JPRS ID: 9151 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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= JPRS L/9151
19 June 1980
F
- West E~ro e ~e r
p po t
CFOUQ 27/80)
FBI~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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~RS z/9i5i _
19 June 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 27/80)
CONTENTS
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
FRANCE
Status of Strategic Naval Force Noted -
(Jean de Geelard; AIR & COSMOS, 10 May 80) 1
Navy Begins Crotale Missile Uae
" (Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 19 Apr 80~........ 5 -
- General Forget Reviews FATAC's Miseion, Readiness
(Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 19 Apr 80) 7 ~
FATAC Airbase at Istres Soon To Be Operational
(Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 26 Apr 80) 10
'TONNANT' Sub, S-3 Missile Put Into Service
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 26 Apr 80) 12 -
Briefs
Neutron Bomb Decision 14
COUNTRY SECTION
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMAAiY
Intelligence Activitiea of Border Guarda To Be Restricted
(Heiner Bremer; STERN, 24 Apr 80) 15
FRANCE
Popularity of PCF's Marchaie Seen Declining �
(Jacques Roure; L'EXPRESS, 3 May 80) 18
- a - [zzz - wE - i5o Fovo]
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`Graduated' Defense of Human Righta in Foreign Policy
(Various sources, various dates) 21
Proposal by Jean-Pierre Cot .
Criticism, Analyais of Proposal, by Emmanuel -
. ?.e Roy Ladurie
Arianespace Participants, Directors Named
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 29 Mar 80) 32
Mirage 2000's Interception Capabilities Described
(Jacques Morisset; AIR & COSMOS, 29 Mar 80) 36
AS-30 Laser Missile Test-Fired at Landes Test Center
(AIR & COSMOS, 3 May 80) 39
Economic Col2aboration With Mexico Outlined
(LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION, 12 May 80) 40
Briefs
' Naval, Customs Operations . 41
_ Strategic Raw Materials Stockpile 41
ITALY
Decline in Shoe Industry Predicted for 1980
(Luciano Mondini; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 26 Apr 80) . 42
SPAIN
_ Briefs
Border Controls 45
SWEDEN
Economy Minister Bohman: No Consumption Increase for
5 Years
(Lars Eklund; VECKANS AFFARER, 17 Apr 80) 46 ,
SWITZERLAND
'Seaguard' Naval Antimissile System Preaented
(AIR & COSMOS, 3 May 80) 51
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
STATUS OF STRATEGIC NAVAL FORCE NO'1'ED
Pari3 AIR & COSMGS in French 10 May 80 pp 32-33
[Article by Jean de Geelard; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in
boldface]
[Text] With Admiral Tannuzel, chief of staff of the French navy, Vice-
Admiral Bigault de Cazanove, port commander and commander in chief of the
Atlantic squadron, Vice-admiral Pieri, commander of the Strategic Ocean
Force, high civilian and military authorities, and superior officers who
have commanded missile launching nuclear submarines during past patrols,
in attendance, Yvon Bourges, Minister of Defense, presided over the cere-
- mony of ccm~issioning the entry fnto active services of the "Tonnant," the
fifth SNLE [missile launching nuclear submarine], at Ile-Tongue on
Saturday, 3 May. ~
This evenz provided the occasion for the Minister of Defense to deliver an ~
important speech on tr.e future of the strategic deterrent force, of which
virtually the full text will be given further on. Three main conclusions
- must be drawn from it:
(1) the entry of the "Tonnant " into 3ervice enables the FOST [Strategic
Ocean Force] to count on three SNLE on Eontinuous patrol most of the time,
but only with the entry into service of a sixth SNLE in 1985 will the
French deterrent force be able to asaure sea patrol by three, indeed four,
SNLE; :
- (2) the Strategic Ocean Force in 1990 wi11 have at Ieast five, if not six,
SNLE equipped with the M4 weapons system (greater destructive capability
with a large number of objectives); and
(3) elementary prudence should lead us to maintaining several components
in our nuclear arsenal and to seek new systems.
Next 23 May, at the lst Strategic Tiissile Group (GMS), installed upon the
Albion Plateau, there will take place the entry into operational service -
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of the first nine SSBS-S3 srrategic ballistic missiles exploited by the Air
Force. This wi.ll also be for the Minister of Defense, who will be ~resent,
still another opportunity to confirm the directions being taken without,
for all that, having already exercised certain options.
The Minister's Speech
"With the entry into service of the 'Tonnant' tiie construction of the
Strategic Ocean Force, such as it had been decided by General de Gaulle
in March 1968, has been achieved.
"It was in September 1972 that construction of the fifth SNLE of the first
generation began. It is taking its place within the SNLE fleet 30 months
after its predecessor, the "'Indomptable."' ~
In order to strengthen the capa.bility of our deterrent force it was de-
cided in December 1970 to replace the M2 automatic weapons of our first
SNEE units with the M20 thermonuclear weapon of 1 megaton power, and to
improve the capabilities of the carrier rockets. To permit keeping four
SNLE so armed in the operational cycle it was decided in January 1977 to
construct a fourth batch of rockets and M20 weapons. It is this fourth
i batch which is arming the 'Tonnant.' Along with her, the four SNLE suit-
al~le for patrol are all equipped with M20 weapons. The reminder of these
facts underlines the remarkable continuity of the defense policy, particu- ~
larly in re~lization of the Strategic Ocean Force. It illustrates the
logical progression and complementary nature of the ma~or decisions which
have come about under the aut~ority of three consecutive presidents of the
Fifth Republic. ~
."The departure of the 'Tonnant' for its first missions marks a new stage.
From that very moment not only are two 9NLE on continuous patrol at sea--
such has been the case since January 1977--but most of the time they will
be joined by a third, thanks to the presence of four ~perational SNLE at
I le I~ongue . .
"The Strategic Ocean Force has thus attained a higher threshold of capabil-
ity: its firepower has been increased more than three times and the number
of objectives by one and a half since 1974. This bespeaks the reality of
the deterrence that our nuclear weapons represent. That is no doubt why
a11 the groups of various opinions support a military policy which assures
the nation's independence. '
As the President of the Republic recalled several weeks ago, it is '
important that 'our deterrence remain an actual deterrent; which presup- -
poses an effort both qualitative and quantitative.
"First of all, we must have available weapons whose destructive capabil-
2ties are combined with the capability of surmounting enemy defenses. In
this respect the primary, and urgent, necessity is to construct
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"miniaturized thermonuclear weapons so that several can be carried by a
sin gle rocket, placed at intervals in time and distributed in space. That
is the threshold that must be crossed for a strategic nuclear armament at
the technical level of those of the other nuclear pawexs.
"That is why the government adopted this objective in December 1974. In
December 1974 the corresponding M4 program was decided upon, for entry
into service in 1985. Since then every effort has been devoted to it.
We now know that this objective can be achieved, thanks to the competence
- of our scientists, engineers, technicians, and ;aorkers.
"Above all, there must be achieved, as quickly as possible, the capability
of attacking the greatest number of objectives with the best weapons pos-
sib le, for it is the magnitude of the d~mage which we can inflict upon an
aggressor which makes deterEence credible. The government has thus chosen
tha t solution which enables the greatest number of weapons to be placed
into operation in the shortest time. After having suspended construction
of a sixth SNLE M20 in December 1975 it decided, in September 1978, to
construct an SNLE of a new generation with the M4 weapons system which will
be operational in 1985. Follawing entry of the 'Inflexible' into service,
the previous SNLE will successively be equipped with M4 systems and
weapons, taking into consideration the schedule for ultimate strengthening
of the SNLE fleet. If it is realized that a single submarine of the
cl.ass carries more weapons than the five present SNLE, the full interest
in this program can be measured. Moreover, it is the solution--the only
solution--that makes possible the greatest and quickest augmentation of the
Strategic Ocean Force. That is why the goverriment made this choice. Its
realization will occupy the present decade. The French deterrent force will
then be able to provide sea patrols by three SNLE, or even four, depending
- upon circumstances.
"To maintain deterrence, as the chief of state desires, from now on the
established program must be suFpassed and preparations made for the third
generation of SNLE. Despite progress whic'h can occur in detection, the sub-
marine will for a long time remain the most favorable means for response to
an a ggression even though simple prudence should lead us to ma.intain sev-
eral components in our nuclear arsenal.and to seek new systems. At the re-
ques t of the President of the Republic studies to establish the nature and
leve 1 of various forces, in particular, the composition of the Strategic
O~ean Force, are con~tinuing. Decisions will be made in due course. Here,
under tk~ese circumstances, I am anx~ous to say to all submariners thar_ our
~ubmarine fleet-...is assured to remaining a large and favored element of
the French na.vq and of our armed forces. Future decisions related to }hem
wi11 clearly confirm that. However, there can be no question of sacrificing,
to it, the combat, protection, and support facilities~of the surface
flee t...."
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More Than 74 Yatrols
Let us be reminded of the pr~sent status of the five SNLE of the FOST:
co~issioned into active service on 1 December 1971 and 'nenceforth equip-
ped with M20 missiles, the "Redoutable," now at the end of a major over-
haul (duration one year) at Brest, has performed 23 patrols. The "Ter-
rible," commissioned into active service on 1 Janua.ry 1973, and equipped
with MLO missiles, is now at The Tor.igue for a substantial overhaul (dur-
ation four to five weeks) after its 22nd patrol; it had already undergone
a major overhaul. The "Foudroyant," commissioned into active service on
6 June 1974 is on patrol at sea; equipped with M20 missiles after having
undergone a major overhaul, it is on its 16th patrol; it is to return
soon; it will replace the "Redoutable" in drydock; the latter is again
going to become operational. The "Tonnant," commissioned into active �
service on 3 April 1980, will have just begun its patrol at sea when this
article is published.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1980
11,706
CSO: 3100
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TH"r,ATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
NA'VY BEGINS CROTALE MTSSiLE USE
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 19 Apr 80 pp 35,.48
[Article by Pierre Langereux]
[Text] The low altitude, all weather ship to aix missile ~
system, the Naval Crotale, has just been placed in active
" service on board tfie corvette Georges Leygues and the frigate
Duguay-Trouin; these_are tfie first twc~ French Navy ships to
be armed with tfiis new weapon system produced by Thomson-CSF
with Matra~s aid for tfie~m~`.ssile development; the booster waS
developed by TFiomson-Brandt with an SNPE [National Propellants
and Explosives Company~ propellant. ~
This event followed tfie complete success of the acceptance
tests conducted by tfie Navy on board tfie fatigate Duguay-Trouin
_ and tfie cor~ette ~eorges Leyg~es, w~iicfi fias just left for a
long crui:se at sea. Tfie ~eorges Leygu~s, wfii:cfi began service
- at the end of 19:79, fs tfie prototype for the C70 series of
corvettes for anti-su5~narine warfare in ~he open seas; it is
armed primarily with two ASM Lynx helicopters with sonars ~
and torpedoes and with an anti-aircraft Nava7~ Crotale system
which has eight missiles on the pad ready far launch.
A sequence of 12 consecutive successful shots, conducted
until February 1980, proved the effectiveness of this new
naval weapon system; this test series included six validation
shots made on board the Navy's test ship, the Ile d'Oleron,
which was equipped with the first firing units of Navale
Crotale in November 1977.
_ Four shots had direct impacts on~the target and the average
pass distance of the other missiles fired was less than the
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distance needed to set off the pro~imity fuse and less than
the lethal radius of tfie missile'~ warhead (8 m) .
The success of tfie salvo firi~gs by the ~eorges Leygues also
confirmed tfie poss~ibility of guiding si~multaneously two
_ missiles fired at an interval of several seconds at the sarae
= target; tliis~ capability of tfie Naval Crotale will enable it
to handle particularly threatening aircraft attacks.
