostok basis. Ideas which arose in
the State Department regarding a solution oF disputed issues in Geneva
were immediately blocked by Schlesinger in the Pentagon and Jackson
on the Capitol. The anti-Soviet campaign in the United States and
the pressure by the military complex for increasing armaments placed
ever new obstacles in the way of detente and the Soviet-American
negotiations. The challenge b.y those circles in the United States
which were pushing Washington toward a harder foreign policy was becoming
= increasingly open and stubborn. "The entire process (of detente) could
= be threateneds" Kissinger observed, "if it benins to be perceived as
something due to us. As the "cold war" is effaced from our memories,
detente begins to look so natural that it seems quite safe to make ever
, increasing detnands upon it. The tenptation to combine detente with
increased pressure upon the Soviet Union will grow. This kind o~
attitude will lead to horrible results. We ourselves would never allow
this from Moscow. Moscow will not allow it from us. In the end, we
- will again come to the "cold war"...."32 he warned. To tliose people
in the United States who, like Schlesinger, publicly kept ta]_king about
the "danger of lagging behind" the USSR in nuclear weapons, and in
their closed circle of friends defended the idea of American superiority,
_ the Secretary of State addressed the eternal question of the nuclear age:~
"What, in the name of God, is strategic superiority? What does it mean?
What can you get from it politically, militarily, and diploniatically?"33
With regard to the campaign about Soviet "superiority in the throw weight"
of ballistic missiles and the "threat" to the survival of the American
"Minutemen" missiles, the Secretary of State provided a reminder that
it was the United States which was the initiator of the creation of
destabilizing strategic weapons.34 Now, through the efforts of the
Pentagon, the cost of past mistakes could be a further undermining of
a military equilihrium and of the process of the limitation of strategic
weapons. Fears appeared that in the future the same would occur with
cruise missiles. True, at first the Secreatry of State himself supported
them as an "exchange card" in the negotiations with the Soviet Union.
But with time the military-industrial comglex began to demand their
creation under all circun,stances and would not agree to any terms for
the limitation of the new weapons system in a Soviet-American agreement.
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"I could never imagine thztt the Pentagon would fall so much in love
with ~:ru~se missiles," the Secretary of State said.35 (Unfortunately,
a relatively short time would pass and K.issinger, now as a pri~rate
peraon, having either changed his views, or adapting himself to -
American domestic political positions, will joj.n the campaign about
the "Soviet threat," and would begin to accuse the USSR of allegedly
making attempts to "violate the world balance of power." (In this
way, Kissinger will not only cast doubt upon many of tiis sensib.le
statements in the past, but will inflict damage on the cause of
detente with which his reputation as an Aznerican government official
was connected.)
At the end of 1975 the disagreements in the Administration reached
such proportions. that they became more intolerable for the President.
Schlesinger no longer found it necessary to even public:~_y conceal his
opinion that the military budget for the 1977 fiscal year (117 billion
dol'~rG) would be insufficiently large for his military program. Ford
could no longer tolerate his lack of control over the Secietary of
Defense who permitted himself, in the words of A. Cox, "to make military
_ statements in Congress which flung a challenge at the basic issues of
the foreign policy which was being conducted by the President and his
Secretary of State.36 In the meantime, the presidential election year
was drawing closer and Ford had decidPd to become a candidate. The
open split in the government on the chief problem of "national security"
was in fact paralyzing the Administration's ability to carry out a
purposeful policy. Al1 of the President's appeals to Congress to give
bipartisan support *_o the Administration's policy were in vain; on the
Capitol sharp contradictions alse held sway. All of ehis was undermining
the President's domestic positions and threatening his hopes for success
in November 1976.
Finally, the President decided that the hour for decisive actior. liad
come. On 1-2 November 1975 he carried out a thorough shake-up of the
key posts in his Administration. He fired Schlesinger and replaced him
with the Chief of Staff of the White House, the former United States
Ambassador to NATO Donald Rumsfeld. He removed Colby from the post of
the Director of the CIA, replacing hi.m with George Bush, the former _
United States Representative to the U.N. In order to balance these
decisions and moderate the indignation of right-wing cir.cles, Ford
announced that his moderate Vice-gresident Nelson Rockefeller would
not be reelected along with him in 1976. Finally, the President deprived
Kissinger of his former post of Assistant for National Security, keeping
hi~n as Secretary of State. Kissinger's deputy Brent Scowfort was
appointed to the post of Assistant to the President. Speaking on
television, Ford explained these shuffles by the necessity to have his
"own team" in the Administration, and not those officials who had come
to him from Nixon. Schlesinger lef t the Pentagon as a hero of militarist
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' circles in the halo of a martyr who had suffered for the military-
industrial complex. In a farewetl taik he said to journalists: -
� "Henry (Ki~singer) show.s firmness wi~th everybody but the Russians."37 _
' Anti-communists. in the Capital and the righ t-wing press liemoaned the
los; of the Secretary of Defense and bitterly criticized the President.
The year 1976 came the Republican Administration's last year in
power. It began c-ith the appearance of a ray of hope in the SALT
negotiations during a visit by Kissinger to the Soviet Union in January.
The essence of the compromise which was discussed in Moscow consisted
of the fact that bomb.ers carrying strategic winged missiles were
equated to ballistic missiles with detachab le nose cones and, in this
way, included in the ceiling for missilies equipped with an RGCh
(expansion unknown) system (1320). At the same time, the deployment
� of sea- and land-hased winged missiles with a range greater than
600 kilometers was prohibited. After returning to Wastiington, the
_ Secretary of State announced to reporters that "90 percent" of the
controversial questions. in the new SALT treaty had been resolved.38
But a final decision was not made. Negative features were becoming
increasingly obvious in Kissinger's approach to Soviet-American
relations. President Ford's position was changing palpably and rapidly
against a new weapons limitation agreement. This transfoi-mation was
expl.ained by the aggregate influence of domestic political factors and
of events on the world arena. With the unanimous support of. the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense D. Rum..sfel.d came OUt sharply
against the compromise which was still being defended in the State
Department. While Rumsfeld was not on the level of his predecessor in
the Pentagon command with respect to strategic theory, he clearly did
not wish to be behind him in adherence to a"hard line" in relation
to the Soviet Union. The new Secretary of Defense willingly followed
the lead of the generals surrounding him. At the same time, as Ford's
appointee and loyal protege he had greater access to the President
than Schlesinger. For its part, the military-industrial complex rejected
the compromise which had been proposed at the SALT negotiations, not
willing to cut itself off from the possibility of deploying long-range
sea- and land-t~ased winged missiles. The latter, apart from everything
else, was connected with strengtheuing American advance-based weapons
and its nuclear guarantees in NATO. In addition, the dissatisfaction
of the militarists was also explained by the fact that the inclusion
of any kind of significant number of airplanes with winged missiles in
_ the ceilings on missiles with detachable nose cones would require, as -
- the "Trident" submarines were commissioned, a reduction of. a correspon-
ding number of existing ballistic missiles with RGCh.*
* The ceiling of 1320 missiles with "MIRV" warheads was supposed to
include: 550 "Minuteman-3" intercontinental ballistic missiles, 496
- "Poseidon" missile submarines, and 240 "Trident" missile submarines,
that is a total of 1286 units. Thus, if missiles with RGCh were not
eliminated, it would be possible to have only 34 airplanes with cruise
missiles within the limits of this level.
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The attitudes of th~ Generals had become for the President an issue of
increased impoi gnce in the domestic situation of 197b. In the spring
C(lE election campaign went into full swing. In his struggle for
reelection President Ford had first to obtain his nomination as a candi-
date from the Republic Party. His chief opponent at this stage was
Governor Ronald Reagan of California a dyed-in-the-wool reactionary
and a long-time and consistent proponentof "absolute nuclear superiority"
for the United States. Reagan, as was to be expected, chose as his
election tactic attacks on the Ford go-Jernment from the right, critici-
zing it for ignoring "national security" and for making "insufficient
efforts" to increase the country's militarv might. "Ronald Reagan
characterized det~nte as a spineless policy toward the Russians," an
American scholar wrote. "He cited President Ford's position on
detente as still another example of his indecisiveness and unclear
thinking."39 Anti-Soviet groups decided to make full use of the
- election campaign during which the political leadership becomes especi-
- ally sensitive to the directions in which domestic winds are blowing.
Despite Schlesinger's departure from the Pentagon, the opponents of a
new agreement between the USSR and the United States and the supporters
of increasing armaments who were led by Senators Jackson and Moynihan
continued to strengthen their domestic political positions.
Sut events in Africa where in 1975 the collapse of some bastions of
colonialism was entering its final stage gave rise to a special rage
in anti-Soviet circles. Portugal's colonial empire had fallen apart,
but the new liberated states of Africa immediately found themselves ~
faced wi_th a new danger. At the end of 1975 an immediate threat hung
. over Angola whose independence had been encroached upon by schismatics
from the national liberation movement who were supported by assistance
from the West and China and also the racist government of the Sc~uth
African Republic. After forces from the South African Republic had
entered Angolan territory from the south, while anned detachments of
schismatics had moved on Luanda from the east and the north, the Soviet
Union, Cuba, and other socialist countries, faithful to their prole-
tarian internationalist duty, provided Angola with comprehensive assis-
tance and support.
In stubborn battles the Angolan patriots inflicted crushing defeats
upon the enemy forces. Displaying wisdom and not wi.shing a repetition
of "~~ietnam" in Africa, the American Congress refused to support the
neocolonialists in Angola. At the end of December 1974 a majority
vote in the Senate ordered a halt to military supplies to the anti-
popular forces of Holdin Roberto. The defeat of the racist units
and of the contingents of inercenaries and schismatics of all colors
in the tropical jungles was enthusiastically welcomed by the progres-
sive anti-imperialist forces of the world. But the Angolan events became
a pr~t:.xt fvr an unprecedented anti-Soviet hysteria in the West. In the
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United States 't led to an even greater consolidation of the opponents
of negoti.a~ions with the USSR and to the unification of the supporters
of a hardening of foreign poZicy and an increase in military might.
It was in this situation that Kissinger decided to pay tribute to the
- anti-5oviet feelings which had swept over the United States and to
demonstrate his "firmness" with respect to the Soviet Union. In a
speech ir.. Sau rrancisco on 3 February ]_976 to the members of the
California Council on World Problems he stated, shamlessly distorting
the true meaning of the USSR's disintef-ested aid to the national
, liberation movement: "If one of the great powers decisively changes
the balance of power in a local conflict by means of military inter- _
- vention and does not encounter resistance, this creates a sinister
pr.ecedent, even if the intervention rakes place in a remote area."40
- With righteous anger Kissinger decided to place the responsibility
for the "loss" of Angola on the Capitol. Well, perhaPs the Secretary
_ of State did succeed in deflecting accusations from the right against
himself. But he had to pay for this with a considerable weakening
of his f.oreign policy positions and arguments in favor of a Soviet-
American SALT treaty on the basis of Vladivostok.
Thus, in the beginning of 1976 united pressure b}- right-wing Republicans
and conservatives in the Capitol and by reactionary public ~roups and
the military-industrial complex forced the Administration to "ireeze"
the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union. Ford was afraid that in
- the situation which had developed Congress would refuse to ratify the
treaty and this would undermine his hopes to make use of the set of
circumstances which had b~ought him to the White House and to remain
there for an additional four years this time as a national elected
_ represenrative of the people. And he rejected the compromise which had
- been recommended by Kissinger, for the first time going against the
position of his Secretary of State on a chief issue of "national secur-
ity." Instead of this, th2 United States proposed signing the treaty
on the Vladivostok basis, but postponing the limitation on winged
missiles until the futur~:, which again brought the negotiations into
a blind a11ey. And this position by the American government meant the
loss of a whole year of precious time whir_h was so necessary in order
for steps on weapons limitation to be able to keep up with the i�_:t~n-
sive development of the technology of nuclear destruction.
The facts show that in 1976 there was a real possibility of making
substantial progress along this path. Tt was a result of the objective
position of the strategic equilibrium between the USSK and the United
States and the genuine long-term security interests of the two greatest
powers. It was provided by the constructive policy of the Soviet
Union which found a new confirmation and development in the historic
decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress in February 1976. The Congress
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formulated a Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International
Cooperation and for the Freedom and Independence of Peoples. The
Summary Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU expressed the
determination of the party and of the entire Soviet people "Lo do
ever.ything possible for the completion of preparations for a new
agreement between the USSR and the United States an the limitation
and reduction of strategic weapons." "To do everything necessary to
deepen the relaxation of international tensions and to ~mbody it in
concrete forms of mutually advantageous cooperation between states."41
Pointing to the necessity for concluding a new SALT treaty on the
basis of Vladivostok, L. I. Brezhnev made additional proposals to the
United States not to stop solely with a limitation of existing types
of nuclear missile weapons. "We believed it possible to go further,"
the General Secretary of the CCPSU said, observing that in the past
these initiatives had already been put forward by the Soviet side
during the course of the negotiations. "Concretely, we proposed agreeing
on a prohibition against the creation of new and even more destructive
weapons systems, particularly new submarines of the "Trident" type
with ballistic missiles and the new B-1 type strategic bombers in the
United States and analogous systems in the USSR. Unforrunately, these
proposals were not accepted by the American side.
_ 'However, they remain in effect."42
The government of the United States did not respond to the USSR's
constructiv~ initiatives. The Pr2sident not only would not decide to
sign a new SALT agreement, but under pressure from the right he began
energetically to demonstrate his concern for ensuring the "defense
capacity" of the United States and to show in every way his "firmness"
toward the Soviet Union and readiness to stand up for American
"global interests." Finally, in his polemical ardor Furd even stated
that in the future he would refrain altogether from the use of the word
"detente," and would speak instead of "peace on the basis of strength."43
This kind of rhetoric at Washington's highest government level did not,
of course, help Soviet-American mutual understanding. But even worse
was the fact that the statements were backed up by real political and
military measures which went counter to the spirit of detente, of the
negotiations, and cooperation. The budget proposed by the Pentagon
for the 1977 fiscal year exceeded the appropriations oF the previous
year by 14 billion dollars and reached the record figure of 1.10 billion
dollars. Despite Schlesinger's departure, his mi_litary programs con-
tinued to develop at rapid rates in keeping with L-he planned schedule.
More than 2 billion dollars were allocated fcr the construction of
the fifth and sixth "Trident" atomic missile submarines. The develop-
ment and production of the first models of the "B-1" bomber was
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appropriated 500 million clollars, the "M-X" program received 70 million
dollars, winged missiles 190 million dollars, and programs to
increase the effectiveness of ballistic missiles and increase their
accuracy and power received 200 million dollars.44 In ris budget
report of February 1976 Rumsfeld repeated almost word for word Che
strategic conceptions, arguments, and validations for military programs
which had 't,een put far.ward previously by Schlesinger.
On 5 Marcli 1976 the first flight tests of an experimental model of a
winged missile of the "t1LSM" type carried by a"B-52" bomber were
carried out at the White Sands Testing Grounds (New 24exico). Before
the year caas over, models of this system were tested six times at
distances o:E from 130 to 370 kilometers. Soon after, on 28 March
1976, tests were begun at White Sands and over the Pacific Ocean of
experimental winged missiles of the "Tomahawk" type from the Navy
"A-6 Intruder" intercepter-bomber, including for a distance of more -
than 1,000 kilometers and involving the use of the "PERKOM" guidance
system. T`he development of new dangerous weapons had crossed another
boundary line and had come another step closer to Ueing deployed in
_ the strategic arsenal of the United States.45 In the spring, making
an election speech in the city of Cincinnati, the President made a
public promise to develop the "B-1" bomber, despite serious doubts
about its strategic usefulness, the enormous cost o~ a new system,
and serious technical difficulties. But these circumstances dic~ not
trouble the President. The interests of the election campaign were
higher than anything else, and near Cincinnati were plants of the
General Electric Corporation which produced new jet engines for the
new bomber. In addition to the aerospace monopolies and the local
trade unions interested in military orders, Ford also hoped to lure
over to his side the numerous Reagan supporters among the politicians
of the southern states.
The shif t by Washington to a harder policy could also be felt in other
areas of foreign policy. Under the leadership of the United States
NATO representatives stymied the negotiations in Vienna on a mutual
reduction of armed forces and weapans in central Europe. The achieve-
ment of progress in this field was not regarded as a more pressing
task in Western capitals. Pressure within the United States under
the leadership of Senator Mansf ield for a unilateral withdrawal of
American divisions from the European continent was replaced by a
campaign led by Senator Nunn to strengthen America's military presence
on the other side of the Atlantic. The West European members of NATO,
in their. turn, now favored a greater coordination of military policy
Uy the participants in the block and agreed to a more even division of
defense expenditures and an annual increase in military budgets. This
was supposed to provide financial support for their collective programs _
to increase their forces and modernize their weapons on the pretext
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of "counteracting" a mythical increase in the "threat" from the Warsaw
Pact and, first of all, the Soviet Union.46
The situation in the Near and Middle East also changed. Zn order to
- compensate for its collapsed hopes of making its inf luence felt in
Angola, the United States put diplomatic pressure upon Cairo in order
to rupture its cooperation with the USSR. In the spring of 1976
President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, having been tempted by promises of
economic and military aic~ from the West and by a promise of American
mediation in setCling the conflict with Israel, commited an unprinci-
pled and short-sighted political act. He broke off a treaty of
friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, erasing the many years
of support by the USSR with unsubstantiated claims and slanders. From
. that moment on, with the encouragment of Washington, Sadat openly took
the path of making separate deals with Tel Aviv, of undermining Arab
unity, and of torpedoing the Geneva Conference on a just peace in the
Middle East. In the neighborhood of this area, in the oil-rich Persian
Gulf, the TJnited States was attempting to strengthen its influence by
seeking support in the right-wing monarchist regimes of Saudi Arabia
and Iran, and it supplied them with an enormous quantity of modern
weapons worth many billions of "petroleum dollars." Washington gave
especial encouragement to the hegemonist pretensions in the region of
the reactionary Shah's government of Iran and to its police actions
against the national liberation movement in the Arab world and its
pro-Israeli foreign policy.
In order to review America's "military needs" at the new stage and,
consequently, its planned weapons programs, and also its approach to
- the SALT negotiations in Geneva, in August the White House sanctioned
the organization of an independent committee for the study of military
problems at the highest level the so-called "Group B." It was
provided with secret information and the right to dispute the positions
of government intelligence agencies. "The main quality which was
requircd fo~ membership in Group B," a jourza7.ist ~.:..~~C, "w~~ n
pessemistic view o� the 5oviet Union's intentions."47 The group was
headed by figures whose reputation in this respect was beyond any
doubts: Richard Pipes the we11-known "Sovietologist" from Harvard,
Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, the former director of the Pentago*~'s intelli-
gence agency, and again the same Paul Nitse.
- As was to be expected, the conclusions of the study by "Group B" por-
trayed frightening pictures of the USSR's military "superiority" on
all weapons levels and almost in all of the strategic areas of the
world. An informa.tion "leak" about the conclusions of "Group B" was '
immediately arranged �or the press; this was the work of Ma3. Gen.
George Keegan, the former intelligence chief of the Air Force. For
many years he had come out against the estimates of American intelligence,
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accusi.ng it of "playing down the Soviet threat." The infromation
- "leak" about the "Group B" study served as yet another pretext for an
anti-Soviet campaign which was begun by Jackson and his supporters in
Cnngress, and also by the press and right-wing political circles. This
campaign placed an even deeper anti-Soviet tone on the domestic political
polemics of the United States just at the time of the elections. The
conclusions of "Groug B" were also reflected in the long-term measures
of the Ford Administration. In November 1976 a decision zaas made to
_ accept the "P-1" for service, and it was planned to equip it with winged
missiles.
The military budget for the 1978 fiscal year the last budget which
was made up under the Republicans provided for another substantial
increase in military appropriations and reached 123 bill.ion dollars.48 -
These enormous sums included monies to increase the effectiveness of
ballistic missiles, speed up the development of winged missiles, far
full-scale design work on the "M-X" system, for the development of a
design of the "Trident 2" sea missile, the series proclu;:tion and
deployment of the "B-1" bombers, and the construction of the seventh
"Trident" missile submarine (their total number accordin~; to the plan
was broadened to 1.6). Appropriations were also made for expansion and
modernization American land forces and tactical avlation and to
strengthen the United States Seventh Army in the FRG. Major programs
were stipulated for an expansion of the Navy (the construction of 140
ships and subtnarines during the following five years) and for the
construction of a gigantic new aircraft carrier and an atomic-power
driven missile cruiser. It was planned to reequip the Navy ~vith
tactical winged missiles of the "Aarpoon" type, and later also with
- "Tomahawk" missiles, to develop anti-subma.rine defense, and so forth.