The shots also verified the effectiveness of the weapon
- system within its~entire range of action and the quality of
the guidance system of tfie missiles, using the firing radar
of the system, even in force 5 seas.
a One of the shots succeeded in striking a target appearing in
the axis of the ship while the sfiip was subject to a roll of
+ 15�. Another also succeeded witfi a target f lying at a
very low altitu3e and flying past the Crtit~le system. The .
lack of smoke when tfie missile is fired and its high initial
speed ~i,v~ tfie Naval Crotale botfi the discretion and the ef-
- fectiveness needed to intercept tfi e~most~mo.dern aircraft.
~ Furthermor.e, the French Air ~Force, which is also outfitted
with the Crotale systent in its land-based version, has in re-=
- cent months made several snccessful~~sfiots of these missiles
at very low altitudes (ATR & COSMOS, no 805).
~ The missile firings will continue this year in order to
_ increase the ranye of action and tfie performances of the
missile. ~ .
The French Navy fias already ordered tfie first group of six
fir�ing units of the Naval Crotale, four of which were deliv -
vered last year to outfit the friga~e Duguay-Trouin and the
first corvettes of the Georges Leygues class. An order for
a second series of about 10 weapon systems is planned, with
delivery starting next year, in order to outfit the Navy's
ships. ~
Tfie Navy is also veryi:nterested in expand~ng the range of
the Naval Crotale missile--which is now lU km--and in certain
improvements of tfie weapon sys~tem, which would give it an . -
improved anti-ship to ship missile capability. -
COPYRI~HT: A. & C., 1980
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THEATER NUCLEAR FGRCES FRANCE _
_ . ~
_ GENERAL FORG~T REVIEWS FATAC'S MISSION, READINESS
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 19 Apr 80 pp 38-39
~ [Article by Jean de Galard]
[Text] Air Force Gen 2~Iichel Forget invited the press to take .
part last Tu~sda~r in a prespnta~ion conducted at two 3st Air ~
- Region bases, Nancy~ and L~euil. This presentation was quite
exceptional both because of i.ts nature and;because of the
number of pieces of equipment involved---t~e resources that
the FATAC jTactical A3r gorce~ fias in its two co~ponents,
conventional and nuclear, to counter a possible agg~essor in
any circumstances and at any ~noment. General Forget, rom--:
- mander of tfie FATAC/lst Air Region, wanted to emphasize the
power and flexibility of this "offensive combat tool,"' the
Tactical Air Force, the per�manerit and instantaneous nature of
its operational capability~, and tfie fiigfi levE~l of skill of
the personnel wfio operate tfiese resources. -
In the introductory briefing fie gave to present the FATAC in
1980--315 (soon to be 330) combat planes on line, divided into .
13 squadrons of Mirage III and eight (soon nine) of Jaguar, or
in all, 21 (soon 22) squadrons, including four (soon to be ~
five) which have tactical nuclear weapons--General Forget re-
stated the three factors which form the unique nature of the
Tactical Air Force:
- a. The fact that its command is merged with that of the Zst
Air Region. Having b~t~~ forces and their support is a pre- '
- cious advantage for these forces, which are most.likely ta
~ have numerous and rapid redeployments. This merger, said
General Forget, in no way haridecs the stationing of FATAC
units outside of the territory of the lst Air Reqion. A
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supplemental group from the lltb Figfiter Squadron based at
Toul was estalilis-fied at Sordear.x~ last year, and before the ~
end of this yea~-, a supplemental group fram tFie 7th ~'ighter
Squadron based at Sai'nt Dizi:er a~rill fiave been formed at
Istreso
b. Its important role in deterrence. At any moment, on the ~
order of tfis ~~iief of state, tfi~ FATAC is ready to employ
its nuclear weapons, in c1osE coordination with the "Pluton"
regiments of tfie lst Army; sucfi a strike would clearly con- _
front the opponent witfi tfie ultiinate threat of the use of
missiles from the strategic nuclear force.
c. The diversity of tfie~missions and range of action of the
. FATAC units. These missions are essentially: reconnaissance,
that is, collection of information; assault, not only in the
area of the battlefield but several hundred kilometers in -
depth; and coverage, which proceeds from mis~ions of a defen- .
sive nature. As for the range of act~on, for several years
now these mission s are no longer li~mited "to the traditional
invasion areas of our terr3tory." T.fie organization and train-
ing of FATAC units, tlie mobility of its units, and the flexi-
bility of its vectors~make it perfectly capable ~f employing
all or par�t of its resources wfierever the situation requires,
eithe~ in Europe or outside of Europe. General Forget re-
vealed that at tfie present time a good number of FATAC squad-
rons have been deployed~outside of France, while originally
this sort of mission was only gi'ven to a single specialized ~
FATfiC squadron .
At the conclusion of his briefing, General Forget pointed
out the eff~rts that have been made in recent years, both in
- territorial and in operational matters, to enable the F.~1TAC to
continue to become even more effect~~e: ~einforcement of the
protection of air force bases and ground defenses (base camou-
flage; hardening of facilities; the nse of~hangar-shelters -
~`or a~r..~.raft whic:h will soon fiave concrete doors; underground
PC jcommand posts]; the establishment of "Crotale" units
and of 20-mm dual-tube gun units; the formation of commando ~
gunner units}; greater cooperation with ground forces and ~
with the Navy, for tfie FATAC units a;e primarily designed to ~
work in the framework of combined operations; rigorous de-
velopment of a doctrine governing the use ~f ~~onver_tional
and nuclear weapons: the mission of the FATAC is a"quick
punch" opera-~ion, rapid, nrutal, and massiye action provi-
ding fire support of extremeTy high density against the
~ enemy's second and first echelon units. Today the FATAC
units are being trained for these mass actions.
~
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The various ty~es o~ ai.~cra~t o~ tfiE ~'ATAC ar~ed with non- ~
_ nuclear v~reapons were presented at tFiE Nancy base; 24irage IIIR
and RD for specific rec~onnai~ance; 'Mirage TTTE equipped with
A~ 37 Martel missiles for pen~tration aid missions; Jaguar
~ equipped with fiomT~s, rocket launchers, and Magic missiles;
and Mirage 5F equipped with bombs. At the Luxeuil base,
. where there are two units of tfie 4th Fighter Squadron with
a nuclear missi:on, tFie reporters were for the first time al-
lowed to enter tfie tactical alert~zone used for aircraft armed
= with the AN 52 on an alert status, and to observe the various
sequences of tfie fitting of tfie nuclear weapon on board ~
Mirage IIIE. Everyone could appreciate the special constraints
in the areas of protection and security required in the en-
vironment of a nuclear squadron.
To conclude, the journalists present witnessed the take-off
- from tw~o runway~s of 'cfie Ltixeuil base of 17 air~raft of, the
FATAC. The capafiility of tfie FATAC in "doing its job" in
case of crisis was one of tFie conclusions to be drawn fr~om ~
this day. We will return to this ~opic again. ~
~ ~ COPYRIGHT: A. & C, 1980 ,
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THEATER NUCLE,AR FORCES FRANCE
FATAC AIRBASE AT ISTRES SOON TO BE OPERATIONAL
Paris AIR & COSMOS in rrench 26 Apr 80 pp 56-57
[Article by Jean de Galard]
[Text] During the interview he had 15 April 1980 with ~ournalists, follow-
ing the visit the latter had~made to the 3d and 4th FATAC fighter wings
based in Nancy and Luxeuil, Air Lieutenax~t General Michel Forget;' commanding
~ the Tactical Air Force lst Air Region, confirmed the basing, starting next
_ August, on the 125 Airbase of Iatres (.4th Air Region), of a ninth Jaguar
squadron. Officiallq created on 1 April 1980, this squadron will be the ~
fourth of the 7th Fighter Wing based in Saint-Dizier. Having been b.aptized _
"Limousin," it will also be a nuclear sqnadron, the fifth of the Tactical
Air Force which has four as of today: the two Mirage III E squadxons of
the 4th Fighter Wing based at Lwceuil and the two squadrons of the 7th
Fighter Wing based at Saint-Dizier. .
Present3.y, while on the Istres base the concrete shelters which will assure
the protection on the ground of the Jaguars which will be stationed there '
are being erected posthaste, the 4th squadron of the 7th Wing is gradually .
accepting delivery of the 15 Jaguars which will constitute its reglementary
isaue. Until today it has received aeven. Next~August, the squadron will
be actually constituted at Istres. At the end of the year it will:be
operational, according to G~eneral Forget. Ita pilots will have been
recycled and trained at Saint-Dizier by instructors of the 2/7 "Argonne"
Squaclron, whose principle miasion is the recycling of Jaguar pilots and the
periodic snpervision of their traixiing, ite secondary mission being
conventional weapon tactical support.
The primordial role of tactical nuclear weaponry was clearly emphasized by .
General Forget Who gointed out in this respect that "the manipulation of the
_ nuclear weapons" was nothing new for the Tactical Air Force which had
already once before, in 1962, assured within NATO the nucl~ar mission which �
was then vested in the air force. After the withdrawal of the French araaed
forces from the organization, it was the 4th Fighter Wing, at Luxeuil,
which was the recipient in 1973 of the first tactical nuclear weapons
conceived and manufactured in France and which was charged with their use.
, In spite of this experience and whatever may be the level of qualification
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and the professional conscience of the personnel charged with the uae of
nuclear weaponry, pverytfiing concerning the tactical nuclear arm is the
object, in aecurity matters, of an absolute rigor: in this respect, the
~ournalists can vouch for it, no room is left for improvisation, initiative,
memox,y, or routine; the successive operations unfold in an immutable, almost
liturgical, order; everything transpires as if, each time, it was the.firat
time. Future improvements in the field of the nse of the tactical nuclear
arm involve a potential inerease in the weapon's power and its release as
far as possible for the objective (which the ASMP~miasile will make possible).
- The short or middle term improvement of conventional weaponry rests on the
possibility, let us recall, for the pilot of a single seat airplane to carry
ont with very great precision, and even flying at low altitnde, tiie automatic
designation of ob~ectives for laser-guided weapons (cf AIR ET COSMOS, No 762, �
- p 31); it also involves the carrying and nse of anti-run~ray bombs, of wide
dispersal (anti-tank and anti-personnel) weap~ns to support ground forces.
Tn the field of electronic warfare, the first offensine counter-measure
equipment is in place.
During th~ir overseas interventions, Jagaar pilots had to perfect their
evolution techniques which made it possible to dodge antisircraft artillery.
The increase in fuel cost, General Forget specified, requiZes know~ng how
to derive mAx~m+.n+ benefit from trainin~ missions; consequently, the pilots'
progress mnst be strictly cont~rolled, which requires authorlty, rigor,
attention, vigilance From unit co~anders. ~
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1980
- 933Q . �
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES I
FRANCE ,
� ;
'TONNANT' SUB, S-3 MISSILE PUT INTO SERVICE .
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 26 Apr 80 p 69 . ,
[Article.by Pierre Langereux] '
[Text] The month of May is going to witness the unfolding of two important
events concerning the Strategic Nuclear Force: the entry into active service
of the Sth missile launching nuclear submarine ("SNLE") 'The Thundering'. '
["LE TONNANT"],on 3 I~1ay, and the inauguration of the lat unit of new SSB~-S3 ~ i
strategic ballistic miasiles on the Albion Plateau on 23 May, by the French ~
Minister of Defense, Yvon~Bourges. ~ I
Aerospatiale has announced in this respecc that it has ~ust carried out,
one month earlier than the date specified in the contract, the "demonstration
of good working worder" of the 1st SSBS-S3 missle firing unit on Albion I
_ Platean (IIpper Provence~. This operation constitutes the complete test of ~
the firing unit composed of 9 missile in ailos and a fire command poat (PCT), ' ~
as well as related higher command and logistic instal.lations. The SSBS-S3 I
program, begucl in November 1973, comprisea a new ground-to-ground miasile of ~
over 3,000 kilometer range equipped with a one megaton thermonuclear charge . ~
and penetration aids (decoys), as well as new logistic installationa (silos,
PCT, higher cammand cente'r, assembly warehonses, etc.). The auccessful '
- synthesis fir~ng,in Ju1y 1979 made it possible to confirm the preceding test
firings and to grant operational statua to the SSBS-S3, Aerospatiale indicated.