Under the heading of appropri.ations for the Atomic Energy Commission,
there were secret funds for the creation of a new inhuman type of
weapon of mass destruction neutron warheads with increased radia- -
tion.~9
But Washington's measures "under the curtain" of the Repiiblic Adminis-
tration which were undertaken under pressure from militarist groups
within the country did not bring President Ford his desired victory in
- the November 1976 elections. A nwnber of American specialists believed
that one of the reasons for his defeat consisted precisely in the fact
that he wanted too much to remain in the presidency, devoted an exces-
sive amount of attention to changea.ble domestic political conditions,
and tried to please all influenti~l groups and, first of all, the
noisiest anti-Soviet circles and the demogogic champions of streng-
thening America's "defense capacity." For the sake of this Ford was
ready to waive the fundamental issues of national security, progress
in detente, and weapons limitations. Later, when the dust of the
election battles had settled, doubts on this account began to be
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expressed even by the leaders of the President's election campaign:
Perhlps, it had not been worthwhile to follow the lead of Reagan,
Jackson, and Nitse and to squander President Ford's political reputation
in tactical maneuvers? Would it not have been wiser to take a principled
line, to sign the SALT agreement, and to defend it to the end? Perhaps
this would have been just the thing to strengthen the President's
authority, to demonstrate his ability to firmly defend his policy,
regardless of domestic political trends and costs, and would have
ensured him the victory in the elections?
But what sense is there in belated regrets! The political zigzags of
the Ford Administration did not lead to its success in November 1976,
but prevented a very important step from being taken in restraining
the arms race in the face o� dangerous tendencies in the development
of nuclear missile potentials. Leaving after eight years in office,
the Republic government left behind a very contradictory heritage in
the field of foreign policy. The relaxation of tensions had entered
a period of serious trials and progress in Soviet-American relations
had slowed down greatly compared with tt?e beginning of the 1970s. The
new agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons "hung in the air."
The tremendous potentials for destruction continued to weigh on the
world, threatening a catastrophic devastation, and the next generation
of death-dealing strategic equipment born in the depths of the military-
industrial complex was approaching. Tendencics toward strengthening -
the armed forces of NATO began t~ prevail over the endeavor by the
North Atlantic partners to lessen the burden of the arms race and
lower the level of military confrontation in central Europe. Within
the capitalist states and, above a11 in the United States, the pressure
of the anti-militarist opposition definitely gave way to the onslaught
of the adherents of increasing military might and of a policy "from
the position of strength."
Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to see only negative tendencies
in the second half of the 1970s. During the preceeding years the
relaxation of tensions had become a reality of international relations
which sprung from the objective interests of states with different
social systems in peaceful coexistence and the prevention of a thermo-
nuclear war. The positive changes were so deep that they began to
be perceived as something given and were less noticeable than the
various new complications in the international situation or the changes
in the domestic political climate in the United States. The Soviet
specialist 0. N. Bykov has rightly observed in this connection that
"the develo*~ment of American foreign policy in 1976 showed that the
complicating influence of the domestic political situation was to a
great extent compensated for b.y the influence of the entire interna-
tional situation whose chief feature remained the rela.xation of tension
and a deepening of peaceful coexistence between states with different
social systems."50
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In the fiel.d of strategic weapons, although there had been a postpone-
ment of the long-term agreement, the soil on which this agreement could
, be reached had been preserved. The Soviet-American agreements of
1972-I974 had substantially decreased the vagueness and dyna~ism of
the nuclear balance and had limited a number of dangerous directions
of the arms race. In and oF themselves, the negotiations hetween the
USSR and the United States on these issues of paramount importance
had become an important stabilizing factor in Soviet-Am~~rican relations.
Despite a11 of the difficulties which had been encountered it~ them,
the SALT negotiations had turned into a very large sphere of co~on
interests between the two great powers and an already well-worn and
promising path for solving the most difficult problems of security
in tlle nuclear age.
Within the United States, although the militarists stuUb.ornly attempted
to wi.n back their lost positions, the situation remained far from
- their ideal. The doctrine of "nuclear superiority" had lost its attrac-
tiveness in the eyes of the broad public and of a detinite section of
the ruling circles. The principle of "strategic equilibriwn" with
the Soviet Union became officially recognized. In the minds of most
Americans the SALT agreements had in the past few years turned into a
legitimate and preferable way to ensure "national security." It is
significant that even those domestic groups which in fact were trying
to obtain one-sided military advantages for the United States wPre
now compelled to publicly justify their requests by the needs of
"parity" or "essential equality." T'he military-industrial complex
w~s coming up against the necessity of taking account of the restric-
tive measures which had been agreed upon or discussed at the Soviet-
American negotiations. Henceforth, it had to reconcile itself with
the loss of its monopoly over the determination of policy in the sphere
of development and deployment of weapons. Under the pressure of Congress
and of public opinion, some programs were slowed down, others were
postponed, and certain others were completely eliminated.
_ As was later emphasized by L. I. Brezhnev, in contrast to the late
1960s, "detente today is not a theory, not a slogan, and not a wel].-
intentioned wish. It has to its credit quite a few good deeds which
are entirely concrete and palpable. In Europe it has been at the basis
of relationships between states and has embraced various aspects of
their life. And despite all kinds of fluctuating conditions, Soviet-
American relations now have a new look, one which is more favorable for
the cause of peace."Sl The enormous responsibility of the moment was
explained by the fact that as a result of the successes of detente
during the first half of the 1970s broad possibilities were opening
up for further progress in the negotiations, for a limitation of military
rivalry, and for the strengthening of universal security. On the other -
hand, this path was being threatened with blockage by large obstacles
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in the form of the arms race, the activization of aggressive imperialist
circles, and an exa.cerbation of international conFlicts and contradic-
tions. And this responsib.ility would have to be taken upon itself by
the new Administration which came to power in the United States in 1976.
3. The Difficult Road to Salt-II
_ "The lessons of the past which have been learned by us can become a
- basis for a fundamental improvement of the prospects for peace in the
world and for the successful solution of internat~onal problems."52
This wish was expressed in May 1.97~ ~n Tokyo by a guest from the United
States. The Governor from the state of Georgia, James Carter. Probably
not many people could have forseen at the time that less than two
years later he would he given the opportunity to demonstrate his
understanding of the lessons of history and to make his own contribution
to international relations from the President's office in the White
House.
On 20 January 1977 the 39th President of the United States, James E.
Carter, took a solemn oath and a Democratic Administration came into
power. This occurred under circumstances which were very unusual for
the history of America after World War II: despite the difficulties
of the situation in the world and within the United States, the main
parties of America's ruling class replaced one another at the helm of
state for the first time when American troops were not conducting
military operations abroad and when there was no acute international
crisis invelving direct opposition between the leading nuclear powers.
A long series of major political agreements between states. with
different social systems and a number of important agreements on
restrainirtg the arms race which had been reached in the first half of
the 1970s made up a solid base for a further strengthening of world
security and for the expansion of mutually advantageous international
cooperation. And the chief task here was the conclusion of a long-
term treaty between the USSR and the United States limiting strategic
offensive weapons,and progress in other directions of military detente.
It has to be said that the speeches made by Jimmy Carter during the
election campaign contained quite a few statements and proposals on
the problems of military detente. He set himself the final goal of
"reducing nuclear weapons to zero," while in the more immediate future
his goal was to achieve "radical reductions" in strategic weapons at
the SALT negotiations, to bring about a complete halt to nuclear tests,
_ and to effectively put a stop to the spread of nuclear arms. The
Democratic Party's candidate also committed himself to strive to lower
the level of conventional forces and weapons and of military and weapons
trade, promised to withdraw American forces from South Korea and to
conclude an agreement on holding back the militarization of the Indian
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Ocean, and announced his intention to reduce American military expendi-
tures by 5 billion dollars.53
However, the Democratic Administration's practical politics during
Carter's first two years in the White House not only left most of the
President`s election commitmer~ts in this field unfulfilled, but in
many cases even led to complications in the international situation
and created additional difficulties for detente and limiting the arms
race, including in the chief sphere at the Soviet-American SALT
negotiattons. Moreover, the Carter government's line in these negotia-
tions were inFluenced more tangibly than ever before by the domestic
political situation in the United States. On the other hand, Washing-
ton's policy in the SALT area was experiencing an extensive influence
from the rc~view of American fareign policy which was taking place and
was being worked out in direct connection with the leadership's
decisions regarding nuclear missile programs.
Even before the formal acceptance of its authority by the Democratic
government, the military-industrial complex and American an;.i-Soviet
circles began an offensive aga:.nst the policy of detente, attempting
not to lose the initiative which had been seized by them during the
election campaign and attempting from the very beginning of the new
administration's work to create the kind of domestic political situa-
tion in the United States in which the achievement of Soviet-American
agreements would become even more difficult, i.f not impossible. The
opponents of detente were at first disturbed by some of Carter's
election statements and by the composltion of the new government which
had enlisted certain figures who were well-known from their public
statements for their support of SALT. They included, in particular,
Secretary of State C. Vance, the Director of the Armaments Control and
Disarmament Agency P. Warnke (concerning whose approval by Congress
the mi~itarists gave the Administration its first battle), and to a
certain extent even the Secretary of Defense H. Brown, who had taken
direct part in the SALT negotiations in 1969-1972.
The so-called "Committee on the Existing Danger" which was formed in
November 1976 and was made up of a~most 200 representatives of pro-
militarist, and reactionary public organizations became the most
important base of support and coordinating center of the campaign
against detente. The "Committee's" executive director P. Campbell
was a confidant of Senators Jackson and Moynihan, and its other out-
standing activists included the already mentioned P. Nitse, D. Packard,
D. Rusk, W. Rostow, and J. Connolly.54 This organization, as its very
name testifies, was created with the direct purpose of inciting hysteria
about the growth of an imaginary "Soviet threat" and of putting pressure
on American leaders in favor of whipping up the arms race and rejecting
agreements with the Soviet Union. The "Comtt~ittee" and supporters also
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made use in their own interests of the crisis of confidence in the
American Executive Branch after Vietnam and Watergate which was
expressed in an offensive b.y the Capitol, the press, and diverse domes-
tic pressure groups on the perogatives of the White House with regard
to ttie problems of ~he economy and of foreign and military policy. In
- the end, the opponents of detente succeeded in creating in Congress a
serious and be]:~igerentopposition to a new SALT treaty.
At the same time, despite the importance of the influence of the domestic
situation on the Administration's course in the field of strategic
weapons, a large role was played in the first two years of Carter's
presidency by the approach of the political leadership itself to the
foreign policy of the United States in which the attitude of American
ruling circles as a whole to the events on the international arena and
to the interests and tasks of the United States abroad during the late
1970s was reflected. And, incidentally, it was precisely these views
which made it possible for the campaign by anti-Soviet groups to become
such an influential factor in Washington's foreign policy. The leitmotiv
of the mood of the American ruling class was a serious anxiety in the
face of a further change in the global balance of power in favor of
socialism and to the detriment of the imperialist policy of "from a
position of strength" and of an aggressive intervention in the affairs
of other peoples. The acute economic and social and political problems
of capitalism and the powerful upsurge of the national liberation
- movement which swept over many countries of the Near and Middle East
and of Africa and Latin America caused great disturbance among the
ruling circles of the West. One after another reactionary regimes which
had recently represented a faithful bulwark for the United States were
collapsing.