The arming of the silos of the lst unit ia presently going fo~rw$rd and the
SSBS-S3 aite of 9-missiles will be completely operational for the "slert"
planned for the beginning of June 1980. The weapon syatem will then be . '
placed in char~ge of the Air Force (lst GM3). ,
~ The SSBS-53 weapon system has been developed nnder the~direction of the DTEn i
[Direction technique dea engineJ with the participation of Aerospatiale, '
prime industrial contractor, of the CEA jCentre d'Experiences Aeriennes .
Militaires] for the direction of the nuclear warhead program, and of the . ~
Service technique dea telecommunicatione et eqnipements aeronaturiques�for ~
the direction of the transmissions programa.~ The principle industrial partic- -
ipanzs are: SEP jService d'Electronique physique], Crouzet, ENID jElectronique
Marcel Dassault], LCT jLaboratoire Ceatral de TelecommunicationsJ, ~
� 12 '
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SAGEM [Societe d'Applications Generales d'Electricite et de Mecanique],
SNPE [Societe Nationale des Poudres et Explosifs], CETT [Centre Europeene
de Telecotemmications e~ Teletransmission], CIt~ISA, Creusot-Loire, CSEE, IC
Entrepriae, SINTRA [Societe Industrielles des Nouvelles Techniques
Radioelectriqnes] and Thomeon-CSF [Compagnie Generale de Telegraphie sans Fil].
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1980
9330
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,
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
BRIEFS
NEUTRON BOMB DECISION--According to a high official of the Miniatry of
Foreign Affairs, "the president of the republic, by deciding next month
to provide France with the neutron bomb, will demonstrate in no uncert,~in
terms that he intends to deal with Moscow from a position of sCrength."
Pressured by the Soviets in 1978, President Carter put aside the idea of
deploying this new tactical nuclear weapon in Europe. French Minister of
Defense Yvon Bourges, by saying that France ~ould riot deny itself ttie us~e '
of this weapon, "was preparing the road ahead for the president," accord-
ing to well informed sources. jText] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 24 May 80 ~
p 125J ~
~
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- COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF BORDER GUARDS TO BE RESTRICTID
Hamburg STERN in German 24 Apr 80 pp 241-242 _
~ jArticle by Heiner Bremer: "Shortening the Leash"]
- [Text] Minister of the Interior Gerhart
Baum wants to make sure that the Border
Guards work for the intelligence service
cnly in exceptional circumstances. �
- Hard times are in the off ing for the West German intelligence services.
- Drastic reductions are planned in the largely unlimited and uncontrolled
_ odd-j ob services performed by the Federal Border Police (~GS) for Cologne's
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and the Pullach
Federal Intelligence Service (BND). Liberal minister of the interior ~
Gerhart Baum, an advocate of strict compliance with constitutional principles, -
wants to put the border guards on a short leash. There is to be an end to
BGS off icials' continuous undercover functions in cooperation with intel-
ligence services. Baum's belief: 1�A citizen is entitled to cross the
border. It is inadmissible that he be kept in the dark as to what is being
controlled and for what purpoae information is being gathered."
- Clicking noises had for many years been heard in the back rooms of German
border stations. BGS officials had been photographing and photocopying
passports belonging to tourists and to travelers who made frequent trips
to East bloc countries. Unauspecting citizens were interrogated about the
destination and purpose of their trips to foreign countries; BGS officials
compiled lists of names and detailed dossiers--all for the intelligence
service � which even provided special cameras for secretly copying documents
_ and whose agents, acting on tips from the SGS, traveled gll over the place
to border guards as agents. -
To ~ustify their extra work the border guards referred to a voluminous 1976
regulation entitled "Special Instructions About Gathering Certain Information
Incident to Border Police Surveillance (SO-GR)." When word got around in
- the spring of 1978 that the BfV had transmitted to the border police confi- -
_ ~dential lists of extremist organizations and publications, as well as
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"black books" containing personal data on left-wing e~ctremists in important
positions to "facilitate their information gathering tasks," Minister of
the Interior Baum had had enough. Lists and books were confiscatpd, the
SO-GK regulation was partly rescinded and a detailed legal investigation of
questionable border control activities was initiated under the aegis of
six independent renowned law prof essors.
The report has been completed. In a confidential letter to the experts
- of the SPD and FDP fractions, Baum cited the investigators' main findings.
First insight: "BGS investigations under the SO-GK regulation have nothing
to do with their mission." In contrast co Bawn~~ reticence, his main
advisor and star witness, Prof Erhard Denning~r from Frankfurt, declares
that "systematic surveillance of travel, usfng nominal and, from the police
viewpoint, neutral criteria (business travElers, refugees) do~s not fall
within the purview of the border police miss�~on." In plain language, the
unlimited snooping exercises conducted by the border guards in behalf of
the BfV and the BND were somewhat extra-legal.
, The second finding of the investigators: "Official assistance to the B�V
on the part of the BGS is basically permissible, since the BfV mission is
based on law. But this must not violate the rule of proportionality."
Denninger, whose strict constitutional guidelines have met with Baum's
approval, confirms: "Placing entire categories of persons entering the
country under suspicion under the SO-GK guidelines is covered neither by the
mission nor by intelligence service authority." According to Denninger,
"BfV requests for official assistance.must be based on sufficiently firm
suspicion of individually discernible anticonstitutional acts or plans."
The third finding, which must deeply hurt old intelligence types: Trans-
_ mission of data obtained from individuals from the BGS to the BND is
questionable from a legal standpoint, because the BND mission is not
defined by law. According to the Ministry of the Interior, "this is however
~acceptable during a transition period."
Baum has in the meantime obtained concurrence for the most stringent action
from the experts in the collition fractions, from BfV and BND presidents
Ri.chard rleier and Klaus Kinkel, the intelligence coordinator in the office
of the chancellor, State Secretary Manfred Schueler. The illegal SO-GK
will be rescinded and replaced by specific requests for official assistance.
Says Baum in a confidential memorandum: "The objective is compliance with
the law. Contents, extent and purpose of the reguested data must be exactly
described and defined." A primary ob3ective is a new border control law,
in addition to a revision of the BfV law. According to one of his asso-
ciates, Baum wants to "nail things down" in the political control of the
services and therefore wants a voice in future important official assistance
procedures. "I have no intention of always.agreeing without knowing why
the BGS is to be used or what use the recipient i~ going to make of the
information."
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But su~ervision by the Ministry of the Interior is not the only one to be
intensified. There are good chances for implementing a plan after the
Bundestag elections, under which a politician "of the Georg Leber type"
(a Baum confidant), who would be responsible to the delegates, would
exercise supervision of the 1tND in the office of the chancellor. This
would serve to exercise closer supervision of foreign intelligence services
and to relieve State Secretary Schueler of this burden, since he has had
enough of BND-watching anyway.
Effective supervision of ~he BND is of particular importance since Baum
does not wish to demand a law governing the BND. His reason: "A BND law
would not constitute a gain for constitutional clarity, since for obvious
reasons the BND mission cannot be exactly defined." This liberal does not
want to be responsible for a necessarily vague law to serve as an excuse
for questionable snooping practices. He prefers instead to regulate the
flow of information to the BND through Che use of other laws.
He does not plan to follow his experts' recommendations in one other highly
controversial item: the photographing of documents will remain permissible
~ for the n~ar future,�but under considerably limited circumstances. A
memorandum from the Baum ministry states as follows: "if the BND needs
detai?Q about development of foreign passports and visa stamps," there must
be a gua-antee that "in no event will there be use of data based on the
person [c~rrying the documents]. If at any time data involving individuals
muet be trar,smitted to the BND, they must immediately be destroyed when the
obj ect of th~ exercise.has b een satisfied.
BND chief Kinkel stubbornly resisted a ban on photographing passports ("I
will take this up with the chancellor, if necessary"), indicating that his
services had a need for foreign, especially Eastern, passports and visa
cancellations to be able to equip their own agents with the latest editions.
. But [in return�for this concession).the BND president must swallow the
bitter pill of prohibiting border guards in the future from working for the
BND in an uncontrolled and arbitrary manner and to nail agents. ~
Baum has been able to settle one additional point of contention concerning
off icial cooperation. The Bundeswehr will have to drop its desire of
having its recruits checked for extremist tendancies by use of the giant ~
computer in the Cologne BfV headquarters (ref. STERN No 16/1980: "Re-
cruitment by Computer"). During a high-level conference, Baum and Defense
Minister Apel turned down the proposals made by Hardthoehe off ici~als. Not
even an appeal by Defense State Secretary Joachim Hiehle made any difference.
His plea: "Mr Minister, the army's combat capability is threatened if a
member of the German Communist Party gets in among the soldiers." Said
Apel drily: "Oh, you know, Mr Hiehle, a communist puts life into the
business and malces things interesting."
COPYRIGHT 1980 Gruner & Jahr AG & Co.
9273
CSO: 3103 17
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
POPULARITY OF PCF'S MARCHAIS SEEN DECLINING
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 3 May 80 p 130
[Article by Jacques Roure]
[Text] Georges Marchais drinking on 29 April in the hotel Meridien of
Paris, with the Soviet Borxs Ponomarev, one of the dignitaries from the
Kremlin. Then, shaking the hand of the Czech Vasil Bilak, one.of the grave
diggers of the Prague Spring. Georges Marchais, the same day, confronting
the No 2 socialist, Lionel Jospin, live on Channel 2.
~aice, within a 2-hour period, the Conference nf the European Communist
Parties and "Les Dossiers de 1'Ecran," recognized at the Tours Conference--
which ratified, in 1920, the split of the Socialist Party and the creation
of the Communist Party--gave the secretary general of the French Communist
Party the opportunity to brilliantly confirm his double betrayal.
He had made himself the champion, belated but apparently determined, of the
independence of the Communist Party from Moscow. He is now playing the part
of the soviet "driving belts" in Europe. He had made himself the advocate
of the Union of the left. He is now demonstrating once again that the
Communist Party and the Socialist Party no longer have anything in common.
- Why this willingness to return to the sources of the Tours Conference:
rallying with Moscow and split with the so~~ialists? "It is a question of
creating the framework of a different left, more radical, tougher, that only
we would then be able to incarnate," explains a communist leader. In other
words: a left completely excluding the Socialist Party.
This explains the more and more caricatural criticism of the socialists.
Day before yesterday, they "were leaning towards the right." Yesterday,
they were accused of being full-fledged members of the "threesome party"
- with Giscard and Chirac. Today, Mitterrand is considered by L'HUMANITE .
to be "more to the right" than the president of the republic. This explains
the systematic denigration. Nothing is too hard to rally the discontented.
This line, pure and ha.rd, which has been guiding Marchais for the past
year now, has led him to a succession of failures.
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--Failure of the European Communist Parties Paris Conference, 28 and 29
April. Marct?ais was counting on the presence of the Italian, Spanish,and
Yugoslav communists to render less noticeable his alining with Moscow. He
was hoping to act as mediator between the Soviets and the Eurocommunists.
He oniy succeeded in being the obliging host of the Soviets and in displaying
publicly the divisions of the Eurocommunists. "Less we will speak of this
meeting, the better off the Party will be," confided a collaborator of the
Central Committee.
--Declining popularity of the co~unist leader in the public opinion. This
decline is noticeable in all public opinion polls. According to the IFOP,
68 percent of the socialist voters would in no event vote for Marchais. And
especially, 20 percent of the communist voters would not vote for him, in
comparison with 12 percent in November 1979. Mitterrand would only get
14 percent of rhe intended votes if Rocard was a candidate, and 15 percent
if Mitterrand was a candidate.
However, it is especially within the system that the uneasiness is being
felt. This is a new and important fact. "I know of 13 members of the
Central Committee that are is disagreement with Marchais," explatns one
communist official. This is to point out that even at ~he highest level,
the secretary general of the Co~unist Party is bei:n.g challenged. Even
amongst the leaders. Thus, Pierre Juquin, who is nevertheless indebted to
Marchais fox his rise in the political tiureau, today admist, in private,
certain disagreements with the policy of the secretary general. Even if
he faithfully continues to play out his role as spokesman.
For the fi.rst time, several federal secretaries, gathered in Paris on
21 April--namely, those from the Midi--did not hesitate, in front of Charles
Fiterman, to denounce the party line. According to them, it is the deep
causE of the militant demobilization that they are noticing in the depart-
~enrs. As a matter of fact, th~ campaign for renewing one's membership in
the Communist Party is becoming a fiasco. Even L'HUMANITE does not dare
put out the falgs. Certain branch secretaries, whose cells no longer meet,
send in their Party cards through the mail. As for L'HUMANITE, its sales
keep decreasing. Its circulation is inferior to 90,000 copies.
"I nave rarely seen the Co~unist Party as little mobilized as it is
presently," explains a Communist Party official. "There is a surviving
core of people where one finds the most sectarian. They stick to Marchais
and are locking the Party." ;
~
Intellectuals who had up to now resisted getting involved in the dispute,
are in turn doubting. Two spectacular examples. The historian Alexander
Adler, one of the writers of "The USSR and Us"--book strongly recommended
by the major ruling body of the Communist Party when it came out in 1978--has
not renewed his members~ip card. The novelist, Gilles Perrault, author of i
"Pull-over Rouge," who ia 1977 had slammed the door on the Socialist Party to
- join the Communist Party, admits today that he feels he has been cheated. ~
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The secretary general of the Coa~unist Party was counting on the burial of
the Union of the Left to steal the leadership of the opposition from the
Socialist Party. One year from the presidential elections, the result of
partial local elections is unequivocal: the Communist Party is stagnant,
when it is not regressing. The Socialist Party is maintaining its positions.
- And it remains in the public opinion polls, the most popular party of France.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
95g2
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
'GRADUATED' DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN FOREIGN POLICY
Proposal by Jean-Pierre Cot
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 31 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 pg 18-19
[Article by Jean-Pierre Cot (Socialist deputy from Savoy)] _
[Text] Is France capable of having a human rights policy? The answer is
less obvious than might be desired. The sub~ect remains one of virtuous -
proclamations which cover up dubious pracCices. Uruguay, which syste-
matically imprisons opponents, which kidnaps, tortures and assassinates
politi.cal pris~~ners, has ratified the United Nations pact on civil and
politiical rigY.ts, as has Pinochet's Chile. The odious regime of the shah
of Iran, whose sinister Savak went hammer and tongs against thousands of
prisoners, celebrated with true imperial pomp the year of human rights
and played an active role on the UN Human Rights Commission. Everyone
has realized since the 20th Congresa of the CPSU, that tviolations of
basic human rights are not the monopoly of capitalist countries and
fascist regimes. Stalin's crimes were in no way inferior to Hitler's,
the Gulag is a good match for Western tyrannies, the genocide of the
Khmer people has, I trust, found no defender.
France's constant position since 1958 has strengthened that situation in
which the most odious vice has thus rendered homage to virtue. Our
diplomacy has been lavish, in international chambers, with good advice
and has kept on recalling, with suspicious insistence, the Declaration of
1789. For all that, whenever the minister was urged to act in a specific ~
case, the reply would roll out: "Surely you do not mean it?! That matter i
comes under the internal 3urisdiction of the national authorities, who i
would see in our intervention inadmissible inCerference. But rest assured, ;
we are acting, in spite of everything, discreetly, effectively..."
However, for several years now, an important change has been observed. -
By the action of private organizations, among the first rank of which
must be placed Amnesty International, public opinion has been swakened
to the problem of human rights. Evidence has been increasing subsCan- ,
tially, such as the long lists of pregnant women, children, and teenagers
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who have "disappeared" in ~rgentina, doubtless abducted and assassinated
by the police.* Henceforth, a citizen who is arbitrarily arrested has
some chance of being traced by othera, in other countries, who will
request an accounting, who will exercise conatant pressure on his behalf.
It is admitted today, throughout the world, that the violation of human
rights concerns all human beings and that in this matter the exception of -
internal jurisdiction can no longer be pretexted. The USSR and the
peoples democracies have learned this at their expense by undertaking at ,
Helsinki agreements whos~ full consequences they did not foresee. Inter- ~
national proclamations are no longer altogether futile.
The effort of private organizations is fundamental but insufficient. As
long as states will not actively intervene to demand respect of the
basic rules for the protection of human rights, the results will be meager.
To be sure, a policy of human righta is not easy to set in motion. In
- this domain where the absolute, where intransigence are the only con-
ceivable aCtitudes, the limits of public action must be admitted. No
government whatever can make the defense of human rights the sole object
of its foreign policy. Other considerations intervene, such as national
security, the maintenance of detente and world peace. These ob~ectives
must constantly be conciliated with the imperatives of the struggle for �
human rights, with the knowledge that in politics it is impossible t~ _
. subordinate everything to a moral imperative. On the morrow of World
War I, Max Weber emphasized the opposition between the ethics of convic-
tion and the ethics of responsibility. He demonstrated how the politi-
cian, who was responsible for all the conseqLences of his acts, comes
under the second ethic and could not take refuge in the comfort of a
moral absolute. In the doma.in of human rights, we are obliged to be
responsible, even if it is more painful there than elsewhere...
The ethics of responsibility lead to what I shall call a conception of the
graduated defense of human rights. I realize how much such an idea may
app.ear shocking, since it involves the defense of universal values. How-
ever, by putting everything on the same level, we are condemning ourselves
to ineffecfiveness and we are facilitating cowardly confusion. I unhesi-
tatingly condemn the practice of occupati.onal interdiction in West Germany,
but I find it inacceptable to place it in the same bag as the building of
the Berlin wall by East Germany. Likewise, I refuse to treat identically
the arbitrary internments in the Soviet Union and the torture, assassina-
tion, and massive disappearances in Argentina. It is proper to grant~
unstinting support to Sov3et dissidentis, no matter what political solu-
tions the latter advocate, because the regime refuses them freedom of
speech and hunts them down for opinion delinquency. It is not clear that
the boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games must be pleaded for as we did for
the Buenos Aires "Mundial." Two years ago, we had to shout aloud about
the abomination of a poorly known regime. Next year, the voice of
*A must on your reading list: "Argentina, the Devil in the Sun," by
Carlos Gambetta (Atelier Marcel Jullian).
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Sakharov and his friends will have to be heard. The context is not the
s ame .
The speech delivered by Jean-Francois Poncet during the debate on the
budget for the Foreign Affairs Department denotes, in human rights
matters, an important evolution in French theses. Henceforth, the prob- -
lem of human rights is considered to fa11 within the p urview of inter- -
national affairs and not within the internal ~urisdiction of the indi- ~
vidual states. Concretely, France affirms that it is its duty to -
intervene, firstly on behalf of its own nationals, but also--and therein ,
_ lies the novelty--for the respect of human rights in the person of every ~
~ human being. The minister adds that the government intends to draw con- ~
sequences from this in bilateral relations between France and the states ~s
concerned. Lastly, the homage rendered to the action of private organi-
zations foreshadows closer collaboration between the latter and official
agencies than has been the case in the past.
While we can only be satisfied by this change in a position of principle, _
the credibility of Jean-Francois Poncet's declarations is sorely tried
- by the recent behavior of French officials in several circumstances.
On Africa, ,the assertions oF the president of the republic cannot cause
; the truth to be forgotten. France refused to the last minute to
acknowledge the Bangui massacres, i~fidch were qualified by Robert Galley
as "pseudo-events." It systematically attempted to discredit those who
were attempting to sound the alarm and was above all anxious to keep the
imperial marionette on his thxone, then to find posthaste a successor for
him. The denials put forth today do not change one iota of the affair:
either our diplomats did not know anything, while all Bangui was in the ;e
know, which seriously calls into question their competence, or, mnre
likely, the government refused to do anything and finds itself today
poorly placed to give protestations of its zeal for human rights. ~
Need it be recalled, on the other hand, that, one after the other, within
1 year's time, the press attache, the cultural attache, and the military
attache of the French Embassy in Buenos Aires publicly made known their
sympathy with the Argentine regime? Colonel Le Guer even declared:
Every French officer would have acted as the Argentine officers did in
a case like that which this country experienced from 1976 to 1978." ! ~
Transf ers were made--disciplinary measures, it appears.
Furthermore, remarkable determination will be required to change the bad
habits of some of our diplomatic envoys--others, fortunately, have an
admirable attitude--by forcing them to break with the tradition of polite-
ness w�hich is the heart of diplomacy. ,
i
The t~sk is all the more difficult in that the Department of Foreign
Affairs is not the only one involved; defense and finance do not neces-
sarily have the same poin~ of view, and the chief of mission will have to ~
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exercise in this respect the new authority which has been conferred on him.
In the absence of such effart, it will have been to no avail to declare
that "our diplomatic machinery is completely mobilizec? to assure, in
France's name, the defense of human rights."
For human rights cannot be separated from overall foreign policy. It ia
the absence of an all-inclusive conception which calls into question the
capacity of the present government to act in Chis ma.tter. What is a human
_ rights policy worth when in other respects the right of the Saharan people
to exist is trampled on? When, in fact, political asylum is abolished by
the Dublin agreement, thus creating a repressive European void? When
' Klaus Croissant or Francesco Piperno, accused on clearly political grounds,
are extradited on the basis of incomplete dossiers, in order to do a
neighbor a good turn? When they are getting ready to institute tY.e rule
of the arbitrary and of the convenient for the expulsion of immigi~ant _
workers under the Stoleru law? France a land of asylum? The minister
- was right to recall~that it is to our honor that we have welcomed many
political refugees. But, if they have to be put at the mercy of state
policy, politics are significantly tarnished as a result.
Lastly, the link between the defense of human rights and arms sales comes
to the fore. The government refuses, to this day, to admit it. It
esteems that it can continue to develop commercial relations in general
and the frui.tful arms trade in particular with any regime whatsoever.
While the United States, within the framework of a policy of limiting
arms sales about which there is much to be said, has suspended a large
number of contracts which had been or were about to be signed with South
American dictators, France has taken up the slack. We are delivering
"Mirage" planes to Argentina and Chile and light and antiguerrilla arms
to most of the countries of Latin America. To my knowledge, the only
embargo rules effectively applied have been those against Chile, with
the known limits. We are not the only ones to act thus because we are
faced with German and British competitior.. The fact remains that the
European Community, in Latin America as wsli as in Africa, is taking the
= place, in the nick of time, of faltering American imperialism. Political
action has its constraints. Let us know how to exp.ose them clearly by ~
stripping them of their aureole of hypocrisy. We will be all the more
.~ustified in saying that, for lack of extending to the entire world the
_ policies being followed, for lack of gathering these up in a coherent
design, the human rights policy outlined by the minister of foreign
affairs runs the risk of being a simple alibi which will not long mask
the truth. ~
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Obaervateur"
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Criticiam, Analysis of Proposal !
Paris CONlNiENTAIRE in French Spring Edition 80 pp 111-114 i
[ArtiGle by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie) I
I
[TextJ Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie is a professor at the i
College de France. Among his principal works are: ~
"The History of Languedoc" (Presses Universitaries de
= France, collection Que sais-~e, 1977); "The Languedoc ~
Peasantry" (:Iouton, 1975; Flammarion, abridged version,
1977); "The Historian's~Territory" (2 volumes,
Gallimard, 1973 and 1978); "Montaillou, a Languedoc ~
Village" (Gallimard, 1975); "Carnaval of Novels" ;
(Gallimard, 1979); "Money, Love and Death in Oc Land" i
(printing, Seuil, 1980).