The Carter Administration set itself the task of mobilizing the West's
resources in order to consolidate imperialism's international positions
in the economic, political, military, and ideological spheres, and
also to ensure more advantageous conditions for itself in the negotia-
tions with the socialist commonwealth and with developing countries. _
As followed from the official statements from the President and his
~
Assistant for National Security Z. Brzezinski, as a result of the re-
evaluation of Washington`s foreign policy priorities, relations between
the United States and its imperialist partners the countries of
Western Europe and Japan were put in first place. Relations with
the developing countries whose raw materials and resources were pJ.aying
an increasing role in the economy of capitalism were allotted second
place. And relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries and the relaxation of tensions were only in third place. In =
addition, the "human rights" campaign in accordance with which the '
American leadership appropriated the right to intervene in the internal
affairs of other c~untries, proclaiming with messianic ardor
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"America's ideals are the ideals of all of mankind" was elevated
to the rank of government policy.55 ~
In and of itself this kind of approach to the foreign policy priorities
of the United States did not p romote progress in political and military
detente because, above all, th e mair~ problem of contemporary interna-
tional relations the prevention of a nuclear war was moved to the -
backgr.ound. In addition, in p ractice the fulfillment of the tasks which
had been named top-priority ones frequently was planned to the detri- .
ment of the interests of the USSR and the other socialist countries.
For example, with regard to th e unification of the West which had
encountered great difficulties in the coordination of the economic
policies of the imperialist co untries Washington began to put increasing
emphasis on strengthening NATOts military potential. At the London
(1977) and Washington (1978) me etings of the leaders of the countries
of the North Atlantic Bloc, th e United States and its partners adopted
a commitment to increase real military expenditures by 3 percent annually,
and long-term (ten to fifteen years) collective programs were worked
out for increasing and modernizing NATO's armed forces at a total
cost of 80 to 90 billion dollars. This course, of course, worsened the
prospects of the negotiations in Vienna on reducing the militaxy con-
frontation in Western Europe and since it was being conducted under the
cover of a mass campaign concerning a growth of the "Soviet threat" it
was having a negative effect upon the European as well as upon the
- international political climate as a whole.
With respect to the developing countries, America's policy, along with
economic pressure, included an intensification of the opposition to
the national liberation movement by political and military methods and
attempts to undermine the inf luence of the Soviet Union which was based
on disinterested aid to progressive forces. In the Near East, after
having rejected an all-embracing and just peace settlement by means of
the Geneva mechanism, Washington took the route of imposing a separate
Israeli-~gyptian deal. In Rho desia and Namibia, the United States
provided comprehensive assistance to the treacheraus conspiracy of the
comprador elite of the black majority and the white racists. Contrary
to Carter's election commitments, the diplomatic maneuvers were accom-
panied by a sharp increase in military supplies for Iran, Israel,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, South Korea, and other countries. Mean-
while, the arms trade was comb ined with direct military pressure (an
example the shifting of an aircraft carrier unit during the revolu-
tion in Iran in the fall of 19 78), by the threat to land forces on
the oil fields of the Persian Gulf, and by the transportation of French
and Belgian parachutists for th e purpose of military intervention in
Zaire province of Shaba (May 19 78). And all of this was also done, of
course, to the accompaniment of heightened official rhetoric regarding
"Soviet-Qibanintervention in th e Third World."
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Nor were Soviet-American relations helped by the attempts of t~~.e
Democratic Administration to play the "China card" and to use the estab -
lisment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China for
pressure on the Soviet Union, and by its encouragement of aggressive
hegemonistic pretensions of the Peking leadership which came to power
after Mao Tse Tung's death. The widely advertised development of
economic relations betGreen the United States, Western Europe, Japan,
and the Chinese People's Republic was accompanied by plans by America`s
allies, with Washington's approval, to deliver weapons to China. The
development of such a course which was covered up by considerations of
"detente in Asia" and of simple "commerce" in fact posed a threat to
the relaxation of tensions in general and to the negotiations to restrain
military rivalries.
- After the new Administration's coming to power the shift hy the United
- States to harder positions als.o revealed itself directly in Soviet-
American relations. It was expressed in an unceremonious intervention
by the American leadership in *_he internal affairs of the Soviet Union
under the pretext of defending so-called "human rights" in the USSR,
by a ban on a number of trade deals, and by loud accusations against
the Soviet Union for an "excessive growth" of its military potenti_al
and for its assistance to the national liberation movement. Despite
constructive proposals by the Soviet side, through the fault of
Washington a blind alley was reached in the negotiations on the complete
prohibition of nuclear tests, on limiting military activities in the
Indian Ocean, and on limiting weapons trade. Returning to the politics
of "coupling," President Carter stated in June 1978 that the Soviet
Union's support of Ethiopia in defending it against direct foreign
_ aggression would make reaching an agreement in the SALT negotiations
difficult. This line reached its apogee in the speech by the President
of the United States in Annapolis in the summer of 1978 where he -
declared: "The Soviet Union may choose either confrontation or coopera-
tion. Z'he United States is equally prepared for both."56 This
statement, however, should. have been addressed to the United States
itself. The Soviet Union had long ago and irrevocably made its choice -
i.n favor of detente, but, as can be seen, the American leadership,
despite Carter's election declarations, had not yet learned the lessons
of history sufficiently well. It would have to learn from its own
~ mistakes and failures.
And this manifested itself in its most concentrated form in Washington's
military policies which were connected in the closest way with the =
Democratic Administration's course at the SALT nego~iations. The review
of United States military policy which had been begun by the new govern-
ment was expressed first of all in an increased emphasis on general
purpose American armed forces. Recommendations regarding this were
contained in the well-known document "PRN-10" which was prepared on
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instructions from Carter by an interdepartmental group as an analytical
base for reevaluating American strategic tasks and plans. Especial
emphasis was put on increasing the combat capacity of American forces
deployed on the European continent and of those designated for transfer
there from the United States, on improving air and sea transportation,
and on training an expeditionary corps consisting of army and infantry
divisions for intervention in other areas of the world, ubove all, in
the Persian Gulf. This tendency had already revealed itself in the
amendments to the military budget for the 1978 fiscal year which were -
proposed by the administration in early 1977 and according to which a
certain reduction in appropriations for strategic programs and the
Navy was accompanied b.y an increase in monies for the American Infantry
and Air ~'orce in Western Europe. In his first budget report in February
1978 ttie Secretary of Defense H. Brown emphasized: "Despite the fact
that we have to devote attention to our nuclear forces both strategic
and tactical, it is n~w generally recognized that the conventional
forces of the United States and its ailies merit at least the same, and
at the present moment, in my opinion, even greater ef_forts."57
At the same time, the Pentagon was taking measures to change not only
the balance of conventional forces but also of tactical nuclear forces
in favor oF NATO. This was ~onnected with published pXans for creating
and siting in Western Europe a new barbarian type of weapon of mass -
destruction neutron bomhs with intense penetrating radiation specifi-
cally designed for the more effective destruction of human be.ings. These
plans, as is known, met with such wide indignation and opposition from
world public opinion that they were to a certain extent reviewed and
postponed by Washington.
In the field of strategic nuclear weapons the new Administration began
a d.efinite reorganization of its predecessor's policies. The plans
for the forced renewal of all three components of the nuclear missile
triad which had been adopted in the last years of the Ford Administration
came up against serious financial and technical difficulties despite
the fact that, contrary to Carter's election commitments, the Pentagon's
budget was continually increasing (on the basis of the request for
the 1979 fiscal year it had reached the record level of 126 billion
dollars). Because of economic and technical complications the "Trident"
program continued to lag behind schedule, although large financial
- injections were given to it. Substantial problems also arose with the
program for the development of mobile "M-X" intercontinential ballistic
missiles, especially with the method of basing them, as a result of
which the schedule for deploying the new system was postponed from 1983
to 1986. Finally, in June 1977 a decision was made to temporarily
stop the production and deployment of the new "B-1" bombers in connec-
tion with the enormous cost and insufficient strategic expediency of
th is system.58
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The Democratic Administration attempted to compensate for the forced
delay ing and cancellation of cer tain programs with an acceleration of
o ther strategic programs which were supposed to increase the "suita-
bility" and effectiveness of the American nuclear potential. In
particular, it was decided to b egin to install new "counter-force"
"~IK-12A" nosecones with more powerful and accurate warheads of the
"MIRV" type on the "riinuteman-3" missiles in October 1977, and not in
1978 as had originally been planned.59 In January 1977 the Department
of ~Defense approved the acceleration of the development of the cruise
- missiles of the "ALSM" type for the "B-52" heavy bombers, and there
was a substantial increase in th e appropriations for this program.
Full-scale tests of the sea-based cruise missile of the "T~mahawk"
type also began in February 1957. On 20 June of thar year, off the
coast of California, this mi~sile was launched for the first time from
a subm~~rged submarine.60 The forced development of still an.other
variant of an airborne cruise, missile and a mobile land-base~i winged
missile of the "ALSM" type began on the basis of the "Tomahawk" system.
On 18 January 1977 the new "Trident-1" ballistic missile which was
designed as equipment for the s trategic submarines of the 1980s was
launched for the first time from the testing gr~unds on Cape Canaveral.
There wasa continuation of the programs to inerease the accuracy of
land and underground ballistic missiles, of research to create a new
missile-carrying airplane, of th e development of the next generation of
cruise missiles ("ASALM"), the improvement of guidance and control for
the s trategic forces, and the creation of anti-satellite space systems.61
Thus, contrary to the statements of certain Western specialists, the
strategic arms race in the United States did not slow down, but continued
at rapid rates, while in a numb er of dangerous directions it even
accelerated. This course by the military-industrial comp:.ex was offi-
cially justified through an increased emphasis on the conceptions of
"guaranteed destruction" and "equality in essence," althaugh the idea
of "strategic flexibility" was also confirmed by the Secretary of
_ Defense H. Brown. "As one of the aspects of this flexibility," he
stated, "we have to have the capacity to inflict controlled counter-
b lows against a wide range of targets, including the enemy's tactical
nuclear and conventional forces, his communications systems, his defense
_ indus try installations, and high ly protected targets from take-off
strips to nuclear warhead warehouses, and from co~nand bunkers to
intercontinental ballistic miss ile launching shafts."62
But f irst the American approach to the SALT negotiations was subjected
to an even more radical reevaluation. As early as his election campaign
Carter had r_riticized ~he 1974 Vladivostok agreement because it allegedly
had placed "too few" restrictions on the strategic arsenals of the two
powers. After having become established in Washington, the Democratic
Administration undertook a frank revision of the Vladivostok principles.