Among the politicians of the Socialist Party, J-P Cot unquestionably
distinguishes.himself by his knowledge of situations and by his sense of ~
responsibilities. I believe it therefore important to submit to an '
am3.ca1 and critical analysis one of the essential texts of Jean-Pierre
Cot. And thiQ all the more so in that LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, the paper
which published this text, has ~always made itself consp3.cuous by i.ts
courageous antitotalitar3an stands, on the various fronts which held
center stage, either on the right or on the left.
Textual analysis is an arid exercise but one which is not without perti- '
nence. I shall inflict therefore this surgical operation on an article
of Jean-Pierre Cot entitled "'Graduated' Defense of Human Rights in '
Foreign Policy."1 i
Since the "Declaration of Human Rights" promulgated in France in 1789,
iC was generally thought that the defense of these rights shruld be :
unconditional, even if c~rcumstantial or opportunistic questioas might
surface here and there. Of what then doea the new principle of "gradua-
tion" or "gradation," proposed by Jean-Pierre Cot, a~urist and Socialist
:iepury from Savoy, consist? There is first of all, from Cot, a firm, and
co~letely ~~sstified, condemnation of the procedures employed in this
domain by Che "rightist" dictatorships of the Latin American countries.2
It would have been logical to include in this condemnation of the Latin '
portion of the New World the Castro regime, which systematically violates ~ ~
human rights. But Cuba,~the communial soil of the sensitivity o.f a
certain left, becomes miraculously taboo in this article: Cot dc~es not .
even mention the name of this large Caribbean island. ~
I
Afterwards comes the pillorying of the former regime of the shah.3 One ~
~ might have thought, there again, that the occasion cried aloud for also
condemning the regime which succeeded that of the shah; t'nis new system,
- for the first time (in a long while) in the history of humanity, sets up I
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a theocracy, which ia absurd, xenophobic and mediaeval in the worat sense
of that ad~ective. It is enough to make laymen like Little Father Combea ~
_ or Jean Mace turn over in their graves: both of these figures, laity
oblige, among the legitimate ancestors of the present Socialist Party.
But Cot does not condemn Khomeyni. The deputy from Savoy will say indeed
that he wanted to avoid blind windows or symbolic symmetry; it would,
therefore, be ridiculous, in order the better to criticize the shah, or
even Pinochet, to heap sarcasms on Khomeyni or Fidel Castro.4
But, however, there is a paradox: these accursed blind windows are going -
to be encountered, ritually (although Jean-Pierre Cot had previously
rejected them), as soon as it is a question of condemning the breach of
human rights which has occurred in the country of "true socialism":
"Everyone has realized since the 20th Congress of the CPSU (USSR), that
violations of basic human rights are not the monopoly of capitalist
countries and fascist regimes. Stalin's crimes were in no way inferior
to Hitler's, the Gulag is a good match for Western tyrannies, the geno-
cide of the Khmer people has, I trust, found no defender."
Let us note in passing the mumbo-~umbo of this long sentence. The
symmetry aan be conceived, indeed, between communism and fascism: in -
different degrees, they both trample human rights under foot. It does
rcot hold, on the other hand, if the USSR is compared with "capitalist"
countries, like England or republican France; in these two nationa,
human rights, in spite of ceYtain deplorable slip-ups, appear to be
fundamentally respected, in comparison in any case with the USSR.
Imperturbably, Cot keeps on alining the blind windows and the sy~etries
which he had sworn, in the introductc~ry paragraph of his article, that
~ he would refrain from utilizing since their usage would be in any event
ambiguous and counterproductive.5 But that is because now the communist
world is ~.n question. Cot doubtless surmises that he should avoid in
the eyes of his own party the fatal reproach of anticommunism. Against
them (sic), he wants to take his urecaut3.ons, a priori, by raining shells
on both froni~. The result is significant. Thus on Stalin: "Stalin's
crimes were in no way inferior to Hitler's" and further long on the
gulag: "the Gulag is a good match for Western tyrannies." Only the _
condemnation of the Cambodian genocide is unilateral and absolute: "the
genocide flf the Khmer people has, I trust, found no defender."
Furthermore, it must be noted that this statement relative to the Khmers
is carefully inserted in the system of symmetrical oppositions which the
preced3.ng sentence defined,6 which introduced inclusively this "risky"
paragraph on Stalin, tha Gulag, Indochina.
The USSR is going to surface again in the following paragraph, which is
devoted to the importanC changes which, according to Cot, Amnesty Inter-
national and the Helsinki agreements have produced. Here again,
the "fatherland of socialism" is caught up in a system of oppositions
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which allows the author to safeguard his good progressist conscience.
He is thus going to use in this case a double-barreled comparison: _
Argentina-USSR, and no longer only Stalin-Hitler or CPSU-Weatern world:
1) Argentina: "Evidence has been increasing substantially, such as the
_ long lists of pregnant women~ children, and teenagers who have 'dis-
appeared' in Argentina, doubtless abducted and assassinated by the police";
2) the parallel connection, USSR and the peoples democracies: It is
admitted today, throughout the world, that the violation of human rights
concerns all human beings and that in this matter the exception of
internal jurisdiction can no ~longer be pretexted. The USSR and the
peoples democracies have learned this at their expense by undertaking
at Helsinki agreements whose full consequences they did not foresee.
International proclamatione are no longer altogether futile." ~
The sophism is evident. It is indeed (I agree with Cot on this) useful
and positive that Amnesty International publieh lists of missing persons
in Argentina and elsewhere. On the other hand, a dose of frightening
ignorance is needed to write that the Helsinki agreements were ach~eved -
at the expense af the USSR, even if, in effect, the East's dissidents
have argued from the Helsinki agreement in view of an action which,
moreover...will gradually lead them behind bars.
There follows a paragraph in which the author emphasizes that a state,
a government, cannot allow itself to be guided solely by moral consid-
eraCions. It would be unseemly to remi.nd Jean-Pierre Cot that his party
(the SP) is not, at the moment, in power; consequently, nothing prevents
Cot from indulging in the (unpreter~tious) luxury of defending moral values
everywhere, wherever they be threatened.
A new train of parallel connections then parades by. For convenience
sake I call them A, B, C, and D. At least three (B, C, and D) reconsti-
tuCe in their turn thase blind and double windows which Jean-Pierre Cot
professed, however, to abhor. The first parallel connection (A) couples
East and West Germany. ~ao others (B and C) again involve the binominal
Argentina/USSR, which, decidedly, pesters our author. A third (D) centers
on Soviet dissidents.
(A) East and West Germany. "I unhesitatingly condemn the practice of
occupational interdiction in West G~rmany, but I find it inacceptable
to place it in the same bag as the building of the Berlin wall by East
Germany . 01
For once, Cot goes very far in the right direction and one should, .
although o~,ie swallow is a long way from making a summer, acknowledge it.
Everyone indeed knows, and Cot is a thousand times right in recalling it,
that the liberal regime af West Gerr.~any is wrong in formulating certain
professional interdictions (berufsverbot); but this regime is infinitely
more human than the dictatorial system of East Germany, symbolized by the
Berlin wall.
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Our writer, however, becomes panic-stricken at his own daring, no matter
how justifiable it may be. Immediately he is going to balance or rather
unbalance his sole piece of intellectual audacity, he will flank it
awkwardly by three debatable propositions symbolica7.ly symmetrical in
f orm.
_ (B): "Likewise, I r~fuse to treat identically the arbitrary internments
in the Seviet Union and the torture, assassination, and massive dis-
appearances in Argentina." This time, the delicate equilibrium is
frankly upset by Cot, and shockingly tilted toward the USSR. Everyone
indeed knows that also rife in the USSR is psychiatric torture, assassi-
nation and massive abductions (there are several million men in the
present gulag, which greatly exceeds the number of abductions in
Argentina, no matter how scandalous these latter may be). Everyone
- knows, furth~rmore, that the USSR practices, among other typea of dis-
crimination, atate-sponsored anCi-Semitism and atate-sponsored anti-
_ Christianism.
Carrying out on a grander and more secret scale the same policy of tor- _
ture, assassination and massive abduction as in Argentina, and, moreover,
taking the liberty of banning from society two of the three religions of
the Bible, is rea3ly an extraordinary record! Why, in these conditions, .
attenuate the moral condemnation leveled at Brezhnev in comparison with
that which overwhelms Videla? An attenuati.on completely unmotivated!
It is evident, however, beyond any doubt, in Cot's short sentence I have
just quoted in this respect.
Proposition (C): the para13.e1 Moscow-Buenos Aires is continued by
reflections on the binominal Mundial-Olympic Games, that other pons
asinorum of our time.~ Here again, as in the preceding proposition (B),
the USSR raceives in relation to Argentina the traditional treatment of
the most favored nation. A sports boycott for Argentina, Cot tells us,
si; a sports boycott for the USSR, non. Let us read the sentence:
It is not clear that the boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games must be
pleaded for as we did for the Buenoa Aires 'Mundial~' Two years ago, we
had to shout aloud about the abominat3on of a poorly known regime. Next
year, the voice of Sakharov and his friends will have to be heard. The
context is not the same." -
The way I look at it, the context is even worse in the USSR, which,
obviously, does not whitewash the Argentines, but ~.et us change the
- subject,
Cot will doubtless plead that his position, ia this case, is du~ to
reasons of expediency. But the denial with respect to the USSR uf a boy-
cott which, conversely, was rigorously advocated for Argentina, appears
to me, in reality, fully correlated with the special indulgence Cot had
previously shown, fundamentally, with regard to the USSR in the question
of "arbitrary internments."
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Whence the interest offered by an exegesis of the final phase D: "It is
proper to grant unstinting support to Soviet diasidents, no matter what
political solutions the latter advocate, because the regime refuaes them
~reedom of speech and hunts them down for opinion delinquency." ~
The blind window here ia conatituted by the restriction: "no matter what
political solutions the latter advocate," which, in itself, contains
nothing shocking. Cot is referring here to the extremist opinions of
some dissidents, even genial ones, such as Solzenitzen.~ It wi11, how-
ever, be noted that not once, with respect to the arbitrary abductions
which have been carried out in Argentina, has Cot formulated the problem -
which should have been self-evident to him, from the very fact of Che
unilateral criticism he has expressed against the opinions of certain =
Eastern dissidents. Among the missing persons in Argentina, there have
indeed also been, hang it! some terrorists Cot has ne~er mentioned; their
attacks, their bullets were ~ust as open to criticism (and even a lot
more so) than some recent arguments, certainly quite debatables of the -
author of the "Gulag Archipelago." Implicitly, with a casuist's
ingenuity, Cot then tips the scales against the Russian dissidents in
comparison with the persecuted Argentines; exactly as he previously
tipped tham toward the USSR in comparison with the Argentina regime.
It is seen here, once again, that the motto "two weights, two measures"
moves ahead, clothed in subtle logic, on all fronts.
We will not be surprised then that with the same logic the second part
of the article (devoted to the human rights policy of the Quai d'Orsay)
com~pletely dismisses the problems of the cot~ntries of the East. The only -
regimes evoked are henceforth those which are sub~ect to Western influ- =
ence.
1) It is first question of French-speaking Africa and, to be sure, of
the Central African Republic.
2) It is next question of Argentina: Cot complains about the tokens of
sympathy which French officers and diplomats are reputed to have proferred
this past year with regard to the Argentine regime.
3) Again in question are West Gerniany and Italy: Cot evokes the Croissant
and Piperno affairs. ,
4) The arbitrary system "[instituted by] the Stoleru law for the expul- ~
sion of immigrant workers" is sharply criticized. '
5) Delivery of planes and light arms to Argentina and Chile are then the
object of severe criticism by our author. -
6) Lastly, in a remarkable display which closes the article, the
European Economic Community and the inevitable American imperialism are
soundly attacked for their African and Latin American interventions.
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It goes without saying that, among these six points of criticism
addreased to Western countries, many are important and deserve attentive
examinatfon. However, how can one help but emphasize that criticism
would equally be possible of certain aspe~ts of the French policy
regarding human rights violations in the East; and, for example, the
- fact that this or that French statesman refused to meet Amalrik; the
fact also of bowing down symbolically before Lenin's mummy; or of
accepting to leaving to the Vietnamese the supervision of sorCing out
their refugees?...
To stick to the three preceding examples (Amalrik, Lenin, the Vietnameae),
these serious weaknesses of French policy wou].d also deserve firm con-
demnation, emanating from a politician of the opposition. But, in that
case, he would run the riak of irritating that ex-ally, the PCF. It is
easier to understand now what Jean-Pierre Cot meant by the sibylline title
of his article: "A Graduated Defense of Human Rights." It is always a
question, for this important leader of one of the two parties of the left,
to operate on what the Anglo-Americans call a double standard: toward the
West, a frank. and massive French condemnation is pronounced, potentially ~
= ~ustified, moreover, against human rights violations perpetrated in or on
behalf of a given Western country. Toward the East, on the other hand,
Cot systematically dolls up his criticism with restrictions, concessions
_ to the adversary, compensating trade-offs, with blind windows... We are
conf ronted here not with the resolutely critical essence of a true spirit
of the left, but with the mental structures of the French left: it has
been afflicted with permanent myopia, since the 1920's, for what is
happening east of the iron curtain. A strange case of squinting! We
have yet to hear the last of it!
FOOTNOTES
1. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 31 Dec 79-6 Jan 80, p 18.
2. "Uruguay, which systematically imprisons opponents, which kidnaps,
tortures and assassinates political prisoners, has ratified the
United Nations pact on civil and political rights, as hae Pinochet's
Chile." (J-P Cot, op. cit.)
3. "The odious regime of the shah of Iran, whose sinister Savak went .
hammer and tongs against thousands of prisoner, celebrated with true -
imperial pomp the year of human rights and played an active role on _
the UN Human Rights Commission."
4. Let us cite in this respect the introductory paragraph of the
incriminated article by Jean-Pierre Cot: "I realize how much such
an idea (the graduated defense of h~an rights) may appear shocking.
However, by putting everything on the same level, we are condemning
ourselves to ineffectiveness and we are facilitating cowardlq confu-
sion."
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5. Cf note 4.
~ 6. I recall this sentence: "Everyone has realized since the 20th Con- ;
gress of the CPSU that violations of basic human rights are not the
monopoly of capitalist countries and fascist regimes."
7. The Mundial, world soccer championship held recently in Buenos Aires.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Commentaire ~
9330
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
ARIANESPACE PARTICIPANTS, DIRECTORS NAMED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 29 Mar 80 p 50
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Arianespace, First Space Transport
Company"]
[TextJ The Arianespace Company for production, marketing, and launching
of the European "Ariane" rockets has ~ust been founded. It is the first
private spac.e transport company existing anywhere in the world ta have at
its disposal a heavy launcher.
The new company's charter and by-laws were signed, according to plan (see
AIR ET COSMOS No 804), in Paris on 26 March, by all the shareholders.
_ Arianespace Company has 48 European shareholders, representing CNES
jNational Center for Space Studies], the principal shareholder (34 per-
cent), as well as 11 European banks and 36 companies in the aerospace
and electronics industries of the 11 countries participating in mass pro-
duction of the Ariane launcher (see AIR ET COSMOS No 791). The company's
nominal capital of 120 million francs is shared by the 47 shareholders in
Arianespace (see table).
At its first meeting, held the same day, 26 March, the board of directors
of Arianespace elected as its chairman and director general Frederic
d'Allest, CNES director of launchers, and consequently director of the
"Ariane program" for the ESA [European Space Agency].
- The 12 members of the Arianespace board of directors are:
--Frederic d'Allest, CNES director of launchers;
--Roger Lesgards, CNES secretary general;
~-Sean-Gerard Roussel, CNES director of industrial and international
affairs;
--Jean-Jacques Sussel, INES deputy director in charge of ma~or indus-
trial pro3ects;
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--Pierre-Marie Usunier, director of the ballistics and space division of
Aeroapace Company (France);
--Andre Garnault, SEP [European Propellant Company) (France) director of
industrial policy;
--Georges Estibal, MATRA Company [expansion unknown], deputy director of
the space sector;
--Bernd Kosegarten, marketing director of ERNO [Northern Development
SyndicateJ (Germany);
--Jorg Feustel-Buechl, director of advanced technological studies of MAN
[Augsburg-Nuremberg Machinery Manufacturing] Com~any (Germany); ~
--P. G. Willekens, administrative director general of SABCA [Belgian
Aerospace Construction Company, Limited] (Belgium), representing group 1
countries (Belgium, Denmark, Italy);
--Hans-Peter Schneiter, technical director of Contraves Company (Switzer-
land), for group 2 countries (Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland);
--Bengt Eriksson, deputy director general of the Volvo Company (Sweden),
for group 3 countries (Sweden, Ireland, United Kingdom).
_ The board of directors of Arianespace thus includes seven French persons
among its 12 members, corresponding to France's majority participation in
Arianespace capital (about 60 percent) and in the development of the
launcher (65 percent).
Arianespace is a French limited liability, private capital cou~any. But
the company's organization will be international in character. It will
be made up, in all, of about 100 persons who will be established at Evey
(Essonne), where the administrative offices of CNES launchers, responsi-
ble for the Ariane program, are already located.
The company will have one or two deputy directors general, as well as
four operations management departments: an administrative and financial
department, a marketing department, an industrial department (in charge
of production and staffing the pro~ect team), and an operations depart- .
ment (transportation, logistics, management of launching facilities).
Marketing prospects for the Ariane isuncher suggest~an estimated 1983
turnover of close to 1 billion francs, according to CNES.
The first Arianespace launching should take place at the end of 1982,
after the four in-flight teat shots (LO1 to L04) and the six launchings
of the first production lot of mass produced rockets carried out under
the direct responeibility of the European Space Agency.
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- We remind readers that parallel to the founding of the Arianespace Com-
pany, the statement made by France remains open to the membership of
European states until 15 April. This document will constitute a gen-
eral legal framework for the production of Ariane launcher~. It will be ,
complemented by a covenant between E5A and Arianespace, to be aigned ~
probably at the end of June. All the details on the new Arianespace
Company were published recently in these columns (AIR ET COSMOS No 804).
Participation by the 48 Arianespace Shareholders Percentage
France: 59.45
CNES ~ 34.20
Aerospatiale [French Aerospace Company] 8.50
SEP ' 8.50
M~T~ 3.60
Air Liquide [Liquid Air Coutpany] 1.85
Comsip-Entreprise [expansion unknown] 0.10
Crouzet 0.10
Deutsch 0.10
Intertechnique 0.10
SAFT [Stationary Battery and Traction Company] 0.10 -
SFENA [French Air Navigation Equipment Company] 0.10
SFIM [expansion unknown] 0.10
SODETEG [Technical Studies and General Enterprises Company] 0.10
Credit Lyonnais 0.50
, BNP [National Bank of Paris] 0.50
Societe Generale ~General Banking CompanyJ 0.40 -
Paribas 0.40
Vernes Bank 0.20
Germany: 19.60
M~ 7.90
ERNO 5.50
Dornier 2.gp
MBB [Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm Company] 2.gp
Dresdner Bank [Bank of Dr~asden] 0.30
Bayerische Vereins Bank [United Bavarian Bank] 0.30
Belgium: 4.40
SABCA [Belgian Aeronautical Construction Company, Limited] 2.60
ETCA-ACEC [Aerospace Technical Studies and Construction-
- Charlsroi Electrical Engineering ShopsJ 1.10
FN [National Arms Manufacturing Company, Limited]. 0.70 '
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Percentage
Italy: 3.40
SNIA-Viscosa [exp ansion unknownJ 1.60
Aeritalta [e~cpansion unknown] 0.90
Selenia U.90 '
Switzerland: 2,~p
Contraves 2.15
CIR [expansion unknown] 2.15
F und W[expansion unknown] 0.10
Union des Banques Suisses [Union of Swiss Banks] 0.30
Spain: 2.50
CASA [Harvester Suppliers, Incorporated] 1.90
Sener 0.60
United Kingdom: 2.40 ~
i
British Aerospace 0.95 ~
Ferranti 0.95
Avica 0.30 ~
Midland Bank Limited 0.20 ~
Sweden: I
2.40
Volvo 1.60.
SAAB-Scania 0.80
i
- Netherlands: 2.2p
Fokker 1.90
Allgemeine Bank Nederland [General Bank of the Netherlands] 0.30 . ~
1)enmark: 0.70 .
Rovsing 0.50 ~
Copenhagen Handelsbank [Copenhagen Commercial Bank] 0.20 ~
~
Ireland: 0.25
ADTEC [expansion unknown] 0.15 ~
Aer-Lingus [Eire National Airline] 0.10
COPYR~GHT: Air & Cosmos 1980
12149 ~
CSO: 3100
35 '
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COWTRY SECTION ~ FRANCE -
MIRAGE 2000'S INTERCEPTION GAPABILITIES DESCRIBED ,
Paris AIR ~ COSMOS in French 29 Mar 80 pp 28-29
[Article by Jacques Morisset: "Five Minutes To Intercept a Plane Flying at
75,000 Feet and Mach 2.5"]
[Text] As the Mirage 2000's main mission is interception, it is of interest
to examine how the Mirage 2000, equipped with an air-to~air~~?missile (MATRA
Super 530 D) will be able to intercept and destroy an enemy aircraft pene-
trating national airspace at very higlh altitude and high speed.
The hypothetical case is that of a"hostile" flying at Mach 2.5, or about
2,700 kilometers per hour, and around 75,000 feet altitude (23,000 meters):
such ~could be the case, for exam~le, for a MIG 25 on photographic reconnais-
sance, a hypothesis put foYward on numerous occasions the past few years.
The "hostile" in question thus covers 45 kilometers every minute and 750
meters every second....
After detection by distant early warning radar (this method of detection
does in fact operate well beyond the borders, and in the case of a MIG 25,
shortly after take-off, as its climbing speed, flight level, and cruising
speed permit rapid identif ication) and,confirmation that the hostile is
- actually prep~ring to penetrate national airspace, a FATAC (Tactical Air
Force) Mirage 2000 is ordered to take off at an appropriate time, selected
- so that interception is accomplished to an optimal pattern. Everything
happens very fast then, on account of the Mirage 2000's climbing speed (up
to 15,000 meters per minute, or 250 meters per.second), its acceleration
capability, its radar range (RDI or RDM [expansions unknown]), and the
performance of the Super 530 D(rar.ge, climbing and acceleration capability).
Af ter take-off, the Mirage first climbs at high subsonic speed, that is to
say Mach 0.95, up to about 20,000 feet; then it makes a transsonic accelera-
tion enabling it to break the "sound barrier" as quickly as possible, ~aith
the thrust of its SNECMA [National Company for the Study and Construction
of Aircraft Engines] M 53 turbo-jet, with burners on; on account of the
increase in.drag inevitably noted between Mach 0.9 and Mach 1.2 or 1.3 -
(the transsonic "hump"), it is indeed advantageous to have transition be
as brief as possible, hence the choice of a trajectory that is (temporarily) �
almost horizontal.
36
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After acceleration, the aircraft is in full supersonic operation, and climbs
again at a less acute pitch at a flight speed of 650 knots t1,200 kilometers
per hour). Less than 3 minutes has elapsed since take-off....