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- And although in words this step was justified by considerations having
to do with "morc radical" reductions in strategic weapons and the
~ strengthening of the "stability" of the nuclear balance, in reality
the new American leadership had made an attempt to berter tailor the
_ SAL1' agreement to American military programs and plans, withou~ regard
to the legitimate defense interests of the Soviet Union and to the
. agreed upon principles. of equality and equal se;:urity of both sides.
.
At tt7~~ end of March 1977, during the conrse of a visit to the USSR
hy the United States Secretary of State C. Vance, the .American side
. put Eorward a new plan for a so-called "all-embracing" SALT agreement.b3
In accordance taith it, the total number of strategic weapons car.riers
would be reduced to 1800 to 2,C~0 units, whila the number of ballistic
missi ?~s with detachable nuse cones would be reduced to 1100 to 1200 -
ii.f-ercontinental ballistic mis~iles and BRPL [subm;3.rine miss:iles~. But
' no consideration at all was given to American advance-b.ased nuclear
weapons whose role and proportion in the military balance o.� power
would have undergone a substar. tial increase with such a reduction in the
_ overall levels of strategic nuclear weapons carriers. In addition, the
'~nited States demanded that the number of Soviet missiles wlli.ch, in
that country were called "too heavy" or "overly effective," be cut in
half. At ttie same time, no limitations were provided on the scope of
the deployment of American winged missiles whose number could reach
- many thousands. Finally, it was planned that a review Ue made of the -
. right of both sides to modernize their missile forces in such a way
: that the Soviet Union would he in a worse position, while most o� the
- United State's military programs such as "Trident" and the "MK-12A" could
continue unimpeded (with the exception of the "M-X" system which had
been held up at an early development stage and which it was planned to
cancel).
In addition to this "all embracing proposal, " Vance put for.ward an
alternative "narrow proposal." In accor.dance with it, it was proposed
_ to co:~c.lude a SALT treatv on the basis of the Vladivostok agreement and
to le~ive out cr.uise missiles and the Soviet bomber called the "Backfire."
For this "concession" to the Soviet Union which permitted it to have
outside of the framework of the agreement medium-range airplanes which
in general were unrelated to the subject of the negotiations, the
United States tried to stipulate for itself the right to an unlimited
increase in its strategic weapons (which is what, in essence, the
winged missiles being developed in the United States were) along a new
channel, possibly an even broader one.
It is completely obvious that the plans for a SALT treaty which were
presented by the American leadership in March 1977 were unacceptable for
the USSR. In this connection, the member of the Politburo oi the CC CPSU
_ and rlinister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union A. A. Gromyko
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stated at a press conference~ "'~le United States representative, Mr.
Vance, has characterized his proposals ab.out which I spoke above as the
basis for a broad and a11-embracing agreement. However, af ter an ob~ec-
tive examina tion of these proposals it is not diff.icult to draw the
conclusion that they pursue the goal of one-sided advantages for the
United States to the detriment of the Soviet Union and its security
and the sec urity of our allies and friends. The Soviet Un~on wi11 never
be able to accept this. "64
After Secretary of State Vance's unsuccessful visit the tlm~rican
leadership took another step which was harmful for the negotiations:
It publicly revealed the essence of its SALT proposals and accused
the USSR of a"lack of desire to reach an agreement." Subsequently,
this created the possibility for attacks anthe negotiations by the
opponents of SALT who created a fuss about the waiving of any of
America's deliberately unacceptable proposals which had been made in
March 1977, stigmatizing it as a"capitulation to the Russians," or
as a one-sided "concession." It is characteristic that even some _
American specialists noted the unrealistic nature of the Carter Admini-
stration's p osition in early 1977. Thus, the authoritative specialist
and former National Security Assistant to President Kennedy M. Bundy
note~: "Th e Carter Administration...has become convinced from its own
e:cperience that it is one thing to believe in radical reductions and _
- quite anoth er thing to compel the Soviet Union to agree to them on
terms which Americans like. The radical American proposals_ in March
1977 which were categorically rejected by the Soviets and rapidly and
wisely removed (by the United States) should serve as a reminder of
the great d istance between hopes and reality."65
'I'he change in Washington's position in the field of SALT and the Demo-
cratic Administration's return to reality had already begun in mid
- 197i; however, the path to a new treaty occupied around two more years
and demanded great efforts from both sides. In addition, the evolution
of the Amer ican leadership's approach to a limitation of strategic
weapons occurred notonly under the influence of the lessons of March
_ 1977, but a lso under the influ~nce of the general situation on the
world arena and of the problems and difficulties which were encountered
by the Carter government's foreign policy.
Without men tioning the continuing deepening of energy, trade, and cur-
rency diff iculties, in the relations between the United States and its
imperialist partners, the Uemocratic Administration's line aimed at a
hardening of policy ~aith regard to the USSR and its "human ra.ghts"
campaign and economic sanctions not only did not encounter unanimous ~
support in Western Europe but gave rise to serious concern in the FRG,
France, and other states and impelled them to conduct a more indepen-
dent policy in the field of a relaxation of tensions with the socialist
commonwealth. The question of siting neutron weapons in Europe gave .
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rise to substant:ial dis.agreements. among the North Atlantic allies and
a wish to place the responsib.ility upon one another. for this act which
had elicieed active resistance from world public opinion.
In the Near East the Camp David deal did not lead to a settle?nent of the
crisis on the terms set b.y the United States, Israel, and Egypt; it -
was condemned by the vast majority of states in that region, and .
Cairo found itself in isolation in the Arab world. Despite Washington's
efforts, the national 1ib.er~tion movement in the south of Africa was
growing wider. In the beginning of 197~, as a result of a revolution
in Iran, the chief bulwark of American influence in the Persion Gulf
zone collapsed; a popular revolution against the dictatorship seized -
Nicaragua. Once again imperialism saw the collapse of its plan to
establish its dominion in strategically important areas of the deve-
loping countries by means of cultivating anti-popular, pro-western
regimes, supplying them with caeapons arsenals, and constructing regional
pacts to suppress the natior.al liberation movement. In February 1979
aggression against Vietnam whicli was begun by China with the connivance
of the West created the threat of a global crisis. It demonstrated
very c:learly that the playing of the "China card" by the United States
was turned by Peking into the playing of an "American card" and that
the encouragement of the great power hegemonistic pretensions of the
Peking leadership could lead to dangerous, unforseen, and uncontrollable
international consequences.
Finally the "human rights" campaign which was undertaken hy the United -
States government was discredited along many lines. Its falsity was
revealed in attacks upon the USSR, and its hypocracy was shown up in
the light of the trampling upon human rights in the United States itself
and also in connection with Washington's pragmatic support of dictator-
ships in Nicaragua and South Korea, the right-wing monarchist regimes
in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the racist governments of Sauth Africa -
and Rhodesia, and in the "forgiving of ths sins" of the repressive -
military bureaucratic system of China and of Pol Pot Cambodia. Permea-
ted by double standards, Washington's moralism encountered a f irm
rebuff from the socialist countries and did not find the ahsolute sup-
port which was expected �rom America's capitalist partners. In the
United States the government's campaign in defense of "~human rights"
was not able to become a base for bipartisan support for its policy
from the Capitol. The contradictions between the legislative and -
exec~itive branches continued on very important issues of the economy
and of foreign and military policy. Moreover, within the Administra-
ti~n itself there was substantial disagreement which, in particular,
showed up puhlicly between Secretary of State Vance and the President's
advisor for Soviet-American relations Brzezinski.
Under these conditions, as was emphasized by the Can3idate Member of
the Politburo of the CC CPSU and Secretary of the CC CPSU B. N. Ponomarev,
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"while giving a firm reply to the intrigues of the enemies of detente
and resolutely rejecting all attempts at intervention in our internal
affairs, the CC CPSU and the Communist Parties of the fraternal sociali.st
states have conducted patient political work in defense of what has
already been aciiieved during the course of. detente and for its further
development....In addition," he empha5ized,"the opponents of detente
are rebuffed in forms and actions which lead not to an exacerUation but
to an alleviation of tensions."66 The purposefulness of the Soviet
Union's policy was the chief factor which ensured the stabilization
- and further progress of Soviet-American relations during this difficult
period. Beginning approximately with the second half o~ 1978, S.
Hotfman observes, "to all appearances the Administration (Carter) was
dealing sufficiently well caith its confusion to put SAI,T at the top of
its priorities and conduct the negotiations in a calmer atmosphere."67
But the negotiations between the USSR and the United States continued to
be an exceptionally difficult process. For what was involved was a
limitation of weapons which comprised the heart of the military poten-
tials of the two states and the very basis of their deiense capacity
and the discussions revolved around extremely difficult and delicate
technical m9_litary questions which concerned a wide ran.ge nf security
- problems for the two powers and their allies. In addition, it was
necessary to find an acceptable balance for the interests of the
sides whose ideas concerning the concrete content of the principle of
- equality and equal security were substantially different. "It seems
that it is nice and easy to say the principle of equality and equal
security," A. A. Gromyko later explained. "It would seem that no one
will object against this principle. But it is another matter when
negotiations are being conducted and, moreover, on an exceptionally
important issue it is here that difficulties arise, and even great
difficulties. To the one side it seems that it is adhering to the
principle of equality and equal security; but the other thinks that it
is acting this way, and not the first side. And yet there is only one
truth."68 However, since both sides had the determination and the will
to bring the negotiations to a conclusion, a mutua.lly acceptable compro-
mise on the highly difficult problems was found, and a new treaty was
prepared for signing at the end of June 1979.
_ Zn Vienna, the cap~tal of Austria, on 15-18 July 1979 a meeting took
place between the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev and the President
of the United States J. E. Carter. It was marked by the conclusion of
a series of agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons between
the USSR and the United States which, as a whole, was given the name
SALT-II. Four documents were signed in Vienna: A Treaty between the
USSR and the United States on the limitation of strategic offensive
weapons, a protocol for it, a joint Statement on the principles and basic ~
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directions of aubsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic
weapons, and also the document "Agreed Upon Statements and General
Understandings in Connection with the Treaty Between the USSR and the
United States on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons."
The essence of the Treaty69 amounted, above all, to the establishment
of equal quantitative ceilings on the strategic nuclear forces of the
two powers. In accordance with them, when the Treaty came into effect,
each of the sides would tie obliged to limit its intercontinental and
BRPL launchers, heavy bombers,* and also air-based ballistic missiles
of ttie "Air-Land" class (BRVZ) to a total not exceeding 2400 units.
Both sides would co~it themselves to limit these types of s.trategic
offensive weapons beginning 1 January 1981 to a total of no more than .
2,250 and would begin to eliminate those weapons which on that date
were above this level. In addition, within the limits of this total
amount an overall level of 1,320 units was established for launchers
for intercontinental ballistic missiles and BRP~L and DRVZ with indivi-
dually targeted detachahle nose cones, and also for heavy bombers
equipped with winged miss.iles with a range of more than 600 lcilometers.
Within this level a ceiling of 1200 units was agreed upon for launchers
for inter~ontinental ballistic missiles and BRPL and also for DRVZ
equipped with the RGCh system; Moreover, lauachers for intercontin-
ental ballistic missiles with multi-warhead nose cones were not to ~
- exceed 820 units.. Finally, both sides would commit themselves not to
- create any additional fixed intercontinental ballistic missile launchers
and not to relocate them into other areas.
The Treaty also contains a large number of qualitative limitations on
strategic weapons, including the following conunitments: not to re-
equip the launciiers for the light intercontinental ballistic missiles
and intercontinental ballistic missiles of the o1d types which were
deployed in 1964 into new heavy type intercontinental ballistic missile
launchers; not to increase the amount of underground launchers by more _
than 32 percent; not to create new intercontinental ballistic missiles -
of heavy types which exceed the existing heavy ones in lauT.iching weight
and throw weight; and not to increase the number of warheads on existing
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The following is also prohibited:
to test and deploy new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
with the exception of one new type of light intercontinental ballistic
missile for each side with a number of warheads not exceeding ten; to
create new BRPL with more than 14 warheads; to create BRVZ with more than
*For the USSR this included the "Tupolev-95" and "Myasishchev" homhers,
and for the United States the "B-52" and "B-1" bomb.ers.
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10 warheads; to deploy cruise missiles on heavy bombers in excess of
28 on each bomb.er.**
In order to ensure the effectiveness. of the Treaty the sides~~ommit
themselves not to hypass, its regulations through any other state or tiy
any other means. The Treaty is to come into effect on the day when
ratification documents are exchanged and will remain in ef#ect until
31 December 1985; the verification of the ohservance of it is provided
by national control equip.ment.
In addition to the long-term Treaty a protocol to it with a.n effective
period until 31 December 1981 u~as signed. It also contains such
additional qualitative limitations. on strategic weapon~ as the commit-
ment by both sides not to deploy mobile light intercontinental ballistic
missile launchers and riot to carry out missile flight tests from them;
not to deploy winged missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometers
on sea- and land-based launchers, not to test such missiles with an
RGCh system, and not to test and deploy DRVZ.~~
In the joint Statement of the two powers a group of problems is
mapped out for discussion at the following, third stage of the negotia-
tions on a limitation of strategic weapons. First of a].1, the task is
set of reaching an agreement on a substantial reduction of the numbers
of strategic offensive weapons and on further qualitative restrictions
on nuclear missile weapon5, including restrictions on their moderniza-
tion and on the creation of new types of weapons, and also on the
solution of problems which were included in the protocol in the context
of the negotiations on the conclusion of a SALT-III treaty.~l
The documents were signed in Vienna are of great and multi-leveled
importance. First of all, as a further development of the 1972 Tempor-
ary Agreement, the SALT-II eqrial overall limitations cover not only _
sea- and land-based ballistic missile launchers, but also heavy
**The additional qualitative limi.tations provided for the USSR and the
United States to renounce: the delivery to areas where intercontinen-
tal ballistic missile launchers are deployed of ballistic missiles in
excess of normal needs and the creation of equipment for the rapid re-
loading of launchers; and the reequipping of land ballisCi_c missile
launchers of a different type into intercontinental hallistic missile
launchers. Both sides accept a commitment not to conduct tests of cruise
missiles and DRVZ from airplanes which are not heavy bombers, and not to
create launchersfor ballistic and cruise missiles in the oceans and
seas, and certain other types; n~t to create mobile launchers for heavy
intercontinental ballistic missiles and also heavy BRPL and DRVZ types,
and not to conduct tests and deploy air-based crua.s~ missiles with
detachable nose cones.
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bombers including those equipped with winged missiles, and also
establish limits for ballistic missiles equipped with detachab.le nose
cones. In addition, strategic staliility is consolidated in SALT-II
on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security for the
sides through a kind of codification of nuclear missile parity with
a certain lowering of the level of military equilibrium.
Strategic stability is also strengthened in another way - by means of
limiting a number of directions of the arms race which could increase
the capacity to destroy various components of strategic forces and -
increase the threat of a nuclear war, especially in a crisis situation.
A large role is played fiere by certain limitations on the modernization
of nuclear missile arsenals and the creation of new weapons systems
and by limits on increasing the number of nuclear warheads and deploying
winged missiles. Finally, the SALT-II Treaty greatly reduces vagueness
both with respect to the existing and to the future state of the
nuclear missile balance and thereb.y makes it possible to approach the
problems of military planning for many years in the future with greater
confidence and rationality, and it reduces to a certain extent additional
stimuli to the arms race. -
In a broad political sense the results of the Vienna Su?mnit Meeting
marked substantial progress in the development of Soviet-American
relations and in an improvement of the entire international climate.
The new treaty between the USSR and the United States on the central
issue of military deter.te can serve as an important stimulus to progress
on other fronts of the struggle for disarmament. We are speaking,
above all, about the conclusion of a treaty on a universal and complete
halt to nuclear tests, on the prohibition of certain other types of
weapons of mass destruction, and on a reduction of armed forces and
armaments in Central ~urope.
The SALT-II agreements are, of course, a complex balance of compromises
and, therefore, of the interests of both sides. As has been written
by the Marshal of the Soviet Union, Chief oF the General Staff of the
USSR Armed Forces, and First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense N. V.
_ Ogarkov, himself a past direct participant in the SAL'T negotiations,
the Vienna Treaty "not only erects definite barriers to a further
quantitative increase and qualitative improvement of a number of the
most destructive strategic weapons, but also lays the basi.s for decrea-
sing them....The Treaty...has a balanced character and accords equally
with the interests of both the USSR and the United States."72 In keeping
with this, along with limitations on certain directions of Soviet arma-
ments, the SALT-II Treaty tangibly affects a number of American military
programs. For example, there are important restrictions on the possible
scale of the deployment of air-based cruise missiles, since a limit of
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1,320 tinits is estahlished for ballistic missiles with mu].tiple
warheads. and for heavy bomhers with winged missiles, while the number
of the latter may not exceed the product of 28 times the number of
these airplanes. The ceiling of 1,200 balli~tic missiles equipped
with the RGCh system requires a slowing down in tfie construction of
"Trident" mis.sile sub~marines compared to the previously projected
rates, or, should the case b.e different, the removal of a correspon-
ding number of existing "Poseidon" and "Minuteman-III" missiles from
the arsenal. The terms of the protocol slow down the development of
new mobile land-based hallisti:c missiles and postpone the date for the
deployment of sea- and land-iiased winged missiles. As the United States
Secretary of Defense has stated, ttianks to SALT-II it is planned to
spend 2 to 3 billion dollars less every year than would have been spent
in the absence of the Treaty over a period of a number of subsequent
years.7~
The signing of the SALT-II Treaty at the Vienna Summit Meeting was met
with approval tiy world pub.lic opinion and by all of th~ progressive
peace-loving forces of mankind. It found fu11 support in the Soviet
- Union and in the fraternal socialist countries. Expressing the unani-
mous opinion of the Soviet people, tlie Politburo of the CC CPSU, the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers
~ noted in the decree "On the Results of the Meeting Between the General
Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairma.n of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet L. I. BrEZhnev and the President of the United States
J. Carter": "The full implementation of the document signed ir. Vienna ,
...would be a new stage in res.training the nuclear arms race and would
open the way tu an important reduction of armaments and to the realiza-
tion of our highest goal: a complete halt to the production arid the
elimination of stocks of nuclear weapons."74
In the United States of America the conclusion of the Vienna agreement
signified the entrance into a new and unprecedentedly acute stage of
the domestic struggle around Washington's policy in the field of
strategic weapons and United States foreign policy as a whole. Most of
- the American pub.lic and the realistically minded representatives of
the ruling circles of the United States (as of the countries of Western
Europe and Japan) came out in favor of ratification of the SALT-II
Treaty and of continued negotiations to limit the strategic arms race.
But the opponents of the new agreement also activated their efforts in -
order to foil the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate (for which
34 votes one-third of the Senate plus one would be enough), or
to "sew on to it" ammendments disturbing to the balanced character of -
SALT-II. The hearings of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee which
went on during the summer and fall of 1979 and then a general Senate
debate became the central arena for the stormy debates concerning the
ratification of SALT-II. Outside of the Capitol, an intense struggle
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between the supporter.s and opponents of the Vienna Treaty unfolded in
the American press and i.nvolved numerous public organizations and
broad political circles.
The opposition's attacks on the new SALT Treaty were organized in
several directions. First of all, it wa~ said that the Soviet-flmerican
agreement allegedly grant "one-sided advantages" to the USSR, in
particular with regard to heavy type intercontinental ballistic missiles,
and that they allegedly made it possible for the Soviet Union to acquire
in the early 1980s the potential for a"disarming strike" against
American land-based intercontinental missiles.75 Meanwhile, and this
was pointed out hy the defenders of the SALT-II, the concrete terms of
tt~e agreement reflect the objective characteristics of the nuclear
missile arsenals of the two powers. Moreover, the5e characteristics
are carefully balanced in the new agreement in accordance with the
principle of equality and equal security for the sides. In the 1960s
and 1970s the United States dEliberately made a choice in favor of
maintaining extensive sea-based missile forces and a large fleet of
heavy bombers, put the emphasis of deployment of detachable warheads
on most of its submarine missiles, and made plans to equip its long-
range aviation with winged missiles. Even from the point of view of
elementary logic it is quite natural that in the ceilings on strategic
carriers and launchers with RGCh which are equal for the two powers
disproportions in favor of one side in certain components of its nuclear
forces have to be compensated by disproportions in other aspects which
favor the opposite side.
As for the statements ab.out the future increased vulnerability of
American land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, even without
considering the question of the actual validity of such a forecast, an
artificial isolation of only one element of America's strategic triad
from the overall picture of the military balance is completely unjusti-
fied. Since only 26 percent of the nuclear warheads in America's stra-
tegic arsenal is concentrated on silo-based missiles, even the most
_ pessimistic calculations of an increase in vulnerability do not allow
one to speak of the vulnerability of the majority of its nuclear missile
potentia1.76 In this connection, commenting upon the totallq theoretical
character of the problem of the vulnerability of American "Minuteman"
forces, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director of the ACDA
[U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agencyj has emphasized. "Since it was
ass umed that th e potential vulnerability of our land missiles would take
place over a period of many years, we have distributed our strategic forces
approximately equally among len~, submarine,_ and air carriers and we are
continuing to modernize each component of the triad....Thanks to SALT -
the maintenance of a stable strategic balance will be less difficult,
less expensive, and less risky."~~
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The opponents of the Vienna Treaty also attempted to prove that by
c~nsolidating~Soviet-American strategic parity at lower levels the
new SALT agreements would undermine America's nuclear guarantees in
- NATO and allegedly weaken the security of America's allies. In refuting
these inventions, realistic-minded leaders pointed out that the treaty
- between the USSR and the United States takes full accuunt of the inter-
ests of both powers' allies. It is completely obvious that SALT-II
strengthens the security of America's partners and also of all other -
countries, since it limits the arms race in the field of the most
destructive weapons of destruction, promotes progress in military
_ detente in a central sphere, and decreases the threat of global war.