Around 25,C~00 Feet (7,500 meters), the radar picks up the target, which is -
- still about I00 kilometers away and flying 50,000 feet higher up...the
closing speed of the two aircraft is very high, and the distance separating
them is reduced by about 1,100 meters every second: detection is immediately
followed by identification, then by radar lock-on (automatic tracking): the
Mirage 2000 is now at nearly 30,000 feet, less than 4 minutes has elapsed _
since take-off.
- As soon as it has locked on to the target, the aircraft begins a new climbing
phase to place itself with its missile in the best possible position: between
_ 30,000 and 40,000 feet, the missile's seeker head loc[cs on to the target, as
permitted, obviously, by information from the aircraft's radar, automatically
transmitted to the seeker head. The Mirage 2000 has swooped skyward (the so-
called "zoom" maneuver) and the pilot is waiting for the optimum time for
firing the missile (actually, the release is automatically activated).
Fir.ing the MATRA Super 530 D: a little over 4 minutes has elapsed since take- _
of.~': the hostile is still sevr~ral tens of kilometers away, and some 20,000 .
feet higher up; while the missile is accelerating (fire~l at supersonic speed,
it will f inish its flight at a speed two or three times higher) and is climbing
- toward its target, the Aiirage 2000 also climbs for several tens of seconds so
as to "Iight up" thP target on its radar and facilitate the work of the missile's
homing he~:d, which can thus see the "illuminated" target perfectly.
A few tens of seconds later, it is all over...the MATRA Super 530 D, accurately
guided by its homing head and having a maneuvering capacility which prevents
the target's esc~pe, has intercepted and destroyed the latter: meantime,
that is to say, as soon as the missile`s homing head became.fully independent, -
the Mirage 2000 began a disengagement maneuver to Teave the interception zone.
_ Hardly 5 minutes have elapsed since take-off, which was itself ordered when
the attack craft was some 200 kilometers away.
Incidentally, the low level of these figures will be noted, an extremely
inreresting level, dur to the conjunction of three factors:
~ --Climbing and acceleration speed of the Mirage 2000: it depends on the
thrust/weight relationship at each instant of flight (and not just on the
~ thrust/weight relationship at take-off) and on the aerodynamic qualities of
the aircraft
--Range of the detection and firing radar
--Range and climbing capability of the missile, which can thus be launched
earlier and lower; in the matching of aircraft and air-to-air missile; it is
obvious that the missile is faster and climbs fas~er: so long as it can be
- 37
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guided, it is obviously an advantage to involve it to the extent possible
in the total energy gainl required, in kinetic terms, for interception.
In fact, the high performance missile valorizes the aircraft carrying it
_ and its radar, and vice versa. Compared to earlier combinations, that is
to say, Mirage 3 and Mirage F 1, the G~?rano 2 and 4 radars, the MATRA 530,
= than the MATRA Super 530 missiles, the combination of Mirage 1 plus RDM or
RDI radar plus the improved Super 530 allows several minutes to be saved
_ during interception, and a considerable shortening of the distance needed
for the interceptor's ta~Ce-off to achieve destruction of an enemy aircraft
- ae soon as it penetrates national airspace, and in some extreme cases (an
aircraft arriving at very high altitude and speed), the Mirage 2000 arms
system will be capable of effecting interceptions that are sti11 normally
impossxble for current aircraft.
1Tota1 energy is equal to the sum of kinetic (speed gain) and potential
(altitude gain)~energy.
- COPYRIGHT: A. ~
~ 'C. 1980 -
12149
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COUN'I'RY SECTION ~N~
E
AS-30 LASER MISSILE TEST-FIRED AT LANDES TEST CENTER
- Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 3 May 80 p 41
[Text] An Aerospatiale "AS 30 laser" laser-guided ground-to-air missile
was fired successfully on 4 April at the 7~andes test center in France
at a target illuminated by the laser beam from the Thomson-CSF "ATLIS" 2 ~
target designation pod, carried by a Jaguar fighter plane. According
to Aerospatiale, which announced this test on 22 April, "the firing on
4 April is the first time a laser-guided misaile has ever been.fired at
a target illuminated by a single-seat aircraft."
The "AS 30 laser," derived from the "AS 30" radio-guided missile, is a
520-kg missile, including a 240-kg explosive payload, with a range of '
between 10 and ~2 km. It is 3.65 m long, with a diameter of 0.34 m and
a wing-span of 1 m. The "AS 30 laser" missile can be used in single-sesc ~
~ or multi-seat combat a3rcraft to attack ma3or, hardened or defended ;
surface targets while peronitting the launch aircraft to remain beyond the
range of enemy defenses. The "AS 30 laser" missile has been adopted by J
the French l~ir'~Force which will use it to equip the Jaguar aircraft of
the Tactical Air Force.
COPYFtIGHT: A. & C. 1980
. ~
i
5058 ~
CSO: 3100
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~
~
~
~
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
CCONOMIC COLLABORATION WITH MEXICO OUTLINED
Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 12 May 80 p 5
[Article: "France Prepares To Play the Mexican Card Fully"]
[Text] Everything between Mexico and France is steeped in oil on the eve
of the arrival of President Portillo. The latter wishes to tnake France a
privileged partner. He is going to propose to France increased deliveries
of petroleum from now to 1990, in return for intensified technical and
scientific cooperation, industrial investment, and financing. Concern
No 1: to avoid as much as possible economic and technological dependence
on the United States. President Giscard is entering fully on this effort:
France will propose, in effect, to Mexico the signature of an agreement
on scientific and technical cooperation on the applications of nuclear
energy, as well as an agreement between the CEA [Atamic Energy Commission]
and URAMEX (riexican company charged with the exploitation of uranium)
concerning exploration for and exploitation of the important resources in
Mexico of radioactive minerals. Fran~e will also propose the use of its
technical services in the area of animal husbandry (SOCOPAL) and ~f the
commercial sale of perishable foodstuffs. PUK [Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann
Company] will also participate in the development of important sources of
copper which have not yet been exploited. To aid in the sale of Mexican
products in Europe, a Mexican trading area [plateformeJ will be established ~
in Le Harve, on the model of the Brazilian trading area already in existence.
France will also propose new sources of public financing, in addi.tion to
the agreement on Fr 1.0 billion approved at the time of the visit of
President Giscard to Mexico. The BNP [National Bank of Paris] i'.s prepared,
in addition, to lead a syndicate of the large Frencti banks in offering a
- loan of $300 million. Finally, about 25 French comp.anies already have
investment projects in Mexico.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Groupe Expansion S.A. ~
5170
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
BRIEFS
NAVAL, CUSTOMS OPERATIONS--The Navy and the Customs Service have divided up
= their maritime monitoring operations. The former will.be in charge of long-
range general surveillance, the la.tter of specifically-targeted missions
(contraband, Ma.ritime immigration, deep-sea fishing). Customs will be
equipped with about a dozen twin-engined craft while the 1Vavy will launch
a 790 million franc five-year plan for the purchase of eleven ships and
- three patrol aircrafto [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 19-25 Ma.y
80 p 24 ] .
STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS STOCKPILE--A national raw materials bank wil~ be
~ set up to enable the offering of state-gua.ranteed loans totalling 1.6
billion francs on the financial ma,rket and which will allow the addition
- of mineral raw materials (cobalt, antimony, chromium, tungsten, copper,
zinc). This stock is currently valued at 500 million francs, i.e., two
months' worth of reserves. In the United States, the strategic stockpile
is valued at about 38 billion francso [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES
in French 19-25 May 80 p 24]
CSO; 310U
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_ COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
DECLINE IN SHOE INDUSTRY PREDICTED FOR 1980 �
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 26 Apr 80 p 11
[Article by Luciano Mondini: "Our Shoes Are 'Going More Slowly
[Text] Alarm sounded at the Venice shoemakers' convention.
The miracle may be over: exports are falling, imports are
rising. The European market will have to be given more
importance. Importance of marketing.
Venice--It is frankly hard to imagine the shoe industry in crisis, beset by
imports, worried by the "loss of velocity" of exports, and oppressed by pro-
tectionism on the American, Japanese and Australian markets as well as by
an EEC disinclined to be generous to production from outside the community.
At the Venice convention, which was announced by ANCI [NationalAssociation
of Italian Shoemakers) as an adjunct to the annual assembly of shoemakers -
(6,308 production units and 112,800 members), the trade seemed to be like
- an athlete that had been pampered for his performances but who is now wal-
lowing in anxiety at an unexpected slump.
This is substantially the impression given by ANCI President Leonardo Trsn-
quilli and the many speakers who poured their laments into the microphone:
producers.; retailers, and producers of machines making shoes for export.
Undoubtedly, the interplay of circumstances bears them out. Yet it is only
fair to remember that 1979 was a"fabulous" year (and not anly 1979, as Ro-
mano Prodi said) and that a certain downturn had to be expected, Last year,
exports of finished products and shoe parts brought in 3.287 trillion lire
� or 1/3 of the petroleum deficit.
- It is as though we made everybody else walk so we could use our cars. Only
in the USA did our shoe exports (including the Lucchesian miracle clogs)
rise from 63 million pairs in 1978 to 97 milliuri. Tn 1977 we had not done
betti~r ~~ian 39 milliun, which makes a downright explosive trend. Could it
continue? No, and the producers knew it.
~.2
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$ut what is alarming, Tranquilli says, is not the foreseeable slowdown but
the feared revcrsal. He cites order figures that are down, as of 10 April
1980, by 42 percent for the USA, 18.1 percent for Germany, and 17 percent
for the rest of Europe. In sum, sales were down 24 percent compared to the
same date last year.
At the same time, imports from not only developing countries have been aggres-
sive and sustained: up 36 percent in quantity, up 77.7 percent in value for
1979 over 1978.
Again according to Tranquilli, who is certainly not optimistic, things will -
be worse in 1980, when imports will account for 23-25 percent of domestic -
_ consumption. The causes: loss of competitiveness through increased labor
costs, rising prices of raw materials, and increasingly tight money, not -
to mention monetary rigidity. Some speeches contained subtle allusions to
a"desire for devaluation," which Prodi, the convention chairman, roundly
rebutted; however, this recurring theme does reveal a distraught frame of
mind.
Essentially, then, if the wind is changing, what ought to be done? Prodi
made a few suggestions. Above all, Europe should be "rediscovere~~." The
European market is less volatile than the American and is basically "domestic,"
i.e. under control and not likely to call for continued changes in production
strategy.