Of considerable importance in this respect was the active support for
the SALT-II Treaty by the governments of France, the FRG, Great Britain,
Japan, and other states which in effect removed the ground from the
various insinuations by the opposition within the United States.
In addition to their attempts to cast slurs upon the essential positive -
significance of the Vienna agreements, the enemies of detente also
resorted to the tactic of dragging out the SALT-II debates in order
to postpone its ratification as long as possible on the eve of the
1980 presidential elections. They hoped to create a domestic political
atmosphere during the election campaign which would be unfavorable for
the approval of the Soviet-American agreement. Toward ttiis end, for -
example, a sensation was created concerning the appearance of a mythi- _
ca1 Saviet military unit in Cuba, and use was also made of the -
American-Iranian crisis.
Another direction of the struggle around the SALT-II Treaty was
represented liy the campaign of a very influential conservative graup _
and of powerful echelons of the military-industrial complex which con-
demned the Democratic government for canceling the "B--1" bomber,
- slowing down the "M-X" program, disturbing the construction schedule _
for the "TridPnt" submarines, and for allegedly "tailoring" American
- military programs in advance to fit the SALT-II conditions and not
showing firmness in foreign policy as a whole. The activities of the
militarist circles who,as it were~ held the ratification of the Vienna
Treaty as a"hostage" consisted in pressure on the American leadership
in the direction of inereasing the arms race throughout its entire
range and of a general hardening of American foreign policy in Soviet- ~
American relations. It has to be said that this campaign had its
effect; under its influence the A3ministration began to tie the ratifi- -
cation of SALT-II more and mo~e c2U.~eIy to the "maintenance of power,"
an increase in military apprvpriations and the continuation and
acceleration of a number of weapons programs. In the summer of 1979
the United States government ma.de a final decision concerning the
deployment beginning with 1986 af aroun3 200 mobile intercantinental
ballistic missiles of the "M-X" .*_yp~, eac~h of which is to carry 10 ~ -
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nuclear warheads of increased accuracy and power and be moved by a
transporter at the launching complexes between a large number of
protected shelters. Parallel to this, the development of the
"Trident-2" sea-based "counterforce" missile was acclerated; it may
enter the American arsenal in the second half of the 1980s. The
first of 12 "Poseidon" submarines reo utfitted with "Triderit-1" missiles
went to sea in October 1979, and in April the lead missile submarine
of the "Trident" class, named the "Ohio" which will enter combat duty
in the Navy in 1981 was put into the water. A year later it is
planned to deploy winged missiles on the first "B-52" bomber squadron.78
At tne same time, the emphasis on the conception of massive "counter-
blows" was strength ened in official American nuclear strategy. Speaking
at Senate hearings, ~ecretary of Def ense Brown stated: "A potential
for guaranteed destruction is essential for restraint, but it is
inadequate as a strategic aoctrine or a criterion of the combat capacity
of our forces. Although I doubt very much that a nuclear war, should
one begin, can be limited...," the Secretary said, "effective restraint
demands the creatio:x of a sufficiently large and flexible potential
so as to be able to inflict selective blows against a number of mili-
tary and other targets and, af ter tha t, keep a substantial reserve of
nuclear might for a considerable time."79 In this way they gradually
began to form a new strategic concep tion in Washington which in Brown's
budget reports for the 1979 and 1980 fiscal years was formulated, in
particular, as a strategy of "opposition" or "escalating domination."
In accordance with it, the United States had to preserve a superior
nuclear potential even after all imaginable scenarios for an exchange
of "counter-blows."80
This conception takes American strate gic policy still another large
step away from the actual conditions of reality and from the true
interests of American security. At the same time, it provides broad
opportunities to the military-industrial complex for validating another
round of an increase and renewal of the strategic nuclear arsenal in
the 1980s. It is clear that to a large extent the Administration's ~
measures in the field of strategic weapons are a concession to the
militarists. At the same time, it has to be seen that this policy by
Washington is aimed at obtaining one-sided strategic advantages during
the coming decade which, in particular, are designed to be used for
putting additional pressure on the USSR during possible f utuie SALT-III
negotiations in order to achieve for the United States more advantageous
conditions in the quantitative reduction and qualitative limitation of
strategic weapons. As has already repeatedly happened in the past,
attempts by the United States to change the military balance in its
favor do not yield their sought-after fruits; however, the creation of
new "trumps" in th e form of weapons p rograms around which as they
develop interested circles of the military-industrial complex unite
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can whip up the nuclear missile race and make the attairmient of an
agreement on SALT in the future more difficult.
In this connection, the question of sitin~ American long-ranged winged
missiles and "Pershing-II" ballistic missiles in Western Europe has
Uecome another dangerous aspect oF United States and NATO policy. In
words these plans were camouflaged by considerations connected with
tlie "modernization" o.F Amer.ican advance-based nuclear weapon.s, and it
was sai.d that given the parity on the higher strategic les:e7. which has
been fixed by the terms of SALT-II, it is allegedly necessary tc
"neutralize" the imaginary Soviet "superiority" on the level of inedium-
range nuclear weapons or of so-called "Euro-strategic" weapons.
Meanwhile, the indisputable fact that during the last ten years the
Soviet Union has not increased its medium-range nuclear weapon carriers
- by a single missile or a single airplane and, on the contrary, their
number has decreased as has the p~wer of the BRSD nuclear warheads was
completely ignored.81
In f.act, the siting in Western Europe of American winged missiles and
"Pershing-II" ballistic missiles has the goal of changing the overa.ll
military equil.ibrium on the European continent in favor of NATO.
In spite of a constructive proposal by the socialist countries to
decrease the number of the USSR's medium-range nuclear weapons if new
medium-range nuclear missiles are not sited in Western rurope, it was
decideci at the Brussels session of NATO (Uecember 1973) to dep loy
beginning with 1983 around 600 American cruise missiles and "Pershing-II"
system~ in Great Britain, the FRG, and Italy. This, of course, wiZl nut
give NATO military superiority: the socialist countries will, of course,
take all of the necessary steps to strengthen their defense capacities.
However, this kind of development of events is capahle of intensi.fying
the military confrontation in Europe and seriously e~cerbate tensions
in the relations between the USSR and the United States.
The noisy campaign in the United States aimed at worsening Soviet-
American relations and undermining SALT reached an unprecedented scope
in early 1980 in connection with the introduction into Afghanistan, at
the request of the Afghan government, of Soviet military contigents to
assist that country in repelling aggression from without. The shock
wave from an explosion of anti-Soviet hysteria deprived rhe Carter
Admi.nistration of its political equilibrium which was expressed in an
irresponsible decision by the White House ro postpone the ratification
- by the Senate of the SALT-II Treaty and in measures to "freeze" bila-
teral negotiations and cooperation between the USSR ar?d the tJnited
States on a number of important issues. Another zigzag by Washington
and a very dangerous one for peace in the direction o:E putting
pressure on the USSR in the spirit of the "cold war" and the blocking
- by iC of international efforts to reduce military dangers has produced
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a very clear impression of the unreliability of the United States
as a partner in inter-st-ate relations in the light of the ability of ~
the American leadership to violate its international commitments under
the influence of emotional outbursts or of consideratioris of a narrowly
- understood immediate advantage.
The steps which were undertaken by Washington in early 1980 are equiva-
lent to a serious miscalculation. They may strike like a boomerang
against the long-term interests first of all of the United States itself.
For these interests require stability in Soviet-American relations,
a return to a business-like and equal dialogue between the USSR and
the United States, and the renewal of efforts, to solve the cardinal
problems of detente and of restraining the arms race, includi.ng the
coming into effect of the SALT-II Treaty. Despite all of the diffi-
culties which have been ca~ssed by the strengthening of militarist and
extremist tendencies of the ruling circles of the United States and of
a number of other imperialisC states, the policy of detente is making -
a way for itself. This policy has deep roots. It is supported by
powerful forces which favor peace and disarmament, and this policy has
every chance of remaining the leading tendency in the international
relations of the present-day world.
Con clus ion
The past three and a half decades of the nuclear age, especially the
experience of the policies of the United States of America in the
sphere of strategic weapons in the 1960s and 1970s have convincingly
demonstrated the unsuitability of traditional approaches to the funda-
mental problem of the present-day the ensuring of security in the
nucle3r age. In the past it was believed that superior military might
was the most reliable guarantee of security. Today it is becoming
increasingly obvious that in and of itself even an enormous weapons
aresenal is not capable of guaranteeing national security, while an
. endeavor to achieve military superiority weakens it by instigating an "
, arms race and exacerbating political tensions. In the past the arms
race was looked upon as an inevitable evil, the consequence of inter-
national contradictions. Now it is completely clear that the military _
rivalry which has been fanned by the imperialist powers has turned
into a very important cause of the worsening of relations between
states and into a serious source of the threat of war. Previously it .
frequently seemed that a limitation on armaments and international
agreeme~its on these questions contained risks for security. Now it is -
being recognized more and more widely that a much greater .risk is
connected with the continuation of an unrestrained increase in weapons
of destruction and with the lack of desire or inability to put them
under control.
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The international treaties to limit the arms race in the 1960s and
1970s and, above all, the Soviet-American SALT-I agreement and others
proved the possibility and reality of a fundamentally new way of
ensuring security in the face of the changed world balance of power and
the new situation on the world arena and within the capitalist countries.
At the same time, it is obvious that the problem of ensuring security
during the nuclear age remains an acute one and its solution still
requires a loig and difficult struggle and the overcoming of many serious
- obstacles. For the events of the last two decades have also shocan the
vitality of the previous, obsolete approaches to these problems which,
it caould seem, have already repeatedly revealed their bankruptcy. And
the reasons for this, of course, are not simply in the Y~ower of tradi- _
tions. They are j~.i the very class nature of imperialist politics which
place the~ir wager on force and on the use of or threat to use military
might to achieve goals on the international arena. These reasons are
also in the gigantic mechanism which turns the wheels of the arms race
that has formed in the capitalist countries and in the military-indus-
trial complexes whose very existence is inseparably bound up with
preparations for wars, with the creation of inereasingly barbaric
weapons, and with the pursuit of an aggressive policy abroad.