Another point: in addition to the industry's capability to make shoes, it
needs to reinvent another--the ability to sell them. The industry needs ~
a commercial network that is flexible, efficient, and able to pick up and ~
transmit signals of style changes and forecasting and steering new trends. ~
I
Thirdly, the sector ought to be considered in the broader context of the i
"system." Only by working together can machine producers, tanners, and
accessory producers make innovations in the production process, make a ~
respectable impact on the market, and move into the Third Woxld with col- ~
laboration and integration procedures that are the only way of exorcising ;
the "enemy." ~
f1~i~~ing said all tliis, Prodi added, we still do not have the "solution" yet. i
Uifferent domestic conditions are needed, as well as a coherent economic
policy and something other than a war of words against inflation. But this ~
_ applies to everybody, not just shoemakers. I
~
[Chart follows ~n nPxt page.] I
~
43
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~ T
1 SINiESl. COMP~RAIIVA CONSUN11V01919 E PREYISIONI 1980 (Totale cali. a qaant. e ~alore)
~ 1978 1979 1980
- { 2 DESCHITIONE
i Paia Valore (000) Peia V~lore {000) Paia Valore (000) ~
~ 5 ES�OPT~110MI ?94.891.911 2.116.695.11I 31d.950.611 3.114.894.929 309,U00.000 3.19i.670.000
' CCMSUMI !K?EeMI 133.11E.53S 1.OdS.631.169 142.173.OD0 1.3U6.316.OCU 128.000.000 1.405.440.OU0
I IMt~OkTUIDNI 20.843.iB3 d6.939.189 21.38?.936 83.31d.617 30.OOO.C00 96.090.000
~
~6 PRODUilO~E ~01.915.719 3.115.381.191 489.239.&]6 a.348.441.316 403.OCO.OUO 4.501.06~.OU0
(1) Comparison of consumption in 1979 and forecasts for 1980
- (total of shoes by quantity and value)
(2) Description
(3) Pairs
(4) Value (in thousands)
(5) Exports
Domesti~c consumption
Imports
(6) Production
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s. ~
8782
CSO: 3104
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SPAIN
BRIEFS
BORDER CONTROLS--Computer terminals linking the State Security Directorate
- and border stations will be put into operation in the coming months. The
data provided by computers will prevent those foreigners who have been ex-
pelled from Spain through one border post from entering through another on
the following day as it now occurs. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish
18 May 80 p 5]
CSO: 3I10
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COUNTRY SECTION
- SWEDEN
. ;n+~�
ECONOMY MINISTER BOHMAN: NO CONSUI~TION INCREASE FOR 5 YEARS
Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 17 Apr 80 pp 72, 73
[Article by Lars Eklund, journalist: "Bohman Even Grimmer; Expect Several
Lean Years"]
� [Text] In the 5-year budget the Government is about to
~ publish a continuing very low economic growth is expected,
Gosta Bohma.n discloses. There will be hardly anything
left f or increased private consumption, unless it can be
transf.erred from the share of the public sector. The
grim forecasts call for an altered view on realities,
says the Minister for Economic Affairs, who now asks for
"courage from politicians, trade unions and representatives
for the employees of the public sector."
[Question] Is there room for an increase in the standard of living within
the not-too-distant future in Sweden? Is it even possible to sustain the
current level?
[Answer] In the period 1960-70 GNP increased by about 92 billion (in 1975
price~). Private consumption increased by 40 billion and public consumption
~ by about 26 billion. We had a capital formation in business here and abroad
that also amounted to 26 billion.
During the seventies, GNP increased by less than half--42 billion in the
same value o~f money. Private consumption amounted to fully 20 billion and
public consumption was about the same. The increase in capital formation
reached 1(one billion, which thus should be compared with 26 billion
during the previous decade.
Here lies the root of the evil: private and public consumption has seized
_ the total GNP increase, except for one billion, during the seventies.
And we cannot go through the eighties without substantial investments--the
growth in both public and private consumption must slow down, relatively
speaking, if we are to manage the Swedish economy. The more efficiently
~ 46
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we cut down the public sector, the more the private sector gains. But if
public consumption is allowed to expand freely, private consumption will be
- hurt.
Conclusion: no rise in the standard of living, worth mentioning, is possible.
- If the rapid expansion in the public sector is maintained there will be less
lef t for salaries--in terms of real purchasing power--the freedom of action
will be reduced, productivity and productive results and the GNP-growth will
deteriorate.
[Question] The ob~ectives for Social Democrats and Moderates (and the other
parties in the Government) seem on the whole to be the same: speed up the
wheels, resources to the industry, better international competitiveness.
- Wtay do you quarrel so damned much?
, [Answer] It is true that the Social Democrats have the same objectives as
we have, but they propose quite opposite solutions that will worsen the
inflation, the budget deficit and the external balance. They want to
increase taxes in order to finance a public sector that already is too big,
add to the budget deficit by expanding expenditures, and they do not want
to limit local goverment expansion which is strongly inflationary.
W~ pay attention to the economic realities--we consider their view of reality
totally wrong. -
I read that they want to get the investments going and to transfer resources
to the productive sector so that we can produce and export more--we shall
work through the crises, not starve ourselves through it. There we agree.
But they suggest ways that will have a.totally opposite effect.
We estima.te (optimistically) a GNP-growth from two to, at most, three per-
cent during the 5 years to come. But that is not enough since it, in itself,
implies an increase in government consumption by only 0.3 percent and in
local government consvmption by 2.8 percent--which together will leave about
0.8 percent for private consumption. Thus, no real rise in incomes. Increases
in consumption by the Gavernment and by local governments must be even more
reduced it we are to find room for rea1, not only nominal, increases in -
~ncomes.
The Swedes have claimed too much as an advance, all figures prove this, and ~
_ now we need a completely different view of reality than the one prevailing ~
during the sixties and the seventies. The adjustment demands courage from ~
politicians and trade union.leaders--not least from those who represent the ~
employees in the public sector. ~
[Question] We are approaching a tougher international economic situation.
Does this mean decline for the industrial countries?
_ ;
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[Answer] The reports I have seen show a poor growth at the end of 1980 but
also a recovery, probably within a couple of years. The world population
grows by about 100 million persons each year. They have to be supporttd, ~
given jobs and energy etc. The LDCs cry for goods to rise their standard
of living. _
GNP in the newly industrialized countries grows faster than in the Old
World. This causes faster turnover also for the traditiona] industrial
countries. This development process should add something also for us, in
somewhat longer persoective.
I see the greatest danger in the international inflationary climate, which
is created by the OPEC-countries' large surpluses of oil money that circulate
in the world economy. At present about 500 billion Swedish crowns.
If I have learned anything in this job, it is how quickly the picture can
change. Sweden's financial position is--apart from the balance problems
I have mentioned--for the moment fairly good. Our exports go well, the
, influx of orders is quite high and unemployment has never been as low as
now. In spite of the fact that--or maybe as a consequence of the fact _
that--our position is so good now, we risk a deeper fall at the end of the
year. Probably, it will not be the smooth transition earlier expected.
[QuestionJ The social contract--the Government package including a price -
freeze, a rent freeze, company profits on blocked accounts, tax relief
measures etc. that you tried to sell to the labor mark.et parties. Price:
a wage freeze. They did not but it:
[Answer] I;im not so sure about that. But first the Confederation of Trade
Unions (LO) shouts at us that the Government has to take steps (at a time
when we already had reduced taxes by 1,500 Swedish crowns for the LO-worker).
After that we released a series of suggestions that--as fiar as we could
judge--ought to gain approval both among employees and in the largest
opposition party.
Following that we are accused of interference--in the wage negotiations.
The expression "social contract" has become poisonous--so let us forget
about it:
We are dealing with substantial economic problems that are the concern of
the whole nation. We n~ed an open attitude between the Government and the
labor market. The wish to politicize in party terms may lead the repre-
sentatives fot the labor market to take steps that they in the interest of
their clients should avoid. Conflicts of loyalty are difficult to handle
when you are standing with one foot in ~ party and the other in a trade -
_ association. The game in politics and the game on the labor market would
be more honest if representatives for the trade unions and enterprises
independently and unassistedly devoted themselves to the long-range interests
of corporations and employees.
48
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By the way, did not the agreement of 1978 come close to a social contract?
The tax rates had been tied to an index, the marginal income taxes redriced.
Starting from this point it was possible to include some kind of index--clauses
in the agreements. The authorities did not promise to keep the inflation
within those specific limits--but I remember how the bare knowledge of these
clauses affected the Swedish economy. All went well the first year--we would
have succeeded also the second year had the new oil-price rises not occurred.
A government should be prepared to do anything in its power to facilitate an
_ agteement--but must take into consideration, all the time, the nation's
economic development in the long run.
[Question] The principle stating that a government should not interfere
when the parties of the labor market are going to negotiate or take up arms?
[Answer] As a principle the territories should be separated, so far both
Palme and Gunnar Nilsson are right. The Gavernment is responsible for
economic policy--the parties on the labor market for the agreements. But
I do not see anything principally wrong in synchronizing. It cannot be
wrong to ask the parties to what extent they axe prepared to cooperate. It
is wrong to accu~e the government of lack of action--but at the same time
refuse to enter into a discussion. Regarding, for instance, where the
measures should be taken to bring about improved real incomes and secure
employment. It is also wrong if the government through its actions interfere
with the real negotiations, without being invited.
[Question] You ask the public employees for restraint. This year they are
the first to come forward with their demands!
_ [Answer) In the year 2000 public employees and the retired will amount to
4 million persons. Ttao million are to support.them. How can the ATP-pension ~
scheme be maintained in such a situation? We need substantial growth in _
the economy--and that, in turn, will not occur if we do not succeed in
accelerating capitai formation and investments, which, in their turns, will
not occur if we are not prepared to slow down the rate of consumption,
especially on the public side. To me this is obvious.
Ttie public sector has grown by about seven pe~-cent in volume annually for
one and a half decades--while GNP has grown by less than half, that is by
2 to 3 percent. Without any action being taken, these two trends will
intersect each other shortly after 1990--the public expenditures will take
all of the national income. This ought to be a warning to anybody who
thinks that we Swedes always can live in the best of worlds.
(Question] Gosta Bohman is the leader of the largest of the nonsocialist
parties--at the same time he is probably the one who has compromised the
most in the name of unity. Almost to the edge of self-destruction?
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[Answer] Palme says that Bohman runs the Government. He says so because it
amuses him and he thinks it irritates the others in the Government. He may
~ well do that--in a way he is helping the Moderates!
A multi-party government has to work as a team--and if I and my coworkers are
not willing to compromise we have no right to expect compromises from others.
In matters of principle I do not compromise! That is why I have got a ~
reputation to carry around: stubborn, difficult, a man that easily flies
into a rage. And it is true, I blow up very easily...but I am not resentful.
And really,. I do not slam doors!
[Question] Do you understand those who fear nuclear power?
[Answer] Fear or the unknown is a protection we human beings have to carry.
Personally I have a strong belief in t'ae future oi technology--I do not
think it will be long before we have 100 percent safe nuclear power plants.
The scourgers march by--now as they did during the Middle Ages. Their
belief was strong...But the world did not come to an end.
Skara, Kristianstad and Jonkoping refused to let the railway pass by. And
the DAGENS NYHETER wrote forcefully against electrifying the railway
Gothenburg-Stockholm in the twenties in the same way as now against nuclear
p ower .
[Question] War and peace. Is the state of the world such as to create a
new boom in armaments--better times ending with the big crash?
[Answer] I was in Washington a little more than a month ago discussing the
economic situation. Nobody believed that rearmament would affect business
activity. Nor do I believe that the recovery will depend on the war industry!
There are always risks. Afghanistan and the unstab~e situation in the Middle
' East are considered more serious cases down in the Continer.t than here at home.
If I thought that a new war was impossible I would be the first to join May .
Wechselmann on the barricades!
COPYRIGHT: Ahlen & Akerlunds tryckerier, Stockholm, 1980
9608
CSO: 3109
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COUNTRY SECTION SWITZERLAND '
_ 'SEAGUARD'NAVAL ANTIMISSILE SYSTEM PRESENTED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 3 May 80 p 43
[Text] The Suisse Contraves Company, at the Hanover Show, presentec~ its
new naval weapons system, the "Seaguard," specially designed for defending
_ ships against anti-ship missiles, including missiles flying at low altitude
(sea-skimmer), n,,~o prototypes of the "Seaguard" are currently being built
by Contraves with the participation of Siemens Albis AG [Incorporated]
(Germany) for the surveillance radar, Plessey Radar Ltd (Great-�Britai.n) for
~he X-band firing radar, and Oerlikon-Buehrle (Switzerland) for the new '
, "Sea-Zenith" cannon combined in the weapons system, This 25-mm quadr uple-
mount cannon can fire special ammunition at a very rapid rate, guaranteeing
- a high destruction probability against missiles. The control of the firing
or optro:~ic radar of the "Seaguard" can be combined with guns or sea-to-air
_ or sea-to-sea missiles. The entire assembly is designed to Qperate in a
powerful environment of electronic countermeasures. According to ContravE~~,
the "Seaguard" can be operational in 1985.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1980
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