The debates on the ratification of SALT-II in the United States
provided still another vivid illustration of the continuing acute
struggle in the West about the choice of a way to ensure security during :
the nuclear age. The broad public and most of the realistic-minded
representatives of American ruling circles favored the ratification of
the Vienna agreements and a movement to SALT-III negotzations. On the
other hand, Washington has taken measures to increase military appro-
priations and to acce].erate a number of strategic programs which are
designed both to encourage the militarists within the country and to
obtain one-sided military advantages in the 198Qs and "trump cards" in
future SALT negotiations.
Such steps, as has already occurred in the past, are capab le of whipping ~
up the arms race, and creating additional difficulties in the next
stage of the negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons. It
is clear that neither the security of the United States itself nor that
of other countries will win from this. The lessons of history and the
realities of the nuclear age dictate another approach to ensuring
security which is being consistantly defended by the Soviet Union,
supported by the peace-loving forces of the entire world, and finding i
a response among the far-sighted government leaders of the West.
Contrary to the arguments of those people in the United States who
assert that the goals of USSR policy in the field of. national security
and strategic armaments are allegedly unclear or, even worse, envisage _
the achievement of "military s~_iperiority," the positions of the Soviet
Union are entirely clear and have been repeatedly explained in the _
official statements of the leaders of the CPSU and Sov~et government.
First of all, the security of both the USSR and the United States
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i
- requires stability in the existing military equilibrium and Lhe
~ consolidation through international agreements which take account of
tt~e structura]_ and technical characteristics of the military poten-
tials oL- states and of the differences in their geographical positions.
"The Soviet Union is effectively taking care of its defense, but it is
not s`eking and wi~l not seek military superiority over the other side,"
L. I. Brezhnev has said in thi.s connection. "We do not wish to disturb
the approximate equilibrium of military forces which h:as now developed, -
for example, between the East and the West in Central Europe, or between
the USSR and t:he United States. B.ut in exchange we demand that nobody ~
~ else shouid try to disturb it in his favor."1
As for plans to use nuclear missile forces, in replying to the arguments
of certain Western theoreticians who keep asserting that the USSR is
seeking a"first strike" ability and call upon the United States to
acquire the potential for a nuclear "counter-Ulow" (be it in the form
Of "massive" OT' "selective" Or ~~foresLalling" OT "reply" nuclear
attacks) , the Soviet Union unambiguously states tha* it has been and
remains an opponent of such conceptions. Its strategic doc~rine has
a thoroughly defensive character, and its armed forces in rhis respect
serve the goals of stability and are designed for restraining a Poten-
tial aggressor. "Our ef.forts are directed," L. T. Breztinev has
emphasi.zed, "at seeing to it that things do not get as far as a first
or a second blow and that there be no nuclear war at a11. Our approach
to these questions may be formulated as follows: the defense poten-
tial of the Soviet Union has to be sufficient to prevent anyone from -
ri.sking disturbing our peaceful life."2 .
~ The measures in the field of limiting strategic weapons, in their
turn, help to strengthen the restraints on a nuclear war on lower -
. levels of military opposition and with lesser economic expenditures.
Ho~.aever, the USSR's policy is not limited solely to ttie taslcs of
preserving strategic stabilit,y on the basis of military parity and of
deterring war on the unsteady ground of "a balance of terror." For
tremendous potentials for destruction continue to hang over the world,
rapid scientific and technological pro~ress is continuously giving -
birth to ever more sophisticated weapons, and international crises _
~hreaten to puk the machinery of global destruction into action. For -
. this reason the Sovie* Union is consistently struggling for the limi-
~ tation and halting of the arms race, for a reduction of armaments,
~ for a just and peaceful settlement of international conflicts, ar.d for
~ an improvement of the world political atmosphere. "Of course, the
- maintenance of the equilibrium which has developed is not a goal in
itself," L. I. Brezhnev has said about this. "We are in favor of
- beginning to bend the arms race curve downwards and of gradually
lowering the level of military opposition. We want to substantially
reduce and then to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war the most -
terrible danger for mankind."~
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There is no more difficult task. But in the nuclear age there is no
~ other way of attaining a genuinely reliable security for the USSR,
for the United States, and for all of the countries of the world, a
- security which, in the final analysis, amounts to ensuring the most
_ basic and the most sacred right of every individual the right to
life.
FOOTNOTES
FROM THE AUTHOR
1. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," Vol. 26, p. 304.
- 2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Following Lenin`s Course," Moscow, 1979, Vol. 7,
p. 589.
- 3. Ibid., p. 353.
CHAPTER V. _
1. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, October 14, 1974, pp. 505, 519.
2. "riaterials of the 25th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1976, p. 25.
3. WASHINGTON POST, 4 Decemb.er 1975.
- 4. "Sane World," May 1974, p. 54.
5. R. Ciine, "World Power Assessment," Washington, 1975, p. 56.
6. T. Mclntyre, "Speech at Kennedy Center," "National Town Meeting,"
26 June 1974.
7. B. Woodward and C. BErnstein, "The Finat Days," New York, 1976, p.446. -
8. G. Natter, "Kissinger`s Grand Design," Washington, 1975, pp. 12, 25.
9. J. W. Canan, "The Super Wariors...," p. 151.
10. PRAVDA, 22 June 1973.
11. Ibid., 4 July 1974.
- 12. Ibid., 1 April 1977.
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13. Ibid., 25 Novemher 1974.
14. Ibid; PRAVI)A, 1 April 1977.
15. "Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress,'' p. 23.
16. G. Ford, President of the United States, "Press Conference,"
Washington, 2 January 1976.
17. H. Kissinger, Secretary of State, "Press Conference," Washington,
23 December 1975.
18. U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
� Affairs, Hearings: "The Vladivostok Accord: Implications to U. S.
Security, Arms Control, and World Peace," 94th Congress, First
Session, Washington, 1975, pp. 22, 25,
19. Ibid., pp. 93-94. -
20. A. Cox, "The Dynamics of Detente," New York, 1976, p. 33.
21. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 22 December 1975.
22. House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearings: "Vladivostok Accord...,"
p. 65. F
23. A. Co~;, "The Dynamics of Detente," p. 39.
, 24. rbid., p. 163. !
25. "For Adequate Defense. Coalition for a Democratic Majority,"
~ Washington, July 1975.
26. FOREIGN POLICY, Fall, 1974, p. 11.
- 27. House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearings: "Vladivostok Accord...,"
p. 86.
28. PRAVDA, 1 April 1977.
29. WASHINGTON STAR, 7 Ju1y 1975.
30. Ibid. ~
31. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on International Relations.
Hearings: "Briefing on Diego Garcia and Patrol Frigate," 93rd
Congress, Sec~nd Session, Washington, 1974.
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32. "Detente and Defnese. A Reader," Washington, 1976, p. 172.
33. A. Cox, "The I?yna*nics of Detente," pp. 147-148.
34. NEW YORKER, 4 April 1977, p. 102.
35. TI~~IE, 13 March 1978, p. 10.
- 36. A. Cox, "The Dynamics of Detente," p. 156.
37. Ibid., p. 153.
38. NEW YORKER, 4 April 1977, p. 103; "Strategic Survey 1976," the
~ International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1977, pp.
107-108.
39. A. Cox, "The 1?ynamics of Detente," p. 160.
40. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 23 February 1976, pp. 201, 211.
41. L. I. Brezhnev, "Following Lenin's Course," Vol. 5, pp. 476, 477.
- 42. Ibid., pp. 473-474.
43. "Strategic Survey 1976," p. 41.
44. D. H. Rumsfeld, "Fiscal Year 1977 Defense Budget Report," pp. 80-89. _
45. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 15 March 1976, 21 June 1976.
46. "Strategic Survey 1976," pp. 112-113.
47. NEW YORKER, 4 April 1977, p. 104.
48. D. H. Rumsfeld, "Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress
on the Fiscal Year 1978 Defense Budget and the Fiscal Years 1978-
1982 Defense Program," Washington, 1977. -
49. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 7 March 1977, p. 17.
50. "International Yearbook. Politics and Economics," 1977 issue,
_ Moscow, 1977, p. 195.
51. L. I. Brezhnev, "Following Lenin's Course," Vo~. 7, p. 294.
52. "Jimmy Carter Presidential Campaign. Address to Me~~nbers of the
American Chamher of Commerce. Tokyo, Japan, 28 May 1975," ATLANTIC, -
1976, p. 1. _
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53. "Jimmy Carter Presidential Campaign, 1975-1976," ATLANTIC, 1976.
54. NEW YORKER, 4 April 1977, p. 108.
55. "Jimmy Carter Presidential Campaign. Address to the Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations, 15 March 1976." ATLANTIC, 1976 p. 2.
56. "Strategic Survey 1978," International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 1979, p. 43.
57. H. Brown, Defense Secretary, "Department of Defense Annual Report
on Fiscal Year 1979 Defense Budget and Fiscal Years 1979-1983
Defense Program," Washington, 1978, p. 73.
58. H. Brown, "Department of Defense Annual Report on Fiscal. Year 1979
- Defense Budget...," pp. 106-120.
59. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1 June 1977.
6~. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 11 July 1977, pp. 14-19.
61. H. Brown, "Department of Defense Annual Report on Fiscal Year 1979
Defense Budget...," pp. 120, 123, 126.
62. Ibid., p. 55.
63. PRAVDA, 1 April 1977.
64. Ibid.
65. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "America and the World 1978," p. 493.
66. B. N. Ponomarev, "Real Socialism ar.d its International Significance,"
Moscow, 1979, p. 11.
67. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "America and the World 1978," p. 476.
68. PRAVDA, 26 June 1979.
_ r~
69 . Ibid. , 19 June 1979.
70 . Ib id .
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid. , 2 August 1979 .
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73. U. S. Congress, Senare, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings:
"The SALT-II Treaty," 96th Congress, First Session, Washington, July
_ 1979, Part l, p. 331.
74. PRAVDA, 22 June 1979.
75. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: "The SALT-II
Treaty," Pdrt 1, pp. 435-451.
76. Ibid., p. 99.
77. Ibid., Part II, pp. 52, 54.
78. H. Brown, Defense Secretary, "Department of Defense Annual Report
on Fiscal Year 1980 Defense Budget and Fiscal Years 1980-1984
Defense Progra.m," Washington, 1979, pp. 114-125.
79. Senate Co~nittee on Foreign Relations. Hearings: "The SALT-II
Treaty," Part 1, p. 303.
80. H. Brown, "Fiscal Year 1980 Defense Budget Report," pp. 74-81,
114-120.
81. PRAVDA, 7 October 1979.
CONCLUSION
~ 1. L. T. Brezhnev, "Following Lenin's Course," Vol. 6, p. 596.
2. Ibid., p. 294.
- 3. Ibid., p. 596.
COPYRIGHT: POLITIZDAT, 1980
2959
CSO: 1800 E~
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